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A B S T R A C T

This thesis is an overall attempt to examine man and his environment in Bahrain after the First World War and to define, if possible, his strengths and weaknesses, his failures and successes in meeting the demands of modern civilization.

Bahrain, although not possessing large oil reserves, owes its existence as a modern state to the revenues of oil which it has enjoyed for a longer time than many of her neighbours.

Therefore as a case study it is possible to examine the impacts of wealth, modernisation and education on this island community and the impulse given by these factors to the social changes and political awareness between the First World War and the present day.

In attempting to study the social and political changes in Bahrain we cannot ignore the two decades immediately prior to the oil era, as during these years events occurred which made future changes easier. Items such as the establishment of a modern administration and education and the fact that they were a relatively stable community gave them the opportunity to observe and adopt further Western innovations, and as oil revenues became available, enabled them to build on this base and extend its social services.

The material benefits had their impact on the social existence and political life of the people and naturally enough this produced certain stresses.

These stresses were either of a personal or group nature

or between the community and their changing environments.

This work attempts to examine the development of this community, the problems which arose and the impact they had upon a traditional society.

As the British had, and probably still have, a voice in the affairs of the Gulf, the work also tries to examine the role they played in Bahrain, and their triumphs and failures in shaping the events with the islands.

يشقى بنوها والنعم لغيرهم

• فكانها والحال عين عذاري

المصادر

S O C I A L A N D P O L I T I C A L C H A N G E
I N B A H R A I N
S I N C E T H E F I R S T W O R L D W A R

by

MOHAMMED GHANIM AL-RUMAIHI

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*Thesis submitted for examination for the Degree of Doctor
of Philosophy at Durham University.*

March, 1973.

P R E F A C E

Between the years immediately following the First World War and the present day, Bahrain Society has witnessed many changes. This study has been undertaken to assess, measure and critically examine these changes, especially in the social, economic and political spheres, which represent the central theme of this work.

As to the methods used to compile this work, it was decided to divide it into four major sections dealing with the general background of Bahrain and its people, economic activities and social problems, both old and new, the development of modern education and its impact on the society and the political trends and strife which occurred.

Because the work involved Arabic sources, problems arose in both translation and transliteration of Arabic names and terms. In the former I have attempted to translate as accurately as possible, in the latter I have attempted, as far as possible, to use the Durham University Oriental Section's Transcription System of Arabic, with the exception of the use of serifs. Other departures from this system have been made where common usage of certain words, names and places has established a widely accepted form of spelling, i.e. Bahrain and "Bahrayn".

At times there are only small differences in the Arabic terms for certain singular or plural subjects, i.e. Sunni and Sunna, which have been used as appropriate.

Within the bibliography however the names of authors, titles of books and articles which are in Arabic have been modelled on the Oriental Section system.

The citing of references, especially the documents obtained from the India Office Records, Blackfriars Road, London, and those of the Foreign Office, from the Public Records Office, Chancery Lane, London have been listed in detail in the bibliography. A certain method of reference was used in the footnotes due to the differences in the files.

Those of the India Office were retained in files bearing a title of the general subject matter of the file. Some of the titles however were misleading as they often contained incomplete or irrelevant information.

The Foreign Office files on the other hand bore no titles and items concerning Bahrain were widely scattered throughout the files and were referred to by document numbers only.

Because of this and also the fact that a single despatch, memorandum or letter is sometimes repeated in different files, I chose to refer to the actual document which I was quoting from or referring to whilst studying the India Office files.

When referring to Foreign Office files I quoted the reference number and the title of the document, if any, prefixed by the letters F.O.

During the preparation of this thesis I have consulted with, interviewed and contacted many people who have provided invaluable assistance in my work, in England, Beirut, Kuwait and Bahrain. To these people I extend my deep thanks and gratitude. I would also take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors, Sir John Richmond and Dr. William Hale, who throughout the work gave guidance and advice, and devoted a

great deal of their time to reading and commenting upon this work and making many valuable suggestions.

To those who helped by offering their time in answering my questions, often persistent, or those who took the trouble to write, especially the late Mr. Al-Baker, Sir Bernard Burrows, Mr. C.A. Gault, Mr. A. Al-Shamlan, Mr. S. Al-Dawsari, Shaikh A. Al-Khalifah, Mr. M. Al-Ansari, and others who at their own request wish to remain anonymous, my sincere gratitude.

To the staff and librarians of the India Office Records, Public Records Office, the Middle East Centre of Cambridge, the Middle East Centre of Oxford, who allowed me access to the private papers of Sir Rupert Hay and Major H.R.P. Dickson, The School of Oriental Studies and the Science Library staff of Durham University, my thanks.

My thanks go also to Dr. Lawless of the Middle East Centre of Durham University, who read the text, and to Dr. J. Bharier, of the Economics Dept. of Durham University, who read and commented on the economic part of this work.

Without the generous grant from Kuwait University, this work would probably never have seen the light of day and therefore to those who made it possible I express my gratitude.

I thank also my wife, Ghanimah, who by her tolerance, devotion and understanding, made my work more pleasant and my stay in this country more productive.

I feel that I should mention that the ideas and comments expressed throughout the work are mine and I am solely responsible for them and if anyone feels that any facts or events have been misrepresented, I would be grateful if they would contact me and correct any wrong impressions I may have gained.

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INTRODUCTION

Bahrain is an Arabian Gulf State¹ situated approximately half-way along the western coastline of the Gulf, approximately 18 miles from Qatar and 20 miles from Saudi Arabia. It is a group of islands, eleven in number, which has a total land area of 256 square miles. The three main islands are "Bahrain" itself, the largest island, which gives its name to the group, Muharraq, which lies to the north east of the main island and is linked to it by a causeway, and Sitra which lies off the east coast. The main island is approximately 30 miles long and from 8 to 10 miles wide.² The capital, Manama, is situated on the north east tip of the island of "Bahrain", opposite to its twin city of "Muharraq" across the causeway.

The total population in 1971 was established as being 216,303,³ making it the largest principality in the lower Gulf area. They are spread amongst sixty-five centres of population, most of which are linked by well-surfaced asphalt roads.

About ten percent of the land area is cultivated, almost exclusively in the northern parts of the main island. Crops are in the main dates, alfalfa and some vegetables. Rainfall is scanty, the yearly average being only 75 mm.

Studying the social and political changes in Bahrain would not be complete without studying the economical activities of the population and how these have developed and helped to transform the social and political trends in the islands.

In undertaking this study the writer feels that a general comparison could be drawn between Bahrain and other Gulf principalities as they have a number of factors which are common to all these areas. These are the historical and cultural backgrounds, the governmental methods, namely a hereditary system of feudal aspect, and above all sharing a change in their economic structures, having moved very rapidly in the course of a few years from a society based on agriculture, fishing and pearl-diving to one based on the modern technologies of oil production.⁴ Another common aspect was the treaty relationships which all of these states had with Britain, who made herself responsible for the stability of the area for most of the 19th century and almost three-quarters of the 20th century.⁵

Therefore, the writer feels that in selecting Bahrain as a case study, although it has its peculiarities and differences, it may in general be treated as an example of the development of similar traditional societies in the area, especially in the social and political aspects. Economically the impact has varied owing to the different outputs and reserves of oil of the various states.

This case study of Bahrain deals with the most important period in the modern history of the Amirates, from the period following the First World War up to 1971, the year of British withdrawal from the area and the declaration of independence of the islands.

In this period of fifty years or so the area as a whole, and Bahrain in particular, has witnessed great social and economic

changes which have brought in their wake a certain measure of political change.

At times the writer has referred to events which occurred outside this self-imposed period. This has been done either to clarify certain points referred to or to complete the overall picture of modern events.

One justification for the selection of this particular period for study is that it was immediately after the First World War that a form of modern administration was first introduced and a modern system of education established.

There is, however, a further justification in that despite the importance and the impact of social and economic development with their consequences of increased political awareness, no-one has yet examined and analysed critically and thoroughly this important period.

So many aspects of Bahrain history, especially after the Great War, have not yet been revealed and discussed, and the very brief allusions to Bahrain made by various writers have often been inaccurate and their mistakes have been perpetuated by subsequent writers.⁶ Many books and articles have been written on most parts of the Arab world, dealing in depth with their problems and development, but one curious omission seems to be on the area of the lower Gulf states of which we have selected Bahrain to be a microstudy of the developments in this corner of the Arab world.

During our studies we will repeatedly refer to the four main rulers of Bahrain during this period and to establish them firmly in the readers' mind and to prevent any confusion we will

take the opportunity at this point to name them and to give their periods of rule. They were Shaikh Isa bin Ali, who ruled from 1869 to 1923, Shaikh Hamed bin Isa, ruler from 1923 to 1942, Shaikh Salman bin Hamed, ruler from 1942 to 1961, and the present ruler of Bahrain, Shaikh Isa bin Salman^a, who has ruled from 1961 to the present day.

The study consists of four main parts.

In Part I we will establish briefly the background to the modern history of Bahrain and also discuss the demographic structure, the various social groups and some problems arising from their differences which have influenced the course of events.

Part II examines in detail both traditional and modern industries and their economic and social impacts on the society.

Due to the importance of modern education in initiating social change the writer has devoted Part III of his work to dealing with its development, structure, aims and impact.

Part IV deals in some detail with the political changes and conflicts which occurred during the period under review and attempts to analyse and establish the causes and effects of these events and to chart the progress of the growth and trends of political consciousness within the island group.

The study has its limitations of course. The writer, whilst referring to the development of the administration structure briefly, has not dealt with the details of any departmental structures and has in some cases, such as Health or Housing, has consciously omitted references to them, in spite of the fact

that they do play an important role in the social spheres of the islands. This was done because it was felt that provision of these services was subsidiary to the mainstream of changes in the social patterns, and did not directly influence or initiate the social, economic or political scene.

During the preparation of this study the writer visited Bahrain twice to collect material and interview persons connected with the events referred to. This was in addition to the writer's previous close knowledge of the island and its people. The major sources of information, however, were the Foreign Office and India Office records in London which contained a large amount of information written by British officials about Bahrain and the surrounding areas. Some of the records made available were as recent as 1950. These letters, despatches and memoranda, although they contain valuable first hand information, should not be treated as infallible sources, as minor errors are often found in the minutiae.

The Government of Bahrain official publications, especially the Annual Reports and the Statistical Information, were major references, and in addition a number of previously unpublished reports of the Government and the Bahrain Petroleum Company have been referred to.

Other valuable sources of information were private papers and letters which were made available to the writer. Those of former British officials were consulted as far as possible, depending upon their availability, also the private letters of some Bahrainis who were involved in the various affairs of the island were made available to the writer.

In addition the writer also corresponded with or interviewed persons who took part in the events of the political unrest in the islands which are referred to during the period under review. Some of H.M.G. officials in Bahrain during the 1950's also consented to be interviewed.


A number of bulletins and unpublished studies have been referred to when appropriate.

As the writer has attempted to present a case study, no attempt was made to fit the facts to any preconceived political or social theories which could have been applied. The theoretical approach ^{OF} ~~on~~ the study was derived in the main from the facts as found and corresponded with the events as they occurred. It is hoped that the study will illustrate and pinpoint the events and trends which have occurred and to enable us to attempt to forecast the course of future political and social developments in this part of the world.

FOOTNOTES

1. Most of the European writers refer to this part of the world as the "Persian Gulf". The term "Arabian Gulf", however is increasing in its usage and the writer will use the latter term unless quoting from documents. For justification of this usage see Al Baharan "The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States" - Manchester University Press, 1968 - Introduction.
2. Belgrave, J.H. - "Welcome to Bahrain" - 7th Edition - Bahrain, 1970, p.7. (See also the map pg. 8)
3. Fifth Population Census of Bahrain, Govt. of Bahrain, Sept. 1971 p.5. It should be noted that the figures used from the 1971 Census are provisional figures from which the writer has derived all other figures for 1971. These may be subject to change on completion of the final Census report.
4. The production of oil started in Bahrain in 1934, in Kuwait 1946, Qatar 1949, and Abu Dabi, 1962, Oil has been found recently in other Gulf principalities but not on the same scale as in the above countries, nor has there yet been sufficient time for revenues to make an impact upon the life of these states.
5. For the background to British relationships and treaties in the Gulf, see the major works of Aitchison, C.U. - "A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries", Vol. 2, Govt. of India Delhi 1933. Lorimer, J.G. - "Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia" - Calcutta, Supt. of Govt. Printing, India, Geographical part, 1908, Historical part 1915, reprinted and published in 1970 by Gregg International Publishers Ltd. Kelly, J.B., "Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880" - Oxford Univ. Press 1968, Wilson, Sir Arnold - "The Persian Gulf", 3rd impression London, 1959, and Busch, Briton, C., "Britain and the Persian Gulf 1894-1914" - Univ. of California Press 1967.
6. An example of the perpetuation of mistakes is the misconception that education started in 1919 and also that in that year there was a political upheaval. The writer has in fact been unable to substantiate either of these widely held claims. This is but one example of this type of error.

THE BAHRAIN ISLANDS



PART ONE

BAHRAIN AND ITS PEOPLE

CHAPTER ONE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The modern history of Bahrain may be said to have started with coming of the Utub to the island in 1782.¹ One of the Utub tribes which crossed the sea from their mainland headquarters in Zubara was the Al-Khalifah who have ruled Bahrain since that time.

The common feature of the political scene up to this time in the Gulf had been the balance of power between "city-states"² which rose and fell regularly as one or other tribe gained ascendancy and in this case it appeared the Zubara was such a city-state in its infancy.

A change took place however which struck at the basis of this type of state and which forced the Rulers of Bahrain and elsewhere to halt their expansionist plans and turn to the defensive to maintain their independence. This was done sometimes by actual conflict and sometimes by playing politics, tasks which often proved hard and unpleasant.

The reason for this shift of power on the political scene in the Gulf was the growing strength of a new politico-religious power in the centre of Arabia, namely the Muwahhidin commonly called the Wahhabi.

We have every reason to believe that it was the growth of this new power which drove the Al Khalifah and their allies to invade Bahrain which, besides its appealing wealth, gave the Al Khalifah the chance to defect to an area free from the Wahhabi,

who were at that time - the last quarter of the 18th century - pressing on the eastern region of the Arabian Peninsula. As early as 1762 Abd al-Aziz, the Wahhabi Amir, raided Al Hasa³ which was under the Bani Khalid tribes, with whom Al-Khalifah were allied.

The Wahhabi and Al-Khalifah in Zubara were not by any means on good terms, according to an Al Khalifah historian writing in the first quarter of this century.⁴ Their fear of the Wahhabi proved to be well-founded, for the Wahhabi eventually clashed with the Utub state in Kuwait in 1793 and followed this with an attack on Zubara in 1795. On this occasion the Wahhabi cut off the town on the landward side and forced the Al-Khalifah and the inhabitants of Zubara to abdicate it and flee to Bahrain, where they had by now a strong foothold.⁵

In fact the Wahhabi power which dominated the eastern part of Arabia prevented the Al-Khalifah from building up their state in Zubara to become strong enough to assume the role of a city-state in the Gulf. All the evidence suggests that they would have done so had it not been for the power of the Wahhabi. For instance, within a few years of their settlement in Zubara, the Al-Khalifah had succeeded in making their city a centre of trade in the Gulf,⁶ and the taking^{of} Bahrain, traditionally the first victim of any ambitious city-state, provided further proof of their expansionist aims. However, the pressing power of the Wahhabi obliged the Al-Khalifah to entrench themselves in Bahrain with the object of resisting all future takeover attempts on this their new stronghold which because of its wealth and position was so often

threatened. The threats to Bahrain's independence during its modern history ~~and~~ which were to play an important part in Bahrain's development were three in number. They were the continuation of the traditional tribal conflicts within the Al-Khalifah family and their allies, the continuous foreign attempts at annexation of the island, mainly by the Persians and Turks, and the growth of British power and influence in the Gulf during the 19th century.

a) The Tribal Conflicts

The arrival of Al-Khalifah and their Arab allies in Bahrain, which was a comparatively settled community, created its own problems. It differed very much from the conditions they were accustomed to in the desert, and having been forced to evacuate their headquarters in Zubara it brought an end to their ambitions of expansion. They had to adopt a new way of life very different from the freedoms of the mainland. Their tribal origins prevented them from working on the land as farmers, something which was completely unacceptable to the desert Arab, so they were forced to go into commerce. As Manesty and Jones stated in 1790⁷ "The acquisition of Bahrain has latterly, however, encouraged the Arabs of the tribe of Beneattaba, who inhabit that Island, to purchase vessels proper to perform voyages from thence to India and to employ them in such voyages, they have been thereby enabled to convey Pearl in a direct manner to Surat."

They coped well with their changing pattern of life but one thing they did not manage to change was the constant bickering and

disputes between the various factions within the ruling family, who allied themselves with one or another of their allied tribes, or foreign powers. After the conquest of Bahrain, the Al-Khalifah adopted a system of dual rulership; the father being assisted during his lifetime by two of his sons and on his death the two sons continued with their duties and shared all authority. Sometimes the grandsons were also called upon to perform various functions of the ruler. This system was used frequently in Bahrain until the accession of Shaikh Isa in 1869, starting from the death of Shaikh Ahmed bin Mohammed al Khalifah,⁸ who was known as Al-Fatih, in Manama in 1796.⁹ He was succeeded by his two sons Salman (1769-1825) and Abdulla (1769-1843) who ruled Bahrain jointly.

As soon as Salman died however, Abdulla tried to enforce his desire of being absolute ruler of Bahrain. This provoked a bloody conflict within the ruling family itself. The consequences of Abdulla's attitude did not only influence the political situation in Bahrain, but it also placed a great strain on the people and the economy. Lorimer, quoting Captain Macleod, the British Resident in Bushire, reporting on his visit to Bahrain in 1823 said,

"The authority of the Shaikhs of Bahrain in their own dominions did not appear to be so absolute as might have been expected",

and that it was

"borne with much reluctance by the inhabitants of the Islands."¹⁰

Referring to^{the} state of the economy at this time (1836-38) Lorimer remarks,

"The lot of the Shaikh's (Abdulla) subjects in Bahrain was growing, from day to day, less endurable, and the Islands were being rapidly depopulated by emigration.

The towns were in a state of ruin and decay, and house rents had fallen to one-eighth of what they had been only a few years before.

Six sons of the Shaikh pretended to exercise separate and independent power, and their attention was chiefly devoted to extracting money from merchants and other men of means."¹¹

The deportation of Abdulla in 1843, by his great nephew, Mohammed bin Khalifah bin Salman, did not conclude the affair. Abdulla, and later his sons and grandsons, continued to be a disruptive element in the political stability of Bahrain. The other Arab tribes were changing allegiances, between the sons of Salman and the sons of Abdulla. This was clearly illustrated by the conduct of the Al Bin Ali and Al-Bu Aynain tribes who at first aided Mohammed in the task of ridding Bahrain of his great-uncle, Abdulla, in 1843. However, no sooner had this ^{been} achieved than they allied themselves to Abdulla, and later ^{to} his sons, against their old allies.¹²

As the struggle between the rival factions of the Al-Khalifah family became more bitter, the more rapidly did Bahrain lose its political independence, and the more the people of Bahrain suffered.

The conflict came to its climax in 1869, when the two branches fell to war again, everyone with his allies. A battle took place in Muharraq between the two. The British Authority by this time judged the situation intolerable and decided that this was an opportune moment to intervene; they deported the two rivals. Mohammed bin Abdulla and Mohammed bin Khalifah, and put in office

Sheikh Isa bin Ali, a great nephew of Mohammed bin Khalifah, who was only 21 years of age.¹³ Shaikh Isa went on to rule Bahrain for a total of 54 years until he was forced to abdicate in 1923 when power passed to his son, Hamed.¹⁴ With the coming to power of Isa and the deportation of his rivals there was a general improvement in the internal relationships within the family but the tribal conflicts continued to arise from time to time, due usually to the activities of the sons and grandsons of the exiled Shaikh Mohammed bin Abdulla and their adherents, in an attempt to unsettle the rule in Bahrain.

b) Foreign Attempts at Annexation

The second factor which affected the political situation throughout the 19th century and up to World War I was the continued attempts at annexation by other powers, both Arab and foreign. The Arab powers were the Wahhabi and Omanis and the foreign power was Persia. The Arab attempts were generally short term in effect and did not influence the shaping of Bahrain's political affairs to any great extent, but the continued claims of the Persians to sovereignty over Bahrain, whilst it did not directly affect the internal politics of the islands, often proved to be an embarrassment to the conduct of Bahrain's foreign affairs

The Omanis attempted to take the island on three occasions, 1800, 1816 and 1828¹⁵ but only succeeded in one of these attempts. When the Omanis conquered Bahrain in 1800 the Al-Khalifah allied themselves with the Wahhabi and succeeded in expelling the invaders in 1802. The Wahhabi, however, took advantage of the

situation to extend their dominion and establish a foothold in Bahrain, a situation which lasted until 1811 when the Al-Khalifah saw the opportunity to rid themselves of the Wahhabi. The first Egyptian expedition into Arabia, under Tusun Bey,¹⁶ was attacking the Wahhabi on the mainland thus weakening their hold on the island. The Al-Khalifah took their opportunity, allied themselves with their old enemies, the Omanis, and expelled the Wahhabi garrison from the island and imprisoned the governor.¹⁷ This move was typical of Al-Khalifah policy, maintaining their own rule by playing off one force against another when confronted by threats of takeover in Bahrain.

In 1816, when the Al-Khalifah were again faced by another Omani invasion,¹⁸ they and their allies assembled a formidable local force in the islands which was remarked upon by Capt. William Bruce on his first visit to the island "..... as he (the Shaikh of Bahrain) was fully prepared to receive His Highness (the ruler of Oman) with any force he could bring; that he had 7,000 men at present under arms."¹⁹

These attempted takeovers by the Omanis came to an end in 1829, when a peace treaty was signed between the two parties after long talks and mediation by the Shaikh of Bushire.

The role of the Wahhabi, after their expulsion from Bahrain in 1811, was generally confined to backing the claims of Abdulla's sons and grandsons, or instigating unrest in Bahrain by causing the tribes to make trouble and thus disrupt the administration of the islands. This may have been a desire to revenge themselves on the Al-Khalifah or more likely in order to obtain the Zakat, or tribute, which they claimed should be paid to them by the

Shaikh of Bahrain. This situation reoccurred on occasions until the Turkish occupation of the Hasa in 1871.²⁰

The threat from Persia however, was the most consistent and long-lasting and, as it was argued internationally, the most serious, even though the claim was never backed by military force. Although the Persian claim had a great effect on the foreign policy of Bahrain it had very little direct effect on internal politics and despite the long standing of their claim there was no serious friction between the inhabitants of Bahrain (Sunna and Shia) and the sizeable number of Persian residents on the island.

The Persians claimed that Bahrain had been part of her territory since 1602,²¹ and that Bahrain was ceded to the Al-Khalifah only on condition that they paid a tribute to the Shah of Persia.²²

Events occurred in the 19th century which made their claim more and more persistent. The first was the negotiations by Capt. Bruce leading to the so-called "Treaty of Shiraz", and the second was the writing of letters by Mohammed bin Khalifa to the Shah of Persia and the Governor of Fars which the Persians claimed, admitted their right to sovereignty over Bahrain.

Whilst the terms of the treaty in relation to Bahrain were quite specific, the treaty was never ratified by either Britain²³ or Persia and thus it was argued that it had no legal standing. The most probable reason for the British condemnation of the Treaty was the fact that Bruce had agreed to supply ships to the Governor of Fars, should he ask for them. For his part in the affair Bruce was dismissed from his post and ordered to return

to India.

Despite the rejection of the Treaty by the two authorities at the time of signing, the Persians later often quoted this agreement as proof of British recognition of Persia's claim to Bahrain.

The affair of the letters took place in 1860, when on the 9th and 11th April, Mohammed bin Khalifa wrote two letters to the Governor of Fars and the Shah of Persia respectively,²⁴ in which Mohammed acknowledged that Bahrain and its inhabitants were "always under the protection of Persia", and agreed to pay tribute to the Persians.

This move by Mohammed was interpreted by Persian historians as indisputable evidence in support of their claim and so it appears to be on the surface, until one considers Mohammed's motives and the circumstances surrounding the events which took place.

At the time the letters were written the Wahhabis were once again threatening the security of the Al-Khalifah in Bahrain by promoting the interests of the exiled claimants to Bahrain, the relatives of Abdulla, and Mohammed was following the usual Al-Khalifah policy of playing off one power against another in order to gain security for himself. As is proved, Mohammed did not hesitate to pay tribute to anyone if he believed this would give him the upper hand against his enemies. At various times Al-Khalifah paid tribute to the Wahhabi, Egyptians and Muscat. In fact Mohammed had written not only to the Persians but to the Turks also offering them the same terms, tribute in return for

protection. The Persians had been the first to reply to his letter and Mohammed made his alleged submission to them, but this however was very short-lived for no sooner had he allied himself to the Persians than the Turks replied, offering him more favourable terms, so he immediately declared himself a subject of Turkey and agreed to pay tribute to the Pasha of Baghdad.²⁵

Thus it is clear that Mohammed was not at that time admitting to an historical submission by Bahrain to Persia, but merely searching for the power who would give him the most favourable terms for protection.²⁶

However the Persian claims to Bahrain continued to arise from time to time but usually only on those occasions when an opportunity presented itself, such as, whenever Bahrain concluded any treaties with other powers or at other times in order to distract attention from internal pressures which were occurring in Persia itself, or occasionally when there was an upheaval in the internal politics of Bahrain.²⁷

The Persians never at any time backed their claims by military action and apart from minor protests by Persia on a few occasions, the only major protest during the years from the 1860's until 1927 was one which was made on 19th November 1868 when a military operation was carried out by the British against Bahrain by the British Resident in the Gulf, Lt. Col. Lewis Pelly.

The protest in 1927 took the form of a note which was handed to the British Government on 22nd November 1927, protesting about article 6 of the Jiddah Treaty which had been signed in May 1927 by Britain and Saudi Arabia, in which the latter undertook

to maintain peaceful relations with Kuwait and Bahrain.²⁸ A copy of this protest was sent to the Secretary General of the League of Nations,²⁹ but no action was ever taken upon it.

In answer to this protest the Bahrain Government introduced a regulation demanding a visa from all Persian subjects visiting Bahrain, a requirement which was never before necessary.³⁰

Another protest from Persia was received by the British Government on 23rd June 1930 after the granting of oil concessions in Bahrain. This was followed by another to the American Department of State. Both protests were rejected by the authorities concerned,³¹ but this did not diminish the claim of the Persians. Support for Bahrain however was forthcoming from other countries, and on 11th December 1954, the Arab League, meeting in Cairo, passed a resolution declaring that Bahrain was an Arab country,³² not Persian. This was reaffirmed by the League on 13th November, 1957 after they heard rumours of Persia's next move in the affair.

These rumours proved to be true when, in 1958, the Anglo-
over Bahrain
Iranian controversy/reached its climax with a declaration by the Iranian Government that Bahrain was considered to be the fourteenth province of Iran and that as such Bahrain would be entitled to two seats in the Iranian Parliament.³³ In addition to this, Iran refused to recognise passports issued by the Bahrain authorities, and instead, insisted on providing Bahraini visitors to Iran with Iranian travel permits, but only after they had signed a declaration to the effect that they were of Iranian nationality.³⁴

However the possibility of a settlement of the affair occurred when the political situation in the Gulf was changed by the British announcement on 17th January 1968 of their intention to

withdraw their troops from the area by the end of 1971. After bitter negotiations, which were contributed to not only by the local powers concerned, but also by international powers including the U.S.A. and Great Britain, Iran finally agreed in 1970 to accept the setting up of an independent one-man commission, to be appointed by the United Nations, and to abide by the commission's findings. With the consent of all the parties concerned the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Winspeare Guiccardi as his special representative with the terms of reference that he should ascertain the wishes of the people of Bahrain with respect to the future status of the island. In April 1970 he visited the island and consulted with a large number of public personalities, who represented all points of view. In his report, which was submitted to the U.N. in late April and formally endorsed by the Security Council on 11th May 1970, he stated "The majority of the Bahrain people favoured recognition by these states as independent and free to maintain her own relationships with other states".³⁵

Between 19th and 24th December, Shaikh Isa, the Ruler of Bahrain, paid the first official visit to Teheran, capital of Iran, thus starting a new era of relationships between the two states.

Although the Iranian Press welcomed the visit, no official communique was issued, perhaps implying that Iran is reserving her position for future moves.

What must be emphasized however, is that, contrary to the claims of Iranian writers,³⁶ the claim of sovereignty over Bahrain never at any time had any significant effect on the internal politics of the island but that the people of Bahrain shaped events in the island by their own efforts.³⁷

A comment by a British writer with regard to this is worth quoting, he said "However, the recent political upheaval in Bahrain was not due by any means to Iran, the very mention of whose name the Arabs hate to hear in connection with their Gulf."³⁸ The foreign powers who did exercise some influence over the course of events in the Gulf were the British and the Turks. Of the two, the British undoubtedly had the greater effect so it naturally follows that we must consider the role that they played.

c) The Growth of British Influence

It has been suggested that the direct political involvement of the British in the Arabian Gulf did not take place until the late years of the 18th century although they had been long-established as a commercial power in the area. The reason for their involvement was the Anglo-French rivalry for supremacy in the eastern waters,³⁹ and to keep the waterways of the Gulf open as their shortest route to British India especially after the occupation of Egypt by Napoleon Bonaparte in the summer of 1798.⁴⁰ In that year the British induced the Imam of Muscat to enter into an agreement allying himself with them, denying any foothold or commercial advantage to either the French or Dutch.⁴¹

This engagement marked the first political relationship by Britain with one of the Arab Gulf States. However by the end of the first decade of the 19th century the French were no longer a real threat to the British, their power having been destroyed in Europe, but the commercial interests were threatened in the area by the piracy of the Jawasim, operating from their base on Oman al-Sir, now known as the United Arab Emirates⁴², backed by the Wahhabi.

Their excesses led to the mobilisation of British Naval forces in the area to put down the pirates and safeguard the trade routes of the Gulf. These punitive expeditions against the Jawasim took place during the winters of 1805-6, 1809-10 and 1819-20.⁴³ The first two expeditions met with only limited success but the third resulted in the General Treaty of 1820.⁴⁴

This Treaty resulted in the first British acceptance of responsibility in Gulf affairs and involved keeping the peace in the Gulf, preventing piracy and campaigning against the slave trade.

As time passed the British became more deeply involved due to the growth of their commercial interests in the area and the constant reoccurrence of tribal conflicts and piracy. Eventually, having settled the affairs of the region, a stability of commerce was established; but this stability attracted the attention of other powers to the region with a view to ~~expanding~~ ^{expanding} their own commerce.⁴⁵ The British however, having put in all the work in the Gulf, did not look kindly on any other power reaping the benefits of their efforts; such as was attempted by the French, Germans and to some extent, the Russians around the end of the 19th century. This policy was made clear by Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, who visited the Gulf and on 2nd Nov. 1903 delivered a speech to tribal chiefs assembled at Sharjah in which he outlined British policy in the Gulf as follows "Sometimes I think that the record of the past is in danger of being forgotten, and there are persons who ask why Great Britain continues to exercise these powers. The history of your states and of your families, and the present condition of the Gulf are the answer. We were here before any other power in modern times had shown its face in these waters

..... It was our commerce as well as your security that was threatened and called for protection The peace of these waters must still be maintained, and the influence of the British Government must remain supreme."⁴⁶

The interests and influence to which Lord Curzon referred grew gradually stronger as the communications improved and as Britain used the Gulf for the furtherance of its military aims during the First World War, when Bahrain was used as a base for the Mesopotamian expedition. To this should be added the prospects of the discovery of oil in the Gulf State after the discovery of oil in Iran in 1908.

In 1930, Capt. P. Parry, writing about the Gulf, summarised the aims of British policy in four points:-

- a) Enforcement generally of the Trucial treaties, which includes suppression of the arms traffic and the slave trade.
- b) Protection of the British interests, and those of British subjects in the Gulf.
- c) Protection of our oil supply from Persia.
- d) Questions dealing with the air route to India.⁴⁷

Although, as can be seen, the British had well-defined aims in the Gulf as a whole, the attitude to individual states tended to vary. Initially their attitude to Bahrain itself was not always clearly defined probably because Bahrain, during the early 19th century was not directly involved in the piracy of the Trucial States and the climate was not considered as suitable for prolonged residence by Europeans.

The first recorded contact between a British official and a

ruler of Bahrain was in 1816 when Capt. W. Bruce, British Resident in Bushire paid a visit to the island when it was rumoured that the British were about to aid the Imam of Muscat to invade Bahrain. Bruce allayed these fears and drew up an agreement, the text of which was not recorded, with the Shaikh. It was most probably a treaty of friendship.⁴⁸ Bruce spoke well of this visit and he remarked "That from the account of Bahrain the Government would be able to appreciate the necessity of keeping on terms of friendship with its inhabitants when such an extensive mart for commerce and speculation was held out and when the balance of trade was so much in our favour."⁴⁹

Despite the Treaty drawn up by Bruce with the Shaikhs of Bahrain, the question of the status of the island was apparently not agreed upon by the authorities of British India. During the preparations for the third British expedition against the Jawasim, late in 1819, the question was raised as to whether to count the Al-Khalifah as allied with the Jawasim pirates and whether to subject the two, after the expedition, to the Imam of Muscat,⁵⁰ or to allow Al-Khalifah in Bahrain to remain independent so long as they abstained from piracy.⁵¹

This question was still not resolved when the expedition's commander, Major-General Sir William Grant Kier, sailed from India towards the Gulf in October 1819.

When the expedition was completed, a representative of the Shaikhs of Bahrain signed the General Treaty which Kier had concluded with the tribal chiefs of the Jawasim, on 5th Feb. 1820 at Sharjah. This was later formally endorsed by the Shaikhs of Bahrain on the 23rd Feb. 1820.

Although Kier allowed a representative of the Shaikhs to sign the General Treaty, this was apparently on his personal initiative. The confusion can be seen from the fact that when the Imam of Muscat expressed a desire to invade Bahrain, Kier was unable to give a clear answer and told the Imam that he was an independent ruler and could do as he pleased.⁵² In the meantime Kier encouraged the representative of Bahrain to come to terms with the Imam. Terms were arranged whereby the Imam of Muscat agreed not to countenance an invasion of the island subject to the payment of an annual tribute of M.T. \$30,000 by Bahrain.⁵³

Further evidence of the uncertainty of British policy towards Bahrain can be seen from the attitude of John Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, with regard to Bruce's conduct in concluding the so-called "Treaty of Shiraz", mention of which has been made earlier. Elphinstone observed that the Persian claim "of which there is not a shadow of proof prejudiced both the independence of the Al-Khalifah and the claims of the Bombay Government's ally, the ruler of Muscat, to the island."⁵⁴

Although Elphinstone, along with the British Authorities, renounced the treaty, he still did not appear to appreciate the status of Bahrain, on the one hand mentioning the independence of the Al-Khalifah and on the other recognising the claim of the Imam of Muscat to the island.

Between the years 1838-40, the second Egyptian expedition against the Wahhabi occupied the Hasa. The Wahhabi Governor fled to Bahrain and the Egyptians demanded not only his return but also the payment of tribute which had previously been made

by the Shaikhs to the Wahhabi and one of the Shaikh's sons to be present at the Egyptian camp, presumably as a hostage.

When the Shaikh sought the advice and help of the British in Bushire he was given only an indefinite answer, although the British were well aware of the Egyptian influence over the Arab chiefs of the mainland and the consequences of their taking Bahrain. This absence of an immediate decisive policy towards Bahrain left Shaikh Abdulla bin Ahmed with apparently no alternative but to yield to the Egyptian demands and in May 1839 he agreed to recognise the Egyptian suzerainty over Bahrain and to pay a tribute of M.T. \$3,000.⁵⁵

The presence of the Egyptians on the east coast of Arabia, and the threat they posed, made the British consider the occupation of Bahrain by a British force. This idea was later abandoned on the grounds that the climate of Bahrain was unhealthy for Europeans.⁵⁶

The show of force by the British and the sudden withdrawal of the Egyptians from Arabia as a whole in 1840 brought relief to the situation although the authorities in India probably viewed the Shaikh's submission to the Egyptians as an unlawful act and were passively in favour of the Imam of Muscat's proposed invasion of the island.⁵⁷ When he demanded military aid in his venture, however, the British made it clear that they did not wish to be directly involved and so, due to lack of support the Omanis abandoned the scheme,⁵⁸ but afterwards the British seemed to adopt a more precise policy with regard to Bahrain.

Proof of this more positive attitude was provided in 1842 when the British Government in India heard a rumour that the

Persians were preparing to invade Bahrain and consequently issued instructions to the Resident in Bushire

"in the event of the Persian Government sending out any force of armed vessels, or vessels carrying armed men, such vessels should be watched and any actual attempt to possess themselves of territory belonging to Arab chiefs in friendly alliance with the British Government should first be remonstrated against and then, if persevered in, resisted."⁵⁹

The growing conflicts between the two factions of the Al-Khalifah family and the growing dislike of the people for Abdulla due to his misgovernment enabled Mohammed bin Khalifah, the great-nephew of Abdulla, to expel the latter from Bahrain in 1843 with the connivance of the Bombay Government, when Captain Hennel, the British Resident gave permission for the allies of Mohammed bin Khalifah to cross the Gulf from Qais Island to the eastern side of the Gulf with a view to making war on Abdulla.⁶⁰ The British attitude in this affair may have been influenced by Shaikh Abdulla's submission to the Egyptians in 1839, and the hope that Mohammed might prove more co-operative.

At first it appeared that this hope may have been justified but stability still did not come to Bahrain. The ex-Shaikh, Abdulla, was wandering throughout the Gulf seeking help from any power which he assumed would be prepared to help him and eventually he arrived in Muscat where he attempted to persuade the Imam to take up his cause.

This turn of events alarmed Mohammed and drove him to approach the British Government with an offer of the Sovereignty

of Bahrain.⁶¹ On the 9th February, 1849 he wrote to the British Resident in Bushire Col. S. Hennell, as follows:

"I beg to inform you I perceived that all the countries in this quarter are dependent on one or other of the Sultans, as, for example, the coast of Fars is dependent upon the Persians, and likewise the people of Kuwait and the Wahhabi territories, etc. are dependent on Turkey. And I, as I have at heart, am dependent upon the Exalted British Government, and subject to it, and I am certain that you will not consent to injury accruing to the dependencies of the Sirkar. Accordingly, my request of you is, if you now approve of what I have at heart and I am bent upon, that you will cause the return to me of those who have seceded from my territories to the advantage of the country and its inhabitants. Otherwise, if you account me dependent upon others, be pleased to acquaint me with whatever is conformable to the policy of the British Government."⁶²

This offer was turned down by the British presumably on the grounds that ^{it} would involve them with the mainland Arabs on whom Mohammed wished to wage war to remove the threat to his own position.

This threat was removed by the death of Abdulla in Muscat in 1849, but was soon replaced by an even greater threat from the Wahhabi, who were backing the claims of Abdulla's sons to the rulership of Bahrain. This pressure grew throughout the 1850's and culminated in Mohammed's correspondence with the Persians and Turkis in 1860, which has been previously referred to.⁶³

Mohammed's conduct in this affair raised the question of the status of Bahrain again. The Bombay Government in referring

the matter to Her Majesty's Government, recommended that the most suitable answer was that Bahrain should be regarded as subject to neither the Persians nor the Turks. This view was approved by H.M.G. in Feb. 1861.⁶⁴

This approval represented the first recognition of Bahrain as an independent state under their Al-Khalifah rulers and this new status was first made public when Mohammed on 31st May 1861 signed a Perpetual Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Britain as "independent ruler of Bahrain". In this Treaty Mohammed undertook to recognise as valid all existing treaties between Bahrain and the British Government i.e. The General Treaty of 1820 and the Slave Treaties of 1847 and 1856, and moreover to abstain from all maritime aggression of every description and in return he was to receive the support of the British Government against any aggression directed against his possessions by the chiefs and tribes of the Gulf.⁶⁵

In 1867 a conflict arose between Mohammed and the tribes of his dependencies in Qatar which the British viewed as a violation of the Treaty of 1861. The British Resident, Col. Lewis Pelly, arrived at Bahrain with a fleet on 6th Sept. 1868 and bombarded Mohammed's headquarters at the Fort of Arad and forced Mohammed to flee to the mainland. The Resident declared Ali bin Khalifah, Mohammed's brother, as the new ruler of Bahrain.

This step by the British indicated that they were prepared to play an active role in Bahrain politics. However Mohammed did not give up easily and allied himself with his old enemy, Mohammed bin Abdulla, and attacked Bahrain in 1869, killing Ali during the action. The British immediately intervened again, deported the two

Mohammeds to India and declared Isa, son of Ali and great-nephew of Mohammed bin Khalifah, ruler of Bahrain.

The occupation of Hasa by the Turks in 1871, presented a growing threat to the security of Bahrain by their obvious expansionist aims,⁶⁶ and so, on the 22nd Dec. 1880, the British Resident, Lt. Col. E.C. Ross, concluded an agreement with Shaikh Isa, consisting of one article only, in which the Shaikh undertook

"as a chief of Bahrain, to bind himself and his successors to abstain from entering into negotiations or making treaties of any sort with any state or Government, other than the British without the consent of the said British Government, and to refuse permission to any other Government than the British to establish diplomatic or consular agencies or coaling depots in our territory, unless with the consent of the British Government."⁶⁷

Although this treaty did not deprive the Shaikh of Bahrain of his right to "the customary friendly correspondence with local authorities of neighbouring states on business of minor importance", it presumably deprived him of his "freedom of action" as an independant ruler.

In 1892, the British Resident, Col. A.C. Talbot, apparently considered that the agreement of 1880 was not conclusive enough, so on 13th March 1892 he made a fresh agreement. The first two articles were on much the same lines as the previous agreement, but the third and final article read as follows:-

"3rd - That I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, any part of my territory save to the British Government."⁶⁸

By the turn of the century the British interests had grown even more in Bahrain; they tried to put pressure on Isa⁶⁹ to adopt

what they evidently considered were necessary, reforms to the administration of the Customs, or, to accept a British adviser. The British intention was to put the administration on a more "secure footing";⁷⁰ but Isa resisted these reforms most strongly.

A new development in the British policy came when they replaced the Native Agent of the British Government in India with a European Officer.⁷¹ J.C. Gaskin arrived in Bahrain in 1900 as an Assistant Political Agent and an official residence was built in Manama during 1901-2.⁷²

Four years later, in 1904, Gaskin was succeeded by Capt. F.B. Prideaux who was invested with the local rank of Political Agent and was later charged with the jurisdiction over all foreigners, instead of over British subjects only as previously had been the case, although their prime aim was to maintain the British interests.

The role played by the various Political Agents in Bahrain varied according to the personalities, principles and initiative of the Agents who held office, although a description of their methods of work is mentioned by one of the Political Residents as follows:

"The close personal contact maintained between the Political Agents and the Rulers is an outstanding feature of the British position in the Persian Gulf. They meet each other frequently and more often socially than for official talks. Possibly the social meetings are more important than the official ones, as a hint dropped here and there in the course of casual conversation is often more effective than formal advice."⁷³

In 1913 the British proclaimed the "Bahrain Order in Council"⁷⁴ the intention of which was to apply to Bahrain the civil and criminal laws of British India.

This was suspended due to the outbreak of the First World War and when it was subsequently enforced after the War it provoked a major political upheaval in the Islands.⁷⁵

A further development took place in 1914, this time with regard to the possibility of the discovery of oil, which had recently been discovered elsewhere in the Gulf. On this occasion, the 14th May 1914, Shaikh Isa undertook to A.P. Trevor, the British Resident in the Gulf, "not to embark on the exploitation of the oil in his country himself, nor to entertain overtures from any quarter regarding that, without consulting the Political Agent in Bahrain and without the approval of the High Government."⁷⁶

In 1913 and 1915 the British concluded treaties with the Turks and Ibn Saud respectively. The Turks agreed that "the Ottoman Imperial Government renounces all its claims to the island of Bahrain etc."⁷⁷ and Ibn Saud in 1915 undertook in Article 6 of the Treaty of 26th December that "Bin Saud undertakes, as his father did before him, to refrain from all aggressions or interference with the territories of Kuwait, Bahrain etc."⁷⁸

As can be seen from these notes, Britain had gradually increased her interest in the Gulf as a whole, and in Bahrain in particular, until Bahrain became the focal point of her intentions in the Gulf. Thus with this growing influence and control of Bahrain, the British, especially after the First World War were in a position to play an active part in the internal affairs of the island.

FOOTNOTES

1. For the rise and development of the Utub States in the Gulf see Abu Hakima, Ahmed Mustafa, "History of Eastern Arabia 1750-1800", Beirut 1965, also same author, "Tarikh al Kuwait" Part I, Kuwait 1967, Part II 1970.
2. An interesting analysis of the city states is presented by Landon, Robt. Geran, "Oman since 1856", Princeton Univ. Press. 1967.
3. Abu Hakima "History of Eastern Arabia" op.cit., p.64.
4. Al-Nabhani, Mohamed bin Khalifah, "Tarikh al Bahrain", Cairo, 1923, he stated that Shaikh Khalifah bin Mohammed, the Shaikh of Zubara disliked the Wahhabis.
5. Abu Hakima op.cit., pp. 159-160.
6. See "Report on the trade of Arabia and Persia by Samuel Manesty and Hardford Jones 1790, cited by Abu Hakima, Tarikh al Kuwait, Vol. II, Kuwait, 1970, p.21. "The Government of Zubara (sic) does not collect duties of any kind on mercantile articles."
7. Ibid p.23.
8. Al-Khalifah sources state that he is Ahmed bin Mohamed, "see Al-Rihani Amen, 'Mulok al Arab' Vol. II, third edition, Beirut, 1951, p.241, and al-Nabhani op.cit. p.126, despite that Abu Hakima, History of Eastern op.cit., p.115, said that it was Ahmed bin Khalifa, and in his Arabic edition of Tarikh al Kuwait, op.cit. p.195 he returned to say that he is Ahmed bin Mohammed.
9. Abu Hakima, History op.cit., p.117
10. Lorimer, Gazeteer of the Persian Gulf, "Oman and Central Arabia", History, Part IB. p.850.
11. Lorimer, op.cit., p.858
12. Kelly, J.B. Britain and the Persian Gulf 1795-1880, Oxford, 1968, p.383.
13. Lorimer, op.cit., p.898
14. Rihani, A., op.cit., p.259.
15. Lorimer, op.cit., pp.841, 843 and 852, see also Kelly op.cit., pp. 103, 146 and 222.
16. "Ardh Al Mamlakh Al Arabiah Al Saudieh" edited by Azam, Abdulwahab, Saudi Arabia 1955, p.133 (Arabic). Hereafter cited "Ardh".

17. Kelly, Op.Cit., p.126. The name of the Wahhabi governor of Bahrain at that time was Abdullah ibn Ufasan not Ibrahim bin Ufaisan as stated by Rihani, op.cit. p.242.
18. At this time Sa'id bin Sultan (1807-56).
19. Historical Sketch of the Utoobee Tribe of Arabs (Bahrain) from the year 1716 to the year 1817 by Mr. Francis Warden, with continuation from 1817-32 by S. Hennel, from 1832-44 by A.B. Kemball and from 1844-53 by H.F. Disbrowe, reproduced by Abu Hakima - "History of Kuwait" Vol. II, Kuwait 1970 p.158. Hereafter cited as "Historical Sketch".
20. Ardh, op.cit., p.235
21. Littlefield, Richard E. "Bahrain as a Persian Gulf State" M.A. Thesis, A.U.B. Beirut, 1964, p.117.
22. Adamiyat Fereydown, " 'Bahrain Islands' - A legal and diplomatic study of the British-Iranian controversy", New York, 1955, p.34.
See also Farouhy, Abbas. The Bahrain Islands, New York 1951, pp.70-71.
23. Lorimer, op.cit., pp. 849-850.
Kelly, op.cit., p.188.
24. Adamiyat, F. op.cit., Appendix II, A & B, pp. 255-258, see also p.156. but Lorimer op.cit. p.887 quotes 1859.
25. Kelly, op.cit. p. 516.
26. Lorimer, op.cit., p.888.
27. For the Persian claim to Bahrain see;
A. Khadduri, M. "Iran's Claim to the Sovereignty of Bahrain" - American Journal of International Law, Vol. XLV No. 4 (Oct. 1951).
B. Kelly, J.B. "The Persian Claim to Bahrain", International Affairs Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (Jan. 1957).
See also Al Baharna op.cit. pp. 167-195.
28. For the text see J.C. Hurewitz, "Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East" Vol. II, New York, 1956, p.149.
29. Adamiyat, op.cit. p.149.
30. The Govt. of Bahrain also passed further laws in Feb. 1929 which stated that all persons born in Bahrain of foreign parents would be considered as Bahrainis unless they registered as aliens with the Political Agent. See Govt. of Bahrain Proclamation No. 180/ 1929 date 27th Feb. 1929.

31. Adamiyat, op.cit., pp. 198-199.
32. Nofal, Sayed, Dr. "Al-Khalij Al-Arabi" Beirut, 1969, p.113.
33. This was the second such declaration, the first being in 1923 which we will refer to later. The seats in the Iranian Parliament were never filled by elected members.
34. Nofal, op.cit. p.126.
35. Huna Al-Bahrain - Issue No. 227, December 1970. We have to bear in mind that the Iranian acceptance of this resolution is probably due to the fact that Iran, at this delicate stage of Arabian Gulf politics, did not want to press her claim further. This claim, after being pressed all these years, must still carry some weight with the "man in the street" in Iran. It must therefore be obvious to Bahrain that it should find some sort of direct relationship with one of the neighbouring Arab states such as Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia or another Gulf State in order to secure here future political status.
36. Adamiyat, F. op.cit., p.190.
37. See Part IV.
38. Bridle, Stanley - The Daily Telegraph, 19th Nov., 1959.
39. Standish, J.F. "British Maritime Policy in the Persian Gulf", Middle East Studies, July, 1967, pp. 325.
40. Kelly, J.B. "The Legal and Historical Basis of the British Position in the Persian Gulf", in St. Anthony's Papers No. 4. M.E. Affairs, No. 1 London, 1958, pp. 120-121.
41. Standish, op.cit., p.325. For the text of the agreement see Hurewitz, Vol. 1., op.cit., p.64.
42. Formerly the Trucial States.
43. An account for these expeditions see: Hawley, Donald, The Trucial States, London, 1970, pp. 98-117.
44. For the text of the Treaty see, Hurewitz, Vol. 1. op.cit., pp. 88-90.
45. See e.g. Curzon's analysis of British policy and interests in Persia and Persian Gulf, 21st Sept. 1899, in which he stated "During our recent negotiations with the Sheikh of Kuwait about the future of the harbour, it was with some surprise that we learned from him that French had already approached him on the subject In Bahrain a French merchant attempted to revive the traffic in arms." Hurewitz, Vol. 1. op.cit., p.232.

46. Cited by Adamiyat, op.cit. p. 188.
47. Parry, P., "The Navy in the Persian Gulf", Journal of the Royal United Service Institute, London, 1930, pp. 314-331.
48. Warden, Historical Sketch, op.cit., p.168.
49. Ibid.
50. Kelly, 'Britain and the Persian Gulf' op.cit., p.141.
51. Ibid, p.142.
52. Kelly, op.cit., p.163.
53. Ibid, p.165.
54. Ibid, p.190. Lorimer, op.cit., p.850.
55. Kelly, J.B. "Mehemet Ali's Expedition to the Persian Gulf 1837-1840". Part 1, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. I July, 1965, p.374.
56. Kelly, J.B. "Mehemets Ali's expedition", Part II., M.E. Studies, Vol. II, Oct. 1965, p.52.
57. Ibid, p.55.
58. Ibid, p.56.
59. Bombay Secret Proceedings Vol. 192, Consuln., 38 of 7th Sept. 1842, letter 2740, T.H. Haddock, (Secy. with Gov. - Gen.) to Reid, 13th Aug. 1842, (No. 679 Sec. Dept.) cited by Kelly 'Britain and the Persian Gulf' op.cit., p.382.
60. Ibid., p.381. This was a contradiction of previous British policy which from 1835 had forbidden the tribes to cross the Gulf on raiding expeditions.
61. Lorimer, op.cit., p.882.
62. Enclos. to Bombay Sec. letters, Vol. 99, Enclos. to Sec. letter 57 of 21st May 1849, Muhammad ibn Khalifah to Hennel, 15 Rabii, 1265 (9th Feb. 1849), enclosed in Hennell to Malet, 28th Feb. 1849. (No. 66 Sec. Dept.) Cited by Kelly, op.cit., p.385.
63. Lorimer, op.cit., p.888. Although Lorimer said this took place in 1859, Adamiyat quoting the actual letter states 1860. This difference is most probably due to the fact that Mohammed was thinking to ally himself with one or other power earlier than 1860.
64. Ibid, p.888.

65. Great Britain Foreign and State paper, Vol. 56, (1864-65) pp. 1402-3.
66. Ardh, op.cit., p.244.
67. Hurewitz, Vol. 1., op.cit., p.194.
68. Ibid, p.209, see also Al Baharna, op.cit., p.34. An Arab historian, "Al-Rihani, op.cit., p.263-4, said that the terms of this agreement were forced on Isa, when he asked the British to defend Bahrain from a growing threat in Qatar, but these events did not take place until 1895. Lorimer, op.cit., p.923.
69. i.e. The British authorities withheld recognition of his eldest living son Hamed, as heir apparent for three years (1898-1901) in an attempt to enforce Isa's agreement with the reform," Lorimer, op.cit., p.927.
70. Busch, B.C. Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914, London, 1967, p.138.
71. For the name of the native agents see Al-Dawood, M.A., Al-Khalij al Arabi wa Al-Alaqat Al-Duwaliyyah, Cairo, no-date, p.224.
72. Wilson, A.T. op.cit., p.248.
73. Hay, Rupert, The Persian Gulf States, Washington 1959, p.20. Sir Rupert Hay was British Resident in the Gulf in 1941 and afterwards between 1946-54.
74. Bahrain Order in Council, 12th August, 1913, London Gazette, 15th August 1913, Vol. LXXXII, p. 5848.
75. See Part IV Chapter One.
76. Aitchison, C.U. "Treaties Engagements and Sanads", Delhi, 1933, Vol. XI. p.191.
77. Hurewitz, Vol. I., op.cit., pp. 269-72. This Treaty with the Turks was not ratified due to the outbreak of War. It is usually referred to as the 1913 Convention.
78. Ibid, Vol. II., pp. 17-18.

CHAPTER TWO

THE PEOPLE

a) Demographical Structure.

Because of its strategical situation, water, agriculture and relative wealth, Bahrain has throughout its history attracted the attention of different races. From time to time Arabs, Persians, and Zenj, amongst other peoples have inhabited the island.

The pre-Islamic inhabitants of Bahrain were the Arab tribes of Beni Baker, Beni Tamem and Beni Abd Qais;¹ the "Bahrain"² region later became a centre of revolt against the Omayyad and Abbasid dynasties respectively. This revolt led to the arrival of other disaffected groups to take up residence in the region. Some of these remained and inter-mingled with the indigenous population. The growth of Islamic States in Persia, especially after the fall of the Abbasid dynasty, led to a certain amount of emigration between neighbouring Islamic states and this brought a certain number of Persians to settle in Bahrain. A much larger number of Persians settled permanently in the Island after the occupation of Bahrain at the beginning of the 17th century, by the Persians.

During the second half of the 18th century the wealth of Bahrain was one of the reasons that attracted the Arab tribes who were at that time migrating in the mainland in a search for new living-spaces. Some of them, notably the Utub tribes and their allies, occupied the islands in 1782, and established themselves as the rulers of the island.

Bahrain had for centuries maintained trading links with India and therefore a small population of Indian merchants had been long-established in the island; but during the later 19th and early 20th centuries, as the political situation became more stable and contact grew with the outside world, the proportion of Indian merchants and workers grew rapidly, especially after the discovery of oil. The small Jewish population increased during the 1920's as some of them fled Iraq and Iran.³

So by the beginning of the 20th century there were three major ethnic groups in Bahrain, Arabs, Iranians and Indians. The Arabs themselves were divided religiously between the two sects of Islam, Sunna and Shia.

Due to the fact that the Bahrain Nationality Law was not introduced until 1937, movement to and from Bahrain had never been restricted, except for Iranians in 1927 as was mentioned in the previous chapter.

The Bahrain Nationality Law contains five articles, the first and second being the most important.

The Law stated:⁴

"Article One - The following are considered to be Bahraini nationals.

- a) All persons born in Bahrain before or after the date of this law, except as provided for in article Two.
- b) Persons born abroad before or after the date of this law, whose fathers or paternal grandfather were born in Bahrain except persons whose fathers during the minority of such persons, registered at the Political Agency in Bahrain in accordance with article Two or might have so registered if resident in Bahrain.

Article Two - Persons born in Bahrain before or after the date of this law whose fathers at the time of those persons birth possessed the nationality of other states shall not be considered to be Bahrain nationals.

- a) If they register at the Political Agency within one year of the date on which they attain the age of 18, if then resident in Bahrain or within one year of the date of the commencement of their residence in Bahrain if not then resident in Bahrain, or
- b) If they register at the Political Agency within one year of the date of the promulgation of this law if they have already attained the age of 18, and are resident in Bahrain, or,
- c) If they shall have been registered at the Political Agency within two years of their birth or if their births shall have been registered within two years of their occurrence."

At this time the Bahrain Authorities commenced also the issue of passports for people wishing to travel abroad and as a form of identity card, a system which still exists to this day.

The first population census in Bahrain, which was also the first to be held in the whole of the Gulf, took place in 1941. This pioneer census collected only a few facts about the population as it was intended at that time to provide mainly the number of people residing in the islands so that the food rationing could be more carefully controlled during the war years.⁵

This was followed by a further two censuses at nine year intervals, in 1950 and 1959, the fourth and fifth place at six year intervals, 1965 and 1971. The 1971 census was conducted between 4th and 23rd April,⁶

TABLE 1. Population⁷

	1941	1950	1959	1965	1971
Bahrainis	74,040	91,179	118,734	143,814	178,393
Non-Bahrainis	15,930	18,471	24,401	38,389	37,910
Total	89,970	109,650	143,135	182,203	216,303

Before 1941 we have only estimated figures, which were quoted.

by various writers, such as Nabhani,⁸ and Rihani,⁹ who visited Bahrain in 1921 and 1923 respectively and estimated the population as being 300,000 and 200,000, figures which were obviously inaccurate when we compare them with the 1941 figure of approximately 90,000 and when we also consider the fact that there had been no natural disasters or mass movement of population between these dates. Another source gives a figure of 120,656 in 1930 and again, obviously we cannot accept this figure due to the fact that it seems to be based purely on assumption.¹⁰

The figures quoted in Table 1 give us an overall picture of the growth of Bahrain's population, bearing in mind that the first two censuses were conducted on a basis of a count of all persons resident in the islands on census night, whereas the later surveys counted only those normally resident in the island, therefore these figures quoted for the earlier censuses, should not be regarded as completely accurate.

Bearing this in mind we can see that in the 30 years covered, the population grew from just under 90,000 in 1941, to almost two and a half times that number by 1971, the average increase per year amounting to 4,211 persons (3,478 Bahrainis and 733 Non-Bahrainis). Thus it can be seen that the native Bahraini population is increasing at an extremely high rate.

The growth in the foreign population was due to the discovery of oil which attracted a large number of foreign workers seeking employment. This influx of workers contributed to some social problems, which will be discussed later.

Another feature of the changes can be observed from Table 1 and this is that the rate of growth of the Bahraini population was

greater during the period 1965 to 1971 than any previous period covered by the census. Where as the rate of growth between 1950 and 1959 was 3.36% per annum, the rate increased to 4.00% per annum for the period 1965 to 1971, which is a substantial increase when we consider that it covers only a six year period as against the nine years period, 1950-59. This growth was probably due to the economic development of the country with its consequent higher family incomes. This enabled the people to raise their standard of living, and the government was able to provide more comprehensive welfare services, such as hospitals and other medical facilities which tended to reduce deaths, throughout all age groups, but especially to reduce the infant mortality rate. Between the 1959 and 1965 censuses the average age of the population fell, and the under thirty age group comprised almost three quarters of the population, as can be seen from the following table.

TABLE II

(Percentage of total Bahraini Population)¹¹

Distribution of Bahraini population by age groups 1959-71

Age Group	1959	1965	1971
Under 11 years of age	36.6	38.9	33.0
Under 16 years of age	46.7	51.6	48.4 ¹²
Under 30 years of age	68.2	74.0	72.1
30 and under 60	26.7	22.7	22.8
60 and over	5.1	3.3	5.1

It is abundantly clear from Table II that demographically the Bahraini population is a "young population" in the sense that there is a higher proportion of young persons in its composition than is

to be found in most other countries.

It can also be seen from Table II that this youthful population will place a greater burden on the welfare facilities of the state; and that as time progresses greater educational and employment facilities must be provided.

With the decline of the traditional economic activities, and the growth of the oil industry, the population has become mobile and the drift from countryside to town continues, despite the efforts by both the Government and the oil company (Bahrain Petroleum Company). The provision of housing by the Government in rural areas such as Asker and Jaw, to encourage the people to remain in their present locality, and the provision by Bahrain Petroleum Company of cheap transport for their workers to and from work has failed to halt this trend.¹³

TABLE III

Geographical Distribution of the Population¹⁴

District	1941	1950	1959 ¹⁵	1965	1971 ¹⁷
Manama	27,835	39,648	61,726	79,098	88785
Muharraq	21,439	25,577	27,115	34,430	37732
" Suburb	-	-	5,187	6,713	-
Hidd	-	-	4,440	5,230	5269
Jidhafs	-	-	5,591	7,941	11152
Sitra	-	-	3,926	5,071	6665
Rifaa	-	-	6,623	9,403	10731
Awali ¹⁶	(1,532)	3,846	3,123	2,097	984
Rural & other areas	39,164	40,579	25,404	32,220	54,985
Totals	89,970	109,650	143,135	182,203	216,303

Comparison of the population by geographical areas over the years tends to be complicated by the changes which have taken place in the administrative boundaries due to the spread of the

larger centres of population and the absorption of nearby villages and the amalgamation of what have become contiguous built up areas.

The censuses of 1941 and 1950 did not give a precise breakdown of the percentages of the various nationalities present in Bahrain, but we can observe the changes in the following table

TABLE IV

(Bahrainis and Non-Bahrainis (Per cent. of Total))¹⁸

	1941	1950	1959	1965	1971
Bahraini	82.3	83.2	83.0	79.0	82.4
Iranian	8.4	6.3	2.9	4.0	2.9
Indians	1.6	2.7	2.8	3.0	3.7
Omani/Muscati	N.A.	2.0	5.1	6.9	6.0
Others	8.0	5.0	6.2	7.2	5.0

The first observation to be made from this table is the large reduction during the 1950's, of the Iranian residents, possibly due to the growth of nationalist feeling amongst the Arab population and the Anglo-Iranian controversy which took place during these years.

The next factor to be considered is that although the Indians are shown as comprising one of the smallest percentages, when linked with the Pakistani groups, both of which are considered as one by the Bahrainis, they then comprise the largest foreign non-Arab group in the island, as can be seen from the more detailed breakdown of the censuses of 1959, 1965, and 1971.

TABLE V.

Nationality of Non-Bahrainis (% of Total)¹⁹

Nationality	1959	1965	1971
Indians	25.9	24.2	31.7
Pakistanis	17.1	18.8	13.5
Iranians	10.3	7.3	7.7
British	0.6	0.4	0.7
American	2.7	1.2	1.6
Other Non-Arabs	30.0	32.9	28.4
Omanis/Muscatis	6.6	4.5	3.5
Saudi-Arabians	2.1	4.1	4.1
Yemeni	0.5	1.1	3.5
Jordanians	0.6	0.6	0.7
Lebanese	0.3	0.6	1.7
U.A.R.	0.7	0.2	0.2
Iraqi	2.6	4.1	2.7
Other Arabs			
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

From the table it can be seen that the Non-Arab group as a whole, and the Indians and Pakistanis, who we shall subsequently refer to as the Indian group, in particular, formed the majority of the non-Arab population of Bahrain. This created a social problem which will be discussed at a later stage.

b) Social Problems in Bahrain.

1. Social Problems between the Bahrainis

The social problems within Bahrain tend to fall into two categories; first, the denominational differences between the Bahrainis themselves, being split between two sects of Islam, Sunna and Shia, and secondly the resentment of the Bahrainis towards foreigners.

The denominational differences have been a frequent source of conflict throughout Bahrain's modern history and have often

led to open conflict between the two. The root cause of the problem was the conquest of the Shia by the Sunna tribes of the mainland, who regarded Shiaism as a form of heresy, and they consequently missed no opportunity to oppress the original Shia inhabitants.

The Shia, who are locally known as the Baharna, are generally regarded as the original inhabitants of the island, but due to their subjugation by other tribes and peoples, they were gradually deprived of their lands²⁰ and were made to depend on unskilled forms of labour for their livelihood and eventually came to be regarded as second class citizens.

Many writers have puzzled as to their ethnic origin, Harrison writing on Bahrain in 1924 identified them as semi-Persians,²¹ others claim that they are the descendants of Arabs taken as prisoners by Nebuchadnezzar into Iraq ~~who~~ who later escaped and settled in Bahrain,²² whilst others go further and claim that they are descendants of Pre-Islamic Jewish inhabitants of the Gulf.²³ More recently a study of one of the Shia villages of Bahrain was carried out by a Danish woman who surprisingly failed to understand that the Baharna were Arabs and she misinterpreted their replies when she stated that

"they themselves (Baharna) emphasise that they are not Arabs, like the ruler, his family and the townspeople, they call themselves Baharna."²⁴

But she did not ask herself the next question which is "What then is Baharna?"²⁵

Baharna is the plural of the classical Arab word, Bahrani, which usually denotes one who inhabits Bahrain. ~~As a result of the~~ ^{As a result of the} ~~conquest of Bahrain, and also the fact that they were Shia under~~

Sunna rule, the term Baharna became synonymous with Shia and therefore the fact that they refer to themselves, due to long usage, as Baharna, does not alter the fact that they are still Arabs.

As so little is known of their ancestry they have been referred to by Sir Robert Hay as "Arabs without a pedigree".²⁶

The fact that they do not know the Persian language and that there are no Persian words in their form of Arabic, seems to rule out the possibility of their being "semi-Persians"; in fact the Arab dialect spoken by the Baharna is very similar to that which is spoken by the Arabs of Iraq.

The Shia of Bahrain are of the Imamite division of Shia who are often known as the Twelvers, which means that they belong to the group of Shia who recognise a succession of twelve Imams, starting with Ali and ending with the twelfth Imam, Mohammed al Mahdi, who they believe will return again as their spiritual leader.²⁷

These Shia beliefs, whilst strongly held, are at variance with the interpretation of Islamic teaching according to the orthodox sect of Islam, the Sunna who, in Bahrain refer to the Shia as Rafzy the Rejectors . These differences of interpretation, both points of view being fanatically held by the two sides, created the tensions which usually led to the various conflicts.

It is not known today which sects forms the majority in Bahrain, but from the 1941 census, which was the only one so conducted, it was found that, at that time, the Shia were slightly more numerous than the Sunna. (46,359 Shia against 41,944 Sunna).²⁸ This was the only census conducted on the basis of Shia, Sunna, as

it was considered politically undesirable to conduct further surveys on this basis.

It may however be argued that whilst the two sects are approximately numerically equal, the Shia constitute the poorer section of the community and manifested the defensive attitudes of ^{an} inferior group.²⁹

They normally reside in their own village communities segregated from the Sunni communities. The two sects reside together only in the capital, Manama, and to a very small extent, in Muharraq, although even in these towns they reside in neighbourhood groups. Such is the depth of feeling between the two sects, that serious rioting took place as recently as the 1950's following incidents during a religious procession.

Even today there is very little intercourse between the two groups. They follow an unwritten code by living apart, worshipping separately and never intermarrying.³⁰ Even on the matters of food, dress and habits a wide cultural gap still exists, especially between those of traditional upbringing. After the First World War, a modern educational system was introduced which, to a certain degree, brought together the two sections of the community. This created a basis for better understanding between them. About this time, with the growth of British influence, changes were made in the administration of the island, and the creation of a central Government department led to further contacts. During the 1920's the British observed the suppression of the Shia community and encouraged them to participate in public affairs and to obtain a better education.

The discovery and exploitation of oil during the 1930's offered the Baharna a higher standard of living³¹ which encouraged them to abandon their traditional agricultural activities. Employment with the oil company brought them into direct contact with the Sunni, and in some cases placed them in position of authority over them. This, combined with their new-found prosperity, aroused for the first time a new feeling of self-respect and equality with the Sunni.

This situation was welcomed by the moderate sections of the two communities, especially the younger educated element, and led to attempts to foster a feeling of brotherhood between them. This is illustrated in the example of the Sunni journalist, Abdulla al Zayed, who in 1940, wrote in Al-Bahrain,³² under the headline of 'An Invitation to Brotherhood and Unity'

"I am directing my words to the intellectual youth of the two sects (Shia and Sunna). We are proud in this country of being young Arab Moslems, our blood is one, our house is one, and our future is one. The discrimination between Shia and Sunna is nonsense"

From the previous discussions it may appear as if the whole of the social problems of the island revolve around the Shia-Sunna conflicts; this in fact is not the case, as the Sunna themselves have their own social problems, being at variance within themselves on a basis of social class divisions. This sub-division within the Sunna society of Bahrain is between the Arab tribes who give allegiance to Al-Khalifah, and form traditionally an upper class, and the Huwala³³ Arabs, who were for a period of time, before the coming of Al-Khalifah, the rulers of Bahrain. The latter tend to form the middle classes of the island and are generally merchants.

The Arab tribes forming the upper class are recognised as being those who came to Bahrain as conquerors and allies of Al-Khalifa and other tribes who have arrived since the conquest and who claimed kinship with the conquerors. The tribes who form this traditional upper class are the following,³⁴ Al-Khalifah themselves, Al-Jalahima, Al-Fadh1, Al-BinAli, Al-Mosalam, A-Naime, Al-Sadah, Al-Rumahi, Al-Bu Aynain, Al-Manana, Sudan, Al-Slutah, Kibisah, Al-Bukuwarah and Al-Dawasir.³⁵ These tribes, who through their claims of kinship formed a tightly-knit community, traditionally had direct access to the ruler. Intermarriage takes place between the various tribes but whilst the Al-Khalifah will accept daughters of the tribes in marriage, they still debar the marriage of males into the Al-Khalifah family in order that power will not pass from Al-Khalifah hands.³⁶

In the early years of the Al-Khalifah rule, these tribes were the nucleus of the defence force of the island, although with the assumption by the British of the role of defender of the island, this practice fell into disuse, but even today some tribal chiefs still draw allowances known as Sharbah, from the Shaikh for providing support in times of trouble.

Although the structure is changing, some tribes still isolate themselves in their own villages, as for instance, the population of Jaw is composed entirely of the Al-Rumahi, and that of Galali of the Al-Manana. Others have tended to concentrate in towns, such as the Al-Naime in Rifaa, the ruler's residence, and the Al-Fadh1 in Manama, where the district in which they live is known by that name.

The traditional activities of these tribes, apart from providing a defence force, was the organisation of the pearl fishing fleets, and some of them worked as divers in the tribal fleets. The fact that they considered working on the land and engaging in commerce as beneath their dignity³⁷ meant that with the change in economic conditions which took place, and the decline of pearl fishing, they have failed to take advantage of and participate in the growth industries, such as the oil industry and commerce.

Their conservative point of view was also an obstacle to their acceptance of the new methods of education which were introduced,³⁸ and although the male members of the families began to participate during the 1940's, only recently have they considered education for their females to be necessary. This conservatism and lack of education delayed the development of any growth of political consciousness amongst them, as had taken place with the mass of the people. This was illustrated during the riots of 1953 when they hurriedly assembled in Rifaa to demonstrate their loyalty to Al-Khalifah. But their demonstration was more for preserving a way of life to which they were accustomed rather than for any political ideas.

However, as some of them began to work for the oil company, they were brought into contact with new ideas expressed by their fellow-workers and they began to realise that it would be necessary for them to adapt themselves to a changing system.

Others of the tribes, when the pearl fishing industry declined, looked around for new sources of income and although traditionally not commercially-minded, began to take an interest in certain

sections of commerce. Their interest in these activities gradually developed, although they restricted themselves to ventures which did not directly involve them in the running of businesses and gave an easy return on their investments, such as the purchase, sales and rent of offices and buildings. To date only one member of the Al-Khalifah family has involved himself in business to the extent of opening and personally managing a furniture store.

The Huwala Arabs, as we have previously stated, form the middle classes or townsmen. They originally came to Bahrain from the western coast of Fars, having settled there following the Moslem conquest of Persia by the Arabs of the Arabian peninsula. They conquered Bahrain in the early years of the 18th century under their leader, Jabbara of Tahiri, and ruled the island until approximately 1753.³⁹ As their tribal structure and way of life was not so rigid as the tribes from the mainland, probably due to their long contact with the Persian culture, they integrated more easily with the other elements of the island. The Huwala Arabs, like the other Arab tribes did not consider it fitting to work on the land,⁴⁰ and their chief occupations were commerce and maritime trading, and due to their predominance in this field, whilst the Arab tribes held the power, they held the purse strings of Bahrain. Because they were town-dwellers and they were also amongst the first to take advantage of the modern education, a large number of them now hold offices in the Government Administration, the oil company and the educational field. In the commercial field some of their family companies such as Kanoos, Wazan and Moayyed, form the largest trading groups in the island

with interests ranging from insurance to machine tool agencies.

Although as a group, they have no solidarity between themselves, such as exists amongst the Shia and to a lesser degree the Arab tribes. They are, due to their better education, the most politically conscious group in the islands. Their political feelings are not expressed as a group, but on an individual basis; their aspirations range from Arab nationalism, Islamic unity and Western-style democracy, to simple patriotism.

The Huwala were the prime movers in the political confrontations of the 1950's, because of their desire for political reforms which they considered necessary for the well being and improvement of the situation in the island.

2. The Attitude of the Bahrainis towards foreign communities

The elements such as education, the build-up of contacts between the native groups, the prosperity of the island and the new political feelings created a sense of unity and national identity amongst the Bahrainis. This led to a resentment of the presence of other national groups in the island on economic, political and social grounds.

The Indians⁴¹ constitute the largest foreign community in the islands; Bahrain, like other principalities in the Gulf, had a long trading association with India. Through this trade, small groups of Indians had been long-established in Bahrain, but the discovery of oil and the building of a modern administration, created a need for semi-skilled and clerical workers; this need was filled by a large influx of Indian workers.

They are a prosperous and reasonably well-educated group and infiltrate all levels of working society. The majority of

them are employed by the oil company and to a lesser extent by the state, whilst a substantial number are employed by local companies and banks. They are so employed due to their working knowledge of English, as the oil company, the banks, local companies and certain government departments conduct their affairs in this language.

Others of them constitute a major force in the island's commerce and trade and have well-established and prosperous businesses as merchants etc.,

The status of the Indians in Bahrain is rather a peculiar one, they consider themselves superior to the indigenous population, they live in their own social milieu, and they have their own clubs and societies, such as the Bahrain Sports Club⁴² which is purely Indian in composition. They organise their own sports meetings and social occasions and at least two of the local cinemas show Indian films exclusively.

They are resented by the Bahrainis population mainly on economic grounds⁴³ in that they feel that the Indians have reduced the opportunities for advancement of the Bahrainis, especially in the field of oil company employment and banking, due to their willingness ^{to} ~~as~~ supply ~~of~~ cheap, ready-trained labour. As early as 1940 the Bahrain newspaper wrote an article demanding that the oil company should, as a matter of urgency, train local labour to replace the Indians.⁴⁴

Another source of resentment was that the Indians exercised an influence within Bahrain out of proportion to their numbers in the island. They were able to exert this influence due to their strong position in the island's administration as

administrators, police officers and clerks.

At the same time they were often granted privileges which were denied to the Bahrainis. Whilst the native workers of the oil company were treated on an individual basis with regard to payment, the Indians, as British citizens, were allowed to call upon the services of the Political Agent to ensure minimum standards on their conditions of service and wage increases, en bloc. This is illustrated by a letter from the oil company's chief local representative to the Political Agent, Mr. G.N. Jackson, on 18th February, 1942 which states

"Referring to your verbal request yesterday for the basic wage rates paid our British Indian Artisan employees. The present hiring rate for Artisans is Rs.5 per working day with 26 working days guaranteed per month and for approximately one year now, we have contracted no British Indian Artisans at less than this rate."⁴⁵

Another privilege which was resented by the Bahraini population was the fact that the Indians were allowed access to certain public places, such as the Gymkhana Club,⁴⁶ which were otherwise reserved for Westerners only; and here and in other localities they were allowed to purchase alcohol. As well as this, they are issued with a permit by the Political Agent which entitles them to a monthly allocation of alcoholic beverage.

The problem of alcohol is a delicate one. Legally, as Moslems, the local people are prohibited from drinking or buying alcohol but due to Western influences and for social purposes, many of them do drink. Their source of supply is by the illegal purchase of alcohol from the Indians, who sell at a handsome profit, a point which exacerbates the situation.⁴⁷

The fact that the Indians, especially the white-collar workers consider themselves superior to the native population and to be western-oriented is not accepted by the Bahrainis. The Bahrainis see the Indians merely as fellow-workers in the oil company and as menial workers in the service industries, such as waiters, tailors, washermen, domestic servants, etc., In the meantime their claim to be Western-oriented is nullified by the fact that the Westerners look upon the Indians merely as their sub-ordinates.

To sum up, it can be said that although the Indians in Bahrain are resented on economic and social grounds, the Bahrainis do not hold any racial prejudice and have a great respect for India.⁴⁸

The second largest group of foreigners in Bahrain are the Iranians. The number of Iranians shown in the census is not strictly accurate and the number is actually greater than that shown. This is because the census records as Iranians, only those who do not hold Bahraini citizenship. A large number of Iranians have been on the island since the 17th century and others have settled there over the years. Many of these accepted Bahrain citizenship in 1937 and are officially recognized as Bahrainis. A great many other Iranians were not recorded due to the high rate of illegal immigration of these people on to the island in search of work.

The Iranians are resented by the local population on purely political grounds because of the long-standing claim by the Iranian Government to the sovereignty of Bahrain, and they were suspected by the local people,⁴⁹ and also by the British, as a fifth

column during the Anglo-Iranian crisis of the 1950's, when the Iranians of Bahrain viewed Mossadeq as a liberator and displayed his picture prominently in their homes and work places.⁵⁰

Although they are Shia, they do not identify themselves with the Baharna, probably because of the difference in their economic status. They are mainly engaged in trade and they constitute a prosperous merchant group. Some others of them work in the oil industry or as employees of various businesses. The poorer of them work mainly in the docks or in the native building trade.

The merchant classes tend to mix reasonably well with the Huwala merchants, but between themselves they always speak Persian, although they know the Arabic language, a fact which tends to create suspicion in the mind of the average Bahraini. They still educate their children in separate schools in Manama, which are supported by money collected by Iranian merchants, and here they are taught the Iranian language and culture. The fact that the schools were privately run, placed them outside the authority of the Bahrain Education services until recent years.

The resentment of the Iranians by the local people came to a head during the 1950's when during the political upheaval, rumours were rife in the island that the Government had found a cache of arms in one of their clubs, the Ferduce, or Paradise Club. This turned out later to be false but the resentment was strengthened when the Iranians formed a committee in rivalry to the Higher Executive Committee, an act which was looked upon by the people as proof that they were a fifth column.⁵¹

Political relationships between Bahrain and Iran improved in 1971 with the agreement by the Iranians to recognise Bahrain as an independent state. This may help to ease the political tensions between the natives and Iranians in Bahrain but could in the future lead to social tension between them if the legal immigration of Iranians increases, and due to their well known flair for business, they establish themselves as a major economic force in the island. Already, since the signing of the Agreement, the Iranians have opened a branch of their National Bank in Manama and their national air line has introduced a regular service to Bahrain. So unless, in the near future, the government of Bahrain places a limit on their level of investments, the Iranians could once more become resented on economic, instead of political grounds.

A minority group in Bahrain, who posed a problem, were the Jews, a problem which has now resolved itself.

There were between 300 and 400 Jews in Manama,⁵² who arrived there following the political upheaval in Iraq during the 1920's. Although they accepted Bahrain nationality they still considered themselves, first and foremost, as Jews.

The community were well known for their high standard of living, high level of education and their receptiveness to western influences. They were engaged exclusively in trading, money exchanging and dealing in real estate. As "People of the Book" they were a protected community, Dimah . . They did not play an active part in the public life of Bahrain, although one of them usually occupied a seat on the Municipal Council.

There was no real conflict between them and the Local Arab

Communities until the Arab-Israeli conflicts of 1947. Their children enjoyed the educational facilities provided in local schools as did the local children and in the early 1940's many of the younger Jewish students developed friendly relationships with the Arab students and they did well in the fields of education and sport.

The Jewish community was respected by the local people and many businessmen preferred to deal with them rather than their own people, as they were noted for keeping their word. Jewish women often provided a service for the Arab women, who were confined to their homes, by purchasing merchandise in the markets and hawking it around the Arab homes. This peaceful coexistence was disturbed in late 1947 when the Arab community heard of the U.N. decision to partition Palestine and form the new Jewish state of Israel. Demonstrations broke out on 3rd December, 1947 with the people shouting slogans against the Jews. The houses of some Jews were broken into and ransacked, although the police soon arrived on the scene. Some of the Arabs were ashamed of the actions of their countrymen and gave shelter to the Jews but from that date, relations between them were never the same again.

With the growth of the Arab-Israeli conflicts the tension between Arabs and Jews in Bahrain increased to the point of delicacy and although violence was never used against them, they were subjected to a complete boycott.

Gradually the Jews began to wind up their businesses and to emigrate to Europe or Israel and nowadays only a few elderly Jews remain in Bahrain conducting their businesses in a small way.

The majority of the non-Bahraini Arabs are Omanis, who emigrated to Bahrain following the discovery of oil, in the hope of earning money. They are employed mainly as manual labour although some have gained employment as clerks. Towards them and Arabs from other Gulf states the attitude of the Bahrainis is friendly, and they are regarded as Awlad Al-Am, or cousins, and there are no political, social or economic problems between them, in fact they fulfil a need for certain classes of labour not obtainable elsewhere. Their numbers are now tending to decrease slightly following the development of the Abu Dabi and Oman oilfields.

Other Arabs are of Lebanese, United Arab Republic,⁵³ Iraqi and Jordanian origin and most work as teachers in the schools, although the Lebanese are often businessmen. Most of the natives appreciate what they have done for Bahrain, especially in the educational field and nursing, but they do not mix to any great extent with the native population.

The last group to be considered are the Westerners, mainly British and American, who form the higher levels of the oil company, banks, and to a lesser extent, the government. They are not resented by the natives on social or economic grounds as it is recognised that they often possess skills which are needed by the administration which are not yet possessed by the local people, but there is slight resentment in some quarters over the amount of political influence wielded by them.

However, in general they are tolerated as being necessary to the island and the fact that the Westerners live apart from the native population in their own town, Awali, or in the suburbs tends to minimise the problems which might otherwise occur.

FOOTNOTES

1. Taki Ali, L'Evolution de la Societe du Bahrain, Ph.D. thesis, Paris, 1970, p.108.
2. Arab classical writers referred originally to the "Bahrain" region as the area of Eastern Arabia extending from Kuwait to Qatar.
3. Belgrave, Sir Charles, "Personal Column", London, 1960, p.148. A small Jewish community existed in the island before this time however, see Palgrave, W.G., "Central and Eastern Arabia (1862-63)" McMillan & Co. 1866 Vol. 2. p.216.
4. Faroughy, Abbas op.cit., pp. 124-5. Appendix IV.
5. Government of Bahrain, The Fourth Population Census of Bahrain, Finance Dept., August, 1969. Hereafter cited as the Fourth Population Census.
6. "Huna al-Bahrain" No. 232, May 1971.
7. Fifth Population Census
8. Nabhani: cited by Abul Karim, Ibrahim, Al-Bahrain Wa Ahammiyatuha bayna al-Imarat al-Arabiah, Bahrain 1970, p.10.
9. Rihani, Op.Cit., p.224.
10. Faroughy, op.cit., p.18. These figures are misleading as for instance when he stated the Utub as 55,000, he again stated 2,200 for other tribes, who usually refer to themselves as Utub.
11. Fourth Population Census, p.14. and Fifth Census, p.5.
12. For 1971, first figure is for under 10 years of age and the second for under 15 years.
13. Hay, Rupert, "The Impact of the Oil Industry on the Persian Gulf Shaikhdom", Middle East Journal, Vol. 9. 1955, pp. 361.
14. Statistical Abstract, Government of Bahrain, August 1970 p.6. Hereafter cited as Statistical Abstract with the given date.
15. Includes 6,185 persons living in what were then known as Manama Suburbs. In 1965 these suburbs were incorporated into Manama Municipality.
16. The population of Awali was calculated on a different basis in the 1941 Census than in the later Censuses.
17. Fifth Population Census 1971 pp. 161-163.

18. Fourth Population Census, p.3. and Fifth Census p. 166.
19. Fourth Population Census.
20. A letter from the political agent in Bahrain, C.G. Prior, to the Political Resident H.V. Biscoe dated 21st Nov. 1931, saying that the land was taken by force from Baharna.
21. Harrison, P.W., The Arab at Home, U.S.A., 1924, p.29.
22. Belgrave, James, op.cit., p.10.
23. Belgrave, Charles, op.cit., p. 148.
24. Hansen, H. Harald, Problems of Contact and Change, Jahrbuch des Museums zur Volkerkunde zu Leipzig Vol. 23, 1966, pp. 82-94.
25. Although Hansen produced a book based on her visit to Bahrain between February - May 1960, Investigations in a Shia village in Bahrain, Copenhagen 1967, she stated on p.30 that the Shia prayed only three times a day instead of five, and this contradictory to the truth. Moreover she also stated in her article op.cit. p.92 that under Islamic law a husband is not allowed to cohabit with his wife during the lactation! and this also obviously has no factual basis.
26. Hay, R. The Persian Gulf States op.cit. p.91.
27. Hansen, H.H., "Investigations in a Shia Village", op.cit. p.26.
28. Qubain Fahim, I., "Social Classes and Tensions in Bahrain", Middle East Journal, Vol. 9., No. 3., Summer 1955, pp. 269-280.
29. Ibid.
30. There are only a handful of recorded instances of marriage between Sunna and Shia and these took place only in very recent years between modernly-educated couples.
31. Littlefield, R. op.cit., p.49.
32. "Al-Bahrain" , Weekly Newspaper, 18th January, 1940, No. 46.
33. Huwala is literally derived from the verb Thawla (to alter) and it applies in the Gulf to the people of Arab origin and emigrated from the Arab mainland to Persia, and came back again. Within Bahrain the Al-Khalifah and their allies refer to themselves as Adjwad, or pure, and to the other non-tribal Sunnis as Baiseri, or commoners.
34. Taki-Ali op.cit., p.129.

35. Al-Dawasir arrived in Bahrain in 1845. Lorimer, op.cit. p.883. Most of them later left for the mainland after the 1923, political upheaval. Other tribes were also present during the 19th and early 20th centuries but left to settle in either Qatar or Kuwait.
36. Al-Salim Hediah Sultan, "Awrak men Dafter mosaferah Ela Al-Khalij Al-Arabi" Kuwait, no date, p.36.
37. Belgrave, Sir Charles, "Persian Gulf - Past and Present", Royal Central Asian Journal, Vol. LV. 1968, pp. 28-34.
38. When questioned on their reluctance to participate in the modern education schemes one of the Al-Khalifah family replied, "Our schools are our councils".
39. Abu Hakima, A.M., History of Eastern Arabia, op.cit., p.34.
40. Taki Ali, op.cit., p. 139.
41. We refer to the Indians as including the Pakistanis.
42. Belgrave, J.H., op.cit., p. 144.
43. Qubain, F. op.cit., p.274.
44. Al-Bahrain, 23rd May 1940, No. 64.
45. A letter from M.H. Lipp chief local representative in BAPCO to G.N. Jackson, the British Political Agent in Bahrain.
46. Belgrave, C. op.cit., p.144.
47. In recent years the restrictions on the sale and consumption of alcohol have been eased and a limited number of places now serve alcohol, although legally it is still prohibited.
48. Littlefield, E., op.cit., p.48.
49. A Bahraini adage, which shows the dislike felt for the Iranians runs "Shar al-Baluch wala khair al Ajam" literally "The worst of the Baluch is better than a good Persian".
50. Qubain, F., op.cit., p.275.
51. Al-Baker Abdull Rahman, "Min Al-Bahrain Ela Al-Manfa", Beirut, 1965, p.13. The committee were known as "Al Itifaq al Watani"
52. Belgrave, C. op.cit., p.148.
53. Under the changing circumstances we refer here to U.A.R. as meaning Egyptians and Syrians.

PART TWO

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, the people of Bahrain have earned their livelihood from three main sources, pearl fishing, agriculture and trade. The first two industries provided not only a source of income to the majority of the people, but also a way of life which, due to its system of working, held them in virtual bondage. Trade, whilst it did not employ a great number of people in Bahrain, was nevertheless important as it provided the major source of revenue for the State prior to the discovery of oil.

There were, of course, many other smaller industries¹ such as fishing and boat building, but these were never large employers of labour and were therefore never quite so important.

One feature of all these industries was that nowhere was a man paid a regular fixed wage, payment being on a speculative basis. This, therefore led to complete lack of security for the mass of the people. Another feature was that most people employed in the local industries, because they owned the basic tool of their trade,² considered themselves free agents, able to work where they pleased, but in actual fact, without realising it they were bound inexorably to the system.

One of the main problems of labour in Bahrain was that the people were unaware of any method of selling their labour to the best advantage, or of organizing themselves to confront their employers. They often shared their labour with others, on what appeared to them to be a co-operative basis, as for instance did the pearl divers; and the profits of their labours, if there was

one, was divided between them. It was not until the growth of the oil industry took place that they saw the advantages of selling their labour for a fixed sum in return for performing specific tasks.

These so-called traditional industries had been carried on in Bahrain for many hundreds of years and the inhabitants of the island, whether native or newcomer, had of necessity to rely upon these sources for their income as there were no alternatives.

The two main industries of pearling and agriculture are today declining and what was the most important, pearl fishing, is now virtually dead due to several reasons, such as the growth of the cultured pearl industry in Japan, the uncertainties and the harsh way of life which it imposed, and the attraction of the prosperity brought about by the discovery and exploitation of oil.

It may have been expected that agriculture in the islands would have benefited from the increased demands placed upon it by the rapid increase in population as the oil industry grew and from the anticipated introduction of modern machinery and methods. This however was not the case due to a number of factors, such as the lack of security of tenure of the farmers and the increasing labour demands of new industries. These factors, combined with the greater demands which were placed on the natural water supplies, which are now so heavily abstracted that they are becoming increasingly saline, has made farming more and more difficult.

The only survivor of the three major industries, and one which has benefited from the changes which have taken place in

Bahrain, is the trade which has, due to the initial wealth of the participants, adapted itself to the growth of the new industries and met the demands of the growing economy. Although it has expanded greatly the basic nature has not changed in that there are still no major manufacturing industries but only groups of merchants engaging in import and export and acting as middle-men.

Of the minor industries only fishing remains virtually unchanged with the fishermen catching enough for their own needs and selling any surplus to their neighbours or, in some cases to fish dealers from the towns.

FOOTNOTES

1. A number of minor industries exist such as pottery, weaving, and preparation of lime and gypsum for the local building industries. All of these were carried out on an individual basis along the lines of cottage industries.
2. All workers owned their own tools, the farmer his scythes and hoes, the fisherman his nets and traps, the puller in the pearling industry his ropes and the diver his oyster net and ballast stone.

CHAPTER ONE

TRADITIONAL ACTIVITIES

a) The Pearl Fisheries

The pearl fisheries were the main source of income for the people of the island for many years. The pearl beds around Bahrain have been famous for thousands of years and have been mentioned by writers as far back as 2000 B.C.¹ We know definitely that the Greeks, Arabs and Portugese, throughout their histories, mention this fact.²

It appears that several factors contributed to make the seas around Bahrain suitable for the growing of pearl since the days of antiquity. The shallow water and the intense summer heat combine to make the water warm and provide conditions which may be to the pearl oyster's liking.

Sir Charles Belgrave, writing in 1968 on the Pearl industry in Bahrain, stated

"Masudi, a ninth century Arab writer, described in his books the methods of diving and customs of the pearl industry in the Gulf. His description fitted almost exactly the conditions in the pearl industry, and the way the men dive, when I first went to the Gulf in 1926."³

Since the customs and methods employed by the industry have not changed for the last 1,000 years we may describe with certainty, the traditional methods.

There are certain dates which controlled the diving seasons and the main season was from the beginning of June to the beginning of October, the period which usually supplies the best conditions for pearling, the water being at its warmest, and was known locally as Al ghaws al-Kabir (the Big Diving).

The Ruler normally issued a proclamation fixing the date of the start of the season.

There were two other less important seasons, before and after this period. The first was Ghaws al-barid, the cold diving, running from April to May, and Mujannah, running from October to March. During these two periods, small boats worked close inshore and did not venture far from the island. It was from the reports of the divers during Ghaws al-barid, on water temperature and the state of the pearl beds that the date for the start of the main season, al Ghaws al-Kabir was fixed.

The first day of the main season was marked by the boats leaving port en masse with flags flying, and the people singing and beating drums. Leading the procession of ships was the "Admiral" of the pearl fleet, who is usually the most experienced captain, or Nakuda, and he was the man who represented the Bahrain fleet when they met with the fleets from other ports in the Gulf. Having left port, the fleet then broke up and proceeded to what each individual captain considered to be the best pearl beds.

On board each boat there were a number of divers, Ghawas, normally from 10 to 40 in number, depending upon the capacity of the dhow. There was an equivalent number of men known as Sayb or pullers, whose responsibility was to raise the diver from the sea bed. Sometimes in the larger boats there were more men known as Redeef or assistant pullers, who rendered assistance when the diver was working in deep waters. The complement of the ship was completed by one or two boys known as Tabab who

provided the Captain with meals and refreshments, some would later train as divers.

The choice of pearl beds for fishing, Fasht, depended to a large extent on the captains' experience, although divers who had a considerable knowledge of the pearl beds advised him in his choice.

The working day of the diver started at sunrise and continued throughout the day till sunset. Each diver had two ropes, the one on which he descended was weighted with a large stone, Hajar, to take him quickly to the bottom and he carried the second rope with him, tied around the waist. As soon as he reached the bottom the puller raised the weighted rope ready for the next dive, and the diver held the second rope, to which he was tied, and placed about his neck an open-weave palm basket, Diyyin, in which to place the oysters. On his nose he wears a clip, Fitam, this kept the water out of his nose and enabled him to hold his breath longer and at the same time left both hands free for work. Sometimes the diver would also stuff cotton or beeswax in his ears for protection. He also wore a set of leather finger thimbles to protect his fingers from coral and other sharp objects. Apart from these objects, and a loincloth, the diver was naked.

The diver, once on the bottom, collected as many shells as he could and when ready to ascend, signalled, on the rope tied around him. The puller, standing on the gunwhale, having received the signal, immediately raised the diver by means of the rope. Having been raised to the surface the divers catch was taken from him, an average 8 to 12 shells, and he rested for a few moments by hanging onto the side of the boat, after which the process was repeated. The time spent below the surface which was normally one minute,⁴

was known as Tabah. After completing ten dives the men came on board to rest. Ten dives would normally occupy about three quarters of an hour, after which the diver was dragged out of the water and man-handled to some spot on the ship to recover, often looking more dead than alive. After a period of rest, and refreshment, usually coffee, he began again.

The diver usually performed 40 to 60 dives per day in waters ranging in depth from 30 to 70 feet. For the latter depths the puller was given assistance in raising the diver.

The diver experienced great danger and discomfort not only from the attacks of sharks and sawfish but also from the masses of stinging jellyfish which swim at all levels and burn the body of the diver or in some cases even put out an eye. Physical damage was often suffered by the diver resulting from ~~the~~ ^{his} ~~disaster~~ driving himself past the limits of human endurance. The "bends" were a common affliction amongst the divers and produced severe pains in the joints, paralysis or even death. Suppuration of the ear drums and rheumatism were also common amongst the divers. If the diver stayed down too long he also often suffered from severe bleeding from the ears and nose. A few seconds neglect by the pullers could mean the difference between life and death to the diver and therefore great co-operation and attention was needed. The divers never ate whilst working and took only small sips of either coffee or water as food would cause nausea.

Having finished diving for the day it was customary for the diver to have a meagre meal of fish, dates and rice and immediately sleep following his exertions in preparation for the next day. These small meals were generally insufficient to sustain

the energies of the divers throughout the season. The small meals, combined with the extremely poor living conditions aboard the boats took their toll of the divers' strength and by the end of the diving season they were usually in very poor physical condition.

The shells collected were usually left overnight so that they may be more easily opened, and the opening of the shells was the first job of the next day. The shells had been put into a pile in the middle of the deck as they were brought from the sea bed so that no diver knew exactly which was his catch. The opening is performed with a small knife, the flesh searched for pearls and the empty shells and flesh thrown back into the sea.

Less than one third of the shells opened yield pearls, mostly small and irregularly shaped and may well be called "pearl dust". These pearls were known locally as lulu and were of comparatively small value. The next in size and value was known as dana and whilst it was more valuable, was still of irregular shape. The rarest and most prized of pearls was the hasbah which was large and perfectly formed.

The captain watched the opening procedure closely so that no pearls were secreted. Stories were often told of divers swallowing a valuable pearl, but the experienced captain usually noticed this and recovered it by his own means.

After the last shells were opened the captain then collected the pearls and tied them in a red flannel cloth which he then put in his sea-chest or bishtakta on the poop deck. After this the business of the day's diving began once more.

Before reaching the international markets the pearls usually passed through many hands. The sales usually took place through one of two local channels. The first of these was the Tawash who , as well as buying the pearls, sometimes financed the expeditions. They roamed in launches between the various banks being fished and if news of a good pearl came to their ears, they would make haste to be first to contact the appropriate captain in the hope of buying it cheaply by an immediate offer of ready cash. Sometimes however the captain would refuse the offer of the Tawash and keep his pearls in the hope of a better offer from the merchants ashore, who were the second local outlet for the pearls.

Although the profits taken by the Tawash and local merchants made them much wealthier than the captain or divers, they did not profit as much as others, despite their advantage of having first choice of the pearls.

They, in turn, sold the pearls to Hindu merchants who came at the end of the season, and who, by grading the pearls and having them made up into jewellery, made the maximum profit when they introduced them to the international market.

1) The Economic and Social Impacts of the Industry

The direct income of the rulers of Bahrain from the pearling industry was never very great and consisted only of a small tax which was levied on each boat. But the indirect income was much greater in that the merchants who sold the pearls often spent their money in buying goods from abroad, and it was upon these goods that a customs duty was fixed and it was this which supplied the rulers with their main source of income.

Various estimates of the value of the pearl trade have been quoted over the years and generally, with one or two exceptions, they show the decline of the industry.

The first recorded figures of the value of the pearls was given in 1833, when Wilson stated that the value of the trade was then estimated as being between £200,000 and £240,000 per annum.⁵

Zwemer, visiting the islands in 1896 gave his estimate of their value when he quoted the value as being £303,941.⁶

Graves, writing on the life of Sir Percy Cox, estimated the figure at the turn of the century as £500,000⁷ and in 1901 Busch put the figure at £400,000.⁸

Harrison, an American doctor, residing in Bahrain, estimated that in 1913 the pearl trade was worth \$9,000,000.⁹ A highly unlikely figure of £2,000,000 was quoted by Rihani, who visited the island in 1923,¹⁰ which seems a gross overstatement when compared with the figures given by Cox in 1925 and 1926 of £220,000 and £192,000 respectively.¹¹ These latter estimates however contradict those given by Sir Charles Belgrave for 1926 and the few following years as being in the order of £1,500,000 per annum.¹²

After the Second World War the decline became more apparent, as was illustrated by figures which were produced by Americans working with the oil company in Bahrain. Thornberg in 1946 put the value at \$250,000¹³ approximately £62,500 and Kruegar in 1949 gave a figure of \$200,000 or approximately £59,000.¹⁴

The last figure quoted, which appeared in the Bahrain Government Annual Report, was in 1954, when it was estimated as

Rs 378,000 or approximately £27,000.¹⁵

These figures can be tabulated as follows:-

TABLE VI

Estimated Value of Pearls landed in Bahrain
for Selected Years

<u>Year</u>	<u>Revenue</u>
1833	£200,000 to £240,000
1896	£303,941
Circa 1900	£500,000
1901	£400,000
1913 16.	£1,850,000
1922	£2,000,000
1925	£220,000
1926	£192,000
1926-1931	£1,500,000
1946 16.	£62,000
1949 16.	£54,300
1954 16.	£27,400

Apart from the figures given by Rihani in 1923 and by Sir Charles Belgrave for the period 1926 to 1931 it can be seen that the industry was declining and the years after the Second World War show a drastic cut in the industry. The rapid decline began in the 1930's with the international monetary crisis and the growth of the cultivated pearl industry, and as stated, the decline gathered momentum during the 1940's until in the 1950 census no-one was recorded as being employed in the pearl industry.¹⁷. The figures quoted after 1950 are those of other Gulf Arabs trading into the ports of Bahrain from the pearl banks.

Until the change in the economic climate of Bahrain, brought about by the discovery of oil, the pearl fisheries provided the major sources of both income and employment to the inhabitants of Bahrain. Figures are available which illustrate the size of the industry from 1835 onwards, some of them, however,

especially the earlier ones, must be treated conservatively due to the fact that they were estimates given by travellers visiting Bahrain.

The first figure, which was quoted in 1833, stated that there were 1,500 boats in the pearl fleets;¹⁸ in 1889, Bent, who was visiting Bahrain at that time, gave the number of boats as 400 and that each boat was worked by between eight and twenty men.¹⁹ Taking the average as 14 men per boat we arrive at a figure of 5,600 men. Whilst the figure for the number of boats can be taken as correct we feel that Bent has under-estimated the number of men involved as it is probable that he was quoting only the number of divers per boat and not the full ships complement and that therefore this figure could at least be doubled giving a minimum of 11,200 men.

Zwemer put the number of boats in 1896 as 900, which was probably an exaggeration or he has counted in his total some boats from other ports in the Gulf; he did not give any number of the men employed in the trade.²⁰ In the years 1926 to 1931 more than 20,000 men were employed in 500 boats.²¹

The industry began to decline during the 1930's and 40's as for instance in 1935 the figures of 360 boats and 11,550 men were quoted; in 1940 the figure dropped sharply to 191 boats and 7,500 men; in 1945 there were 121 boats engaging 5,100 men; in 1952 the figures were down to 20 boats and 563 men and finally in 1954 there were only 11 boats employing 500 men.²²

The following table shows these numbers in a comparative form.

TABLE VII

Table of Boats and Men in the Diving Industry

<u>Year</u>	<u>Boats</u>	<u>Men</u>
1835	1,500	-
1889	400	11,200 (approx.)
1896	900	-
1926-31	500	20,000 +
1935	360	11,550
1940	191	7,500
1945	121	5,100
1952	20	563
1954	11	500

The running and financing of the pearl industry throughout its history proved to be disastrous socially to various sections of the community but none more so than to the direct workers in the industry, divers, pullers, etc.,

The social impact of the pearl industry did not die with the pearl fleets but continued for a long while to cast its shadow over the lives of the former pearl industry employees.

The evil of the system lay in the method in which the expeditions were financed. Pearl diving, by nature a speculative industry, attracted people in the hopes of earning money.

The abuses of the system were most apparent at the lower level, namely the divers and pullers, who comprised the largest proportion of the industry. The divers and pullers virtually mortgaged their lives and livelihood to the pearl industry. This was due to the fact that they were not paid wages as such, but were entitled to a share in the profits, something which rarely gave them any return at all for their efforts.

A diver, starting the season, was usually given a cash payment, Salafyh, (credit), which was intended to support his family while he

was away; at the end of the season, after the sale of the pearls, the divers were given another payment called Tisgam, or maintenance, and in the winter, when no diving took place he was given Karjiyah, pocket money, in anticipation of him diving for the same captain the following year.

All of these cash advances were recorded against the divers name in the captains log-book, but it was only very rarely that a diver would earn enough to cancel his debt to the captain. When a diver did not earn sufficient to cancel these debts, the amount outstanding was carried forward to the following year and interest charged upon it.

Having once taken an advance from the captain, a diver was compelled to work for that captain throughout the following season, and in effect the divers doomed themselves to work until their death in an effort to repay these debts. Until 1923, when the General Reforms in the administration were started in Bahrain, even death was not an exit for the Bahrain diver, as his debts were then inherited by his sons or brothers, who were forced to enter the pearl industry themselves unless they had money or property with which to clear the debt. Some of the more inhuman of the captains would insist on marrying the widow of the diver as payment for the debts, and in doing so obtained for themselves the children of the diver to act as servants in his house and later, to be trained as divers themselves.²³

The divers, however, were not the only people to be in debt, as the captains themselves were often forced to obtain finance from the merchants in the towns to equip and provision their boats and to pay the advances to their divers. The shore merchants charged

interest on their money and the captains passed this in turn, onto their divers.

The charging of interest, or usury, is contrary to Islamic law, but the merchants circumvented this by a system known as Mukalaba or turn-over. The system worked by the merchant selling to the captain certain goods or provisions, for a fixed sum, the goods were immediately resold by the captain to the merchant for a cash payment which was appreciably less than that originally specified. The difference between these two prices formed the interest payment to the merchant.

When the season came to an end, the captain deducted from the sale of the pearls, the cost of the crews' food and provisions. The remainder represented the profit and was shared according to certain rules, depending on whether or not the captain was the owner of the boat.

If the captain owned the boat, one half of the profits were retained by him, and the remainder was divided amongst the crew after the deduction of any advances made, with the divers taking two shares to the pullers one, the Tabab, or boys, received nothing.

If the captain was not the owner, he was entitled to only one-fifth of the profits, the remainder of his normal 50% being paid to the owners or financiers of the boat. The other half was paid to the crew on the previously mentioned share system.

The merchant who put up the money for the expedition was entitled to buy the pearls at 20% below the market value and this obviously further reduced the earnings of both captain and crew and had the effect of putting them further into debt, especially after a bad season.

The fact that the divers were illiterate led to many abuses of the system by the captains. Because the divers could neither read nor write it was possible for the captain to falsify the accounts so that the divers were permanently in debt to him and it was not unknown for the accounts of the best divers to be falsified the most in order that their services were retained for future seasons.

If the captain himself was in debt, he was often forced to sell his ship or his house to the merchants in order that he may carry on; quite often the captains sank so far into debt that they were forced to become divers themselves.

The position of the diver was summed up by Harrison who wrote, in 1924

"The diver is known as a slave for the rest of his life. It is probably easier for a negro slave on the Pirate Coast to escape, than it is for a Bahraini diver to regain his freedom. As long as he is in debt he cannot change his employer, no matter how badly he is treated, nor can he leave the town, except under bonds to return before the diving season begins and he will never be able to get out of debt, he cannot read or write, there is no witness to the transactions that take place between the captain and himself. It is the recognised thing for the divers to receive a loan of rice, ... The sum written into the books is regularly about 50% greater than the market value of the rice. If necessary entirely false entries are written in. The upshot of the matter is that their men never get out of debt, not one in a thousand of them.

In seven years residence in Bahrain, I have never yet met a diver who had escaped from the account book, as the Arabs put it."²⁴

The decline of the pearl industry brought further problems for the people working in the industry, the captains went bankrupt and the divers went further into debt. In spite of selling all their properties the debts were still not met or liquidated, and it was not unusual to find people working in the oil industry and at

other jobs for up to two decades before the debts were cleared.

As if this were not enough, the control of these properties and lands, passed into the hands of the merchants and financiers who profited greatly from them and became even richer during the time of economic growth and development following the discovery of oil.

The abuses of the pearl trade were not confined only to the pearl trade itself but extended even into the Arbitration Court which dealt with disputes in the pearl trade. This arbitration body, which was called locally Mahkamah al-Ghaws, or diving court,²⁵ was supposed to adjudicate in disputes between the divers and captains, and usually consisted of two or three of the more influential captains, who were appointed by the Ruler. At one time, in the years immediately prior to the administrative reforms of 1923, the court was reduced to only one individual.

Because of the structure of the court, in that the captains were the adjudicators, the court was often biased and the divers rarely found there the justice which they were seeking. Evidence, as such, was not taken, but the case was decided purely upon statements made by the parties involved under oath; but the captains often circumvented this by either trickery during the taking of the oath or by bought witnesses. The divers, on the other hand, having little or no money, and usually being illiterate could present neither written evidence nor could they afford to buy witnesses, as did the captains, and thus the scales were heavily loaded against them.

2) The Reforms

Up to 1924 nothing had been done to improve the conditions of the men working in the industry, although after the First World

War the British Political Agents often made mention in their reports of the harsh conditions suffered by the men in the pearl trade. However, after the situation in Bahrain had been changed by the Reforms of 1923, and a modern administration began to get under way, Major C. Daly, the Political Agent (1921-26), felt able to introduce, in 1924, a major reform in the industry, backed by the two Qadis of the Sunna and Shia sects,²⁶ the newly created Shaikh Hamed bin Isa and also with the support of the British Government in India.²⁷

Daly's work at that time was not fully appreciated, although time proved that the reforms which he promulgated were the most progressive in the pearl trade for many years. The principal features of these new laws were as follows:-

1. All hereditary debts were abolished. When a diver died, his debts died with him.
2. The amount advanced to a diver Salafiyh, and the rate of interest were to be strictly controlled and no other charges were to be debited against the diver.
3. Merchants and captains were compelled to keep regular accounts which were scrutinized by a number of diving clerks appointed by the Bahrain Government.
4. A system of accounts for the divers was instituted. Each diver was provided with a small book which contained his account with the Captain, as well as other details, such as advanced of money or goods. These books were inspected at regular intervals by the specially appointed diving clerks.

5. The boat's captain was forbidden by law to sell pearls privately, but must do so in the presence of not less than three of his divers.
6. The divers were given the right to seek other jobs on condition that they repaid part of their debt each year, and they could no longer be forced to provide unpaid labour for their captains after the end of the pearling season.
7. The old diving courts were to be reformed and in addition the diver had the right to appear before an ordinary court in any dispute with his captain, if he so desired.

Despite the fact that these reforms were designed primarily to help the diving community, and were backed by the more progressive members of the Bahrain people, the divers and pullers themselves were some of the main opponents of the reforms. Their main objection was to the restriction of the advances payable, they presumably preferred to have the cash to spend and worry about repaying it later. During the first few years following the introduction of the reforms, the advance was restricted to Rs100 to the diver and Rs 80 to the puller.

The divers considered this amount insufficient and they regularly held demonstrations at the start of every season demanding higher advances.

In 1929, Shaikh Hamed raised the limit on the advances to Rs. 130 for the diver and Rs. 100 for the pullers. In this same year the Political Agent estimated that the Reforms had enabled as many as 60% of the divers to get out of debt.²⁸

Although the reforms had proved to be of great benefit to the

diving community, demonstrations and disturbances continued to break out at the start of every season until the climax was reached in the riots of 1932.²⁹

On the 25th May, 1932, a number of divers were arrested following disturbances over the payment of Salafiyh and were imprisoned in Manama. The following day 1500 of their colleagues crossed from Muharraq to Manama with a view to releasing them. On their way they looted several shops belonging to unpopular merchants, they then marched on the police station and obtained the release of the arrested men by force.

The police, the British Adviser, the Political Agent and several Shaikhs tried to prevent them from doing so but were unsuccessful and the police were forced to open fire. Several divers were killed and a number wounded. The rioters then dispersed, but the following day the ring leaders were arrested and subjected to a public flogging in the market place, each man receiving ten lashes.

This was the last incident of this type, partly because of the setting up of a centralised Salfah Court, where the amount of advances could be fixed and grievances aired, and partly because of the new opportunities for work outside the pearl industry created by the nascent oil industry and the subsequent decline of the pearl industry. It was also possibly due to the divers finally realising that the reforms were entirely to their benefit.

b) Agriculture

Before the discovery of oil, agriculture formed the second traditional source of income for the inhabitants of Bahrain. The area cultivated was comparatively small, amounting only to approximately ten per cent of the area of the islands, which represented only about 23 square miles under cultivation. The cultivated area is confined mainly to the north of the main island where natural fresh-water springs occur.

The two most important products were dates and alfalfa and these were supplemented by small vegetable gardens.³⁰ The date palm tree played a significant role in the life of the Bahrain people prior to the oil era. It not only provided them with dates, which with rice and fish, formed the staple diet of the main part of the populace, but also provided them with almost everything they needed except clothes. Its branches were used in the construction of their homes,³¹ the dry leaves were used as fuel and also to make mats and baskets, its wood was used to make furniture and the sticks to make fish traps. Moreover, the fibre of the tree was used to make ropes which were used by the fishermen. Thus the palm tree formed the centre of agricultural life in the islands.

This importance is illustrated by a quotation from Mr. T. Bent when he cites a conversation between himself and the Wazir of Isa bin Ali, during his visit to the island in 1889. In pointing out to Bent the many advantages of the palm tree, he said, "Mohamed said, honour the date tree, for she is your mother", to which Bent replied "True enough".³²

This dependence upon the products of the date palm no longer

holds true today. The decline began in the early 20th century and continued rapidly between the World Wars, since when it has become a very minor part of the economic life of Bahrain, to such an extent that in 1967 60% of the date crop was simply abandoned.³³

A number of social and economic factors contributed to the decline of agriculture in Bahrain and the absence of a proper policy to this section of the economy accelerated its decline.

One of the main social factors was the system of tenure and renting of the land. This system has its roots in the conquest of the island by the Al-Khalifah. It has been suggested that prior to the arrival of the Al-Khalifah in Bahrain, that the land was owned by the Baharna, the Shia community of Bahrain.³⁴ After the coming of Al-Khalifah and their allies the land was regarded as the property of the conquerors, to be disposed of as the ruler wished.³⁵ From this point in time, the rulers traditionally regarded the land as their personal property to seize, give, rent or otherwise dispose of, as they saw fit.

The conquerors were helped to a certain extent by the fact that many Shia, fearing oppression and tyranny, and fearing involvement in the wars which often broke out, fled to neighbouring countries, some to the mainland and some to Persia. Thus it came about that, with so much land vacant, after a while Al-Khalifah and their allies took over and divided between them most of the cultivated land. Having done this they then proceeded to extract from the remaining Baharna, all their wealth in the form of land rents and taxes which were levied on the villages. This practice continued throughout the 19th century and the early years of the 20th. The tenure of land was made even more complex by the Shaikh Isa bin Ali (1869-1923) who would often give

or sell a particular piece of land two or three times to different persons on several occasions.

This attitude of the rulers to the ownership of land³⁶ continued well into the 20th century as for instance, when the Dawasir Arabs fled Bahrain following the political upheaval of 1923, Shaikh Hamed bin Isa, backed for a political reason by the British Resident, claimed the land which they abandoned as his personal property.

The peasants who were fortunate enough not to have had their land taken from them by force³⁷ were penalised by the imposition of heavy taxation which reduced them to the level of the tenant farmers who lived at bare subsistence level.

In the words of Major C. Daly "Date garden tax. Collected quite arbitrarily, according to the whim and appetite for oppression of the particular shaikhling, within whose area the garden exists. Practically collected from Shias only."³⁸

One would expect that after the 1923 reforms some action would have been taken with regard to the situation which existed in the matter of land tenure, especially after the repeated agitation by the Shia; or at least to the questions of taxation and land rents, bearing in mind that efforts had been made to reform the pearling industry.³⁹

In fact the Political Agent, the Political Resident and the Government of India were concerned with this problem, but decided to take no action upon it at that time, as a matter of political expediency. This is made clear in correspondence between Trevor, the Political Resident, and the Government of India. In talking of the Reform as a whole, he mentions the problems of land survey, registration and revenues and went on to say that the problem of the

land revenues was serious, because it affected the Al-Khalifah as a whole and therefore should be deferred. In the letter he states ... "We should not involve ourselves in this matter because most of the land belongs to the Al-Khalhish family and the other to the Baharna. If we collected the revenues, from the Baharna only, we would provoke their anger against us."⁴⁰ Thus, it can be seen that, as the British did not wish either the rulers or the peasants to be provoked by further drastic reforms, they presumably decided that for the time being they would merely retain the status quo.

One of the greatest abuses was the system of land rents. These were not usually on a fixed monetary basis, although a small proportion were, but were fixed on the anticipated output of a particular date garden. As rent, the tenant was expected to deliver a fixed number of date "skins" to the owner,⁴¹ irrespective of the harvest for that year or the circumstances prevailing in the island. If the tenant was unable to achieve his target he was often forced to purchase additional "skins" in the open market, with a subsequent loss of income, and many tenants fell into debt, or borrowed money at high rates of interest to retain their date gardens.

To quote Harrison

"The terms under which the date cultivators work are hard and oppressive. Contracts with the owner of the garden run for one year only and at the end of the time a new agreement must be made, the gardener must deliver not a certain percentage of the crop but a fixed number of tins or boxes of dates to the landlord. In addition he must deliver a certain amount of alfalfa, if he raised the crop, and of various other vegetables and fruits, depending of course on what the gardener raises."⁴²

There were no other means of earning a livelihood, especially for the Baharna, before the era of oil, except as either a peasant or diver. Because in the latter occupation there was rivalry for employment with the Sunna section of the community, the majority of the Baharna had no alternative except to work on the land and accept the conditions offered.

The peasant families were living under extremely insecure circumstances, either by the fear of being deprived of their tenancy, or going into debt, and in addition their insecurity was often increased by the vague terms of the contract Daman which were often subject to alteration by the owner. This latter condition was one of the grievances which were presented to Shaikh Isa Bin Ali in 1922 along with other demands for reform. The demand stated "4. Documents concerning gardens leased to subjects by the ruling family to be in duplicate, a copy in possession of each party and to be witnessed by independent witnesses. No conditions other than those written in the document to be enforced..."⁴³

Although this, along with other demands, were granted, the terms offered to the tenants did not become less harsh.

A Land Department was created in 1927 with the principal object of registering the ownership of the land and legalising the position of the owners. A proclamation was issued on 20th December, 1927 that all persons claiming to hold land must produce documentary evidence. This proclamation was presumably designed to clarify the position of many owners who held their lands either as gifts or by sale from ex- Shaikh Isa bin Ali.

The second major land law was promulgated on 8th May, 1937, when the Government of Bahrain issued a proclamation supplementary

to the 1927 Land Registration. It was on much the same lines as the 1927 proclamation but was designed to restrict ownership of land in Bahrain to Bahraini nationals and to deprive the foreign elements in the island of any land they possessed. However, this latter law confirmed that the ownership of all unclaimed land passed to the State, and subsequently to the ruler.⁴⁴ The purpose of the law was probably not so much to regulate land ownership as to provide a means of depriving the rich Iranian landlords of their holdings. This was confirmed in November 1937⁴⁵ when the Government issued a further notice stating that the new law applied specifically to them.

Neither of these laws dealt with the basic problem of land rents or distribution although it did limit the power of arbitrary seizure of the land by the Shaikhs.

Because of this problem of the fixing of a fair rent for the land was unsolved, from the 1930's onwards as alternative employment became available in the oil industry, the peasants ceased to work the land and opted for the more secure employment of the oil company.

In the words of the Government Report of 1954 "The major portion of agricultural land is owned by shaikhs and merchants who, on the whole, are not very interested in agriculture. The rent charged is relatively high and as the cost of labour has risen very appreciably in the past few years, tenants are finding it increasingly difficult to meet the rents, and making a living off the land."

As the gardens were gradually abandoned, some of those nearer the towns, especially Manama, were destroyed and re-developed as land for housing projects, which became necessary as the towns grew. Others were bought by some of the more well-to-do townsmen and made into country estates for the entertainment of their families and friends,⁴⁶

or were converted into vegetable gardens which were more profitable than the original date gardens. For instance between the years 1952-59 the number of vegetable gardens increased from 150 to 576.⁴⁷ Prior to the 1930's the peasant labour force was composed entirely of Bahrainis, but with the abandonment of the land as a way of life and the change in character of agriculture, the number of Bahrainis employed in the gardens fell and foreign labour, mainly Omani, was imported for the work in the gardens. Figures are available which show that in 1959 the number of Bahrainis working in agriculture and fishing was 3,918 and the number of non-Bahrainis was 546; by 1965 the number of Bahrainis had dropped to 3,562 and the number of non-Bahrainis had doubled to 1,094.⁴⁸

The economic factors which influenced the decline of agriculture can be separated into two aspects. First, the growing scarcity of the water supply, and second, the marketing of the crops. As the rainfall in this area is extremely small, averaging only 75 mm. per year, the gardens of Bahrain were formerly irrigated from either natural springs or surface wells. It has been suggested that the origin of this fresh water supply is from two underground aquifers located in Saudi-Arabia. The water either flowed through the gardens from the springs or was raised by various manual means from the wells to the level of the land.

In the first two decades of this century the usage and wastage of water was sufficient to alarm Shaikh Hamed bin Isa, who engaged Major Frank Holmes, who was in the area during the 1920's seeking oil concessions, to drill a number of artesian wells in Bahrain. Many of these were drilled by Holmes during the 1920's and early 1930's and for a time supplemented Bahrain's natural water supply and

changed the outlook on irrigation. Instead of having to raise the water by manual means for their gardens, a much more convenient piped supply became available, which due to its ready availability was used wastefully and thus increased water consumption.

By the late 1930's this waste of the precious water supply moved the Political Agent, H. Weightman, to attempt to influence Shaikh Hamed towards a policy of water conservancy, by placing restrictions on its use in agriculture and stopping the drilling of further wells.⁴⁹ In the meantime he also persuaded the geologists of Bahrain Petroleum Company to produce a report on the state of the water table supplying Bahrain. This report, confirmed Weightman's fears by stating that there had been a drop in the head of water and that if it continued to drop, the water would become increasingly saline.⁵⁰

The outcome of this report and of Weightman's pressures was that a proclamation was issued by the ruler that no further artesian wells were to be drilled without a written permit from the Government. This proclamation was enforced for only a few years until pressure by the influential landowners again created a growth in the number of wells drilled. The increasing consumption of water during the 1950's led to a situation whereby between 1955-58 the static head of the water had dropped by more than four inches per year.⁵¹ By the 1960's the situation had become even more serious, consumption was by now ~~11,626,000~~ ^{11,626,000} ~~130,000~~ gallons per day, a vast amount for a Gulf State of the size of Bahrain.⁵²

Despite this increasingly serious situation the Government of Bahrain took no action until as recently as 13th of January 1971,

when a law was published to attempt to restrict water consumption and to organise the distribution of the water supply. Provision was also made to carry out surveys on the water supply and to find alternative sources of supply.

The other economic problem was, as stated previously, the marketing of the date crop.

As conditions in Bahrain changed and the standard of living rose, the dates no longer formed the staple diet of the people and consequently the demand for these fell. Although in the past the local market had been limited in scope and had been controlled by a few contractors, supplying the larger consumers, demand had been sufficient to enable the farmer to make a marginal profit,⁵³ but as demand fell and the high influx of foreigners created a demand for new foodstuffs, the farmers were unable to meet the demand due to lack of capital and a lack of a policy of help and guidance from the government. As there were no tariffs on the import of vegetables, which could have been the basis of an alternative market, it was cheaper for the "few contractors", who controlled the market in Bahrain, to import these vegetables from Lebanon or other countries than it was for them to finance the farmers in order that they may be grown locally.

Although an Agricultural Department was created in the early years of the 1950's, with a British agricultural adviser, the objects of the department were restricted to agricultural experiments with a view to "meeting the requirements of the local residents for plants."

Many of these experiments were successful and produced good results but the lack of any real drive in adopting the methods devised on a large scale, and the lack of cohesive policy to make use of these

results meant that the Department became little more than an expensive demonstration unit.

The lack of a helpful policy toward the farmers is illustrated by the case of poultry farming in Bahrain. Early in 1956, experimental work showed that European style poultry farming could be successful in Bahrain⁵⁴ and subsequently Black Leghorn and Plymouth Rock poultry were successfully introduced and the results were so encouraging that in 1958 many local farmers took up poultry farming as a source of income. Ducks and geese were also introduced.⁵⁵

As the demand for poultry created a growth market, the contractors and merchants began to import cheaper frozen poultry from abroad, thus undercutting the local product and eventually led to the collapse of the local industry.

Another area of interest was animal husbandry but this met with little success as it was hardly practicable in Bahrain due to the lack of grazing and the high cost of imported feed for the animals. As the report of the Department put it, in 1954 "the cost of feeding stuff is gradually rising, the maintenance of stock for meat and milk is losing its attraction for the local population."⁵⁶ The method of milk supply has therefore either reverted to the traditional one of a neighbourhood supply from the owner of a few cows or, where these are not available, the people have taken to using dried milk.

The mechanisation of farming was yet another area where support was lacking. As late as 1956 there was not a single tractor available for agricultural use in the whole island and by 1963 there ~~was~~ ^{were} still only four tractors and the Agricultural Department was not

in a position to meet the demands for the use of them by the local farmers.

Generally speaking, a great deal of reform is still necessary in the field of agriculture in Bahrain, bearing in mind that this is one of the few areas of the Gulf with good cultivable land.

Measures which could be taken to improve the lot of the farming community and which would probably result in an immediate improvement in the industry are as follows:-

1. The sale of cultivable State-owned land to the farmers on a long term mortgage.
2. Privately owned lands be let at fair rents on long term leases.
3. Protection of the local products either by subsidies to the local farmers or by the erection of tariff barriers on imported foods until the local farmers are on a competitive footing.
4. The enlargement of the Agricultural Department and a broadening of its terms of reference with a subsequent increase in its influence and authority.
5. Establishing a system of Agricultural Education and the setting up of a relevant Institute of Agriculture.

These measures, if carried out could provide the basis of an agricultural expansion in Bahrain. They would also help to make the island more self-sufficient and may even help reverse the flow of labour from the land.

FOOTNOTES

1. Bowen, Richard le Baron, "The Pearl Fisheries of the Persian Gulf", Middle East Journal, Vol. 5, 1951. pp. 161-180.
2. Bent, Theodore, "Southern Arabia", London, 1900, p.6.
3. Belgrave, Sir C. "Persian Gulf - Past and Present" R.C.A.J. Vol. LV 1968.
4. Bowen, op.cit., p.172.
5. Wilson, D., "Memorandum Respecting the Pearl Fisheries in the Persian Gulf". Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, Vol. III., 1833, p.284. cited by Taki, A., op.cit., p.226.
6. Zwemer, S.M., Arabia the Cradle of Islam, New York, 1900, p.100.
7. Graves, P. The Life of Sir Percy Cox, London, 1941, p.96.
8. Busch, B.C., op.cit., p.26.
9. Harrison, The Arab at Home, New York 1924. P.86. op.cit.
10. Rihani, A. op.cit., p.214.
11. Cox, Sir Percy, "Persian Gulf", Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago, 1946, Vol. 17, p. 605, cited by Taki, op.cit., P.226.
12. Belgrave, Sir C., "The Pirate Coast", London 1966, p.165.
13. Thornburg, Max, "Bahrain" Encyclopaedia Americana, New York 1949 Vol. 3, p.48, cited by Bowen p.163. op.cit.
14. Kruegar, H.C., "Bahrain" Collier's Encyclopaedia, II, New York 1949, p.668.
15. Govt. of Bahrain, Annual Report, 1954, p.4.
16. The monetary values for these years were expressed in dollars. The figures shown have been obtained by converting as follows:-
1913, £1 = \$4.868; 1946, £1 = \$4.03; 1949, £1 = \$3.68 (average).
The figure of 1954 was expressed in Rupees and this was converted at the rate of £1 = Rs. 13.813.
17. Tweedy, M., Bahrain and the Persian Gulf, East Anglian Magazine 1952, p.19.
18. Wilson, D., op.cit., p.285.
19. Bent, T., op.cit., p.8.
20. Zwemer, op.cit., p.100.

21. Belgrave, C., The Pirate Coast, op.cit., p.165.
22. Littlefield, op.cit., p.100.
23. The system which we have described was known as Salafyh and was the most popular in Bahrain. Another System which was used chiefly in the mainland ports was Khamamis which was organised on a more co-operative basis. It may be that the Salafyh system was introduced following the coming of the Al-Khalifah to Bahrain as another system of payment was used this system is described by Parsons, Abraham in his book. "Travels in Asia and Africa", Longman, Hurst Rees and Orme, London 1808 pp. 202-206. Parsons visited Bahrain in the summer of 1775. He gave the value of the pearl catch as between £112,500 and £187,500 per annum.
24. Harrison, op.cit., p.80, see also Harrison, P.W., "Economical and Social conditions in East Arabia", The Moslem World, Vol. XIV, April, 1924.
25. Also known as the Salfah Court.
26. The famous two Qadis were Jasim bin Mehzah, Sunna and Kalaf bin Ahmed al-Osfoor, Shia.
27. I.O. R/15/2/8/5. "Reform in the Pearl Industry" i.e. letter from C. Belgrave, the Advisor to the Govt. of Bahrain, to the Political Agent, dated 9th February, 1930, D.O. No. 1337/48.
28. I.O. Letter from the Political Agent in Bahrain, to the British Resident in the Gulf, dated 1st June, 1929.
29. I.O. R/15/2/35/4. "The Diver riot of 1932" i.e. A letter from the Political Agent to the British Resident in the Gulf, dated 30th May, 1932.
30. It has been suggested that Bahrain, in its pre-modern history had a different agricultural production, but at least within this century no significant changes of crop have been noted. See Littlefield op.cit., p.88.
31. 1959 census was the first in which the type of houses had been counted in that year 18.1 per cent of the houses in Bahrain were "Barastis". This figure dropped in 1965 to 6.4%. The Fourth population census in Bahrain, p. 8. However in Manama in 1969 there were 499 "Barastis" from a total of 12,192 buildings. Huna Al-Bahrain, No. 217, Feb. 1970.
32. Bent, T. op.cit., p.19.
33. Ashir, A.E., Bahrain Trade Directory, 1967, p.163.
34. Belgrave, J., op.cit., p.53. See also Part One, Chapter 2.

35. This could be illustrated by the demand put forward by the Al-Abdulla section of Al-Khalifah when they insisted on having their share of the villages in mid-19th century see Kelly, J.B., op.cit., p. 508.
36. In the early 1930's some members of the Al-Khalifah began to sell their land. This was stopped by Govt. Proclamation No. 42/1351 dated 15th Nov. 1933 which forbade the al-Khalifah to sell land except to another member of the family.
37. A letter from G.R. Prior, the Political Agent in Bahrain to H.V. Biscoe, the British Resident in the Gulf dated 21st Nov. 1931.
38. Letter from C.K. Daly, Political Agent in Bahrain to British Resident in the Gulf, No. 70. C. dated 11th April, 1922.
39. See the reform of the pearl industry and see part IV of this work.
40. Letter from Trevor, the British Resident in the Gulf to Foreign Sec. to the Govt. of India, Delhi, dated 10th Nov. 1923, No. 622. S.
41. A skin is known locally as Galla. It is made by weaving palm leaves into a basket shape which normally holds 12-15 lbs of dates.
42. Harrison, P.W., op.cit., pp.51, 52.
43. I.O. letter from the Political Agent in Bahrain to the British Resident in the Gulf. No. 34.C. dated 18th Feb. 1922.
44. Govt. of Bahrain Proclamation No. 19/1356 "Law Regarding ownership of Immovable Property in Bahrain by foreigners"
45. Bahrain Govt. Notice No. 53/1356 dated 1st Nov. 1937.
46. Ashir, op.cit., p. 164.
47. Govt. Annual Report, 1959, p.2.
48. The Fourth Population Census of Bahrain, op.cit., p.28.
49. I.O. R/15/2/4/44 "Bahrain Development", see letter from H. Weightman to H.E. Shaikh Hamed bin Isa, dated 29th June, 1939, No. C/242.
50. Report to the Political Agent by Phil Huny, a geologist with BAPCO, dated 25th Sept., 1940.
51. Annual Report 1958, p.2.
52. See  Statistical Abstract 1969 p.38. Average daily consumption for 1969 calculated from figures in Abstract.

- 53. Govt. Annual Report, 1957, p.3.
- 54. Ashir, Bahrain Directory, 1963, p. 122.
- 55. Govt. Annual Report, 1958, p.3.
- 56. Govt. Annual Report., 1954, p. 93.

CHAPTER TWO

COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY IN BAHRAIN

a) The Growth of Trade

1) Imports

We have already referred earlier to the Merchant Traders as the only survivors of the traditional industries of the Bahrain people. As we have seen, the pearl trade and agriculture had declined to the point of insignificance.

The merchant trading however, continued to flourish, and the sea-going ships trading between Bahrain and the other Gulf ports were the main source of income and provided the money required for International Trade and the import of foreign goods.

This trade was carried out mainly between Bahrain and India, and to a lesser extent, with the neighbouring Arab States. By the end of the first quarter of the 20th Century however, the sea-going ships of Bahrain were confined to local trading with other Gulf ports such as Kuwait, Al-Aquer on the Hasa Coast, Doha in Qatar and the Trucial States, having been superceded on the international trade routes by the steamers of the British India Steam Navigation Company. Bahrain did not suffer because of this change as it was used as a distribution centre by the traders using the British India services for the Hasa and the States of the lower Gulf as it was the possessor of deep water harbour facilities for the larger ships being used.

The use of Bahrain by British India Steam Navigation Company grew to such an extent that they appointed a permanent local agent

to look after their interests.

The domination by British India Steam Navigation Company of the international routes and the growing influence of the British in the region brought about changes in the trade, namely that less business was done with India, but in its place large quantities of manufactured goods were imported from England for re-export to other countries in the region.

An impetus was given to merchant trading in the region by the establishment in Bahrain of the British-owned Eastern Bank Limited in 1920.¹ At first it was used chiefly by alien elements such as Indian traders and foreign companies, who were familiar with international banking procedure, but local merchants soon made use of the monetary services offered once they realised the advantages of the banking system.

An unexpected contribution to Bahrain's foreign trade occurred when between the years of 1920 and 1942,² the Sultan of Nejed and its dependencies, Ibn Saud, due to a quarrel between himself and Kuwait, placed an embargo on imports from that country and trade was re-directed through Bahrain.

Whilst this move increased the volume of trade through Bahrain, only a little was gained financially, as Ibn Saud prevailed upon the British Agent in Bahrain to use his good offices to reduce the tariff on re-exports to his country from 5% to 2½%.³ Following pressure from the British authorities Shaikh Isa at last reluctantly agreed to the suggestion of the Political Agent that only a 2 per cent duty should be levied on goods for re-export to the mainland, provided they were transferred within 20 days.⁴ During the early 1930's however Shaikh Hamed had cause

to complain of the growing practice of transferring goods at sea off the Coast of Bahrain to avoid all duty payments.⁵

The United Kingdom Government therefore, acting on behalf of Bahrain, entered into an agreement with Saudi-Arabia in November 1935 in which the latter agreed to pay a duty of $1\frac{3}{4}\%$ on goods which were transferred at sea without passing through Bahrain. Goods passing through Bahrain were still subject to the usual 2% ad valorem duty.

The growth of the foreign trade encouraged more Bahrainis to turn to this business as their source of employment. This was a slow but continuous process and reached its peak just before the discovery of oil, by which time import duties and tariffs on re-exports accounted for the major part of the national budget. For instance, in 1930 it was stated that the income from the customs duties amounted to 97% of the total revenues of Bahrain.⁶

This growth of trade made it imperative to establish a proper body for the regulation of trade and the safeguarding of the traders' interests.

Thus, the traditional body, which was known as Majlis al-Urof, which was a committee nominated by the Sheikh to sit as an arbitrary body to resolve trade disputes, was gradually reformed until, in 1939, the need was seen for a more representative body. And so in that year a formal Chamber of Commerce was established with traders' representatives sitting on the committee to legislate and protect the interests of the merchants.⁷

It was officially recognised by the Bahrain Government in 1951,⁸ and in 1968 it became known as the Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

The development of imports.

The vast bulk of foreign trade in Bahrain was, and still is, to a large extent, carried on by sea trade, and so here we must consider the trend over the years after the First World War of the growing value of the imports.

As can be seen from Table VIII, the estimated value of imports rose from £1,350,000 to £22,841,506 between 1918-19 and 1959.

Records of local boats plying into Bahrain are not so complete but for the years for which they are available a similar significant rise is observed.

TABLE VIII

Value of Imports to Bahrain (1916-70)

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of Ships</u>		<u>Estimated Value</u>	<u>Increase or</u>	<u>Percentage Increase</u>
	<u>Steamers</u>	<u>Local</u>	<u>of Imports</u>	<u>Decrease</u>	<u>or Decrease</u>
1916-17 ⁹	-	-	£1529758		
1917-18	-	-	£1607049	+ £77291	+ 5.05
1918-19	35	-	£1350060	- £256989	- 16.00
1919-20 ¹⁰	-	-	£1414423	+ £64363	+ 4.77
1920-21	-	-	£1250993	- £136430	- 11.55
1921-22	-	-	£1452689	+ £201696	+ 16.12
1929-30 ¹¹	-	-	£1930692	+ £478003	+ 32.90
1930-31	-	-	£1087524	- £843168	- 43.67
1931-32 ¹²	137	-	£ 821824	- £265700	- 24.43
1953-54 ¹⁴	535	480	£1812580	+ £990756	+120.55
1956	447	1498	£4864296.92	+ £3051716.92	+168.36
1957	471	1680	£4414009.23	- £450287.69	- 9.26
1958	657	974	£4448084.61	+ £34075.38	+ 0.77
1959 ¹³	784	890	£22841506	+ £18393422	+413.51
1962	672	2027	£27302977	+ £4461471	+ 19.53
1965	565	-	£33929072	+ £6626095	+ 24.27
1966	533	-	£36807356	+ £2878284	+ 8.48
1967	581	-	£39801226	+ £2993870	+ 8.13
1968	601	-	£45552539	+ £5751313	+ 14.45
1969	606	-	£50734676	+ £5182137	+ 11.38
1970	574	-	£70163748 ¹⁵	+ £19499072	+ 38.43

From the above table it can be seen that after the First World War the import trade gradually increased, with the exception of the years 1918-19 and 1920-21, which could have been due to repercussions of the First World War, until the 1930's, when the effects of the International Crisis made themselves felt and imports fell by 43.67% in

1930-31. The imports were further depressed during this period due to the collapse of the pearling industry, which meant a significant loss of revenue to the administration, and thus a loss of the islands main source of foreign currency earning power.

Statistics for the late 1930's and the 1940's are not available¹⁶ but comparing the figures of early 1950's with the late 1920's we may assume that wartime restrictions of the 1940's were still taking their toll, as during the war period, in spite of the revenues from the oil, which started in 1934, both the foreign and local businessmen were unwilling to place their money at risk during such an uncertain period. From what records are available, however, it can be seen that at this stage food and fuel still constituted the major portion of the imports.

The main imports up to the 1940's were mainly food and fuel with items such as rice, coffee, tea, sugar, piecegoods, wheat, flour, meat, livestock and kerosene figuring prominently on the import lists, although with the discovery of oil, imports of fuel dropped correspondingly.

The first change which became apparent in these lists was the import of construction materials such as cement, wood and steel following the start of the oil industry. The main countries exporting to Bahrain between 1920 and 1940 were British India, Persia and Iraq. Up to 1930 India was by far the larger exporter, for instance in 1929-30 she exported to Bahrain goods to the value of £1,399,173 from a total import value of £1,930,692 which represents 72.47% of the total imports.

During the period Iraq was the second largest exporter to Bahrain although the overall percentage compared with India was small.

For instance, in 1929-30 Iraq exported to Bahrain goods to the value of only £219,008 or 11.34% of the total.

The trade with Persia, despite an official embargo due to the dispute over the ownership of Bahrain, continued to grow throughout the 1920's, but then remained static and thus represented a much smaller percentage of the total imports as the years went by. In fact the position of import/export had been reversed by 1953 when of a total of 480 local ships calling at Bahrain, 265 of these were actually exporting from Bahrain to Persia.¹⁷

The pattern of imports changed dramatically during the 1950's and 1960's with the total value of imports rising rapidly and the geographical origin changing also. The type of commodities also changed from being mainly food imports, to consumer goods. The imports grew during these two decades with the exception of 1957, which was possibly due to political unrest on the island and the closure of the Suez Canal.

The apparent great increase in imports of 1959 should not be regarded as a dramatic increase as it was due to the introduction of a new and more efficient accounting system by the Bahrain Government.

Trade was encouraged by the decision in 1953 to construct a deep-water anchorage at Manama to eliminate the previous difficulties encountered by large ocean-going ships which had previously to anchor well off-shore and transfer their cargoes to lighters for trans-shipment to the island. The new harbour, "Mina Salman" was completed in 1962 and has docking facilities for up to six large ocean-going ships and extensive warehouse facilities.¹⁸

Besides the construction of the new harbour, the Bahrain Government in 1957 took a decision which made possible a Free Trade Area at the harbour,¹⁹ whereby no tariffs or duties were levied

on goods which were for re-export, thus encouraging the use of Bahrain in its traditional role as the clearing-house of the Gulf, and the setting up of more import/export agencies in the island.

From the statistics available it can be seen how these decisions had the effect of producing during the 1960's a rapid but steady growth in the value and quantity of goods imported to the island with imports increasing year by year at a rate of between 8% and 38%.

As previously mentioned, the geographical origin of import to Bahrain changed and centres of supply moved from India, Iraq and Iran to Europe and the United States, owing to the oil production industry. Although India's exports have still risen they do not represent such a significant share of the total imports, e.g., in 1962 India's share of the imports was 10.33%,²⁰ against the previously mentioned figure of 1929-30 of 72.47%.

During the 1950's and 1960's the European and U.S. share of the imports continued to rise and by 1965 represented 51.39% of the total imports.²¹ During this time the United Kingdom, due to its long and close association with Bahrain, achieved a substantial proportion of the total imports. From 1959 to 1968 the U.K. increased the value of its exports to Bahrain from £5,887,040 to £11,153,240, an increase of 89.45%.²²

The second largest exporter to Bahrain was the United States with exports for the same years of £2,610,333 and £5,507,005 respectively, an increase of 110.97%.

After these two major exporters come West Germany, Holland, Italy and France.

During the latter years of the 1960's, however, the Asian

countries began to achieve a substantial share of the market, and although exports from Europe and the United States continued to rise in value, as a percentage of the total imports their share has declined; e.g., 1965 the United Kingdom share of total imports was 25.6%, and by 1967 it had declined to 22.52%, and in 1969 was 24.63%.

The same applies to the United States as, for instance, in 1966 her share was 13.87% and by 1968 it had declined to 12.9%.

The new forces in the market of Bahrain are now Japan, Hong Kong and the Peoples' Republic of China.

Japan in 1959 exported to Bahrain goods to the value of £1,936,077,²³ and by 1969 her exports had jumped to £7,240,805, an increase of 274% in only 10 years,²⁴ by which time Japan's share of Bahrain's imports was 14.27%.

Hong Kong during the same period increased her exports to Bahrain from £491,243 to £1,962,346, a rise of almost 300%.

China did not start its export drive to Bahrain until about 1963, but by 1969 it had achieved exports to the value of £3,326,620, representing 6.56% of the total imports.

Bahrain's non-Arab neighbours such as India, Pakistan and Iran still export to Bahrain but the value of their imports remains almost static and represents only a very small proportion of the total.

The record of Bahrain's Arab neighbours is astonishingly poor, being at the bottom of the league table of imports. The largest Arab country exporting to Bahrain, namely Iraq, in 1965 and 1969 exported to Bahrain goods valued at £850,262 and £805,604, respectively being only 2.5% in 1965 and 1.59% in 1969.

Syria's exports to Bahrain in 1966 were valued at £106,830 and by 1967 it was only £78,809, 0.29% and 0.2% respectively.

As one further example, Sudanese exports in 1966 were worth £43,782 and by 1969 had declined to £14,010.

The only exception to this pattern of the Arab world is Lebanon, whose exports between 1966 and 1967 rose from £518,388 to £832,749.

The poor trade record of the Arab countries can probably be attributed to the facts that firstly, they have very little to offer to meet Bahrain's needs and those countries who do have goods for sale have no sea-going capacity to trade with Bahrain and confine themselves chiefly to the land routes. Secondly, until 1971 Bahrain was not a fully contributing member of the Arab League and could not therefore take advantage of the existing trade and tariff agreements between the members of the Arab League. Things, however, may change in the future as Bahrain is now a participant in the Gulf Amirate Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which held its third meeting in Bahrain in May, 1971,²⁵ at which ideas were put forward for joint ventures in the fields of commerce and industry.

As the sources of the goods imported have changed over the years, so also has the type of goods imported, changing from food and fuel being the major imports to consumer goods, machinery and construction materials being by far the larger.

In the field of consumer goods, household goods account for the larger proportion followed by clothing, hardware and cutlery, silk and cotton piecegoods and cigarettes.²⁶

In the machinery and construction goods category, machinery,

parts and oilwell equipment is the largest, followed by cars and accessories, cement, timber, and building materials.²⁷

The expansion in the imports of all of these goods was necessitated by the classical pattern of the needs of an expanding area, where men flowed in from all parts of the world requiring food, shelter and clothing, and the construction of towns, roads and all the basic facilities.²⁸

The influx of oil workers from the Western countries created the initial demand for western style consumer goods and as the revenues from the oil began to filter through to the Bahrain population the demand was naturally increased, thus creating a further demand for these goods, by the natural inclination of a newly rich populace having money to spare for the first time in their lives.

As the industries on the island, and the population grew, so also did the demand for both capital and consumer goods, and the per capita expenditure on imports rose accordingly as can be seen in the table below.

TABLE IX

Imports, Exports and Per Capita Expenditure on Imports
for Domestic Use

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Balance</u>	<u>Per Capita Imports for Domestic Use</u>
1959	143,135	£22,841,506	£9,499,124	£13,342,382	£ 93.20
1965	182,203	£33,929,072	£9,404,553	£24,524,519	£134.60
1970	212,000*	£70,163,748	£22,028,021	£48,135,727	£227.00

* Estimated

2) Exports

There has always been a close relationship between the imports and export trade in Bahrain and because Bahrain was used as a re-exporting centre any depression on one branch of the trade

usually produced an immediate reaction on the other.

Unfortunately, prior to 1959, neither the Political Agent's Trade Reports, nor the documents of the Bahrain Government, give a complete year by year picture of the exports from Bahrain. However, the figures which are available from these sources prior to 1959 help us to see the overall trend during this period.

The feature which characterises the Bahrain exports is that they can be divided into two distinct parts, namely, the export of oil, which we will discuss later, and the re-export of imported goods.

From 1959 onward more complete and detailed figures are available, and these, along with the earlier statistics have been combined and are shown in the table below which details the trends in this sector of the trade.

TABLE X

<u>Values and Percentages of Increases or Decreases on Re-Exports</u>			
<u>Year</u>	<u>Value of Re-Exports</u> ^{29.}	<u>Increase or Decrease</u>	<u>% Increase or Decrease</u>
1916-17	£779,943	-	-
1917-18	£817,243	+ £37,300	+ 4.79
1918-19	£1,317,811	+ £500,568	+ 61.25
1929-30	£887,565	- £430,246	- 32.65
1930-31	£604,034	- £283,531	- 31.94
1931-32	£547,896	- £ 56,138	- 9.29
1959	£9,499,124 ^{30.}	+ £8,951,228	+1633.75
1962	£9,597,197	+ £98,073	+ 1.03
1965	£9,404,553	- £192,644	- 2.01
1966	£11,028,896	+ £1,624,343	+ 17.27
1967	£12,863,397	+ £1,834,500	+ 16.63
1968	£16,194,395	+ £3,330,998	+ 25.90
1969	£17,402,802	+ £1,208,106	+ 7.47
1970	£22,028,021	+ £4,625,218	+ 26.58

It is important at this stage to consider the policy of Bahrain as a re-exporting country and to observe its development, and the

impact of the various changes.

As mentioned earlier, one of the first changes of policy after the First World War occurred in 1920 when Ibn Saud, Sultan of Najed, later Saudi Arabia, placed an embargo on the import of goods to his country from Kuwait. This in effect cut off his main source of supply of foreign goods and he was forced to turn to Bahrain for alternative supplies.

At this time the tariff on all imports to Bahrain was fixed by treaty,³¹ at a standard 5%. On re-exports, however, the Sheikh had a free hand to levy further taxes and it was customary for a handling charge of a further 5% to be levied on all goods for re-export.

Ibn Saud, however, balked at paying a total tax of 10% on all of his imports from Bahrain and so he persuaded the Political Agent in Bahrain to present a case to Sheikh Isa for the reduction of all tariffs to only 2.5% for exports to Najed. Eventually, after a great deal of bargaining the Political Agent prevailed upon Isa until he finally agreed to reduce the overall tariff on all re-exports to only 2%.³²

This lower tariff, which was low when compared with other Gulf States, except possibly Kuwait, and a relatively good harbour at that time made it possible for Bahrain's export trade to flourish. This was especially so when various foreign goods became available and Bahrain's policy of low tariffs subsequently made it possible for them to re-export at much lower prices than the other higher tariff Gulf Ports.

The lowering of tariffs also encouraged Najed ^{merchants} ~~merchants~~ to set up permanent offices in Bahrain from 1920 onwards with a view

to re-exporting to the mainland, a job for which they were admirably suited, since they knew well the needs of their countrymen.

The figures available to us show that as the quarrel between Kuwait and the Najed built up, Ibn Saud was already turning to Bahrain for more of his supplies, prior to the embargo on Kuwait's imports, as is shown in the 61.25% increase of 1918-19.

This build-up of trade continued until overtaken by the world monetary crises of the ^{late}1920's and ^{early}1930's, which had their effect on the trade figures in general, as for instance, the figures by 1929-30 had fallen by 32.65% on the 1918-19 figures.³³

Imports and exports remained at a standstill throughout the Second World War. We may make this assumption even though official trade figures for this period are not available, since the wartime restrictions of rationing essential foodstuffs such as rice, flour, sugar and tea were imposed, and price controls were introduced. These measures had the side-effect of starting an unofficial export business in the form of smuggling to the mainland coasts.³⁴ In 1941 an embargo was placed on the export of any foodstuffs from Bahrain, which lasted for the period of the war. This embargo has been re-introduced occasionally for short periods during the 1950's and 1960's.

The next stage of the policy developed in 1950, when a Customs Ordinance was issued by the Government of Bahrain.³⁵ The ordinance consisted of more than 37 articles, but, basically, it regularised the charge of 5% ad valorem on all foodstuffs and other goods imported to Bahrain. On certain consumer goods, however, such as air conditioning equipment, radios and televisions, jewellery and domestic

electrical goods, the tariff was raised to 10%. Newspapers, magazines and printing and publishing materials were exempted from all duty.³⁶

On exports from Bahrain charges were also fixed by this ordinance, but no fixed percentage was applied, rather, each item was considered individually and the charges fixed accordingly, but these normally averaged out at the usual 2%.³⁷

This continued until, as mentioned in the section of imports, the Bahrain Government in 1957 took a decision to encourage the use of Bahrain as a clearing house for the other Gulf Ports by creating a free trade area in the port of Mina Salman at Manama.

The port opened in 1962 and after a two year breaking-in period the Bahrain Port Ordinance of 1964 was issued, and under this the tariffs on goods for re-export were abolished and were replaced by a handling charge only.³⁸

This handling charge was so low in comparison with the other Gulf Ports, which retained not only handling charges, but also the old style tariffs, that the re-export business of Bahrain flourished.

As we have seen in Table X, the re-export business after 1962 grew steadily, with the exception of 1965 when there was political unrest in the island, increasing by as much as 25.9% in 1968 and 26.58% in 1970.

The nature of the goods for re-export were not determined by Bahrain, but were obviously geared to meet the needs of the countries to which they were to be exported, and although the needs were often for the same type of goods as those imported to Bahrain, the percentages required differed. The main requirements

being for foodstuffs, household goods and machinery.

The main importer from Bahrain was, and still is, Saudi Arabia, as for instance, in 1918-19 the exports from Bahrain to Saudi Arabia were £551,720 from a total of £1,317,811, or 41.87%. This rose to 84.27% by 1931-32.³⁹ It is still today Bahrain's largest customer from a monetary point of view although the percentage is now much smaller. The decline in percentage began during the late 1950's. Although the value of exports to Saudi Arabia continued to rise, the figures for 1959, 1967, 1969 and 1970 revealed the gradual decline in percentage of total trade.

TABLE XI

Value of Exports to Saudi Arabia

<u>Year</u>	<u>Value of Exports to Saudi Arabia</u>	<u>% of Total Exports</u>
1959	£5,362,521	56.45
1967	£6,683,012	51.95
1969	£8,690,016	50.03
1970	£10,984,325	49.86

40.

All other Gulf States are customers of Bahrain's re-export trade to a lesser extent.

The decline in the percentage of exports to Saudi Arabia can probably be attributed to many factors such as the devaluation of the Saudi Arabian Rial in 1957, which reduced the purchasing power of the currency, the construction of the deep-water port at Dammam, and the subsequent imposition of duties on imports from Bahrain in an attempt to dissuade the Saudi Arabian merchants from dealing through Bahrain and to use instead direct imports to Dammam.⁴¹

Bahrain, however, should still continue to play a major role as an importer to Saudi Arabia, because of the excellent monetary and banking facilities available on the island, which are

superior to those available in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, and also because of the longer experience in this type of trade of the Bahrain merchants.

In 1966 the countries of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Dubai, Abu Dabi and Muscat took between them a total of 80.82% of Bahrain's exports.⁴² This percentage was accounted for by the growing demand from the new oil-producing countries, e.g., in 1959 Abu Dabi received only 0.73% of Bahrain's exports, but by 1967 this had risen to 7.32%.⁴³

Despite these recent rises, the export trade of Bahrain is in some jeopardy due to the fact that the newly-rich oil-producing states are in the process of constructing their own deep-water harbour facilities. The upsurge in Bahrain's exports in recent years is therefore due not so much to the ability of the Government and merchants of Bahrain as the overall growth of demand in the area as the new oil fields were opened up.

As these new deep-water facilities are developed Bahrain may lose a substantial proportion of its traditional trade with the Amirates and Muscat.

The boom in the export trade may continue for a decade or so until these alternative facilities are fully utilised, but in the final analysis much of its export trade will be lost to them, and other sources of income must be found.

One alternative which could offset the loss of this trade would be for the Bahrain Government to encourage a programme of industrialisation for the island.

b) Industry

1) General

The widely-held view amongst most modern economists with

regard to the underdeveloped areas of the world is that industrialization of a community is the most readily available and effective method of achieving economic growth.

This theory holds true for most communities which have a narrow Economic Base , such as nations who are agriculturally based or who are exporters of single product raw materials, such as sugar, cotton, or in the case of Bahrain, oil.

The reasons for this view are that these two groups, relying upon a one sector product, face a number of obstacles to maintaining a steady and secure growth. Firstly, the price is fixed by demand, and is subject to large and sudden fluctuations in the international markets, over which the producer has little or no control. Secondly, the terms of trade tend to worsen for primary producers creating a balance of payments problem. Lastly, that to countries having only one exporting sector, the danger is that the Government of that country does not have sufficient control over the development of its own National Economy; i.e., in the oil industry, it is well known that the bulk of the production, refining, transporting, and marketing is under the auspices of eight international companies and these companies usually have the final word on level of production and price.⁴⁴

Besides these economic reasons for industrialization, human communities tend to associate industrialization with economic progress and increased technological knowledge. On the other hand, they regard agriculturally based communities as being rather backward.⁴⁵

Before the discovery of oil in Bahrain, the local manufacturing industries were very small and limited to meeting only a local demand.

They were what may be termed "oases" industries. For instance, the local coppersmith's market in Manama consisted of a number of family groups, who passed on their skills from father to son, making copper nails for boats and house-building, coffee pots and other cooking utensils. On the same basis, pottery was produced from kilns situated in various parts of the island, pots, bowls and water jars being their main products. Lime also was produced by the local inhabitants, but only to meet the limited needs of local housing.

Boat-building also has declined to the point of insignificance. This can be traced to the advent of steamers during the 19th century, the decline of the pearling industry and the introduction of fast motor launches. These all combined to reduce the demand for the large old-fashioned sailing boats. Many small boats were built however, after the first world war; these were mainly of the Shoa'y type, rowing boats for local inshore fishing, but even the demand for these declined after the second world war.

There was a very small amount of weaving carried out in some of Bahrain's villages, but their product could hardly be classed as commercial industry as their product was usually for their own consumption and was only very rarely sold.

None of the above mentioned industries had any influence on the national economy or contributed to its revenues.

The new era of Bahrain's economy was founded upon the discovery and exploitation of oil, with the subsequent refining and construction industries.

The production and refining of oil has dominated the economy for three decades and for the moment continues to do so, although it

is gradually being recognised that there must be more diversifications of industry into other fields.

The first step was taken in the opening of a ship repair yard in 1954 to meet the needs of the growing maritime traffic.⁴⁶ This was followed in 1955 by the setting up of a small paper manufacturing plant, but the recognition of a need for diversification was not fully realised until the 1960's. In 1961 the Bureau of Commerce began the registration of all industries in Bahrain and the number of employees in these industries.

Various other industries have started since this date, one of the more notable being the Bahrain Fishing Company in 1966, which was a joint enterprise between the Ross Group of Grimsby, England, and local capital.⁴⁷

Ah impetus to diversification was given in 1967 by the setting up of the Development Bureau to investigate the needs and prospects for new industries in the area. The first, and major success of the Bureau occurred in 1968, when a consortium of international companies⁴⁸ were persuaded to set up in Bahrain, an aluminium smelting plant which would use natural gas from the oil field as a fuel source. Work on the smelter was started in January, 1969, and production commenced in May, 1971. It will eventually supply employment for 1,400 people⁴⁹ when full production of 96,000 tons per year is achieved.

Since registration of industrial establishments was begun in 1961 there has been a steady growth in the numbers and types of industries as is illustrated by the following table.

TABLE XII

Growth of Industrial Establishments in Bahrain by Type of Industry
Since 1961

<u>Economic Activity</u>	<u>Years of Registration</u>										50.	
	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	<u>Total</u>	<u>% of total establishments</u>
Crude Oil	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.7
Farm Poultry	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2.9
Dairies	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2.1
Fishing	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	0.7
Bakeries	1	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	-	4	2.9
Beverages	5	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	7	4.7
Prefabrications	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.7
Paper Products	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	1.3
Printing & Publishing	2	1	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	6	4.1
Ice Plants	5	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	6	4.1
Oxygen Plants	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2.1
Plastic Industry	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	2	1.3
Oil Refining	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.7
Tiles	2	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	9	6.2
Blocks	6	2	4	1	2	1	1	1	-	-	18	12.4
Workshops	21	4	1	6	1	6	9	7	7	-	62	42.9
Ship Repairs	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.3
Neon Plastics	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2.1
Gas	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.7
Water Distillation	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2.1
Stone Crushing	4	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	7	4.7
TOTALS *	65	8	9	12	7	10	14	10	10	1	146	100.0

* The table does not include industrial projects under construction. We can see from the above table that there are 146 plants of different types. With the exception of oil, fishing, ship repairing and the plastic industries which have relatively large sized plants, the remainder of the servicing and manufacturing activities are small establishments belonging to individual proprietors. The overall growth of industrial establishments in the ten year period was 123%, an annual average growth rate of 13.6%.

The aluminium company, ALBA, does not figure in the table, since in 1970 the smelter was still under construction.

Since the oil industry has been the most influential industry

in Bahrain, and up to recent years the largest employer of labour, it is appropriate at this point to consider its history and its impact upon the economy of the island.

2) Oil: Concessions and Production

Following the discovery of oil in Iran in 1908 the Gulf region became a potential source of supply of this commodity and the major oil companies of that time began seriously to survey the area and to attempt to obtain the oil concessions.

The British Government wishing to safeguard the interests of themselves and the British oil companies took the initiative through the British Political Agents to ensure that the potential wealth of the area was not exploited by other foreign powers.

In accordance with this policy the British extracted from Sheikh Isa bin Ali, in the form of a letter to the Political Agent in Bahrain in May, 1911, a promise that....."if there is any prospect of obtaining kerosene oil in my territory, I will not embark on the exploitation of it myself and will not entertain overtures from any quarter regarding it without consulting the Political Agent in Bahrain, and without the approval of the High Government....."⁵¹

In the years immediately following this undertaking, possibly due to the disturbance of the war, no further action was taken until 1923, when Sheikh Hamed bin Isa took office. The Administration at this time began to discuss the deteriorating situation with regard to water supplies and it was decided to explore the possibility of sinking wells to locate further sources. A New Zealander, Major Frank Holmes,⁵² who was in the area at that time as a representative of a small London oil company, "Syndicate of Eastern and General", seeking oil concessions in the area, was contacted by two Bahrain

merchant brothers, Ali and Mohammed Yateem, with a view to drilling between 12 and 16 water wells in the island.

On behalf of his company, he undertook this work and the wells were successfully drilled. As a reward for his work, Sheikh Hamed, on 2nd December, 1925, granted an exclusive option to explore for oil over an area of 100,000 acres.⁵³ The option was eventually to run for three years, during which a payment of 10,000 rupees per annum was to be made to Sheikh Hamed, with increased payments if oil were to be found.

The concession received the approval of the Colonial Office in London.

Several geologists were hired to survey the island and advise Holmes, but in spite of evidence of oil seepages, all except one reported that drilling was not worthwhile, and even the dissenter gave only limited approval to Bahrain as a prospective source of oil.⁵⁴

Despite these discouraging reports Holmes tried unsuccessfully for two years to interest various British oil companies in purchasing the concession for Bahrain, and having failed here he turned to the American companies. In November, 1927, the Eastern Gulf Oil Company, a subsidiary of the American Gulf Oil Corporation entered into an option with a view to purchasing the oil rights of the Syndicate.⁵⁵

The purchase was, however, overtaken by events, namely the signing in 1928 of the "Red Line Agreement" which obliged the signing companies not to develop any oil concessions independently. Gulf Oil was one of the signatories of the Agreement, and was therefore, except if the Gulf Company was able to interest other

partners in exploiting the field jointly, barred from taking up the option.

In the absence of any other companies wishing to form a consortium and the refusal of permission by the other companies to allow the Gulf Company to exploit it individually, the option was not taken up in spite of good reports by the Gulf Oil geologists.

On 21st December, 1928 the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) bought the option from Eastern and General Syndicate for a sum of 50,000 dollars,⁵⁶ on condition that the Syndicate was to obtain a renewal of the concession which had expired on 2nd December, 1928, and to transfer it to Standard Oil Company of California.⁵⁷

Ratification of this agreement, however, involved the British Colonial Office who insisted that only a British-owned company would be permitted to operate in Bahrain. This issue was the cause of prolonged negotiations which eventually involved the British and American Governments, the British continuing to insist that only a British Company be allowed to operate in Bahrain, whilst the Americans pursued the "open door" policy.⁵⁸

In 1929 a compromise was eventually reached whereby a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of California, to be known as the Bahrain Petroleum Company Ltd., be formed and should be registered in Canada.

The other major provisions of the compromise were that the Bahrain Petroleum Company, must remain a British company, one of the directors of the company must be a British subject, and persona grata to the British Government. The Company's chief local representative must be appointed by the British Government, and all communications with the Sheikh must be through him and the Political

Agent. Also, as many of the employees as was consistent with efficiency must be British and Bahraini subjects.⁵⁹

By August 1930 the oil concession was assigned by the Standard Oil Company of California to Bahrain Petroleum Company, and the transfer became fully effective in December 1934 when Sheikh Hamed bin Isa granted a minor lease to Bahrain Petroleum Company carrying the same terms as the original lease, i.e. 100,000 acres on the main island. The lease was to run for 55 years and the royalties were negotiated at 3 rupees 8 annas per ton with a guaranteed minimum of 75,000 rupees per annum.

In addition to this the company was granted major customs and tax exemptions.

During the years between 1934 and 1940 negotiations took place concerning the unallotted areas of the Shaikh's dominions, with Bahrain Petroleum Company and the Iraq Petroleum Company being actively involved⁶⁰ and in 1940 the Shaikh extended the area allotted to Bahrain Petroleum Company to cover the whole of the main islands plus the islands surrounding Bahrain.⁶¹

The Iraq Petroleum Company was excluded from Bahrain by the Shaikh on the grounds that two oil companies operating on such a small area was excessive.

The new agreement which was signed in July, 1940 conferred exclusive rights to Bahrain Petroleum Company over the "present and future dominions" of the Shaikh. On the signing of the agreement the Shaikh received the sum of Rs. 400,000 (£30,000), and the minimum annual royalty was raised to £95,000 for the first 15 years, rising to £127,500 if oil was discovered in the newly-leased territories.

An additional clause in the agreement reduced the minimum

annual royalty to £11,250 and £22,500 respectively after the termination of the 15 year period.

The royalty per ton remained unchanged for the time being at 3 rupees 8 annas.

In 1952 the agreement was again renegotiated and the lease was extended to a definite termination date of 2024 A.D.

Drilling started on the first oil well in Bahrain on 16th October, 1931, and by the 1st May, 1932 the first commercially productive well was brought in at a depth of 2008 ft. This important discovery, the first on the Arab side of the Gulf, brought a renewal of interest in the Arabian Peninsula as a potential source of oil supply. The drilling was continued successfully and more wells were brought in, storage tanks were built and in December, 1934 the first tanker-load of Bahrain oil entered the world market.

Production at first rose rapidly during the first years of exploitation then settled down to a steady growth which has been maintained up to recent years as is witnessed by the following table.

TABLE XIII

Bahrain Oil Production - 1933-1970 62.

<u>Year</u>	<u>U.S. Barrels</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>U.S. Barrels</u>	<u>Tons</u>
1933	31000	4000	1952	11004278	1510000
1934	285072	39008	1953	10978351	1506000
1935	1264807	173072	1954	10994754	1570000
1936	4644635	635555	1955	9196527	1260000
1937	7762264	1058511	1956	11013702	1509000
1938	8297997	1138000	1957	11691462	1602000
1939	7588544	1041000	1958	14873111	2038000
1940	7074065	971000	1959	16473378	2257000
1941	6794110	932000	1960	16500424	2260000
1942	6241135	856000	1961	16444492	2252000
1943	6571825	902000	1962	16445932	2253000
1944	6710810	921000	1963	16502868	2261000
1945	7309125	1003000	1964	17999821	2466000
1946	8009925	1099000	1965	20787617	2848000
1947	9410710	1291000	1966	22520831	3085000
1948	10914905	1496000	1967	25370007	3475000
1949	10985484	1508000	1968	27597728	3781000
1950	11015711	1512000	1969	27813454	3810000
1951	10994344	1508000	1970	27973000	3832000

In 1936, due to difficulties in marketing the crude oil, Bahrain Petroleum Company decided to erect its own refinery on the island. This installation was initially designed to handle up to 10,000 barrels per day. The commissioning of this plant took place in 1937.⁶³

In the meanwhile the Standard Oil Company of California had been conducting negotiations with the Texas Corporation for use of its marketing facilities, as the latter had an extensive distribution network in Asia, Africa and Australia, but no Middle East oil production at that time, all the company's oil being shipped from America to these markets.

Finally, on 28th June, 1936, an agreement was reached between the two which resulted in the formation of the California-Texas Oil Company (CALTEX) with each company, Bahrain Petroleum Company and Texas Oil Company becoming equal partners in the Bahrain oil production in exchange for a 50% share of the Texas Corporation's eastern marketing facilities. Thereafter Bahrain Petroleum Company became the producer of oil and all the marketing was done by Texas Oil Company.

In January, 1946 Texas Oil Company completed the purchase of a company which had been marketing oil in Europe and the Mediterranean countries, thus extending even further their already considerable markets into the Western Hemisphere.

The Truman proclamation of 28th September, 1945, regarding the exploitation of minerals within the area of the continental shelves, created a new precedent in international law and opened up wider opportunities for the oil companies.

In June, 1949, after having taken advice on the subject, the

Sheikh of Bahrain issued Proclamation No. 37, in which he declared

....."that the sea-bed and the subsoils of the high seas of the Persian Gulf bordering the territorial waters of Bahrain and extending seaward as far as limits that we, after consultation with the neighbouring governments shall determine more accurately when the occasion so requires, belong to the country of Bahrain"⁶⁴

As previously mentioned, the royalties were originally fixed at 3 rupees 8 annas per ton. However, following the devaluation of the rupee in 1949 Bahrain Petroleum Company increased the royalties to 10 rupees per ton. This came into effect from January, 1950.⁶⁵

During 1951 and 1952 the Government of Bahrain entered into negotiations with Bahrain Petroleum Company again in an attempt to achieve a larger proportion of the profits from the oil in line with local tendencies to claim a 50-50 profit sharing of the net income from the production and sale of the oil. Although negotiations continued well into 1952, agreement along these lines was finally reached and the agreement was backdated to 1st January, 1952.

Although this agreement substantially increased Bahrain's earnings from the oil, the price of Bahrain oil, which was used as a basis for calculating the taxes paid to the Bahraini government, was below the posted prices used to determine such payments to the host governments of neighbouring oil producing countries. Instead the price was arbitrarily established by the parent company, Bahrain Petroleum Company, and the marketing subsidiary, California Texas Oil Company.⁶⁶

In line with Proclamation No. 37 of 1949, the Sheikh of Bahrain conducted direct negotiations with King Saud of Saudi Arabia in 1958. These negotiations concluded on 22nd February, 1958 and resulted in the establishment of marine frontiers between the two countries.

Article 2 of this treaty designated an area to the northeast of Bahrain in which Bahrain was to receive half of the net profits of any oil found in that area. Sovereignty of the area was to be retained by Saudi Arabia who would also carry out any oil operations in the designated area.⁶⁷

In 1963 the Arabian American Oil Company began to drill in this area and oil was found in the off-shore field of Abu Safa, some 27 miles north of Dahrhan. Commercial production began on 19th January, 1966, and in accordance with the Treaty the Bahrain Government began to receive its negotiated share of the net profits, thus increasing her oil revenues. As the oil revenues grew over the years so also did the utilization and capacity of the refinery, which as previously mentioned, was originally constructed to handle 10,000 barrels per day, had been quickly extended during 1937 to handle 25,000 barrels per day by adding a second crude still with a cracking, reforming and treating plant. During 1938 the capacity of the crude still was further increased to 30,000 barrels per day.⁶⁸

By then the refining capacity was in excess of Bahrain Petroleum Company's oil production and the company decided to import crude oil from Saudi Arabia to utilize the spare capacity. This operation was carried out initially by the use of tank barges which were eventually replaced in 1945 by the construction of a

direct underwater pipeline to the island.

During the war years the Bahrain oil production and refining capacity was appreciated as a highly valuable contribution to the war effort, and in 1943 the United States Government decided to rapidly develop the Saudi Arabian fields. In turn the Bahrain refinery was increased yet again in size and scope in this year by the addition of a third crude distillation unit, a catalytic cracking unit to produce high octane spirit, a gas recovery and stabiliser unit and other units for the manufacture of special products.

The throughput of the refinery was raised to 37,500 barrels per day in 1944 and to 65,000 per day in 1945.⁶⁹ In this year the new 12 inch pipeline was laid over the 34 miles between Bahrain and the mainland for the delivery of crude oil to the refinery. At this time the 17 miles of underwater pipe was the longest underwater stretch of pipe in the world.

Between 1947 and 1952 the capacity of this line was doubled to meet the expanding requirements of the refinery.

During 1944, following the opening of the catalytic cracking plant, a drum manufacturing and filling plant was added to facilitate the transportation of the high octane aviation fuel and motor spirit being produced.

Following the war years the refining capacity of Bahrain continued to grow and reached its peak during the late 1960's, and in 1969 whilst the Bahrain oil production was only 27,813,454 barrels the total refined was 87,375,625 barrels, an average of 239,385 barrels per day.⁷⁰

The products currently being manufactured by the Bahrain refinery include Naptha, Gasoline, Kerosene, Aviation Turbine Fuel, Diesel Oil, Fuel Oil and Asphalt.

TABLE XIV

Selected Years of Refining Production (U.S. Barrels)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Bahrain Products Refined</u>	<u>Saudi Arabian Products Refined</u>
(1953	10978351	59668382
71. (1954	10991754	65164333
(1955	9196527	61116578
1956)	10941126	58459368
1957)	11784980	44291485*
1958)	14828176	48668088
1959)	16390110	50548677
1960)	16493442	58462862
1961)	16493998	63238830
1962)	16487577	71982462
1963)	16597889	66450124
1964) 72.	17911358	56974833
1965)	20793253	49647777
1966)	22516482	49397139
1967)	25311229	62444609
1968)	27543057	55877186
1969)	27813454	58159182
1970)	27940945	63517833

*It should be noted that the substantial drop in Saudi Arabian oil supplies for 1957 was due to the closure of the pipeline between November, 1956 and March, 1957, because of the effects of the Suez Crisis. There is no official explanation for the fall in supply from Saudi Arabia between 1963 and 1966 study of the Bahrain Petroleum Company's reports for these years indicate major shut-downs of parts of the refinery for repairs, modernisation and automation.

Although, as can be seen, the oil from Saudi Arabia represented the major portion of the refinery's throughput, the advantage to Bahrain until 1952 was nil as no royalties were collected on the oil so processed. But in 1952 with the opening of the second pipeline from Saudi Arabia a small tax of 5½ cents per barrel on all oil passing through the pipeline was levied.⁷³

Between the years of 1960 and 1964 Bahrain Petroleum Company was extremely active in surveying all the territory within the area of its concession in an attempt to locate further oil supplies. Having failed to locate any reserve fields the company in 1965

relinquished all territorial rights except for the current production area, and the area relinquished was re-leased to the Continental Oil Company.

Although Bahrain was not an active member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), she still managed to take advantage of OPEC negotiations and agreements. For instance in 1965 Bahrain Petroleum Company agreed to the principle of royalty expensing to the limit of 12½% of the production at the posted price, but reserved the right to deduct 8½% from the 1964 posted price, 7½% in 1965 and 6½% in 1966, reducing gradually to zero.⁷⁴

It is worth noting that the Bahrain oil production is extremely small when compared with other countries in the Gulf region, but it is still important in that it possesses one of the largest refineries in the Middle East.

At the present moment, the existence of an oil industry in Bahrain appears to be limited, as it is calculated that the oil reserves in the island are sufficient to last till only 1990.⁷⁵ It has, however, had a major influence on the island in two spheres.

First, it has created a much needed field of employment and second, the revenues from the oil have made it possible to introduce measures for the social and economic development of the community at the time it was most needed. As Longrigg put it, ... "No community or government, indeed, has been more suddenly and timely rescued from economic disaster than those of Bahrain in 1932....."⁷⁶

The payment of the oil revenues to Bahrain was from the beginning divided into three equal parts. One part is paid directly to the Shaikh for the maintenance of his household and family. Another

part is used to meet current government expenditure and development projects. The third part is invested abroad as a reserve against future contingencies.⁷⁷ These payments of the revenues are confined to the production of Bahrain oil. It has been suggested that revenues from the foreign oil fields, such as Abu Safa, are regarded as the Shaikh's personal income. This may be true, as the income from the Abu Safa oil fields was expected to increase the oil revenues by 1970 to a figure approximately 40% higher than that of 1964.⁷⁸ On studying the figures available this projected increase does not appear to have taken place. The income from oil has over the years been the mainstay of the Bahrain economy, with customs duties, interest from overseas investments, and other smaller items making up the remainder.

The writer arrived at the following figures for oil income after deducting the one third of the revenues which is paid directly to the Shaikh. Thus the true amount available for Government expenditure may be arrived at and the percentage which the oil revenues represent of the total State Budget may be established.

TABLE XV

The Contribution of Oil to the State Budget

<u>Year</u>	<u>Oil Income</u>	<u>Total (All Sources)</u>	<u>%</u>
79. 1934-35	Rs. 379000	1153000	32.87
1935-36	Rs. 461000	1416000	32.56
1936-37	Rs. 2110000	3281000	64.31
1937-38	Rs. 2363000	3563000	66.32
1938-39	Rs. 2157000	3500000	61.63
1939-40	Rs. 2368000	3717000	63.71
1940-41	Rs. 1977000	3443000	57.42
1941-42	Rs. 1748000	3108000	56.24
1942-43	Rs. 1807000	3798000	47.58
1943-44	Rs. 1859000	4575000	40.63
1944-45	Rs. 2017000	5391000	37.41
1945-46	Rs. 2073000	5634000	36.80
1946-47	Rs. 2601000	7379000	35.25
1947-48	Rs. 3061000	8799000	34.79
1948-49	Rs. 3281000	10547000	31.11
1949-50	Rs. 6255000	13877000	45.08
1950-51	Rs. 10226000	20042000	51.02
1951-52	Rs. 13401000	25358000	53.06
1952-53	Rs. 27656000	45061000	61.38
1954	Rs. 35002000	49200000	71.14
1955	Rs. 28370000	44790000	63.84
1956	Rs. 24120000	38005000	63.47
80. 1957	Rs. 35040664	54863668	63.87
81. 1958	Rs. 39553756	58613822	67.48
82. 1959	Rs. 33540124	55689455	60.23
83. 1960	Rs. 35243924	59061962	59.67
1961	Rs. 34741158	54852429	63.34
84. 1962			
85. 1963	Rs. 35858666	58355667	61.45
86. 1964	Rs. 39039954	63335954	61.64
87. 1965	Rs. 39333334	71133332	55.30
1966			
1967			
88. (1968	B.D. 5333000	8814000	60.50
1969	B.D. 5913000	9793000	60.38
1970			
89. 1971	B.D. 6133000	14933000	41.07

Starting from 1965 the Bahrain Annual Budget moved into a deficit situation and the government began to draw upon the portion of the oil revenues which were normally invested abroad plus the interest from existing investments, and quite recently, due to the expansion of the social services and the consequent growth of the

civil service, some of the actual investments have been redeemed for use in the island's budget.⁹⁰ This is clearly shown by the figures for 1971 where although oil earnings are the highest ever recorded they represent only 41.07% of the Governments Budget.

It can also be seen from the table that during the last two decades, with only very few exceptions, oil revenues have provided more than 60 percent of the islands income, a percentage high enough to qualify Bahrain as a "single product" state, and it is obvious that if for one reason or another this income had been curtailed then the economy of the island would have quickly collapsed.

FOOTNOTES

1. Eastern Bank Limited - Al Rihani, op.cit., p.266
This was the first bank to be established in the Arab Gulf. It remained so until 1941 when the British Middle East Bank opened in Kuwait. Also see "Huna al'Bahrain", No. 217, Feb. 1970. "Al -Manama" by Shaikh Abdulla K. al-Khalifa, pp.20-25.
2. This embargo was the result of a boundary dispute between Najed and Kuwait. Marlow, J. "The Persian Gulf in the Twentieth Century"^{Gresset} London, 1962.75., states that the embargo began in 1922, but apparently it started two years earlier according to Rihani who, as an eye witness, attempted to mediate between Ibn Saud and the Shaikh of Kuwait, but was unsuccessful. This version is confirmed by H.R.P. Dickson, Political Agent in Bahrain, 1919-1921, in his private papers, held in the Middle East Centre of Oxford Univ.
3. Dickson, H.R.P. Private Papers
4. Letter from Pol. Res. To Shaikh Isa No. 438 of 29th August, 1920. In this letter the Pol. Res. informed Shaikh Isa that the duty on goods for transshipment to the mainland would be 2% only.
5. Letter from Shaikh Hamed bin Isa to Pol. Res., H.V. Biscoe dated 27th June, 1932.
6. F.O. 371-144457, a letter from the Political Resident in the Gulf, H.V. Biscoe, to the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India, dated 13th Feb. 1930.
7. Personal interview with Mr. Kassim Fakroo, Former Treasurer of the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
8. Al-Obadi, K.N., "Al-Bahrain", Baghdad 1969, p.211
9. Dickson, I.O., H.R.P. Report on Bahrain Trade No. 101.189, dated 22/7/1920.
10. F.O. 371-8942, Report on Bahrain Trade for 1921 and 1922 by Major C. Daly.
11. F.O. 371-16008, Report on Bahrain Trade No. 787, dated 21/7/1932, by Capt. C.G. Prior, Political Agent.
12. From 1953 to 1958 the figures were extracted from various Bahrain Govt. Reports, and were expressed in Rupees. These have been converted to Pounds Sterling on the basis £1.00 = 13 Rs.
13. For 1959 and 1962 the figures were extracted from "Statistical Abstract", Bahrain Govt. 1967, (Arabic), p.56. "Statistical Abstract", Bahrain Govt. 1969, p.40. Values expressed in Bahrain Dinars and converted on the basis of £1.00 = 1.142 BD.

14. Excluding tankers.
15. All figures c.i.f. But excluding gold and silver, bullion and dust.
16. Farougy, A. op.cit., p.41. quotes figures for imports / exports between 1941 and 1947, but as he does not mention his source and as the totals appear to be high, too much reliance should not be placed upon them. The proportion of the various commodities however, appear consistent with what may have been expected at that period.
17. Bahrain Government Annual Report, 1954, p.77.
18. Ashir, A.E., Bahrain Trade Directory no. 5, 1963, pp.81-91.
19. Bahrain Government Annual Report, 1957, p.5.
20. Statistical Abstract, 1969, p.40. This figure probably includes English or other foreign goods re-exported from India.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. For figures before 1965, see "Statistical Abstract", 1967 (Arabic).
24. Ibid & Statistical Abstract 1969.
25. "Huna al Bahrain", No. 233, June 1971.
26. Statistical Abstract, 1969, p.41.
27. Ibid.
28. Rostow, W.W. "The Process of Economic Growth", Oxford University Press 1962, p.211.
29. Excludes export of oil, gold and silver, bullion and dust.
30. Converted from Bahrain Dinars at the rate of £1.00 = 1.142 B.D. from 1959 onward.
31. The treaty referred to by Dickson in his private papers was probably that of 1861, "Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship", in which in Article 3 Sheikh Mohammed bin Khalifah gave favoured status to all British subjects, including Indian merchants for the import of their goods. This, however, had over the years gradually been applied to all merchants. For this treaty see Great Britain, British Foreign and State Papers, vol. 56, 1864-65, pp. 1402-3.
32. Dickson, H.R.P. - Private Papers.

33. Unfortunately, export figures for the period 1919-1922 are not available in F.O. 371-8942 op.cit.
34. Belgrave, C.D. - "Personal Column", op.cit., p.116. The mainland coast maybe taken to include Iran. As Faroughy op.cit. p.112 stated that "A bag of sugar could be bought in Bahrain for 80 Rs. and on the Persian Coast would be sold for 800 Rs.
35. For details of this see "Bahrain Gazzette", Jan. 1950.
36. Goods for the Ruling Family, materials for BAPCO, and more recently some industrial projects have also been allowed into Bahrain exempt from all tariffs.
37. Bahrain Trade Directory, 1967, see Bahrain Trade and Customs Procedure, pp. 137-141.
38. Bahrain Trade Directory, 1967, see pp. 182-188.
39. Villiers, A., "Sons of Sindabad", New York 1940, pp.342-3. The author observed, on a visit to Bahrain in 1938, on board a Kuwaiti ship, en route from East Africa to Kuwait, that Ibn Saud's agents in Bahrain were buying as much as possible from passing ships.
40. Statistical Abstract, 1969, p.47.
41. See Sanger, R.H., "The Arabian Peninsular" Cornell Univ. Press, New York 1954 p.147.
42. Statistical Abstract, 1967, p.60 (Arabic).
43. Ibid.
44. "Oil in the Persian Gulf", - The World Today, Vol. 20, July, 1964, pp.305-331, anon. Also Haytham Malluhy, "A Comparative Study of Oil Concessions in Arabian Countries and Venezuela", (Arabic), Al-Abhath, Vol. 12, No. 3, Sept. 1959, pp. 392-450.
45. Viner Jacob, "International Trade and Economic Developments", Oxford University Press, 1953, pp.46-54.
46. Bahrain Ship Repairing and Engineering Company (BASREC) - a company consisting of 700 local shareholders. The first slipway was constructed by Gray Mackenzie & Co. Ltd., on the south side of the Manama - Muharraq causeway and later extended and new slipways constructed at Mina Salman with a capacity to handle ships of up to 2,000 tons. A.E. Ashire, Bahrain Trade Directory, 1967, p.35.
47. Al-Nahar, Beirut daily newspaper, Special supplement on Bahrain, July, 1970, p.36.

48. ALBA consists of a consortium comprising the Government of Bahrain, 19%; British Metal Corporation, 17%; Aktiebolaget Elektrokoppar of Sweden, 12%; Western Metals Corporation, 8.5%; General Cable Corporation, 17%; Breton Investments, 9.5%; plus smaller holdings by a number of other companies. See Report of the London Chamber of Commerce Mission, 1969 "States of the Arabian Gulf - A Survey for Businessmen", p.25.
49. This figures is based on Government estimates, other sources state that the eventual number may only be 450 persons - See "Monthly Survey of Arab Economics" Year 2, No. 22, Beirut October 1970. p.52.
50. Al-Mulla, Aziz Ahmed K., "Industry in Bahrain - Its Present Structure and Future Prospects", unpublished paper, Kuwait Institute of Economic and Social Planning in the Middle East, 1970, p.9.
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62. This table is calculated and compiled from BAPCO's annual reports.
63. Longrigg, S.H., op.cit., p.104.
64. Young, R., "Further Claims to Areas Beneath the High Seas", American Journal of International Law, Vol. XLIII, No. 4, Oct. 1949, p.791. For the text see the Supplement of this article. Proclamation No. 37-1368 H, June 5th, 1949, pp. 185-186.
65. Shwadran B., op.cit., p.383.
66. Shwadran op.cit. pp. 382-383. The author at the same time states that up to 1948 BAPCO had made \$55,000,000 from an investment of \$1,000,000 in Bahrain and Caltex \$17,000,000 from an investment of \$100,000.
67. For the text of the agreement, see Al-Baharna, H., "The Legal State of the Arabian Gulf States", Appendix No. X. p. 319.
68. Longrigg, S.H., op.cit., p.103.
69. Longrigg, S.H., op.cit., p.136.
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71. Cummins, John W., "Report of an Inquiry into the Working of the System of Government in Bahrain, and The Structure of the Bahrain Civil Service", 1957, part I, p.3.
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76. Longrigg, S.H., op.cit., p.103.
77. Shwadran, B. op.cit., p.379.
78. "An Economic Survey of Bahrain", British Middle East Development Division, Beirut, 1965, p.24. Although not a member of OPEC Bahrain, in May 1970 joined the regional organization, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)
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83. " " " " " , 1960, p.99.
84. " " " " " , 1961, p.66.
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89. Pamphlet, "Bahrain" - Govt. of Bahrain, no date given.
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CHAPTER THREE

THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF MODERN INDUSTRY

a) The Structure of the Bahrain Labour Force.

Starting from the third census of Bahrain in 1959 information was collected regarding the economic status of the economically active members of the population, the industries in which they were working and the occupations which they followed.

The early census of 1956, which covered employment only, was to a certain extent an estimate of the actual numbers in certain fields, but it provides us with a basis from which we may build to obtain the overall picture and trends.

It is noticeable from table XVI below that, during the period covered there has been a tremendous growth in the number employed in the Government Service, which at the present time is the largest single employer of labour, due to an expansion of the government administration machinery. Meanwhile, other sections, such as the wholesale trade have experienced a period of growth followed by a rapid decline. In the case of the wholesale trade this was probably due to the fact that in earlier years with a rapidly growing economy many small wholesaling businesses were set up but as the economy became more stabilised the trade was not so attractive to small traders, amalgamations and rationalisations took place until finally the wholesale trade was left in the hands of a few larger companies whilst those employed in the smaller wholesale agencies found employment in the other sectors, such as the retail trade.

An interesting feature of the table is the very high proportion of non-Bahrainis in the labour force, the percentage of

TABLE XVI

Industry	Table of Economically Active People by Trades									
	1956			1959			1965			1971
	B	N-B	Total ^{1.}	B	N-B	Total ^{2.}	B	N-B	Total ^{3.}	
Agriculture & Fishing										Total ^{4.}
Manufacturing	716	996	1712	3918	546	4464	3562	1092	4654	995
Construction	2492	1472	3964	817	207	1024	224	177	401	2327
Oil Industry	5826	2959	8785	2742 ^{5.}	1997	4739	3452	4876	8328 ^{6.}	4765
Quarrying	49	17	66	6127 ^{5.}	2784	8911	5164	1776	6940 ^{6.}	519
Wholesale Trade	-	-	-	154	316	470	124	53	177	4
Retail Trade	-	-	-	299	205	504	638	828	1466	107
Banking	3368	2449	5817	3061	1201	4262	3889	2031	5920	2039
Transport & Communications	-	-	-	143	130	273	202	152	354	330
Government Services	887	864	1751	1119	512	1631	2928	2566	5494	2676
Other Services ^{8.}	-	-	-	4128	2364	6492	6922	3472	10394	3980
Not Stated	4055	3446	7501	8031	5614	13645	4126	5020	9146	4526
	-	-	-	371	169	540	-	-	634	183
Total	17393	12203	29596	30910	16045	46955	31231	22043	53274	22451
										60301

B - Bahraini

N-B - Non-Bahraini

The economically active population for 1959, 1965 and 1971 was taken to include employees, employers, the self-employed, unpaid family workers and the unemployed who were looking for work. On the other hand students, disabled and retired persons were excluded as were also the housewives.

the total being in 1956 - 41.2%; 1959 - 34.2%; 1965 - 41.3%; and 1971 - 37.2%. The reason for this is possibly due to the fact that the non-Bahraini labour forces are composed of two main groups, those possessing technical skills and those having no skills but providing manual labour for the construction, transport and retail trades, and working in the service industries, jobs which are not attractive to the local population because of the low status and pay, but which are nevertheless essential to the economy.

As we have already mentioned the unemployed were included in the figures of the previous table, but this does not show us the unemployment rate for the economically active groups, nor yet have we considered the proportions of the economically active with respect to the total population, the crude participation rate, two features which are important in any industrially based economy.

Table XVII below has been calculated from the available figures in the censuses of the three years 1959, 1965 and 1971.

It is noticeable from the table that the crude participation rate for the non-Bahraini population is very much higher than that of the Bahrainis. This is because the non-Bahraini population have emigrated to Bahrain for the sole purpose of obtaining employment and it follows that the vast majority of the immigrants are of the working-age groups and in many cases do not bring their dependants with them.

It is noticeable, also, that the crude participation rate of the Bahraini population has steadily fallen and this is no doubt due to the large increase during the period shown in the total population which now includes a very high proportion of young people who may not

be considered active.

The crude participation rate of the total population of Bahrain, both Bahraini and non-Bahraini, is less than the world average crude participation rate, which was 42.5% according to the censuses taken in 1950 and 1951.⁹ But this is no doubt due to the fact that the local female population ~~being~~^{are} almost entirely non-working due to local customs and attitudes. When one compared the participation rates of the Bahraini males with those of other countries, such as the North American continent however; then the figures are very similar at the level of 56.8 per cent.¹⁰

The unemployment figures show that the percentage unemployed in the non-Bahraini population is substantially lower than that of the Bahrainis. This is probably because the majority of the non-Bahrainis are prepared to change their field of employment more readily and to accept any employment which may be offered. This difference is accentuated partly by the Bahrainis' social attitude to jobs involving manual labour and domestic service, these being looked upon as very inferior means of employment.

The figures for 1959 and 1965 show a substantial degree of unemployment in the island, a situation which now seems to have changed, although the figures for 1971 should be treated with some reserve as the normal method of specifying a particular number as being unemployed was not used. Instead, the number given was "unemployed persons seeking work for the first time", a rather inadequate statement.

From the Government Census of Industry in 1969 it can be established that of the total number of persons employed on industrial projects in Bahrain, the Bahrainis numbered 5,381 and the non-Bahrainis

1,808, and of the total numbers of Bahrainis employed, 4,455, or 82.8% were directly or indirectly employed by Bahrain Petroleum Company.¹¹ As is shown in Table XVI up to 1959 the Bahrain Petroleum Company was still the largest single employer of labour in the island, even larger than the Government, and it is therefore appropriate at this stage to study the employment, wages, and technical training given to the Bahrainis and the developments which these brought about.

b) Bahrain Petroleum Company as an employer.

1. General

In the years immediately following the discovery and production of oil in Bahrain, the industry provided a great opportunity for local manual workers to obtain steady employment at relatively high wages following the decline of their more traditional methods of employment. In those years, however, there was very little prospect of the local labour being employed as anything other than manual workers, since the needs of the company were for labour with particular skills which were not available locally and which therefore had to be recruited from abroad. As Mr. Max Weston Thornburg pointed out.

....."the American oil men (in Bahrain) had been told by British friends with many years experience in other parts of the Middle East that not much could be expected of Arab labour, and that for all but the lowest unskilled grades it would be necessary to import Indians or others for training. The local labour, consisting of peasants, villagers, tribesmen, fishermen, pearl divers and town-fringe indigents, was indeed unskilled.

It was also illiterate, impoverished, under-nourished and diseased, these people flocked to the company for employment but were seemingly indifferent to wages beyond the few rupees which would provide food for the family group that each supported."¹²

The first part of this statement is possibly true as up to that time the local inhabitants had experienced very little contact with organised industries, and the standard of general health and medical attention was very low. But to state that they were indifferent to wages beyond that which would support their families seems to be something of an exaggeration.

For the first ten years or so the policy of the company was to subcontract the hiring of labour in the island to local agents, namely Ali and Mohammed Yatteem, who received from the company the wages of the men employed which they then distributed to the workers after having deducted a substantial commission for themselves. The money actually received by the workers at this time was often as low as 4 to 6 Annas (1 Rs. = 16 Annas) per day.

This system naturally led to dissatisfaction on the part of the local labour especially when they saw the Indian workers and others, over the years, being granted better wages and conditions than those which they themselves enjoyed. Throughout Bahrain Petroleum Company's industrial history in the island, these feelings continued to grow and were usually connected with wages and conditions as the labour concessions of the workers developed. However, it is difficult to talk of labour unrest in isolation, as periods of unrest on the industrial scene usually coincided with political unrest in the island, as happened in 1938, 1953 and 1965.¹³ The only exception to this record was in 1943 when a strike took place relating to wages and conditions at a period when, due to the war, there was very little political activity in the island.

The main demands of local employees were usually in the fields of wages, conditions and training, the last-mentioned being very

important as the Bahrainis resented the presence of Indians and Pakistanis on the intermediate grades of the company, which in fact appeared to the Bahrainis as a threat to their promotion prospects.

As early as 1940, the editor of the local paper, Abdulla Al-Zayed, in a meeting with Mr. Thornburg, company Vice-President, placed before him some of the complaints and demands of the local employees. These were as follows:-

a) That after the deduction of his personal expenditure connected with his employment, the local labourer was left with only 10 rupees per month on which to support his family.

b) That the quarters provided by the company were too cold in winter and too hot in the summer, and that electric lighting should be provided.

c) That the local employees should be given training which would enable them to replace the Indian workers at the earliest opportunity.¹⁴

The justice of these demands was borne out by a letter sent to the Political Agent by the chief local representative of the Bahrain Petroleum Company in 1942¹⁵ in which he mentioned that although some local employees were performing the same work as the Indians, the latter enjoyed other privileges denied the Bahrainis, such as hospitalisation during illness, and half pay during the hospitalisation, and also the payment of housing allowances and war allowances. This created a feeling of frustration amongst the Bahrainis, as was instanced by an occurrence which took place in 1939 during the visit of a Swedish doctor, Dr. Lindit, to the island.

He wrote,

"I shall never forget the very hurt face of my very well-born Arab interpreter when, accompanying me on a tour of the Bahrain oilfields, he was refused admittance to the hospital".¹⁶

The wages of the Bahraini coolie during the early 1940's did not exceed one rupee per day,¹⁷ and the resentment at these conditions gradually built up, culminating in the strike of 1943, when on the 22nd December the local labour employed in the refinery walked out in protest against the wages and conditions. They were soon joined by the workers in the company's transport department, tank field, and sea transport divisions.¹⁸

The strike continued until the end of the month and almost brought the company to a standstill.

Great efforts were made by the Adviser to the Government, the Political Agent and the Chief Local Representative of the company to persuade the men to return to their work in return for a promise that their demands would receive full consideration. When their efforts failed Bahrain Petroleum Company introduced a Benefit Plan and War Allowances scheme to bring them more into line with the Indian workers, but this would apply only to those who returned to work before 30th December.

Pressure was also brought to bear upon the Shaikh to persuade the workers to return even though he was in sympathy with some of their demands, such as the granting of Fridays, the main Islam day of worship, as a regular paid rest day. He was approached by the Political Agent who later stated in his report,

....."I pointed out to His Highness that the cessation of work at the refinery would mean a serious falling-off in the output and would seriously affect the supply of petrol for the Royal Air Force. I also drew his attention to the fact that cessation of work at the refinery should mean a decrease in royalties paid to His Highness....."¹⁹

After the suspected ringleaders had been arrested by the Government and the workers began to feel the hardship with no money to support their families, they began gradually to return to work. By the first week of January, 1944 all the workers were back at work again with nothing more than the War Allowance which amounted to 20% of their wage.

The workers who had remained at their posts during the strike were rewarded by the company with the grant of an ex-gratia payment equivalent to the War Allowance payable for the strike period, a blatant attempt to buy the loyalty of the workers.

The demands which were the cause of the strike were as follows:-

- 1) The Tindal at Bahrain Petroleum Company should receive 10 rupees per day.
- 2) The ordinary gauger or operator should get at least 7 rupees per day.
- 3) Labourers at any plant should receive 4 rupees per day.
- 4) Pay should be given to the labourers for holidays, whether weekly holiday or Iad holiday.
- 5) All labourers should be entitled to transport to and from their places of work, as were the Indians.
- 6) Vacations should be increased to 1 month per year.
- 7) Labourers should not be treated with cruelty or be abused by the "Sahib", nor should they be despised.
- 8) If any labourer happened to be injured during his work for the company, he should be entitled to full pay for the duration of his injury.

9) If a labourer was taken ill and was certified as such by a doctor, then he should receive half pay during his illness.

10) In recognition of War Problems the labourers should be given a rise of 15% as a War Allowance, graduated according to earnings.

11) Any new notices with regard to rations and conditions which were issued to the Indians should also be issued to the Bahrainis.

12) The practice of fining a labourer for trifling mistakes should be stopped.

13) The above details should not be agreed temporarily, but should stand perpetually for both present and future employees.

14) The company should commonly announce to the public as well as the labourers all the above details and to state whether they are acceptable or not.

15) The reason for this strike of the labourers is caused mainly by the following items.

- a) The continuing rise in expenses.
- b) Cruelty used in the treatment of labourers.²⁰

Some of the above detailed demands were unrealistic, whilst others were justified. Some were even in advance of their time and anticipated future social developments. But basically the strike was due to what would be termed nowadays as the "rising cost of living", a fact which did not appear to be fully appreciated by the company.

The demands which may be classed as premature and to a certain extent ill-considered were those for one month leave per year, and for a minimum payment of 4 rupees per day for labourers, the latter

representing a rise at that time of approximately 300%.

The demands for paid holiday, transport and the cessation of cruel practices were entirely justified, however.

The demands for payment during periods of injury and sickness were in advance of their time for the area, but were in fact no more than those which the Indian employees already enjoyed.

The lack of a proper organisation and experienced negotiators precipitated the ending of the strike, although some concessions were won. Reading the demands carefully we may conclude that even at this early stage some Bahrainis had received sufficient training to achieve positions of responsibility, as is instanced by the references to Tindals, gaugers and operators, and once the war time restrictions were removed some of the trained operatives made use of their experience, by accepting employment in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, in positions of high responsibility and better wages.

During the second half of the 1940's many oil workers left Bahrain for the oilfields of the mainland. As one report put it,

"Restrictions which had been imposed by the Bahrain Government on people leaving the country to work in Saudi Arabia were lifted during the summer (1946), and some 1,300 Bahraini subjects crossed to Saudi Arabia because they were attracted by the prospects of higher wages".²¹

Over the years, once it passed its initial peak, the number of Bahrainis working for the company began to decrease possibly due partly to the rationalisation of the labour force by the Bahrain Petroleum Company, but also due to the attraction of higher wages elsewhere. The overall trends are shown in the following table.

TABLE XVIII

[illegible]

Figures quoted in the table up to 1955 have been obtained from various sources and those from 1958 to 1963 were obtainable from the Bahrain Petroleum Company annual reports. From 1964 onwards the Bahrain Petroleum Company quoted only percentage of the total national groups and the other figures were obtained by comparing these percentages with the "Rupee Payroll", which listed Bahrainis and Gulf Arabs as a single group.

As may be seen, the decline in the total numbers employed began during the latter half of the 1950's and the numbers of all groups employed has fallen, including those of the Bahrainis. For instance, in the 12 years between 1958 and 1970 the number of Bahrainis employed by Bahrain Petroleum Company decreased from 5,684 to 3,791 a percentage decrease of 27.83, a substantial figure, bearing in mind the dependence of the Bahrainis on Bahrain Petroleum Company as a source of employment and revenue.

Comparing the number of Bahrainis employed by Bahrain Petroleum Company in 1971 with the total economically active Bahraini population for that year, we see that Bahrain Petroleum Company employees represent only 10% of the total and when expressed as a percentage of the crude participation rate only 2.12%.

It is astonishing, therefore, to consider that this 2.12% of the Bahraini population is directly or indirectly responsible for producing oil revenues which in 1971 represented 41.07% of the total National Budget.

In spite of this fact it is well-known that the wages paid to Bahrain Petroleum Company employees are lower than those paid by other oil companies in the Gulf.

A comparison is usually drawn between Bahrain Petroleum Company and Arabian American Oil Company, as they are both American-owned and are closely linked with each other, both from the geographical point of view and from the joint use of the Bahrain refineries.

One comparison which could readily be drawn is that of wages as for instance in 1954 the average, not minimum, daily wage for Bahrain Petroleum Company employees in the lowest category, "non-contracted daily", was 4.25 rupees, whilst about the same time the Arabian American Oil Company minimum daily payment was SR.6,³¹ (at that time and up to 1957 1 SR = 1.5 rupees) a difference which appeared to be excessive.

One of the arguments by Bahrain Petroleum Company and the Bahrain Government was that this difference in wages was justified on the grounds that the cost of living in the other countries was much higher than in Bahrain where prices had in the past been controlled.³² This may well have been true during the war years and the years immediately following, but closer examination of this argument, especially following the lifting of restrictions in 1947, reveals this to be untrue, as both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were both buying and importing goods to their respective countries at the same price on the international market,³³ and in addition to this the Saudi Arabian Government were heavily subsidising the imports of food to maintain prices at an artificially low level, whereas Bahrain which had to import her food from the same sources did not adopt the same measure and therefore prices of food in Bahrain were, if anything, higher than those of the mainland.

This differential between the wages paid in the two countries

has been maintained up to the present day and the maintaining of this differential is a direct contradiction of the company's "BAPCO" stated policy which is that,

"Salary ranges and wage rates based on prevailing domestic rates in the home country for Pound Sterling and other non-Dinar payroll employees or on going Bahrain rates in Bahrain and the Gulf Area for local and foreign contract payroll employees are established and periodically reviewed."³⁴

These reviews do not appear to have been conducted on an absolutely fair basis, since the policy clearly states that the local employees should be paid the going rate of "Bahrain and the Gulf Area", and since the Arabian American Oil Company is the nearest oil producer in the Gulf area, one would have thought that the Bahraini wages would be the same or very near to those paid by the Arabian American Oil Company.

Despite certain technical differences in classification, as in the Arabian American Oil Company, there are General, Intermediate and Senior Staff, with sub classifications within these groups. Bahrain Petroleum Company classified her employees as Grades One to Eleven, with groups One to Four forming the lowest daily-paid groups, the writer arrived at the following comparisons in Table XIX. (P.156)

It can be seen that although the Arabian American Oil Company payments antedated those of the Bahrain Petroleum Company by some 18 months, they were still substantially higher than those enjoyed by Bahrain Petroleum Company employees, especially in the lower grades of the company in which the majority of the Bahrainis were employed. As can be seen from the table following the equivalent payments by the Arabian American Oil Company for grades 1 to 7, which comprise the general labouring and intermediate grades, vary from 11.11% to

TABLE XIX

Monthly Payments for Bahrain Petroleum Company and the Arabian
American Oil Company Employees

<u>Class of Labour</u>	<u>MINIMUM</u>		<u>% lead</u>	<u>MID-POINT</u>		<u>MAXIMUM</u>	
	³⁴ <u>BAPCO</u>	³⁵ <u>Aramco</u>		³⁴ <u>BAPCO</u>	³⁵ <u>Aramco</u>	³⁴ <u>BAPCO</u>	³⁵ <u>Aramco</u>
C 1	300.50	355.00	18.14	390.70	455.00	480.00	555.00
C 2	400.30	490.00	22.41	500.90	595.00	570.30	700.00
C 3	450.10	-		570.30	-	640.70	-
C 4	540.0	600.00	11.11	690.00	720.00	780.00	840.00
C 5	660.50	755.00	14.31	840.00	907.50	1020.50	1060.00
C 6	830.00	935.00	12.65	1050.50	1122.50	1280.00	1310.00
C 7	1000.00	1145.00	14.50	1350.00	1375.00	1690.00	1605.00
C 8	1270.00	1400.00	10.24	1700.00	1680.00	2120.00	1960.00
C 9	1570.00	1710.00	8.92	2100.00	2052.00	2620.00	2395.00
C10	1950.00	-		2600.00	-	3250.00	-
C11	2440.00	-		3260.00	-	4070.00	-

BAPCO salaries effective from 1.7.68, Aramco from 11.1.67.
Aramco payments are quoted in S.R., and BAPCO in Rupees.
The exchange rate at this period was 1 SR = 1.02 Rs.

22.41% higher than the Bahrain Petroleum Company payments. With regard to maximum payments, however, Bahrain Petroleum Company appears to be more generous in the treatment of her higher grade employees.

However, the status of the Bahraini labour in Bahrain Petroleum Company is still very low, occupying in the main only the lower and middle grades, as can be seen from the payroll of December, 1970, below.

TABLE XX

Breakdown of BAPCO Labour by Classes³⁶

<u>Class</u>	<u>Non-Dinar</u>	<u>Local</u>	<u>F.C.</u>
1	-	750	-
2	-	400	3
3	-	360	4
4	-	830	8
5	-	710	13
6	3	530	14
7	30	350	32
8	50	142	15
9	83	40	7
10	78	12	-
11	40	6	2
12	17	1	0
Totals	301	4131	96

From the above table it can be seen that local employees fill almost all posts in the lower and middle grades of the company. Up to grade 7 the number of local employees was 3,930 from a total of 4,131, or 95.13%.

In conclusion, it has been suggested by an Arab oil expert that since oil is an international commodity and the price varies only very slightly, it follows that all oil workers employed in the same conditions and grades should receive the same remuneration especially if the countries are in the same geographical positions.³⁷ The argument appears to suit the situation with regard to Bahrain Petroleum Company and Arabian American Oil Company.

One further point is worthy of mention, and this is that of 4,721 local employees in 1965 only 45 of these had any university training or qualifications, less than 1% of the total Bahrain labour force,³⁸ and this no doubt is the reason for a lack of local employees in the top-flight management levels of the company, a situation which could have been rectified by more company training and sponsorship of employees for university education.

2. Training

In the years immediately following the start of BAPCO's operations in Bahrain, the capabilities of the local inhabitants were regarded as minimal. As Thornburg put it,

"As would be expected there was wide variation in the abilities of these workmen (Bahrainis), a variation more baffling than in the West, because the workmen seemed to lack observable traits that would indicate their probable capability or aptitudes, for several years the company's only guide was trial and error"³⁹

The situation appeared to improve a little, however, as the same writer noted that by 1940,

"In Bahrain a casual observer might walk the length of the oil refinery and scarcely see a European. They were there, of course, in the offices, control rooms, laboratories, and shops. But the Arabs were everywhere, not only as "coolie" labour, but in maintenance squads working under their own foreman, and also as machine helpers, truck and tractor drivers, hoist operators, pumpers, gaugers, carpenters, painters pipe fitters and even acetylene welders"⁴⁰

From these two statements by the same author it may be safely assumed that given the opportunity and training the local labour was capable of assuming a greater responsibility and occupying more advanced positions in the company.

This improvement was possibly due to the initiative of the local labour rather than any defined company training policy which was not formally adopted until after the industrial unrest of 1948.

This unrest was caused by the demands of the Bahrainis for improvements in conditions and a formal training programme for the workers. In that year, 1948, a Western observer remarked, "part of the trouble is due to the Bahrain Petroleum Company's failure to encourage its Arab workers to train themselves for technical and administrative jobs in the refinery."⁴¹

This lack of training was obviously due to a shortsightedness on the part of Bahrain Petroleum Company in its relationship with the local labour as it is normal policy for new industries establishing themselves in a particular area to import their top executives but to seek the immediate participation of the local labour in the intermediate grades of the company hierarchy, thus encouraging the local people to identify themselves with the company and to become loyal employees.

Following the unrest of 1948 a policy of training was adopted by Bahrain Petroleum Company under the heading of the Bahraini Development Programme. This programme was designed to provide Employees with a new and improved skill. This training took two forms,

"on site" and "off site" training. The former was undertaken by the employees' own department within the company whilst the latter was the responsibility of the Industrial Studies Section.

The company still, however, appeared to provide mainly on site training only, thus restricting to a certain extent the promotion prospects of the Bahrainis within the company, although the company stated by 1957 a total of 2,467 local employees had progressed through these two forms of training.⁴²

One good feature of these training programmes was the setting up of evening classes in the villages and towns where the oil workers lived, which gave an opportunity not only for the oil workers but also for members of the general public to learn the basic elements of reading and writing. This was done in co-operation with the Government Department of Education as part of a general drive against illiteracy. In 1953 there were 138 Bahrain Petroleum Company employees⁴³ attending these classes, but by 1957 the number had risen to approximately 600 employees attending at 17 centres⁴⁴ established in the towns and villages of Bahrain.

Another scheme which was introduced by Bahrain Petroleum Company was the opening of a vocational training centre in 1954, the intention being to recruit school-leavers for a form of apprenticeship training, lasting for four years, with a view to eventual employment, within the company. The first group consisted of 44 primary school-leavers in 1955 and their training consisted of craft operating and commerce. The syllabus was extended for later applicants in 1959 to cover catering and stores control.

In the first few years of this programme large numbers of applicants were attracted by the promises of the company of secure employment, promotion and the opportunity for further training abroad.

In 1956, 87 applicants were accepted and in 1958, 88⁴⁵ were accepted from a total of approximately 200 applicants per year.⁴⁶

In 1959, 32 of the first batch of apprentices completed their training and the following year there were 68 graduates but as it became apparent that the company's promises to these apprentices were not being fulfilled, the number of applicants fell. From 1961 onwards Bahrain Petroleum Company ceased to mention in her annual reports the numbers accepted and undergoing training, and also in this year, the company announced that the training period was to be cut to 2½ years only.⁴⁷

In 1960 the company also announced that 581 apprentices had enrolled up to that year, no further figures were given until in 1964 the annual report stated that there were 718 employees with the company who had been enrolled and trained under this scheme. The report made no distinction between those currently employed by the company and those undergoing training, but we may assume from these figures that only 137 new pupils were enrolled during these four years (1960-64).

In 1961 it was decided to extend the scheme to cater for secondary school-leavers but by 1965 it was stated that only 18 Bahraini graduates from secondary schools joined Bahrain Petroleum Company.⁴⁸

It appears, therefore, that these schemes have not been entirely successful and this is probably due to the fact that the company did not fulfill its promises to the apprentices and that the local school-leavers were obviously unwilling to spend a four year period of training on very small wages with no firm prospects of employment with the company at the end of their training, except in the lower echelons of the company structure.

3. Benefits and Social Services

In order to meet the demands for improved conditions of employment, the company in 1948 introduced a Thrift Plan for the Rupee Payroll employees. The system adopted was that the company contributed to the plan an amount equivalent to the employees' contribution. The scheme was to apply to all employees with more than one year's service.

A member's equity in the plan was always equal to his own contributions plus any interest earned. After five years service the equity was increased by an additional amount contributed by the company. This amount ranged from 50% after 5 years up to 100% after 15 years' service.

Also in 1948 the amount of annual vacations was also agreed, rising from 14 days per year for those with only one year's service up to 28 days for those with more than 5 years' service. In 1966 the vacations were reviewed and 28 days granted to all employees, irrespective of the length of service. These vacations were in addition to public and religious holidays.

Prior to 1953 local employees were normally expected to provide their own accommodation,⁴⁹ and no formal housing plan was in effect. In that year, however, the company introduced a plan to provide limited help for its local employees. The essence of the scheme was that employees with more than 5 years' service, and at a certain level on the Rupee Payroll, could borrow against their Thrift Plan money to extend and repair their existing homes.

A new plan was introduced in 1964 which enabled those at the higher pay levels to borrow money for house building.⁵⁰

By the end of 1969 a total of 161 home loans had been granted.

Other Benefit Plans which were introduced over the years included the "Death and Disability Plan", which gave financial help to the employees and their dependents in cases of loss of employment, from sickness, injuries or death, the "Tuberculosis Leave Plan", which provided financial assistance for employees suffering from T.B. for up to 12 months, and in the field of health, Bahrain Petroleum Company has a modern, well-equipped hospital and also from time to time has donated equipment to the Government hospitals.

4. Bahrain Petroleum Company's contribution to the local market.

The company's contribution to the local economy takes a variety of forms such as royalties, which provide the means for local government and social services, wages and salaries which obviously find their way into the local economy, sub-contracting of work, and direct purchasing on the local markets.

The amounts of royalties and wages have already been discussed, the sub-contracting is only a limited factor and we therefore propose to discuss at this stage the effects and influences of local purchasing by the company. As Bahrain has very few local products, in order for the island's economy to profit from local purchasing, this means the use of local merchants as agents or middlemen between the company and the world markets. The company specifies her needs in advance and in some cases she has the deciding voice in specifying the origin of the commodity.

This policy began in answer to the criticism by local merchants during the early 1950's that the company was ignoring the local suppliers and importing all her needs from abroad without the payment of taxation or customs duties and thus failing to benefit the local

economy.

Therefore, in 1953 the company opened a small office in the capital, Manama, "to facilitate the purchasing of goods and equipment within the country to the fullest extent possible".⁵¹ The office was extended in 1956 to form an official "Local Purchase Department".

As this office was situated in the capital it became the "shop-window" of Bahrain Petroleum Company and it was entirely staffed by Bahrainis, the Office Manager being the first Bahraini to hold "Head of Department" status in the company.⁵²

The table below shows us the expansion in local purchasing over the years from 1954 onwards.

TABLE XXI

Value of Local Purchase Made by Bahrain Petroleum
Company

<u>Year</u>	<u>Value of Purchases</u> ⁵³
1954	Rs. 2,400,000
1955	Rs. 3,223,000
1956	Rs. 2,863,000
1957	Rs. 5,000,000
1958	Rs. 8,303,190
1959	Rs. 13,152,000
1960	Rs. 14,655,000
1961	Rs. 16,888,000
1962	Rs. 19,421,000

After 1962 the writer was unable to establish any reliable figures for local purchases as it became company policy to publish a joint amount covering both local purchases and services, this could be due either to a levelling-off or even a decline in the amounts purchased. This latter comment is based on the figures available in Table XVI p.141, which indicated a fall in recent years in the numbers employed in the wholesale trade. These traders and wholesalers were, however, the main beneficiaries of the company's local purchase plan, and it

was through them that any money reached the local economy.

c) Labour Legislation.

As previously stated the labour movement in Bahrain has always been closely associated with political movements in the island and demands for political reforms. The forerunner of the modern labour legislation were the pearl diving reforms of 1925 although the modern legislation did not begin to crystallise until the 1950's when there was political confrontation and labour unrest was widespread. This unrest came to a head between the years of 1953 and 1956 when one of the basic demands was for the right to form trade unions in Bahrain.⁵⁴

Following the general strike of December, 1954, the Government yielded in part to this demand by promising to consider the matter. When no decision seemed to be forthcoming, the Higher Executive Committee,⁵⁵ hearing that Bahrain Petroleum Company intended to establish a Joint Consultative Committee, announced on the 8th January 1955, that they intended to establish a labour union consisting of twelve members representing the various trades, and that they would start to draw up their own labour legislation with a view to raising the status of local labour and protecting their rights.⁵⁶ This move spurred the Government into action and on the 23rd February, she announced her intention to establish a Labour Law Advisory Committee to draft labour legislation and meanwhile to establish a labour exchange under a Department of Labour.⁵⁷

In April of that year, the Government announced that elections would be held to choose the three labour representatives to sit on the tripartite committee.

Meanwhile, the Higher Executive Committee took the initiative

and began a campaign of recruitment until in October, 1955 a general trade union, Bahrain Labour Federation, (BLF) was founded, and within a very short time claimed a membership of 6,000.⁵⁸ Most of these members were from Bahrain Petroleum Company and the Government services. Membership was restricted to Bahrainis and the initiation fees were fixed at 5 rupees, and the annual dues at 12 rupees.⁵⁹

One of the earliest declared intentions of this newly-formed union was the setting-up of a building co-operative to provide "hygienic, comfortable housing" for its members.⁶⁰

The Tripartite Labour Law Advisory Committee had been set up in the meantime and consisted of Government, employers and labour representatives.

The Government representatives comprised two members of the Ruling Family and a British Employee of the Bahrain Government, the employers were represented by a member of the Bahrain Petroleum Company management, an important local merchant and a local contractor, whilst the workers were represented by three elected representatives from the labour forces of the Government, Bahrain Petroleum Company and an independent commercial establishment.

Although the Bahrain Labour Federation gave its support to the labour representatives, it was dissatisfied with the constitution of the Committee, feeling that the Government and employers were combining to frustrate their demands, and also with the general progress of the negotiations.

In February, 1956 a meeting of the Bahrain Labour Federation was held to discuss the work of the Labour Law Advisory Committee and several resolutions were adopted for submission to the Government

and the Labour Law Advisory Committee. These were: 1) The right to establish only one labour organisation as a state-wide federation, joined by all Bahraini workers; 2) Recognition of the Bahrain Labour Federation by the Government; 3) The speedy conclusion of the Committees work; 4) Incorporation into the Labour Law of a cost of living escalation clause for general wage adjustments; 5) The appointment of any worker representatives to any Joint Consultative Committees to be a function of the Federation.⁶¹

All of these proposals were rejected, especially the setting-up of a state-wide federation as this was unacceptable to the employers because they wished to keep the various trades separate and the Government looked upon the establishment of such a federation as a potentially dangerous political weapon.

Following the outright rejection of their resolutions, the Bahrain Labour Federation backed by the Higher Executive Committee went ahead with its plans and on the 21st March, 1956, announced that they would hold an election for the formation of its Administration Council and General Assembly, and that nominations would be opened in July. The structure of these two bodies was to be as in the following table.

TABLE XXII

<u>Proposed Organisation of Bahrain Labour Federation</u> ⁶²			
<u>Employee Group</u>	<u>Seats in Admin. Council</u>	<u>Seats in General Assembly</u>	<u>Total</u>
Bahrain Petroleum Company	5	43	48
Other Companies	3	23	26
Govt. Employees	4	18	22
"Capable Persons"	4	0	4
	<u>16</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>100</u>

The Government reacted strongly to these proposals and the setting up of the Committee without its permission and these, combined with other occurrences on the island, prompted the Government to crush the Committee for National Unity⁶³ and Bahrain Labour Federation. In November 1956 the leaders of the Committee for National Unity and Bahrain Labour Federation were arrested along with others and were brought to trial, following this the labour movement disintegrated.

The Labour Law Advisory Committee continued to meet throughout these troubles and by October 1956 had held 58 meetings, and following the removal of labour and political pressure by the exiling of the leading members of the Committee for National Unity the committee pressed on with its work. In early 1957 the Government extended the committee's terms of reference to include the draft of Compensation Ordinances.

By July, 1957 the Committee had completed its draft of the "Bahrain Labour Ordinance" after 70 meetings.

On 10th October of the same year the Bahrain Employed Persons' Compensation Ordinance was signed by the Shaikh and on 12th November the "Bahrain Labour Ordinance" was signed by the Shaikh after certain modifications had been made.

Both of these legislative acts came into effect on 1st January 1958.⁶⁴

The labour exchange, which was mentioned earlier, was established in July 1955. Originally its intended function was to carry out the proposed new labour laws and to compile current cost of living indices, but as the new laws were not passed until 1957 its activities were initially confined to the registration of unemployed labour, mainly

unskilled Bahrainis, and attempting to find work for them.

It was not until 1957, however, that the Labour Department was placed on formal footing by the appointment of one of the Ruling Family⁶⁵ as its first President and Commissioner of Labour.

On the signing of the Compensation Ordinance the Department immediately became responsible for handling all complaints made under this act. At the same time the Labour Department also began the registration of all unemployed foreign nationals.

In carrying out her task of placing the registered unemployed labour, the Department observed over the years that even up to the present day there is not a single instance of skilled labour using the services of the Department.

This could be due to either the natural tendency of skilled workers to find employment on their own initiative or a lack of confidence in the Department's abilities.

The figures available for unemployment define the labour as either non-skilled or semi-skilled but it is difficult to differentiate between the two categories as the Government Report of 1957 points out,

"For the Bahrainis there is no clear-cut distinction between one category of labour (semi-skilled) and another (non-skilled). The same labourer claims to be a painter, carpenter or pipe fitter. He might have been doing all of these jobs with various employers and therefore acquired some little skill in each occupation".

However, the following table shows us that the efforts of this Department have been expanded in the placing of Bahraini labour in preference to non-Bahraini.

TABLE XXIII

The Placement of Unemployed Persons (Bahrainis & Foreigners)⁶⁶

<u>Year</u>	<u>Bahrainis</u>		<u>Non-Bahrainis</u>	
	<u>Registered</u>	<u>Placed</u>	<u>Registered</u>	<u>Placed</u>
1955	2586	586	-	-
1956	1748	1189	-	-
1957	2843	1034	828	241
1958	1866	1247	993	421
1959	1122	977	639	324
1960	936	428	686	108
1961	1053	803	1088	100
1963	947	886	1674	62
1964	910	787	1489	0
1968	1075	715	-	-
1969	1047	929	-	-

above
It is clear from the/ table that a deliberate policy of preference for Bahraini labour appears to have been adopted and it is probably in accordance with this policy that the Department from 1964 onward ceased to publish the numbers of unemployed foreign nationals.

1. The Legislation.

The Compensation Ordinance of 1957 covered claims for industrial injuries and diseases and specified in detail compensation payments to be made in cases of death, temporary or permanent, total or partial disability or disfigurement due to industrial causes. The compensation payable was related to earnings and was broken down into four classes.

TABLE XXIV

Compensation for Death and Permanent Disability⁶⁷

	<u>Monthly Earnings</u>	<u>Compensation</u>
	<u>Rupees</u>	<u>Rupees</u>
Class 1	Up to 300	12,000
Class 2	301-600	15,000
Class 3	601-1000	18,000
Class 4	1001 or more	27,000

Industrial claims arising between employers and employees had, prior to the introduction of this ordinance, usually been dealt with under Indian compensation legislation, although this legislation had never been officially enforced for the benefit of Bahraini workers and compensation had been on an "ex gratia" basis.

The Bahrain Labour Ordinance of 1957 was divided into five parts and appendices, the official text being in Arabic. The Ordinance deals specifically with three major areas of industrial relations on which the Government intended to regularise.

These were the relationship between employer and employee, Trade Unions and Trade Disputes.

Part II of the Ordinance, which covers relations between employer and employee, contains a number of items of interest, e.g. Para. 6, states that "The employer shall at the request of the employed person draw up in duplicate or triplicate a written contract of service between him and the employed person." Para. 23a provides for a maximum working day of eight hours and a maximum working week of 48 hours, with the exception of Ramadan, during which the hours were to be six and 36 respectively.

The Amendment of 18th March, 1958,⁶⁸ Para. 23b, provided for a minimum payment for overtime working of an extra 25% of the employee's normal hourly rate of pay or time off in lieu of overtime.

Para. 31 specified that employees with not less than one year's service should receive 14 days annual vacation on full basic pay and cost-of-living allowances (if any) and after five years' service this was to be increased to 28 days annual vacation. This was to be in addition to nine public holidays to be specified by the employer,

but which must include not less than two days for each of the following; Id Ul Fitr, Id al Haj, Ashoor,⁶⁹ and one day for the Prophet's birthday.

Para. 32a, entitles the employee to two weeks of paid sick leave on full basic pay and cost-of-living allowances (if any) after completion of one year's continuous work with his employer.

Part III of the Ordinance which covers Trade Unionism lays out certain conditions for the creation of trade unions and membership thereof.

It specifically excludes from membership of trade unions such groups as members of management, head teachers, and office superintendents, students, domestic servants, part-time employees and other classes of persons who may after consultation be precluded from joining a trade union.

This section allowed for the setting up of both general and craft unions provided that there was a minimum membership of 20 persons. The Ordinance does not directly forbid the setting up of a confederation of unions.

The right of an individual to refuse to join a trade union was safeguarded and it was forbidden to intimidate or coerce a person into joining. Nor was it allowed for employment to be refused to such a person on the grounds that he was not a union member.

Part IV, which covered Trade Disputes, made provision for any dispute between the two parties to be referred to the Commissioner by either party. He was empowered to take such steps as were necessary for promoting a settlement of the dispute. These steps included the power to set up a committee under the chairmanship of a nominee of the Commissioner or a person acceptable to both parties. If the

dispute was not settled within 14 days then the Commissioner was empowered to refer the dispute to an arbitration board.

This section also stated that for a period of 21 days following the reporting of the dispute to the Commissioner, no industrial action should be taken by the employees, and neither should the employer close his place of employment nor suspend or dismiss his workers. Any persons refusing to participate in a trade dispute were not to be subjected to expulsion from the trade union nor subjected to any fines or penalties.

Para. 82 of the Ordinance place restrictions upon the right to strike of certain public employees such as those providing gas, water, electricity, sanitary services and also those employed in the fire and public health services.

The Ordinance did, however, provide for the right of the trade union to engage in peaceful picketing in furtherance of trade disputes.

A number of minor labour legislations ordinances were enacted during the 1960's. One of these was the "Percentage of Bahraini Employment Regulations", which came into effect on 1st January, 1962.⁷⁰ These Regulations stated that:-

1. The employment of unskilled Bahraini labourers in unskilled jobs should be 100% if available and medically and physically fit.
2. In skilled jobs preference should be given to Bahrainis if available, medically and physically fit.

Another item of legislation was contained in Proclamation No. 2 of 1965,⁷¹ which was issued by the Government of Bahrain, which laid down a minimum wage level of 8 rupees per day for daily paid unskilled

labourers. The Proclamation excluded porters, domestic servants, pearl divers, persons serving a probationary period of employment, persons employed as apprentices, and students taking part-time employment during vacations. Ironically, these exclusions cover almost the entire range of lowest paid workers in the island.

Although there are at the present time a number of labour legislations in force, most exist on paper only. There is still not a single trade union existing in Bahrain,⁷² much less a state-wide union as was first envisaged in the creation of the Bahrain Labour Force, and the re-activating of such a body is actively discouraged.

Of the legislation which is in force very little use appears to be made of the powers contained in these items of legislation and the workers of Bahrain have never enjoyed the full benefits of the provisions of these laws, the climate towards trade unionism having been for the most part continuously repressive.

As the reports of the British Middle East Development Division stated in 1965, "Powers under this legislation appear to have been used sparingly over the last few years."

In the face of intensive suppression during the 1960's the labour force of Bahrain continued their attempts to give voice to their grievances. Apart from the 1965 upheaval, which was political in nature rather than a true expression of discontent with working conditions, the Bahrain workers during the second half of that decade frequently showed their discontent through strike action. In April 1968 the electricity workers went on strike in protest against working conditions. The Government broke the strike, imprisoned the ringleaders and on the return of the men to work

demanded that all workers should sign an agreement absolving the Electricity Department from all blame should any worker be killed in the course of his employment. This latter measure only served to further inflame the situation. Resentment against this condition built up until in September of that year the men went on strike again and eventually the Government agreed to waive this regulation in order to effect a return to work.

During 1970 strike activity became intensive. Amongst those striking were employees of the Gulf Aviation Company, Cable and Wireless Company and the Sanitary workers of the Health Department. In December of that year the employees of ALBA who were in the process of constructing the new aluminium smelter also struck. Again action was taken against the leaders of the strike and the strikes broken. Even news of all these strikes was suppressed by the Government and they scarcely achieved a mention in the local newspaper.

The general demand of the strikers, apart from improvements in conditions and wages, was to be allowed to form trade unions. In view of the continued suppression of strikes by the Government some of the more enlightened workers sought to conduct negotiations with the Government and argued that since Labour Laws existed, at least in theory, then that law should be utilised to assist the workers in conducting their negotiations and setting up trade unions.

In mid July 1971 a Foundation Committee was formed⁷³ and the committee planned a provisional constitution along the lines of the Bahrain Labour Law and collected almost a thousand signatures on a petition for reform which was presented to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. After prolonged negotiations with the Ministry and interrogation by the Special Branch of the Police Department, the

committee put their initial demands to the Government.

These were:-

1. To allow the publication in the local press of a statement of their intentions to form a trade union.
2. To allow the committee to debate the issue of trade unionism publicly.
3. To allow the distribution of leaflets to explain the purposes of the proposed trade union and the procedure of forming the same.

The intention of the committee was to eventually create a trade union representing labourers, white-collar workers and the self employed.

The Government however continued to prevaricate over the issue and prolonged the negotiations. By January 1972 however the number of signatures to the petition had grown to 3,000⁷⁴ and discontent was again arising.

In March 1972⁷⁵ the matters came to a head and a violent strike and demonstrations occurred between the 8th and 22nd of that month.

The Government re-acted swiftly, imprisoned many people, including members of the committee and the last hope of any form of labour representation evaporated once more.⁷⁶

However it is probable that if the provisions of the Bahrain Labour Laws had been granted in full to the workers of Bahrain when they were formulated and if the modest demands of the committee had been met, the benefits to the community as a whole would have been great and may have gone a long way to resolving the recurring periods of industrial unrest and may have avoided the latest confrontation.

FOOTNOTES

1. Porter, R.S., "Report on Census of Employment in Bahrain, 1956", Beirut, 1957, p.5. It has been estimated in this census that taxi and bus drivers totalled 750, maritime industries 4,000, agriculture, domestic service and fishing 8,000. It appears that these figures have been over-estimated and have not therefore been included.
2. Government of Bahrain, Fourth Population Census "Statistical Abstract" Aug. 1969, p.28.
3. Ibid
4. Calculated from 1971 census.
5. The figures quoted probably include both direct and indirect employees.
6. Ibid
7. This figure includes those employed in the wholesale and retail trades and banking.
8. "Other Services" includes those employed by the Government in the 1956 figures.
9. Zayani, A.R., "Manpower Situation in Bahrain", Kuwait Institute of Economic and Social Planning in the Middle East; Unpublished paper, 1970-71, p.10.
10. Zayani A.R. op.cit. p.10.
11. Al-Mulla, "Industry in Bahrain", op.cit., p.15.
12. Thornburg, M.W., "People and Policy in the Middle East" W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1964, p.68.
13. Because the 1938, 1953 and 1965 confrontations were dominated by political demands, we shall treat them as such and refer to them in the Part IV on Political Change.
14. Al-Bahrain, 23rd May, 1940, No. 64.
15. I.O. A letter from W.P. Anderson, Chief Local Representative of BAPCO to E.B. Wakefield, Political Agent in Bahrain dated 4th August, 1942.
16. Lindit, A.R., "Politics in the Persian Gulf", R.C.A.J., Vol. XXVI, 1939, p.619.
17. I.O. Report on the Strike Situation (In Bahrain), on 28th Dec. 1943, by Major T. Hickinbotham, Political Agent in Bahrain.
18. Minutes of the meeting held at the British Agency (in Bahrain), on 23rd Dec., 1943. Present were Major T. Hickinbotham, C.D. Belgrave, Adviser to Bahrain Govt., W.P. Anderson, General Manager and Chief Local Representative of BAPCO, and R.M. Brown, Manager, Operations, of BAPCO.

19. I.O., Note on the interview between Major T. Hickinbotham and Shaikh Suliman bin Hamed on the afternoon of 28th Dec., 1943.
20. I.O., Extracts from Minutes of a meeting held at the Political Agency (Bahrain), on 11th Jan. 1944, Present were Major T. Hickinbotham, C.D. Belgrave, W.P. Anderson, T.H. Beckhuis, BAPCO.
21. Govt. of Bahrain Annual Report 1366 H. (1946-47), p.35. See also Littlefield, R.E., op.cit., p.110. As one Aramco employee told him, if it had not been for the Bahrainis the tapline would never have been built. Also Finnie referred to this fact, p.93.
22. Longrigg, S.H. op.cit., p. 103.
23. Al-Bahrain, No. 16, 22nd June 1939
24. Faroughy, A. op.cit., p.44. The figure of 750 U.S.A. employees undoubtedly includes European employees also.
25. Ibid. p.45
26. "Summary of Recent Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1952-53"
27. Finnie, D.H., "Desert Enterprise" Harvard University Press, 1958, p. 107. The numbers quoted for total Bahraini employees includes other Gulf Arabs.
28. Sayegh, K.S., "Oil and Arab Regional Development". Frederick, A. New York, 1968, p. 302.
29. BAPCO Annual Reports for the respective years.
30. Govt. of Bahrain Census of 1971.
31. Finnie, D.H., op.cit., p. 109
32. Belgrave, C.D., op.cit. p. 147.
33. Cummins, J.W., "Report of an Enquiry", op.cit., 1957, Part II, p. 5.
34. Confidential BAPCO Local and Foreign Contract Payroll - 10th June, 1968.
35. Confidential Aramco Saudi Royal Payroll Schedule, dated 11th Jan, 1967.
36. The information in this table was given to the writer by a BAPCO employee in January 1971.
37. Sarkis, Nicolas. "Le Mouvement Syndical et ses Incidences sur les conditions de travail dans l'Industrie Petroliere Arabe". Publications du Centres de Recherche, Beirut 1969, p.53.

38. Government of Bahrain, 4th Population Census, Aug. 1969, p.4.
39. Thornburg, M.W., op.cit., p.69.
40. Ibid, pp. 72-73.
41. White, Leigh, "Allah's Oil, World's Richest Prize", Saturday Evening Post, 27th Nov. 1948.
42. BAPCO Annual Report, 1957 p.
43. Finnie, D.H., op.cit., p. 121.
44. BAPCO Annual Report, 1957.
45. BAPCO Annual Report, 1956 and 1958
46. O'Ferral, J.M., 'Human Relations in the Bahrain Oil Industry' Industrial Welfare, Vol. XLII No. 5, (Sept. - Oct. 1960), p.278.
47. Another short-lived experiment by BAPCO was conducted between 1950-51 and 1956 when employees were released to attend the Govt. run Technical College. This scheme was unsuccessful due to lack of support.
48. BAPCO Annual Report 1965, p. 18.
49. Up to this time only small "bachelor quarters" were provided for the local employees who were willing to occupy them. As previously mentioned, however, these were considered totally unsuitable by the Bahrainis.
50. BAPCO was the last oil company in the Gulf to provide such a scheme, most others having operated similar schemes for a number of years previous to this. For instance, Aramco up to 1955 has spent a total of \$77,000,000 on housing and related facilities for their employees, "Aramco World", Nov. 1955, p.2. In Iraq and Saudi Arabia accommodation for workers and their families must be provided by law. (Iraq Law No. 29 of 1947; Saudi Arabia, Labour and Workmen Regulations of 1947).
51. Finnie, D.H., op.cit., p. 174
52. This was in 1964 BAPCO Report, 1964, p.17.
53. Calculated from BAPCO Annual Report for the respective years.
54. From Leaflet No. 1, published by the Higher Executive Committee, dated 13th October, 1954.
55. The function and role of the Higher Executive Committee will be more fully discussed in Part V Chapter 3.
56. From Leaflet, by Higher Executive Committee, dated 8th February., 1955.

57. Bahrain Official Gazette No. 69, 24th Feb., 1955, p.4.
58. Beling, Willard A., "Pan-Arabism and Labour", Harvard Middle Eastern Monograph Series, 1960, p.69.
59. Beling, W.A., "Recent Developments in Labour Relations in Bahrain", Middle East Journal, Spring 1959, p.161.
60. From leaflet circulated by Higher Executive Committee entitled "News", no date given.
61. Leaflet published by Higher Executive Committee, 26th February 1956.
62. From leaflet dated 23rd July 1956, issued by Higher Executive Committee.
63. C.N.U . - Committee for National Unity, the new name of the H.E.C. after recognition by the Govt. on 18th March, 1956.
64. Bahrain Government Annual Report of 1957, p.32.
65. Shaikh Ali bin Ahmed al-Khalifah.
66. Extracts from Bahrain Government Annual Reports for the respective years.
67. Beling, W.A., "Recent Developments" op.cit., p. 163.
68. Decree No. 5, dated 18th March, 1958.
69. These religious festivals were carefully selected to cover the requirements of both the Sunni and Shia sects.
70. Govt. of Bahrain Labour Dept. - Proclamation No. 22, 7th Dec., 1961
71. Published 8th July, 1965.
72. United States Dept. of Labour - Labour Digest No. 7, Sept. 1963 p.2.
73. There were eight members of the committee, two electricity workers, two welders, two bank employees, one airline employee and one engineer.
74. From a letter to the writer by a member of the committee, 13th April, 1972.
75. The events of March 1972 were almost a carbon copy of the violence of March 1965. A number of Bahrainis were reported to have been killed in the clashes. For details of these events see "Arab Studies" Vol. 8 No. 8 Beirut, June 1972 pp. 109-122 See also the speech of the Bahrain delegate to the Fifth Conference of the Arab International Trades Union, Cairo, 26th-29th May, 1972. Document No. 5/37.

76. In attempt at establishing an air of liberality following the breaking of the strike the Government instructed employers to pay the wages of employees who had taken part in the strike. See "Al-Adwa" No. 125, Bahrain, 28th March, 1972.

PART THREE

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

INTRODUCTION

It is acknowledged nowadays that education is widely used as one of the instruments for bringing about technological and social changes in modern societies.¹

Education can also be defined as one of the methods of improving communications, not only in terms of enabling human beings to read and write, but also to communicate through the media of literature and thus exchange ideas and knowledge or give and receive human experiences.

If it is deemed necessary for the developed countries to use education as a tool for the advancement of scientific knowledge and human studies in order to enrich civilisation, then it is absolutely essential for underdeveloped countries to use education as a means of catching up with the rest of the world in order to enjoy the benefits of modern civilisation.

In the underdeveloped countries, however, "modern education", which some term as "western style education", is a comparatively recent innovation which few of the populace have so far experienced.

In the Gulf Area as a whole there was very little formal education, apart from the religious education which was received by children in their local villages, until the turn of the century.

Modern education in Bahrain, for instance, did not start until the early years of the 20th century when mission schools were established on the island. These were, however, only on a very small scale, catering for possibly fifteen to twenty children. It was not until well after the First World War that the first modern educational institutes were set up by some richer members of the community for the education of their sons and other members of their family or social group.

These first pupils were later to be regarded as the country's "intellectuals", having been exposed to modern teaching methods and having acquired the basic skills of reading and writing. We use the term "intellectual" in this context in the widest sense, for as Kautsky put it the intellectuals "are all persons with an advanced modern education and the intellectual concern and skills ordinarily associated with it"²

In a traditional society such as existed in Bahrain at that time, the "intellectual" and the "educated person" were two faces of the same coin. As in any underdeveloped society, to the uneducated father, being able to neither read nor write, the son who obtained a working knowledge of these subjects was regarded as educated, and was a source of pride to both the family and the community.

The achievement of these rudiments of education were regarded as the maximum education which was necessary until as late as the 1940's when education was extended beyond the primary level.

It was during this period that the difference began to crystalise between an educated person and an intellectual, and the people at last began to recognise the difference. Even those people who could not afford to undergo a formal course of secondary education began to apply the basic skills which they had learnt to educate themselves. With the establishment of secondary education the possessor of a certificate, Shahada, denoting the achievement of a higher level of education became a person of standing in the community.

The educated person or intellectual in such an underdeveloped country are often the first to find common ground for contact with

outside communities. As Halpern stated

....."They are often the first in the history of their family to be literate. They often discover their best friends at school or in a political movement They are the first to trust strangers on grounds of competence or shared ideology. They are ready to trade new dogmas for old. They are also the first to publicly confess their uncertainties"³

The above points hold true in the case of Bahrain as education provided the means of breaking the traditional closed communities and opening up new areas of contact between Sunni and Shia by the use of common educational facilities and secondly by breaking down the existing class structure and creating in its place a new meritocracy.

In the initial stages of education in Bahrain the community did not easily accept that a person from a humble background could by virtue of his education become the social equal of the traditional elite.

Therefore, initially the use of education as an instrument of social mobilisation was very limited and in the first instance the acquiring of a basic education was restricted almost entirely to providing the means for those of humble origin to obtain a more secure job as a Kateb, or clerk, due to the long held traditional view that birth rather than education best fitted a man for positions of responsibility or power.

The recognition of the schools as educational institutes fitting man for future responsibilities was grossly underestimated. As for instance at one time the Ruling Family in Bahrain decried the need for education by saying Majalisna madaresna, literally translated Our salons are our schools. Thus saying that their heirs could obtain all the education they needed to rule the country by attending and

listening to their councils.

Over the years this attitude gradually changed as the Administration expanded and the need for educated persons was felt. More school-leavers began to enter Government Service and the old rigid attitudes began to relax slightly.

When considering the development of modern education in Bahrain we find that it can be defined in two distinct sectors, the private schools, which were established by foreign nationals to serve specific interests, religious or national, and public schools which were established by the Bahrainis themselves and which were later incorporated into the Government Service.

Although the private schools were not a significant factor in the development of education in Bahrain we propose to deal with this sector first as they were the founders of modern education on the island. Although two of them were established before the First World War they had little impact on the local community as one was Non-Islamic and the other Non-Arab in their teachings.

FOOTNOTES

1. King, Edmund J., "Education and Social Change", Pergamon Press, London, 1966, Introduction.
2. Kautsky, John H., "Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries", (Nationalism and Communism)", edited, John Wiley and Sons, New York - London, 1963, p.198.
3. Halpern, Manfred, "The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa", Princeton University Press, 1965, p.56.

CHAPTER ONE

MODERN EDUCATION

a) Private Schools

The first western style school was founded in Bahrain by the American Mission, an independent group who began their operations in Bahrain in 1892, and who were in 1894 "adopted" by the Reformed Church in America.¹

The school was opened in Manama by a Mrs. Samuel M. Zwemer and catered for a small number of local girls. The classes were very small, hardly ever exceeded one dozen during the early years, due partly to the resentment by the local population of girls being educated and partly due to the fact that Christian religious instruction was given at the school.² In spite of the poor response Mrs. Zwemer persevered and in 1905 a boys' school was also opened in the Mission building, and in 1908 it was said that four children of the Ruling Family were attending the school. This is highly questionable in view of the known attitude of the Ruling Family with regard to the need for education of their sons, and also in view of the statement made in 1910 by Julius Richter that, "work among women, and schools are still in their initial stages, both being much hampered by the stupidity and fanaticism of the Moslems".³ Between 1910 and 1914 the number of children enrolling at and attending the school declined and by 1922 a Christian Arab writer noted that

"if the mission had stopped evangelising for converts to Christianity and devoted their work to medical and educational services, they would have been more successful, as the Moslems in general and the Arabs in particular are extremely loyal to their religion and will not accept any other."⁴

By 1934-35 poor attendances and a lack of financial support, caused the closure of the boys' school.⁵ The girls' school continued to function as before with the classes being composed mainly of pupils of Persian origin who were said to be "of the poorest and most ignorant class."⁶ Over the years the numbers attending the school continued to grow and it attracted more and more students as the views on girls' education relaxed and more foreign elements entered the island following the discovery of oil. By 1956-57 the number of pupils had risen to 162 and the activities of the school covered the range of education from pre-primary grades through to a seventh grade specialising in teacher training for girls wishing to become primary school teachers. The staff at that time consisted of ten full-time teachers and five part-time.

In 1964-65 the number of pupils was 201, and the teaching staff was twelve full-time teachers. It was reported at that time that most of the teachers were not qualified, not having undergone the required secondary education.⁷

According to Mr. Al-Hamer, the school was co-educational but this was probably at pre-primary (kindergarten) level only.⁸ However, by the academic year of 1970-71 there were 382 pupils and 23 staff and the range of education had been standardised and covered eight grades, six of them primary, and two elementary.

The second modern private school to be opened in Bahrain was one catering for the teaching of the Persian language and culture for the children of the Persian minority residing in Bahrain. The actual date of the opening of the school is a matter of conjecture as for instance, Al-Hamer mentions that it was opened around 1910 and was called "Al-Itihad" Union.⁹ He does not, however, quote the

source of his information. On the other hand, Winder states that the school was not opened until 1923 and was called Tarbiyat Education, although he concedes that a form of Persian school existed between 1914 and 1921.¹⁰ This information he obtained from a private letter from Sir Charles Belgrave. Faroughy confirms the setting up of the Tarbiyat school as being after the First World War.¹¹

However, neither Rihani nor Shaikh Haffez Wahbah,¹² who was the first headmaster of Bahrain's first public school, have mentioned the existence of this school in their writings.

We may conclude that some form of informal school was in existence immediately before the First World War and that it was reformed on a formal basis in 1923 as the Tarbiyat, a name which was later changed to Al-Itihad. The date of 1923 may be taken as the correct date as it was about this time, during the setting up of the public schools in Bahrain, that the Persians decided to set up their own school following the rejection of their demand that the Persian language should be part of the curriculum of all Bahraini schools.

The Al-Itihad school is still in existence and is run by a Board of Trustees composed entirely of Persians holding Bahraini nationality. The finances of the school come from two sources, donations from the Persian community, and from the relatively high tuition fees demanded of the pupils. Most subjects are taught in the Persian language although Arabic is in the curriculum and is used for Religious Instruction and Social Studies. It caters for the teaching of boys only and restricts its teaching only to the primary level, after which the pupils go on to attend Government secondary schools.

Figures of the number of pupils attending the school were not

available prior to the 1960's.

In 1964-65, however, we see that there were 242 pupils and in 1968 this had risen to 295 and by 1971 there were 335 pupils.

Throughout the 1960's the number of classes was never more than six, and the number of teachers never exceeded nine, although by 1971 there were twelve teachers.

Two other private schools opened simultaneously in 1940, The Sacred Heart School, run by the Roman Catholic Church, and the Indian School, run by the Indian community on the island.

The former had for several years only two grades which were supervised by lay teachers. By 1953, at which time four Sisters arrived to take over, the school had 85 pupils. The numbers enrolling at the school grew quickly over the years and in 1958 there were 500 pupils, and by 1960 the number had jumped to a peak of 850 pupils in ten classes, with twenty-five teachers. In 1971 the figures were 835 and 23 respectively.

The grades covered by the school are the infant, primary and intermediate levels which follow the pattern of 2, 4 and 4 years' study at each level.

The language of instruction is English and it is probably this fact that accounts for the popularity of the school, making it by far the largest private school on the island. It is co-educational school and the majority of the pupils are foreign nationals.

The Indian school which was opened in the same year is supervised by an independent group of Indians living in Bahrain. The pupils are exclusively Indian and the teaching covers infant and primary levels. The school is co-educational and the numbers attending the school were 170 in 1968, rising to 319 in 1971, in which year there were eighteen teachers. The school is financed

by the local Indian community.

One other major private school was opened in 1956. This was the Urdu School, which is administered by Pakistanis settled in Bahrain, for the education of Pakistani children only. The school is co-educational and the teaching covers infant, primary and secondary levels which the pupils attend for 2, 5 and 5 years respectively.

The media of instruction is Urdu but both Arabic and English are taught as secondary languages. Text books are imported from Pakistan and from 1968 onward the correction and marking of examination papers for the secondary level was carried out in Karachi.

A number of other minor private schools exist in Bahrain. These are the Pakistan, St. Christopher, Awali, Bahrain-American, Dar Al-Hadana, Dar Al-Hanan and the Muharraq Kindergarten school

The first four of these are to serve the needs of children of foreign elements residing in Bahrain and the other three to serve the needs of the Bahrainis and other Arab groups for children at Kindergarten level.

Prior to 1961 all private schools in Bahrain operated completely independently and were not subject to any form of Government control. This degree of independence was unacceptable to the Bahrain public and repeated demands were made to have them brought under the supervision of the Department of Education.

The 1955 Tagrer Report on Education demanded that all private schools in Bahrain should be brought under the supervision of the Bahrain Department of Education in order to, "correct the situations in those schools and to guarantee their performances and to ensure

that their curricula met the national interests".¹³

The Bahrain Private Education Ordinance of 1961 provided the Department of Education with overall powers of supervision.¹⁴

An Inspector was subsequently appointed and from that date the schools became subject to close Government supervision.

b) Public Schools

Prior to the introduction of modern public education into Bahrain after the First World War, some traditional Arabic schools existed. These took the forms of Mutawa or Kuttab, as they were locally known.

The two names denote 'shaping' and 'schooling', and the object behind these schools was as the names indicate, to shape the child with regard to manners and obedience, and to impart to the child the rudiments of education. The teaching consisted of the child learning the Quoran by heart, with the teaching of writing and arithmetic playing a very minor role.

The schools were run by the local mullas, who were usually in charge of the local mosques, to ensure additional source of income for themselves, and were usually held either in the house of the mulla or in the corner of some local shop. Payment was made each Thursday in either cash or kind, the level being agreed according to the circumstances of the parents. This payment was known as Al-Khamisiya.

There was no fixed period of time for the child to attend these schools, his or her education was deemed to be complete when they had learnt the Quoran by heart. When the child had attained this objective, it was usual for a celebration to be held to mark

the event, at which the child was dressed in his best clothes and was taken to every house in the neighbourhood, carols being sung at every doorway. This celebration was known as Al-Khatmah 'The Finishing', and the carols were called Al-Tahmedah, 'Thanks'.

After the completion of this education it was usual for the girls to be confined to their houses thereafter and never to see this neighbourhood again until they were married, the boys would then seek work, usually in the same occupation as their fathers.

An eye witness described these schools in 1914. He wrote,

"The native school finds itself between other houses. Some are found in the bazaar, amidst the noise and bustle of Eastern trading. The smell of fish, locusts and rotten fruit, in addition to the dunghill nearby, makes the smallest whiff of fresh air impossible for the children inside, the building is low without windows. The scholars sit on the ground along the wall, they stay from sunrise to sunset, six days a week, we seldom find more than one teacher in each school, the teachers are bigoted mullas or mutawwas, they know the Koran perfectly, and teach only the Koran. That is the only text book, although the older boys are taught the traditions privately. No other Sura is entered upon until the opening chapter is mastered. The boys are taught to repeat the book. The method is that of endless repetition. All the pupils read aloud in a sing-song tone bending their bodies back and forth."¹⁵

This quote, starting from "the scholars sit on the ground", if we disregard his comments on "bigoted mullas", gives us a perfect picture of these traditional schools which continued their existence on a smaller scale until the 1950's, in the remoter areas.

The change from traditional to modern style education in Bahrain can be loosely considered in three different phases, although there are other subdivisions of the development which we will consider concurrently with the theme. These main phases are, on a chronological

basis, the foundation period during the 1920's and 1930's, the growth period during the 1940's and 1950's and the period of modern development from 1960 onward.

There is no clear cut dividing line between these periods, although each period can be distinguished by certain significant features.

1) The Foundation Period

All the Government of Bahrain records and those of the Education Department state that 1919 saw the start of modern public education in Bahrain with the opening of Al-Hidayah school for boys in the northern part of Muharaq, by public subscription. This date was officially recognised by the Bahrain Government to the extent that they celebrated the Golden Jubilee of the Education Service in 1969. Study of other sources however state that the date of 1919 is probably incorrect.

The main reason given by the Government for fixing the date as 1919 is that Shaikh Abdulla bin Isa, after his visit to England in that year, decided to institute a system of modern style education along the lines of educational institutes which he had visited during his travels.

Although he may have formulated the ideas for schools during 1919 the creation of an educational system in the physical sense did not come until later, and there are a number of reasons to support this argument.

The first point is that Shaikh Abdulla did not return from his tour until late 1919, which did not allow sufficient time to collect finances and build a school.

A further point is that Dickson, in his private papers, mentions that Shaikh Isa bin Ali, father of Shaikh Abdulla, did not

hold a meeting until early 1920 to discuss with the various sections of the community the possibility of building a school, and to collect public subscriptions. And therefore, as the matter of finance was still being discussed during 1920 it is probable that building had not even started by then.

One further point in support of this argument is that in 1923, during Rihani's visit to Bahrain, he remarked on the existence of a "small primary school" which had recently been constructed in Muharaq.¹⁶

From these points we may conclude that a more probable date for the start of modern education in Bahrain would be 1921.

The setting up of this first school was not without its initial troubles, mainly due to an argument between the Arab and Persian communities with regard to the proposed curriculum.

Dickson remarked that at the meeting of 1920, to which we have referred previously, the Arabs promised Rs.120,000 whilst the Persians' contribution was only Rs.7,000. The Persians promised a further Rs.100,000 on condition that teaching at the school should include the English and Persian languages. The demand was apparently refused and the Persian contribution returned.¹⁷

It is interesting to note that an Education Committee was established under the guidance of Shaikh Abdulla bin Isa which was composed of the Sunni notables only¹⁸ to supervise this school, and that the Shia were excluded.¹⁹

The Hidayah School was the very first modern public school to be opened in the Gulf Area. The first headmaster was an Egyptian, Shaikh Haffez Wahbah, and he was assisted by a Syrian, Mohammed al-Yamani.

The committee's work was extended in 1923 when a second Hidayah School was opened in Manama.

A problem was created in 1922 by the deportation of Haffez Wahbah by the British on the grounds of being a political agitator.²⁰ This led to the committee engaging a number of Syrian teachers to take over the running of the two schools.²¹ The head of the Syrian teaching mission was Uthman al-Hourani,²² who took the post of headmaster and supervisor over both schools.

As may be expected in these early years the curriculum of the schools was mainly religious apart from some elementary reading, writing and arithmetic, adapted from the syllabi of other Arab countries. The attendance at the schools was poor, being on a casual basis, the pupils absenting themselves from the school during the diving season or in the summer time when their families left the town for the sea-shores. Another period of absence was the month of Ramadan when families required their younger members to read the Quoran until very late at night so that they were not able to attend the school on the next morning.

An early report of the school, discussing absenteeism during 1921 states,

"from the above list we see that 25 pupils ceased to attend school before Ramadan because their homes were too far from school or their parents had left the town for the sea-shore and now another 35 pupils were absent between the first and tenth days of Ramadan, and some of the latter alleged that their fathers compelled them to read the Quoran till late at night and they would not be able to come on the following day. Some of them played truant because of the approaching examinations. I tried hard to advise their fathers via the porter of the school but I failed and now there is no more than 80 pupils attending the school."²³

An early Government report which described the results of the first years of education in the public schools stated that,

"Boys were unable to read or write after two years of school and those who left after several years were incapable of filling the simplest posts in the Government offices. The reason for this poor showing in education was undoubtedly the fact that most members of the Education Committee took more interest in the financial advancement of their friends and relatives than in education itself."²⁴

In 1927, however, the committee was responsible for the opening of two more schools in addition to those in Muharraq and Manama. These were situated in Hedd and Raffa.

The growth of these schools, which were restricted to the sons of the Sunni population, created a feeling amongst the Shia that their sons should also have the opportunity of enjoying a modern style education, and with this thought in mind a committee of Shia notables²⁵ was formed with the object of raising money to finance their own schools. The Advisor to the Shaikh, Sir Charles Belgrave, attended the meetings of this committee in an attempt to give such guidance as may be necessary. He later remarked, "The Shia community were poor, but they put up a few thousand rupees as a token contribution." As to the committee themselves, he added that, "The Shia were even less educated than the Sunnis, neither of them knew anything about school management."²⁶

Nevertheless, the Shia committee succeeded, in 1927, in opening four classrooms in Manama which they called the Jaffaria School.

A year later another Shia school was opened in the village

of Al-Kamiss and took the name of the Al-Alawia school.

In contrast to the Sunni committee, who recruited their teachers mainly from Syria, the Shia recruited their teachers from Iraq.

In the same year, 1928, the Sunni committee took two important steps forward. The first was in the opening of the first girls' public school in the Gulf Area, and the second was the sending of eight boys to Beirut with a view to their obtaining a higher education.²⁷

The opening of the Girls' school brought a storm of protest from the more conservative elements within the community. Typical arguments against the opening of the school were, "If the girls learn to read and write, what is to prevent them from getting letters from men, without their parents' knowledge".²⁸ The local mullas were moved to vigorously attack this innovation to the extent of publicly denouncing the move in the Friday Kutba.

The more enlightened sectors of the community including the Sheikh gave the new school limited support, privately, in view of the general resistance to girls education by the conservative majority.

The school was at first only a limited experiment and was held in a house rented by the committee.²⁹ From these small beginnings began the first education service for girls in Bahrain.

All of the eight boys selected to go to Beirut to study were Sunni, and of these, three were sons of members of the Ruling Family. The boys returned from Beirut two years later, three of them having been successful in their endeavours and these three immediately joined the teaching profession in Bahrain. One later became the

island's Director of Education, and later Minister of Education.

Thus, by the end of 1928 there were seven public schools in Bahrain. Five of them, including the girls' school, were the Al-Hidayah schools, which were run by the Sunni committee, the other two being those run by the Shia committee.

The Government began to subsidise the public schools as early as 1925 but apparently became increasingly dissatisfied with the management of the schools and the running of their finances. Because of this the Government quickly attempted to bring these schools under ^{her} ~~his~~ supervision but this move was strongly opposed by both committees.

In view of this opposition the Government threatened to withdraw all subsidies from the schools and this threat had the effect of making the committees agree to the Government supervision which was required.

So in 1929 the Government appointed Mr. Fayek Adham, a graduate of the American University of Beirut, as overall inspector of these schools.

One of his first actions was to open another girls' school in Manama of which his wife became the first headmistress.

Other actions taken were to review the administration of the schools and to introduce new curricula on the Lebanese pattern. Advanced subjects such as physics, music and higher mathematics were dropped on the grounds that they were badly presented. The pay of the teachers was reviewed, the hours worked reduced and more teachers were recruited.

By the end of 1930 it was reported that 500 boys and 100 girls were attending the eight schools.³⁰

The new organisation was declared unacceptable by the teachers, who, led by the headmasters of the Manama and Muharraq schools, and with the backing of their pupils, declared a strike on the 1st February, 1930 and presented their demands to the Government and the two committees.

Their demands were that, no changes should be made in the salaries paid to the teachers, that their appointment should be on a permanent basis and that the new inspector should take into account the views of the two headmasters when considering matters affecting the curriculum.³¹

The Government reacted swiftly and arrested Uthman al-Hourani and two of his associates and deported them. By the 15th February the situation had calmed down and control was restored, and the Government, through its new inspector, took a firm hand over the control of the schools. The committees were reduced to an advisory capacity and were later disbanded. Mr. Fayek Adham became Director of Education and was answerable to Sir Charles Belgrave at the Adviserate. The responsibility for the girls' schools was placed in the hands of Lady Marjorie Belgrave,³² assisted by Mrs. Wafika Tabara Nair, a Lebanese from the British Syrian Training College, who was also the sister-in-law of Mr. Adham. Mrs. Nair continued to serve in the girls' section of the Education Department, and in 1957, on Lady Belgrave leaving Bahrain, she became Directrix of the Girls' Education Department.

Mr. Adham's period of office extended up to the academic year 1938-39 by which time education in Bahrain had undergone some vital changes.

The most important change was the amalgamation of the Shia and Sunni schools, especially in Manama, when in 1930 on the completion of the new Jaffariya school, which was capable of accommodating up to 500 pupils, it was taken over by the Government as a non-sectarian school and all boys transferred there. The old Manama boys' school of the Sunni sect became an enlarged non-sectarian girls' school. The latter move gave the opportunity for the first time for Shia girls to obtain an education.

These amalgamations were at first resented by the opposing religious factions, but eventually it proved to be one of the most important steps taken towards the integration of the two communities.

Meanwhile a backward step was taken which laid the foundations for future divisions within the Administration. This step was in allowing boys' and girls' education to develop along entirely independent lines. These two separate lines were later to be officially adopted in the 1940's as official policy and were in themselves the most serious obstacle to the wider development of education in Bahrain during the 1940's and 1950's.

The pattern of primary education was put on a sounder footing during the 1930's on the basis of three years pre-primary and four years primary education. The enrolment of pupils was started at the age of six.

Some writers doubt the existence of pre-primary schools, Tahdiriyyah, during this period as for instance, Winder, quoting a Government report of 1951³³ states that the start of pre-primary education did not take place until 1949-50. On the other hand Al-Hamer, relying on the Government Report of 1943,³⁴ chooses that year as the starting date.

In fact the two reports of 1943 and 1951 were referring to specific schools and not to pre-primary education as a whole, as both these reports are pre-dated by other sources such as the "Al-Bahrain" newspaper which in issue No. 15, dated 15th June, 1939 mentions the existence of Tahdiriyah in an article complaining of overcrowding in the Tahdiriyah classrooms of some schools.

We therefore have good reason to believe that pre-primary education was introduced during the administration of Mr. Adham.

The stated goals of the pre-primary schools were to, "give the student character, training, good habits, sharpened senses, and heightened powers of observation".³⁵ The curriculum consisted of the principles of reading, writing and arithmetic, verses from the Quoran, religious instruction and songs. Study periods for the pre-primary schools consisted of morning attendance only.

Once primary level was reached the pupil was expected to attend on both morning and afternoon for five days per week. Thursday attendance was on the morning only and Friday was the weekend holiday. Each class usually lasted for 45 minutes and the teachers were expected to undertake 43 classes per week.

The number of classes was usually exactly equal to the number of teachers, including the headmasters and headmistresses, who were also expected to teach the same number of classes in addition to their other duties.³⁶

A further innovation was introduced during the Adham administration when in 1936 two technical classes were formed, one being attached to Muharraq Boys' School and the other to Manama Boys' School.

Two Lebanese teachers were engaged to teach the boys simple carpentry and mechanics in a course lasting for two years.³⁷

The following year, however, a separate technical school was established in Manama and these courses were transferred to the new school. In addition to the existing courses two others were added, blacksmithing and turning. The responsibility for the administration of this new school was given to the Electricity Supply Department.

The school was open to any pupil who had completed the first or second years of his primary education.

Towards the end of this period, in 1937-38, there was still only eight schools in Bahrain.

In Manama and Muharraq there were four schools, one boys' and one girls', in each town, and in addition there was the Technical School. The other schools were situated at Rafaa, Hedd and Suq al-Khamis.

It was reported that by the end of the academic year 1938-39 there were 1,589 students, almost three times the 1930 number.³⁸

Although the number of pupils had almost trebled the number of schools existing between 1928 and 1938 had risen only from seven to eight, and the resulting overcrowding gave rise to concern as to the quality of teaching which could be carried out in these overcrowded conditions. Public discontent mounted and was given a voice in "Al-Bahrain" on 15th June, 1939, when criticism of both the modern and traditional schools was expressed and the following points raised: that the pre-primary schools were overcrowded with between 50 and 60 pupils per class, that the Manama and Muharraq schools were located in remote areas and the pupils had difficulty

in reaching them, and that the Department of Education should provide transport to the schools for both pupils and teachers.

The article also stated that the educational level of the teachers was very low and that, "the teacher who has nothing can give nothing"; and that the proper school teacher should be "healthy, have a good knowledge of his subjects, organise his time, and should not resort to beating the pupils". The writer also mentioned the continued existence of the traditional Kutab schools throughout the island and expressed the opinion that they were filthy, mis-educated the pupils and that the mullas put pressures upon the boys and their parents to prevent the children attending proper schools.³⁹

The Government seized the opportunity to review the situation following the forced resignation of Mr. Adham and his wife, who returned to their native country, and appointed an English educational expert, Mr. A. Falness, who had been working with the Education Department in Iraq. He assessed the situation and ascertained the views of the local people and presented his report, with certain recommendations, in 1938-39.

The Government of Bahrain appointed Mr. Falness as Director of Education in order that his recommendations might be carried out. His appointment marked the segregation of boys, girls and technical education into three rigid sectors, himself being Director of Education for the boys, Lady Belgrave for the girls, and Sir Charles Belgrave became responsible for technical education.

This system was in force for two decades and each sector tended to develop independently. This we propose to deal with in the next section on the growth of the educational system.

2) The Period of Growth:- Boys' Education

The official name of the Boys' Department was the "Maarif Talim al-Banin" (Boys' Education Department).

One of the first acts of Mr. Falness in carrying out his recommendations, was to open another three schools, two for boys, in Sitra and Budayyia and a girls' school in Hedd, in order to relieve the pressure on the existing schools, and to spread the facilities over a wider area.

Another of his recommendations was to promote secondary education in the island and the first establishment in Bahrain to offer facilities for secondary education was opened in Manama in 1940-41. This was known as Al "Kulliyah", or Manama College, and was intended to take the cream of the pupils leaving primary schools at around 13 to 14 years of age, and its object was to provide higher education and character training for those of the Bahrain students who would later like to enter one of the Government Departments, or serve as teachers in the Education Department.⁴⁰

The courses were designed to be of three years' duration and instruction was carried out in English on the lines of the Indian curriculum. The first batch of pupils, 30 in number, were personally selected by Mr. Falness. A small hostel was also set up to accommodate boys attending the school from remote areas of the island.

A year later the name was changed to "Thanawiyah", or Secondary School, instead of "College".

Mr. Falness served as Director for two years and was succeeded by Mr. F.G. Wakelin, who served for four years, and Mr. Willie, who served for only a few weeks before being replaced by Mr. Ahmed Al-Umran in late 1945, and who continues to hold the post up to the present day.⁴¹

During these early years, however, the British Administration introduced certain modifications in the system, which can be summarised as follows.

The working hours of both masters and boys were reduced, pay and conditions for teachers were regularised and permanent rates of pay, with annual increments were introduced, and the teachers, with the exception of the villages' mullas were included in the Government Provident Scheme.

Grades of teachers and standards of education were defined. The system whereby the pupils had to pay for their own text books and equipment was abolished and in its place a central store was established at the Education Department to provide free stationery, text books and equipment, thus removing what had been an insuperable barrier to education for the poorer sections of the community.⁴²

In an attempt to relieve the overcrowding the enrolling age was raised from 6 or 7 years to nearer 8 years of age. The number of over-aged pupils and married men who had formerly monopolised the higher levels of education was reduced and further enrolment of this group of pupils was restricted.

The use of the Quoran as a means of teaching pre-primary children to read was discontinued and proper reading books were introduced. Thus the village schools were transformed into proper teaching establishments with the mullas being retained for the teaching of religion alone.

All Government schools in the island were also brought into a good state of repair.

During this period, up to the end of the Second World War, the number of boys' schools rose from five to thirteen, including secondary

schools, and the number of students and teachers were 1,750 and 82 respectively.

In 1943, Mr. Wakelin succeeded, with the help of the British Councils in Bahrain and Cairo, in recruiting a number of Egyptian teachers to serve with the Education Department in Bahrain, mainly in the secondary schools. They took up their duties in 1944 as the first Egyptian Education Mission. The syllabi in the schools from that time began to change to the Egyptian curriculum.

Mr. Ahmed al-Umran gives us some idea of the situation at the end of the Second World War when in his report of 1955, he states that, "When I took office, this sort of education (secondary) was hardly worthy of mention. It consisted of only two classes bearing the name of secondary school."⁴³ In the year mentioned (1945) there were only 36 pupils of secondary level. This was not the highest number of secondary pupils up to that date as in 1943-44 there had been approximately 50 pupils at this level but a number of them had left to take up employment and had not been replaced by newcomers.

In 1947 a new development took place with the introduction of a special course of evening classes in the secondary school, called "Al-Qism al-Khass" with a view to training those pupils attending secondary school who were inclined to enter the teaching profession, in the rudiments of teaching, prior to becoming primary school teachers. These classes were in addition to the pupils' normal studies. To encourage students to enrol in these classes a monthly allowance of 15 rupees was given.

Psychology, methods of instruction, both general and particular, theoretical and practical, were the main subjects, besides attending experimental classes.

The response by the secondary level students to this scheme was good, probably in view of the fact that the allowance and the prospects of a secure future were attractive to them.

Between 1946 and 1948 due to the pressure of the increased enrolment at pre-primary level, the normal three years of "kindergarten" were reduced to two.

The pattern was thus established of 2 years of pre-primary from 8 to 10 years old, followed by four years primary education and four years secondary education.⁴⁴ This was the theoretical classification but in fact the age of pupils at all levels tended to be higher than that laid down, as for instance in 1948 the average age of secondary school pupils was between 18 and 19 years of age, indicating a high level of older pupils.

The 1950's saw further developments in the field of boys' education. A new secondary school building was opened in Manama in 1951 which was equipped with more up-to-date facilities in the form of laboratories, large classrooms, a modern library and a large playground.

The studies at secondary school were divided into two year periods; the first two years being in general subjects, and the last two years allowing the pupil to specialise in either science or arts subjects.

In 1952 Commercial Studies for the last two years were added to the curriculum,⁴⁵ and in 1954 a teacher training branch was established, which replaced the former system of evening classes.⁴⁶ The pupils attending the teacher training branch were given an allowance of Rs. 60 per month throughout their training.

The programme of each section of the secondary school was

modelled on the Egyptian syllabus.

The goals of the secondary school were stated to be to provide the adolescent with sufficient general education, "Thaqafah", so as to become a useful member of society, and to impart scientific knowledge with a view to continuing with university studies.⁴⁷

In 1951 a new hostel was constructed adjoining the secondary school to serve the needs of the pupils who lived too far from Manama to make a daily journey. This was mainly for the secondary school, the technical school and certain of the higher classes of the primary schools. A number of Gulf Arab students were also accommodated in this hostel and in 1955 it was reported that there were 100 students living in the hostel, thirteen of whom were non-Bahraini Arabs.

The 1950's generally was a period of great growth in the boys' education service in Bahrain with a number of new schools being opened. The largest primary school in the Gulf at that time, was opened in 1957, namely the al-Salymaniya School, capable of accommodating 1,000 pupils.

The aims of primary education during the 1950's were stated to be

"the spread of general culture in the younger generation the bringing up of a generation equipped to cope with the demands of civilised life such as general knowledge, correct things, healthy bodies, solid morals, deep spiritual faith, good taste and a willingness to make sacrifices for the nation (Al-Ummah), and the country, (Al-Watan)"⁴⁸

It was recognised at this stage that at least a primary education was something that no citizen should be without.⁴⁹

By the end of the period which we have termed the "Growth

Period", there were 34 boys' schools with 12,364 pupils and 470 teachers,⁵⁰ a great increase from the humble start made after the war.

The Administration of the Department of Education became more formalised during the 1950's and a great deal of centralisation took place under the Director of Boys' Education. The divisions or "Idarah" were as follows:-

- 1) Secretariat - which kept records and statistics and confidential correspondence and assisted with the organisation of examinations.

- 2) Inspection - the duties of the division being to supervise the work and management of the schools.

- 3) Sports Inspectors' Division - to supervise sporting activities and other organisations such as the Scouts which were attached to the schools.

- 4) Employees' Division - Publication of official notices and recruitment of all grades of employees.

- 5) Stores Division - Distribution of books and materials and care and maintenance of school buildings and official housing.

- 6) Transport Division - Transportation of staff and pupils from remote areas to and from the schools.

- 7) Library Division - Supervision of the Department's General Library.

In 1956 a Council of Education was established as a result of political pressure. It was authorised by "Health and Education Councils Ordinance" of 31st December, 1956, which also authorised the setting up of the Health Council.

The number serving on each council was fixed at 8 persons,

five of them selected by the Municipalities and three by the Shaikh with one of the Shaikh's nominees being Chairman of the Council.⁵¹

The terms of reference of the Education Council were to,

"Consider all proposals concerning education services coming from the public or local councils, and to make representations to the head of the department concerned, as to action to be taken, on the other hand the council would be the channel through which the Director pronounced his policies and reported progress. The council would have close public relations and in this way the members, and in turn, the Municipal councils and the wider public, would concurrently be aware of results and kept in touch with prospective developments."⁵²

Early in 1957 this council was appointed under the chairmanship of Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman, the second son of the then current Ruler, now the Prime Minister.

Although the Technical School was under a separate administration from that of the primary and secondary education systems for boys we propose to deal with it at this stage as it was another branch of the boys' education and eventually became an integral part of it.

At the start of the period of growth of education in Bahrain the responsibility for technical education was placed in the hands of a British principle under Sir Charles Belgrave, who acted as Head of Technical Education until his retirement in 1957.

In 1946 a new principal was appointed, Mr. Said Tabara, a Lebanese from the American University Hospital in Beirut, who held this appointment until 1958 when the school was amalgamated into the Boys' Education Department. At this time Mr. Tabara also assumed the role of Head of the Technical Division of the Boys' Education

Department.

Enrolments at the school, despite the attraction of the training allowance which was payable,⁵³ was very small and amounted to only 40 pupils in 1945-46.

In 1946-47 the length of the courses was extended from two to three years and in 1948-49 to four years.

On taking over the school in 1946 Mr. Tabara immediately set about re-organising the curriculum and extending it to cover a wider range of subjects. He also re-organised the number of hours worked by teachers and pupils at the school.

In 1950 the school started a special programme for the training of BAPCO employees which as we have mentioned earlier, lasted only for a few years.

The Education Report of 1952 mentioned a rise in the standard of acceptance, in that pupils now had to complete either two or three years primary education before entering the school and by 1955 the Education Report stated that pupils were preferred to have completed their primary education, thus indicating a welcome rise in standards at the school.

By the end of the academic year 1949-50 the number of pupils at the technical school had risen to 60 and the number of teachers to 11. The numbers of boys attending the various courses were 9 in Blacksmithing, 10 in Machining, 10 in Carpentry, and 31 in the General Group.

Between 1955 and 1957 the laboratories and workshop facilities were greatly extended. Other innovations included the supply of overalls and tool-kits to the pupils, free of charge.

Despite these changes enrolment during the 1950's was still

very low and by 1959-60 the total number of pupils was only 89.

The poor response to technical education was a reflection of the community attitude to this type of education which still regarded manual work as a social stigma.

Successive Government Reports deal with this point. The 1954 Annual Report stated,

"Among the young men and boys of Bahrain there is still a definite feeling that to learn a trade is derogatory, and so long as this feeling exists it will be difficult to get the right type of boys to take up technical training. The majority of these boys who do enter the school are either those of Persian origin, or boys from villages."⁵⁴

In the Annual Report of 1957 it was said that,

"The Bahrain Government is rather anxious to further encouragement towards such professional and technical education in Bahrain,"⁵⁵

and in 1959 the Annual Report stated that "The monthly grant for (technical) students was increased by an average of 15 Rupees, it is hoped that enrolment will increase in the future."⁵⁶

These statements reflect the difficulties in attracting pupils to participate in the Technical Education in Bahrain.

Some of the difficulties experienced by the Technical Education School may be attributed to the fact that it was a separate entity, apart from the mainstream of general education. The persons in charge of the education programme repeatedly demanded during the 1950's the amalgamation of the Technical School into the Boys' Education Department. Mr. Umrani wrote in 1955 that,

"it is natural that the Education Department should have complete supervision over the Technical School, as is the case in all other countries it may be that one of the reasons for the lack of growth of the technical education, despite the country's need for this type of education, is that it is not attached to a department specialising in educational matters. The school should perhaps be a part of the

secondary school system so that the pupils would feel that they were on the same road and seeking the same goals as other graduates, only on a different branch, and that their work also could serve their country."⁵⁷

Girls' Education

As previously mentioned, in the two decades under review Girls' Education was administered by a separate department, and for most of this period, up to her departure in 1957, Lady Marjorie Belgrave was the Directrix of Girls' Education.

Between 1957 and 1960, in which year the amalgamation of both educational departments took place, Mrs. W. Nair (Waffica Tabara), took over the duties of Directrix.

After the amalgamation she became the Head of the Girls' Division in the Directorate of Education.

During the 1940's and 1950's the limitations which impeded the progress of girls' education were the facts that it was segregated from the main developments in boys' education and also that the local attitude to girls' education was still to a large extent one of discouragement.

The fact that girls' Education had to develop within a male-dominated society and within the limits of the traditional purdah system made progress in numbers and types of training available very difficult.

The Bahraini girls, however, were eager to obtain education. As early as 1939 an anonymous open letter to the "Al-Bahrain" newspaper,⁵⁸ written by one of the schoolgirls, demanded that girls' education should be compulsory, at least between the ages of seven and twelve, before they took the purdah.

In 1940 there were three girls' primary schools accommodating around 450 girls. By 1945-46 the number of schools had risen to five and the number of pupils to 1,139. At this time there was a total of fifty-one teachers.⁵⁹

There was no secondary education for girls at all during the 1940's and by the end of the decade there were only six girls' primary schools with only 1,356 pupils and 58 teachers.

The purpose of girls' education during the 1940's was summarised in Mr. Umran's lecture in London in 1946 when he stated that, "The goal of girls' education is to prepare the girl to be a respected wife, intellectual mother and an educated housewife."⁶⁰

Thus we see that Mr. Umran, who was regarded as an enlightened man, saw no role for women outside their own homes.

The curriculum of girls' schools differed slightly from the boys', in that greater emphasis was placed on Arabic and domestic sciences at the expense of other subjects, such as English and scientific subjects.

The years of the 1950's were marked by an expansion in the number of girls' schools in both towns and villages. The first girls' secondary school was opened in 1950 in a rented house in Manama, with a first year class of eleven girls.

It was conducted along the same general lines as that of the boys' general academic programme with the addition of domestic science. Due to the comparatively large number of enrolments it became necessary after the first two years of general studies to sub-divide the courses into three sections, General Academic for both Arts and Sciences, Teacher Training and Domestic Sciences.

The first group of girls to complete their secondary education graduated in 1956. Only five girls graduated, but three of these

went on to Beirut College for Women to complete their higher education.⁶¹

By the end of the 1950's there were sixteen girls' schools, including the secondary school, with an attendance of 5,467 pupils and 202 teachers.

Despite the growth of education for girls, the general attitude was still that the main object was to fit them for a life in the home, although some did feel the need for a more modern attitude to be adopted.

Mr. Umran, in a report to the Shaikh in 1955 put forward the view that,

"I feel some anxiety when I talk of boys' education without mentioning the girls, this is an unnatural thing to exist it is like our sons living in one country and our daughters in another. Are they not the future fathers and mothers of our grandchildren? Do they not live in the same environment? It is imperative that we bring together both boys' and girls' education that they may march together to the same goals."⁶²

In general, education in Bahrain during this period, despite the growth which took place, suffered to a certain extent from the division of the service into three separate compartments, with each one competing against the other for the resources which were available. There was wastage and rivalry in the fact that each Department (Boys' and Girls') duplicated each others functions and efforts.

One peculiar aspect of the system, however, was that during this period, with the exception of Mr. Umran, education was controlled by two families, Sir Charles and Lady Belgrave being responsible for Technical Education and Girls' Education respectively assisted by Mr. Said Tabara and his sister Waffica Tabara (Mrs. Nair).

Whatever the merits of this arrangement may have been, in Bahrain, with its relatively small community, it was resented on the grounds that it smacked of nepotism and public sympathy was very much with Mr. Umrān who was one of their own people. Although he was not publicly outspoken about the situation one could sense from his reports his doubts and dissatisfaction.

3) The Period of Modern Developments (1960-71)

The amalgamation of the Technical School into the Boys' Education Department in 1958 has already been mentioned, but a far more important step was taken in August, 1960 when the Boys' and Girls' Departments were amalgamated under the newly-created Directorate of Education. Mr. Umrān assumed the title of Director-General, assisted by Shaikh Abdul Aziḡ bin Mohammed al-Khalifa, who was Assistant Director-General, now Minister of Education.

The Directorate was sub-divided into two main divisions, the Boys' Directorate and the Girls' Directorate, but with a central administration.⁶³

The Directorate was set up on the recommendation of a two man committee of Arab educational experts, namely Mr. M. Kamel Nahhass, of the U.A.R. Ministry of Education, and Professor J. Katul of the Department of Education of A.U.B.

They produced their report in April, 1960. As well as the setting up of the Directorate they also recommended a change in the pattern of education from the existing system of two years preprimary, four years primary, and four years secondary, to six years primary, two years elementary (Junior secondary), and three years secondary. This followed the pattern of the Egyptian system then in use throughout most the Arab countries.

These recommendations meant the lowering of the enrolment age to six years old once more and this, along with their recommendation that there should be automatic promotion for the first three years of primary education, was adopted and introduced during the academic year 1960-61.

This latter point of automatic promotion was intended to deal with the problem of "repeaters" during primary education, as in their investigation they found that forty percent of primary students in each class failed to progress to the next grade each year and that only eight percent went straight through all grades without failure.⁶⁴

In adopting the new pattern of education it was found necessary to introduce during the last three years of secondary education, the "Tawjiheyvah" (Egyptian High School Qualification Certificate) to prepare the boys for continuing their studies in universities abroad. In 1963 this system was also adopted by the Girls' Secondary School. In the same year the domestic sciences branch of the Girls' Department was discontinued and their curriculum brought more into line with that of the boys.

The academic year 1962-63 also saw major changes in Technical Education. The entry of boys to the Technical School was restricted to those pupils who had obtained their Certificate of Primary Education, the period of study was extended to five years and the standard of education raised to that of the secondary level.

These moves were probably responsible for the subsequent popularity of Technical Education which for so many years had been the poor relation in the educational field, as under the new system pupils in the technical area were assured of an educational standard

equal to that of the normal secondary system and they were thus no longer looked upon as an inferior branch of the education service.

Religious education has not been mentioned so far and this is because it occupies a peculiar place in the system.

The first modern religious school was reported to have been started in 1938 by the Shia Appeal Khadi.⁶⁵ Just before the start of the Second World War a few students from this school were sent abroad to the Islamis College of Lucknow in India.⁶⁶ This is the only time a Shia religious school was mentioned and it appears to have died out very soon afterwards.

After Shaikh S₄lman came to the throne in 1942 a small number of boys started to attend the "Al-Madrassa ad-Diniyah" (the religious school), a Sunni school wholly subsidised by the Shaikh. A small number of its graduates were sent to study at Al-Azher in Cairo. The level of this school probably did not exceed the primary level.

In 1960, however, the school came under the control of the Directorate of Education and was incorporated into the system.⁶⁷ Pupils were allowed to attend this school only after having completed the first three years of their primary education. The school was later extended to cover primary, elementary and secondary levels. It was renamed the "Al-Mahad ad Dini", and its curriculum was modelled on that of Al-Azher with the addition of the English language.

The Commercial section of the Boys' Secondary School was in 1965 made a separate Commercial School with secondary education status.

By the end of 1966 the total number of schools had risen to

eighty-two with a total attendance of 37,607 pupils and 1,654 teachers, according to the Annual Report for 1966.

This expansion of the school services placed an excessive burden on the Administration and in late 1965 the Directorate engaged Mr. D.J.S. Crozier and Mr. V.L. Griffiths to investigate the problems of the system.

They reported in January 1966 and in their findings⁶⁸ they mentioned that whilst there was very little problem with "repeaters" in the secondary level, in the primary schools the level of "repeaters" after the initial three years was running at about twenty percent. This, however, was an improvement on the previous level of forty percent.

The rising cost of learning was one of the problems considered by the two experts and they recommended the abolition of the special allowances payable to pupils in the teacher training division, both boys and girls, and those to the technical school pupils.

This was immediately agreed and the allowances were discontinued to all pupils with the exception of those attending the religious school.

In accordance with their advice the system of free transport for pupils was also reviewed and a charge imposed on all using the service except those pupils who, after the application of a form of means test, were deemed to be of families too poor to meet these charges.

The report also recommended the closure of the teacher training divisions of the secondary schools for boys and girls and the replacement of these two separate classes with a new teacher

training institute. It was planned that these institutes would provide a higher grade of Bahraini teacher for primary and elementary schools and would eventually be beneficial to the economy of the education service in that it would limit the large sums of money being spent on the importation of Non-Bahraini teachers.

The training institute for boys, the "Mahad al-Moalemeen", was opened in 1966 and a year later the girls' institute was opened.

The boys and girls who were at that time undertaking teacher training at the secondary schools were transferred to the new teacher training institutes and once these pupils had completed their training future enrolment took place only from those pupils who had completed their general academic secondary school education. Pupils attending the colleges undertook a two year course in theoretical and practical teaching and these institutes became the highest level of education obtainable in Bahrain, the important point being that they were no longer part of the secondary school system, but an extension beyond that point.

Teacher training took for the first time a number of different specialised forms in that teachers were no longer "general subject tutors", but were trained to teach specifically in areas such as Arabic language and Islamic Religion, Science and Mathematics, English Language, Social Studies, Physical Education and Arts and Handicrafts.

The increased interest in technical education made it necessary to open a second technical school to cater for the demand. Therefore, in 1969 the second technical school was opened in the town of Jidhaffs with a view to giving a greater opportunity

for the boys of the surrounding villages to obtain a technical education once they had finished their primary schooling.⁶⁹

To give a summary of the growth and development of education in Bahrain the following table shows the numbers of schools, pupils and teachers since the inception of modern public schools in Bahrain. (P.221)

The increase could have been even greater if education in Bahrain had been compulsory as even in 1971 of a total school age population (between 7 and 17) only 73 percent were attending Government Schools. This will undoubtedly increase in the future as already, from the same census it can be calculated that there is approximately 77 percent attendance rate of those of primary school age (7 to 12).

It is interesting to note that students as a percentage of the total population have also increased dramatically over the years shown. In 1950 full-time students as a percentage of the population amounted to only 5.1 percent. By 1959-60 however this had risen to 14.3 percent, by 1965 to 20.6 percent and in 1971 it reached the figure of 23.1 percent. If school attendance was compulsory the figure could be as high as 30 per cent of the total population.

Another area in which education has made an impact is in the sphere of adult education. The effect has been both social and political.

With regard to the social aspect, vocational training for adults has made the Bahrainis more efficient in the jobs which they already hold and in many cases has fitted them for positions of greater responsibility, thus increasing the social mobility of the

TABLE XXV

Selected Years of Growth of Government Education in Bahrain

Year	No. of Schools		No. of Students		Total	No. of Teachers						
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls		Bahraini		Non-Bahraini		Gr. Total		
						Male	Fem.	Total	Male		Fem.	Total
1945-6	13	5	1750	1139	2889	59	46	105	23	5	28	133
1950-1	15	6	3792	1763	5555	102	55	157	54	11	65	222
1955-6	25	12	7374	3313	10687	211	80	291	103	39	142	433
1960-1	36	19	13923	6486	20409	409	172	581	138	80	218	799
1965-6	51	31	23353	14254	37607	798	362	1160	251	243	494	1654
1970-1	64	47	28768	21303	50071	1132	734	1866	304	210	514	2380

The growth shown in the table became really significant during the Development Period (1960-61 to 1970-71) when the number of pupils attending school rose by almost 250 percent in 10 years.

people.

On the political side the general literacy campaign has enabled previously illiterate people to take an active interest in political events both at home and abroad for the first time.

The forms which adult education took could be divided into three main sectors, in-service teacher training, vocational training (commercial or technical) and the literacy campaigns.

The "Complementary Evening Studies" were started in 1950-51 and were designed for those teachers already in the Education Service who had not during their own school days obtained a school-leaving certificate, either primary or secondary. The duration of each course was two years, during which the teachers were encouraged to complete the primary or secondary education.

Once a teacher had obtained either of these qualifications he was awarded an increment to his salary and as the scheme progressed the possession of these qualifications became a major consideration in the field of promotion.

The programme was terminated in the mid-1960's by which time all teachers had obtained their primary education certificates, although in-service teachers not yet holding their full secondary certificate can still sit for the Secondary General Certificate as external students.

Vocational training, which was another aspect of Adult Education, began in 1953-54 and covered both Commercial and Technical training. Both evening classes were open to the general public for a very small fee and their purpose was to raise the standard of education and skills of the people to enable them to raise their standard of living. The course of study for the

Commercial course was both theoretical and practical, whilst the Technical training was entirely practical. For both types of training a student must not exceed the age of 35; however, for the Commercial studies he should hold the primary certificate of education. These courses finished in 1965 although the Technical training was later restarted in 1966-67 with a new system of evening classes. For the new courses all primary school leavers, interested in following technical studies, who obtained below average results and who are above 16 years of age, are enrolled in these classes with the idea of preparing semi-skilled labourers for the market.

One of the limitations of this new system is that, as one document stated, recruitment is from those pupils who had obtained only "below average results"⁷² in their primary education and this tends to lower the standard that could potentially be obtained from these types of classes.

In an attempt to raise the literacy level of the Bahrainis various literacy campaigns have been organised. The first of these was in the post-war years when BAPCO, in co-operation with the Education Department, began a campaign to encourage both BAPCO employees and members of the general public to learn to read and write so that they would become more employable. These campaigns were continued with varying degrees of success until 1955 when they were given an impetus by the Bahraini national clubs deciding to co-operate in the scheme by instituting a series of evening classes throughout the island. More help was forthcoming during the 1960's when a number of Bahraini university students organised evening classes during their vacations with a view to assisting the

drive to raise the literacy level.

As there has been no formal policy on literacy campaigns as such no figures are available, although we may see the progress which has been made by studying the figures of the various censuses.

The census of 1941 gives a figure of 10.5 percent literacy for the total population, whilst by 1950 this had risen to 12.8 percent, the actual breakdown between adults and minors, male and female, not being given.⁷¹

In the later censuses of 1959, 1965 and 1971 these figures are available and we see that the literacy figures for the adult population have risen dramatically in recent years.

TABLE XXVI

Adult Literacy in Bahrain (For all over 15 yrs of age.)⁷³

<u>Year</u>	<u>% Male Pop.</u>	<u>Female Pop.</u>	<u>% of Total Adult Pop.</u>
1959	35.2	13.7	25.3
1965	36.1	18.2	29.3
1971	49.2	28.5	40.2

Although to some degree the rapid percentage increase between 1965 and 1971 may be due to a large number of literate school leavers joining the adult population, the dramatic rise when compared to the preceding six year period can be attributed to the success of the literacy campaigns.

It is interesting to note that in comparison with other areas of the Arab World, Bahrain is relatively highly placed in the literacy league with a literacy rate for all over 10 years of age of 38.3 per cent.⁷⁴

Despite the fact that education takes up a large proportion of the Bahrain National Budget an even greater effort will be required in the future to raise the literacy level to that of the developed countries of the world.

Thus if Bahrain is to keep pace with the growing demand for education she must expand the services on more than one front. Expansion must take place not only to cater for the naturally increasing birthrate but also for the future growth in the percentage of those of above school age wishing to participate in the educational programmes.

FOOTNOTES

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2. Ibid, p. 310.
3. Richter, Julius, "A History of Protestant Missions in the East", Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, London 1910, p.277.
4. Rihani, Ameen, op.cit., pp. 200-201.
5. Winder, op.cit., p. 312.
6. Ibid.
7. Govt. of Bahrain Education Dept. (Statistic Division), "Educational Statistics 1959-60, through 1963-64."
8. Al-Hamer, Abdul Malik. "Development of Education in Bahrain 1940-1965", Oriental Press, Bahrain, 1969, pp. 102-103.
9. Ibid. p.8 and p. 104-
10. Winder, op.cit., p.308.
11. Faroughy, op.cit., p.28.
12. Wahbah, H., "The Arabian Peninsula in the 20th Century." Second edition, Cairo, 1946.
13. Al-Umran, Ahmed, "Report on Education in Bahrain", Department of Education, 1955 - Najah Press, Bahrain, p.39. Henceforth cited as "Taqrer - 1955".
14. Govt. of Bahrain, "The Bahrain Private Education Ordinance, 1961". Notice No. 11, 1961.
15. Van Peunsem, G.D., "Public Schools in Bahrain" - Neglected Arabia, No. 90 (July, Aug., Sept., 1914) pp. 11-14, quoted in Winder, op.cit., pp.283-284.
16. Rihani, op.cit., p.200.
17. Dickson mentions in his private papers that the Rs.7,000 was handed over to Mr. Yousef Kanoo, a leading merchant, in order for him to return the contribution to the Persian community. It was probably this move which made the Persians open their private school in 1923.
18. The committee consisted of Messrs. Yousef Ibrahim Fakroo, Abdul Latif Al-Mushari, Abdul Aziz Al-Qussabi, Abdul Rahman Mohammed Al-Zayani Abdul Rahman Abdul Wahab Al Zayani and Ahmed Hassan Kanoo.

19. Al-Qoos, Yacoob Yousef. "Memories of Education in Bahrain in its Early Years". Huna Al-Bahrain, April 1969, pp. 10-13. Special publication to mark the Education Jubilee. Henceforth cited as "Education Jubilee". The article and names of writer will be given.
20. Wahbah later joined the service of King ibn Saud and became his Ambassador at the Court of St. James between, 1948-1956.
21. Al-Baker, Abdul Rahman, "The Political Situation in Bahrain" lecture delivered in Al-Ittihad Club in Kuwait later published by "Dar Al-Ki-tab al-Arabi", Cairo 1956, pp. 18-19.
22. Al-Hourani was ironically one of the leading political agitators against French ruled Syria.
23. Extracted from a Schoolmaster's Report of 1921 quoted by Al-Ansari, Mohammed J. "Aspects of the Arabian Gulf", (Arabic), Bahrain 1970 p.97.
24. Govt. of Bahrain Administration Report for the years 1926-37, date and place of publication unknown, p.51. (I.O.)
25. Belgrave, Sir C.D., op.cit., p.93. Al-Qoos gives the names as follows - Abd Ali bin Mansoor bin Juma, Adnan al-Biladi, Abd Ali bin Rajab, Ahmed Al-Allawi, Abd al-Rasool Rajab, and Mohammed al-Baharna.
26. Belgrave, C., op.cit., p.93.
27. Govt. Documents and Warden, op.cit., p.317, say that these boys were sent to the A.U.B., Littlefield, op.cit., p.54, disputes this statement and says that they were sent to the International College as there was no secondary education in Bahrain at that time and therefore they could not have gone direct to University. Littlefield's statement is the more feasible. The boys concerned were Shaikh Khalifah bin Mohammed bin Isa al-Khalifah, Shaikh Hamed bin Abdulla al-Khalifah, Shaikh Abdulla bin Ibrahim al-Khalifah, Ahmed Al-Umrani (later Director of Education), Rashid Abdul Rahman al-Zayani, Abdul Rahman Al-Maowdh, Kamal Qassem al-Myhza and Abdul Aziz Saad Al-Shamlan (later a leading member of the Higher Executive Committee of 1953).
28. Belgrave, C., op.cit., p.95.
29. Al-Shurakhi, Amina "Girls' education in Bahrain", "Education Jubilee", pp.17-20.
30. Winder, op.cit., Appendix 1, p.324.
31. F.O. 371.14457 - "Report on the students' strike", by H.V. Biscoe, Political Agent in Bahrain, dated 13th Feb., 1930.
32. Mrs. Belgrave was appointed officially in Sept. 1939, as Directrix.
33. Winder, op.cit., p.296.
34. Al-Hamer, op.cit., p.11.

35. Taqrer, 1952, p.16.
36. Al-Qoos, Y.Y., op.cit., p.12.
37. Tabbara, Said, "Technical Education in Bahrain" - Education Jubilee, pp. 14-16.
38. Winder, op.cit., p.324.
39. Al-Bahrain, No. 15, 15th June, 1939.
40. Al-Bahrain, 15th Jan. 1942, No. 150.
41. He became Minister of Education in 1971.
42. Al-Hamer, op.cit., p.10.
43. Taqrer, 1955, p.15.
44. Al-Hamer, op.cit., p.11.
45. Al-Jishi, Jamil, "The Development of Commercial Education in Bahrain". Education Jubilee, pp. 23-25.
46. Al-Arrayed, Jalil, "The Development of Teacher Training in Bahrain", Education Jubilee, pp. 27-30.
47. Taqrer, 1955, p.15.
48. Ibid. p.12.
49. Ibid.
50. Government of Bahrain, Education Dept., "Education in Bahrain 1919-1968", Bahrain, June, 1968, p.12. - The figures quoted apply to the academic year 1959-60.
51. Govt. of Bahrain Adviserate, "Health and Education Councils Ordinance of 1956" Bahrain, 28th J-Awal 1367 H (31st Dec. 1956). The members of the Education Council were two from Manama Municipality and one from each other municipality, Muharraq, Raffa, and Hedd.
52. Ibid. The political aspects of these proposals will be discussed in Part IV of this work.
53. In 1952 the amount was Rs. 16 per month for the first, second and third years, and Rs. 25 for the fourth year.
54. Govt. of Bahrain Annual Report 1954, p.37.
55. Govt. of Bahrain Annual Report 1957, p.12.
56. Govt. of Bahrain Annual Report 1959, p.10.
57. Taqrer, 1955, pp. 37-38.

58. "Al-Bahrain" , 10th August, 1939.
59. Within the system of girls' education all teachers, without exception, are female.
60. Al-Umran, Ahmed, "From the past, and about it". (Arabic)
Reprinted in "Education Jubilee", p.43.
61. Al-Shuraqi, A., "Girls' Education in Bahrain", op.cit., p.20.
62. Taqrer, 1955, op.cit., p.36.
63. Centralisation is the main theme of education in Bahrain,
and whilst this has its advantages, it tends to deprive
headmasters and headmistresses of the power to formulate their
own policies and make decisions on even minor matters.
64. Nahhas, M.K., and Katul, J., "A Report about Education in Bahrain",
Govt. of Bahrain Director of Education, Abdin Press, Alexandria
1960. pp. 33-34.
65. Govt. of Bahrain Annual Report, 1938, p.26.
66. Al-Hamer, op.cit., p.13
67. Because it was in this year that the school was incorporated into
the Directorate, Littlefield mistakenly quotes this date as being
the start of modern religious education in Bahrain. Littlefield
op.cit., p.60.
68. Crozier, D.J.S., and Griffiths, V.L., "Bahrain Education"
mimeographed in Arabic, Jan. 1966.
69. A further technical school was opened in Bahrain in 1970, but
this was outside the Directorate's jurisdiction. The school
is the "Gulf Technical College" : its pupils are drawn from all
Arab countries in the Gulf, and it is subsidised jointly by the
Governments of the U.K. and Abu Dhabi. Its instruction is
entirely in English, as are most of the teachers. It is co-educational.
70. State of Bahrain - Ministry of Education - "Education Statistics,
1961-1971".
71. Govt. of Bahrain Annual Reports for 1941 and 1950.
72. Bahrain Govt. Education Dept., - "Education in Bahrain, 1919-
1968", June 1968, p.5.
73. The table is calculated from figures in the censuses mentioned.
74. Literacy rates in various countries of the Arab World in 1970
were stated by UNESCO to be.

Saudi-Arabia	3 percent	Egypt	30 percent
Morocco	11 percent	Jordan	30.3 percent
Sudan	13.5 percent	Tunisia	31.3 percent
Libya	16 percent	Syria	39.2 percent

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Iraq	19 percent	Kuwait	52.9 percent
Algeria	19 percent	Lebanon	60 percent

See "Al-Arabi" No. 161, Kuwait, April, 1972.

CHAPTER TWO

a) The impact of Education on Bahrain Society

We have referred earlier to education being one of the initiators of social change, by making possible a greater degree of social mobility. But how far has education in Bahrain opened the door to social mobility?

There is no doubt that education was looked upon by the Bahraini public as an effective means of improving the lot of the individual and of creating wider job opportunities, but several factors combined to prevent full advantage being taken of the opportunities offered. These factors were either the traditionally held social attitudes of the community or the limitations contained within the system itself. In spite of this, the very fact that children were being educated, opened up for the children and youth of Bahrain, much wider horizons than had previously been possible, and sowed the seeds of future social and political enlightenment.

The social attitudes which made their effects felt were the insistence of the older element in continuing to place great importance on religious instruction and the attitude of the local population to manual labour, considering it degrading and only to be entered into by the lowest of the social classes.

As a Muslim society Bahrain retained many of its old traditions, first and foremost being the high regard in which they still held their religion, and the most obvious point to note in this respect is the continued survival of the "religious school".

This school operated independently until it was brought under

the control of the Directorate of Education in 1960.

Having taken control of this school the older generation, fearing an erosion of their religious principles, brought pressure to bear through the Council of education which resulted not only in the school being retained within the Directorate in its existing form but also in religious teaching being extended even further into all Government schools in Bahrain. Religious Instruction was even introduced into the syllabus of the Technical School and extra periods of religious teaching were imposed in all other schools in Bahrain.

This then was the view of the older generation, but it was flatly contradicted by the pupils themselves. In the questionnaire prepared by Mr. Al-Hamer,¹ he found that when considering the "religious school", "The latter is supposed to prepare the learned imams of the future. But not a single student from the very school has chosen to become an imam."²

We must then ask ourselves the question, why do pupils continue to enrol at this school? The answer to this question is that the majority probably enrol to take advantage of the monetary allowances payable.

This state of affairs could have equally applied to the technical training and teacher training divisions which up to 1966 also paid monetary allowances to the students.

Students from poor families were enrolling in these divisions purely for the monetary allowances, those not too proud in the technical division, and those whose families, even though poor, looked down upon technical education as a loss of status, compromised

and enrolled for the teacher training, even though some may not have been entirely fitted for it, in order to obtain the monetary allowances to supplement the family income.

Summing up on this point it is seen that even though education in Bahrain has developed along modern lines, the controlling conservative elements of the island still feel their religion has an extremely important part to play in a child's education even in the complexities of modern society. This view which is held by the older generation who control the education service seems to represent in a way a longing for the old traditional values embodied in the "Kutab" schools rather than looking to the needs of the future.

As can be seen, one of the other factors which made the system less effective was that the poverty of some sections of the community dictated the choice of education which their children could follow, instead of a child's abilities deciding which was the most suitable, only those families who could support their children financially could really afford to give the child the opportunity of a better quality of education. Al-Hamer's investigations support this point, when in ascertaining the family background of his sample pupils, he found that only 27 of his 129 sample stated that their fathers were manual workers.³

Although education has not to date produced any great social mobility it has mobilised the political forces in the island in that it enabled the students to make themselves politically conscious of the current situation both in Bahrain and throughout the Arab World. They were first in taking the initiative by demonstrating to air their grievances and make known their views on what they considered

were injustices both at home and abroad. As Sir Charles Belgrave said, "it was the schoolboys who first introduced the habit of strikes."⁴ The students were ever-ready to take to the streets in support of both political and industrial actions entirely on their own initiative, and it is on these grounds that we state that they formed the spearhead of political activities in the island.

The Authorities of the island were unhappy with this state of affairs and attempted to place the blame for this on the foreign teachers, especially the Egyptians. They were repeatedly accused during the 1950's of expounding policies of political agitation to the Bahrain students. As Sir Charles Belgrave wrote, "The Egyptian teachers became fervent missionaries preaching the dangerous gospel of Nasserism."⁵

On the same subject, Anthony Nutting stated,

"I gathered that he (Ahmed Umran) was well aware of the Egyptian menace and had taken steps to meet it. He had reduced the proportion of Egyptian teachers to a mere seven percent of the total and is now sending all Government-sponsored students to the American University of Beirut instead of Cairo."⁶

Both writers have over-simplified the issue and have overlooked the basic fact that education gave to the students a capacity to explore new ideas for themselves and to open up their minds to new ideas and ideologies from whatever source they originated.⁷ This and the contributory fact that they were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the conditions of the island made them query the "status quo" of the traditional system. Therefore, to single out the Egyptians as the root cause of the repeated student unrest was inaccurate and tends to mislead one from the real cause of the students' political activities.

One of the grievances of the students was that the educational system in Bahrain was not in itself complete, it was a closed system in that having finished one's education in Bahrain there were no facilities for higher education to raise the level of student training to the stage at which they would be ready to take advantage of a university education. This was the situation up to 1962 for boys and 1963 for girls, as it was not until these years that it was possible for students to complete all of their studies in Bahrain, prior to entering university. Before this time it was necessary for the student to go abroad for one year to obtain the Tawjeeh (University Entrance Certificate) at his own expense, except for those few sponsored by the Government.

This period of study abroad in a strange environment placed an extra strain on the students at this critical time in their educational careers. Even this facility was available only to the General Academic students in Arts and Sciences and the same opportunity was not afforded to the other divisions of Teacher Training, Commercial and Technical studies. Students in these divisions, having completed their education in Bahrain were faced with a dead end. The Authorities appeared to show no interest in rectifying this situation and appeared to discourage students from leaving Bahrain.

In spite of these difficulties a number of students qualified with B.A.'s and B.Sc's from foreign universities and began to return to Bahrain. The first ever graduates, two in number, returned to the island as early as 1950 from the American University of Beirut. They were followed over the years by others

who had studied in universities throughout the world. By 1967 there was a total of 200 Bahraini graduates in a variety of specialities and this number rose to a total of 302 in 1970-71. Of these 254 were male and 48 female.

Even though the number of university graduates is increasing the students can still be faced with financial difficulties during their education. Having obtained the Tawjeeheyyeh, unless they were one of the small number of outstanding students who were awarded Government scholarships, and unless they could obtain a scholarship from a foreign university, they were once more faced with the prospect of supporting themselves financially during the period of their studies abroad.

Sir Charles Belgrave remarked that "I only knew two or three Arabs who had any genuine desire to acquire knowledge for the sake of learning." This was undoubtedly untrue as the Bahrain students generally held high aspirations with regard to education. As Al-Hamer wrote,

"Practically all pupils (in the 1960's) who finish their primary education join the Intermediate Schools. Approximately 86 percent of their graduates continue their learning in Secondary School, 85 percent of whom prefer the General Academic School leading to the Tawjeeheyyeh Certificate."⁸

In his student questionnaire he found that 40 percent of his sample wanted to go to university. This is a very high proportion especially in view of the fact that his sample included those undergoing Teacher Training, Technical, Commercial and Religious Studies who knew that there was very little chance of them obtaining such an education.

Another factor in the limitations of the Bahrain educational

system was that it discriminates between pupils on the grounds of sex, girls still being barred from Technical and Religious educational establishments. Only in 1970 were they allowed to participate even in the Commercial Training programmes.

One of the reasons in the past for this discrimination was that the teaching profession was the only socially acceptable employment for females, a situation which the female students themselves are now trying to change. Mr. Al-Hamer in his student survey found that 65 percent of the girls, as against 29 percent of the boys, wished to pursue their higher education through university and wished to obtain jobs such as doctors, lawyers and pharmacists.

Of the 40 girls questioned in his sample he found that only two of them wished to become teachers.⁹

The opening of Kuwait University in 1966 made it easier for boys and girls in Bahrain to obtain a higher education. It was reported in 1971 that there were upward of 1,100 Bahraini students studying abroad and that a very large proportion of these were attending Kuwait University.¹⁰

As the number of students seeking higher education increases so it becomes more difficult for the Government to cope with the problem of employing these large number of returning graduates, and to create a suitable political climate acceptable to the ideals which these people held.

This is becoming an increasingly urgent problem, as the number of students rises as, for instance, the 1971 figure of 1,100 students at University represents a proportion of one graduate per 196 members of the population.

The resentment of the Government to the problem of university graduates became apparent as early as 1953 when there were only four graduates in the island and the Government Annual Report stated that when they returned they were "contemptuous of many things in their own homes and country; they resent having to resume the life they used to lead, and they have no inclination to settle down in Bahrain."¹¹

The statement at this time (1953) probably referred only to social conditions but during the late 1950's and the 1960's the Bahraini students abroad started to organise themselves into Rabita, and started to study closely the political and social structure of their homeland and subjected it to severe criticism.¹²

Some students were extremely critical and this has provoked the Bahrain Government to harsh countermeasures, such as banning certain students from re-entering Bahrain, or jailing them on their return,¹³ measures which in themselves serve only to provoke further criticism and delay any solution to the problems which the island faces.

b) Problems Facing Educational Development in Bahrain

The first problem facing both developed and underdeveloped countries is the rising cost of education and Bahrain is no exception to this general rule.

As more people are becoming educated so the demands placed upon the Education Service increase and as Coombs stated with regard to underdeveloped countries, "The setting of bold targets, the making of large promises, and the very expansion of education fired an increase in popular expectations and educational demand that fed on itself and soon got out of hand."¹⁴

This situation is typical of that in Bahrain where a growing percentage of the National Budget which is being spent on education is a cause for some concern, being by far the largest item of expenditure.

From selected years shown in the table below it can be seen how the recurrent and non-current expenditure on education has increased disproportionately to the growth of the National Budget.

In the 1960's, with the exception of 1961, expenditure on education never fell below 20 percent of the total expenditure, an extremely high figure for an underdeveloped country to bear. Education is paid for entirely by the Government and there has been no financial support from the public since the Government took control of education in the early 1930's. The rising costs and the need for public financial support was mentioned as early as 1955 when Mr. Al-Umran wrote,

"We are hoping that the wealthy element of the country would, as their counterparts in other countries had done, participate in the financing of public education and as they had once done when education first started, but the people are relying on the Government to do everything when is the conscience of these people going to awake."¹⁵

The rising cost of education can be viewed from another angle, namely the cost per pupil. In 1950-51 it was estimated that every boy, at all levels of education, was costing at the time Rs.500 p.a. to educate. Every girl Rs. 204, and boys attending technical school Rs.700 (excluding allowances payable to these students.)

The figures for 1964 were no longer segregated between boys and girls but quoted costs for primary, intermediate and secondary levels, Rs.370, Rs570 and Rs.1,000 respectively.

<u>TABLE XXVII</u>		<u>Education Budget as a Percentage of Total Expenditure</u>																																	
		<u>Selected Years</u>																																	
<u>Years</u>	<u>% of Total Expenditure</u>	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971		
		2.88	3.71	6.48	9.37	23.15	16.70	13.42	13.36	16.84	18.16	20.63	23.93	25.4	20.0	24.0	20.0	24.0	20.0	24.0	20.0	24.0	20.0	24.0	20.0	24.0	20.0	24.0	20.0	24.0	20.0	24.0	20.0	24.0	

By 1966-67 the figures had become Primary Rs.387, Intermediate Rs.690, Secondary Rs.967, and Technical Rs.1,784, and further large increases were suffered in the following academic year 1967-68, when costs rose to Primary Rs.560, Intermediate Rs.790, Secondary Rs.840 and Technical Rs.2,181,¹⁶ massive increases in all except Secondary education.

These last increases were due to the following, which although exceptional for this year, are not a typical of those difficulties faced by other countries. These were increases in teachers' salaries, an increase in welfare services and an increase in expenditure on books, school supplies and maintenance.

It was also stated that in 1968 teachers' salaries alone represented 72 percent of the entire Educational expenditure.

With regard to the level and type of education, Bahrain tends to cover a much wider area than other Middle Eastern countries, but spends substantially less of her budget doing so, thus pointing to a more efficient usage of her facilities. For instance in 1966 on General Academic education at secondary level, Bahrain spent 11.5 percent of her educational budget compared with 17.2 percent by Iraq, 33.4 percent by Jordan and 36.8 percent by Kuwait,¹⁷ this in spite of the fact that in general the Bahrain education service is educating a much higher proportion of the school-age population than the other countries. For instance, in Bahrain in 1967, 48.8 percent of all the eligible secondary school age group (12+ to 16+) were undergoing some form of secondary education, this is a high percentage when compared with countries such as Iraq, 29 percent, Jordan 38 percent, Qatar 20 percent, and Saudi Arabia only 5 percent (all figures for 1965).¹⁸

Naturally, the concern of Education in Bahrain has been

concentrated on quantity not quality, in an attempt to raise the general level of education of the people. This is a phenomenon shared by almost all other underdeveloped countries. As Professor C.E. Beeby wrote,

"It was inevitable that questions of sheer quantity should be the first to emerge as attention was turned, in the post-war years (by underdeveloped countries), to the educational system of developed countries and it was only to be expected that considerations of quality should play a minor part."¹⁹

Successive conferences of UNESCO, during the 1960's called for 100 percent participation in all countries in primary education by 1980 and Bahrain is taking steps in order to meet this preliminary target.

With regard to the quality of education in Bahrain, although it may be considered at present to be slightly low, the people responsible for education have publicly stated the lines along which they visualise education progressing. In 1961 Mr. Umran summarised the main principles behind the philosophy of education in Bahrain as follows "Freedom ... Democracy ... Raising the standard of living Exalting the spiritual and moral life ... and reinforcing the spirit of both patriotism and Arab Nationalism."²⁰

As to freedom, he said that students should be encouraged to think independently and not merely copy the example of others and to give the students the opportunity to discuss all things and choose that which is good.

On the subject of democracy he advocated that students should participate in the organisation and running of their schools and on the subject of Arab Nationalism, he stated that students should be taught by deeds, not words, the true nature of Arab Nationalism, and

that teachers had a very important part to play in this.

Whilst these ideas may be considered to be important to the quality of education in Bahrain, the realities of what actually happens within the system are very different.

For instance, it was noted by Warden that around the time of these statements many of the high officials of the Education Department were in fact sending their sons to be educated at the Sacred Heart Catholic School,²¹ which denoted their own lack of faith in the Bahrain Government system of education. Furthermore, for many years it was the standard practice to teach Arab history only as far as the period of the Crusades²² which hardly met the needs of patriotism and Arab nationalism. As recently as 1968 many students and teachers complained at the serious lack in the syllabus of any relevant teachings on local history and geography and as Arab nationalism spreads throughout the Gulf the demands for national education and the study of Arab society becomes more urgently needed.

It goes without saying that the quality of education depends upon the quality of the teachers and it is in this respect which Bahrain tends to suffer. Of the 2,380 teachers in Bahrain's schools in 1970-71 it was reported that only 378 held university qualifications, about 15.8 percent.²³ This indicates the need for more professional teachers in the education service as this is the only way in which the quality may be raised.

Another obstacle facing the raising of quality in Bahrain education is the lack of suitable school buildings. Even to the present day it is the policy of the Education Directorate to rent houses, especially in the towns, and convert them to school use. These houses lack the essential facilities for education, such as

classrooms, laboratories and playgrounds and overcrowding is a very serious problem. Al-Hamer found from the teacher questionnaires that amongst the pressing problems which the teachers had to face the most serious was that of suitable school buildings.

Nahhas and Katul reported that on their visit to Umm Al-Hassam School (a rented school) "its classes are overcrowded with students in a way that must reflect on their ability and health."²⁴

This problem still persists. In 1971, 57 of the total of 111 schools on the island were of the "rented house" type.

A further obstacle to education in Bahrain is the lack of any suitable training facilities for the child prior to the age of 6 years. This combined with the probable illiteracy of the home background means that the child starting school is completely ignorant of any learning and time is wasted in the early years rectifying this problem.²⁵ Al-Hamer found that 47.2 percent of the boys' fathers and 15 percent of the girls' fathers were illiterate. The fact that the percentage for girls' fathers was less than that of the boys' indicate that education for girls in Bahrain still depends to a large extent on the education and enlightenment of the girls' parents and that in the main girls whose fathers have received some education themselves are more likely to be allowed to attend school.

So far there is no law in Bahrain which enforces compulsory school attendance although the public has recognised that in order for their sons and daughters to gain employment education is essential and therefore the percentage attendance of the total school age population is still rising and in 1971 stood at 73 percent.

Even if a child has obtained an education the prospects of employment after leaving school are becoming increasingly slim, as in the past the Government and non-Government employees have been content to rely on expatriates and have not seriously pressed for adequate training for the Bahrainis.²⁶ Mr. Al-Hameer in 1968 observed that in his experience many students were facing great difficulty in obtaining employment.²⁷

There are two probable reasons for this state of affairs, the obvious one being the scarcity of suitable jobs in the island, especially for those qualified only in general academic subjects, and whose educational standard is still comparatively low. The other is the fact that many of the Government Departments, all banks and many business establishments use English as their business language. Meanwhile most teaching in the Bahrain schools is dominated by the Arabic language.

The choice of the Government in the latter case is either to follow the lead of neighbouring Arab countries and pass laws making Arabic the official language or to concentrate on teaching more English language in the schools. The Government has not up to the present time faced up to this dilemma and appears undecided on which course to adopt although the making of Arabic the official language appears to be the most sensible as the Bahrainis would then be working in their native tongue and the expense of importing even more teachers to teach the English language would be saved.

FOOTNOTES

1. Al-Hamer in 1968 conducted a survey amongst teachers and students in the form of a series of questionnaires. The number of teachers involved was 138 and students 129. These being carefully selected to represent a complete cross-section of the educational system. Henceforth referred to as the "questionnaire".
2. Al-Hamer, op.cit., p.77.
3. Al-Hamer, op.cit., p.74.
4. Belgrave, C.D., op.cit., p.93.
5. Belgrave, C.D., op.cit., p.145.
6. Nutting, Anthony, "I saw for myself" London 1958, p.72.
7. The lack of any locally-orientated syllabus and the fact that all text books were imported from Egypt, naturally led the students to consider the Egyptian way of life. After the rise of Nasser, the apostle of Arab Nationalism, with whom they could identify themselves, the Egyptian system became even more attractive to them.
8. Al-Hamer op.cit., p.15.
9. Al-Hamer, op.cit., p.76.
10. It was reported that in the academic year of 1971-72 there were a total of 316 Bahraini students enrolled at Kuwait University see "Al-Seyassah" No. 138, Kuwait, 8th May, 1972.
11. Govt. of Bahrain Annual Report 1953. (1372H), p.26.
12. Many magazines and pamphlets are published by the Rabitas at Universities throughout the world, such as "Sout Al-Bahrain" in Cairo; "Sada al-Kalige" in Halab, Syria; "Al-Masira" in Kuwait and "Al-Nashra" in London. After many attempts the Bahraini University students succeeded in creating the National Union of Bahraini Students with contacts between all Rabitas. This was officially proclaimed on 26th Feb., 1972 from Damascus.
13. The Gulf Bulletin, No. 2 Oct/Nov. 1971 - Gulf Committee Russel Foundation - London.
14. Coombs, Philip H., "What is Educational Planning" UNESCO IIEP Paris 1970, p.27.
15. Taqrer 1955, p.35.
16. For more details on the financial aspect see El-Nessaf, Hassan Ali - "The Financial Aspects of Education in Bahrain" - unpublished paper presented to Kuwait Institute of Economic and Social Planning in the Middle East - Kuwait 1969-70.
17. Ibid, pp.20-21

18. Al-Solyty, Hamed, "Some Aspects of the Development of secondary Education in Bahrain". Huna al-Bahrain No. 228, Jan. 1971, p.28.
19. Beeby, C.E., "The Quality of Education in Developing Countries" London; Oxford Univ. Press, 1966, p.7.
20. Al-Umran, A., "School and Society", Abdin Press, Alexandria June 1961, pp. 3-64.
21. Warden, op.cit., p.310.
22. Nahhass and Katul. op.cit., p.44.
23. State of Bahrain Education Statistics 1961-1971, pp. 77-72.
24. Nahhass and Katul - op.cit., p.35.
25. On this problem see Jackson, E., and Marsden, D. - "Education and the Working Class" Pelican Books, London 1968. Although this book dealt specifically with the English working class it illustrates the general problem of pre-school education.
26. "An Economic Survey of Bahrain". British Middle East Development Div., op.cit., p.44.
27. Al-Hamar op.cit. p.71.

CHAPTER THREE

a) Some Aspects of the Social Change

In any given society social change is a continuous process, the degree and speed of which is dependent upon a number of factors which could exert their influence on that society.

In the case of Bahrain these factors were chiefly the modernisation of the administration immediately following the First World War,¹ and the income from oil revenues which followed and made possible the expansion of the administrative and social services.

We propose to examine the social change in Bahrain both from the point of view of the development of a socio-economic class structure and the changes which have occurred in the role of the family and the changing status of the female in Bahrain society.

In order to do this we must also consider the change which took place to transform Bahrain from a rural to an urbanised society.

It should be borne in mind that changes did not occur simultaneously in all fields, nor once a change became apparent could it be guaranteed that it would proceed at a steady rate, as the changes had different effects on the various parts of the community, certain parts of the community may welcome a change which may be fiercely resented by another part which feels its interests to be threatened. Others resisted change for merely conservative reasons in that they saw no good reason to change the status quo.

Some parts of the community have not undergone any great change as they have not come into direct contact with the forces of the social changes, although today the number of such people is

fewer.

The degree of change however varies between towns and villages, rich and poor and even educated and uneducated within a family, and each have their own problems.

The degree of contrast can often be great, as for instance as recently as 1960, it was noticed that whilst there were many banks and monetary exchanges in the towns, certain villages had still not yet adopted a monetary system but carried out all their transactions by the bartering system with itinerant pedlars.²

The 1920's saw the start of the dramatic changes in Bahrain when for the first time the society felt the full impact of British influence in their domestic affairs, which was later termed the "Reforms" in Bahrain. The British influence had several direct results such as the Pearling Reforms, the establishment of a regular police force for the maintenance of law and order, and the setting up of a legal system with regular courts.³ Many other reforms such as those on slavery and public health affairs were due to the enthusiasm of the various Political Agents. The impact of these laws and reforms made itself felt even in family life where the result was a change in the legal status of the woman.

The discovery and development of oil during the 1930's provided a shot in the arm for more speedy social changes, more money and regular employment became available. This engendered the creation of new socio-economic classes such as the new working class of oil employees and the extended middle classes from the developing trade.

b) The Growth of the Urbanised Society

Traditionally Bahrain was a village society based on agriculture, pearling, fishing and other activities and there is no doubt that during the period under review that the pattern of life has changed dramatically due chiefly to the new economic activities. Unfortunately, there are no official statistics available for the numbers inhabiting towns and villages prior to the 1941 census, but even from this date up to the present day we may observe the trend of the depopulation of the countryside and the growth of the towns. The depopulation would possibly have been greater had not the oil company provided transport from various different centres of population to their place of work.⁴ Had this not been done then whole family units or communities would have abandoned their villages and concentrated in the larger centres of population. The same also applies to the provision of transport by the government of Bahrain for some of her employees and for students.

Even taking this into consideration there has been a major shift in the centres of population since the Second World War, as the job opportunities and quality of life in the villages was very much lower than that of the towns and the people naturally gravitated towards the latter. The following table illustrates this trend

From table XXVII we can see the trend of the Bahrainis to gravitate towards the towns. With the exception of Awali, which is populated by Europeans only, all urban centres of population have increased.

In Manama for instance, 30.9% of the total population resided

TABLE XXVIII

The Trend of Urbanisation (1941-1971)

Towns	1941		1950		1959		1965		1971	
	Pop.	% of tot.	Pop.	% of tot.	Pop.	% of tot.	Pop.	% of tot.	Pop.	% of tot.
Manama ^{5.}	27835	30.9	39648	36.15	61726	43.12	79098	43.41	88785	41.00
Muharraq ^{5.}	21439	23.8	25577	23.32	32302	22.56	41143	22.58	37732	17.44
Hedd ^{6.}	-	-	-	-	4440	3.10	5230	2.87	5269	2.43
Riffa ^{7.}	-	-	-	-	6623	4.62	9403	5.16	10731	4.90
Awali	1532	1.70	3846	3.50	3123	2.18	2097	1.15	984	0.45
Jidhafs	-	-	-	-	5591	3.90	7941	4.35	11152	5.15
Isa Town	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7501	3.46
Rural & other areas	39164	43.5	40579	37.00	29330	20.49	37291	20.46	54149	25.00
Total	89970	99.90	109650	99.97	143135	99.97	182203	99.98	216303	99.83

there in 1941 and by 1971 the percentage had risen to 41.00%, the actual number of inhabitants having increased by 313.5%.

Muharraq shows the same trend up to 1965, the fall in numbers of the 1971 census being chiefly explained by the shift in population due to the creation of Isa Town in 1968.

The reason for the fall in population of Muharraq and not the other towns is probably due to the rules formulated which qualified people for housing the newly-created Isa Town.⁸

The towns of Muharraq and Jidhafs are usually considered to have very close ties with the capital Manama, both serving as dormitory towns for the latter, Muharraq being only 1½ miles away across the causeway from Manama and Jidhafs being only 4 miles away on the main trunk road to the city and this probably accounts for the growth in their populations.

The overall picture shows that in 1971 75% of the Bahraini population are concentrated in seven towns and of these three of them, namely Manama, Muharraq and Jidhafs, contain almost 64% of the total population. The 1971 census shows that there are 65 centres of population within the islands and therefore the remaining 25% of the population are scattered over 58 small villages.

Although the rural population has increased over the 30 year period by approximately 37.7% as a percentage of the total population it has decreased from 43.5% in 1941 to 25% in 1971.

With the vast majority of the population being concentrated in and around the Manama area the conclusion to be drawn is that the job opportunities in Government service, the oil industry and other trades are much greater than in the remainder of the island and this urbanisation has created the new socio-economic classes.

c) The Stratification of the New Socio-Economic Classes in Bahrain

Social classes in Bahrain have not previously been clearly or rigidly defined on the basis of wealth, although a class structure based on lineage or marriage was common. This system had its roots in the Ruling Family and their allies holding the vast majority of the wealth and land of the island by right of conquest, thus creating a peasant nation of the original inhabitants.

The hold over the land and wealth of the islands was maintained either by force or by marriage between the various tribes allied to the Rulers in order that it did not pass from them. The grant of lands by the Ruling Family to the chiefs of their allied tribes created a new land-owning class and these chiefs, having new-found wealth, took in turn the role of pearl merchants. Thus the al-Khalifah and the chiefs of their allied tribes formed the traditional elite of Bahrain society. Meanwhile the other members of the tribes were compelled to become pearl divers and fishermen in order to earn a living and along with the original peasants formed the lowest strata of the traditional Bahrain society.

The realities of the situation were not consciously realised as even the lowest classes felt kinship vertically through the existing family ties reaching right up to the Ruling Class, rather than with his fellow-workers. The bonds of the various sects of religion also provided a means of identification within the structure.

The only people outside this system was the class of large merchants. The bulk of this class was, at the turn of the century, of either Persian or Indian origin with only a very small number of Bahrainis, as this occupation was looked down upon by the Ruling Family and their friends. Many Bahrainis were, however, merchants in a small way as either shopkeepers or sub-agents for the

Persians and Indians and could not conceivably be included in the overall term "merchant class", but rather should be classified with the mass of the ordinary people.

We may summarise by saying that in the early part of the twentieth century there were in terms of socio-economic classes in Bahrain two main groups, the elite, comprising the Ruling Family, the landowners, pearl merchants and large merchants, and the vast majority of the politically unconscious masses.

This latter group, until the reforms of the 1920's began to make themselves felt, had been continually subjected to various forms of tyranny either in their employment, such as the abuses suffered by the pearl divers and the farmers, or in their religion as is instanced by the discrimination practiced against the Shia.⁹ The latter was in fact more consciously felt and was more apparent than the other abuses.

At this time, politically speaking, the Shaikh, his family and close associates, with the moral support of their tribes were the supreme rulers of the island and its inhabitants and even the wealthy merchant class did not attempt to make their political views known for fear of repercussions. Indeed, some of the wealthy merchants and pearl merchants took British citizenship,¹⁰ even though they were Bahraini by birth, to escape the strictures of the Ruling Class and enjoy British protection.

The situation with regard to the creation of new socio-economic classes began to liquidise following the reforms of the 1920's and the discovery and exploitation of oil during the 1930's.

The establishment of a more modern system of maintaining law and order and the modernisation and reforms within the administration

brought about restrictions in the powers of the Ruling Family and thus created a more relaxed political atmosphere and encouraged more people to enter into various businesses and started the formation of new socio-economic groups.

The reforms also brought about a re-alignment of the power structure within the island in that the Al-Khalifah abandoned many of their old associates from the former hierarchy and in order to maintain their power and influence identified themselves closely with the growing influence of the British within the island group.

These moves were made easier for the Al-Khalifah by the collapse of the pearling industry after which the pearl merchants were no longer a political or economic force to be reckoned with and could therefore be abandoned.¹¹ Thus the elite of the Al-Khalifah family and the landowners who had survived the collapse of pearling became the new upper class within the island and were the main beneficiaries of the transfer of their allegiance to the British. Many of them became even richer as oil revenues began to be paid and land values rose with the needs of the oil company.

The status of the wealthy merchant class did not undergo any great change but with the greater demands for goods following the discovery of oil more Bahrainis began to take an interest in the development of merchant trading businesses. The number of Bahrainis in this type of business grew as various political restrictions were placed upon foreign national groups, especially the Persians, a fact which made it much easier for the Bahrainis to establish themselves in this sphere of economic activity and eventually to supercede both the Indians and Persians as the major force in the

mercantile business.¹²

This group of Bahraini nationals formed the core of emerging middle class of the island.

The needs of the new administration created a new lower middle class as more salaried employees were recruited to fill the role of administrators.

Politically, the wealthiest merchants and the top administrators formed bonds of common interest and gained a certain amount of political power although it was usually used only for their own benefit. The remainder of the middle class did not manage to gain similar powers and this created feelings of frustration at their impotence within the society.

Many of the new Bahraini businessmen were persons who had had previous contact with the Europeans working in the Administration or for the oil company,¹³ (either in Bahrain or on the mainland) and had an appreciation of the new needs for certain types of commodities.

Many of them utilised the skills they had learnt with the oil company to establish themselves in the service industries whilst others successfully forecast the increased demands for certain types of consumer goods which were not usually a requirement of traditional life in Bahrain.

To a certain degree the emergence of the new middle class could be attributed to a deliberate policy of the oil company in Bahrain. In 1948, Mr. Leigh White interviewing Mr. Thornberg states that the latter advocated the enlargement of the middle class in Bahrain in order to create a stabilising political force in the island.¹⁴ This was to be achieved by the involvement of

local capital in the subcontracting of work for oil company projects and requirements.

This view became reality when the oil company began in the 1950's to contract out some of their projects to local contractors and to purchase some of their requirements through local merchants.¹⁵

Within the middle class a new group has emerged within the last decade or so. These are professional people such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, journalists, etc., who are the result of the improved educational system and who provide a liberal influence within the middle class.

Bearing in mind the difficulties of defining accurately the composition of the middle class and the lack of figures available for occupations and incomes we can draw relative picture of the numbers comprising the middle class of Bahrain.

TABLE XXIX

Approximate Numbers of Urban Middle Class

	<u>in Bahrain</u> ¹⁶		
<u>Occupation</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1971</u>
Administration & Clerks ¹⁷	4830	6599	11199
Wholesale Trades	504	1466	327
Retail Trades	4262	5920	6339
Total	9596	13985	17865
% of economically active population	20.4	26.25	29.6

Despite the apparently large size of the Bahrain middle class¹⁸ they wield very little economic power as in the main they tend either to be salaried people who, although they enjoy a reasonable income, have "limited" earning power or small shopkeepers (retailers) who

in theory have "unlimited" earning potential but who in actual fact are controlled by both the wholesalers and prevailing economic conditions.

These two groups may be classified as the lower middle class or petty bourgeoisie. The latter group have grown steadily over the years as we may see from the above table, the number of commercial establishments in Manama alone having grown from 3326 in 1952 to 4000 in 1962 and to 5348 by 1969.¹⁹

The wholesale merchants, property owners and developers, and contractors who make up the upper middle class can be said to be typical of the Arab "bourgeoise" as they differ from their Western counterparts in a number of ways.

The most noteworthy point in this respect is the lack of Western-style management and entrepreneurship,²⁰ they still rely on imported goods for their businesses or engage in only the most stable and riskless types of deals such as land and housing.²¹ They are investors rather than entrepreneurs, placing their money with large foreign companies operating in Bahrain who give an assured dividend or simply banking it. The merchants, however, have done well for themselves by manipulating the "agent system" of imports and controlling the flow of goods to the retail outlets.

The manipulation of the "agent system" by the larger Bahraini and foreign merchants, with the backing of the Administration, created tensions between the various groups of merchants. The granting of import licences and the setting up of agencies was rigidly controlled by the Government for the benefit of the big merchants and any newcomer wishing to break into a particular field faced a monopoly situation which was almost impossible to break.

This situation fell harder on the newly emerging group of Bahraini national merchants. The discontent expressed by the smaller Bahraini merchants was directed mainly against the foreigners, but the larger Bahraini merchants, feeling their own position threatened were moved to grant some minor concessions to the smaller merchants in an attempt to quiet the discontent. As a direct result of this discontent the "Bahraini Merchants' Association" was founded in 1939 in order to give a platform for their complaints and to protect their interests. As we have seen earlier this association later became the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Other limitations imposed by the Government were to exclude imports from countries who in the Government's view were politically unacceptable, even though the goods were cheaper. Bans were imposed during the 1930's on goods from Japan and Germany which have since been removed.²² At the present time restrictions are in operation against goods from the U.S.S.R. and up to 1963 this also applied to the Peoples Republic of China.

With the exception of the largest merchants, the middle class as a whole did not possess any political or economic power, this being concentrated in the hands of a few of the wealthy merchants. The economic power of these merchants before oil became the main source of revenue, was considerable, as they were the payers of customs duties on which the Ruling Family depended for their income, but as the revenues began to flow in from the oil their powers of influence faded accordingly.

Some of them, however, formed close links with the British and the top administrators and thus retained a certain political

influence. Meanwhile the bulk of the merchants and the salaried people forming the remainder of the middle class were frustrated in their ambitions for the advancement of their careers²³ and their political aspirations.

The lack of influential political contacts by this sector created discontent against the top administration and the foreign influences. This discontent was to a large extent justified for as recently as 1969 of a total of 32 departmental heads within the Administration, 16 were relatives of the Sheikh, 8 were British and only the remaining 8 were Common Bahrainis.²⁴

However, the Bahrain middle class as a whole continues to expand and will gain more influence in the future if the regime fulfils its promises and develops a system of representative Parliamentary Government along the lines of that of Kuwait,²⁵ something which the intellectuals have demanded for a number of years.

The other socio-economic class engendered by the changes was the new working class in its wider sense. The economic change in the society was the main factor in its creation which transformed the people of Bahrain from the drudges of the pre-oil era, when they worked as peasants, fishermen or pearl divers, receiving their wages in shares or kind, ^{into} ~~in~~ to regular wages earned^s working for the oil company, the Government and other industries which sprang up and it is understandable that they lost no time in changing their former occupations to the newer and more lucrative forms of employment

The first result of the new system of work was the bringing together of the previously disputing sections of the community,

namely the Shia and the Sunnī. Naturally changes did not occur overnight and at first the workers who were obliged to live near their work used to gather on a village, kinship or sectarian basis. Gradually, however, the realisation occurred to them that they were all employees on an equal basis of the "Al-Sharikh" or Company and a sense of camaraderie developed. The Sunni elements, descended from semi-tribes, learnt to accept orders from the Shia who had previously been regarded as very inferior, furthermore they learnt to accept manual work as a means of earning a living,²⁶ again something which had been regarded in the past as degrading. The change, however, has been gradual and still continues and as yet there is still no clear-cut ^{class} consciousness. Industrial and political disturbances have not been a struggle to catch up on the standard of living of their more fortunate compatriots but have instead been directed against the foreign elements in the island. Examples of the lack of class consciousness occurred in the early 1950's when, as we have seen, the workers of Bahrain attempted to create Trade Unions under the auspices of the middle class, and provisions were made under their proposed organisation of the Bahrain labour Federation for Government employees and free-lance workers to hold seats on the council. Following the strikes of the late 1960's a Founding Committee was formed which in 1971 placed certain demands for the creation of a Federation of employees, which was to have again included Government employees and freelance workers such as doctors, lawyers and small merchants.²⁷

It is obvious that the interests of some groups of the council could be in direct conflict with those of the workers but their inclusion shows that the workers of Bahrain continue to think on national rather than class lines.

From the foregoing we may conclude that whilst a working class exists as one of the socio-economic groups in Bahrain and it has a distinguished record in its various attempts to obtain its rights, a working class consciousness has still not yet developed.

The loyalty of the workers however manages to supercede the class barriers, as they feel that not only do they have common cause with their fellow workers in the horizontal sense but also that they express their loyalty vertically through the usual class barriers on a tribal or sectarian basis.

This may be in part due to the traditional pattern of family or religious life, which usually included a degree of nepotism, and partly to a sense of a lack of security, not yet having found their place within the new pattern of life of the island, as to date there are no recognised organisations to protect their interests.²⁸

An interesting development took place when a National Guard was created in 1968 which gave rise to a military clique, which, in line with occurrences in other Arab countries, has within a short time attempted to influence the course of political events.²⁹

This group, although it is now contained and controlled by members of the Ruling Family, consists mainly of loyal subjects but as expansion takes place it may present a potential source of political power once more.

d) The Changes Within the Family and Woman's Status

The status of the family and that of women has also been affected by the modernisation and the economic changes which have taken place. The degree of change has not been the same throughout

the spectrum of the various socio-economic groups or through the traditional status.

To the elite of the Ruling Family, their social expectations and reactions have hardly changed. Bent, describing the behaviour of the young sheikhs at the Majlis wrote, "The gay young Shaikh Mohammed, on ordinary occasions as full of fun as an English schoolboy, sat there in great solemnity incapable of a smile."³⁰ This situation still prevails, the scene at the Majlis being very similar to that described by Bent at the turn of the century. The younger members of the family are still expected to behave in a dignified and decorous manner at any time whilst in the public eye.

The old ties with the Shaikh's allied tribes are still maintained today for social purposes, even though politically they are no longer necessary. On this matter Belgrave wrote,

"Sometimes I used to see some dignified but shabbily dressed old Arab, followed by two or three tall sons, looking somewhat different to the town Arabs, being received with marked respect by a Khalifah Sheikh. When I asked the Sheikh who the visitor was he would say, 'That is Shaikh ----- of the ----- tribe. His ancestors helped us to conquer Bahrain'".³¹

This is a typical reaction of the Ruling Family which has not changed over the years.

With regard to the families of other groups, however, some changes have taken place. With the new economic situation created by the oil industry, the old ties of "extended family" and tribe have tended to become looser and ties are becoming more restricted in that they are now changing to an "immediate family" basis. The old order has changed in that nowadays it is not unusual for one of the sons to be ~~w~~ the major economic influence within the

family and with the son being financially independent, the father is no longer looked upon by the rest of the family as the source of power within the family. Thus the influences of the new economic situation have made it necessary for the older generation to accept, either voluntarily or involuntarily, the new ideas and practices and a much-reduced role in the everyday life of the family.

The middle class has suffered from much the same problems as the former group but has been even more changed by the adoption by their offspring of an even more westernised culture.³²

Publicly the elite of Bahrain society still maintain their traditional role by participating in the cultural life of the island, patronising the arts and supporting the old social and moral values but their new-found wealth has raised them so far above the mass of the people, both in social prestige and privilege that they now privately enjoy every luxury they may care to indulge. This fact has not passed without notice by the Bahrain people and it has engendered a great amount of discontent and their privileges and mode of life are being queried, especially by the younger generation.

The role of the woman in Bahrain society before the economic changes made their effects felt, was in the main restricted to the home. The only work undertaken by them outside of the home was usually for the wives of fishermen to clean and sell fish or for the wives of the peasants to help their husbands in the fields and to sell the produce.³³ The wives of the males of other sections of the community were usually restricted to running their households and raising children.³ In general they were veiled,³⁴ and their freedom of movement was restricted in what was, and still to some extent is, a male-dominated society. The attitudes towards women

differed slightly within the groups of the community. For instance, some tribesmen felt themselves at liberty to kill any female member of his family on even the suspicion of any offence against their moral laws.³⁵

However, these rigid attitudes have started to yield. The new order brought with it a new freedom for the women although it was a freedom without sufficient safeguards. Slaves could be set free by applying to the Political Agent, but once set free there was no employment or aftercare and many turned to prostitution. During the Second World War, although it was illegal, brothel areas were set up, a thing which was previously unknown. With the changing order there was nothing to stop any woman turning to prostitution if she set her mind to it as the old moral order was collapsing. Usually the only constraint was that if one of her neighbours complained, she would be moved by the police into the brothel area. The administration merely turned a blind eye to the existence of this area apart from the occasional "clean-up".

The emancipation of women was brought about by the expansion of education,³⁶ although its effects were more apparent amongst the townspeople rather than the villagers, and even in the towns it was initially confined to the more well-to-do.

The women in the poorer classes and in the villages were still in the main, veiled and confined to their houses or villages. As recently as 1960 one observer commented that the village women were hardly even allowed to go on their own outside the confines of the village or to marry outside the village.

The educated townswomen, however, won a certain degree of emancipation when they began to become teachers in the girls' schools.³⁷

Up to 1955 there was not a single organisation in Bahrain for women to meet socially or for them to play any role in community affairs. In that year, however, an association was set up which was called "Bahrain Women's Awakening" (Nahdhet Fatat al-Bahrain). It was composed initially of women from the elite families who provided some forms of limited social services for the poorer families on a voluntary basis.

Five years later another association was set up by a group of middle class women who played a more active role in community affairs by providing nursery school facilities. This organisation was the "Care of Child and Motherhood" group (Riaut al-Tofola Walmomah).

Two other groups opened up in 1970. These were the Awal Association and the Riffna Women's Association.

In recent years Bahraini women have started to take employment in other fields than teaching, such as working in banks and offices, in the Government service, the oil industry, in hotels and more recently in the police service, the latter being a great advance, as Bahrain is only the second state in the Arab world to employ women in this capacity.³⁸

Despite these recent advancements the women of Bahrain still suffer both legally and socially from male domination as their civil rights are still conducted on the "Shariya" or "Urof" lines, which are the old systems of unwritten laws. Socially, even the younger of her brothers has a greater say in family affairs than she has, and there are still many petty restrictions placed upon her private and public

life. Women do not enjoy equal pay with men and even if they do earn wages high enough to be financially independent, in the present climate of Bahrain it is still unthinkable that they should be socially independent.

The status of Bahraini women still needs to be fought for, and the more educated of the women are coming to realise that they have a valuable role to play in society, domestically, socially and economically, but that they will not achieve the freedom to play out this role until the old order is changed and they are given greater freedom within the community.

FOOTNOTES

1. This will be argued in more detail in the political part of the work.
2. Hansen, H.H., op.cit., p.61. She reported that in the village of Sar, villagers exchanged eggs and chickens for sweets and shampoos with pedlars, and Ibid p.103. She reported that the local teacher in the nearby village still used a donkey as transport to and from the school.
3. These were set up by the Bahrain Order in Council which was initially to deal with foreign nations and Bahrainis who were in dispute with them. Its effects felt on the community however, which will be discussed in the political part of this work.
4. Hay, Sir Rupert. "The Impact of the Oil Industry on the Persian Gulf Shaykhdoms" - The Middle East Journal, Vol. IX - Autumn 1955, p.364. (This step was taken in the early years of the 1950's after the failure of the company to provide suitable living quarters.)
5. The figures for Manama and Muharraq include those living in the suburbs.
6. Up to 1959 the population of Hedd was included with that of Muharraq.
7. Up to 1959 Rifaa and Jidhafs were classified as Rural Areas.
8. "Isa Town is a newly created town situated 6 miles south of Manama. It was officially opened in Nov. 1968 and has been designed to eventually accommodate 35,000 people. The rules for obtaining a house there are that a Bahraini should be able to prove that all of his family had been Bahrain subjects for at least 2 generations! As Muharraq is inhabited by the oldest Arab families it is possible that they took priority under this system. Govt. of Bahrain pamphlet on Isa Town, undated.
9. Al-Baker op.cit., p.31, stated that a slave belonging to a Sheikh in Bahrain would stand over a Shia shopkeeper and say, "My stick wants so-and-so", and if the shopkeeper did not quickly oblige he was promptly beaten with the said stick and the goods taken by force.
10. The "New Society" Magazine No. 29, dated 1st Nov. 1970, and No. 33, dated 7th Dec. 1970. Bahrain.
11. Belgrave, C.D., op.cit., p.127.
12. e.g., Yousef bin Ahmed Kanoo, Yousef bin Abul Rahman Fakroo, Mohammed Ali Al-Zayani, whose businesses, now run by their descendants, are the largest in the islands.

13. Thornburg, M., op.cit., p.117, mentions a certain Abdullah who received some training from the oil company and subsequently opened his own business which quickly flourished. Also Belgrave, C.D., p.127, mentions a certain Mohammed who worked for him as a kitchen boy before opening his own business which has since expanded to be the largest hotel in Bahrain. Some writers such as Meyer, A.J., Middle East Capitalism, Harvard U.P., 1959, p.43, suggests that the Shia in Bahrain possessed more capital than the Sunni and therefore opened up more businesses. This in fact was not the case.
14. White, Leigh - "Allah's Oil", op.cit. In fact the extension of the middle classes in oil producing countries was the theme of some American books during the late 1940's. See in this respect Roosevelt, Kermit, "Arabs, Oil and the History", London, Victor Gollanez, 1949.
15. BAPCO reported that in 1958 they purchased articles from 211 local merchants. This fell in 1965 to 150 and in 1966 and 1967 to 140. See BAPCO reports for the respective years.
16. Because of the lack of a defined level of income to which a poverty level can be related it is hard to define the border between the lower and middle classes.
17. The figures for 1959 and 1965 do not include teachers. For 1971, however, the figures include both teachers and professionals.
18. Berger, Morroe, "The Middle Class in the Arab World", Princeton Univ. Conference, No. 9, p.5, stated that in 1947 the urban middle class in Egypt did not exceed 10% of the economically active population.
19. For the 1952 and 1969 figures see "Huna al-Bahrain", no. 217, Feb. 1970. For the 1962 figure see the article by Belgrave, James, "The Changing of Social Scene in Bahrain" - Middle East Forum, Vol. 38, No. 7, 1962.
20. Berger - op.cit., p.8.
21. Many of the business establishments and accommodation in Bahrain are owned by members of the Al-Khalifah family. They do not personally deal with letting of property but farm them out to brokers who often abuse the system in their fixing of rents and taking of profits.
22. I.O. - R/15/2/9/23 and 41 - "Japanese Trade Activities in the Persian Gulf 1934-1939" and "German Trade Activities in the Persian Gulf 1938-1939".
23. Cummins, J.W. - "Report of an enquiry", op.cit. Part 2, p.4. stated that cases will arise in Bahrain and have already risen, when recruits (to the Bahrain Civil Service) from abroad receive a higher level of remuneration than their equals or superiors in the service.

24. Govt. of Bahrain Annual Report, 1969, pp.137-140.
25. In his address to the nation on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of his accession (1970) Shaikh Isa pledged himself to create a modern constitution to "regulate the practice of authorities". See "Huna al-Bahrain", No. 227, Dec. 1970.
26. A contradiction to this attitude is apparent when we examine the attitude of the Sunni workmen, especially towards the Technical College, in that they discourage their sons from attending the courses at this school.
27. "The Trade Union Movement in Bahrain" - mimeographed - presented to the Founding Congress of the Bahrain National Students - Damascus, 16-25th Feb., 1972.
28. Political or Trade Union Organizations.
29. A premature attempted coup occurred in 1970. The Govt. suppressed the publication of any news of this event.
30. Bent, Theodore - "South Arabia", Smith, Elder & Co., 1900, p.40.
31. Belgrave, C.D., op.cit. pp. 127-128.
32. Some practices adopted by the young of some middle class families are giving rise for concern in that drink and drugs are being taken and addiction to these is becoming more widespread. J.H.D.B. "Oil and Bahrain", The World Today, Vol. 7, 1951, p.82 stated that a local liquor is made by Bahrainis.
33. "The Woman in Bahrain and the Arabian Gulf", mimeograph presented to the Founding Congress of Bahrain National Students Union - Damascus - Feb. 1972.
34. There are two types of veil in Bahrain. In the town a fixed veil is worn whilst village women normally arrange their veil only as necessary. See Hansen, H.H., "The Pattern of Women's Seclusion and Veiling in a Shia Village". Folk, Vol. 3, pp.23-42.
35. Belgrave, C.D., op.cit., p.101.
36. For increasing literacy rates of Bahraini women see Table XXVI.
37. The number of working women in Bahrain is still very small. In 1959 they comprised only 3% of the economically active group. This rose to only 4% by 1965 and approx. 5% by 1971.
38. The first two, recruited in 1970, were university graduates in sociology. "Huna al-Bahrain" No. 229, Feb. 1971.

PART FOUR

POLITICAL CHANGES AND CONFLICTS

INTRODUCTION

In this section we will attempt to observe and evaluate the political changes and conflicts which have taken place in Bahrain since the First World War.

In order to facilitate this study we propose to divide the years concerned into specific periods.

The first of these is the period 1918 to 1929 which witnessed the passing of the old order and the introduction of a form of modern governmental system.

The second is the period of 1930 to 1939 during which a number of important political demands were made, and the third is the years following the Second World War up to the Declaration of Independence in Bahrain in 1971.

In order to understand the Bahrain political evolution, which started after the First World War and developed rapidly, but not without major setbacks, we must consider the stimuli which set in motion the forces of political change. If we accept broadly that the major stimuli of change in the "Third World" are factors such as economic development, education, improvement of communications, etc., then each of these forces must produce some form of reaction or consequence which in turn may produce other changes. Thus we have a situation of "input-output and feedback."¹

The input-output notion is more fully explained by Zartman as "a broadening of integration (or input) in the political system through quantitative and/or qualitative increases in participation and a broadening of allocation (or output) through an attempt to seek out and solve problems," or in other words "to keep the

political system in harmony with the society and the economy."²

In general the above theoretical argument may be accepted as true and reasonable but occasionally local conditions throw up obstacles which can handicap the course of progress. In the case of Bahrain the input-output seems to have worked to a certain extent but was impeded by the handicap of local conservatism within the society and/or foreign intervention, whether obvious or hidden, positive or negative.

Due to the latter reason the social groups became rigidly attached to a definite economic structure and status and thereby developed a conflict of political ideas. Thus the political system did not develop in harmony with the society but yielded reluctantly to the increasing demands of the populace.³

To attempt to single out the major stimuli of political change would be perhaps to oversimplify the situation, but we may safely assume that certain forces may be credited with providing the catalyst to initiate changes, although, needless to say their effect was not simultaneous and they overlapped to a certain extent.

These forces, we consider to be a) Arab nationalism, b) Advances in Communications, c) Cultural Conflicts and d) Foreign interference.

These elements were often either in conflict with each other and/or reinforcing each other to initiate political change. The cause and effect of each of these overlap one another and one would be hard put to differentiate between that which caused change and that which was changed.

a) Arab Nationalism

Arab Nationalism today may be defined as a state of mind, its basic concept, however, took its form in the more advanced countries of Egypt, Iraq and Syria during the early years of the twentieth century culminating in the demands of the 1920's for self-determination. The concept has of course since developed further but if we accept that the basis of the concept at that time was the feeling of Arabs that their subjugation of the immediate past was unwarrantable and that as soon as they had the power to control their own destiny they could improve their lot and take their rightful place in the world; we go some way to understanding the force of the movement.

We can find material evidence of these feelings in Bahrain in the formation of a Literary Club⁴ in the early 1920's to study the literature being propagated by Arabs abroad. Prior to this, literature and leaflets published by the various Arab secret societies in Istanbul, Paris and Beirut, were brought clandestinely to the island and circulated amongst the fore-runners of the Literary Club.⁵ Magazines and papers such as "Serkes", "al-Hilal", "Mukhtataf", "Aljeridah", "al-Muayyd", "al-Liwa", "al-Ahram", al-Ahali, "al Istaklal", "al-Bilad", "al-Kabas" and others were to be found in the Literary Club during that period.

At that time Arab Nationalism was not clearly defined and did not have specific supra-national goals, it was patriotic rather than nationalistic. We may assume however, that the Bahraini elite, in the absence of direct contact with the authors, placed their own interpretation on these aims and applied them to their particular situation.

During this early period Arab Nationalism and Islamic Nationalism were intricately intertwined and the two often conflicted and clouded the true aims of each. A controversial debate occurred in 1908 between the adherents of the two movements in Bahrain, when one of the Arab Nationalists eulogised Mustafa Kamel⁶ and stated that more mourners followed his corpse than followed that of Ahmed bin Hambel, a great Muslim leader of the ninth century.

During the debate which took place over the following months it became apparent that a number of the more enlightened Bahraini elite were prepared to put a secular leader on the same plane as a religious leader, a very brave step to take in those days.⁷

Correspondence between Bahrainis and other Arabs, both at home and abroad provide us with an outline of the current views held on Arab Nationalism.

Shaikh Ibrahim bin Mohammed al-Kalifah, writing to Rihani in the early 1920's stated, "the most important conversation between brothers is how to uplift one's nation to that of the more advanced nations and how to draw the attention of the elite to the demands of the time"⁸ Although "the nation" is not clearly defined here, it seems that the writer is referring to Bahrain.

Another of the Bahraini elite, writing to the same person, displays another train of thought when he said,

"Tell the West that I (Rihani) visited Egypt, Hejaz, Yemen, Iraq, Najd and Bahrain and saw in these countries people shake off the dust and start to work, ... people will come to shake hands with you as friends but not as masters. Tell them that the Arab people are your first teacher, so do not return bad for good, be as their adviser and liberator but not their dominator."⁹

Here we find the basic ideas of Arab Nationalism in the way in which he referred to the "Arab people" even though he first referred to individual countries.

b) Advances in Communications

Here we apply the term communications in its broadest sense to include all forms of communication, both material and social. As Deutsch rightly stated,

"within any geographical setting and any population, economic, social and technological development mobilised individuals for relatively more intensive communications. We may call this the social and political public, the mobilised population."¹⁰

In the early 1920's there was hardly what could be called a mobilised public, as communications of all forms in Bahrain were still in their infancy. For instance there was only one simple printing machine in the island which was installed in 1915 and up to 1918 only one car.¹¹ The publications of the printing press had a very limited circulation due to the very high level of illiteracy and communications even between the towns and villages of the island were infrequent and based on word of mouth.

As education developed and physical communications, such as roads, were improved so the numbers of the "mobilised public" were gradually increased.

During these early years, however, the main form of communication with the outside world was by the travels undertaken by the Bahraini merchants, who corresponded with their counterparts in Bahrain with regard to the world political situation. These letters were often read at the Majlis to communicate the news to those who may be interested in such developments. An example of these letters was that written by Abdulla al-Zayed from India.

The topics which he came across were, a) the situation in England, in which he attempts to describe and analyse the background to the Lloyd George resignation affair; b) the situation in India, describing the new laws and regulations proclaimed by the British to counter the Indian Nationalist movement. In addition to this he also discussed the current events and situations in both Ireland and Egypt.¹²

Thus it may be seen that initially, in the early years of the twentieth century, ~~the~~ except for the educated minority (mostly Sunni), communications were in a primitive state, but that the seeds of future political awareness were present in the strong curiosity of the minority in the outside world.

c) Cultural Conflicts

There has always been a cultural gap between the two main societies in Bahrain, namely the Sunnis and the Shias. This gap has over the years generated a great amount of distrust and to some extent promoted conflicts between the two communities.

The Sunnis Tribes looked upon themselves as "pure" Arabs, because their ancestry was known and easily traceable whilst the Shia, who formed the aboriginal population looked upon the Sunnis as "conquering foreigners". The mistrust was therefore mutual. An eyewitness of the early 1920's described their animosity,

"A Sayyd, distinguished by his green turban passed by and a shopkeeper's friend spat on the ground and hissed something. When I asked him what he said he replied, 'I said that the man was a dog. You never can trust those Shia, they are two-faced'".¹³

The writer went on to say that it became evident to him that this feeling was generally held by the Sunnis and was reciprocated by

the Shia. This animosity, however, resulted from historical and economical factors such as the oppression of the Ruling Family and the control by the Sunnis of the island's economy. The mistrust eventually initiated political demands from alternate sections of the community, either Shia or Sunni. These demands continued to be made over the years until such times as the cultural gap between the two sides had been narrowed by other elements. As Deutsch put it,

"the channels of culture, like those of society, consist of material facilities. Like those of society they originated through processes of history, are changed by history, and may be destroyed by it."¹⁴

In Bahrain, however, the cultural gap has not been entirely destroyed by history but so far it may be assumed that the gap has been bridged as Arab Nationalism spread through the two communities.

d) Foreign Interference.

Interference in the political field in Bahrain was carried out mainly by the British, especially after the First World War, although their influence is to be seen from a much earlier time.

This interference contributed to the other elements in either a positive or negative manner to determine the course of political events in Bahrain.

To conclude, we may assume that these four elements sometimes conflicted or reinforced each other, but at any time they were the cause of more political demands. Over the years foreign interference and cultural conflicts have gradually faded into the background leaving Arab Nationalism and communications as the driving forces behind political change in the island.

The discovery and exploitation of oil from the 1930's onward, amongst other things provided a stimulus for the improvement of communications through education and prosperity. It also increased the degree of foreign involvement. These factors combined to give rise to the political demands of the future.

FOOTNOTES

1. An interesting paper written by Frank Stoakes entitled "Social and Political Change in the Third World" published with other essays in "The Arabian Peninsula; Society and Politics", edited by D. Hopwood: Geo. Allen & Unwin, London 1972, pp. 189-215. The author applied in his paper the theoretical pattern of Social and Political Change in the Third World to the Arabian Gulf States. Although he excluded Bahrain it is safe to assume that his remarks may equally apply there.
2. Zartman, William - "Morocco", a paper presented at the 18th Near East Conference of Princeton University, March 24-25; 1966, published in "Political Modernisation in the Near East and North Africa" - Princeton Univ. Paper No. 49, pp. 25-36.
3. In this respect see the argument developed by Al-Urwi, Abdulla - "The Attitude of Arab Marxists towards Islamic Ideology in the Arab World" - Arabic - "Arab Studies", Eighth Year No. 10 - Aug. 1972, pp. 8-27.
4. The Literary Club took its name from that founded by Arabs in Istanbul in 1909. See Al-Shahabi, Mustafa - "Muhadarat en al-Estemar" - Arab League Publication, 1957 Institute of Higher Arab Studies, Vol. II, Cairo. and Antonius, George - "The Arab Awakening". J.B. Lippincott, New York 1939.
5. Al-Baker - "The Political Situation in Bahrain", op.cit., p.37.
6. An Egyptian National Leader who died in 1908.
7. Although this debate was concluded in favour of the more conservative elements the very fact that it occurred at all indicates that tolerance was possible between the two groups.
8. Rihani, op.cit., p.206.
9. Rihani, op.cit., p.207. As it became clear later the Arab Nationalist Movement became hostile to foreigners but the seeds of both fear and hope with respect to foreigners can be seen in this letter. For the attitude of Arab Nationalism toward foreigners see Amin, N. Faris, "The National Movement and their attitudes toward foreigners in the Arab World" - Al-Abhath, Vol. VI No. 10 March, 1953, pp. 3-16, also see Finer, H., "Reflections on the Nature of Arab Nationalism". Middle East Affairs, Vol. IX No. 10, Oct. 1958, pp. 302-313. See also on this point : Khadduri, M. "Political trends in the Arab World" Johns Hopkins Press : London 1970. P.23 and Chap. 8.
10. Deutsch, Karl, W., "Nationalism and Social Communication" - The M.I.T. Press, Third paperback edition, Oct. 1969, p.126.
11. Al-Nabhani, p.23.

12. A collection of private letters from Abdulla al-Zayed were given to the writer by Mohammed al-Ansari. Mr. Zayed visited India mainly as a pearl dealer, but his letter quoted, which was written on 8th March, 1921, consisted of eight pages of which only the first was on business affairs. Mr. Zayed later became the owner and editor of Bahrain's first newspaper in 1939.
13. Hakken, B.D., "Sunni-Shia Discord in Eastern Arabia" - The Muslim World, Vol. XXIII, 1933, pp. 302-305.
14. Deutsch - op.cit., p.89.

CHAPTER ONE

THE PASSING OF THE OLD ORDER (1918-1929)

With the end of the First World War the British consolidated their influence over a large area of the Arab Middle East. Traditionally they had a strong foothold in the Gulf Area, especially in Bahrain. From the early years of the twentieth century the two main issues which appeared to concern the British, as far as the internal situation in Bahrain was concerned, were the jurisdiction over foreigners in the island and the status of the Customs.¹

With regard to the latter, the chaos of the Bahrain Customs was a constant source of discussion as early as the visit of Lord Curzon to Bahrain in 1903. When Curzon mentioned the reforms required to Shaikh Isa he replied that it was a matter concerning only himself. Curzon was reported to have warned Shaikh Isa that the matter could not, and would not, be dropped.²

Since that time, until real reforms were introduced in the early 1920's the Bahrain Customs was a favourite topic of the letters and dispatches of the Political Agents.³

As to the former, jurisdiction over foreigners, it came under consideration as early as 1904, when in September of that year, an incident took place involving Shaikh Ali, a nephew of Shaikh Isa, in which a German clerk in the employ of Messrs. Wonkhaus was beaten up. Another incident in which two Persians were injured took place in November and involved the same nephew.

Mr. Wonkhaus made representations to the German Consul in Bushire for compensation and the Persians to the Shah.⁴

These actions alarmed the British both at home and in the Gulf as they felt their security as "protectors" of the area to be threatened by other powers such as the Germans and Persians.⁵

Major Percy Cox, who had recently been appointed as British Resident, arrived in Bahrain empowered to investigate the affairs and with authority to make use of British Naval powers if necessary. After prolonged negotiation he took Hamed, the heir apparent, as a hostage and delivered an ultimatum on the 23rd February, 1905, that Isa should expel his nephew, Shaikh Ali bin Ahmed for a period of five years and that he should pay Rs 2000 to the Persians as compensation and to prohibit the use publicly of "sukhra" or forced labour of foreigners and employees of Europeans. Isa yielded to the ultimatum on the 25th February, when he realised that Cox was prepared to bombard Manama if the terms of the ultimatum were not fulfilled.⁶

The ultimatum, however, contained a fourth, and important demand: "I am to warn you that further rejection of advice (from the British Political Agent) in important matters will not be tolerated."⁷

This warning marked the turning point in Britain's relationship with Bahrain.

The Customs issue was not raised publicly at this stage⁸ but all foreigners were brought under the jurisdiction of the British Political Agent.

After the affairs of 1905 the relations between the British Authorities and Shaikh Isa were far from normal⁹ although both tried to make the best of the situation. The British apparently were still not satisfied with the internal administration of the

island. As Lorimer put it, "they (the internal affairs) were not creditable to the protecting British power."¹⁰

In fact the administration of Shaikh Isa was a typically traditional feudal one. Apart from the Customs, which were leased by Isa for his own ends, there was no form of "government". Law and order was kept by the Amirs of the various towns and villages, assisted by a small number of their own bodyguards who also assisted in the levying of their own taxes. In addition to this the Qadis were responsible for applying the religious law.

Two other informal bodies were also in existence, "Majlis al Urf", for the resolving of disputes between merchants, and the "Salfah" Court for adjudicating on matters concerning the pearl industry. Members of both of these bodies were selected and appointed by the Shaikh.

With this state of affairs it was hard for any person without influence to obtain a satisfactory form of justice.

After 1905 not only foreigners residing in Bahrain began to enjoy the benefit of British protection, but also the Political Agents "were authorised to manumit slaves in suitable and deserving cases."¹¹

The latter point directly affected mainly the Sunni tribes of Bahrain but apparently Shaikh Isa was prepared to concede this point so long as the Customs matter, which was raised constantly in the pre-war years,¹² was forgotten.

In order to regularise the position of the Political Agent with regard to jurisdiction over British subjects and foreigners on the island, it was suggested in 1908 that an Order in Council

should be issued on the lines of the Indian Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890.¹³

In the course of the ensuing correspondence on the subject, the thought was expressed that it would be desirable to obtain from the Shaikh a formal request to be relieved from exercising jurisdiction over foreigners. This request came in July 1909 in the form of a letter from Shaikh Isa to the Political Agent in which Isa stated,

"It is not hidden from you that I have had considerable trouble in many cases (that arose) in my territory in which foreigners were involved. For this reason I wish that I may not be held responsible in these cases, and I would be grateful to the British Government if they removed this trouble and responsibility from me. I mean that (the British Government) should exercise authority in all cases, and in cases that occur between foreigners and my subjects it is necessary that you and I should settle them jointly."

It is apparent from this letter that Shaikh Isa surrendered completely his jurisdiction over foreigners to the British, but in fact Isa later claimed that this was not what was in his mind at the time as by "foreigners" he claimed that this applied only to subjects of the major recognised powers, not the dependents of the petty Arab potentates in the Gulf Area, some of whom had special arrangements with him. This specific point became the subject of repeated arguments between Isa and the British. The basis of Isa's argument was contained in the Agreement reached between himself and the British in 1880.¹⁴

As the British Government in India pointed out, however, there was no documentary evidence of any such agreement with other Shaikhs and that the British were prepared to acknowledge any such agreements only if such evidences were produced and the other parties were to recognise them.¹⁵

Despite these arguments the preparation of the Bahrain Order in Council was continued and was eventually published in the London Gazette on 15th August, 1913.¹⁶ Due to necessary negotiations with the Turks over spheres of influence in the Gulf and later due to the outbreak of the First World War, the Order was suspended and was not applied until early 1919.

Because of its far-reaching effects on the internal political situation of Bahrain it is worthwhile here to quote some of its provisions.

The Order was in seven parts, with seventy-nine articles and a schedule. Besides giving the Political Agent jurisdiction over all foreigners he was also given the right to select half the members of the "Majlis al-Urf", and also, in conjunction with the Shaikh, to appoint the judges of the "Salifah" court, both being privileges exercised exclusively by the Shaikh. The Qadis or judges of the religious courts, were still to be appointed by the Shaikh but only after acceptance by the Political Agent.

The Order also provided for the setting up of other courts, a Chief Court, which was to have all the powers of a High Court of Judicature (Article 14), headed by the Political Resident in the Gulf,¹⁷ and a District Court (Article 35) in which the Political Agent was deemed to be a District Judge.

A third court was also instituted, this was the Joint Court composed of the Political Agent and an official appointed by the Shaikh.

The Order also introduced various rules and regulations, the like of which the Bahrainis had never experienced before. It gave the Political Agents tremendous power and meanwhile deprived the

traditional local courts of their authority. For instance, Article 14 stated with reference to the Sharia (Religious Courts), "the judgment passed by the Qadi cannot be carried into effect until it is ratified by the Political Agent, and the Political Agent is empowered to revise the findings and sentence."

This meant that the British not only controlled the Judiciary with respect to cases between Bahrainis and foreigners, but also interfered in the traditional religious law courts by which the community set great store.

Article 21(i) stated,

"Where it is shown by evidence or oath, to the satisfaction of the District Court, that any British subject has committed, or is about to commit, an offence against this order, so as to be dangerous to peace and good order, or is endeavouring to excite enmity between the people of Bahrain and His Majesty, the courts may prohibit that person from being within the limits of this Order, during any time therein specified, not exceeding two years."

Besides these provisions, which were felt to be unacceptable by a number of people in Bahrain, the controversial issue was raised, who were "foreigners" and who "Bahrainis"?

The Order in Article 8 (2) defined the foreigners as those "with respect to whom the Shaikh of Bahrain has agreed with His Majesty for, or consented to, the exercise of jurisdiction by His Majesty"; a vague phrase, which did not define who was, or was not, subject to British rule of law.

As we have already stated the Bahrain Order in Council did not come into effect until 1919, although Shaikh Isa and his confidants were no doubt aware of its contents.¹⁸

During the war years the Bahrain Shaikhs were loyal and helpful to the British Government, Bahrain hosted His Majesty's

forces for a short time during 1914, Shaikh Isa and his sons actively helped the British to such an extent that he was invested by the British with the C.S.I. in 1915 and 1919 with the K.C.I.E.

The internal situation in Bahrain appears to have been quiet during the war years.

In November, 1918 Captain Norman N.E. Bray arrived in Bahrain to take up the appointment of Political Agent. The significance of his appointment was that he was the first of a number of men who were assigned to this post from the Civil Commission in Baghdad.¹⁹ Shortly after his arrival the Bahrain Order in Council was introduced and his first action was to nominate the members of the "Majlis al-Urf". This move was, however, resented by Shaikh Isa who dismissed one of the members appointed by Captain Bray.²⁰ When the latter protested, Shaikh Isa relented under pressure, apparently for the time being only, for when Shaikh Isa received an invitation to send his youngest son to London the opportunity was seized by him to correspond with people in high office there²¹ vis a vis the situation in Bahrain and the application of the Order in Council.

Shaikh Abdulla embarked for his visit in May, 1919 accompanied by Captain Bray, who in his report summed up the political situation in Bahrain as, there being,

"a considerable feeling of hostility to ourselves due to religious, economical, personal and war reasons also there is a considerable party hostile to the Shaikh and consequently to ourselves. In contrast to this I find no British party and a general lack of touch especially with those hostile to ourselves."²²

Captain Bray goes on to list his proposals to remedy the situation and suggested that the Political Agent should hold a fortnightly Majlis, that a pro-British party be formed and encouraged, schools, local industries, and so forth were to be promoted.

In his report Captain Bray seems to have overlooked the real issues such as the row over the Bahrain Order in Council and the suppression of the Shia community. Although he mentioned those who were hostile to the Shaikh, he did not ascribe to them the reason for their hostility, this being the growing feeling among the elite that they should have the right of self-determination rather than be "ruled" by the British.

In September, 1919, after his arrival in Britain, Shaikh Abdulla handed a letter to Sir Arthur Hirtzel.²³ In this letter he requested:- 1) That Shaikh Isa should have equality with neighbouring Arab rulers in the exercise of jurisdiction over all subjects except those of Great Britain and other great European powers. 2) That Shaikh Isa should be sole adjudicator ^{as to} ~~over~~ whom were suitable persons to serve in the Majlis al-Urf and the Salifah. 3) That British assistance should be forthcoming to enable him to establish a port at Zubara on the mainland.²⁴ 4) That Shaikh Isa should have the right to correspond directly with London should necessity arise.

There was no immediate reply to this letter. However, on the 6th November, 1919 a new Political Agent arrived in Bahrain. He was Major H.R.P. Dickson, who, like his predecessor, had served in Iraq and had a reasonable knowledge of the Arab language

and customs. Besides his post as Political Agent in Bahrain he was also assigned to be the liaison between the Civil Commission in Baghdad and Ibn Saud. Apparently Major Dickson much preferred Ibn Saud to Shaikh Isa,²⁵ His opinion of Shaikh Isa was expressed in one of his letters as,

"a very old and weak man, imbued with sincere feelings of friendship and regard for His Majesty's Government, swayed and confused in his weakness by virile and astute minds and delicate intrigues, dictated for the most part by evil intentions to himself, to us and to both, helped in this by the characteristics of the Arab mentality."²⁶

In the same letter Major Dickson gave an overall picture of the political situation in Bahrain. Some of the points noted by him were:-

"a) The political atmosphere of Bahrain, while not in any way dangerous, is wholly unsatisfactory. b) There is a strong anti-British sentiment which is longstanding and deepseated. c) British prestige rests on entirely false standards, namely on fear and not on respect."

Dickson went on to classify the opposition to the British as those either honest or dishonest and finished by classifying leading members of the Bahrain community into two lists, a 'black' list and a 'white' list, with sub-classifications into either Arabs or Persians.

After a few months in Bahrain, Dickson decided to force the issue of the setting up of the Majlis al-Urf, which had as yet not been convened.²⁷ Shaikh Isa gave as his excuse for not doing so, the fact that he was still waiting for a reply from his letter to London.²⁸ Later, however, he reluctantly agreed on condition that it would operate only for six months and then the situation would be reviewed.²⁹

In the course of compiling a reply to Abdulla's letter of the 4th September, 1919 the British Government of India considered the views of Captain Bray, Major Dickson, the Political Resident and the Civil Commissioner in Baghdad. Dickson, however, refused categorically to allow Shaikh Isa jurisdiction over the coastal Arabs on the basis that this "would deprive him of important sources of information from the mainland."³⁰

The final answer to Shaikh Abdulla's letter came from the Government of India on the 5th May, 1920. Shaikh Abdulla was informed that with regard to the second point, the procedure for the selection of members of the Majlises was clearly laid down in the Bahrain Order in Council and that it was not within their competence to alter this.

In reply to the third point they stated that the request was an old one which had received much consideration and the Government of India was unable to accede to this request in view of the difficulties involved. As to the fourth request it was stated that the political relationships of Bahrain were to be conducted with the Government of India, and it was proper that Shaikh Isa should conduct his business through them, and that the latter (Government of India) would if necessary pass any correspondence to the Government in London.

With regard to the first, and most important request, however, the Government of India agreed that Shaikh Isa could exercise jurisdiction over the subjects of other Arab rulers, subject to the formal concurrence of those rulers.³¹

Dickson promptly wrote to Ibn Saud and to Shaikh Abdulla bin Jasim al-Thani of Qatar asking them if they would allow their

subjects to be under the jurisdiction of Isa. Naturally enough, both rulers gave a negative answer. Ibn Saud was at that time an adherent of the British and was well aware of the Bahrain internal situation and Ibn Thani, with his longstanding animosity for the Al-Khalifah was not prepared to grant this request either.³²

Dickson did not consult with Shaikh Isa before sending these letters and did not consult with other Arab Gulf principalities such as Kuwait, Sharjah, Abu Dhabi and Muscat.

After receiving the two replies he published a notice on 26th November, 1920 stating -

"All foreign subjects including Persians and subjects of Arab rulers and chiefs other than those of Bahrain, were, while in Bahrain entitled to British protection."

The issue of this note was a blow to Shaikh Isa's and Abdulla's efforts to gain jurisdiction over subjects of neighbouring countries and was probably the breaking point in Shaikh Isa's relations with the British, at least in private.

The most important point, however, was that at that time the term "Bahrain subject" was not clearly defined and Major Dickson was in a position to place persons who sought his aid under British protection.

These actions brought vigorous opposition from Shaikh Isa, his supporters and other Arab tribes, even the petty Shaikhs outside the towns felt this to be a direct challenge to their traditional powers. To the Bahrain public at large, Dickson's actions, especially with regard to the placing of some women under British protection, was completely unacceptable.

One incident, involving a girl of the Dawasir tribe, who were

powerful and prosperous pearl merchants of Budayya, was regarded by them as humiliating and hurtful to their pride.³³

The opposition during the approximately two years of Dickson's office grew almost daily and came from many quarters. Shaikh Isa, and his youngest son Abdulla, who was more politically active than his elder brother Hamed, and other petty Shaikhs and their supporters were vigorous in their opposition on the grounds that Dickson was interfering with their authority. Members of the tribes and the more conservative elements in the island also opposed Dickson because they felt that he was interfering with the accepted moral code and pattern of behaviour of the community.

Even the more enlightened elements opposed Dickson's actions on principle, as they felt them to be unwarranted interference by the British.

Other sections of the community, however, especially foreigners, were enthusiastic in their support of the measures as they felt that their position was much more secure under the British protection. Others such as the Shia, although they were Bahrainis, because they had been oppressed for so long, began to take the opportunity to win more concessions from the Ruling Family,³⁴ and were delighted to see their Rulers discomfited.

Dickson summed up the political situation in mid-1920 when he wrote that there were five important political personalities in Bahrain, Shaikh Isa and his wife,³⁵ Shaikh Hamed, Shaikh Abdulla³⁶ and Jasim al-Shirawi (Abdulla's friend and secretary to Shaikh Isa). He gave as his sources of Arab (Sunni) discontent, a) the propaganda of the Caliphate movement in India, and b) the Egyptian newspapers

which were beginning to arrive in Bahrain which carried anti-British articles.

As to the reasons for the Shia discontent he gave the following. Resentment of the long history of tyranny by the Ruling Family which included such things as, (i) They were forbidden to own land.³⁷ (ii) They were obliged to support, free of charge, the horses, donkeys, and camels of the Ruling Family and their hangers-on, and to supply free food to any passing member of the Ruling Family if so requested. (iii) They had to submit to forced labour at any time. (iv) Fish, dates and vegetables had to be provided, gratis, for the Ruling Shaikh's table, these to be provided by each village in turn.

Dickson considered that the majority of the Persians in Bahrain could be counted upon as being pro-British.³⁸

The long-standing problem of the customs revenue, which was regarded by the Shaikh as his personal income, was not pressed during this period although Dickson examined the situation closely and in May, 1920, he reported that his estimate of Shaikh Isa's revenue was in the region of Rs.20,000 per month and in addition to this he claimed 5% of all livestock coming to Bahrain. He estimated that Shaikh Isa retained about Rs. 80,000 per annum for his personal use and that the leading members of the Ruling Family shared the remainder.

They also claimed as a privilege the free supply of items such as firewood, charcoal and butter from the importing merchants.³⁹ In all, the customs system was in chaos.

Although he had no legal right to do so Major Dickson also interfered in the newly-created municipality by insisting on

choosing half of the council members. This dispute was resolved by a compromise between Dickson and Shaikh Isa, whereby the Shaikh chose the council members, half of whom were to be foreigners under British protection, and that this half of the council should be approved by Dickson.⁴⁰

During Dickson's period of office, therefore, the Bahraini relations with the British were very strained, especially amongst those who opposed these new British policies, mainly Sunnis whether pro or anti-Khalifah.

The termination of Major-Dickson's term of office in late 1920 brought a feeling of relief to those who had opposed him. Some of them believed that he was removed from Bahrain as a result of the protests they had made against his policies and because of the friction and ill-feelings generated by those policies. This however, was untrue as events were to prove.

The new Political Agent, Major Clive Daly, who was assigned to the post turned out to be a tough, single-minded soldier who, like his predecessor, had served in Iraq. He vigorously pursued Dickson's policies and put more and more people under British protection, and in addition to this began to deport people who opposed him, whether foreigners or Bahrainis.⁴¹ For instance, on 19th November, 1921, he convicted and deported Jasim al-Shirawi for alleged conspiracy against the Bahrain Order in Council.⁴² A few weeks later he deported Haffez Wahbah the first headmaster of Bahrain's only school.⁴³ Daly was apparently trying to isolate Isa and his youngest son, Abdulla, from what he considered were evil advisers. Furthermore, he appointed a Bahraini of Persian origin, Khan Sahib Mohammed Sharif Kutbaddin, as head of the municipality,⁴⁴ which

controlled a small force of "market guards", the only law-keeping force in Manama. The appointment of a Persian as head of the municipality was a cause of considerable ill-feeling and when Mohammed Sharif began to recruit Persians to the force of market guards this added fuel to the flames.

Daly apparently preferred to deal with Shaikh Hamed and put pressure on Isa to delegate more authority to him. His view of Hamed was that "he was extremely popular with all communities, and in addition to being their apparent, is in every way the most suitable person to manage affairs". With respect to internal affairs he wrote,

"Bahrain is in a constant state of unrest owing to the political intrigues of a small party under the leadership of Shaikh Abdulla."

He finished the same letter by saying,

"I am constantly approached by leaders of every community and requested to appeal to the Government for some alleviation of the situation."⁴⁵

It appears that Shaikh Isa yielded to a certain extent to this pressure by appointing Hamed to take control of some aspects of the administration under his guidance. This was a popular move and one of the few acts for which Daly received praise from the Bahrainis.⁴⁶

Shaikh Hamed, however, was hard put to carry out his new duties due in part to his own mild nature and weaknesses and in part to the rivalry of his younger brother, Abdulla.

The oppression of the Shia, especially in the country areas, continued, and they turned more and more to the Political Agent. He reported these oppressions in detail and granted British protection to any person he felt was suffering from the tyrannies

of their rulers.⁴⁷ The fact that so many people were granted protection gave them a greater sense of security and increased their freedom of expression and this gave rise to increased political demands.

On the occasion of the visit of Lt. Col. A.P. Trevor, the Political Resident from Bushire, on the 21st December, 1921, he was met by a crowd of Shia who presented him with a petition specifying their grievances, as follows:-

"We beg to state to the possessor of great wisdom, the chief of the Gulf, that the Shia community is in a state of great humiliation, and subject to public massacres, they have no refuge, the evidence of none of them is accepted (in the courts), the properties are subject to plunder, and their selves liable to maltreatment at any moment.

Trevor later reported that the Shia said to him that if they (the British) were not prepared to persuade the Shaikh to remove the oppressions and create a reasonably efficient government, the British should remove their protection from the Shaikh so that they could persuade other Arab rulers to depose the Shaikh and administer the country in his place.⁴⁸

Trevor suggested that as pacific means had failed to persuade the Shaikh it was the time for more direct action. The Government of India was not enthusiastic at that time towards the Political Resident's suggestion and in January, 1922 the Government of India expressed the view that they were not prepared to consider drastic action regarding the misgovernment of Bahrain until all local resources of bringing pressure to bear were exhausted and that intervention only became imperative in order to secure protection of foreigners and to secure His Majesty's interests, and that they were not anxious to intervene between the Shaikh and his subjects

neither would they consider putting all of the Shia population under British protection. They concluded by saying that if the Shaikh was prepared to introduce reasonable forms of reforms, the Government would lend their moral support to back him.⁴⁹

However, Lt. Col. Trevor was instructed to visit Bahrain in the immediate future to restore the Political Agent's prestige and to tell the Shaikh that he was running a great risk from his own subjects, and also to remind Shaikh Hamed that his future as a ruler depended upon his behaviour and co-operation with the Political Agent. This course of action was recommended in order that it would be brought home to Shaikh Isa that although no immediate action was contemplated he was being very closely watched.

To the public, however, it appeared from the absence of immediate action that the Government of India was not prepared to become directly involved at that time, despite the wishes of their representatives on the spot. News of this reluctance of the British to become involved soon filtered down to the Shia community⁵⁰ who took matters into their own hands and began to exert political pressure culminating in the demands presented to Shaikh Isa on 16th February, 1922.⁵¹ These demands were:-

1. No-one, except the ruler (Shaikh Isa), and Shaikh Hamed had the right to decide cases of dispute or to ^{had} ~~take~~ the right to punish in any way.
2. Cases which Shaikh Hamed could not decide to the satisfaction of both parties were to be referred by him to Shariah, Majlis al-Urf or Salifah courts, as the case may be.
3. No-one should be dragged off to the ruler's court without notice

but be summoned to attend on the written authority of Shaikh Hamed.

4. Documents concerning the lease of gardens by the Ruling Family to their subjects (Shia) to be in duplicate and a copy to be retained by each party to the agreement and to be witnessed by independent witnesses. No conditions other than those contained in the document were to be enforced.
5. Steps were to be taken to stop the Shaikh's camels entering the private gardens and grazing there and damaging crops.
6. Sukrah (forced labour) of the owners of donkeys to cease and the Ragabyyyah (Poll-tax) to be abolished.
7. The practice of placing the Shaikh's calves with the cows belonging to the Baharna (Shia) to fatten free of charge should cease.
8. The prisons should be put in proper order and a reasonable building should be provided for that purpose.⁵²

As we can see from the demands the emphasis was placed on Shaikh Hamed rather than Shaikh Isa, presumably because the former was made in favour with the British and it appeared that he would be more well-disposed to their demands.

Although the above-listed demands were justified, it must not be assumed that all the Ruling Family treated the Shia community with contempt, indeed a small number of them saw the advantages of retaining the support of the Shia community, and of maintaining good relations with them.

Isa replied to these demands within the space of a few days, after consulting with the other members of the Ruling Family, and announced that he agreed in principle to all the demands with certain

reservations. These were that the status of prisoners depended entirely on the kindness of the ruler and that the Ragkabyyah should continue as had been the custom of his forefathers. He did, however, make one further promise which the Shia themselves had not demanded. This was that the Shia were to be allowed to elect two members of their community to serve on the Majlis al-Urf.⁵³

Shaikh Isa also issued an order for the opening of a Government office, with two regular clerks, to deal with public affairs and also made preparations to establish a regular court for the settlement of cases between his subjects.⁵⁴ This court took shape a few months later as a joint court,^{and} on the bench were Shaikh Hamed and Daly.⁵⁵

These first small steps marked the beginning of a form of organised administration in Bahrain and appeared to calm the internal political scene, at least temporarily.

To Shaikh Hamed was delegated the duty of running the day-to-day affairs of these offices, under the constant supervision of the Political Agent. As Hamed wrote to the latter,

"My dear friend, I cherish hopes that you are pleased with my conduct of affairs since I took over, in spite of the difficulties which I have experienced from the opposition of my younger brother (Abdulla) for which reason there may have been delay in carrying out some of the improvements we both desire, but I am sure you are satisfied with me."⁵⁶

Shaikh Abdulla did at that time undoubtedly oppose both Daly and Shaikh Hamed, but Daly's constant support for Hamed and the imminence of the long-awaited visit by Trevor created a feeling of fear and panic with Abdulla and before Trevor's visit took place he wrote to Daly, the Political Agent, admitting his previous opposition to him and Shaikh Hamed and promising to mend his ways.

On the 7th March, 1922, Trevor, acting upon the instructions of the Government of India, visited Bahrain in the warship H.M.S. Cyclamen to review the situation and to reassert the authority of the Political Agent. He delivered warnings to Isa, Hamed and Abdulla. To the latter he gave the warning that if he continued his present behaviour he would certainly get into trouble from the British.⁵⁷ The terms of Isa's warning were unknown but Trevor evidently felt a certain amount of sympathy for him in his position as an old man in a changing world.

His warning to Hamed consisted of advice to take a strong line against the tyranny of the other members of the Ruling Family.

In fact, Hamed could not put into effect any immediate steps to check the power of the Al-Khalifah, especially those who were set in their ways and had practiced for many years the things now prescribed.

Shaikh Khalid bin Ali (Shaikh Isa's brother) for instance supplemented his income by the poll-tax which he levied on the Shia villages within the sphere of influence, especially those of Sitra, and he was very loath to give this up. Many older members of the Al-Khalifah family were in much the same position.

After Trevor's visit Daly was able to report, however, that he was in the confidence of both Abdulla and Hamed and that they were, under Daly's instructions, looking for ways to reform the administration of both the system of justice and that of taxation. These items concerned not only the Shia but also the Sunni section of the community.

Besides the Ragabyyah and the "date-garden" taxes, there was also a fish-tax. These applied to the Shia only and could be collected

by any local Shaikh. The Sunni, however, paid only a "pearl-tax" which was collected by the Ruler.

Reforming the tax system meant the more even distribution of the tax load and this meant shifting the emphasis from the Shia to the whole community. This the traditional elite of the Sunni society were simply not prepared to accept.⁵⁸ The Dawasir, for instance, who lived semi-independently in Budayyia, started to oppose the scheme and were not under any circumstances prepared to pay. They were not alone in their opposition to the proposed reforms and even Shaikh Hamed did not whole-heartedly support their introduction.

The idea of equality of taxation appeared to many of the Sunni as British interference. The Dawasir started to communicate with Ibn Saud, the support of Shaikh Isa and his sons began to fade⁵⁹ in the face of the strong opposition, and Daly realising this tried to enlist the support of the Government of India to carry through the reforms.

The Government of India, however, continued to maintain their former attitude, that they did not wish to interfere between a ruler and his subjects, but authorised the Political Resident to encourage the Shaikh to go on with his schemes. They said that

"nothing should be done to encourage the idea that the reforms were being introduced at the Government's (of India) dictation",

but that they would lend the Shaikh their moral support.⁶⁰

Throughout this manoeuvring there was in fact a small number of the more enlightened Sunnis who looked favourably on the reforms proposed. The head of this section was Abdul Wahab al-Zayani,⁶¹ who had been campaigning for some time for the introduction of a

representative council on democratic lines. But although he opposed Shaikh Isa, he also opposed the British, on the grounds that, whilst he agreed with the reforms as good, they represented interference by an outside power in what was essentially a Bahraini affair, in which the initiative should come from the Bahrainis. His opposition to both parties naturally limited his public support.

Whilst the events within Bahrain appeared to be developing satisfactorily, albeit slowly, in the second half of 1922, events outside the island determined the course of future British policy.

The Persian Government and the Persian Press were observing closely the developments on the island. The Persian national feelings were riding high at that time and during 1921 and 1922, campaigns were launched in the Persian press against British interference in Bahrain.⁶² A vigorous assault was made against Mohammed Sharif Kutbaddin accusing him of being pro-British and actively helping them to control the island.⁶³ Questions were raised over the status of Bahrain and the measures taken to protect the Persian community there.

Bearing in mind the long-standing claim of the Persians to Bahrain and in view of this latest attempt to discomfit them, the British Government decided at last to act and play a more active role in the affairs of Bahrain to preclude the possibility of any Persian interference.

On 7th December, 1922, the Foreign Office informed the India Office that they desired, "to express their earnest hope that steps might be taken forthwith for the introduction at Bahrain of reforms tending to ensure the equitable treatment of Shia."⁶⁴

The Government of India forwarded the Foreign Office's views to the Political Resident and added to them that the persecution

of Shia by the Sunni offered the opportunity for anti-British agitation in Persia and elsewhere and that steps should be taken to counter this possibility, and also asked for his assessment of the situation.⁶⁵

The Political Agent and the Political Resident took a fresh look at the condition of the island and in January, 1923 they listed the following causes of unrest in letters between themselves and the Government of India.⁶⁶

1. A vast increase in the wealth of the Ruling Family had taken place due to increasing customs duties and the forcible seizure of Shia property.
2. Recent events in Iraq, India and Egypt had engendered more positive ideas of democracy in the island which had been fed by the newspapers and foreigners visiting the island.
3. That the Rulers were more ignorant and less travelled than many of their subjects.

In the letter Daly, referring to Shaikh Isa, remarked that he was "privily obstructive and will never agree to the exploitation of oil in Bahrain, except under pressure."⁶⁷ Daly is here referring to British interests and hinting that stronger action against Isa will be needed.

Trevor in his letter wrote, "for the sake of the well-being of the Shia population and of our good name the administration of Bahrain is in great need of improvement."

Both men agreed on the areas in which reforms were needed. They were:-

- 1) Equality of taxation.
- 2) Proper courts to be constituted.

3) The drawing up of rules to safeguard the pearl divers' interests.

Trevor added that,

"the Shaikh may not yield even to strong pressure and that the Government must be prepared to back up moral pressure by material force if they are determined to carry their reforms."

The Government of India reluctantly agreed to take steps towards introducing the necessary reforms. In April, 1923 the Viceroy of India telegraphed the Secretary of State that they agreed to secure the introduction of administrative and financial reforms in Bahrain, but that,

"we are anxious to use every endeavour to induce Shaikh Isa, ostensibly on his own initiative, it should be explained to Shaikh Isa that his subjects were prevented from rising against him by our protection alone, and that we shall back him up in carrying out reforms. Failing that even if it means his enforced retirement and the deportation of Shaikh Abdulla we are determined to carry out reforms ourselves."⁶⁸

In reply the Secretary of State gave the required authority and this was passed to the Political Resident to take the appropriate steps as the opportunity arose.⁶⁹

At the end of April, Trevor left Bushire on leave and was replaced temporarily by Lt. Col. S.G. Knox who decided to look again at the whole issue concerning Bahrain. In early May he wired the Government of India stating that all the facts had not been put to them and that matters in Bahrain were not any worse than the British had already tolerated for the past twenty years and he requested that action should be delayed whilst he appraised the situation.⁷⁰

Knox backed up his telegram by a long despatch analysing the situation. He argued that the Persians were agitating not merely in support of their co-religionists but were in effect reasserting their claim to sovereignty over the island and that appeasement of the Persians would not work without this pre-condition.⁷¹

With regard to the internal situation he argued that the very fact that so many people were free to approach the Political Agent and Resident indicated the degree of freedom they enjoyed in the island. On the matter of equal taxation, Knox regarded the situation as being far from scandalous and considered that the need for reform of the pearl industry was not peculiar to Bahrain, but applied to the Gulf Area in general.⁷²

Knox's argument appeared to be an assertion that whilst things were not perfect in the island it would not serve the best interests of the British Government to precipitate any action which might bring about the forced abdication of Shaikh Isa, as this would step up opposition to the British rather than gain them support.

In reply to his earlier telegram, and probably before his full despatch was received, Knox received a cable from the Government of India stating that the Foreign Office in London considered that the time had come to force the direct issue with Persia and that should the latter appeal to the League of Nations, "misrule would be the only serious flaw in our case."⁷³

Ironically, whilst Knox was trying to explain his point of view vis a vis the internal situation in Bahrain, a serious riot took place on the island. The cause of the riot was very minor

indeed, being an argument over a watch stolen from an Arab by a Persian, but the existing state of tension between the two communities magnified the incident out of all proportion.

Between the 10th and 13th May, 1923, the riots continued spasmodically and resulted in the deaths of five people. It has been suggested that the two men behind the riot were Mohammed Sharif Kutbaddin who, as head of the police, was reported to have encouraged his men to open fire, and Abdulla al-Qisibi, an agent of Ibn Saud, who was accused of inciting the Arabs to riot.⁷⁴

The strange fact is that both men who were accused of starting the trouble were both "foreigners" under British jurisdiction, and therefore they had no connection with Shaikh Isa.

The trouble of the island, however, gave the British Government of India the perfect opportunity to put their plans into effect, and Knox, the man who had argued against interference, was delegated to carry them out.

On 15th May, Knox, accompanied by two of His Majesty's warships, Triad and Crocus, arrived in Bahrain and as a first immediate step deported Al-Qisibi to the mainland and dismissed Mohammed Sharif from his post.

Over the following days Knox negotiated with Shaikhs Hamed and Abdulla the voluntary abdication of their father. This was fiercely resented by Shaikh Isa who refused to write a letter of voluntary resignation to Knox but instead told Knox to write him a letter which made the true position clear, that any abdication was not voluntary but was being demanded by the British.⁷⁵ The alternative he offered to Knox was to consult the tribes to see if they wished Isa to continue as their ruler.

Knox saw the delays of argument were harmful to his case so on the 26th May, 1923, he asked the leading members of Bahrain's community to assemble in a Majlis. Two to three hundred were present, and at this Majlis he announced the formal abdication of Shaikh Isa.

Although Isa was blamed for these troubles by the time they occurred he was merely a figurehead ruler except for his continued appropriation of the customs duties. As to his status at that time Rihani wrote,

"Shaikh Isa was no longer (early 1923) the ruler of Bahrain, this function having been delegated with the consent, the sanction, or on the order, as you will, of the British Agent to his son, Shaikh Hamed."⁷⁶

At the Majlis of 26th May, Hamed addressed the meeting and started his speech by saying, "In obedience to the orders of the High Government, today I assume on my shoulders the responsibility of the Government of this country;"⁷⁷ an obvious indication to the true situation with respect to the "abdication".

Knox's speech, however, was more elaborate and comprehensive and during the course of it he blue-printed the future British policy which was to be adopted, not without his own interpretations and comments.

Some of them were,

"Recent deplorable events have merely emphasised and accentuated an insistent cry for the reform of the administration on modern lines. And the British Government, looking to the general good, have in their wisdom decided that it is time that new blood was introduced and the Administration strengthened, and I am here as the mouthpiece of my Government to promise the help of that Government to Shaikh Hamed in all paths of lawful endeavour both against external aggression and internal sedition. It is my earnest hope that the measures of reform we initiate today will bring the Sunni community into line with other communities."

He continued to outline the reforms and policies and started by saying,

"the Customs Revenues, after deduction of necessary working expenses, they must pay all such revenues to Shaikh Hamed and Shaikh Hamed alone."

His second warning, to the Qadis stated,

"but to any Qazi who permits the interference or advocacy of influential persons or their submitting to Shara will be dismissed from his appointment, be he Sunni or Shia."

Addressing the Al-Khalifah family he stated,

"it is my duty to warn you that you must not expect that because you have taken the trouble to be born you have therefore the right to live on the rest of the community, whether by allowance from the revenues of these islands or by preying on the poor and helpless."

To the Sunnis, especially the Dawasir, he said,

"You have frequently met such threats in the past by a counter threat to leave the islands in a body and go over to Bin Saud. If that is your intention, in God's name, go; But, do not be surprised if your lands and houses are confiscated to the State and given to others."

To the Shia community he addressed the following remarks.

"Much of the agitation of recent years has been fictitious. I cannot subscribe to the opinion that recent misrule is either more tyrannical or more flagrant than it has often been in the past. You must not expect equality at a bound and Sunni privileges cannot be swept away at once, if at all. You have found recently that you have a voice, and foreign advisers have taught you how to use it. Be careful that you do not, by clamouring unjustly, destroy the benefits you may reasonably expect from the inauguration of the present regime."⁷⁸

Immediately following the Majlis the order was issued to redirect the Customs revenues to the Eastern Banks as Government assets instead of private property, and Mr. Bower of the Imperial Indian Customs Service was assigned temporarily to the post of Chief Customs Official.⁷⁹

A Civil List was drawn up and the amounts to be paid to each person on it were clearly specified.⁸⁰

The Political Agent and Shaikh Hamed assumed joint control of the civil administration soon afterwards.

A series of incidents of political unrest followed upon the enforced abdication of Isa. These came from two quarters. First, from the more conservative elements such as some of the Al-Khalifah and those of the Dawasir tribe and secondly, from some of the embryonic politicians of the islands, who, although moderate in their views, regarded the recent developments as detrimental to the future self determination of the island.

The former reacted vigorously to the British initiatives. On the 19th May, when they saw the way in which the situation was developing, members of the Dawasir tribes attacked the Shia village of Aali and killed two people.⁸¹ As the culprits were not traced the blame for the incident was placed upon the Dawasir leader, Ahmed al-Dosari, who was in fact not even on the island, being at sea with the pearling fleet. He was compelled to return to Bahrain and was fined the sum of Rs.15,000 in reparation for the acts of his tribe.

A few months later another incident took place in which a follower of Shaikh Khalid bin Ali, killed a member of the Shia community of Sitra. Again the head of the family, Shaikh Khalid, was held responsible and was fined Rs.2,000.

Other members of the Al-Khalifah family made their moves by means of letters and petitions to the High Commission in Baghdad and to their friends and supporters on the mainland.⁸²

This barrage of telegrams and letters grew to such an extent

that the Political Resident was moved to issue a warning to all Gulf Shaikhs that they should not receive any member of the Al-Khalifah family, and to ignore their overtures on this matter. All approaches were to be referred to their local Political Agents.

The second opposition party preferred to make political moves to ensure that their grievances were heard.

Once the diving season finished and the more moderate elements returned home, they gathered support for their proposed moves.

On 26th October, 1923, a meeting was held under the name of the "Bahrain National Congress" at which certain demands were formulated. Twelve members of the meeting⁸³ were chosen to present their demands which were:-

- "1. The continuance of our chosen ruler, Shaikh Isa, in the administration of internal affairs of the Government as heretofore without the intervention of the British Consul who should abide by the friendly relations which are binding to us as well as to Great Britain. Should Shaikh Isa decide to appoint his son, Shaikh Hamed as ruler we would expect from him as we would expect from his father.
2. That the whole administration should be conducted in accordance with the Mohammedan Law and the Urf, which is part of it, and complies with it.
3. That a Consultative Council (Majlis Shura) should be formed from members of the general public which will attend to the interests of the country and to any matters which may arise in accordance with the practice of other countries.
4. That a Committee of four people should be formed to act as a Divers' Court and its members should be knowledgeable of diving affairs.
5. The British Consul should abide by the contents of the Treaties contracted between the Government of Bahrain and the High Government and should not interfere in internal affairs.
6. This Congress appoints twelve members to pursue these resolutions and seek to fulfill these resolutions by peaceful means."

The people who were elected to present these demands were in fact entirely from the Sunni community.

There was no evidence to suggest that any Shia was represented at this Bahrain Congress. The two main leaders, however, Abdul Wahab al-Zayani and Ahmed bin Lahij apparently tried to enlist the support of the Shia leader. A note, which the writer discovered in the Political Agent's records was sent by Zayani to Abd Ali bin Mansoor Al-Rajab requesting a meeting to discuss the matters mentioned.⁸⁴ This offer of a meeting was apparently refused and the fact that the note ended up in the Political Agent's records shows that apparently the Shia still mistrusted the Sunni to co-operate in taking joint action. It was an attempt, however, by the moderate Sunnis to bridge the gap between the two communities which under the circumstances proved to be unbridgeable.

The Congress demands, although moderate, were at that time considered radical. They did not insist, as did others, that Shaikh Isa should remain as ruler, but accepted Shaikh Hamed provided that the handover of power was voluntary.

Their demands for the formation of a Consultative Council representing all the people (Shia and Sunni) was an extremely progressive move which, if accepted, would have sown the seeds of a more constitutional form of government.

The Congress representatives submitted their demands to Trevor, who by this time had returned from leave, in the hope that he may take a more reasonable view than Knox.

In the meantime the leader of the Dawasir tribe refused to pay the fine imposed on him for the killing of the Aali

villagers and wrote to Trevor appealing against the convictions.

Trevor replied to these notes in the form of a general proclamation to the Bahrain people in which he said that he wished,

"to inform and assure the public in Bahrain that His Majesty's Government, after thorough official enquiries, ascertained that in the month of Shavval last, that the state of affairs in Bahrain was much in need of reforms, consequently His Majesty's Government issued orders to begin the necessary reforms. I declare to the people that the orders of His Majesty's Government will be executed in all circumstances and the programme of reforms which we have already begun will continue steadily without the least hindrance.⁸⁵

In view of the continuing troubles Trevor felt that the proclamation was not enough and that further action was required to quell the unrest. He therefore proposed to the British Government of India that the leaders of the Congress should be deported, as he considered them to be agitators. He also proposed the expulsion of the Dawasir en masse.⁸⁶

Trevor visited Bahrain between 1st and 7th November, 1923, and after consultation with Shaikhs Hamed and Abdulla he invited the Congress representative to an assembly at the British Agency on the 7th November, ostensibly to discuss their demands. Having assembled there Trevor detained Abdul Wahab al-Zayani and Ahmed bin Lahij, who were deported that same night to India.⁸⁷

The Dawasir tribe were given ten days in which to completely evacuate Budayyia, failing which, Trevor threatened that the town would be bombarded.⁸⁸

In the face of this threat the Dawasir evacuated the town and left Bahrain completely before the ultimatum expired.⁸⁹ After

their departure their houses and gardens were confiscated by the State as Knox had forecast.

Following these events in November of 1923 the situation became more stable and reforms to the administration began to proceed.⁹⁰ From these actions however, it appears that the British were in favour of reforms when imposed by themselves but not when proposed by the indigenous Bahraini population.

In early 1924 a British Customs Official was appointed to straighten out the issues of the Customs Revenues⁹¹ and in 1925 Daly, realising that he was not in the best position to assist Shaikh Hamed, engaged a British Advisor who was to be employed by Shaikh Hamed to assist him in managing the affairs of state.⁹² The new Adviser was Mr. Charles D. Belgrave, who eventually took up his position in 1926.⁹³

From 1923 up to the end of the decade advances were made, albeit slowly, in the reform of the administration and courts, etc., and new departments such as the Land Registration Department were created. Political resentment, however, did not die out but continued to simmer below the surface, breaking out into occasional acts of violence.⁹⁴

Abdul Wahab al-Zayani continued his opposition from his exile in India. He fought vigorously against his illegal deportation and on behalf of Shaikh Isa, by appeals in the Indian Courts and to the Viceroy. He enlisted the support of various people, notably Jinna, who acted as his Counsel. He continued his campaign without success until his death in 1925 in Bombay.

The Government of India were well aware of the deep involvement of their representatives in Bahrain, and as early as

December, 1923 queried whether they had gone too far.⁹⁵ In mid-1924 the Government of India instructed the local representatives not to proceed further or faster along the lines of reform they were seeking, unless they could carry the Shaikh whole-heartedly with them.⁹⁶ The Government also expressed the opinion that the Political Resident and Political Agent had shown a tendency to treat the island too much along the lines of a native state in India.

By the late 1920's Bahrain possessed a reasonably efficient and modern administration⁹⁷ and Mr. Belgrave, who by that time had completed a few years service, was in charge of all the Departments. This situation was paradoxical in that whilst the British Government of India wished to moderate British influence, Mr. Belgrave, as head of the administration, with the help of a small number of British civil servants, actually increased this involvement.

As was pointed out by Sir Denys Bray, who visited Bahrain in 1927, in the capacity of Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.

"The British involvement in Bahrain is more than is desirable. A British Financial Adviser, British Police Superintendent and British Customs Manager, this is more British than Katal, which is a Border state."⁹⁸

Bray acknowledged that Bahrain was the keystone of the British position in the Gulf, but added that,

"no treaty could adequately cover it (the British position in Bahrain) unless it were a treaty extinguishing the Shaikh's sovereignty to a degree less than that possessed by an Indian chief."⁹⁹

The passing of the old order in Bahrain proved to be a painful period¹⁰⁰ and the forces of change which brought this about were those of foreign intervention and the cultural gap between the communities. These forces of communication and Arab nationalism were still very much in their infancy but were yet to grow more powerful.

FOOTNOTES

1. Further details of this point will be discussed later in this chapter.
2. A despatch from Political Resident, Lt. Col. L.B.H. Howarth, to Foreign Sec. of Govt. of India, No. 295. S. dated 1st Sept., 1927.
3. For these letters see Bidwell, R. "The Affairs of Arabia, 1905-06" Foreign Office Confidential print, two volumes, Frank Cass and Co. 1971. Vol. I, p.88 and 137.
4. Letter from Political Resident to the Govt. of India, No. 420, dated 17th Dec. 1904.
5. Although, as Rihani reported (p.264) compensation was paid by Shaikh Isa to Mr. Wonkhaus, H.M. Govt. instructed her Charge d'Affaire in Berlin that if the Wonkhaus affair was raised he should state that it had been brought to the attention of H.M. Govt. and a ship would be sent to investigate. F.O. despatch of 5th Dec. 1904, No. 261. German attitude during this period in the Gulf see, Staley Eugene, "Business and Politics in the Persian Gulf", "The Story of the Wonkhaus Firm". Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 48, 1933. pp. 367-385.
6. For details of these events see Busch, B.C., op.cit., pp. 148-153. For the documents of the period see Bidwell, Robin - "The Affairs of Arabia 1905-06" Frank Cass and Co. 1971.
7. For the full text see Bidwell op.cit., Vol. I Pt. 2. pp.65-67.
8. Lorimer, op.cit., p.942, tells us that the Indian Govt. suggested that the Customs issue should be investigated, but, "the proposal did not commend itself to the High Government."
9. Shaikh Isa sent a petition to the Govt. of India in late 1905 protesting about the conduct of the Pol. Agent and Pol. Res. See Bidwell op.cit., Vol. 2. Pt. VIII, pp. 6-7.
10. Lorimer, op.cit., p.943.
11. Despatch referred to in footnote 2, and Lorimer op.cit., p.944.
12. Letter from Political Agent, Capt. F.B. Prideaux to the Political Resident, No. 620, dated 7th Dec., 1907.
13. F.O. 371/535. 44/2218.
14. The text of the agreement on this point stated, "This engagement does not apply to, nor affect, the customary friendly correspondence with the local authorities of neighbouring states on business of minor importance."
15. Viceroy's telegram to Sec. of State for India, of 6th July, 1912, repeating telegram from Political Resident.

16. Also published in London Gazette on 13th July, 1915, and 26th July, 1917. The Order in Council was amended many times especially 1948, 51, 59-61 and 1967.
17. Although the Political Resident in Bushire was nominal head of the Judiciary, in practice the Judge in the Chief Court of Bahrain was the Political Agent.
18. Similar Orders in Council were applied to Muscat, Trucial States, Qatar and Kuwait. For these see Liebesny, Herbert, J. - "International Relations of Arabia" - Middle East Journal Vol. I, 1947, pp. 148-168, also "British Jurisdiction in the States of the Persian Gulf" - M.E. Journal, Vol. II, 1949, pp. 330-332, also same author, Vol. IX, 1955, pp. 384-396, also Vol. X, 1956, pp. 33-42.
19. Previously the Political Agents had been recruited from the Political Dept. of the Govt. of Inda. During the early 1920's a total of three men came from Baghdad then the practice reverted to India. For opinions of the conduct of these men see Irland, L.W. Iraq: A Study in Political Development. London 1937.
20. This was Abd Ali bin Mansoor Al-Rajab (Shia).
21. Letter from Lt. Col. A.T. Wilson, Civil Commissioner in Baghdad, to Shaikh Isa bin Ali, dated 13th May, 1919 inviting him to send his younger son Abdulla to London. The same invitation was also extended to one of Ibn Saud's sons, Feisal and Abdulla completed their journey together.
22. Demi-official, written aboard "Lawrence", the 27th May, 1919, from Bray to Lt. Col. Wilson, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad.
23. Deputy Under Secretary of State for India.
24. This demand was for backing in his long-standing feud with al-Thani of Qatar over the ownership of Zubara. For details of this see Al-Baharna oplcit., p.37 & pp. 247-249 although he did not mention the above incident.
25. One act of preference for Ibn Saud was the occasion in 1920 when he exerted pressure on Shaikh Isa to reduce the tariff on goods re-exported to the mainland, in preference to all other states who paid a higher rate.
26. Memorandum No. 6.C - 5th Jan. 1920, from Major Dickson to Civil Commission in Baghdad and Deputy Political Resident in Bushire.
27. Letter from Major Dickson to Shaikh Isa dated 10th Jan. 1920, referring to the fact that since Shaikh Abdulla left for England no move had been made to convene the Majlis al-Urf.
28. Letter from Shaikh Isa to Major Dickson - 13th Jan. 1920.

29. The Majlis members were appointed on 16th Jan. 1920, Shaikh Isa's nominees were Abdulla Hassan al-Dawsari, Abdul Rahman, Mohammed al-Zayani, Abdul Aziz Hassan al-Qusabi, Yusef Abdul Rahman Fakro, and Abdul Ali bin Rajab, the latter being the only Shia. Names contained in letter from Shaikh Isa to Dickson, 21st Jan. 1920 (30th Rabi al-Awal 1338). The first three asked to be excused from service. To add to the confusion Dickson also nominated Abdul Aziz Hassan al-Qusabi as one of his choices as he regarded al-Qusabi as a foreigner.
30. Letter from Dickson to the Political Resident, 6th Dec. 1919.
31. Letter from M.A. Cater, Sec. to Govt. of India to Shaikh Abdulla bin Isa al-Khalifa, D/O No. 1145/EA.
32. Telegram of Civil Commission, Baghdad to Govt. of India, No. 4601, 15th April, 1920 and letter from Ibn Saud to Dickson, 22nd July, 1920 and letter from Abdulla bin Jasim al-Thani, 29th July, 1920.
33. The writer's informant, Saud bin Abdul Aziz al-Dawsari, now living in Damam, stated that the woman mentioned absconded from her home following a domestic quarrel and sought Dickson's aid. Their attempts to affect her return were met with rebuffs from Dickson. Dickson did not mention this specific incident in his book, "Kuwait and Her Neighbours", George Man & Unwin, 1956, but mentions a similar incident in Suq Ashukh, in South Iraq, which confirms his attitude to this type of affair.
34. Letter from Dickson to the Political Resident, dated 20th March, 1920.
35. Isa's wife was Isha bint Mohammed, daughter of Mohammed bin Khalifah who was deported in 1869 by the British, and the mother of Abdulla. She was an extremely powerful and influential member of the al-Khalifah. It was reported that she dominated Shaikh Isa and even held her own courts, fining, imprisoning or otherwise punishing those who had given offence to her.
36. Shaikh Abdulla, besides being a shrewd politician, was a notorious rake and was involved in many incidents. Dickson reported that Ibn Saud's view of Abdulla was that "Abdulla is a snake with two faces. One day he will bite, Hamed is straight forward and the Govt. (The British) would do well to trust him rather than the snake who steals men's wives."
37. Dickson is exaggerating on this point as a number did own land, although they were very few. Most Sunnis however would not usually sell land to a Shia.
38. F.O. Political Diary of the Political Agent in Bahrain, for April and May, 1920, No. 150, of 3rd June, 1920.
39. Letter from Major Dickson to the Political Resident, dated 12th May, 1920.

40. This half of the council (the P. Agent's choice) was to be three Persians, two Mohammedan Indians and one Hindu Indian. This step made the opposition to Dickson even more vigorous. From an undated letter signed by a number of Bahraini notables which was addressed to Shaikh Isa. It opposed the new council on general grounds and especially on the rumours of the opening of a cinema.
41. Rihani in his first edition of "Muluk al-Arab" stated that Major Daly had been a Lt. Col. in Iraq but had been demoted because of his attitude during the revolt in Iraq in 1920. The writer has not been able to establish the truth of Rihani's statement. Daly had, however, been a Political Governor of a Diwaniya in Iraq and it was in Daly's region that the revolt began. Philby, H. St. John, in his book "Arabian Days", Robert Hale Ltd., London, 1948, p.193, referred to him as, "one of Wilson's toughest men", and went on to say that it was on his insistence that Daly was transferred from Iraq. In Bahrain he gained an even greater reputation as a "tough man". Even nowadays anyone using the Bahraini adage of "Khutat Daly", literally "Daly planned", means that his orders are not negotiable and not to be deviated from. Besides his political work he interested himself fully in the social lives of the islanders even to the extent that the people travelling in boats between Manama and Muharraq were for the first time in their lives forced to wear undergarments in order not to give offence to anyone as they waded ashore.
42. Daly convicted al-Shirawi under Part III, Section 21(i) of the Order in Council. This specific section in fact gave him power to deport only foreigners. When this was pointed out to him following al-Shirawi's appeals from his exile in India, he wrote back that his name was Shirazi (from Shiraz in Persia) and he was therefore a foreigner. The Shirawi family was in fact a notable Arab family of Bahrain with no Persian connections whatever. See Daly's letter to the Political Resident, No. 59/C/1923.
43. See letter from Political Agent to Political Resident, No. 6-C of 8th Jan. 1922. Wahbah also played an important role in Kuwaiti Politics prior to his arrival in Bahrain.
44. Daly harrassed Abdulla, who was the first head of the new municipality until he resigned his duties, after which Daly assigned the post to Kurbaddin, who was Daly's confidant.
45. Letter from Major C. Daly to Political Resident dated 23rd Nov. 1921
46. Letters of thanks from leading members of Bahrain communities, headed by the Qadis of the two sects, written in June and July, 1921. These were written during the early months of his tenure of office and may not have been specifically because of the pressures he was exerting on Abdulla. This support from the more enlightened people waned as Daly's "tough" reputation was established.

47. An example of this tyranny is to be found in late 1921 when members of Shaikh Khalid bin Ali's family attacked a village in Sitra and killed the father of a Shia family and badly injured the son, leaving him to die. The son survived however, after hospitalisation and he later demanded British protection to escape further reprisals. The Shia community quoted this incident as a prime example of the tyranny they suffered. Letter from A.P. Trevor, Political Resident to Mr. D. des. Bray, Foreign Sec. to Govt. of India, no. 495-S, 30th Dec., 1921.
48. Ibid.
49. Telegram from the Foreign Sec. to the Govt. of India to the Political Resident No. 119-S, dated 30th January, 1922.
50. Two members of the Shia community who were in frequent contact with Daly and who looked upon him as their helper in gaining their political demands were Khalef al-Qsfoor (the Shia Qadi), and Abd Ali bin Mansoor al-Rajab. (See F.N. 20)
51. At this time Hamed was absent from Bahrain, being in India from 6th Jan. to 20th Feb., 1922.
52. Petition presented to Shaikh Isa on 15th Jamada II, 1340 A.H. included in a letter from Major Daly to Lt. Col. Trevor (P.R.), no. 34-C, dated 18th Feb. 1922.
53. Proclamation by Shaikh Isa bin Ali to the Petitioners of Our Subjects, dated 17th Jamada II, 1340 A.H. (18th February, 1922).
54. Letter from C. Daly to A.P. Trevor, dated 11th March, 1922.
55. Besides this court there was a lower court presided over by Mohammed Sharif. It was known by the Bahrainis as "Mahkamet Khan Bahardur".
56. Letter from Shaikh Hamed to Major C. Daly dated 7th March, 1922, forwarded to the Political Resident.
57. Trevor on his visit to Bahrain imposed fines for their misdemeanours on Shaikh Abdulla and his son, Mohammed. The writer's informant, Shaikh Abdul Rahman, the son of Mohammed, stated that for non-payment of these fines certain shops in Manama belonging to Abdulla and his son were confiscated and sold by the British to pay the fines.
58. From a letter in the collection referred to in footnote 12, (Introduction) from A. al-Zayed to Shaikh Ibrahim bin Mohammed al-Khalifah mentioning the grievances. Unfortunately undated but probably written around 1923. In the letter Zayed mentioned the high emotions of the Sunnis over the proposal to tax their gardens.

59. Letters from Political Agent to Political Resident, No. 446-S, dated 28th June 1922, and No. 111/C, dated 7th July, 1922.
60. Telegram from Foreign Office, Simla to Political Resident dated 2nd May, 1922.
61. Letter from Political Agent to Political Resident dated 17th Oct. 1923.
62. See Asr I-Azadi, Nos. 69-70 dated 30th July 1922 and No. 116 of 21st Sept. 1922 also Istakhr No. 17 dated 25th July 1922. (Both papers were published in Shiraz).
63. Asr-I-Azadi, No. 120 dated 17th Oct. 1922, and No. 122 of 25th Oct. 1922, also Istakhr, No. 24, dated 17th Sept. 1922.
64. Telegram from Foreign Secretary (Home Govt.) to the India Office (London), 7th Dec., 1922.
65. Telegram No. 915-S, from F.O., Simla to Political Resident, Bushire.
66. Letter from P.A. to P.R. on 8th Jan. 1923, and letter from P.R. to D.C. Bray Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, No. 42-S, 27th Jan. 1923.
67. Daly stated in his letter that Isa would not grant the concession to drill for oil to W.N. D'Arcy, a British prospector. This was speculation, as Isa had already given a firm undertaking to the British Govt. that he would consult them before making any move.
68. Telegram from Viceroy of India to H.M. Sec. of State for India, dated 17th April, 1923.
69. Telegram No. 1626 from Sec. of State to Viceroy dated 17th April, 1923 and telegram No. 459X from Foreign Sec. to Govt. of India to Political Resident dated 19th April, 1923.
70. Lt. Col. Knox's telegrams of 6th May, 1923 and telegram No. 421, dated 9th May, 1923.
71. The Persian press campaign of 1922 resulted in a motion being put forward at the Persian Majlis to give Bahrain the right to elect a member to take a seat at that Majlis. This matter was referred to a sub-committee for discussion. (Teheran telegram No. 112, 17th April, 1923). The committee reported in favour of the motion in May, 1923 and Bahrain was given the right to elect such a member to the Persian Majlis. (Telegram from Sir P. Loraine, despatched 6.30 p.m. 15th May, received 8.30 p.m. 16th May, 1923). It was probably this action by the Persians which stirred the Govt. of India into action and hardened their resolve.

72. Letter from Lt. Col. S.G. Knox, Deputy P.R., to the Foreign Sec. of Govt. of India, dated 11th May, 1923.
73. Telegram No. 634-S, dated 14th May, 1923.
74. Letter from C. Daly to the Political Resident, dated 13th May, 1923. I.O. documents refer to the May riots as Najdi-Persian riots. This probably referred to the nationality of the two persons accused of causing the riots. In actual fact many sections of the Bahrain communities were involved.
75. Knox stated in his telegram from Bahrain to the Govt. of India that Isa told him, "you can kill me or turn me out but while I am alive I will not retire." Telegram dated 24th May, 1923. The state of affairs in Bahrain was in complete contrast to the British attitude which was adopted in Oman when the Sultan of Oman, during the Civil War there, offered to abdicate in the face of the advancing Imamate Forces. The British then refused this offer of abdication and backed up the Sultan with British forces. (Wingate, Sir R., "Not in the Limelight" - Hutchinson of London & Co., 1959). It is also in contrast with the attitude of the British administration in Iraq, when following the 1920 disturbances, direct British control was withdrawn and the number of British officials reduced.
76. Rihani, Ameen, "Around the Court of Arabia" (English version of Muluk al Arab) Constable & Co. Ltd., London - 1923, p.267.
77. Hamed's speech was read on his behalf by his brother, Sheikh Mohammed bin Isa.
78. Later Knox reported that when he was in Bahrain he met a leading member of the Persian community who informed him that, "with a few, and unimportant exceptions no Persian in Bahrain desired Persian rule in the island". Telegram from P.R. (Bushire) to Foreign Sec. of India, Simla, No. 112/481 dated 29th May, 1923.
79. The long-standing Customs issue was thus resolved and Daly reported on the 10th June that the Customs were effective in Muharraq as well as Manama. Prior to this the Muharraq Customs was controlled by Ali bin Abdulla bin Mohammed who was apparently involved in large scale embezzlement in addition to taking the 25 % allowed by Shaikh Isa. In Manama the custom for certain merchants such as Yousef Kanoo and Yousef Fakroo was that they were allowed to settle their customs toll annually. Daly reported that even these large amounts were not properly recorded and sometimes completely omitted from the customs accounts of the Hindu merchant charged by Shaikh Isa with their administration.

80. The Civil List included Shaikh Isa (Rs. 4,000 per month from the Customs and Rs. 2,000 per annum from Civil List). Letter from Political Resident to Govt. of India No. 283-s of 15th June, 1923. For some years Shaikh Isa refused to draw this money. The List specified that payments were to be in cash not kind, and Shaikh Hamed agreed that no additional money was to be paid to any person without first consulting the Political Agent.
81. Telegram from P.A. to P.R. No. 80/C, 19th May, 1923.
82. Letter from Mohammed bin Abdulla to the High Commission in Baghdad dated 20th Safer 1342 AH (3rd Oct., 1923), and telegram from Shaikh Isa to Foreign Office, London (sent from Kuwait), 24th Oct., 1923 - F.O. 371/8942.
83. The twelve representatives elected were:- Abdul Wahab al-Zayani, Abdul Latif bin Mahmood, Said Abdulla bin Ibrahim, Hussein bin Ali al-Manai, Shahn bin Sakr al-Jalahma, Mohammed bin Rashid bin Hindi, Isa bin Ahmed al-Dosari, Ahmed bin Jasim bin Jowdr, Mohammed bin Sabah, Mahena bin Fadle, Jabr al-Muselem and Ahmed bin Lahij. Some confusion exists over the Congress and the nationality of its members. Some authorities state that the opposition was mainly Persian, but as may be seen from the names all were from well-known Bahraini families. Farougy, op.cit., p.28 and Adamiyat op.cit., p. 180 stated that the movement has a Persian bias and that Zayani himself was a Persian. With regard to the date of the Congress, Adamiyat (op.cit. P. 190) gives the date as 1913 and Humaidan, A., (op.cit. p.60) as 1912. Unfortunately, a thesis by Qasim, Jamal Zakariya, Ain Shems University, Cairo, 1966 adds further the confusion by giving the date as 1912 and stating that Zayani was head of the Shia community of Bahrain. The writer's sources of information, however, definitely indicate that the Congress took place in 1923 and that all the representatives were Sunni Arabs.
84. Note dated 5th Rabia Al Awal 1342 A.H. (16th Oct., 1923).
85. Proclamation issued 28th Oct., 1923.
86. Telegram from Trevor to Foreign Sec., (Delhi), 2nd Nov., 1923, affirmative reply was received 4th Nov. 1923.
87. Ahmeb bin Lahij at first excused himself from attending on the grounds that he was suffering from eye trouble, but Hamad, at the suggestion of Trevor, sent men to ensure his forced attendance. Hamed, earlier that day, wrote a letter to Trevor asking for his help in the deportation of Zayani and bin Lahij.
88. Telegram from P.R. to Foreign Sec. (Delhi), No. 622-S of 1923.

89. Signal from C.O. of HM.MS. Crocus to the Political Agent of Bahrain asking for information on Budayyia situation. Signal No. 567 of 16th Nov., 1923. The Dawasir emigrated to Damam on the mainland. Meanwhile the Political Resident telegraphed Shaikh Ahmed al-Jaber of Kuwait warning not to accept the Dawasir within his territory. (Telegram of 6th Nov., 1923).
90. There were no international questions asked over Britain's role in the forced abdication of Isa and their assumption of control of the island. The only protest came from Sharif Hussain when he asked the High Commissioner, Herbert Samuel, to persuade the Government to re-examine the case. His request was ignored. Letter from L.D. Wakely the Under-Sec. of State, Colonial Office, 13th March, 1924. Ibn Saud made no official protest at the time although Dickson in his book "Kuwait and Her Neighbours" op.cit., p. 114 stated that Ibn Saud told him in 1937 that in his opinion the actions taken in the forced abdication of Isa had damaged the British cause in Arabia for the next hundred years. Apparently Ibn Saud, although he had no power to help Isa, felt sympathy for him and on 26th Feb., 1930, without reference to Shaikh Hamed or the British made a flying visit to Bahrain to call on Shaikh Isa in Muharraq. (That was 27th Ramadan 1348 A.H.).
91. Mr. Claude de Grenier took up his appointment on 14th Jan., 1924 on a three-year basis - Letter from Govt. of India to P.R., No. 480X, 10th April, 1924.
92. Letter from F.B. Prideaux to Major Daly dated 27th August, 1924 mentioning the importance of an Adviser and pointing out that it was improper for the Political Agent to administer the affairs of state.
93. Mr. C.D. Belgrave, later, Sir Charles, was appointed initially for four years from Jan. 1926, subject to three months' notice by either party, at a salary of Rs. 1,000 per month rising to Rs. 2,200 per month. (Telegram from Govt. of India to P.R. No. 142N, 23rd Oct., 1925). Sir Charles Belgrave continued in the service of the Bahrain Govt. until 1957. Daly's service in Bahrain ended in August, 1926 after Belgrave was firmly settled in his job.
94. On 8th Jan., 1924 a raid was carried out by members of Shaikh Khalid bin Ali's family on the village of Wadyan, near Sitra, and a man and woman killed. (Letter from P.R. to Govt. of India, No. 50-S, 17th Jan., 1924). A few months later another raid was carried out by persons unknown on Tubli village. The major political incident took place, however, when on 13th Oct., 1926, a group of men fired on Shaikh Hamed in an attempt to assassinate him, near Budayyia (Letter from Major C.C.I. Barrett, Pol. Agent in Bahrain, to Pol. Resident, No. 108/5/1, 15th Oct., 1926). There was no immediate arrest despite intensive investigations and offers of rewards, until in 1928 the Govt. put her hands on the people alleged to be responsible. These men were Shaikh Hamood bin Sabah, who was the head of Majlis at Tajar, Shaikh Hamed bin Abdulla al-Gatam, Shaikh Ibrahim bin Khalid bin Ali, whose brother

94. contd.....

had been deported over the 1924 incident mentioned above. All of them were members of the al-Khalifah family and it was claimed that they had been supported by a group of hired killers. Shaikh Hamed did not take any drastic action but merely fined them. Hamood was also found guilty of the Tubli raid and was fined Rs.2,000. The injured party refused to accept the reparation and the fine became the first subscription towards the building of the Shia Jafariya school.

95. Telegram from Govt. of India to Pol. Res. No. 1688-S, 8th Dec., 1923.
96. Telegram from Foreign Office (India) to Prideaux, Pol. Res., 25th July, 1924.
97. The Majlis al-Urf, the Salifah Court and the Joint Court gradually faded into insignificance as Bahraini Court to cover all civil disputes was established and were provided over by Shaikh Hamed's son, Salman, and Mr. Belgrave. This reduced the involvement of the Pol. Agent as there were less cases to be heard by the Appeal Courts. Religious cases were still referred to the Qadis, Shia or Sunni, their power however, was reduced by the creation of a Wakfs Dept. in July 1927, and later by a Minor's Dept.
98. Letter from Foreign Sec. to Govt. of India to the Pol. Res., No. F164-N/29, 29th May, 1928.
99. Ibid.
100. Some of the Dawasir tribe later returned to Bahrain in the late 1920's but found that conditions there were changed and they felt that they could no longer live on the island, so they returned to Damam.

CHAPTER TWO

THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL AWARENESS (1930's)

a) 1934-35 Affairs.

The early 1930's witnessed the start of the expansion of commerce in Bahrain as oil prospectors moved in and preparations were made to exploit the oil finds. Politically, however, it was a period of increasing demands. The reforms of the 1920's with the setting up of a modern administration with regularised finances, a new police force and the customs revenues reformed, opened the eyes of the people to the need for reforms in other areas.

Although the courts had undergone some slight reforms the situation was far from satisfactory. The courts had to a certain extent been centralised but justice still lay in the hands of the Sunni as it was administered in the main by the Al-Khalifah family.

In the civil courts for instance, there were two levels, the Higher Court and the Lower Court. In the former the bench consisted of Shaikh Salman, eldest son of Hamed, assisted by Belgrave and the lower courts were entirely staffed by members of the al-Khalifah, whose attitudes were far from tolerant,¹ especially to the Shia community. As there was no written code of law, procedures were arbitrary and every adjudicator put his own interpretation on the law. Sentences for the same offence were inconsistent from one court or one judge to the next, depending entirely upon his personal feelings on the matter before him. Even two people in the same court arraigned on the same offence were likely to receive different sentences.

The people who suffered most from these vagaries of justice tended to be the Shia and the poorer members of the Sunni community, namely those without influence.

After the 1920 reforms, however, the Shia community had begun to realise its own political strength provided they acted in concert. This was true especially of the new Shia merchant class which had begun to blossom in Manama.²

The direct cause of the demands of 1934-35 was the inconsistency of the courts which we have already mentioned.

The troubles began when Belgrave left Bahrain for a period of leave during the summer of 1934. In his absence Shaikh Salman took sole responsibility in the courts³ and, as was the practice, decisions on cases were made on the Shaikh's whim.

The Shia apparently took this opportunity to express their further grievances. They felt that justice could not be administered by the whim of the ruler, but that a written code of law should be drawn up and applied in order that justice was the same for all sections of the community. This, and other demands were put to Belgrave and Shaikh Hamed late in 1934.

The list of demands, which were presented by eight leading members of the Shia community of Manama and the villages,⁴ on 20th December, 1934, read as follows:-

- "1. Court cases should be dealt with properly in accordance with laws, namely that in every judgment passed in a case, the section of the proper law applied should be quoted.
2. As we (the Shia) form the majority of the inhabitants it is but just that we should be represented on the Municipal Council and the Majlis al-Urf with a proportional number.
3. We require to restore our rights on the Board of Education of which we have been deprived for many years."

As can be seen the demands consisted basically of two main points, the codification of the law and proportional representation on the Majlis al-Urf, Municipality Council and the Board of Education.

The Shia had small numbers of representatives on Majlis and

the Municipality Council but none on the Board of Education, which was in fact hardly in existence at that time.

Hamed saw in the demands similar features to those which had preceded his father's enforced abdication. He was bewildered and was unsure of the course which he should adopt. Belgrave, however, who had a firmer grasp of the situation advised Hamed not to yield to the demands. This view was confirmed by other members of the al-Khalifah family.

Upon receiving this advice, Shaikh Hamed replied to the petitioners on the 29th January, 1935 in a vague manner, promising only that a committee would be formed to collect and codify previous decrees and that comparisons would be made with the laws of other Islamic countries to choose those which they felt could best be applied to Bahrain for cases in the civil and criminal courts. He stated in his reply that this could not be undertaken lightly and that it could not be completed quickly. With regard to the issue of seats on the Municipal Council, Shaikh Hamed agreed to promote the numbers of "all of our subjects" against those of the foreigners, but added that,

"as you are aware the foreign nationals, especially in Manama, have an important place with regard to commercial activities and finance, but, Inshallah, we will deal with the subject in the forthcoming elections."

Referring to the matter of the Majlis al-Tujar,⁵ Hamed's reply was that, "it consists of leading members of various national groups and it is capable of dealing with cases referred to it", and he added that if there were any members of the Shia community with the knowledge and ability to be of service to the Majlis then his appointment would be considered.

On the subject of the Board of Education Hamed contented himself with saying merely that educational progress was satisfactory and that as finances were improved they would consider the construction of new schools.

Apparently these replies did not satisfy the petitioners as they soon sought a meeting with Belgrave and Shaikh Hamed. The meeting took place on 1st February 1935, at which Shaikh Hamed, with Belgrave's support, resisted any further concessions.⁶ The petitioners, attempting to carry their demands, told Hamed that without the support of the Shia he could not continue as Shaikh and that unless their demands were met they would refer the matter to the Political Agent.⁷ They were prepared to take this step as they felt that the British authorities had been their firmest supporters in the past. On the continued refusal of their demands they asked for a meeting with the Political Agent.

This took place the following day. The committee which met Lt. Col. G. Loch, the Political Agent, consisted of only the four Shia members from Manama. They stated to Col. Loch that if Shaikh Hamed refused to accept their demands and lawful means of persuasion failed, they were prepared to take other measures. They also told Loch that they had the backing of the entire Shia community and that they had friends in India who were prepared to publicise their cause to the world.

Although the British were far from happy with Shaikh Hamed's administration⁸ they continued to support him. Loch's reply to the delegates was that the matters raised were of a purely internal nature which was within the discretion of the Ruler to settle as he thought best. In addition to this Loch warned the representatives

that if there was any trouble arising from the reply to their demands - "they (the eight committee members) and most of the common folk would be held responsible."⁹

This then was the Political Agent's public attitude.

However, he wrote to his superior,

"It will not be easy for the al-Khalifah to maintain their tribal form of rule, but it is in many respects well-suited to the island and measures are gradually being taken to adapt it to the complicated and changing circumstances of the Bahrain of today."¹⁰

The Political Resident looked at the situation from a different viewpoint, to that of the Political Agent and Belgrave. He considered that the latter's role in the Government of Bahrain was alarming. He observed that Belgrave was -

"Judge, Financial Adviser, Head of Police, besides other minor jobs, and from the political point of view it is undesirable that we should be associated in public opinion with a measure of interference in, and responsibility for Bahrain internal affairs."¹¹

Fowle, the Political Resident, suggested that the Political Agent should make representations to Shaikh Hamed that he should pay regard to the wishes of the majority of his people.¹²

This point of view was flatly rejected by the Govt. of India who stated that,

"no representations should be addressed to the Shaikh suggesting the introduction of popular institutions of a democratic nature or carry the implication that the support of the Government to the Ruling Family will depend upon the degree to which the Ruler meets the aspirations of the Shia."¹³

It appears that the Govt. of India was inclined to the view of their "man on the spot" that the tribal form of government was

that most suited to the island, a view which contrasted sharply with those held prior to Shaikh Isa's abdication in 1923. This change of attitude was probably due to the fact that the British authorities now felt their interests to be secure¹⁴ and that they would be best served by maintaining the status quo.

Thus it was brought home to the Shia that yesterday's allies were not prepared to support them further in what they considered their legitimate demands and it was from this time that it became necessary for them to cast about in a search for new allies who shared their aspirations. It was this disappointment which later helped close the gap between Sunni and Shia as they joined forces to lend weight to their political demands.

Following the meeting of the 1st February the Government of Bahrain kept its promise and set up a tripartite committee headed by a member of the al-Khalifah along with a member from both the Shia and Sunni communities.¹⁵

The committee apparently was only a sop to appease public opinion as the meeting of the committee were irregular and no tangible results were ever achieved.¹⁶ Besides this, the expanding economy, as oil became king during the late 1930's, diverted the minds of the people for a time from political to economic matters.

b) The 1938 Affairs

The second half of the 1930's saw the beginnings of the material benefits which were to be enjoyed by the Bahrainis. This was brought about by the steadily increasing flow of revenues. Besides the natural increase in employment which was brought about, the revenues enabled new departments such as the Public Works and Health Services to be set up and the existing departments to be expanded.

The influx of foreigners who were either working or seeking employment with the oil company inevitably came into close contact with the Bahrainis and opened their eyes to many new ideas and customs. The section of the community which was most receptive to these new ideas was the newly emerging middle class comprising mainly petty merchants, Government and BAPCO employees, and the increasing number of students.¹⁷

With improving communications a greater interest in foreign affairs was to be found. Iraqi propaganda¹⁸ began to circulate freely and this combined with the affairs in Dubai and Kuwait in 1938 produced a reaction in Bahrain as the people studied these affairs, drew lessons from them and compared them to their own situations.

Locally, however, the Government and BAPCO were both in need of a source of trained labour to carry out their operations on the island and it was to India that they both turned for their supply.

The importation and employment of Indians in many posts in the Administration and the Oil Industry was seen by the Bahrainis as a restriction of their job opportunity and many were prepared to exert pressure to remove this new alien influence.

Belgrave, who at that time had been in post for twelve years, completely dominated the political life of the island, and the very fact that he held almost unquestioned authority increased the resentment. People often tried to avoid Belgrave's influence by contacting the shaikhs through unofficial channels, even this proved to be almost impossible for as Belgrave stated,

"Often when I saw the Shaikh he would push some letters or petitions into the outside pocket of my coat saying, 'Take those, read them some other time, and deal with them as you think best'".¹⁹

It seems here that Belgrave enjoyed the complete confidence of the Shaikh but not of the new middle classes, who tried to avoid him.

Thus it was that dissatisfaction grew in the island during 1938 as the people found no way of expressing their dissatisfaction without the interference of Belgrave and other foreigners within the Administration.

The Political unrest of 1938 had distinguishing features which were not be found in any of the previous political disturbances. The first, and most important, of these features was that for the first time the Shia and Sunni communities combined in presenting a joint petition, and the second was that two levels of leadership became apparent as the events progressed. The latter was to introduce for the first time a radical influence to the movements. The first level was comprised of certain elements of the merchant classes, some of whom had taken part in the 1934-35 affairs and were accorded some sort of official and recognised status in the movement.

The second level, however, was composed mainly of students and oil-field workers who were united in their ardent dislike of the high-handed manner of the Administration.

The political atmosphere of the island grew gradually worse during 1938 as the people became increasingly dissatisfied and felt the need for a reform of the Administration. Besides this, intrigues were afoot within the Ruling Family itself as Shaikh Salman, Hamed's eldest son, had still not been declared as

heir-apparent, a situation which alarmed him as he saw the possibility, on the sudden death of his father, of the Family electing Shaikh Abdulla as the Ruler of Bahrain.²⁰ With these apprehensions in mind he encouraged meetings of the leaders of the Sunnis and Shia to exert political pressures for reforms, all of which included his naming as heir-apparent.

These various meetings in support of Salman were mainly organised by Yousef Fakroo,²¹ a merchant who took it upon himself to organise support for Salman and to press for constitutional reforms.

The demands which came from these meetings, besides the naming of Shaikh Salman as successor to the Ruler, were that,

- a) A Legislative Committee should be formed.
- b) Reforms should be carried out within the Police Department.
- c) The Laws of Bahrain should be Codified.
- d) The Inspector of Education should be dismissed, and
- e) The two Shia Qadis were to be dismissed and replaced by others more acceptable to the community.²²

Later, two other demands were added. These were that,

- f) The Nationals of Bahrain should receive preference over others for employment by BAPCO.
- g) The members of the Legislative Committee suggested
 - (a) should consist of three Shia and three Sunni members presided over by Shaikh Salman.

During the formulating of these demands the Sunni activists tried to enlist the support of their Qadis, and in the course of doing so, attempted to persuade the Qadis by adding two further riders.

These were that, even with increasing foreign elements on the island, restrictions should remain on the sale of liquor as before and that women should not be emancipated by law.²³

These demands, however, were never officially presented to the Government. The Sunni Qadis were reluctant to be drawn into the dispute and expressed the view that the demands should be presented not to the Shaikh but to Belgrave, as if they were presented to the former there was very little likelihood of any action being taken on them.

In view of the reluctance of the Qadis to associate themselves with the demands, and the probable evasiveness of S_alman the merchants lost heart and the impetus of the first level of leadership dwindled for the time being.

As there was reluctance to present these demands personally in Bahrain some persons took the opportunity to have them publicised abroad. An article appeared in an Egyptian magazine in September, 1938,²⁴ which was written anonymously and entitled "Gloomy despair in Bahrain. An Ardent Call." The writer referred to the degree of intervention by foreigners in Bahrain as "colonisation" and referred to Belgrave as being detrimental to the whole administration. The writer went on to commend the example of the Kuwaitis in securing their own Legislative Council. In a call to Arab Nationalism he said, "Give up fear and sloth. Don't think that England will put you all on the mouths of cannon. These are your rights and we call you in the name of Nationalism to concentrate your cause on the following demands."²⁵

He then summarised the demands as, creating a Legislative Council, with Salman as President, the sole power over the

Administration to be in the hands of the Council, only Shaikh Hamed to have overriding authority of the Council and that foreign influences should be removed.

The above points expressed popular feeling within Bahrain at the time but in the absence of anyone to present the demands the second level of leadership, namely the students and workers, decided to force the issue.

Starting in October public meetings were held in the market places and beside the oil installations in an attempt to express their feelings and to explain more fully the reasons for their demands.

Events took a new turn when on the night of 22nd October, 1938, posters were distributed and hung on many houses and business establishments throughout the main centres of population of the island.

The posters read as follows.

"Good news, O noble Nation. You will get rid of the oppressions. You have heard in the meetings of leaders and speakers of the Nation what has proved to you that the oppression will be removed from you. Be prepared until you get another order."²⁶

The people behind the poster campaign appeared to be well organised as on the 31st October, 1938, another poster appeared in answer to the first one, which read,

"We thank the representatives of the Nation for this good news which granted the removal of oppression we are prepared for the next order."

Although the posters were primitive and confused in their message they had their desired effect in producing a reaction from the Administration.

Between the two dates the Political Agent produced a report on the grievances which the Bahrainis were expressing. He stated that the grievances expressed to him were that -

1. With regard to education, the people wished to put things to rights as they disagreed with the policy of the present Inspector, who, in nine years of office, had not succeeded in raising the standard of education above primary level. It was felt that school-leavers were not sufficiently educated to be employed even as minor clerks.
2. In the Bahraini courts the judges were uneducated and ignorant of the law,²⁷ besides which, there were no codes to guide them.
3. As there was no official Inspector of Police, the Police Force was in chaos, and people were often arrested and held without charge. Mr. Narayan, Belgrave's secretary, and Mr. Jelaladin of the Passport Office, who were both Indians, often interfered in police work.
4. In the Shariah, the Sunni courts needed to be reorganised and that the Shia Qadis were not wanted by the people and that the Shia should be allowed to elect two new Qadis who were acceptable to them.
5. The BAPCO labour relations were bad and the Bahrainis alleged that men were dismissed on false pretences before they reached the top level of earnings and re-engaged later at the lower starting rate of pay. In addition they claimed that the Indians were given preferential treatment.
6. The Secretary of the Municipality was useless and corrupt.²⁸
7. The Passport Office was in chaos and the Head of the Department was accepting bribes for the issue of passports to persons not legally entitled to them.

8. The Indians in the Customs Department were harassing the Bahrainis and giving preference to merchants of Indian origin.
9. The administration of the Minor's Department should be removed from the Civil Administration and be returned to the Qadis in the Shariah courts.
10. The Majlis al-Tujar should be elected, not appointed.
11. The state of the prisons was inhuman and that "Shaikh Hamed's fetters", which weighed up to 14 lbs., should be abolished. In addition, the civil servants employed the prisoners in their houses to provide free labour for themselves.²⁹
12. Women who engaged in prostitution should be prosecuted by the police and not protected by them as at present.³⁰

In all it appeared that Belgrave's insistence on attempting to oversee all the works of the Administration brought him to rely heavily upon his imported Indian Officials, and that whilst at no time could the finger of suspicion be pointed at Belgrave, many of these officials abused their position of trust and engaged in corrupt practices.

The Political Agent appeared to consider that of all the grievances the one concerning the courts was the important one, and he recommended in his next report that, "we should advise the Shaikh that no member of his Family should be appointed to the court unless he has some training."³¹

On 27th October, the Political Agent backed up his letter by a telegram to the Political Resident in which he stated that one of the prime demands of the people was the setting up of an Administrative Council to supervise all functions of the Administration in order that power should no longer be concentrated

in one person's hands.³²

The Bahrain Government, in an attempt to get to the root of the problem, issued a Proclamation stating that,

"anyone who wished to draw the attention of The Government to any matter can ask for an interview (with the Shaikh) and state what he has in mind."

The Government also, in an attempt to placate the Shia, took action in one of their complaints and dismissed the most unpopular Shia Qadi and his clerk and appointed three new Qadis in his place.³³

Soon after this Belgrave interviewed those whom he considered to be the leading Shia and attempted to persuade them to break their new alliance with the Sunnis and modify their demands, in return for which he promised them more concessions.

In this he was partly successful, for as he reported later, the party he saw made no references to the establishment of a Legislative Council and their grievances were only the absence of a codified system of law and their lack of representation as Shia on the Municipal Council and in the Government Departments as they felt that the Sunnis held the lion's share of the posts.³⁴

At this stage it was felt that action was needed against the agitators for reform. As the Political Agent pointed out in one of his reports, the more time went by without action against them, the longer time they had to gather support.³⁵

During the first week of November, rumours were rife that a strike of the Bahrainis employed by BAPCO was planned to take place in support of the overall political reforms demanded.

Although these rumours at the time perturbed the Government, Belgrave felt that his efforts and promises of co-operation would

neutralise the Shia and the view was held that the possibility of "joint action by the Shia and Sunni appeared to be receding."³⁶

With this in mind the Government decided to take action against the Sunnis. On the 5th November, 1938, Saad al-Shamlan, a local Wakil, and Ahmed al-Shirawi, a BAPCO employee, were arrested as suspected ringleaders of the disturbances. The following day the Government proclaimed that there was no reason for anxiety and that business should be as usual and the Government were prepared to take action against any "irresponsible persons".³⁷ The action of the arrests disturbed the public feelings and the Government proclamation did little to calm them.

As soon as the arrests became known, on the 6th November, a large crowd of students and BAPCO workers gathered in the Grand Friday Mosque in Manama, baricaded themselves in and demanded to see the Political Agent.³⁸

When the latter refused to see them on the grounds that they were Bahraini subjects, they formed a demonstration procession, paraded through the streets to the market place and closed down the market in protest.

In the evening of that day the Government again took action and arrested Ali-bin Khalifah al-Fadhil, a former secretary to the Municipal Council, as the leader of the demonstration.

As the arrests proceeded³⁹ the younger element became more furious and on the 8th November leaflets were distributed in Manama, demanding a general strike until such time as the prisoners were released and also praising the unity of the people. They were signed by the "Society of Free Youth".

Whilst this was going on Belgrave again interviewed the

Shia leaders and extracted from them a promise to keep the Shia quiet and uninvolved as the arrested persons were Sunnis. BAPCO also issued a statement saying in effect that unless the workers did not return to their jobs by 9th November they would be dismissed.⁴⁰

The Society of Free Youth, which apparently kept the names of its members secret, bombarded the Political Agent with letters and petitions. Their demands ranged over both the political and industrial fields and included the following:-

- 1) The freeing of the arrested men and the declaring of a general amnesty.
- 2) The establishment of both a Judiciary and Education Council.
- 3) The setting up of a Workers' Council and regulation of the hours of work.⁴¹

Except for the specific demand for the freeing of the arrested men, the other demands are characterised by their vagueness as they detailed nothing of the proposed composition and objectives of the Councils demanded.

Due to the lack of leadership the students and workers were unable to maintain support for the strike, which started to collapse after the 10th November.⁴² It did make its point, however, in showing the extent of the political unrest which was present on the island.

The Political Resident for instance, asked for a report on the progress of the ad hoc committee which had been set up in 1935 to consider the codifying of Bahrain law⁴³ and Shaikh Hamed later asked the British to help him in obtaining the services of an expert

in legal matters from either Egypt or Sudan.⁴⁴

With the collapse of the strike a committee was formed to continue the struggle for their demands and to try to obtain them by more peaceful means.

This committee was formed of the moderate elements, all the committee members were merchants, and some of them had been involved in the discussions with Shaikh Salman to which we referred earlier. Their first action was to present, on the 12th November, five specific demands. These were as follows:-

- "1) Education. To form a committee of eight members, four Sunnis and four Shias. This committee to supervise education, arrange curriculum of studies for the schools, employ headmasters and teachers from outside and send students abroad.
- 2) Courts. To improve the courts by changing the present magistrates and to form a bench of three judges, one Sunni, one Shia and one to be the choice of the Government, for each court. To form a special criminal court of one judge only employed from Iraq; and should be employed until such time as a Bahrain subject will be able to take his place.
- 3) Municipalities. To improve the municipalities by appointing Bahrain subjects in place of foreigners.
- 4) Labour Committee. To form a Labour Committee acknowledged officially by the Government to look after the affairs of Bahraini labourers whether they are employed by companies or others and to protect their rights.
- 5) To avoid any unintentional misunderstanding in future between the Government and the people we request the selection of six persons, three Sunnis and three Shia to represent the people."⁴⁵

The demands were moderate indeed as they contained no reference to the setting up of a Legislative Council, but instead asked only for a Consultative Council to avoid misunderstandings. Nor did they make any reference to the burning issue of Belgrave's maladministration which had been the target of the pamphleteers when they claimed that,

"we started demanding the dismissal of this man who lives on the income of the nation and is not ashamed of intriguing against them. No sooner had we claimed these rights publicly than the despotic nature of the Adviser was enraged. He imprisoned some of us without trial and ordered the Police to beat our countrymen, with sticks and rifle butts. We respect and like H.H. Shaikh Hamed and our loyalty to him will no doubt make us confident that H.H. will favour his nation by dismissing this individual who is not wanted in this country."⁴⁶

The Government replied promptly to the five demands of the merchants on the 13th November, 1938. In the reply the Shaikh agreed to the setting up of an Advisory Council for Education but denied them the power of financial control or the appointment and dismissal of staff and suggested that an official of the Ministry of Education, Baghdad should visit Bahrain to look at the school administration and report to the Government.

The setting up of the Advisory Council, however, did not materialise at that time although the second suggestion was acted upon.

With reference to the demands concerning the courts Shaikh Hamed replied that he thought this demand to be "entirely unconstitutional"! and that the "magistrates should be appointed by the Government, not elected by the people".

To the matter concerning the Municipalities he expressed the opinion that the matters raised would be best dealt with by the Municipality Councils themselves. He went on to say that he was not aware of a preponderance of foreigners on the staffs of the municipalities.

Concerning the appointment of a Labour Committee he disagreed with the suggestion that such a Committee should be established. He

suggested instead the appointment of one person, as a Bahrain Government representative, to act a go-between in discussions between Bahraini employees and BAPCO.

He also refused the last request, for a Consultative Committee as he saw no need for such a body and considered, "that the proposed committee would embarrass the Government and give rise to disturbances."⁴⁷

Despite these rather sceptical censures to the requests Belgrave went even further, and in order to prove that not all Bahrainis were in favour of the demands he turned to the tribal structure which traditionally supported the al-Khalifah and obtained from them letters stating that they disassociated themselves from the demands and that they had at no time been consulted about them.⁴⁸

The official British reactions seemed to be contradictory. The Political Agent, Weightman, tended to back up Belgrave's point of view that everything was under control and would very soon settle down, as they considered the agitators to be in the minority. The political Resident, however, expressed other views. He considered that the Bahrain people had no "legal channels" through which to express their grievances and he suggested that it would be advisable to set up an Advisory Council for this purpose.⁴⁹

The Political Agent, however, argued that there was no possibility of the Shaikh accepting an Advisory Council and went on to say that furthermore the administration was a "British Administration", and that, "if we support an Advisory Council, Belgrave's and de Grenier's would be an embarrassing position,

and we should not appear to be supporting the rebels."⁵⁰

He concluded his letter by saying that in his opinion the Bahrain Government was a "good government".⁵¹

Although the Political Resident replied to this by saying that "good government (by the British) was no substitute for self-government",⁵² The Political Agent's point of view carried the day and no actions were taken to set matters to rights.

BAPCO also took strong measures against the leaders of the strike within the company and dismissed eighteen of them.⁵³

When at a later date, representations were made by the Sharia Qadis to Shaikh Hamed for the release of the prisoners arrested during the troubles, the Political Agent advised him not to do so and told Shaikh Hamed that he should tell the Qadis to mind their own business.⁵⁴

In December Shaikh Hamed appointed Shaikh Ali bin Ahmed al-Khalifah as the Government Representative to BAPCO. His terms of reference, however, were very limited and fell far short of the Committee's demands.⁵⁵

Belgrave, however, succeeded in hushing up the matters which arose during the troubles and expressed his opinions in two long letters to the Political Agent.

He dismissed the unrest as being fermented by people with personal grievances and considered the leaders to be acting entirely from self-interest and not from any regard for the people. His views on the proposed Advisory Council were summed up as follows -

"The words 'Executive' or 'Advisory' mean nothing to the people of Bahrain. The institution of a Council by orders of the British Government would be universally regarded as the forcible removal of power and authority from the hands of the Shaikh and his successors."⁵⁶

As to the Shaikh's views on the council, Belgrave continued,

"The idea of the Council has been discussed by the Shaikhs since the recent political unrest. They one and all regard any suggestion of a Council as being the swan-song of the Khalifah as Rulers of Bahrain. The Shaikhs believe that the British Government would not wish to undermine their position as Rulers of Bahrain. They are certain that with a Council in Bahrain (however it might be styled or formed) the Khalifah would not remain the Ruling Family."⁵⁷

Belgrave in the second letter regarded his position as sine qua non.

He wrote,

"I feel that I should say that His Highness and his brothers and the people who have voiced their complaints have all stated that if I had remained in the Courts the present complaints would not have been made. I knew that this was true."⁵⁸

In referring to the Court here Belgrave appeared to be thinking still in terms of the 1934-35 affairs but still ignored the fact that there was no codified law, a fact which was now irrelevant as it was now only one of many complaints.

The most important political demands which was made, however, was the formation of a Legislative Council along the lines of those of Kuwait and Dubai, which although they were short-lived fired the inspirations of the Bahrain people. It had been stated that a Gulf Committee was formed in Basra during 1938 to advance the ideas of self-determination throughout the Gulf Area.⁵⁹ There appears to have been no direct contact, however, with the people of Bahrain although the writer did find a number of their leaflets which had been circulated there during late 1938.

In summing up it may be said that although the 1938 affairs produced very few tangible proofs of progress, this may have been due

to a lack of organised leadership and the calculated reactions of Belgrave. It did, however, give us proof of the growth of a mobilised public and a greater political awareness, especially amongst the younger generation of students and workers who had experienced the effects of modern communications.

FOOTNOTES

1. This of course did not apply to all members of the al-Khalifah, as we have mentioned before, as at that time some of the members of the family suffered pangs of conscience over the Shia situation. One of them, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Wahab al-Khalifah, whose father was known as the "Wazir" of Shaikh Isa, was moved in early 1934 to declare himself a Shia. See letter from Col. G. Loch, Pol. Agent, to the Pol. Res., T.C. Fowle, 7th Nov., 1934.
2. Starting from the second half of the 1920's many Shia gravitated towards Manama and some of them set up shops and became prosperous merchants. There were of course Shia merchants prior to this time, but they were very few and their political actions were limited. Prior to this time most political action tended to be initiated by the religious leaders.
3. Letter from Pol. Agent to Shaikh Hamed, No. C/98 dated 8th Feb. 1934, also letter from Shaikh Hamed to P.A. dated 23rd Du al-Qada 1353 A.H. (9th March 1934). It should be borne in mind that this was not Belgrave's first absence but that it was indirectly a cause of the troubles.
4. The representatives were Mansoor al-Areydh, Mohsen al-Tajir Abdul Rasoor bin Rajab, Abd Ali al-Aliwat, Abdul Aziz al-Boory, Ali bin Abas al-Aali, Hasan bin Mohammed al-Marhoon al-Biladi and Ahmed bin Nasr al-Barbari. The first four were from Manama.
5. Majlis al-Urf had apparently begun to lose its powers of jurisdiction and was in the process of being replaced by the Majlis al-Tujar, whose function was later mainly to safeguard the interests of merchants.
6. Being aware of Shaikh Hamed's weakness we may assume that Belgrave was the mastermind behind the handling of the whole affair.
7. Letter from C. Belgrave to the P.A., Lt. Col. G. Loch dated 4th Feb., 1935.
8. As early as 1932 the P.R., H.V. Biscoe, writing to the For. Sec. to the Govt. of India, stated that, "I have never had any illusions regarding Shaikh Hamed, I have always considered him to be a perfectly useless individual, utterly unfitted to perform the duties of ruler of Bahrain". Dated 25th Feb., 1932.
9. Letter from Lt. Col. G. Loch, to P.R., No. C/112/1 - 1b dated 18th Feb. 1935.
10. Ibid.
11. Letter from Col. T.C. Fowle, P.R., to the For. Sec. to the Govt. of India, No. C/43 dated 18th March, 1935.
12. Ibid.

13. Letter from Dept. for Sec. to the Govt. of India to the P.R., No. F.235.N/53 dated 6th Nov., 1935.
14. At this time the oil concessions had been firmly established and furthermore negotiations had been completed in April of that year for the establishment of a naval base on the island. See Belgrave "Personal Column", p.106. Burrell, R.M. in his article on the Gulf, published in "Arabian Peninsular" op.cit., p.168 stated that the agreement on the naval base was not signed until 12th Oct. 1934. In addition to this the newly established air lines were beginning to use Muharraq as a staging point on the India route.
15. The committee was headed by Shaikh Salman, the other members being Yousef bin Ahmed Kanoo (Sunni) and Mansoor al-Arayed (Shia). See Govt. of Bahrain Proclamation No. 1038, 6a dated 9th March, 1935, also Belgrave's letter to the P.A., No. 256, dated 3rd March, 1935.
16. It has been reported that at a meeting on 18th January, 1936 which was attended by the P.A., P.R., Belgrave and Shaikh Abdulla bin Hamed (who apparently replaced Salman as head of committee)m it was decided that the areas of law to be covered were 1 a) Diving Law, b) Irrigation Laws, c) Land Laws, d) Fish Traps, e) Bankruptcy, and f) Motor Vehicles. In Feb., 1937 an interim report was issued which stated that in addition to the above they were also considering matters concerning g) Pre-emption, h) Court and case regulations, i) Inter-Pleaders j) Rules governing Wakils, and k) Partnerships. See letter from P.A. to Pol. R., No. C/16 - 1b/5, dated 24th Feb., 1937.
17. In 1935 the first modern printing press was installed in Bahrain by the pioneer Abdulla al-Zayed. See Al-Khatir, M. "Nabighah al-Bahrain", Arabian Co., Bahrain, 1972, p.38. The year 1937 also saw the opening in Bahrain of the first cinema in the Gulf Area.
18. King Ghazi's encouragement of propaganda became a bye-word in Bahrain and a folksong praising him and detailing their grievances against foreigners (British and Indian) became very popular in Bahrain.
19. Belgrave, C.D. op.cit., p.68.
20. Shaikh Hamed secretly appointed Shaikh Salman as heir-apparent during 1940, (Belgrave op.cit., p.118 & 124) but Shaikh Salman was not informed until 1942. The method of appointing successors in the Gulf States was precarious indeed, it being usual for the successor to be named by the dying Ruler at the last moment. It has been suggested that Shaikh Abdulla al-Salim sympathised with the 1938 movement in Kuwait probably in order to secure his status as potential successor much as Shaikh Salman did. The same (contd.)...

20. contd.....

situation occurred in Dubai in 1938 when Shaikh Ju^{ma} al-Maktum supported the demands there for a Legislative Council to gain support against his brother Said, who was the Ruler, and the Ruler's son Rashid. Mana, the ruler's uncle was also actively involved. The Kuwaiti affairs are alluded to in "Al Jamal Yahya" - "The Constitutional Methods in Kuwait" - Kuwait Univ. Press (Arabic) 1970-71, p.130. See also Al-Adsani, Khalid, "Half Year of Constitutional Rule in Kuwait" - Arabic 1947. As to the Dubai affairs evidence is very scant even to this day and most references are based on hearsay.

21. Fakroo, A Sunni, contacted Mohasin and Mohammed al-Tajir and Said Ahmed al-Alawi, who were all Shia, and meetings took place at first in the garden of Shaikh Salman. After a few meetings they were joined by two other Sunnis, Mohammed bin Yousef bin Nasr and Abdul Latif bin Mashari.
22. This demand was added after a meeting took place at Sanabis village in the house of Ahmed bin Qamis (Shia).
23. With the influx of foreigners rumours were rife that the sale of alcohol was to be made legal. With regard to women the former practice of the Political Agents of protecting women had been taken over by the courts who granted women "freedom" from their families. This freedom had been abused as many women so freed had turned to prostitution. The situation became such that the mainland peoples associated the Bahrain "Huriyah" or freedom, with prostitution. The people who tried to enlist the Qadis to their cause were Kahil al-Mouaid, Yousef Kanoo and Abdul Rahman al-Zayani.
24. "Al Rabita al-Arabia", 14th Sept. 1938, a monthly magazine started in Cairo in 1936 by a well-known historian, Amin Said, with the object of promoting Arab Nationalism.
25. Belgrave suspected the following people as possibly being authors of the article, Ibrahim al Arayed, Ali-al-Tajar, Said Mahmoud al-Alawi, Mohammed Dowarkr, (all Shia), and Abdulla al-Zayed and Mohammed S. al-Sharawi (Sunni). Significantly all were young people, some holding government posts such as Dowerkr, head of the Minors' Dept. and Mahmoud al-Alawi, head of Belgrave's Advisory Bureau. The latter is now Minister of Finance for Bahrain.
26. Letter from the Pol. Agent, H. Weightman to the Pol. Res., T. Fowle, dated 24th Oct. 1938.
27. The judges were at that time all for the Al-Khalifah family. They were Shaikhs Mobarak and Doyaj, sons of Shaikh Hamed, Shaikh Ali bin Ahmed, Shaikh Mohammed bin Ali, and Shaikh Ali bin Mohammed. These Shaikhs sat in the Lower Joint Courts assisted by an Indian who was Political Agent Assistant.

28. This was Mohammed Salah al-Shater who took up office in 1934 and who still holds it to the present day.
29. Narayan, Belgrave's secretary, and Mohammed Khalil, the Indian head of the Land Dept. were often mentioned in connection with this practice.
30. All these points were mentioned in a letter from the Pol. Agent to the Pol. Resident dated 26th Oct., 1938.
31. Letter from Pol. Agent to Pol. Res., No. C/666/ - 1b/5 dated 27th Oct., 1938.
32. Also mentioned in the telegram was the resentment of Belgrave's power and the feeling that if he stayed it should be only as Financial Adviser. He cited the agitators as Mohasin and Mohammed al-Tajir, Said bin Said Khalfan, Abd Ali al-Aliwat, Mansoor al-Arayed, Said Ahmed al-Alawi (all Shia), and Ali Abdulla Abul, Ibrahim bin Jowder, Saad al-Shamlan, Ali bin Khalifah al-Fadhil, Khalil al-Mouaid and some of the Kanoo's (Sunni).
33. Shaikh Ali bin Safer was dismissed and Bakr al-Asfoor, Ali bin Hassan and Mohammed Kari, were appointed from a Joint Shia Court. Shaikh Abdul Mouhasin al Helli, who had been recently recruited from Iraq, was appointed Appelate Qadi.
34. Letter from Belgrave to Weightman dated 3rd Nov., 1938. He met Mohasin and Mohammed al-Tajir, Mansoor al-Arayed, Said Saied, Tahr Mohasin and Abdulla Abo Deeb.
35. Letter from Pol. Agent to Pol. Res., 3rd Nov., 1938.
36. Letter from Pol. Agent to Pol. Res., No. C/680-1b/S, 5th Nov., 1938.
37. Proclamation No. 3/1357, 6th Nov., 1938.
38. The situation was exacerbated when Shaikh Abdulla bin Isa and some of his bodyguards attacked the demonstrators in the mosque and beat many of them.
39. A total of four people were arrested and held in custody. The fourth being another local Wakil, Ibrahim Kamal. The letter was one of the writer's sources of information for the events of this period.
40. Letter from Pol. Agent to Pol. Res., DOC/691-1b/S, 12th Nov., 1938.
41. From letters to Pol. Agent dated 9th & 10th Nov., 1938.
42. The quick collapse of the strike was probably hastened by the fact that it was the period of Ramadan.
43. Letter from Pol. Res. to Pol. Agent DO No. 582-S, 11th Nov., 1938.

44. Letter from Shaikh Hamed to Pol. Agent, 19th Ramadan, 1357 AH (12th Nov. 1938).
45. Letter submitted to Shaikh Hamed on 12th Nov., 1938 signed by Yousef Fakroo, Sayed Said, Sayed Khalaf, Mansoor al-Arayed, Mohasin al-Tajir and Esa bin Sabah bin Hindi. Of these the first and last only are Sunnis.
46. Undated pamphlet circulated in Manama during the 1938 strike.
47. From letter from Belgrave to Weightman. DO No. 619/9-A, 13th Nov., 1938.
48. On 17th and 22nd Nov., 1938 Belgrave sent lists of names to the Pol. Agent purporting to be those who would have nothing to do with the current unrest and stating their satisfaction with the Administration. (See letter No. 1700-9-A). Some names quoted were Jabr al-Musalem, Sayed Ibrahim bin Abdulla, Nasr bin Salim al-Suwaidi, Khalifah bin Zaal al-Buflassa, Hamed bin Sakr al-Buflassa, Ahmed bin Rashid al-Manana, Sayed Ahmed bin Yoshah, Said bin Mubaraq al-Saluti and others. Belgrave did not forget in his letters to list the tribes to which these men belonged. (All of these are Sunni).
49. Letter from Pol. Res. to Pol. Agent, DO No. 597-S, 17th Nov., 1938. The Pol. Res. was no doubt influenced by the happenings in Kuwait and Dubai and probably saw no reason why the same conditions should not apply in Bahrain.
50. Letter from Pol. Agent to Pol. Res. DO No. C/720-1b/S, 27th Nov., 1938.
51. Ibid.
52. Letter from T. Fowle, Pol. Res. to Pol. Agent, DO No. 704.S, 13th Dec., 1938.
53. Letter from Chief Local Representative, Mr. J.S. Black, to the Pol. Agent, 13th Nov., 1938.
54. Letter from Pol. Agent to Pol. Res., 3rd Dec., 1938. The prisoners were later released in 1939 during Ibn Saud's visit to Bahrain during which he interceded for their release.
55. Letter from Pol. Agent to Pol. Res., DO. No. C/785-1b-S, 13th Dec., 1938. His duties were to represent the Government to BAPCO rather than the employees. The committee's demands contained in a letter to the Government on 22nd Nov., 1938 outlined their objectives of the suggested Labour Committee. There were seventeen articles, some of which were, priority of Bahrainis in employment with the company, parity of conditions and wages with foreigners a proper compensation scheme, protection against dismissal, pay during sickness, job training and the introduction of a provident scheme.
56. Letter from Belgrave to the Pol. Agent, No. C/751-1b/S, 8th Dec., 1938.

57. Ibid.
58. Letter from Belgrave to Pol. Agent, No. 1822/9.A, Dec., 1938.
59. Humaidan, Ali, "Les Princes d'Or. Noir" - Ph.D. Thesis, Paris 1968 p.92. cited by Al-Jamal Y. op.cit. p.129.

CHAPTER THREE

THE YEARS OF CONFLICTS (1950's)

a) The Background 1938-53

The post-war period in Bahrain witnessed the growing political maturity of the Bahrainis. This growth became increasingly apparent, especially during the 1950's, which were yet another episode in the struggle which had started in earnest during the 1930's.

This came about in part due to the establishment of greater physical and social communications during the war years with items such as the completion in 1941 of Shaikh Hamed's causeway, linking the two main islands, which promoted mobility between the communities and also the establishment, with British encouragement, of the local newspaper "Al-Bahrain". It was started in March, 1939 and was quickly used as a propaganda medium by the British for the Allied cause.¹ Although it was mainly international war news which was published, the able editor, Abdulla al-Zayed, took a deep interest in social, economic and sometimes political affairs, not only of the island but of the whole Gulf area.

Al-Zayed, who usually wrote under a nom de plume, often criticised the Government and BAPCO for various aspects of their policies.

"Al-Bahrain" was also used by other men of letters outside Bahrain to express their opinions. Prominent writers such as Abdul Razakh al-Basir of Kuwait, Mohammed Ali Lugman of Saudi Arabia and others made use of the newspaper to disseminate their

ideas.²

On 4th November, 1940 the Bahrain Broadcasting Station was started, under the auspices of the British authorities in the Gulf. Like the newspaper its prime objective was to spread war propaganda to the region in the face of growing Axis broadcasts.

The spread of political propaganda during the war opened the people's minds further so that they began to examine critically their own status. Despite the fact that it was illegal at that time to listen to the Berlin Arab Service broadcasts many Arabs in fact did so, and assessed for themselves the conflicting views presented.

Because of the past British policies in their treatment of the Bahrainis, a number were only too willing to listen to the Axis broadcasts and one contemporary writer described how the people of Bahrain were clandestinely repeating news of the Berlin broadcasts in the majlis and coffee shops and that some carried copies of Hitler's book, "Mein Kampf", concealed in their garments.³

The political atmosphere, although not actively hostile to the British, was far from being pro-British, in spite of the intensive Allied propaganda.⁴

Having played their part in the war effort the newspaper and the broadcasting station ceased to exist.⁵ One of the by-products of their existence, however, was the tremendous impact they had in forming the future political conduct of the Bahrainis. They learnt first hand the ways and means of modern media and how to apply these media in their own conflicts.

during this period (1938-53) the Bahrainis also participated

in the setting up of various clubs and societies which, whilst they were formed ostensibly as sporting or cultural societies, rapidly developed into crucibles of political thought for the exchange of ideas and views.

The passing of the Literary Club towards the end of the 1920's which we cited earlier, left a vacuum which was not filled until the late 1930's.

In 1937, for instance, the "Al-Shabiba" football club in Muharraq, changed its name to "Nadi al-Bahrain" following its move from the field of sport to social and cultural activities. This was the first of a number of clubs which followed suit and engaged in other than sporting activities.

A number of the Muharraq notables associated themselves with the new society. The first president of the club was Abdul Aziz al-Shamlan, who will be mentioned again later. A year later the "al-Ahli" club was founded in Manama to draw together the enlightened elements of that town. This was followed by the formation of the "Nadi al-Aruba" (The Pan-Arabism Club) in 1942. The latter was founded mainly on the initiative of the Shia community and a small number of enlightened Sunnis.

These were followed by other clubs and societies throughout the towns and villages of Bahrain.

Initially they were formed as meeting places where interested parties could gather to discuss world affairs and participate in other activities. They also served as a substitute for the local news media due to lack of newspapers or broadcasting service between the years of 1945 and 1949.

The clubs and societies flourished after the war and reached

their peak during the early 1950's.

The membership of the clubs covered a wide field and included such groups as students and graduates of the Secondary School, petty merchants, employees of foreign companies, schoolmasters, other Arabs and Bahrainis.

It may safely be assumed that these clubs served as the catalyst for political ideas, enhanced and lubricated by the growing material prosperity and the growth of literacy.

Belgrave expressed his apprehensions at the role these clubs began to play on the internal political scene especially in the post-war years and early 1950's as follows:-

✓ "Bahrain was quiet yet I was aware of a new, indefinable feeling of an emerging political consciousness. One sign of this was the increasingly important part which the Arab clubs played in the lives of the educated young men."⁶

During the 1940's Bahrain was not free from political and industrial unrest. In 1942-43 the previously described oil-field strike took place, which was followed by a similar period of unrest in 1947-48. One contemporary Arab writer⁷ placed the blame for the latter on the Shaikhs, whereas it was more probably due to the local policies of BAPCO.

Political problems in other parts of the Arab world also had their effect, mainly on the occasion of the proposed partition of Palestine between Jews and Arabs. The Bahrainis took to the streets to demonstrate their support of the Arab cause in late 1947. Apart from this the local branch of the Moslem Brotherhood sponsored a token force to take part in the Palestinian War. This small force did in fact take part in the fighting in Palestine in 1948.

The British policy vis a vis the Gulf Area had also undergone some changes during this period. Against a background of decreasing influence in Persia and an increasing interest in the Gulf principalities, Bahrain became the focal point of British interest. The Residency was transferred from Bushire to Bahrain⁸ and the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force installations became the main British bases in the Gulf.

Following the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 the authority for the Gulf Area was handed over by the India Office to H.M.G.'s Foreign Office in London. This new situation of direct contact with London, without intermediaries, brought about a new style in the implementation of policies which had not previously been experienced.

During the early years of the 1950's Bahrain was in a state of political turmoil; although in the beginning it was immature it was immensely robust. Broadsheets were distributed under different names demanding political and administrative reforms. Many of the former members of 1938 - Society of Free Youth and others had now grown up and were searching for ways to express their feelings and ideas. A number of interested parties obtained permission to edit and publish a monthly magazine which took the name of "Sout al-Bahrain" (The Voice of Bahrain) and commenced publication in late 1949.⁹

Abdul Rahman al-Baker, who we will mention in more detail later, was actively involved in the venture.

"Sout al-Bahrain", during its five year life, made a deep impression on the political, social and cultural life not only of Bahrain, but also of the surrounding regions, by providing a

platform for the viewpoints of all social classes and age groups. The eloquent articles touched on all aspects of life in the islands.

Other newspapers followed in the wake of the "Sout al-Bahrain". (The original intention of these newspapers was to publish daily but in fact most published only weekly). These new papers included those such as "Al-Qafilah", which later changed its name to "Al-Watan", under the editorship of Ali Sayer, "Al-Mizan" and "Al-Khamila".

"Al-Qafilah/Al-Watan" were probably the most bona fide in their approach to the existence of local problems and they were not slow to openly criticise, and often antagonise, the administration.

During the period under review (1938-53), the economy flourished, the oil industry in Bahrain estimated its local disbursements at slightly over 41 million rupees.¹⁰

Up to the end of 1372 AH. (9th Sept. 1953) the purchase value of the Reserve Fund amounted to 46.45 million rupees (face value of maturity 49.32 million Rs.)¹¹

With this increased material prosperity the Bahrainis still felt the need for an increased participation in the affairs of the administration of the island, which manifested itself in the views expressed by the newspapers.

Belgrave, on his return to the island in late 1953 observed,

"We (Belgrave and Shaikh Salman) returned to Bahrain in September (1953). Outwardly everything seemed as before, but I soon found that below the surface there was a strange undercurrent of political unrest. It manifested itself by floods of anonymous notices and letters and by violent articles in the local press. The local newspapers were edited by irresponsible young men who found that the more violently they wrote the better sales they had."¹²

The press was in fact only echoing the growing discontent felt towards the administration and the status quo. Although Shaikh Salman had assumed the Rulership in 1942, up to 1953 there had been no change in either the style or political machinery of the Government and very few advances had been made in other fields such as welfare.

Belgrave, as sole initiator and executor of all policies drawn up, seemed reluctant, apart from creating a few small essential departments, to widen the concept of the government. It was still, for example, virtually impossible to complete a course of Higher Education on the island, and his attitude to administrative and legal reforms appeared to be summed up by his reported remarks to a Bahraini student of law when he said, "Why are you studying law? Bahrain will not need lawyers for a hundred years to come",¹³ this despite the fact that the Bahrainis had attempted to have a qualified judge appointed as early as 1934.

His attitude towards education and educated people by and large, is possibly explained by his nostalgic statement that,

"education continued to be a permanent 'pain in the neck'. I often wondered whether in the long run it did not do more harm than good to the people of Bahrain. Every year a large proportion of the population became literate, to the extent of being able to read and write, but I don't think were any happier than they used to be."¹⁴

As to his style of government and his method of initiating new projects he wrote,

"When I wanted to introduce something new I found that the best plan, after obtaining the Shaikh's consent, was to explain my idea to two or three leading Arabs, not always the same men, and after being taken into my confidence they came to regard the project as their own and therefore gave it their support."¹⁵

His descriptions of working in the garden of his weekend house of Jidda Island, the prison colony, with the prisoners, and of his fish-doping expeditions with both police and prisoners¹⁶ leads one to conclude that he saw himself in the role of a colonial-style District Officer with almost complete powers to do as he wished. Circumstances and times, however, had changed and this role was no longer valid, a point which the people, if not Belgrave, appeared to appreciate.

This then was the situation inside Bahrain, but outside Bahrain, especially in the Arab world and other countries around the Gulf, there were new and far-reaching events taking place. Egypt's revolution of 1952 and the growth of the influence of Pan-Arabism in the Levant did not pass without their effects upon the people of Bahrain. Furthermore, Mossadeq's confrontation with the British also made its impact. But by and large the Bahrainis began to turn more and more to Cairo for their aspirations during the 1950's, as against their observance of the events in Baghdad during the 1930's. This, in combination with the internal situation, combined to produce the ingredients of the political confrontations of 1953-56.

b) The Conflicts of 1953-56

As we may note from the preceding section the political scene in Bahrain was one of turmoil. The new intelligentsia were no longer prepared to tolerate the tutelage of Belgrave. On the mainland, especially in the Eastern Provinces of Saudi Arabia and in Kuwait, the prosperity brought about by oil had made a much greater impact upon the material prosperity of the people there, than had taken place in Bahrain. The Bahrainis, especially those

who had experienced the higher wages and standards of living of the oil workers of the mainland, considered the situation of the Bahrainis to be humiliating in comparison.

Ironically, however, the spark which caused the political unrest was a traditional one, the cultural gap between the Sunnis and Shia. In September 1953, during the celebration of Muharram, a Shia festival, a number of scuffles and serious riots took place which were later attributed to a childish action by one of the Al-Khalifah.¹⁷ The animosity which followed the incidents, and the mishandling of the situation by the police, caused the more liberal elements of both communities to recognise the grim future which lay ahead if these traditional conflicts continued.

There had been no major conflicts between the two sects for many years prior to 1953 and the members of the clubs and societies and the press had been actively campaigning for many years in efforts to reconcile the two factions.

These campaigners saw in the Muharram incidents a deliberate attempt by the regime to undo all the good work which had gone before. By the end of the year, therefore, the two sides established tentative contacts with each other and eventually, after meetings in which al-Baker was actively involved, more formal meetings were arranged to try to rectify the situation.¹⁸

Whilst this was going on, however, the hostilities continued between the two sides, occasionally erupting into violence. The major incidents which took place in these affairs happened in June 1954 at Sitra camp, between elements of the two sects. During the scuffles a Sunni was killed. The police arrested the alleged ringleaders of the Shia who were, after trial, sentenced to various

periods of imprisonment.¹⁹ The sentences were considered by the Shia community to be excessively harsh and after heated meetings and demonstrations on the 2nd July, 1954, the Shia began to march on Manama Fort in an attempt to free the prisoners.

The police, apparently apprehensive at the fervour of the demonstration, opened fire with the resultant loss of the lives of four Shia.²⁰

Following this incident a general shutdown of business occurred, partly from fear and partly from the industrial action of sympathisers. The shutdown lasted for a week before a gradual return to work took place. An investigation of the incidents was ordered by Shaikh Salman but this came to nothing except for a reprimand to the police for their actions.

The July incidents at last brought home to the Bahrainis the need for greater understanding between the two communities and for a measure of joint action and co-operation. Throughout these incidents Al-Baker and his friends continued their endeavours to establish a rapport between the two sides and this laid the foundations of future co-operation.

Al-Baker's policy began to bear fruit later in the year following industrial action by taxi-drivers in September, 1954.

On this occasion the taxi-drivers went on strike in protest against the Government's decision that all taxi services must be fully insured. The drivers however, felt that the existing insurance premiums were too high and that the regulations promulgated by the foreign insurance companies were unduly restrictive and they therefore decided to strike and brought the island's transport services to a standstill.

Al-Baker and some others intervened to act as intermediaries and were instrumental in resolving the dispute. Part of the solution consisted of the formation of a taxi-drivers' Co-operative Compensation Society to which all taxi-drivers were to subscribe, in return for which, they were to be insured at much more competitive rates and they were to receive help and advice in running their businesses. The first General Secretary of the Society was Al-Baker himself, assisted by a committee of prominent Bahrainis.

The significance of this step was not merely a commercial one but meant that for the first time it brought together the Sunni and Shia working classes on a co-operative working basis, working with and assisting one another.

The Government, failing to recognise the change in the political climate saw Al-Baker's role in this new venture as a challenge to their own authority and threatened to withdraw his passport and citizenship.²¹

This move, however, proved to be the straw which broke the camel's back, for, on hearing of this threat, Al-Baker's supporters and others of the enlightened elements decided to force the issue of political dissatisfaction and embarked upon a series of public meetings. The first of these took place in early October in the Al-Khamis mosque in Manama. Members of all the various clubs and societies, as well as the notables of the towns and villages, were invited to attend and the meeting resulted in a number of resolutions being put forward.

These were:-

1. That a united front should be presented to fight the dictatorship, personified in the form of Sir Charles Belgrave, and to guide the people in obtaining their political rights.
2. That a proclamation should be issued to express resentment at the Government action against Al-Baker in the threats to withdraw his passport and citizenship, as this was felt to be contradictory to the rights of the citizen.
3. That a further meeting be held within a week at Sanabis village at which all sections of the community should be represented in order to elect delegates for the formation of the Front, who would carry out the wishes of that meeting, in representations to the Government.
4. That attempts should be made to mobilise public opinion in support of their campaign.

After this meeting a war of nerves developed between the campaigners and the Government. Articles appeared in the press which indirectly attacked Belgrave and aspects of the Administration.

A British writer, visiting Bahrain at that time, described Belgrave's position, stating, "As Head of Police he could arrest a man, try him in the Courts of Law as Head of Judiciary, sentence him and judge the appeal against sentence as Head of the Court of Appeal."²²

Against this background it is understandable that the Bahrainis should feel justified in seeing in Belgrave the figure of a dictator.

The Sanabis meeting took place as planned on 13th October, 1954, and hundreds of Bahrainis, from both sects,²³ were in attendance.

The meeting resulted in the creation of a General Assembly of 120 members to represent all sections of opinion in Bahrain.

Besides this a Higher Executive Committee (H.E.C.) was formed. This consisted of eight prominent Bahrainis, four Sunni and four Shia.²⁴

A number of resolutions were passed at this meeting for the H.E.C. to act upon. These were that the H.E.C. should ask the Government that:-

1. A Legislative Council should be formed.
2. A codified system of Criminal and Civil Law should be adopted.
3. The creation of Trades Unions should be permitted.
4. A Higher Appeal Court should be instituted.

Wasting no time the H.E.C. drafted a letter to the Government incorporating these proposals and in the meantime they started to issue Bulletins to keep the people informed of their actions and to raise funds.

The letter to the Shaikh was also released for publication and appeared in the newspaper "Al-Qafilah". The letter read,

"Your Highness, It is now more than a quarter of a century since a modern administration was introduced into this country. It was adequate at that time but is not sufficient to meet the needs of the present day. The Country has since advanced socially and culturally but the administration has stood still. It is this which has brought about the gap between the Government and the people which has resulted in the unrest we are witnessing today.

Your Highness, this unrest is of benefit to no-one, either ruler or ruled and in order that matters may take their natural course there should be a radical improvement in the Governmental system, which should allow the people a greater degree of participation in the conducting of their affairs. The people have demonstrated their awareness both in the press and at various mass meetings and they desire to fulfil the reforms upon which depend the improvement of their progress and welfare. In order to remove the cause of the unrest mentioned above we present to Your Highness, on behalf of the

contd....

people, the following demands which we trust you grant, and by doing so you will write a shining page in the history of this country.

1. The Creation of a Legislative Council, freely elected and representative of all the people.
2. To draw up a Code of Law, Civil and Criminal, drafted by experienced Lawyers corresponding with the country's traditions. These should be endorsed by the Legislative Council.
3. Permission should be granted for the formation of Trades Unions both for the workers and the self-employed.
4. The formation of a High Court for the purpose of resolving disagreements arising between the Legislative and Executive Authorities and also for settling any disputes between the Government and any citizen.

Your Highness, we wish to assure you that these demands do not aim to interfere with the position of the Ruler and do not conflict with the interests of the British Government."²⁵

Despite the fairness of the demands and the moderation of the language the Government flatly rejected all of the demands. A few days later, on the 2nd November, the Government proclaimed that the so-called committee was not representative of the people and that the Government would endeavour to do its best to introduce reforms.²⁶

The Government was apparently in a predicament in that they did not know how to accede without loss of face. Belgrave later explained his reasons for advising the Government to reject the demands when he said, "I sympathised with some, but by no means all, of the aspirations of the intelligensia but I mistrusted the men who led them."²⁷

The H.E.C. promptly escalated the conflict and gathered support, both moral and financial, from the community.

The eloquence of Al-Baker and Al-Shamlan, joined by a poet from Muharra²⁸q, inflamed the passions of the people and they lost no

opportunity to whip up support, speaking at meetings throughout the island, including religious meetings and festivals.

In an attempt to assuage these passions the Government granted some minor concessions which included the promise of the setting up of elected committees to supervise, but not administer, the Health and Education services.

On the 17th November, during the celebration of the Prophet's Birth, the H.E.C. took the opportunity to turn the festivities into a political rally. Thousands of people turned up that afternoon in the Ide Mosque in Manama, and an eyewitness account described the enthusiasm of the people. Referring to Shamlan he stated,

"We stood inside the speakers' roped-off area whilst Abdul Aziz (Al-Shamlan) gave an impassioned speech, interrupted by the cheers from a crowd of several thousands. At the end of it some of the crowd broke through the rope and flung themselves upon him, hugging and kissing him."²⁹

The popular support for the H.E.C. forced the Government to reconsider its position and clandestine talks took place between themselves and the H.E.C.

Meanwhile the H.E.C. attempted indirectly to contact the local British Authorities to try to establish their attitudes to the H.E.C., and one of the H.E.C. members at that time gained the impression that they were in sympathy with some of their demands.

The writer, however, was informed that at that time the British were strictly neutral and were merely observing the situation and noting developments.³⁰

In the atmosphere the H.E.C. leaflets appealed to the people for their co-operation in not provoking any trouble in view of the

negotiations which were taking place.

It appeared, however, that the talks with the Government did not make any progress with the main demand for a Legislative Council, although certain other concessions were won. In view of this the H.E.C. decided to force the issue and to proclaim a General Strike.

On the 2nd December, 1954, the H.E.C. issued its Bulletin No. 8 which stated,

"Because the authority has ignored your repeated demands for reforms and because of the growing discontent of the groups and individuals who are pressing the demand for more positive action we announce a peaceful General Strike, the purpose of which is to sound the people's grievances and to demonstrate that the people stand behind their representatives."

The H.E.C. specified that the strike was to last for one week and that it was to begin on Saturday, 4th December.

The strike was extremely effective and brought Bahrain to a complete standstill. The H.E.C. organised the essential services and no vehicles moved in the island without their authorisation.

Within a day of the lifting of the strike Shaikh Salman announced in a Proclamation, the formation of an ad hoc committee to supervise the Education, Health and Police Services.³¹ The Proclamation went on to cite the latest improvements in the Administration such as the appointment of a British Judicial Adviser,³² two British officers to the Police, an additional doctor in the hospital and the forthcoming elections for a new Municipality Council.

The H.E.C. replied to the Proclamation and acknowledged the reforms cited by the Government but stated that they were no

substitute for the more radical reforms which they were demanding.

They cited the Government's suppression of the "Al-Qafilah" newspaper and the encouragement of employers by the Government not to pay the wages of some of the strikers, as unhealthy signs of lack of co-operation and sincerity on the part of the Government. They also repeated their original demands.³³

Because of the opposition of the H.E.C., the ad hoc committee never materialised but the Government went ahead with its plans for Municipal Elections, which were to be held on the 19th February, 1955, despite threats by the H.E.C. to boycott them. Furthermore, the H.E.C. presented an ultimatum to the Government that if they did not reply to their original demands they would initiate certain actions. These included the following steps.

1. That the H.E.C. would demand from all citizens participating, now or in the future, in any council, elected or appointed, to withdraw from those councils. Those who did not comply with this would be proclaimed as traitors.

2. That the H.E.C. would create special councils in the towns and villages of Bahrain to act as arbitrators between the people on civil matters without reference to Government Departments.

3. That if the above steps were taken, and within two months no action was forthcoming from the Government, the H.E.C. would organise political rallies to parade through Manama and Muharraq in which all men, women and children would participate.

4. That if all this produced no result the H.E.C. would take further crucial steps which would be announced at the time.³⁴

Thus, by issuing the ultimatum the H.E.C. put themselves in an irretrievable position, in that if the Government stood firm

they had committed themselves to actions which they may not have been able to carry through. If this happened they would then suffer a loss of confidence on the part of their supporters.

As another means of pressing their case the H.E.C. approached the British Government by means of handing a memorandum to the Political Resident for forwarding to the Foreign Secretary. In the memorandum, which was handed in on the 21st February, 1955, the H.E.C. described in detail their demanded reforms.

The reply to the memorandum was received by the General Secretary of the H.E.C. on the 17th March, 1955 and was deeply disappointing. Far from supporting their views, the reply instead detailed measures that the Bahrain Government had already taken toward reform and went on to describe future improvements which were to be made. The Foreign Secretary advised the H.E.C. that instead of opposing the Government, its interests would be best served by working in close co-operation with it.

In spite of the disappointment, the H.E.C. replied to the letter disputing in detail the facts contained therein, in the hope of changing the Foreign Secretary's views but this proved to be of no avail.³⁵

Therefore, lacking any progress on the political front the H.E.C. moved into the social field to maintain their support in the country. One of their more notable successes was in obtaining a number of scholarships from Cairo University and recruiting and selecting Bahraini Secondary School-leavers to fill them.³⁶

At this time the H.E.C. also took the first steps, which we mentioned earlier towards founding Bahrain's first Trade Union and drawing up their own labour legislation.³⁷

In view of these developments the Government hastened the setting up of a Labour Law Advisory Committee in order to combat these moves. To forestall criticism on other points the Government proposed the establishment of permanent councils to supervise both Health and Education. They also adopted, after modification to suit local conditions, a Criminal Code of Law which had been drawn up originally by legal experts in the Foreign Office for general use in British-administered areas of the Gulf.

It was announced that the Criminal Code would take effect from August, but the H.E.C. counter attacked on the grounds that the laws had been drawn up without reference to the people of Bahrain and that certain articles had been written in to enable the Government to ban the H.E.C. as an illegal organisation.³⁸

This fierce attack forced the Government to suspend the introduction of the Code indefinitely and to announce later that a legal expert from Egypt would be appointed to study the Bahrain laws and make recommendations for any changes thought necessary.

The H.E.C. showed their readiness to participate in the proposed committees and after negotiations with the Government it was agreed that each committee should consist of one half elected members and one half Government nominees. The polling day for the Education Council elections was announced as 9th February, 1956.³⁹

The H.E.C. then embarked on an intensive and well-organised political campaign and encouraged support for the H.E.C.'s own nominees (three Sunni and three Shia).⁴⁰

On polling day eighty percent of the Bahrain electorate went to the polls and the result was that the H.E.C. sponsored candidates won a landslide victory by gaining ninety-two percent of the poll.

After the sweeping victory and demonstration of the support they enjoyed the H.E.C. asked the Government for formal recognition.

The victory, however, soon turned sour as the Government immediately appointed two of the other candidates who had been so disastrously defeated at the polls amongst their nominees on the Council. The H.E.C. candidates then refused to take their seats on the Council until the Government nominees were changed.⁴¹ This the Government eventually did but not without taking another step which upset the people. Having replaced the two offending members by others more acceptable they then appointed as Chairman of the Council Shaikh Abdulla bin Isa, the Ruler's uncle, thus assuring themselves of a permanent majority: the H.E.C. sponsored members, therefore, continued to refuse to take their seats on the council.

Whilst this was going on two unfortunate incidents took place. The first of these was during Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's visit on the 2nd March 1956. Whilst travelling from the airport to Manama his car was mobbed by a crowd shouting anti-Belgrave slogans. Whilst the H.E.C. immediately condemned this action publicly,⁴² it proved to be the breaking point as far as the British were concerned in that it appears that from this time they decided privately that it would be politic to rid themselves of the H.E.C., as we will see later.

After this incident the atmosphere in the island was very tense and a number of minor disturbances and scuffles with the police took place, but a serious riot developed on the 11th March following an incident in the vegetable market near the (now old)

Municipality building. A row developed initially between a Municipality official and a stall holder but as more people became involved the official fled chased by a crowd. The police promptly opened fire on the crowd killing three and wounding many others.⁴³

These killings, and the fact that the Government had still not granted them recognition, moved the H.E.C. to call a general strike in protest at the incident.⁴⁴ The call was taken up enthusiastically by the people and once again Bahrain business was brought to a halt in a strike which lasted for one week before the British, acting as mediators, were able to arrange a compromise.

The mediation started on 13th March when Mr. C.A. Gault, the Political Agent, met members of the H.E.C., but without results. Following upon this, a second meeting was arranged for 16th March at which the H.E.C. presented the following demands as a condition for ending the strike.

1. The Government should recognise the H.E.C.
2. A Public Enquiry should be held into the killings of 11th March and the culprits punished. Compensation to be paid to the relatives of the unfortunate dead.
3. Sir Charles Belgrave to be relieved of his post.
4. Dr. Abdul Razaq al-Sanhouri, the Egyptian legal expert, should be invited to come to Bahrain to study the Codification of Civil and Criminal Law with the assistance of a democratically chosen committee.

After prolonged negotiations a compromise was reached. This involved the H.E.C. dropping, for the time being, demands for a

Legislative Council and not to press for Sir Charles Belgrave's dismissal (although it was verbally promised that he would be retired before the end of the year).⁴⁵ In exchange for this the Government agreed to recognise the H.E.C., provided that it changed its name in view of the fact that it had been connected with previous troubles, and that its General Secretary, Al-Baker should go into self-imposed exile for a period of six months.⁴⁶

Following the agreed compromise the strike was lifted on the 17th March and the committee became known as the Committee for National Unity (C.N.U.).⁴⁷

A Foreign Office statement which was issued reflected the lightening of the Bahrain situation.

"We are glad to learn that the situation in Bahrain is now quiet. We have every confidence in the Ruler of Bahrain and his Advisor, and we will continue to give him all necessary support in carrying out his programme of gradual development, both in the material well-being of the country and in its orderly constitutional advancement."⁴⁸

On the 18th March, 1956, in the presence of Al-Baker, Al-Shamlan, Al-Aliwat and Mohasin al-Tajir Sheikh Salman signed the recognition document giving legal status to the C.N.U. The agreement was witnessed by the Political Agent, Mr. C.A. Gault.

On the same day the Shaikh announced that a committee would be set up to investigate the affairs of 2nd - 16th March⁴⁹ and that the Chairmanship of the Education Council had been vacated and would be filled by a member elected from the Council. He also announced the creation of an Administrative Council, consisting of nominees of the Shaikh, and chaired by Shaikh Abdulla bin Isa.⁵⁰ It was stated that the functions of the Council would be,

"to arrange matters between Government departments in order to improve their functions, to contact the people and to carry out our orders. The Council, however, should not interfere with the State's finances, nor with political or foreign affairs."

Despite the fact that the Council was composed mainly of al-Khalifah the terms of reference appeared to be very limited and its powers minimal.

The C.N.U., however, under its new General Secretary, al-Shamlan, saw the Council, which was without any elected members, merely as a continuation of the Ruler's policy of denying the people a place in their own Government. They attacked the Council vigorously⁵¹ for its composition and aims and included Belgrave in their attacks as the suspected architect of this new move.⁵²

The Government on her side continued with what ~~they~~^{were} regarded as necessary reforms and concessions. In May and June they stated their intentions to establish a Health Council in the near future they proclaimed a new Press Law and the creation of a new Government post, Secretary to the Government. This position was awarded to Mr. G.W.R. Smith, formerly Head of the customs Department.⁵³

The lack of consultation in the moves increased the frustrations of the C.N.U. and so in July they issued a bulletin to the Bahrainis in which they made public their differences with the Government. They refused to accept the Administrative Council as it was constituted and disagreed with its functions and aims. They expressed resentment, on principle at Belgrave's continued presence at the meetings between C.N.U. and the Government and they also objected strongly to the new Press Law which limited the freedom

of the press. It was a lengthy bulletin⁵⁴ which showed clearly their frustrations and fading hopes and finished by quoting a text from a prominent Egyptian writer,

"People who enter, with their Rulers or Colonisers, into bargains with their freedom, are signing at the same time the document of their slavery. By these acts they prove themselves to be still in the cradle, incapable of seeing with their own eyes, hearing with their own ears or standing on their own two feet."

In the same bulletin the C.N.U. blueprinted their plans and hopes for the future. They cited goals such as full employment for the Bahraini people, the fight against corruption within the Administration, the improvement of the Health and Education services, the founding of Trades Unions, plans for expanding the economy by developing other industries and fighting for a free press.

Thus, whilst it appeared that the C.N.U. realised that its demands would only be met reluctantly, they were prepared to adopt a realistic attitude and to continue negotiations peaceably with the Government, especially after the announcement in August that Sir Charles Belgrave would terminate his period of service as Advisor to the Shaikh the following summer.⁵⁵

Whilst events were proceeding fairly peacefully in Bahrain, however, the Arab world elsewhere was in a turmoil. Nasser's announcement on the 26th July of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal started events on a collision course between himself and the British. Also Al-Baker made a number of violently anti-British speeches in Beirut and Cairo.⁵⁶

These events were reflected in Bahrain as the press began openly to attack the British over their policy towards Egypt. On "Egypt Day" (14th August) the C.N.U. organised a political rally in support

of Egypt and two days later they called a one day strike as further evidence of their support.⁵⁷

During the period up to November of that year nationalistic feelings were riding high and this was increased by the return of Al-Baker in late September. As the fervour increased friction broke out between the leaders of the C.N.U. over which course should be adopted in its struggle, and personal jealousies and conflicts of opinion became apparent.

On the 29th October, 1956, however, an event occurred which completely changed the situation. The Israelis invaded Sinai. The following day students from Manama Secondary School took to the streets to demonstrate. They were joined by boys and girls from other schools and they paraded through Manama and Muharraq shouting anti-Israel and anti-British slogans, overturning and setting fire to cars and damaging property. Some C.N.U. members went into the towns in an attempt to calm the students and restore order, but they had no option in view of the popular feelings except to sympathise with their objectives but disapprove of the methods of the students otherwise they would have lost much of their support.

They therefore issued, the following day, their 77th and last bulletin which condemned the Israelis, along with the British and the French for their attack on Egypt, and praised Egypt and Arab Nationalism. The bulletin called on Shaikh Salman to support his people in the condemnation and to disregard the advice of "imperialists". They called upon all people to unite against the "new Crusaders".

They called for peaceful processions of demonstration to support their campaign and ended the bulletin by calling for a

general strike, "until further notice!"

On Friday, 2nd November the processions were formed and the march started peacefully, but during the parade some elements got out of hand and began to stone Government and certain commercial establishments and these attacks progressed to fire-raising. During the day, Ibrahim Fakroo, a member of the C.N.U. committee, was arrested by the police in Muharraq.

Over the next few days as the situation became calmer the C.N.U. attempted to negotiate for the freeing of their colleague.

The Government, however, were in no mood to negotiate and imposed a curfew immediately following the disturbances and had decided to force a showdown with the C.N.U. On the night of 5th November the Government declared a State of Emergency and British troops, who had been stationed there since the March strike were employed in an active role in enforcing security. During the early hours of the 6th November Al-Baker, Al-Shamlan, Al-Aliwat and Ibrahim bin Moosa were arrested by the police and troops, and were later transferred to Jidda island along with Fakroo.⁵⁸

The Government declared the C.N.U. an illegal organization and added that anyone issuing statements or bulletins under this or any other name would be arrested.

The strike, however, continued, although with police and troops saturating the towns little could be done.

A number of other members of the C.N.U. General Assembly were arrested and others made good their escape, fleeing to Qatar, Kuwait and Beirut.

The five members of the C.N.U. committee were hastily brought to trial and sentenced, three to exile and two to imprisonment.⁵⁹

After the arrest and trial of the leaders of the C.N.U. things could not be the same in Bahrain. All the hard-won gains in the social, political and industrial spheres collapsed, the press was completely banned and Bahrain entered a period of political repression.

c) The Years of Repression

With the collapse of the C.N.U. in late 1956 many of the intelligentsia fled the country and took refuge in other parts of the Arab world. Some, less fortunate, were arrested and committed to prison and the Bahrain political scene entered a new and rather repressive phase.

This change was contrary to the expectations of some observers who saw the political climate as one from which advances could be made. Sinclair, for instance, writing in December, 1956, observed that, "The Bahrain Administration has brought a rather high degree of political consciousness to the people and they appear to be ready for the next step."⁶⁰ Whilst there was undoubtedly a great amount of political consciousness the actions of the Bahrain Government ensured that the "next step" never materialised.

In the months following the November disturbances the British troops were used extensively to carry out police duties under the State of Emergency Decree. In the meantime the police force was itself reinforced by an intensive recruiting campaign from South Yemen and the Jordanian Bedouins. Furthermore a special branch was set up within the police force, headed by a British officer, for the specific purpose of investigating and dealing with any suspicious political occurrences.

Only when the police force had been strengthened and had firm control of the situation were the British troops withdrawn to their bases.

The civil authorities then gradually tightened their control until by the end of the decade Bahrain was virtually a police state.

Following the departure of Sir Charles Belgrave in 1957, Mr. G.W.R. Smith assumed full control as Secretary to the Government. Lacking the former's initiative and contacts, Smith followed fairly narrow and predictable lines of government with the result that all the other departments gradually came to be dominated by the Police Department, who often influenced the appointment of Heads of Departments and other high-ranking officials.

After the closure of the private newspapers in 1956 there was no free press in Bahrain until 1966. During this period the only news media in Bahrain were the Bahrain Broadcasting Station, which had been re-opened in 1955, and Government leaflets and publications. Both were very closely controlled by the Government and used very much as pure propaganda devices by them.

In the face of the oppressive and frustrating situation the new generation began to look for new ideas in an attempt to find a way out of their dilemma.

This unrest manifested itself in the actions of many Bahraini students studying abroad who suddenly found themselves free of the strictures of their homeland. Some, for instance, who were studying in Beirut and Cairo indulged themselves in the new Arab political movements. Those in Beirut were often deeply influenced by the Ba'athist movement, and persons such as Ali Fakroo,⁶¹ during the 1950's,

became leading figures in the Ba'athist cause, especially in A.U.B. circles, and were outspoken critics of the Bahrain Government. The Arab Nationalist Movement also found ready adherents amongst the Bahraini students there and people such as Mohammed al-Ansari⁶² (A.U.B.) and Abdul Rahman al-Zamel (Cairo Univ.) became leading advocates of the Movement.

The organ of the Arab Nationalist movement, "Al-Huriah", found a wide market and was eagerly read by many Bahrainis.

Both organisations did not find it very difficult to convey their messages and win recruits within Bahrain itself, as many students, on returning to Bahrain for their vacations, or on the completion of their studies, promptly enlisted the support of their friends and younger students and established cells of both movements throughout Bahrain.

The Communists also found it fairly easy in such a repressive atmosphere to gain many recruits. Clubs such as "nadi al-Fajr", on the outskirts of Manama, and "Nadi al-Noor" became hives of Communist activity during the late 1950's and early 1960's. Prominent amongst the members of the movement in Bahrain were Yusef al-Ajaji and Ahmed al-Dhawadi.

Although they were the smallest in number, the Communists were the most active both inside and outside of Bahrain to the extent that they were the first ever delegates from the Gulf area to attend an Arab Communist conference in Beirut in Many, 1965.⁶³

Although many of the Bahraini youth found a haven in these political organisations, because of the strict police supervision, none of them were able to take the lead in promoting open conflict with the Government. The Special Branch of the Police were extremely

active in the early 1960's. On the smallest pretext they arrested, imprisoned or deported anyone they considered to be a potential agitator. Some students, returning to Bahrain for their vacations, found that they were prevented from leaving the country again because of their alleged political activities in Beirut or Cairo. In addition they were often denied a work permit and were thus prevented from finding work either at home or abroad.

This situation continued although not without protest. One such protest occurred in March 1965 when the situation suddenly erupted. The initial cause was the fact that for a number of months before, BAPCO had been making redundant hundreds of her Bahraini employees, following the visit of a "chopper" committee during the winter and the commissioning of the new automatic plant.⁶⁴

On the 5th March the students of Manama Secondary School decided to demonstrate against the sackings and organised a sit-in. The police intervened fiercely and a number of students were injured. The students then broke out from the school and took to the streets to continue their demonstration.

This action caused the political factions in Bahrain, Ba-athists, Arab Nationalists, Communists and others, to join forces in forming an underground organisation which became known as the National Front for Progressive Force (N.F.P.F.)

After two days of rioting the situation deteriorated further as the police began to arrest the alleged leaders of the students.

The N.F.P.F. then issued leaflets calling for a general strike, which started on the 10th March. Up to the end of the month Manama and Muharraq were wracked almost daily by violent demonstrations.

Violence was the most striking feature of the demonstrations, apart from the participation of women in large numbers.

It was reported that in certain areas the local population stormed the police stations and seized stores of arms. In the two main towns the population barricaded the streets in defiance of the police, who opened fire on numerous occasions, killing and wounding many people.⁶⁵ During the course of the disturbances two members of the hated Special Branch were severely injured in bomb attacks.⁶⁶

The N.F.P.F. then took the opportunity to formulate a set of demands which were reported to be ;

1. To stop the arbitrary dismissal of BAPCO employees and allow them to return to their jobs.
2. To recognise the right of the workers to form their own Trades Unions.
3. To lift the State of Emergency which has existed since 1956 and to allow the foundation of a free press and to re-establish freedom of speech.
4. To free all political prisoners, to grant an amnesty to all those involved in the disturbances and to allow the return of political exiles.
5. To dismiss all foreign employees within the police forces.⁶⁷

The demands were never formally presented and came to nothing.

Gradually the Government re-established its control of the island, large numbers of people were arrested and a curfew was imposed which lasted until mid-April.⁶⁸

To many of the people in Bahrain the March riots of 1965 were a nightmare, and the months following were very tense and

apprehensive, because of both the violence which took place and the savage official reaction.

The "Guardian" drew a comparison between the unrest of 1953-56 and that of March 1965, to the former the paper concluded that the unrest was the result of the desires on the part of the middle class whilst the affairs of March 1965 were built on the strength of the working class.⁶⁹

"The Observer" noted that it was regrettable to suppress too severely what was a completely reformist movement and that the policy of using force to maintain so-called order could only lead to greater disappointment.⁷⁰

The harsh suppression of the disturbances in March can probably be in part explained by the need of the British for a friendly Government to be in control of Bahrain, which was to become their major base in the area, following the decision to withdraw from Aden, which had till then been a major staging-point in the Middle East for British troops.

The idea of moving to Bahrain was first mooted during Shaikh Isa bin Salman's visit to London in 1964. Reports appeared in the press in August, 1965 stating that Britain was re-negotiating the lease on her bases in Bahrain with the intention of meeting the Bahrain Government's demands for a substantial and realistic rent in lieu of the token £250 per annum they had been paying previously.⁷¹

During the visit of Shaikh Khalifah bin Sulman, the Head of the Finance Department at that time, to London between 11th and 23rd May, 1966 negotiations took place between himself and Mr. Walter Padley, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, at which

an agreement was concluded whereby the British Government agreed to pay an initial lump sum of £1,000,000 followed by yearly payments of £500,000 as rent for her bases in Bahrain. It was also announced, following the agreement, that Britain would encourage investment in local Bahraini-owned businesses, besides which they also promised to rent houses and flats as accommodation for her Army officers.⁷² Both of these moves were an effort to stimulate the local economy.

The duration of the lease was not specified but could be terminated by either side on receipt of five years' notice to quit.

The issue of whether Britain should maintain a continued presence "east of Suez" was a very controversial one in British home politics, especially in view of the state of the economy and Britain's experiences in Aden. British experts in the area presented many conflicting views.⁷³ "The Economist" was one of the first to voice its reservations over the wisdom of moving the British troops to Bahrain from Aden, especially in view of the Bahrain political situation. It went on to say, "It is doubtful whether the British servicemen who will be moving into the area (Bahrain) realise what a hornets' nest they are landing on."⁷⁴

However, within a very short time the British changed their policy towards a British presence in the Gulf. In January 1968 it was announced that British troops would be withdrawn by the end of 1971.⁷⁵

This put the small lower-Gulf Shaikhs and especially Bahrain, into a serious predicament. For Bahrain this meant that they would lose their British "protection" they enjoyed both

from their own people and from foreign intervention. The latter was important in view of the unsettled Iranian claim to sovereignty over the islands. This issue was, however, later settled by diplomatic means which have been mentioned earlier, but the former remained to be resolved.

Between 1968 and 1970 intensive activity took place in diplomatic circles between Bahrain and the lower-Gulf States in an effort to form a union of United Arab ~~Am~~irates. The negotiations were extended and a number of mediators attempted to find a solution but old feuds, traditional rivalries and tribal loyalties proved to be an insurmountable stumbling block.⁷⁶

The Government of Bahrain decided eventually to go its own way, especially in view of the U.N. Security Council resolution of 11th May, 1970, which recognised that the people of Bahrain wished to be independent and to be accorded recognition as such.

Encouraged by the recognition and in view of the failure of negotiation to found the U.A.A., the Government on the 14th August, 1971 formally announced its independence as an Arab State.

The following day Shaikh Isa bin Salman, the Ruler, and Sir Geoffrey Arthur, the British Political Resident in the Gulf, exchanged notes which ended the 1882 and 1892 Treaties between Bahrain and the British and established instead a new "Treaty of Friendship", valid for ten years.⁷⁷

Administratively, however, there had been no change in the Governmental system since the setting up of the Administrative Council in 1956. As we have mentioned this Council was, in effect, on paper only and was never a properly functioning unit.

The first change did not occur until 1970 when a State Council was established headed by Shaikh Khalifah bin Salman.⁷⁸

The creation of this council was intended to give the Administration a new image but in fact it was very much the old style as it was still not an elected council but consisted mainly of members of the al-Khalifah family and some Heads of Departments. Furthermore some unrest was felt in regard to its constitution. Article 8, for instance, stated that the resolutions of the council should be decided by a simple majority, provided that the head of the Council (the Shaikh's brother) agreed to the decision.

After the Proclamation of Independence this council changed its name to the Ministerial Council but there was no change in either structure or membership.

Despite the continued political repressions there still existed a small amount of organised political unrest. The most frequently recurring events were the arrests and trial of students returning from abroad, for political activities.⁷⁹ A secret society was discovered in mid-1970 calling itself the East Arabian Liberation Front, which consisted of former Ba'athists.⁸⁰ During their trial later in the year it alleged that the organisation had in its possession quantities of arms and explosives.⁸¹

The most active political section, however, is the Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (P.F.L.B.), which is a left-wing movement operating clandestinely in Bahrain, but more openly abroad. Their main aim is to oppose the existing system of government and to work for reform to more democratic lines.

At the time of writing they are organising opposition to the composition of the proposed Foundation Council for which elections are to be held during December, 1972. Their reason for opposition is that whilst twenty-two members are to be

elected to the Council, which is to draw up a written Constitution, prior to the establishment of a Legislative Assembly, it is still intended that the Government should reserve the right to make up the remainder of the Council by the appointment of ten further members by decree and in addition granting a seat on the Council to every minister,⁸³ thus attempting to ensure themselves of a majority on the Council.

d) Critical Assessment of Political Affairs

From the 1920's onward, through the Second World War and up to the present day Bahrainis have developed on increasingly sensitive political consciousness. The four major elements which we have cited earlier, namely the cultural gap, Social communications, Arab nationalism and foreign influence have all contributed either positively or negatively, to this development.

The cultural gap between the two communities in Bahrain has still not yet by any means been bridged, but the very fact that a greater degree of collaboration has taken place since the 1950's indicates that this is no longer a major issue.

The influence of Arab Nationalism has been felt in the political trends of the islands but because the concepts of Arab Nationalism were only very vaguely defined at first the effect in the early years was intellectual rather than political. Even today, when the supreme goals of Arab Nationalism have become fairly defined as liberation, socialism and unity, they have never been truly absorbed in Bahrain as political aims. All the political struggles have centred on liberal demands and reforms within the system.

The political elite would sometimes cite the examples of other Arab countries, as in 1938, or identify themselves with various Arab National movements, i.e. Ba'athists or Arab Nationalists. As these movements never formulated a policy with regard to the future political events of Bahrain the effects were therefore minimal.

Political support for other Arab countries occurred from time to time, i.e. Palestine 1947-48, Algeria 1954-58 and Egypt during 1956, on an emotional rather than an ideological basis. This attitude appears to be changing as events move nearer home for the Bahrainis and today many are actively involved with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Gulf who are presently fighting the Government forces of Oman. Summing up we may say that in the past Arab Nationalism has been applied in Bahrain in an effort to solve their own domestic problems and only recently have the Bahrainis grasped the true aims of Nationalism on a pan-Arab ideological front, with their support, on a local basis, of progressive forces at work in Oman and elsewhere.

The widely-held view of foreign observers was that political unrest in Bahrain was engendered mainly by outside forces, especially with regard to the unrest of 1953-56. Contributing to this view the Economist of March, 1956 stated that, "There are about eight hundred Bahrainis being educated in Egypt so that its influence is constantly renewed."⁸⁴ In fact at that time there was hardly a fraction of that number of Bahrainis in Egypt but the idea that the Egyptians were behind the 1953-56 unrest was still put forward by many writers.⁸⁵ Others, however, took another view in that the unrest began as a desire for genuine

reforms⁸⁶ but that it later became "servant to Egypt".

The latter attitude was reflected by British officials. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Secretary at the time, in replying to a question on Bahrain from Mr. Warby, stated, "I do not agree that there is any sorry state of affairs in Bahrain. And I am not so sure of the origins of the so-called 'Popular Movement'".⁸⁷

Events later revealed that Egypt had nothing whatsoever to do with the unrest during 1953-56 in Bahrain. Confirmation of this came from many quarters. The late Al-Baker told the writer that he met Nasser during his self-exile of March to September, 1956, and that during the interview Nasser expressed hardly any enthusiasm for their cause and held out little hope of any support.

This view is confirmed by H. Trevelyan who stated that, "He (Nasser) had told me that the accusations about his activities against the British in Aden and Bahrain were groundless, since he had no organisation in either place".⁸⁸ In fact the unrest was due simply to a reformist movement in Bahrain who were, in Nutting's words attempting to gain a "Magna Carta"⁸⁹ The aims of the movement, which were expressed to the writer by Al-Shamlan in 1971, were "to fight denominationalism within Bahrain society and to bring the intelligensia, petite bourgeoisie and labouring classes under one umbrella, with a view to fulfilling the legitimate goals of the people".⁹⁰ Even allowing for the time interval between 1956 and 1971, during which the influence of Arab Nationalism has spread more widely, we find no mention of Arab Nationalism in this statement but rather idealism and patriotism.

Al-Baker, writing in 1965, expressed the view that he

refused to recognise any substitutions of Shaikh Salman as Ruler of Bahrain, and expressed the committee's loyalty to the Al-Khalifah,⁹¹ which pointed to the fact that they desired progressive reforms rather than revolution. They were in fact general reformists without any set ideology and both Al-Baker and Al-Shamlan denied the writer's suggestion that they wished to form a political party. Support for this argument comes from the New Statesman which, when commenting on the affairs of 1953-56, referred to the events as the actions of a reformist movement which, "seemed to lack the congenital Anglophobia which makes Arab Nationalism elsewhere."⁹²

The other facts which influenced the political scene in Bahrain from the 1920's was, as we have stated earlier, the growth of British influence.

The initial interference in 1923 seemed to be motivated by humanitarian reasons and was positively constructive. There may be reason to doubt this, however, as on the same situation in Iraq (suppression of the Shia)⁹³ the British adopted a different attitude. It may in fact have been a manoeuvre to gain influence and control of the strategically-placed island and to obtain control of its administration. Although at that time Britain did not appear to have any long term policy with regard to the island, the presence of a British Advisor as early as 1926 shows that they intended to keep the initiative which they had gained. Having appointed the Advisor they virtually ceased to make constructive and progressive reforms and seemed more interested in merely maintaining the status quo. The British Authorities in the Gulf saw the very fact that there was a highly-placed British

employee in the Bahrain Government as being sufficient to maintain a "progressive and improved government". They overlooked the fact that sometimes, consciously or unconsciously, a vested interest developed. Human nature being as it is people holding power often resist reforms in an attempt to safeguard that same power.

The safeguarding of the British interests was constantly in the minds of the authorities of the Gulf and the Political Resident, as early as 1929, in referring to the importance of the British Advisor, stated, "if the European Advisor were removed Shaikh Hamed would surely fall under the influence of some intriguing Syrian or Egyptian who would, for a consideration, play into the hands of Persia or Najd".⁹⁴

The basis of the argument changed over the years but a reason could always be found for the continued presence of the Advisor.

The British declined to look objectively or sympathetically on the political aspirations of the Bahraini people, seemed at times to be cynically exploiting the divisions within the community for the maintenance of their own influence. This is instances in their encouragement of the Shia and the undermining of the Arab tribes' authority in 1923 as opposed to their attitude in 1938, when Belgrave cited the loyalty of the Arab tribes to the Shaikh as a justification of the maintenance of the status quo.

Looking back over Belgrave's long service in Bahrain leads one to ask the question, was he merely an employee of the Shaikh or was he an instrument of British rule? Writing on this subject he stated,

"One of my personal problems was how to weight my loyalty to the Shaikh with the loyalty I owed the British. This was not easy, especially when the Shaikh and the British did not always see eye to eye".⁹⁵

He does not tell us, however, whether he supported any particular party in these disputes, indeed a further statement of his leads us to the opinion that he himself was often confused by the situation and the role he played, and sometimes wondered whether he was being used, when he said,

"So often the attitude was as though the Resident was the headmaster of a school, the Political Agent the form-master, the Shaikh the head boy and I - well I do not quite know what - neither fish, fowl nor good red herring."⁹⁶

In this statement he is probably underrating his own role, however, as it is more likely that he was "head boy" rather than the Shaikh.

During his service in Bahrain a myth grew that Belgrave was biased towards the Shia. This charge was repeated by many writers, even by al-Baker.⁹⁷ This is probably an image that he cultivated for his own purposes and used for political ends. He played this role successfully for a time, as he often used his very influence with the Shia to neutralise them as political forces until, during the period 1953-56 when he was no longer able to maintain this role.

He himself, in the later stages of this political unrest, felt that he was no longer persona grata to the British. He noted that, "He (the Shaikh) knew that the British authorities would like me to leave as soon as possible".⁹⁸ This idea of the removal of Belgrave was probably the first major change of policy by the British towards Bahrain for a long time.

As it appeared later the British had no intention of backing the demands of the 1953-56 political movements, despite what appeared at the time to be their support during their attempts at mediation.⁹⁹ In fact early in March, following the scenes involving Selwyn Lloyd, and whilst the mediation was going on, the British Cabinet had decided to take action. As Nutting revealed later,

"when riots broke out in Bahrain following the Foreign Secretary's brief visit, Eden put the blame on the Committee of National Union. The "whiff of grapeshot" school suggested that troops of the Strategic Reserve be sent from Aden to quell the riots, and when the War Office pointed out that there was not enough troops to spare, Eden proposed to invite Nuri es-Said to help with the despatch of an Iraqi police detachment."¹⁰⁰

Nutting went on to say that it was fortunate that this proposition was not put into effect as the Iraqi police authority convinced Nuri es-Said that the police would not fire on fellow-Arabs. He continued, however, "He (Eden) wanted a demonstration of strength, an assertion of Britain's power and influence to raise her battered prestige."¹⁰¹

This view was confirmed to the writer by Sir Bernard Burrows, the Political Resident in the Gulf at that time (1954-58) who stated that we (the British) decided to take action after the Selwyn Lloyd incident in 1956. This attitude was taken by the British in spite of the fact that the H.E.C. had immediately publicly condemned the action of the rioters.

Further confirmation of this attitude is clear in the reply of the Foreign Secretary to a question by Mr. Philips Price on the 19th March, 1956, concerning what advice that he had given to the

Shaikh of Bahrain about associating the people of the island more actively with the government of the territory.

He said, "H.M.G. are not responsible for the internal affairs of Bahrain but in view of our association and friendship with the Ruler we are naturally concerned that Bahrain should remain as it has been in the past, a stable and well-ordered state, under the present House."¹⁰²

This statement was made only one day following the completion of the negotiations in which the British were mediators and the subsequent acknowledgment by the Bahrain Government of the C.N.U. Possibly the mediation was just an attempt to buy time, for Mr. C. Gaultt informed the writer, "at that time we wanted to keep the situation quiet."¹⁰³

The lack of British support for the reforms can be seen in the fact that the small gains made during the negotiations of 1956 were to evaporate before the end of that year in the face of renewed repressions.

If the negotiated reforms of elections to the Health and Education Councils and the recognition of organised labour had been backed by the British after their part in the negotiations they would probably have continued and progressed.

The future downfall of British policy in the Gulf area was elaborated upon by Mr. Paul Johnson, who, writing in 1958, put the view that,

"it is difficult to think of any single act more calculated to place strength into the hands of Britain's worst enemies in the Middle East, to complete the identification, once and for all, in the eyes of every Arab, between British policy and the worse brutalities of feudal reaction."¹⁰⁴

He went on to suggest that,

"the Ruler of Bahrain, for example, should be told that he had precisely two years in which to draw up a constitution and come to terms with his subjects."¹⁰⁵

As we have already stated, Bahrain, during the 1960's tended to be a police state. An Indian lawyer, who practiced in Bahrain for seven years stated,

"In Bahrain, Britain's petite South Africa in the Arabian Gulf, when every officer of authority (Bahrain State Police), has the uncommon benefit of happy irresponsibility, and the result is a government of plurality of unassailable English whims."¹⁰⁶ Later he went on to say, "Prison, perhaps is the easiest place to go to in Bahrain."¹⁰⁷

The uncertainty of the long-term British policy towards the Gulf area made the situation worse, as the Ruler counted on continuing support from the British.

Mr. G. Thompson, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, whilst visiting Bahrain on 10th May, 1965, announced that his Government had no intention of changing Britain's role in the Gulf.¹⁰⁸ A year later the new lease for British bases in Bahrain was signed and was taken as a sign that a British presence would continue. As we have seen, however, less than eighteen months later the decision to withdraw put the rulers of the Area, especially the Ruler of Bahrain, in a delicate situation.

The consequences of the British withdrawal in 1971 remain yet to be seen.

FOOTNOTES

1. Its war propaganda apparently upset Berlin to the extent that Arabic Service, broadcasting from Berlin condemned the paper as a British mouthpiece. See "Al-Bahrain" No. 23, 31st Aug., 1939.
2. See "Al-Bahrain", Nos. 50, 67 and 82.
3. Al-Khatir, Op.cit., p.52.
4. The Govt. of Bahrain co-operated in producing anti-Axis propaganda and plays such as "The Italian Atrocities in North Africa" were produced by the Bahrain Education Authorities.
5. "Al-Bahrain" newspaper stopped publication during 1944 following a quarrel between the proprietor and the authorities.
6. Belgrave, C.D., Personal Column, op.cit., p.144.
7. Anon. "Jazirat al-Arab Tatehim Hukamoha" Cairo, 1948.
8. The decision to move to Bahrain had been taken before the war. For the background to this see Farah Talal - "Question of Removal of British Residence to Bahrain" - M.A. Thesis. Beirut, A.U.B. 1970, also Saffoury, L.Y., "Britain's Withdrawal from the Persian Gulf - Decision and Background", M.A. Thesis. Beirut A.U.B. May, 1970, p.40.
9. "Sout al-Bahrain" was formed on a co-operative basis. The original idea was to form a publishing house to produce other periodicals. These others, however, never materialised. The Editorial Board was mainly composed of both Sunnis and Shia. Another member of the board was Mr. James Belgrave, son of Sir Charles Belgrave, who, it was later revealed, had been appointed to make easier the process of Government approval.
10. Qubain, F.I., "The Impact of the Petroleum Industry on Iraq and Bahrain" - Ph.D. Thesis - Univ. of Wisconsin, 1956, p.330.
11. Govt. of Bahrain Annual Report, 1953, p.74.
12. Belgrave, C.D., op.cit., p. 189.
13. Reported to the writer by the late al-Baker. The conversation referred to is alleged to have taken place between Sir Charles Belgrave and Mr. Hamed al-Sabah of al-Hedd.
14. Belgrave, C.D., op.cit., p. 166.
15. Ibid, p. 113.
16. Ibid, p. 114.

17. Littlefield, op.cit., p.14 stated that Shaikh Abdulla bin Jaber (?) had initiated the incidents. It was in fact Shaikh Daij bin Hamed.
18. Al-Baker - "Min al-Bahrain" - op.cit., pp. 59-63.
19. Belgrave, C.D., op.cit., pp. 200-201, also Littlefield op.cit., p.16.
20. "The Times", London, 13th July, 1954 - Belgrave made a strange statement on this incident when he said, "Some of the police on the tower fired in the air, without orders, and the shots hit several men on the outskirts of the crowd"! op.cit., p.202.
21. Because of his previous activities al-Baker had been ordered to leave Bahrain for a short exile from June to Sept., 1954, and it was his immediate involvement in the dispute on his return which led to the threat.
22. Owen, Roderick - "The Golden Bubble" - Collins, London 1957, p.72.
23. Humidan, Ali - "Les Princes de l'Or Noir", op.cit., 64, estimated the numbers attending the Sanabis meeting as being in the order of 20,000. This is an over-estimation.
24. The Committee consisted of:- Sunni:- Abdul Rahman al-Baker, Abdul Aziz al-Shamlan, Ibrahim bin Moosa, Ibrahim Fakroo. Shia:- Mohasin al-Tajir, Abdulla abu Dheb, Said Ali Said Ibrahim and Abd Ali al-Aliwat. The most active members of the committee were the first two named members of the Sunni and the last named of the Shia. The other three Shia members became insignificant and inactive members of the Committee and were not involved in any of the later troubles. For the names and the purpose of the H.E.C., see H.E.C. Bulletin No. 1, dated 13th Oct. 1954.
25. "Al-Qafilah", 29th Oct., 1954.
26. Govt. of Bahrain, Proclamation No. 74/8 dated 6th Rabia al Awal 1374 (2nd Nov. 1954), also H.E.C. Bulletin No. 2, 4th Nov., 1954
27. Belgrave, C.D., op.cit., p.205.
28. Abdul Rahman al Mawda, at present living in Qatar.
29. Owen, R., op.cit., p.205.
30. Personal interview with Sir Bernard Burrows at his home in Petersfield on 8th Oct., 1971.
31. Govt. of Bahrain Proclamation No. 13/1373 - 11th Dec., 1954.

32. This was Mr. Geoffrey Peace who held the post until 1958 at which time he was succeeded by Mr. David Humphreys.
33. H.E.C. Bulletin No. 11, 14th Dec., 1954.
34. H.E.C. Bulletin No. 15, 8th Feb., 1955.
35. The British Government Memorandum to the H.E.C. and the subsequent reply to the latter are cited in Al-Baker's book "Min al-Bahrain", op.cit., pp. 104-123.
36. The scholarships were from the newly-created Islamic Conference in Cairo. H.E.C. Bulletin No. 19, 21st May, 1955.
37. Dealt with in Chapter III, Part II of this work.
38. H.E.C. Bulletin No. 23, 7th July, 1955. Also No. 24, 22nd Aug., 1955.
39. The committee which supervised the election consisted of Kadim al-Asfoor, Isa al-Hadi, Mirza al-Urrayed and Abdulla al-Sai.
40. The H.E.C. candidates were Khalil al-Mooyyed, Kassim Fakroo, Mohammed Kassim al-Shirawi (Sunni) and Ali al-TajirTaki al-Baharna, Ali Abdulla Al-Biladi (Shia).
41. Belgrave, C., op.cit., 221, put the blame on the elected members. He wrote, "The elected members refused to attend because they did not like the men who the Shaikh had appointed."
42. H.E.C. Bulletin No. 43, 3rd March, 1956.
43. Belgrave, C.D., op.cit., p.222, gave his account of the incident as "The police fired into the air, several people on the edge of the crowd were hit".
44. "The Economist" - "Growing Pains in Bahrain" - Issue No. 5874 24th March, 1956.
45. This promise was made according to Al-Baker's version of the meetings. Belgrave, however, p.223, said that the Shaikh refused to allow the negotiations to revolve on his dismissal.
46. Al-Baker's version of this was that the matter of exile did not arise until the negotiations were completed, but that he agreed to only avoid a further confrontation. Al-Baker, op.cit., pp. 130-131.
47. "National" in this sense was "al-Watani" as so opposed to "al-Qoumi".
48. "Bahrain Islander", 18th March, 1956.

49. It was a two-member committee consisting of Mr. Peace, the Govt. Legal Advisor, and Mr. Maudsley, an Assistant Judge of the Resident Court.
50. Govt. of Bahrain Proclamation No. 19/1956 dated 20th March 1956. The Council, besides Shaikh Abdulla as chairman, consisted of Shaikh Khalifah bin Mohammed al-Khalifah, Shaikh Daij bin Hamed al-Khalifah, Shaikh Khalid bin Abdulla al-Khalifah, Mr. G.W.R. Smith, Mr. Ahmed al-Umran, Mr. Salem al-Arayed and a Secretary, Mr. Yousef al-Shirawi.
51. Letters from C.N.U. to H.H. Shaikh Salman dated 27th March, 1956, and 3rd April, 1956. See also replies dated 2nd and 9th April, 1956, Nos. 1436/1375 and 1476/1375 from Shaikh Salman to C.N.U.
52. C.N.U. Bulletin No. 1, 15th April, 1956.
53. "The Times" - London, 18th June, 1956, also "The Economist" - "Faster and Faster in Bahrain". Vol. CLXXX No. 5890, 14th July, 1956, p.141.
54. C.N.U. Bulletin No. 6, July, 1956.
55. "The Times", London, 14th August, 1956.
56. Al-Baker was cautioned by Public Relations Officer of the British Consulate in Beirut not to go to Cairo and an American Intelligence Service official adopted the same attitude. See Al-Baker "Min al-Bahrain", op.cit., p. 133-134.
57. C.N.U., Bulletin No. 68, 13th Aug., 1956.
58. "The Economist" - Nov. 10th, 1956, reported under the title "Riots in the Oil Sheikdoms", that, "In Bahrain several members of the C.N.U. were arrested and the committee dissolved nevertheless there was rioting and British troops lately stationed there, at the Ruler's request, had to help the police to restore order".
59. The trials took place secretly during 21st and 22nd Dec., 1956 and resulted in two members being committed to prison for a period of ten years (Fakroo and al-Moosa), the other three to fourteen years imprisonment in exile on St. Helena. The two in Bahrain prison served the full sentence but the prisoners on St. Helena were freed in 1961 after a long legal battle, and compensated by the British Government. See Levin, Bernard - "The Prisoners of St. Helena" - "The Spectator", Vol. CCV and CCVI, July/December, 1960 and January/June, 1961.
60. Sinclair, Angus - "The Persian Gulf Principalities" - Mimeograph from Aramco Research Library, Dec. 16th, 1956.
61. Now Doctor Ali Fakroo, the Minister of Health to the Govt. of Bahrain.

62. The former Minister of Information in Bahrain. The Arab Nationalist Movement started in the 1950's, some of its founders were Dr. Ahmed al-Khatib of Kuwait and George Habish now leader of the P.F.L.P.
63. The Conference, the Arab Peace Movement, was held between 21st and 23rd May, 1965. Delegates from Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Bahrain were in attendance. See "Al-Akhbar" - 30th May, 1965. Beirut.
64. Humidan, Ali, op.cit., p.79 estimated the number of redundant workers at around 1,500.
65. Some of the people known to have been killed during this period were Jasim Khalil Abdulla, Abd al-Nebi Mohammed Serhan and Abdulla Murhoon Sirhan (14th March, 1965) Abdulla Hisain Bounoda (24th March, 1965) Abdulla Said al-Ganim (13th April, 1965) and Faisal Abas al-Gasab (14th April, 1965). All were young men in their 20's.
66. These were Abdul Abd al-Mohasin, a Jordanian and an Anglo-Cypriot familiarly known as "Bob".
67. "Al-Ahram" - Cairo, 22nd March, 1965. Also "Al-Moharri" - Beirut, 24th March, 1965. See also bulletin of "Free Bahrain" distributed in Beirut, 30th March, 1965.
68. On 6th and 7th April, 1965 representatives of the Arab Lawyers' Association were prevented from entering Bahrain, as it was their intention to act as counsel for persons arrested during the troubles. See "Al-Wathiyukh al-Arabih", A.U.B., Politics and Public Administration Dept., 1965, pp. 172-173.
69. "The Guardian" - London, 24th March, 1965.
70. "The Observer", London 28th March, 1965.
71. "The Economist", London 28th August, 1965.
72. For this see "Daily Telegraph", London, Saturday, 16th April, 1966. Also "Al-Adwa" Nos. 39 and 40, 2nd and 6th June, 1966, and "Daily Mail", London, 25th April, 1966. At that time it was reported that British troops in Bahrain included paratroops, two squadrons of Hunter aircraft, various Navy units and staff of the Joint Headquarters.
73. On this see Toynbee, A., "Britain and the Arabs, The Need of a New Start" - International Affairs, Vol. XL No. 4, 1964, also Monroe, Elizabeth, "British Bases in the Middle East" - International Affairs - Vol. XLII 1966, pp. 24-34, Kelly, J.B., "The Future in Arabia" - International Affairs Vol. XLII 1966, pp. 619-640, Watt, D.C., "Britain and the Future of the Persian Gulf States" - The World Today, Vol. XX 1969, pp.488-491, to the same author - "The Decision to Withdraw from the Gulf" - Political Quarterly, Vol. 39 1968, pp. 310-321.
74. "The Economist" - London, 5th March, 1966.
75. For the background to this decision and its consequences see

contd...

75. contd....

Fabian Research Series Pamphlet No. 259 - "When Britain Goes".

76. As it is outside the sphere of this paper to discuss in detail the attempts to establish the U.A.A. from nine Gulf Amirates for more details of this see Brewer, William D., - "Yesterday and Tomorrow in the Persian Gulf" - Middle East Journal, Vol. 23 No. 2 - Spring 1969 pp. 149-158, Also Anthony, John Duke, "The Union of Arab Amirates" - Middle East Journal - Vol. 26, No. 3, Summer 1972. pp. 271-281.
77. See "Sunday Telegraph" - London, 15th August, 1971, and "The Guardian" - Manchester - 16th August, 1971.
78. Govt. of Bahrain Proclamation No. 1/1970 dated 19th Jan. 1970. Besides the Head of the Council it consisted of four members of the al-Khalifah family, eight Heads of Department, four Sunnis and four Shia. See Proclamation No. 3/1970.
79. See, for instance, "Al-Taliah", Kuwait, No. 389 dated 26th Aug., 1972, also "Al-Hadef", Beirut, No. 168, 9th August, 1972.
80. The Leaders of the society were Awad Ubaid al-Yamani, Mustafa Husain Alawi, Abdulla Ahmed al-Mujerin and Ahmed Kassim Abdul Rasoor.
81. For a record of the trial of the leaders of the E.A.L.F. see "Sada al-Usbou" Bahrain, No. 65, 12th Jan. 1971 and "al-Adwa", Bahrain, No. 277, 7th Jan. 1971.
82. See for instance, "Al-Taliah", Kuwait, No. 214 and No. 394, 22nd July 1972 and 30th Sept., 1972 respectively .
83. See Govt. of Bahrain Proclamation No. 12 dated 20th June, 1972. Article 1.
84. "The Economist" Vol. CLXXVIII, No. 5874, p.641.
85. See Belgrave, C.D., op.cit., p.210, Owen, op.cit., pp. 76-77.
86. Sinclair, A., "Oil and Political Development" - an article in "New Look at the Middle East", edited by Sands, W., published by Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1957.
87. "Parliamentary Debates", Vol. 568 (1956-57), p.27, reporting on proceedings of 2nd April, 1957.
88. Trevelyan, H., "The Middle East in Revolution", Macmillan - 1971, p.71.
89. Nutting, A., "I saw for Myself", op.cit., p.73.
90. From letter to the writer dated 10th Oct., 1971.

91. Al-Baker "Min al-Bahrain", op.cit., p.96.
92. Johnson, P., "The Struggle for the Middle East" - New Statesman Vol. LIV, No. 1374, 13th July, 1957, pp. 53-56.
93. For the British attitudes towards the Shia in Iraq during the early 1920's see Al-Nafeese, A.F., "The Role of the Shia in the Political Development of Modern Iraq" - 1914-1921, Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge 1971 - pp. 327-331.
94. F.O. 371/14457, Despatch No. 385.S, of 1929 from Lt. Col. C.C.J. Barrett, Pol. Res. to Foreign Secretary of Govt. of India.
95. Belgrave, C.D., op.cit., p.125.
96. Ibid, p. 122.
97. "Al-Baker - Min al-Bahrain", op.cit., p.61, also see Seargent, R.B., Fisherfolk and Fish Traps in Bahrain" - Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies - Vol. XXXI, Pt. 3, 1968.
98. Belgrave, C.D. op.cit., p.227.
99. Hay, Rupert, Pol. Resident, who witnessed events up to 1954 dismissed the H.E.C. leaders as "a certain element of the population, mostly of Persian origin", op.cit., p.93.
100. Nutting, A., "No end of a Lesson", Constable, London 1967, pp. 36-37.
101. Ibid.
102. "Parliamentary Debates", Vol. 550 (1955-56), pp. 807-808.
103. Mr. C. Gault, Pol. Agent in Bahrain, 1955-59.
104. Johnson, P. - "Journey into Chaos" - MacGibbon and Kee, London 1958, p.155.
105. Ibid, p. 158.
106. Abraham, K.V., "British Justice in Bahrain", Kangalathu House, Kerala, India, 1963, p.37.
107. Ibid, p.72.
108. "The Guardian", London, 11th May, 1965.

PART FIVE

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

From the end of the First World War up to 1971, the year of independence, there is no doubt that Bahrain has undergone great changes in the social and economic spheres of life and that these in turn have politicised the inhabitants of the islands in their feelings and views toward the concepts of modern government and administration.

Economically Bahrain has always been relatively prosperous in comparison to other Gulf states and the rulers pride themselves on the fact that Bahrain, unlike other Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, etc., has never had to rely upon subsidies from foreign governments to survive. On the contrary they took pride in the fact that they had been in a position to subsidise their neighbours, as they did for Ibn Saud, for instance, during the second decade of the century.¹

The Bahrainis maintained this relative standard of wealth when the arrival of the oil era gave a further impetus to their economy.

The wealth, however, brought its own problems, Jealousies were stirred by envious neighbouring rulers until such time as they gained their own oil revenues and in addition the Bahrain rulers themselves became overproud. On the matter of subsidies from other Governments the Al-Khalifah took the view that it was almost a personal insult that they, the wealthy rulers of Bahrain, should be offered foreign finance. They failed to see the difference between personal wealth and the utilisation of help and capital, from whatever its source, as a means of improving the lot of their

people and creating new industries and job opportunities. This can be illustrated by the fact that they were content for many years to allow the British the use of their bases in Bahrain for a nominal rent until the hard economic facts of the cost of running a modern administration was brought home to them as the country's budget moved into deficit.

This complex about foreign aid proved to be a major handicap in the country's economic growth as the Government refused to countenance the raising of loans for the creation of new industries to diversify the nature of the economy and to maintain healthy economic growth by moving away from the concept of a single-product economy. It is only very recently that the Government has changed its viewpoint on the matter and accepted grants and given foreign capital the opportunity of initiating new projects in Bahrain.² In doing so, however, they seem to have panicked and moved too far in the opposite direction as, for instance, in the case of ALBA, tax exemptions, relief from import and export duties, grants of land and cheap gas supplies have encouraged the company to set up its production facilities in Bahrain. At the same time the continued suppression of the work force and the refusal to allow the formation of trades unions have placed the working people of Bahrain in a position of weakness from which they cannot hope to benefit to any great extent from their recent innovations. Furthermore, the failure of the main modern industrial employer in Bahrain, the oil company, to pass on to the native workers the industrial engineering skills necessary in the present day means that even with new companies such as ALBA the Bahrainis are again to be placed only in the lower labouring class of the companies, with little

hope of responsibility or advancement. Until this takes place the troubles of the past will re-appear in the future due to the frustration of the hopes of the Bahrainis to gain positions of power and respectability in their own land.

Over the years foreign observers have often cited Bahrain as an example of good government in comparison with other Gulf States. One of the main reasons for taking this view was the fact that Bahrain had set up a Reserve Fund into which was paid one third of the oil revenues.³ What was overlooked was the fact that an equal amount of money was going into the Shaikh's pocket each year, a fact which often caused the rich young members of the Al-Khalifah family to become completely blase and to fail utterly to appreciate the needs and problems of their subjects.

Welfare services such as Health and Education enabled the people to maintain a reasonable degree of health and literacy but these very things created a need for more jobs and better housing as the people raised their aims of life. No plan seems to exist, however, to fill their needs and development of the limited economy often appears to be more haphazard than planned.

The population of Bahrain is now increasing at a rate of four percent per annum, which, besides the strain it places on the welfare services also exerts a political stress. As Duverger pointed out,

"The theory of demographic pressure describes the situation in under-developed countries, where population growth proceeds at an extraordinary rate, greatly aggravating political antagonism."⁴

The output of the educational system of Bahrain far exceeds the capacity of the industries of the island to absorb the

school-leavers and graduates. This situation, with the absence of any proper wage policy, has led to too many people chasing too few jobs with the consequent depression of wage levels in an employers' market.

This has led to a state of affairs in which even the intelligensia are at variance with one another, those with jobs supporting the Government and employers in order to safeguard their interests, and those without jobs, in spite of their education, becoming increasingly frustrated and bitter.

The Government has taken some measures to alleviate this situation by the creation of new jobs within the Administration. As we have seen this led to the Government, rather than the oil company, becoming the largest employers of labour in the islands.

Although the number of jobs was increased the services provided by the Government were not and this has led to the situation whereby people are being employed in jobs where there is little or no work, Government spending has soared and money is now being drawn from the Reserve Fund to offset this inefficient increase in Government expenditure.

In addition to the above the idea of the traditional supremacy of the Al-Khalifah family has also created problems due to the practice of appointing members of the Family, often uneducated, in key jobs or as Heads of Government Departments, a form of the traditional tribal nepotism which serves only to exacerbate the situation.

The denominational problems between Shia and Sunni have diminished somewhat over the years but there is still a gap to be bridged and mistrust to be overcome. The pressures of modern

living and modern employment have thrown the two sides together and there are signs that in recent years the people are coming to realise that their problems are not ones of denomination but of class, with the poorer sections of both communities beginning to identify themselves more with their fellow workers than their sects. Evidence of this shift of opinion away from religious sects to class identification is seen in the work of the thinkers of the island. One Bahraini poet has even gone so far as to compare the sacrifices of Hussain, a Shia saint, with those of modern day revolutionaries such as Che Guevara,⁵ an idea which only a few years ago would have provoked extreme indignation and even violence.

In the social sphere Bahrain has undoubtedly absorbed much of the modern cultures and accepted many innovations. Instances of this are numerous. Instead of employing the traditional "musawet", or neighbourhood street-crier, the modern techniques of advertisement by radio and press are used. Children no longer play hopscotch in the streets but take part in basketball and football matches, and most important of all women are becoming increasingly emancipated.

The emancipation of women in Bahrain is one of the most striking features of the changes which have taken place. In the past it was considered shameful to even mention the name of any of one's female relatives whilst in male company. Men never addressed their wives by their first names, but referred to them as "mother of", or "daughter of"

Now, however, the women are increasingly taking their places in jobs, in offices and schools, or taking employment in

various forms of skilled or semi-skilled manual work, and although there is still a long way to go towards complete emancipation these first steps will no doubt pave the way towards this goal.

Politically, especially from the point of view of delegation of power to the people, Bahrain has not progressed very far.

The rulers of Bahrain, like their counterparts in other Gulf states, place great emphasis on their "natural right to rule". In Bahrain, however, with the presence of a British Advisor for so many years, one would have expected that this viewpoint would have been somewhat modified especially with regard to the opinion expressed in 1937 by T.C. Fowle, Political Resident at the time, when he states that, "Our policy in Bahrain, as I see it, is to teach the Bahrainis to govern themselves".⁶

Although this statement is rather vague it implies that at least the ruler should have been trained to run a modern administration and delegate some of his powers accordingly. In actual fact little or no change took place and as late as 1966 Mr. David Holden pointed out that, "the present ruler, Shaikh Isa, retained nearly as much personal authority as his father or his grandfather."⁷

The withdrawal of the British from the islands in 1971 has at last brought the Shaikh into contact with his people without the "protection" and help of the British and it remains to be seen whether the ruler is capable of facing up to the new situation or whether the tribal conflicts, even within the ruling family, reassert themselves and become manifest in events such as have taken place recently in Qatar and Sharjah.

Internationally the growing importance of the Gulf and the

strategical position of Bahrain appears to be attracting the attention of other powers such as the Americans. Initial moves have already taken place, such as the transfer of the Middle East Headquarters of the First National City Bank from Beirut to Bahrain, the signing of a lease by the U.S. Government for the renting of the former British Naval base on the island,⁸ and the frequent visits to Bahrain by high-ranking American Government officials.⁹

These moves by the American show the growing links being established between themselves and the existing regime, but this may eventually drive the U.S. Government into a position of supporting the Government of Bahrain against progressive political reforms in order to maintain their friendly relations.

The internal politics of Bahrain, however, are static for the present. The Government on the one hand is encouraging the merchants to come together in trade associations and on the other is continuing to discourage a similar association of workers.

Any attempts at radical political changes in the future appear to be doomed to failure without the active support and co-operation of movements within other major Arab countries. The possibility of this taking place in the near future appears to be remote considering the fragmented state of many of the movements of the Arab world.¹⁰

Despite the fact that it is academically undesirable to forecast in terms of time and events what changes will occur, it is sufficient to state that the possibility of any radical political change in Bahrain is dependent upon changes in the region

as a whole, and especially in Saudi Arabia.

It is time, however, that the Bahrain Government realised that there is more to independence than a flag and a national anthem. To survive in the era of large political and economic blocs, Bahrain, as a small state should be looking towards union with other states, especially within her own geographical and economic sphere.

The worst enemy of the Bahrain Government appears to be its own apathy which is nowhere better illustrated than its actions following the unrests of 1953-56 and of March, 1965. The Government on both occasions called for reports to review and make recommendations on the Administration, presumably for study to avoid the same mistakes in the future. But on both occasions instead of acting upon the recommendations of the reports only very few of the recommendations were implemented and the problems were left to rise again in the future.

The recent steps which have been taken towards the formation of Bahrain's first Legislative Council may mark the turning point in Bahrain's internal political affairs.

Much of the outcome, however, still depends upon the extent to which the ruler is prepared to delegate his authority to a democratically elected assembly.

The events up to the present suggest that if any power is conceded it will be done reluctantly and on a very limited basis.

FOOTNOTES

1. Telegram from Keyes, Pol. Agent in Bahrain, to Trevor, Pol. Resident., 27th June, 1915.
2. The Govt. have accepted a grant from Kuwait with a view to establishing new industrial ventures. See "Sada al-UsBou", No. 71, Bahrain, 2nd March, 1971.
3. See, e.g., Childs, J.R., "Foreign Services Farewell - My Years in the Near East" - Univ. of Virginia, 1969, p.158.
4. Duverger, M., "The Study of Politics" (Translated by Robt. Wagoner) Thomas Nelson & Sons, London, 1972, p.43.
5. "Huna al-Bahrain", No. 230, March, 1971, p.23.
6. Letter from T.C. Fowles, Pol. Res., to Mr. J.C. Walter, India Office, London, D.O. No. 88S, 23rd Dec., 1937.
7. Holden, David, "Farewell to Arabia" - Faber and Faber, London, 1966, p. 179.
8. "Arab Report and Record", 1st to 15th Jan., 1972, No. 1. News of the signing of the lease was first published in the U.S.A. press in late 1971 and confirmed by the Bahrain Govt. on 23rd Dec. 1971. These secret moves provoked a sharp reaction from other countries in the Arab world.
9. Such as the visit to Bahrain by Mr. Rogers, Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs to the U.S. Govt. See "Al-Seyassah", Kuwait, 4th July, 1972, No. 1445.
10. This state of affairs reflects itself upon the Bahrainis as for example the Ba'athists of Bahrain find themselves torn between the adherents of the Baghdad or Damascus doctrines.

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- c) Al-Harakah al-Wataniyyah fi al-Khalij al-'Arabi.
- d) Istikhdam Mawarid al-Bitrul fi Tanmiyah al-Sina'at
fi al-Khalij al-Arabi.
- e) Al-Marah fi al-Bahrain wa al-Khalij al-'Arabi.
- f) Al-Taqrir al-Siyasi al-Mugaddam min al-Lajnah
al-Tahzirayyah li al-Mu'tamar al-Ta'sisi.
- g) Tarikh al-Imtiyazat al-Naftiyyah fi al-Khalij
al-'Arabi.
- h) Ta'thir al-Bitrul 'ala Mantiqah al-Khalij al-'Arabi.
- i) Al-Tawsiyat al-Sadirah 'an al-Mu'tamar al-Ta'sisi.

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Abbreviations:-

R.C.A.S.J. - Royal Central Asian Society Journal
M.E.J. - Middle East Journal
M.E.A. - Middle East Affairs

A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX 1

BAHREIN ORDER IN COUNCIL

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 12th day of August, 1913

PRESENT

The KING's Most Excellent Majesty

Lord President.
Mr. Secretary Harcourt.
Sir William Carington.
Mr. Fischer.
Sir Louis Mallet.

Whereas by Treaty, Capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance, and other lawful means His Majesty the King has jurisdiction in Bahrein;

Now, therefore, His Majesty, by virtue and in exercise of the powers in this behalf by the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, or otherwise in His Majesty vested, is pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows:-

PART I. - Preliminary and General.

1. This Order may be cited as "The Bahrein Order in Council, 1913."

2. The limits of this Order are the islands and islets of Bahrein, including the territorial waters thereof, and all other territories, islands, and islets which may be included in the Principality and be the possessions of the ruling Sheikh of Bahrein, together with their territorial waters.

3. This Order is divided into parts, as follows:-

Parts.	Subject.	Articles.
I	Preliminary and General	1-10
II	Application of Law of British India and of the United Kingdom	11-13
III	Criminal Matters	14-34
IV	Civil Matters	35-43
V	Bahrein Subjects and Tribunals	44-50
VI	Registration	51-59
VII	Miscellaneous Provisions	60-79
	Schedule	

4. In the construction of this Order the following words and expressions have the meanings hereby assigned to them, unless there be something in the subject or context repugnant thereto, that is to say:-

"Administration" means letters of administration, including the same with will annexed, or granted for special or limited purposes, or limited in duration.

"Bahrein" includes all places and waters within the limits of the Order.

"Bahrein subject" means a subject of the Sheikh of Bahrein.

"British ship" means a merchant-ship being a British ship within the meaning of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, and, except where the context otherwise requires, includes a ship belonging to any British subject as hereinafter defined.

"British subject" includes a British protected person.

"Judicial Assistant" means the officer for the time being holding the office of Judicial Assistant under the provisions of the Persian Coast and Islands Order in Council, 1907.

"Chief Court" means a Court held by the Political Resident as hereinafter defined.

"District Court" means a Court held by the Political Agent or by the Judicial Assistant.

"The Court" means a Court held by the Political Resident, the Political Agent, or the Judicial Assistant to the Political Resident.

"Joint Court" means a Court composed of the Political Agent and an official appointed by the Sheikh of Bahrein.

"Majlis-el-Urf" means a Civil Court composed of not less than four members selected by the Political Agent in concert with the Sheikh of Bahrein.

"Salifah Court" means a Court consisting of one or more Judges who have knowledge of the local diving and customary marine law, and are appointed by the Sheikh of Bahrein and the Political Agent in concert.

"Kazi" means any official Kazi appointed by the Sheikh of Bahrein and accepted by the Political Agent.

"Foreigner" means any person not a British or Bahrein subject.

"Imprisonment" means imprisonment of either description as defined in the Indian Penal Code.

"Month" means calendar month.

"Oath" or "Affidavit" includes affirmation or declaration.

"Offence" means any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force.

"Person" includes corporation.

"Political Agent" means His Majesty's Agent at Bahrein appointed by the Governor-General of India in Council, including a person acting temporarily with the approval of the Governor-General of India in Council for such Political Agent.

"Political Agency" means the office, residence, Court, or other appointed place of business of the Political Agent.

"Political Resident" means His Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, including a person acting temporarily with the approval of the Governor-General of India in Council for such Political Resident.

"Rules of Court" means rules of Court made under the provisions of this Order.

"Secretary of State" means one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State.

"Sheikh of Bahrein" means the ruling Sheikh of Bahrein, or his duly accredited representative for the time being.

"Ship" includes any vessel used in navigation, however propelled, with her tackle, furniture, and apparel, and any boat or other craft.

"Treaty" includes any capitulations, convention, agreement or arrangement made by or on behalf of His Majesty with any State or Government, King, Chief, people, or tribe, or to the benefits of which His Majesty has succeeded, whether the Sheikh of Bahrein is or is not a party thereto.

"Will" means will, codicil, or other testamentary instrument.

Expressions used in any enactments applied to Bahrein, or in any Rules, Regulations, or Orders made under this Order, shall, unless a contrary intention appears, have the same respective meanings in this Order.

5. (1) In this Order words importing the plural or the singular may be construed as referring to one person or thing, or to more than one person or thing, and words importing the masculine as referring to the feminine, as the case may require.

(2) Where this Order confers any power or imposes any duty, then, unless a contrary intention appears, the power may be exercised, and the duty shall be performed from time to time as occasion requires.

(3) Where this Order confers a power, or imposes a duty on, or with respect to, a holder of an office, as such, then, unless a contrary intention appears, the power may be exercised and the duty shall be performed by, or with respect to, the holder for

the time being of the office or the person temporarily acting for the holder.

(4) Where this Order confers a power to make any Rules, Regulations, or Orders, the power shall, unless a contrary intention appears, be construed as including a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like consent and conditions, if any, to rescind, revoke, vary, or amend the Rules, Regulations, or Orders.

(5) This Article shall apply to the construction of any Regulations, Rules, or Orders made under this Order, unless a contrary intention appears.

6. Where this Order refers to any specified Act or Acts of Parliament, such reference shall, unless a contrary intention appears, be deemed to include any Act or Acts amending or substituted for the same.

7. In the event of the death, incapacity, removal or absence from Bahrein of the Political Agent for the time being, all and every the powers, authorities, and immunities by this Order granted to him shall, until His Majesty's further pleasure is signified through the Governor-General of India in Council, be vested in the Political Resident.

8. The powers conferred by this Order shall extend to the persons and matters following, in so far as by Treaty, grant, usage, sufferance, or other lawful means, His Majesty has jurisdiction in relation to such persons, matters, and things, that is to say:-

(1) British subjects, as herein defined, within the limits of this Order.

(2) Foreigners with respect to whom the Sheikh of Bahrein has agreed with His Majesty for, or consented to, the exercise of

jurisdiction by His Majesty.

(3) Bahrein subjects registered in the Political Agency as being in the regular service of British subjects or foreigners; with the proviso that all cases wherein such Bahrein subjects are concerned shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Part V of this Order.

(4) The expression "person to whom this Order applies" shall be construed in accordance with the above three sub-Articles.

(5) The property and all personal or proprietary rights and liabilities within the said limits of British subjects and of foreigners within sub-Article (2) and of Bahrein subjects within sub-Article (3) whether such persons are themselves within or without the limits of this Order.

(6) British ships and ships belonging to foreigners within sub-Article (2) with their boats, and the persons and property on board thereof, or belonging thereto, being within the limits of this Order; provided that jurisdiction over foreign ships shall not be exercised otherwise than according to the practice of the High Court in England in the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign ships.

(7) If any question arises whether the subjects or citizens of any country, State, or tribe have or have not been placed under the jurisdiction of His Majesty by agreement with, or the consent of, the Sheikh of Bahrein, it shall be referred by the Court to the Political Resident, and a certificate under his hand and seal shall be conclusive on the question, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

9. All His Majesty's jurisdiction exercisable within the limits of this Order for the hearing and determination of criminal and

civil matters, or for the maintenance of order, or for the control or administration of persons or property, or in relation thereto, shall be exercised, under and according to the provisions of this Order, so far as this Order extends and applies.

10. Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to relieve any officer or person in the service of His Majesty of the duty, as far as there is proper opportunity, of promoting reconciliation and encouraging and facilitating the settlement in an amicable way, and without recourse to litigation, of matters in difference between persons subject to this Order, or between persons subect to this Order and persons who are not subject to this Order, within the limits of this Order.

PART II. - Application of Law of British India and of
the United Kingdom.

11. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Order, and to any Treaties for the time being in force relating to Bahrein, His Majesty's criminal and civil jurisdiction in Bahrein shall, so far as circumstances admit, be exercised on the principles of, and in conformity with, the enactments for the time being applicable as hereinafter mentioned of the Governor-General of Bombay in Council, and in accordance with the powers vested in, and the course of procedure and practice observed by and before, the Courts in the Presidency of Bombay beyond the limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay according to their respective jurisdiction and authority, and so far as such enactments, powers, procedure, and practice are inapplicable, shall be exercised in accordance with justice, equity, and good conscience.

(2) The enactments mentioned in the Schedule to this Order shall as from the commencement of this Order apply to all persons subject to this Order.

(3) Any other existing or future enactments of the Governor-General of India in Council, or of the Governor of Bombay in Council, may be applied to Bahrein by King's Regulations under Article 70 of this Order.

(4) Any Act of the Governor-General of India in Council, or of the Governor of Bombay in Council, whether passed before or after the commencement of this Order, amending or substituted for any Act of either of those Legislatures which applies or may be applied to Bahrein, shall, subject to the provisions of this Article, also apply to Bahrein.

(5) The Court may construe any enactments in force in Bahrein, under the provisions of this Article, with such alterations not affecting the substance, as may be necessary or proper to adapt the same to the matter before the Court.

12. The enactments described in the first schedule to the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, shall apply to Bahrein, as if it were a British colony or possession, but subject to the provisions of this Order, and to the exceptions, adaptations, and modifications following, that is to say:-

(i) The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf is hereby substituted for the Governor of a colony or British possession, and the Chief Court is hereby substituted for a Superior Court or Supreme Court, and the District Court for a Magistrate or Justice of the Peace of a colony or British possession.

(ii) For the portions of the Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 and 1867, referred to in the said Schedule, shall be substituted Part XIII of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894.

(iii) In Section 51 of the Conveyancing (Scotland) Act, 1874, the Court of the Political Agent is substituted for a Court of Probate in a colony.

(iv) With respect to the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881 -

(a) So much of the 4th and 5th sections of the said Act as relates to sending a report of the issue of a warrant, together with the information, or a copy thereof, or to the sending of a certificate of committal and report of a case, or to the information to be given by a Magistrate to a fugitive, shall be excepted, and in lieu of such information the person acting as the Magistrate shall inform the fugitive that in the British possession or protectorate to which he may be conveyed he has the right to apply for a writ of habeas corpus or other like process.

(b) So much of the 6th section of the said Act as requires the expiration of fifteen days before issue of warrant shall be excepted.

(c) The Political Resident shall not be bound to return a fugitive offender to a British possession unless satisfied that the proceedings to obtain his return are taken with the consent of the Governor of that possession.

(d) For the purposes of Part II of the said Act, Bahrein, Muscat, the Persian Coast and the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Oman, Aden, and British India, shall be deemed to be one group of British possessions.

13. Where, by virtue of any Imperial Act, or of this Order, or otherwise, any provisions of any Imperial Acts, or of any Law in force in India, or of any Orders in Council other than this Order, are applicable within the limits of this Order, or any forms, Regulations, or procedure prescribed or established by or under such Act, Law, or Order, are made applicable for any purpose of this Order, or any other Order relating to Bahrein, such Acts, Laws, Orders, forms, Regulations, or procedure may be construed or used with such substance as may be necessary having regard to local circumstances, and anything required to be done by, to, or before any Court, Judge, officer, or authority may be done by, to, or before a Court, Judge, officer, or authority having the like or analogous functions, or by, to, or before any officer designated by the Secretary of State or by the Court (as the case may require) for that purpose; and in case any difficulty occurs in the application the Secretary of State, or with his previous or subsequent assent the Governor-General of India in Council, may direct by, to, or before whom and in what manner anything is to be done, and such Act, Law, Order, form, Regulation, or procedure shall be construed accordingly.

Where under any such Imperial Act, Law, or Order, any publication is required to be made, as respects any judicial proceeding in any "Gazette" or otherwise, such publication shall be made by such mode as the Court shall think fit to direct.

PART III. - Criminal

14. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Order, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the other enactments relating to the administration of criminal justice in British India for the time

being shall be applicable to Bahrein. The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf shall hold and form a Court, to be called the Chief Court which shall have all the powers of a High Court of Judicature; the Political Agent at Bahrein shall be deemed to be the District Magistrate and Sessions Judge; the Judicial Assistant to the Political Resident shall be deemed to be the Additional District Magistrate and Additional Sessions Judge; and the powers of the Governor-General in Council and of the Local Government under those enactments shall be exercisable by the Secretary of State, or, with his previous or subsequent assent, by the Governor-General of India in Council.

Notwithstanding, in any case triable by a Subordinate Magistrate under Chapters XVI to XXIII inclusive of the Indian Penal Code, if both the complainant and defendant are Mahomedans and are acquiescent in such procedure, the Political Agent may order the case to be tried by a Kazi, a representative from the Agency attending to record briefly the proceedings. In such suits the judgment passed by the Kazi cannot be carried into effect until it is ratified by the Political Agent, and the Political Agent is empowered to revise the finding and sentence as if the Kazi were a Sub-ordinate Magistrate, or to return the case for re-trial to the same or another Kazi. The sentence of the Kazi, when ratified by the Political Agent, shall for all purposes be regarded as if it were the decision of the Political Agent in the District Court.

(2) Any jurisdiction exercisable by the Chief Court in criminal matters under this Order may be exercised by the Judge of that Court either within the limits of this Order or elsewhere.

15. In cases in which the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the sentence of a Court of Session to be confirmed by the High Court, the sentence shall be referred for confirmation to the Governor-General of India in Council instead of to the Chief Court.

16. Where a person subject to this Order is accused of the commission of an offence the cognizance whereof appertains to the Court, and it is expedient that the offence be inquired of, tried, determined, and punished in a British possession, the accused may (under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, section 6) be sent for trial to Bombay.

The Chief Court may, where it appears so expedient, by warrant under the hand and seal of the Political Resident, cause the accused to be sent for trial to Bombay accordingly.

The warrant shall be sufficient authority to any person to whom it is directed to receive and detain the person therein named, and to carry him to and deliver him up at Bombay according to the warrant.

Where any person is to be so sent to Bombay, the Court before which he is charged shall take the preliminary examination, and shall bind over such of the proper witnesses as are British subjects in their own recognizances to appear and give evidence on the trial.

17. (1) The Political Resident may by General Order prescribe the manner in which, and the places at which, sentences of imprisonment are to be carried into execution within the limits of the Order.

(2) The Court may, in any case by warrant sealed with its seal, cause an offender convicted and sentenced to imprisonment before the Court to be removed to, and imprisoned in, any place that shall be prescribed by the Political Resident under the Authority provided for in subsection (1) of this Article.

18. Where an offender convicted before any Court under this Order is sentenced to imprisonment, and the Political Resident proceeding under Section 7 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, authority in that behalf being hereby given to him, considers it expedient that the sentence should be carried into effect elsewhere than within the limits of this Order, and the offender is accordingly sent for imprisonment to a place outside the limits of this Order, the place shall be either a place in the Presidency of Bombay, or a place in some other part of His Majesty's dominions, the Government whereof consents that offenders may be sent thither under this Article, or a place in which by Treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or other lawful means His Majesty has jurisdiction, provided that if a person is not a British subject he shall only be sent under this Article to a place in His Majesty's dominions.

19. (1) In cases of murder of culpable homicide, if either the death or the criminal act which wholly or partly caused the death happened in Bahrein, a Court acting under this Order shall have the like jurisdiction over any person to whom this Order applies who is charged either as a principal offender or as an abettor as if both such criminal act and the death had happened in Bahrein.

(2) In the case of any offence committed on the high seas or within the Admiralty jurisdiction by any person who at the time of committing such offence was on board a British ship, or by any

British subject on board a foreign ship to which he did not belong, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of this Order, have jurisdiction over such person as if the offence had been committed within its jurisdiction.

(3) In cases tried under this Article no different sentence can be passed from the sentence which could be passed in England if the crime were tried there.

(4) The foregoing provisions of this Article shall be deemed to be adaptations, for the purposes of this Order and of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, of the following enactments, namely:-

The Admiralty Offences (Colonial) Act, 1849;

The Admiralty Offences (Colonial) Act, 1860;

The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, Part XIII;

and those enactments shall apply accordingly, and be administered in Bahrein.

20. Where a person is convicted of an offence, the Court before which he is convicted may, if it thinks fit at any time before he is discharged, require him to give security to the satisfaction of the Court for his future good behaviour, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, cause him to come or be brought before the Court.

21. (1) Where it is shown by evidence on oath, to the satisfaction of the District Court, that any British subject has committed, or is about to commit an offence against this Order, or is otherwise conducting himself so as to be dangerous to peace and good order, or is endeavouring to excite enmity between the people of Bahrein and His Majesty, or is intriguing within the limits

of this Order against His Majesty's power and authority, the Court may, if it thinks fit, by order under its seal, prohibit that person from being within the limits of this Order, during any time therein specified, not exceeding two years.

(2) The Court, by order in writing under its seal, may vary any order of prohibition (not extending the duration thereof), and may revoke any order of prohibition or removal.

(3) The Court shall forthwith report the order and the grounds thereof to the Chief Court, which shall forthwith report to the Governor-General of India in Council every order made under this Article, and the grounds thereof, and the proceedings thereunder.

22. (1) If any British subject fails to give security for good behaviour or for keeping the peace when lawfully required to do so, or fails to comply with an order of prohibition made under this Order, the Chief Court or the District Court may, if it thinks fit, order that he be deported from any place within its jurisdiction as prescribed by this Order.

(2) If the order of deportation is made by the District Court, it shall forthwith report to the Chief Court the order and the grounds thereof.

(3) Thereupon the person ordered to be deported shall, unless the Chief Court thinks fit otherwise to direct, be as soon as practicable, and in the case of a person convicted either after execution of the sentence or while it is in course of execution, removed in custody under warrant to the place named in the warrant.

(4) The place shall be a place in that part of His Majesty's dominions, or in the British Protectorate, to which the person belongs, or the Government of which consents to the reception of persons deported under this Order.

(5) The Court, on making an order of deportation, may, if it thinks fit, order the person to be deported to pay all or any part of the expenses of his deportation, to be fixed by the Court in the order. Subject thereto, the expenses of deportation shall be defrayed as the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Treasury, or with the previous or subsequent assent of the Secretary of State, the Governor-General of India in Council, directs.

(6) The Chief Court shall forthwith report to the Governor-General of India in Council every order of deportation made under this Order, and the grounds thereof, and the proceedings thereunder.

(7) If a person deported under this Order returns to Bahrein without permission in writing of the Chief Court, or the Governor-General of India in Council, or the Secretary of State (which permission the Chief Court, or the Governor-General of India in Council, or the Secretary of State respectively may give), he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two months, or with a fine which may extend to 1,000 rupees, or with both.

(8) He shall also be liable to be forthwith again deported under the original or a new order, and a fresh warrant.

23. An appeal shall not lie against an order of prohibition, or removal, or deportation made under this Order.

24. (1) Where under this Order a person is to be sent or removed or deported from any place within the jurisdiction of the Court as prescribed by this Order he shall, by warrant of the Court sealed with its seal, be detained, if necessary, in custody, or in prison, until a fit opportunity for his removal or deportation occurs, and then be put on board a vessel belonging to, or in the service of, His Majesty, or if no such vessel is available, then on

board some other British or other fit vessel.

(2) The warrant shall be sufficient authority to the person to whom it is directed or delivered for execution, and to the Commanding Officer or master of the vessel, to receive and detain the person therein named, in the manner therein prescribed, and to send or remove and carry him to the place therein named, according to the warrant.

(3) In case of sending or removal for any purpose other than deportation, the warrant shall be issued in duplicate, and the person executing it shall, as soon as practicable after his arrival at the place therein named, deliver, according to the warrant, with one of the duplicates of the warrant, to a constable, or proper officer of police, or keeper of a prison, or other proper authority or person there, the person named in the warrant, to be produced on the order of the proper Court or authority there, or to be otherwise dealt with according to law.

25. If any person to whom this Order applies does any of the following things, namely:-

(i) Wilfully by act or threat obstructs any officer of or person executing any process of the Court in the performance of his duty; or

(ii) Within or close to the room or place where the Court is sitting wilfully misbehaves in a violent, threatening, or disrespectful manner to the disturbance of the Court, or to the intimidation of suitors or others resorting thereto; or

(iii) Wilfully insults any member of the Court, or any assessor, or any person acting as a Clerk or Officer of the Court during his sitting or attendance in Court, or in his going to or returning from Court; or

(iv) Does any act in relation to the Court or a Judge thereof, or a matter pending therein, which, if done in relation to a Superior Court in England or in India, would be punishable as a contempt of such Court, or as a libel on such Court or the Judges thereof, or the administration of justice therein, such person shall be liable to be apprehended by order of the Court with or without warrant, and, on enquiry and consideration and after the hearing of any defence which such person may offer, without further process or trial, to be punished with a fine not exceeding 100 rupees, or with imprisonment not exceeding twenty-four hours.

A Minute shall be made and kept of every such case of punishment, recording the facts of the offence and the extent of the punishment.

Provided that, if the Court thinks fit, instead of proceeding under the preceding provisions, it may direct or cause the offender to be tried in a separate criminal prosecution or proceeding, in which the offender shall be liable to any punishment to which he would be liable if the offence were committed in relation to the Court of a Sessions Judge in India.

Nothing herein shall interfere with the power of the Court to remove or exclude persons who interrupt or obstruct the proceedings of the Court.

26. If any person to whom this Order applies smuggles or imports into or exports from Bahrein any goods whereon any duty is charged or payable to the Sheikh of Bahrein, with intent to evade payment of the duty, he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two months, or with fine which may extend

to 1,000 rupees, or a sum equal to treble the value of the goods (whichever shall be the greater), or with both imprisonment and fine.

27. If any person to whom this Order applies smuggles or imports into or exports from Bahrein any goods the importation or exportation whereof is lawfully prohibited, he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to 2,000 rupees, or a sum equal to treble the value of the goods (whichever shall be the greater), or with imprisonment and fine.

28. Any act which if done in British India would be an offence against the law for the time being in force in British India relating to trade-marks, merchandise marks, copyright designs, or inventions, shall, if done in Bahrein, be an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two months, or with a fine which may extend to 1,000 rupees, or with both.

29. (1) If any person to whom this Order applies -

(i) Publicly derides, mocks, or insults any religion established or observed within the limits of this Order; or

(ii) Publicly offers insult to any religious service, feast, or ceremony established or kept in any place within those limits, or to any place of worship, tomb, or sanctuary belonging to any religion established or observed within those limits, or belonging to the Ministers or professors thereof; or

(iii) Publicly and wilfully commits any act tending to bring any religion established or observed within those limits, or its ceremonies, mode of worship, or observances, into hatred, ridicule, or contempt, and thereby to provoke a breach of the public peace;

he shall be guilty of an offence, and on conviction thereof, liable to imprisonment which may extend to two years, with or without a fine not exceeding 500 rupees, or to a fine alone not exceeding 500 rupees.

(2) The Political Agent shall take such precautionary measures as seem to him proper and expedient for the prevention of such offences.

30. Any person being within the limits of this Order may be proceeded against, tried, and punished under this Order for piracy wherever committed.

31. If any person, subject to this Order, violates, or fails to observe within the limits of this Order, any stipulation of any Treaty between His Majesty, His predecessors, heirs, or successors, and the Sheikh of Bahrein for the time being in force, and applicable to such person, in respect of the violation whereof any penalty is stipulated for in the Treaty, he shall be deemed guilty of an offence, and on conviction thereof under this Order shall be liable to a penalty in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty, or the provisions of this Order.

32. The Foreign Jurisdiction Neutrality Order in Council, 1904, shall apply to all persons and to all property subject to this Order.

33. Where a person entitled to appeal to the Chief Court from any judgment or order passed in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction under this Order desires so to appeal, he shall present his petition of appeal to the Court which passed the judgment or order; and the petition shall with all practicable speed be transmitted to the Chief Court with certified copies of

the charge (if any) and proceedings of all documentary evidence admitted or tendered, of the depositions, of the notes of the oral testimony, and of the judgment or order, and any argument on the petition of appeal that the appellant desires to submit to the Chief Court.

34. The Court against whose judgment or order the appeal is preferred may postpone the execution of the sentence pending the appeal, and shall, if necessary, commit the person convicted to prison for safe custody, or detain him in prison for safe custody, or shall admit him to bail, and may take security, by recognisance, deposit of money, or otherwise, for his payment of any fine.

PART IV - Civil

35. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Order, the Code of Civil Procedure and the other Indian enactments, relating to the administration of Civil justice and to insolvency and bankruptcy, shall have effect as if Bahrein were a district in the Presidency of Bombay. The Political Agent shall be deemed to be the District Judge, and his Court shall be deemed to be the District or Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in the District; the Judicial Assistant to the Political Resident shall be deemed to be an Additional District Judge, and his Court shall be an Additional District Court of Original Civil Jurisdiction; the Court of the Political Resident shall be deemed to be the highest Civil Court of Appeal for the District, and the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of the District Court; and the powers, both of the Governor-General in Council and the Local Government, under those enactments shall be exercisable by the Secretary of State, or, with his previous or subsequent assent, by the

Governor-General of India in Council.

(2) Any jurisdiction exercisable by the Chief Court under this Order in civil matters may be exercised by the Judge of that Court, either within the limits of this Order or elsewhere.

36. When a suit between persons to whom this Order applies is filed in the Political Agency, the Political Agent shall enquire from the several parties whether they desire that proceedings shall be instituted in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian enactments made applicable to Bahrein, or in accordance with local usage, and shall record their replies.

37. When any of the several parties desire that the suit shall be determined in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure and other enactments made applicable to Bahrein, the District Court shall forthwith proceed to decide the suit in accordance with the provisions of such enactments, as far as local conditions permit.

Nothing in this section shall prevent the District Court from referring -

(a) A question of local custom to the Majlis-el-Urf for consideration and report;

(b) A dispute over accounts between pearling masters and divers to the Salifah Court for scrutiny and adjustment;

nor shall prevent the District Court, the Majlis-el-Urf, or the Salifah Court from referring any matter in the progress of a suit which involves a point of Mahommedan Law to a Kazi for decision, or from sending any party or witness, being a Mahommedan, to a Kazi

for the administration of an oath.

38. (1) The Foreing Jurisdiction (Admiralty) Order in Council, 1910, shall apply to Bahrein, and the Chief Court shall have the jurisdiction conferred by Article 4 of that Order, and the District Court shall be deemed to be a Provincial Court, and the Registry thereof a District Registry within the meaning of the said Order.

(2) Admiralty actions commenced in the said Registry shall be tried in the District Court, unless the Chief Court is at the time sitting within the limits of this Order, or unless all parties agree that the action shall be tried in the Chief Court sitting elsewhere than within the limits of this Order.

(3) The duties of the Registrar and of the Marshall either of the Chief Court or of the District Court under the said Order shall be performed by such officers as the Political Resident shall direct.

39. (1) The District Court shall endeavour to obtain, as early as may be, notice of the deaths of all British subjects or foreigners leaving property in any place within the jurisdiction of the Court as prescribed by this Order, and all such information as may serve to guide the Court with respect to the securing and administration of their property.

(2) On receiving notice of the death of such a person, the Court shall put up a notice thereof at the Court-house, and shall keep the same there until probate or administration is granted, or, where it appears to the Court that probate or administration will not be applied for, or cannot be granted, for such time as it thinks fit.

(3) The Court shall, where the circumstances of the case appear so to require, as soon as may be, take possession of the property left by the deceased in any place within the jurisdiction of the Court as prescribed by this Order, or put it under its seal (in either case, if the nature of the property or other circumstances so require, making an inventory), and so keep it until it can be dealt with according to law; perishable articles being disposed of as the Court may consider best in the interests of the estate.

(4) All expenses incurred on behalf of the Court in so doing shall be the first charge on the property of the deceased, and the Court shall, by sale of part of that property, or otherwise, provide for the discharge of these expenses.

(5) When a British subject or foreigner dies with the jurisdiction of the Court as prescribed by this Order intestate, his property, or so much thereof as is within those limits, shall, until administration is granted, vest in the Political Agent.

40. If a person to whom this Order applies be named executor in a will, and to the establishment of whose title as such it is necessary to obtain probate of that will, take possession of and administers, or otherwise deals with, any part of the property of the deceased, and does not obtain probate within one month after the death or after the termination of any proceeding respecting probate or administration, he shall be liable to pay double the amount of any fees chargeable on obtaining probate, and he shall also be liable to a fine which may extend to 1,000 rupees.

41. If any person to whom this Order applies, other than the person named executor, or the administrator, or a person entitled

to represent the deceased without obtaining probate or letters of administration, or an officer of the Court, takes possession of an administers, or otherwise deals with, any part of the property of the deceased, he shall, as soon as practicable, notify the fact and the circumstances to the District Court, and shall furnish to the Court all such information as the Court requires and shall conform to any direction of the Court in relation to the custody, disposal, or transmission of the property or the proceeds thereof, and, in case of any contravention of this Article, he shall be punished with fine, which may extend to 1,000 rupees.

42. (1) When the peculiar circumstances of the case appear to the District Court so to require, for reasons recorded in its proceedings, the Court may, if it thinks fit, of its own motion or otherwise, grant letters of administration to an officer of the Court.

(2) The officer so appointed shall act under the direction of the Court, and shall be indemnified thereby.

(3) He shall publish such notices, if any, as the Court thinks fit, in Bahrein, the Persian Coast and Islands, Bombay, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere.

(4) The Court shall require and compel him to file, in the proper office of the Court, his accounts of his administration at intervals not exceeding three months, and shall forthwith examine them and report thereon to the Chief Court.

(5) The accounts shall be audited under the direction of the District Court.

(6) All expenses incurred on behalf of the Court in execution of this Article shall be the first charge on the estate of the deceased as dealt with in accordance with the provisions of this Order; and the Court shall, by the sale of that estate or otherwise, provide for the discharge of those expenses.

43. In cases where parties are Mahommedans the District Court may refer any question, concerning probate of wills or administration of property of deceased persons to whom this Order applied, to a Kazi for settlement under the general supervision of the Court.

PART V. - Bahrein Subjects and Tribunals.

(a) Criminal

44. (1) When a Bahrein subject desires to institute a complaint against a person to whom this Order applies, or a person to whom this Order applies desires to institute a complaint against a Bahrein subject, the Political Agent shall entertain the same, and may -

(a) With the concurrence of the Sheikh of Bahrein, himself hear and determine it in his District Court, or

(b) Send it to the Joint Court, or

(c) If the defendant is a Mahommedan, refer it to a Kazi for decision, sending a representative of the Agency to record briefly the proceedings. Such decision, when endorsed by the Political Agent, shall for all purposes be considered as if it were that of the District Court.

(2) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the Political Resident from exercising the revisory powers possessed by him Under Article 4 of the Convention with Bahrein, dated the 31st May, 1861.

(b) Civil

45. (1) When a Bahrein subject desires to bring a suit against a person to whom this Order applies, or a person to whom this Order applies desires to bring a suit against a Bahrein subject, the Political Agent shall admit the complaint, and

(a) With the concurrence of the Sheikh of Bahrein, may hear and determine the suit in his District Court, or

(b) May hear and determine it in a Joint Court, or

(c) May refer it to the Majlis-el-Urf for decision, or

(d) In cases between pearling-masters and divers, may refer it to the Salifah Court, or

(e) With the consent of the several parties, may refer the case to one or more Arbitrators for settlement.

(2) The Judgment of the Joint Court or of the Majlis-el-Urf shall for all purposes be considered the same as if it were that of the District Court.

(3) An appeal from the decision of the Salifah Court shall lie to the Political Agent acting in concert with the Sheikh of Bahrein, and in all Salifah cases their joint decision shall be final.

(4) The award of the Arbitrator under sub-Article 1 (e) shall be final, and shall not be open to appeal unless the same shall within a reasonable time have been ordered by the Political Agent to be set aside on the ground that it is not final or is defective, or that the Arbitrator has exceeded his authority, or has been guilty of misconduct in the matter.

(5) Nothing herein mentioned shall prevent the District Court, the Joint Court, the Majlis-el-Urf, the Salifah Court, or the

Arbitrator from referring any matter in the progress of a suit which involves a point of Mahommedan law to a Kazi for decision, or from sending any party or witness, being a Mahommedan, to a Kazi for the administration of an oath.

46. (1) Where a Bahrein subject obtains, in a Court established under this Order, a decree or order against a defendant being a British subject, or foreigner, and in another suit that defendant is plaintiff and the Bahrein subject is defendant, the Court may, if it thinks fit, on the application of the British subject, or foreigner, stay the enforcement of the decree or order pending that other suit, and may set off any amount decreed or ordered to be paid by one party in one suit against any amount decreed or ordered to be paid by the other party in the other suit.

(2) Where a plaintiff, being a Bahrein subject, obtains a decree or order, in a Court established under this Order, against two or more defendants, being British subjects, or foreigners, jointly, and in another suit one of them is a plaintiff and the Bahrein subject is defendant, the Court may, if it thinks fit, on the application of the British subjects, or foreigners, stay the enforcement of the decree or order pending that other suit, and may set off any amount decreed or ordered to be paid by one party in one suit against any amount decreed or ordered to be paid by the other party in the other suit, without prejudice to the right of the British subject or foreigner to obtain contribution from his co-defendants under the joint liability.

(3) Where in a suit a Bahrein subject is co-plaintiff with a British subject or foreigner who is in Bahrein, it shall not be necessary for the Bahrein subject to give security under this

Article as regards fees and costs, unless the Court so directs, but the co-plaintiff British subject, or foreigner, shall be responsible for all fees and costs.

47 - (1) Every agreement for reference to arbitration between a person to whom this Order applies on the one hand, and a Bahrein subject on the other hand, may, on the application of any party, be filed for execution in the office of the Court.

(2) The Court shall thereupon have authority to enforce the agreement, and the award made thereunder, and to control and regulate the proceedings before and after the award, in such manner and on such terms as the Court may think fit, in concert with the Sheikh or his representative.

(c) General

48 - (1) Where it is proved that the attendance of a person to whom this Order applies, to give evidence, or for any other purpose connected with the administration of justice, is required before a Bahrein Tribunal, a Court established under this Order may, if it thinks fit, in a case and in circumstances in which the Court would require the attendance of that person before the Court, order that he do attend as required.

(2) If the person ordered to attend, having reasonable notice of the time and place at which he is required to attend, fails to attend accordingly and does not excuse his failure to the satisfaction of the Court, he shall, independently of any other liability, be liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two months, or with fine which may extend to 1,000 rupees, or with both.

49. When a person to whom this Order applies invokes or submits to the jurisdiction of a Bahrein Tribunal, and engages in writing to abide by the decision of that Tribunal or to pay any fees or expenses ordered by that Tribunal to be paid by him, the Court may, on such evidence as it thinks fit to require, enforce payment of such fees and expenses in the same manner as if they were fees payable in a proceeding in the Court, and shall pay over and account for the same, when levied, to the proper Bahrein authority, as the Court may direct.

50. - (1) If a person to whom this Order applies wilfully gives false evidence in a proceeding before a Bahrein Tribunal, or in an arbitration between a person to whom this Order applies, on the one hand, and a Bahrein subject, on the other hand, he shall be guilty of an offence, and shall, on conviction, be liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two months, or with fine which may extend to 1,000 rupees, or with both.

(2) Nothing in this Article shall exempt a person from liability under any other British or British Indian law to any other or higher punishment or penalty:

Provided that no person shall be punished twice for the same offence.

PART VI - Registration

51. A register of persons to whom this Order applies shall be kept in the Political Agency.

52. Every person to whom this Order applies, being of the age of 21 years or upwards, or being married, or a widower, or a widow, though under that age, shall register himself at the Political

Agency within three months of the commencement of this Order, if resident within the limits of this Order at that time, or, if arriving within the limits of this Order, within one month after such arrival.

Provided that a person who fails to register himself within the time limited by this Article may be registered at any time if he excuses his failure to the satisfaction of the Political Agent.

53. The registration of a man shall comprise the registration of his wife, or wives, if living with him; and the registration of the head of a family shall comprise the registration of all females and minors, being his relatives in whatever degree, living under the same roof with him at the time of his registration.

54. Registration under this Order shall be renewed annually in the month of January.

55. Every person who has not previously been registered applying to be registered under this Order shall, unless excused by the Political Agent, attend personally for that purpose at the Political Agency, but no person applying for the renewal of his registration need attend personally unless directed by the Political Agent so to do.

56. Every person registering himself under this Order may obtain, if he so desire, a certificate of registration in such form as may be prescribed by the Political Resident.

57. If any person to whom this Order applies neglects to register himself under its provisions he shall not be entitled to the protection, assistance, or good offices of the Political Agent, and shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 25 rupees for each instance of such failure, but he shall, although not registered, be

subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts established by this Order.

58. A person applying to be registered under this Order must produce such evidence as the Political Agent may think necessary that he is entitled to be registered.

59. Registration under this Order shall be no evidence of nationality, and a statement to that effect shall be inserted on the face of every certificate of registration issued under this Order.

PART VII - Miscellaneous Provisions

60. Subject to the control of the Secretary of State the Political Resident may, from time to time, with the previous sanction of the Governor-General of India in Council, make Rules of Procedure and other Rules, consistent with this Order, for the better execution of the provisions herein contained in respect of any matter arising in the course of any civil or criminal case, including insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings.

61 - (1) Subject to the control of the Secretary of State acting with the concurrence of the Treasury, the Political Resident may, from time to time, with the previous sanction of the Governor-General of India in Council, make rules imposing fees leviable in respect of any proceedings in, or processes issued out of, any Court established under this Order.

(2) But a Court before which any matter is pending may, in any case, if it thinks fit, on account of the poverty of a party, or for any other reason, dispense in whole or in part with the payment of any fees chargeable in respect of such matter.

62 - (1) All fees, charges, expenses, costs, fines, damages, and other money payable under this Order, or under any law made applicable by this Order, may be enforced under order of the Court

by seizure and sale of goods, and, in default of sufficient goods, by imprisonment as a civil prisoner for a term not exceeding one month, but such imprisonment shall not operate as a satisfaction or extinguishment of the liability.

(2) Any bill of sale or mortgage, or transfer of property, made with the view of avoiding such seizure or sale, shall not be effectual to defeat the provisions of this Order.

(3) All fees, penalties, fines, and forfeitures levied under this Order upon a British subject, and fees, other than actual Court fees, that may be levied under the provisions of this Order, on a person to whom this Order applies, shall be paid to the public account, and shall be applied in such manner as the Secretary of State, with the consent of the Treasury, or, with the previous or subsequent assent of the Secretary of State, as the Governor-General of India in Council, may direct.

63. Whenever an Acting Political Agent or Acting Judicial Assistant has commenced the hearing of any cause or matter, civil or criminal, he may, unless the Political Resident otherwise directs, continue and complete the hearing and determination thereof, notwithstanding that his authority to act as Political Agent or Judicial Assistant, has otherwise ceased by reason of the expiration of the time for which he was appointed to act, or by reason of the happening of any event by which his authority is determined.

64 - (1) If an officer of the Court, employed to execute a decree or order, loses, by neglect or omission, the opportunity of executing it, then, on complaint of the person aggrieved and proof of the fact alleged, the Court may, if it thinks fit, order the officer to pay the damages sustained by the person complaining, or part thereof.

(2) The order may be enforced as an order directing payment of money.

65 - (1) If a clerk or officer of the Court, acting under pretence of the process or authority of the Court, is charged with extortion, or with not paying over money duly levied, or with other misconduct, the Court may, if it thinks fit, inquire into the charge in a summary way, and may for that purpose summon and enforce the attendance of all necessary persons as in a suit, and may make such order for the repayment of any money extorted, or for the payment over of any money levied, and for the payment of such damages and costs as the Court thinks fit.

(2) The Court may also, if it thinks fit, on the same inquiry, impose on the clerk or officer such fine, not exceeding 50 rupees for each offence, as the Court thinks fit.

(3) A clerk or officer punished under this Article shall not, without the leave of the Court, be liable to a civil suit in respect of the same matter; and any such suit, if already or afterwards begun, may be stayed by the Court in such manner and on such terms as the Court thinks fit.

(4) Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to prevent any person from being prosecuted under any other British or British Indian law for any act or omission punishable under this Article, or from being liable under that other law to any other or higher punishment or penalty than that provided by this Article:

Provided that no person shall be punished twice for the same offence.

66. The Political Resident or the Political Agent may exercise any power conferred on any Justices of the Peace within His Majesty's

dominions by any Act of Parliament, for the time being in force, regulating merchant sea-men or the mercantile marine.

67. Where under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, anything is authorized to be done by, to, or before a Consular officer, such thing may be done in any place in Bahrein by, to, or before the Political Resident, or the Political Agent.

68. The Political Resident and the Political Agent shall each be entitled in Bahrein to act as a Notary Public.

69. The Court shall have jurisdiction from time to time to make an order requiring a person to whom this Order applies to contribute in such manner as the Court directs, to the support of his wife, or to the support of his or her child, whether legitimate or not, being, in the opinion of the Court, under the age of 16 years. Any such order may be made in a summary way, as if the neglect to provide for the support of such wife or child were an offence, and any failure to comply with any such order shall be deemed to be an offence, and shall be punishable with a fine not exceeding 10 rupees for any one default, and the Court may direct any penalty imposed for such offence to be applied for the support of such wife or child in such manner as the Court thinks fit.

70. The Political Resident shall have power to make Regulations (to be called King's Regulations) for the following purposes (that is to say):-

(a) For the peace, order, and good government of persons to whom this Order applies in relation to matters not provided for by this Order.

(b) For securing the observance of any Treaty for the time being in force, relating to any place within the limits of this Order, or of any native or local law or custom, whether relating to trade,

commerce, revenue, or any other matter.

(c) For applying, amending, modifying, or repealing with respect to Bahrein any Acts or enactments which apply, or are made applicable or have been brought into operation in Bahrein by or under any of the provisions of Article 11 of this Order.

(d) For regulating or preventing the importation or exportation in British ships or by any person to whom this Order applies of arms or munitions of war, or any parts or ingredients thereof, and for giving effect to any Treaty relating to the importation or exportation of the same.

(e) For requiring Returns to be made of the nature, quantity, and value of articles exported from or imported into Bahrein, by or on account of any person to whom this Order applies or in any British ship, and for prescribing the times and manner at or in which, and the persons by whom, such Returns are to be made.

(f) For the governance, visitation, care, and superintendence of prisons.

71 - (1) Any Regulations made under the preceding Article may provide for forfeiture of any goods, receptacles, or things in relation to which, or to the contents of which, any breach is committed of such Regulations, or of any Treaty or any native or local law or custom, the observance of which is provided for by such Regulations.

(2) Any person to whom this Order applies committing a breach of any such Regulations shall, in addition to any forfeiture prescribed thereby, be liable, on conviction, to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months, or to a fine, or to both.

(3) Any fine imposed for a breach of Regulation shall not exceed 1,500 rupees, provided that in the case of any breach of any native or local law relating to customs law, or under which the importation or exportation of any goods is prohibited or restricted, the fine may extend to a sum equivalent to treble the value of the goods in relation to which the breach is committed.

72 - (1) King's Regulations shall not take effect until they are allowed by a Secretary of State, or, with his previous or subsequent assent, by the Governor-General of India in Council; provided that in case of urgency declared in any such Regulations, the same shall take effect before such allowance, and shall continue to have effect unless and until they are disallowed by the Secretary of State, or, with his previous or subsequent assent, by the Governor-General of India in Council, and until notification of such disallowance is received and published by the Political Resident, and such disallowance shall be without prejudice to anything done or suffered under such Regulations in the meantime.

(2) All King's Regulations shall be published by the Political Resident in such manner and at such places as he may think proper.

(3) In this Order "breach of the Regulations" includes the breach of any native or local law or custom, the observance of which is required by any King's Regulations.

73. Judicial notice shall be taken of this Order and of the commencement thereof, and of the appointment of the Political Resident, Political Agent, and Judicial Assistant, and of the constitution and limits of the Courts and districts, and of the seals and signatures, and of any Rules and Regulations made or in

force under this Order, and no proof shall be required of any of such matters.

74. Nothing in this Order shall deprive the Political Resident, or an officer subordinate to him, of the right to observe, and to enforce the observance of, or shall deprive any person of the benefit of any reasonable custom existing in Bahrein, unless this Order contains some express and specific provision incompatible with the observance thereof.

75. Nothing in this Order shall -

(i) Affect any power of jurisdiction conferred by, or referred to in, the Act of the Governor-General of India in Council, entitled the Foreign Jurisdiction and Extradition Act, 1879 (Act XXI of 1879), or in the Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction) Order in Council, 1902; or

(ii) Affect any jurisdiction for the time being exercisable by the Political Resident under any Imperial Act other than the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890; or

(iii) Prevent the Political Agent from doing anything which His Majesty's Consuls in the dominions of any State in amity with His Majesty are for the time being, by law, usage, or sufferance, entitled or enabled to do.

76. If a question arises whether any place is or is not in Bahrein for the purposes of this Order, it shall be referred to the Political Resident, and a certificate under his hand and seal shall be conclusive on the question, and shall be taken judicial notice of by any Court established under this Order.

77. Not later than the 31st day of March in each year, or such other day as the Secretary of State, or, with his previous or

subsequent assent, as the Governor-General of India in Council, directs from time to time, the Political Resident shall send to the Governor-General of India in Council, for transmission to the Secretary of State, a Report on the operation of this Order up to the 31st day of December in the previous year, or such other date as the Secretary of State, or, with his previous or subsequent assent, as the Governor-General of India in Council, directs from time to time, showing for the last twelve months the number and nature of the proceedings, criminal and civil, taken under this Order, and the result thereof, and the number and amount of fees received, and such other information, and being in such form as the Secretary of State, or, with his previous or subsequent assent, as the Governor-General of India in Council from time to time directs.

78. - (1) A printed copy of this Order, and of all Rules of Procedure and other Rules for the time being in force under this Order, shall be kept open to inspection free of charge in the office of the Political Agent and of each Court established under this Order.

(2) Printed copies thereof shall be sold within the islands of Bahrein at such reasonable price as the Political Agent from time to time directs.

79. - (1) This Order shall be published in the "Gazette of India" within such time after the passing thereof as the Secretary of State may prescribe, and shall come into force on such day (in this Order referred to as the commencement of this Order), within six months after that publication, as the Governor-General of India in Council may, by notification in the said "Gazette," appoint in this behalf.

(2) But any appointment under this Order may be made at any time after its passing, and no proof shall, in any proceedings, be required of any of the matters prescribed by this Article.

And the Most Honourable the Marquess of Crewe, K.G., and the Right Honourable Sir Edward Grey Baronet, K.G., two of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, are to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respectively appertain.

Almeric FitzRoy.

SCHEDULE

Indian Acts Applied.

Acts XXXV and XXXVI of 1858 relating respectively to lunatics and lunatic asylums.

The Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860);

The Whipping Act, 1864 (Act VI of 1864).

The Indian Succession Act (Act X of 1865).

The Indian Divorce Act (Act IV of 1869),

except so much as relates to divorce and nullity of marriage.

The Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869, (Act XIV of 1869), except sections 6, 15, 23, 32, 33, 34, 38 to 43 (both inclusive), the last clause of section 19, and the last two clauses of section 22.

The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act I of 1872).

The Indian Contract Act, 1872 (Act IX of 1872).

The Indian Oaths Act, 1873 (Act X of 1873).

The Indian Majority Act (Act IX of 1875).

The Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (Act XI of 1890).

The Indian Pilgrim Ships Act (Act XIV of 1895).

The Code of Criminal Procedure. (Act V of 1898), except
Chapter XXXVIII.

So much of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (Act VI of 1898),
as relates to offences against the Post Office.

The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908).

The Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (Act IX of 1908), so far
as it applies to appeals and applications.

And the enactments relating to insolvency and bankruptcy
for the time being in force in the Presidency of Bombay beyond the
limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay.

APPENDIX II

Note on the political situation in Bahrein as existing at the end of 1919, with suggestions and proposals for improving the situation

by Major H.K.V. Dickson.

1. I arrived in Bahrein on November 6th, 1919, and since my arrival I have taken pains to try and get at the bottom of the curious atmosphere of hostility which seems to exist everywhere in Bahrein for the foreigner and more especially towards the Agency. To accomplish my purpose I have spent much time interviewing persons, great and small, and have taken special care to get at the confidence of people by frequent visits and dinner parties at the houses of residents of all shades of opinion, both neutral, Sunni and Shiah. I have also been largely helped in my investigations by riding around among the many hamlets of the Island and chatting over a cup of coffee with the local headman surrounded by his villagers in the local guest chamber. The general conclusions that I have arrived at are enumerated below.

2. In my opinion -

- (a) The political atmosphere of Bahrein while not in any way dangerous is wholly unsatisfactory.
- (b) There is a strong anti-British sentiment which is long standing and deepseated.
- (c) British prestige rests on entirely false standards, namely on fear and not on respect.

I consider our task therefore both extremely difficult, yet imperative.

3. It would be quite useless were I to make the bold statements above, had not strong proofs to substantiate them and

suggested remedies in different directions to rectify them. The character and methods of Shaikh 'Isa bin 'Ali al Khalifah, K.C.S.I., C.S.I., the Ruler of Bahrein, are so well known as hardly to bear repetition, yet I must perforce give a rough sketch of the man so as to convey the true atmosphere prevailing. Shaikh 'Isa is a timid ruler, at the same time I believe he is a very loyal friend to ourselves and means extremely well by us. Friendly letter that he writes to myself either personal or for transmission to His Majesty's Government give him almost childish pleasure, and he has been heard on several occasions to tell others of them and boast about the said friendliness. In opposition to this he is continually attempting to assert his supposed rights in an illadvised way and to cause small embarrassments by puerile methods and easily discernable intentions.

The explanation of such contrary virtues and vices is easy of explanation. His own personal feelings are undoubtedly of the friendliest nature to ourselves, those of his advisers by no means unanimous in this respect. Their reasons for their hostile attitude may be divided into two degrees:-

"A" An honest one, that we may ourselves appreciate;

"B" A dishonest one;

both call for special consideration and different methods of handling.

"A" The honest opposition is based partly on fear, partly on pride, partly on suspicion, inherent in Arab minds, and partly on ignorance appalling in its completeness.

(i) Fear of a great power who has them so completely in its control makes them anxious to grasp and hold on to what actual

freedom and liberty of action remains to them, with the constant dread that their freedom may be still further curtailed.

(ii) Pride, which is equally part of the Arab character, encourages them to acts that will gain them renown, however small, in the eyes of their compatriots, and makes them equally averse to surrender an action once committed, or an attitude once assumed. Pride of comparison bears a real part in their line of thought, that is to say, their own power compared to that exercised by other Arab rulers, and the fear of loss of prestige in any curtailment of their powers in the eyes of other rulers.

(iii) Suspicion, which, as I said above, is an inherent vice or virtue, depending on the standpoint of regard in the constitution of Arab minds, and which always exists in the minds of a more or less primitive people, its degree depending on the extent of their backwardness, as a wild animal depends on suspicion, whilst a domesticated depends on its confidence, for its comfort and well being.

(iv) Ignorance of anything outside their own environment is so astonishing as to merit a special paragraph to itself, and I will treat this question further on in this note. But it is a real and distressing factor with which we have to deal. All the above are what we might call honest drawbacks, which we may appreciate, sympathize with and gradually remove by personal intercourse, sympathy, example and tact. The pity of it is that these characteristics are taken advantage of by those ill-disposed towards and I attribute eighty per cent. of our difficulties in our relationship with the ruler, and the present low standard of prestige, as due to them.

B - Dishonest opposition.

This we may take for granted comes in no inconsiderable extent from those in opposition to Shaikh Isa himself; mainly from his cousins Ali Ibrahim Rashid the sons of Mahomed al Khalifah who was formerly deposed by us, and to a certain extent from the heir presumptive. Quite apart from the natural hostility of the former family to ourselves for ousting their clan (hamoula) from the succession and their natural rights, it may be easily understood how they would be only too ready to advise Shaikh 'Isa to take a line of action that will bring him in opposition to ourselves. For they aim at nothing less than the deposition of the Shaikh himself, and clumsy diplomats as they are, they hope and never cease from attempting to accomplish this by trying to make us lose patience with the present ruler, through his apparent obstinacy and maladministration, both of which they encourage and excite. They may therefore be said to be playing a two-handed game, on incited by their own hopes and ambitions and the other fostered by their real hostility to ourselves, for supposed wrongs committed and natural dislike of the white foreigner, the more so as he has behind him the mighty strength of a great nation.

Thus then may we sum up the character of Shaikh 'Isa bin 'Ali al Khalifah with its resultant effects on his dealings with ourselves:

"A very old and weak man, imbued with sincere feelings of friendship and regard for His Majesty's Government, swayed and confused in his weakness by virile and astute minds and delicate

intriguers, dictated for the most part by evil intentions to himself, to us and to both - helped in this by the characteristics of Arab mentality mentioned above."

4. We must now turn our attention from the "Entourage" of the Ruler to the "Mass", and in this direction are causes of hostility and lack of prestige no less interesting and no less delicate. For here we have the "pawns" in the game and the material for the edifice of hostility.

We will divide them into two classes:-

A - The Government officials;

B - The notables of the Islands.

A - Like all Government officials of an oriental State, we may expect to find abuse of authority and extortion, but unlike most oriental States in such close relationship to a European Power, we may be justly grieved to find that these exceed all bonds of propriety and sense of justice, so much so as to call forth the odium of the Arabs themselves. The Amirs or Governors of the towns of Muharraq and Manama are officials entirely unsuited for control, and the power they wield is oppressive and immoral.

The Amir of Manama encourages and receives an income from prostitutes and gamblers, impresses boat and donkey transport in a shameless manner and generally extorts money from householders, shopkeepers and the people as a whole.

The Amirs of Muharraq is little better, and would be equally as bad, were he not more or less under the supervision of the Shaikh who resides there for the greater part of the year.

The Amirs being men of this stamp, it is not surprising that the "Fidawis" (police) and officials under them follow their lead.

This being so, it is obvious that any measure of reform is at once opposed by these gentlemen, and intrigues set on foot to prevent them being carried out.

B - The Notables of the Island. - Of these 25 per cent. are friendly to a greater or less degree, while 75 per cent. are definitely hostile.

I will attempt to describe the more important of them further on in this note, but for the present I will confine myself to anticipating the causes of our unpopularity in a general way before coming to details.

These causes we may study under three headings:-

(i) War, (ii) Normal, (iii) Individual.

(i) War.

(a) Economical. - The necessary restrictions due to the war have hit the Island hard as in most other places. The prohibition of the export of silver and restrictions as to the export of rice from India during 1919 especially have caused acute hardship and discontent, but except where these have been taken advantage of by ill-disposed persons they should be speedily corrected or eradicated by the return of normal conditions, when present prohibition prices will fall and normal trade be resumed. Our efforts then must be directed to the removal as soon as possible of trade restrictions made necessary by the war.

(b) Propaganda. - This has left its scars, and is still existent. The present uncertainty of future status, active

pro-Turk feeling and Khilafat propaganda from India, are exercising men's minds and providing material for hostile endeavour. This can be eradicated or partly reduced by measures proposed (See paragraph v).

(ii) Normal.

- (a) Fanatical hostility, due to ultra-religious feelings among the Arabs; this is to be expected in a place like Bahrein, which has always taken its cue from Najd, but it can be reduced by intercourse and closer touch. (The "Akhwan" movement of the mainland has undoubtedly increased this feeling of hostility.)
- (b) Persians, due in the first place to a rather unfriendly and fanatical Shiah Persian community, but also due to recent political events in Persia, and the natural leaning of the Persian towards intrigue.
- (c) Ignorance - It is difficult to credit the hopeless ignorance that exists in Bahrein, even among the best families. Those who have travelled and seen something of the world are a class apart. But the Shaikhs (ruling house) and people generally are the most ignorant people I have ever met. No story, however, impossible is too extravagant for their credulity. Isolated to a deplorable extent, they are callous and indifferent to outside matters of any kind. I refer not to the humble and poor, but to the rich and influential. Very few can write. Geographical knowledge is appalling, politics of most amazing conception, they cannot understand the simplest measure of administration or

reform, incapable of clear statement and sound reasoning, intellectually dull and naturally stupid. It is for this reason that I specially advocate at homes, weekly durbars, evening visits and a newspaper to help broaden their minds and help their judgment.

(iii) Individual.

I attach a black and white list of important Bahrein individuals with a short description against each. The list is by no means complete, but is interesting as an index to the various causes and effects it is necessary to study. I also attach a list of important individuals who do not pay visits to the Political Agent.

WHITE LIST

1. Salman bin Matar	A wealthy pearl merchant, very friendly.
2. Yusuf bin Ahmed Kanoo, M.B.E.	Influential merchant; has incurred hatred of Shaikh 'Isa and his anti-English advisers for his friendliness to us. Undoubtedly would get into serious trouble if British ever withdrew from Bahrain.
3. Abdullah bin Mahmud	Pearl dealer.
4. Haji Ahmad bin Yatim	General merchant, member of the Majlis al Urfi.
5. Salman Megoo	General merchant, very friendly to us.
6. Abdul Aziz al Qusaibi	Bin Saud's agent in Bahrain. One of the best type of Nejdis, a fervent supporter of the Imam, an "Akhwan" in his tenets. Very friendly to the British.
7. Abd-el Rahman al Qusaibi	Brother to (6) and equally friendly, spends six months each year in Bombay making purchases for Bin Saud and people of Nejd generally.

8. Mahomed Ali al Zaiyani	General merchant, regularly visits India.
9. Sayed Mahomed Jemal al Lail	Head man of the Yemen community; anti-Turk and anti-ruler of Bahrein; would like to see British in absolute control here.
10. Mahomed bin Hamad al Qazi	A well read Nejdi merchant from Anaizeh.
11. Sulaiman bin Hamad al Bassam	Nejdi merchant of well-known Bassam family established Basra, Mecca, Baghdad, Damascus, etc.
12. Seyed Ahmed bin Seyed Alawwi	Bahrein pearl merchant and broker. The leading Shiah inhabitant. Very British, often goes to India. Afraid of showing his liking for us, for fear of persecution from the Ruler of Bahrein. Has secretly applied to become a British subject, was once imprisoned and fined Rs.5,000 by Shaikh 'Isa; became bankrupt owing failure in pearls now gradually looking up again. A man with greatest influence among Baharna villagers of the Island.
13. Shaikh Abdul Latif al Dosari	Of Buddaiya, cousin of Shaikh Abdulla al, Dosari. Pro-British probably on account of Shaikh Abdulla, being chief friend and adviser of Sheikh Abdulla bin Isa al Khalifa, C.I.E., Shaikh 'Isa's youngest son. A frequent visitor to Agency and good provider of local news.

Persians

14. Khan Sahib Muhammad Sharif Kutbaddin	A wealthy general merchant, head man of the Persian community, pro-British and friendly to the Agency.
15. Muhammas Farook Akil	A wealthy and influential general merchant with firms in Bombay, Lingah, Debai, Henjam.
16. Yousuf Lutfali Khunji	English educated general merchant. Pro-British, keeps up English style, subscribes London Times, Graphic and the Near East. He is very friendly with the Agency. He is gone to Bombay where he intends establishing a good business and will stay there five months in a year during winter.

17. Abdul Nabi Bushiri Ali Kazim Bushiri	Wealthy partners in general business. Once suspected of smuggling tea, but now friendly towards the Agency. Follow Khan Sahib Muhammad Sharif's advice. They hold no political views.
18. Abul Kassar	Ditto ditto ditto

BLACK LIST

Arabs.

1. Haji Yusuf bin Abdul Rahman Fakhru.	Formerly noted arm smuggler from Muscat and Bahrein. Suspected strongly of being chief smuggler of contraband goods into Persia now. Too clever to be caught out: anti-English chiefly because of his crooked trade dealings.
2. Haji Jassim Jodar	Violently pro-Turk resulting in extreme hostility to everything British, openly boasts his political view.
3. Shaikh Rashid bin Muhammad Al Khalifah.	First cousins of Shaikh Isa.
4. Shaikh Ali bin Muhammad Al Khalifah.	Intriguers - father deposed by His Majesty's Government who appointed Shaikh Isa as Shaikh of Bahrein instead.
5. Shaikh Ibrahim bin Muhammad Al Khalifah	Hostile and revengeful in consequence.
6. Fahad bin Abdul Rahman, Amir of Muharaq.	Always arresting British subjects apparently from sheer desire to cause trouble between Shaikh Isa and His Majesty's Government. A dangerous man.
7. Ali bin Husain Ghomri, Amir of Manamah.	A man of loose character and crooked dealings. Has great influence with Shaikh Hamid bin Isa. Violently pro-Turk.
8. Ali bin Musa	Partner to (1) above and as equally a notorious arms smuggler. Well-known at Muscat.
9. Shaikh Abdullah bin Hasan Dosari	See No. 13 White List. Easily led by others. Stupid rather than dangerous.
10. Haji Abdul Rahman Al Zayani	Pearl merchant. Partner to Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa Al Khalifah in business. Knows Bombay well. Pro-Turk but moderate in his views.

11. Ahmad bin Salman Ghigu	Pro-Turk, former member of Majlis-ul-Urfi.
12. Shaikh Jassim bin Mehza	Chief Sunni Qazi in Manama. Has very high reputation locally for charity and good works, pretends to like English. A mischief maker of worst-type.
13. Shaikh Ahmad bin Mehza	Brother of (12). Narrowly escaped deportation 1905-06. Dangerous intriguer. Confidential adviser to Shaikh Isa on land question.
14. Ali bin Abdullah	Financial Agent of Shaikh Isa. Ill-disposed jealous of English interference. Reputed hand in glove with Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa Al Khalifah, C.I.E., in swindling Shaikh Isa out of half the receipt from the Customs. Hated by all for his miserly methods. Dangerous.
15. Jassim Chirawi	Shaikh Isa's Private Secretary. Great friend of Shaikh's son, Abdullah. The cleverest rogue in Bahrein. Outwardly extremely polite and polished, but always endeavouring undermine British influence with Shaikh. Close friend of Shaikh Isá's wife (the Queen). A man to be watched very closely. Engaged in deadly feud with Yosuf Kanoo, M.B.E., whom he is trying to ruin. Adopts humble attitude and pretends always he has no influence with Shaikh Isa.
16. Ahmad bin Mansur	Ill-natured bigot.

Persian

1. Haji Abdul Nabi Kazeruni	Formerly used to style himself Persian Consul, Bahrein. Used to take money and issue passports till stopped by Agency. Violently anit-English. Undoubtedly engaged in smuggling contraband to Persia.
2. Abdul Nabi Germani	Lately Head Clerk to the German firm of R. Wonckhaus and Company, pro-German and so pro-Turk.
3. Abdullah Germani	Agent at Muharaq for the late German firm of R. Wonckhaus and Company. Poor and mischievous.

4. Mullah Shaikh Abdul Rahim Petty merchant. Was warned for giving out false war news. Pro-Turk.

Indian

1. Mr. Muhammad Roshan Akhtar Punjabi Musalman, formerly employed as vernacular clerk in the Agency. A well educated Indian. Holds strong political views, has visited Egypt and travelled generally. Openly talks about recent Punjab riots. Reads Indian papers to Arab public, who gather to hear anti-English news in his house. Being clever with easy and assumed manner, his influence is distinctly not for good. A staunch member of the khilafat movement. Secretary to Mr. Yosuf Kanoo, M.B.E., who is afraid of him, but dare not get rid of him lest he join hands with Jassim Chirawis party. A dangerous individual.

List of Notables who do not call on the Political Agent, Bahrain.

1. Shaikh Abdul Latif bin Sa'ad, Imam of the great mosque, Manamah.
2. Shaikh Ali (brother) pro-Turk. Influential Aalim, smaller Imam of a mosque.
3. Shaikh Hussian Musharraaf, pro-Turk.
4. Mubarak al Fadhil.
5. His son Khamis.
6. Shaikh Ahmad bin Mehza. Was going to be deported 1904-05.
7. Shaikh Khalid bin Ali al Khalifah, brother of Shaikh 'Isa. Lives in Rafa'a Old.
8. Shaikh Hamud bin Sabah al Khalifah. Lives in Rafa'a, well read pro-Turk.
9. Shaikh Rashid bin Muhammad al Khalifah, cousin of Shaikh Isa.
10. Shaikh Hamad bin Muhammad al Khalifah. On bad terms with Shaikh.
11. Ali bin Abdullah, Shaikh 'Isa's financial agent, influential (came once), ill-disposed.
12. Shaikh Abdul Wahhab bin Hajji Zaiyani, pro-Turk (came once).
13. Shaikh 'Isa bin Rashid, bigoted Aalim, Imam of Jumma, Muharraq.
14. Shaikh Ahmad bin Muhammad Qazi of al Hidd.

5. Action proposed to improve on the situation. (a). To meet and defeat these various difficulties, an energetic and open handed policy is immediately imperative. For in my opinion with so much cheap sentimentality at large in the world to-day, sue to catch phrases used for political purposes both during the world war and throughout the period of the Armistice, men's minds, especially those of orientals, are apt to fasten on unrealities rather than on the facts of the outcome of the world conflagration. These ephemeral ideas are greedily fastened on to by the astute Arab mind and especially by those unfriendly to us, and if British prestige is not to suffer, I submit a change of manner in dealing with these people is essential. And the primary duty of a Political Officer in these serious times is to break away from the fetters of the past and enter a wider and freer sphere of political thought lest British domination or control appear weak-kneed and sentimental. Added to this the general upset due to the war, the doubts and uncertainties, propaganda and dislocation of trade with its necessary hardship necessitates infusing energy and wideness of vision into our work in order to lead minds unbalanced by recent events into same channels.

(b) A closer touch with individuals, who have the least influence in educating public opinion, with the closest possible study of their individuality and especially, if hostile, their reasons for hostility. The Political Officer must be the doctor of his charge and know accurately the medicine required for each of his patients. It is impossible for the senior political officers to have leisure to do this except in the case of men of real importance, but so well should they be sured by their junior lieutenants that the exact tune and

mentality of any particular place can be clearly and accurately sounded. I must be pardoned if I appear to generalize, I am writing a note on Bahrein and the mainland under it, (in a junior sense) and I purposely write at length so that one's superior officers may themselves feel the atmosphere as I feel it, and as I am about to ask for support, to give my fullest reasoning. I have started, therefore, a list of every important and fairly important personage in the place. I intend to meet them frequently to study them individually. A short visit of a few hours may easily change an enemy into a friend. I need not emphasise this aspect of political dealing that gained an Empire a hundred years ago, but has greatly fallen into disuse to our disadvantage, mainly through pressure of office work. To the above end I have set apart four days in each week for calling purposes. The hours selected are from 5.30 p.m. to 7 p.m. between sunset prayer and the Arab's dinner hour.

(c) Entertainment and open handedness is an essential, and I intend to hold at homes to the gentry of the place, where rumours may be corrected, and minds enlarged by social intercourse. The Political Officer must be the schoolmaster of public opinion and thought. Our opponents in the past have robbed us of many things by these means, in future we must deny this to them. The King's birthday, New Year's day, etc., etc., must be celebrated in good style and made an occasion of entertainment on a suitable scale.

(d) The public. The small shopkeeper, the man earning a small livelihood, must be equally studied and considered, especially our own subjects and protected persons, he must feel his position not only in law suits and public matters, but also in his private life,

and small hurts and pleasures, so that his citizenship becomes something to him. I have, therefore, instituted a weekly (Monday) Darbar or Majlis at which all, or any of the above, are free to come and will be served with light refreshment to take away shyness and reserve. They will be encouraged to speak their minds, and if immediate action can be taken, it will be taken before them. Through this channel I hope firstly to gain confidence and information, and secondly to set an example to the Ruler and his people.

(e) Education. - The Political Officer cannot hope to educate in its literal sense, yet education on sound lines is essential if the present ignorance is to be rectified. I hope to carry through my predecessor's proposal to have a school for British subjects and protected persons. But it must be under the supervision of the Political Officer.

(f) Health. - The political importance of this subject cannot be overestimated, or its means for progress denied. Much prejudice will have to be ridden down, the Ruler in particular will have to be gradually weaned to the idea that a clean tidy city is in every way preferable to a dirty one. This duty I have taken upon myself and hope to be able to report results before long.

(g) Reward, for services rendered either to ourselves or to the community, should receive frequent recognition and I can not emphasize too strongly the enormous influence these have on the Arab mind. While not cheapening the higher decorations and distinctions, we may be a generous distribution of the less imposing ones gain many friends and encourage honest endeavour. Often have I heard the Arab cry that he has served faithfully 10 or 20 years, but has received nothing, while his less deserving but intriguing brother has been rewarded in some incomprehensible manner.

(h) Presents have their great value and are fully appreciated by Arābs, and are a sine qua non among themselves. I do not deny that we have and do give presents, but a judicious increase in this respect will help us greatly. Foreign firms were very generous in this respect, with excellent results to themselves, and we as a Government should be no less generous.

(i) Letters of appreciation or thanks are treasured and have their weight, and occasional letters from the Senior Political Officer go a very long way to cementing a friendship. An instance of this I saw only last week when in public Darbar Sheikh Abdul Latif al Dosari of Budaiyeh pulled out a black edged letter written him by Sir Percy Cox, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., on the occasion of the late King Edward's death. He paraded this letter with a great show and obviously placed a very high value on it. He insisted on reading it over twice to his audience.

(j) Intelligence. - Even in time of peace is of the utmost importance both as a means of forestalling troubles and difficulties and guaging the trend of events. The information thus gained might be centralized in Baghdad and would yield important results. I propose in future supplying the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, and to the Deputy Political Resident, Bushire, with a short weekly report that will, I hope, give information that gradually may be of use, under the headings Military trade, localities, individuals, public opinion.

For secret service work I require Rs 2,000 per annum. As my allotment here is fixed and I have no funds to meet such a charge, I trust Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, will grant this sum from funds at his disposal for 1920.

Summary of matters to be taken in hand for improving
general tone.

- (a) Electric light Capital promised. Baghdad asked to supply but later failed. Enquiries being made India for estimates.
- (b) School Subscriptions promised. Teachers asked for from Baghdad, general arrangements well forward.
- (c) Water supply This will have to await until India or Baghdad can supply pipes. It is most urgent measure.
- (d) Pearl Button Plant Enquiries being made
- (e) Bank Greatly desired by local merchants awaiting sanction by Government of India to allow export of silver. Eastern Bank willing open branch.
- (f) Darbar Arranged weekly on Mondays.
- (g) Visit to gentry Started - Car wanted.
- (h) Information Funds being asked for from Civil Commissioner.
- (i) Honours and Rewards For consideration of Civil Commissioner.
- (j) Letters of thanks For consideration of Civil Commissioner.
- (k) Newspaper All ready to start on conclusion of peace.

Note. - Reference (g). Shaikh Isa has imported a car and also Shaikh Abdullah, his son, roads are being improved in consequence, and with a car at one's disposal one will now be able to go over the whole island.

APPENDIX III

- a) Speech made by the Hon'ble Lieutenant-Colonel S.G. Knox,
C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
at the Majlis convened in Bahrain on the 26th May 1923.

Gentlemen:

You have just heard read to you the letter in which Shaikh Hamad announces to you that he has, in obedience to the orders of the British Government, taken over the administration of these islands as his father's fully empowered Agent. Some of you present here to-day may remember what was the state of these Islands when fifty-five years ago Shaikh 'Isa was summoned by His Majesty's Government to take his seat as Shaikh. These Islands were then exposed to the full blast of internecine strife, rapine and disorder. His father, Shaikh Ali, had been killed in the fighting that had taken place a few months before. For fifty-five years his rule has been blessed with peace and, on the whole, good orders. He has been a steady loyal friend of the British Government and the Islands have undoubtedly progressed in wealth, population, commerce and agriculture. The Islands of Bahrain are ever watched by covetious eyes on both sides of the Persian Gulf and the fifty-five years of Shaikh 'Isa's rule have been no mean achievement. I am sure I may speak confidently on behalf of this assembly of Bahrain Notables when I say that we all thank him for what he has done for these Islands: he leaves no enemy or ill-wisher behind him and we all wish him still many happy years of well-earned retirement after the labour and fatigue of so many years of arduous rule.

Recent deplorable events, on which I have no wish to dwell on this occasion, have merely emphasized and accentuated an insistent

cry for reform of the administration on modern lines and there is, after all, nothing surprising in the fact that a man who has reached the ripe age of seventy-five years, Shaikh 'Isa's easy tolerant rule - some may perhaps call it misrule : I personally prefer to call it lack of rule - has led to the growth of a number of petty tyrannies and independencies which were fast crystallising into vested interests and seriously weakening the Administration. Rights were being lost which it would be hard to recover and the British Government, looking to the general good, have in their wisdom decided that it is time that new blood was introduced and the Administration strengthened. Shaikh 'Isa is still titular Shaikh of these Islands and Shaikh Hamad is only his Agent, although the fully empowered Agent for his father, and he has assumed a very difficult and thankless task.

Gentlemen, you know Shaikh Hamad far better than I, a foreigner, can know him. You know he is a modest, unassuming man, but I should like to tell you that throughout the negotiations that have preceded this decision, Shaikh Hamad has valiantly fought for his father's retention and it was no greed for power that led him to assume the Administration. It is rather a regard for his father's good name, for the benefit of the Al-Khalifa and for the welfare of the Sunni community that had induced him, despite some diffidence, to take upon his shoulders the weight and burden of the Administration. He relies greatly on the promise of unstinted and loyal assistance from his brother Shaikh Abdullah, and I am here, as the mouthpiece of my Government, to promise the help of that Government to Shaikh Hamad in all paths of lawful endeavour both against external aggression and internal sedition.

It is quite possible that many of you present here to-day, especially Sunnis, may view with regret the disappearance of a Sunni ruler who has ruled over you for so many years. It is a very natural feeling and I venture to express the very earnest hope, almost the belief, that our proceedings to-day will eventually tend to the uplift and special progress of the Sunni Community. Ever since some twenty years ago Shaikh 'Isa in his wisdom handed over the Political Agent, Bahrain, the administration over and direct responsibility for foreigners, there have been practically two Governments working side by side in Bahrain. One has been open and above-board and has resulted in an enormous influx of foreigners to these Islands and I believe that I shall not be accused of exaggeration if I say that the proportion of foreigners has during the last twenty years progressed as 20 : 1 and their wealth as 100 : 1. I really believe I am understating facts. On the other hand, the other Government has been, so to speak, behind a purdah and the Sunnī community and its ruler have been apt to stand aloof and distinct from other communities and, although there has no doubt been some progress, they have lagged behind the foreigner. It is my earnest hope, which I am confident is fully shared by Shaikhs Hamad and Abdullah and by the Political Agent, that the measures of reform we initiate to-day will bring the Sunni community into line with other communities. They will pull their weight in the boat and have, as is their birthright, a preponderating voice in the administration of these Islands so that, in spite of some natural regrets, we can look forward with some confidence to a bright and happy future for the Sunni community.

I must now give my first warning, which is to those who collect the main revenues of these Islands - the Customs revenues - that after deduction of necessary working expenses, they must pay all such revenues to Shaikh Hamad and to Shaikh Hamad alone. No drafts except those signed by him on the Customs should be honoured. Infringements of this rule will entail dismissal and the personal responsibility of the guilty party.

My second warning is to the Qazis. We shall preserve the Shara Law and the Shara Courts to the fullest possible extent and we have no wish to fetter litigants or those who seek arbitration, from free recourse to Shara but any Qazi who permits the interference or advocacy of influential persons or their submitting cases to Shara will be dismissed from his appointment, be he Sunni or Shiah. The only persons who have the power to commit cases to Shara are Shaikh Hamad and the Political Agent, Bahrain, or their regularly appointed deputies. Qazis are expected to be vigilant against these abuses and to defeat these attempts by suspending cases and reporting to Shaikh Hamad or the Political Agent, Bahrain, as may seem most convenient or expedient in the particular case. I repeat that the free intercourse of litigants themselves direct to Shara is a right which God forbid! I or anyone else should interfere with.

Attempts by unauthorized persons to usurp executive or judicial authority will be resented and punished, particularly attempts by persons who constitute themselves leaders of any community as has been done in the past.

Gentlemen of the Al-Khalifa:

I am afraid that looking to the past it is my duty to warn you that you must not expect that because you have taken the trouble to be born you have therefore a right to live on the rest of the community, whether by allowances from the revenues of these Islands or by preying on the poor and helpless. "He who will not work, neither shall he eat" is a good motto and you had better apply it to your own case. Those of you who lend your energies to assisting Shaikh Hamad in his thankless task of raising the Government of these Islands to the plane of modern civilization will be liberally rewarded and given opportunities of exercising such talents as God has given you. Those who sit still and do nothing must be content with a bare pittance for subsistence. Those who do mischief will be cut off absolutely and punished accordingly. In any case, it is Shaikh Hamad to whom all classes must now look for reward and punishment and the British Government, here by my mouth, promises him full support in all lawful exercise of authority. I endeavour to turn your thoughts to education and the means of earning an honest living for you are too numerous for all to find places in the administration and I fear, owing to neglect, many are not competent.

Gentlemen of the Sunni persuasion and especially the Dawasir tribesmen:

It is for you to understand that we mean to establish the rule of these Islands under a Shaikh of the Al-Khalifa and that the Shaikh's rights are going to be enforced

equally over all to the best of Shaikh Hamad's ability and in such attempts he will have our full support. You have frequently met such threats in the past by a counter threat to leave these Islands in a body and go over to Bin Saud or others. If that is your intention, in God's name, go; but if you resign as a protest, do not be surprised if your lands and houses are confiscated to the State and given to others, and I can assure you that there will be no lack of applicants. These Islands are not date gardens in desert Arabia where the proprietors roam the desert the whole year round only returning to eat the fruit of their gardens at the time of harvest. I do not mean it to be understood that the mere departure of a proprietor on business to Bombay or pilgrimage to the Haj or other lawful occasions will be the signal for the Shaikh to confiscate the property left behind, but I do mean that those who behave contumaciously may find themselves dealt with stringently. We have no use for absentee landlords or persons owning a double allegiance. I fear that in the East this merely means playing off one ruler against another and consistently betraying both. If you reside in the Islands of Bahrain, you must, while owning property there, conform to the rule of the country and pay the customary dues, nor can we tolerate an imperium in imperio.

Gentlemen of the Shiah persuasion and especially those indigenous to these Islands!

I wish you particularly to weigh the following remarks. Much of the agitation of recent years has been fictitious. I am far from saying that you have had no cause for complaint but what I mean to say is that I cannot subscribe to the opinion that recent misrule is either more tyrannical or more flagrant than it has often been in the past. The state of these Islands, the signs of additional wealth that meet the eye everywhere around give the lie to the contention that misrule has been persistent and is increasing. We have admitted some abuses and announced our intention of fighting them. But I want you to remember that this is a Sunni country and surrounded on this shore of the Gulf by powerful Sunni communities who watch our proceedings with vigilant interest and no small degree of suspicion. You must not expect equality at a bound and Sunni privileges cannot be swept away at one, if at all.

As Shaikh Hamad has told you, we shall endeavour to see that you know to what extent you are being taxed, that taxes are levied equally and not arbitrarily, that you remain in quiet enjoyment of the fruits of your labour and that you are not exposed to outrage of any kind as you have I fear, sometimes been in the past, and I look to you for loyal support of Shaikh Hamad who promises to protect you against oppression and exaction. You have found recently that you have a voice, and foreign advisers have taught you how to use it. Be careful that you do not, by clamouring unjustly, destroy the benefits you may reasonably expect from the inauguration of the present regime.

To you, gentlemen, who, to use a legal tag, are foreigners within the meaning of the Bahrain Order in Council, I have little to say. The jurisdiction over foreigners will continue to be exercised in the future, as it has been in the past, by the Political Agent. I believe it has been to your benefit and that you are reasonably content with it. One thing no one will deny, that since Shaikh 'Isa, in his wisdom, entrusted foreign cases to the Political Agent, the number of foreigners, their wealth, importance and weight in the community has increased in a manner that is little short of amazing. It does not seem as if people would flock here to the extent they do, if they were dissatisfied under the conditions under which they live. Shaikh Hamad, however, expressly authorises me to say that he will welcome comments and criticism and that he will lend a sympathetic ear to all that may tend to increase the wealth, comfort and general well-being of the town of Manameh in which foreigners preponderate to such an extent that it may almost be said to have been made by them.

Gentlemen, I have kept you an unreasonable time and yet no speech in Bahrain would be complete without a word on the subject that must be uppermost in the minds of those who live in Bahrain - the pearl trade. It is the source of the wealth of these Islands. It furnishes the reason why foreigners flock here in such numbers and build fine houses and on it are founded the prosperity, cleanliness and well-being of Manameh. And yet, I know,

the Political Agent knows, Shaikh Hamad knows, the Qazi, Shaikh Jasim bin Mehza, and you all know, and above all, the divers know that it is the plague spot of these Islands. We all know that labour is in a position little short of lifelong slavery and that trickery, fraud and oppression are rampant in the Trade; and what are any of us doing to remove these evils? It is almost impossible to get respectable people to serve in the Salifa Court, Nakhodas steadily refuse to produce their accounts; if they did, divers, who are dumb driven cattle, would not understand them; and yet, who cares or gives real thought to all this suffering? You can register divers, you can even reform the Salifa Court, you can imprison Nakhodas, compel them to furnish accounts, and yet, even in that way you will not go far. You must begin at the bottom with the lowest class - the divers- encourage them by finding them work in the slack season, in habits of thrift which will render them independent of Salaf and its oppressive usury instead of encouraging them, as the Nakhodas do, in extravagance and dependence. I must leave those among you who wish them well to find out the way. Shaikh Hamad and the Political Agent can do little but practical, cautious philanthropists can do a great deal.

(N.B. - The speech now passed into Arabic.)

And now, Shaikh Hamad, I ask you to bear with me while I give you some advice for the future. I have already spoken to you on the subject and for one word I say to you now I speak six to my other hearers.

My first piece of advice is "Fear two : first God and then fear". I had almost reversed the order, for Allah is the merciful, the compassionate, the mild and the generous, while fear is the hated enemy.

My second piece of advice is, "Avoid two things : hate and love". They are the "wasamain" (camel-marks) of the weak man and however harmless a weak man may be as a merchant or a cooly, he is useless as a ruler.

My third piece of advice is in regard to rewards and punishments, the two principal functions of a ruler. In regard to both of these, follow the rules of the British Man-of-War and let twenty-four hours elapse between the act and its recompense, whether that recompense be good or evil. Examine yourself if your heart is cold and if you find it not so, wait another four and twenty hours. Then recompense.

And now O Hamad ! I will tell you a story that I heard here of what took place the other day when there was an assembly much like the present one, to celebrate a School Prizegiving. Most of the scholars received rewards but one, who probably did not deserve one, began to whimper and the headmaster, fearing that he would spoil the tamasha, led him up to you and explained that by some mistake this boy had been forgotten. Whereupon, O Hamad! you pulled out a gold watch from your pocket and presented it to this whimpering little boy and another member of the Al-Khalifa, not to be outdone in generosity, gave him £5 and I have no doubt that the assembly went out saying what

noble-hearted open-handed gentlemen you were. It sounds like a story from the Arabian Nights or the spacious days of Haroun al Rashid.

Now I tell you O Hamad! that your conduct on this occasion was absolutely rotten. It was bad for the boy himself, it was bad for the other boys and if you go on on such principles, you will not, O Hamad, last six months. Thirty years have I worked with Hakims great and small and yet never have I known or met the Hakim who was not in need of money for public needs. The Political Agent is hard put to it for want of money, I am cramped for lack of funds, Persia and Iraq and France are on the verge of bankruptcy and Germany has fallen over the precipice. The Government of India is reducing its establishments and dismissing its servants and the Government of London is doing likewise and who are you, O Hamad, that you should be better than they? You have rich and ample revenues but I shall be greatly surprised to learn that they amount to as much as Re. 1 per month per head of the population of these Islands : and yet, all these men, women and children look to you, O Hamad, for their moral uplift, sanitation and progress. And how much uplift, sanitation and progress are you going to effect for Re. 1 per head per month and how much will be left over for giving gold watches, and five-pound notes to little whimpering boys for a term's work or, for that matter, for motor cars or motor boats for the members of the Al-Khalifa? In all private expenditure, O Hamad,

you must be a miser and it is only when you entertain projects that will bring money out of money and projects for the general advancement of your people that you must spend money with both hands.

If you will follow these four precepts and people curse you, as people will curse a Hakim, go on your way without flinching. If they praise you to your face, examine yourself and ask in your heart "Where, O Hamad, hast thou erred?" And in conclusion, my friend (and here I took him by the hand), blessings and prosperity on your rule.

Note. - The speech was well received and Shaikh Hamad, though he might have resented some of this public plain-speaking, appeared genuinely delighted with it. Even Yusuf bin Ahmed Kanoo, our caustic critic, was moved to enthusiasm and said that Hamad should have kissed my hands and head for the Arabic advice. Read in cold blood and in an English translation it sounds silly in the extreme but one must recollect the primitive folk to whom it was addressed.

S.G. KNOX.

b) Translation of Speech made by Shaikh Hamad bin 'Isa Al-Khalifa at the Majlis convened in Bahrain on the 26th May 1923.

Gentlemen, - In obedience to the orders of the High Government, to-day I assume on my shoulders the responsibility of the Government of this country with the object of preserving the honour of my dear father and to serve the family of Al-Khalifa and the public. I will do my utmost for the welfare of the subjects of His Excellency my respected father and, as you are perfectly aware, His Excellency my father has always been solicitous to preserve

peace, order and prosperity in his country and I shall endeavour to follow in his footsteps. Moreover, gentlemen, I know, as also you all know, that, of recent years, there has been a great progress in civilization and prosperity in all towns in this world and why should our dear native country not follow their example? I say that my chief duty is cheerfully to attempt to promote the prosperity of my dear native country, the spread of education and public sanitation, to encourage commerce and agriculture. I thank Almighty God for my good fortune in that my brother, Shaikh Abdullah, on whom I fully rely, has promised me his assistance in Council and to co-operate in settling Government affairs. From the love I bear to my dear country I desire that all in my town attend to their own business, that the merchant busy himself in his mercantile affairs and others follow each the work by which he earns his livelihood and the peasant concern himself with his cultivation.

I say confidently that if I find persons intriguing against the nations or indulging in any mischievous actions or disturbance, I will take the necessary action for his chastisement. Gentlemen, I inform you that in future I will not suffer the intermediation of anyone on behalf of any culprit to prevent his being punished as he deserves, so it is useless for anyone to trouble himself in such matters. Also I seize this occasion to acquaint you that I intend to safeguard the income and rights of my Government. After the deduction of the salaries of those who assist

Government and are entitled to receive salary and after the deduction of other necessary expenditure by Government servants on Government account, this is my first duty. The balance of the income and taxes will be kept with me and earmarked for the improvement, promotion and extension of the commerce of my country and for such ends as may lead to the improvement of the condition of my country and Government. In these circumstances, I am responsible before the public not to waste public funds. I shall carefully consider and make the necessary arrangement regarding taxation, so that it may fall equally on all and that the amount of the tax should be openly known, so that no official can recover more than the fixed amount.

This what had to be said and in conclusion I sincerely thank the High Government for their valuable assistance to us in the past and I hope that they will assist us and our Government in future in public progress and the extension of our subjects' trade and that friendly relations will be maintained between us. I also thank the Hon'ble Colonel Knox, C.S.I., C.I.E., the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, for the assistance afforded by him to us and in conclusion, gentlemen, accept by gratitude and respect.

(Note. - Original not reproduced)

A P P E N D I X IV

Letter from Colonel S.G. Knox to Shaikh, Sir, Isa Bin.

Ali A'l Khalif, K.C.I.E.

From

Colonel S.G. Knox, C.S.I. C.I.E.,

The Resident at the Persian Gulf.

To

His Highness, Shaikh, Sir, Isa, Bin. Ali A'l Khalif, K.C.I.E.

Your letter is received and what you have mentioned therein is understood.

I do not remember it appearing from the papers that are with the British Government to have consulted the people when the British Government made you King of Bahrein. Besides times and affairs change on all circumstances. So I do not see the least necessity for consulting people as long as the British Government, in view of the public good, considers that owing to your old age you are incapable and unfit for the administration of Government matters. So in accordance with the directions of the British Government received by me, I inform you that now and henceforth you have no right to meddle with the affairs of the Bahrain Government which is transferred to your son Shaikh Hamad as your regent. I also require you to do the needful so that the order of the British Government may take effect with respect to the above.

24th May 1923 (8th Shaval 1341. A.H.)

(Sd.) S.G. Knox,
Colonel, S.G. Knox,
The Head of the Gulf.

A P P E N D I X V

Petition from Shaikh Isa to Colonel Trevore, Political
Resident in the Gulf.

To,

His Excellency Colonel Trevore,

The Diplomatic Agent,

&

The Consul General for the Persian Gulf at Bushire
for the British Government.

From

Shaikh Isa Bin Ali, the Chief of Bahrein and his Nobles,

Scholars and the Chiefs of the Tribes

Your Excellency,

In your absence have occurred great incidents and important matters which disturbed our thoughts and ruffled our senses. Our treaty with the British Government was for justice equity respect for the Arab tribes and assistance. But with much regret we have to state that we have experienced from the present Diplomatic Agent (Major Daly) treatment interference and his tendency towards disturbances and encroachments which have collided with the British Policy and have transgressed its precedents towards the Arab people.

This made us invite your attention hoping your Excellency would right the wrong after inquiring into what has taken place at Bahrein of disturbances and mischief though during a century that passed before this occurrence no mischief was heard of and no blood was shed at Bahrein.

This will help you to understand as to who has been the cause for all this. And we are sure of your gentlemanliness and straightforwardness.

Your Excellency:-

Since the accession of shaikh Isa to the throne of his country he has abided by the friendly relations between him and the British Government and the many years that have passed would prove that he has preferred to be friendly with Britain to any other feeling and fully confident that on her part she too would answer by tightening the ties of sincerity and confidence tending to mutual good and with an intention of assisting the Arab tribes in their progress. We felt grateful to her for her abiding by the understanding made between us both. But since Major Daly is appointed for us the activity has proved to be entirely retrograding and his actions show that he is altogether ignorant of the British Policy towards the Arabs. We bore patiently his going astray beyond the lawful barriers and preferred not troubling you with the matter and hoped that he himself would see his way to what is right. But it was in vain for he continued persistently his policy injurious and calumnious for Britain, and lastly five months ago he and Col. Knox who harbours old malice towards Bahrein and its Government in a spirit far from veracity and uproots the pillars of our confidence and that of the people in His Majesty's government if we did not know that she won't allow them both to continue this interference.

Thus we could no longer connive at things and pacify the spirit of the tribes and promised them that we would inform you the details of what has passed which we state as follows:-

The actions perpetrated by Major Daly are:- Formation of Police of strangers and handing over of the offices of the Municipality to an alien in an Arabian country. We rose and protested and sent petitions after petitions to Shaikh Isa which petitions (Major Daly) he presented to him and we received no reply to our protest. In the month of Ramzan there occurred a small quarrel between an alien and an Najdi. The Police Officer and the Municipal Officer were influenced with their communal prejudice and ordered the aliens to fire. The duty of police is to set apart the quarrelling parties and to set up an inquiry. But the communal prejudice prevailed and the police instead of doing their duty undertook transforming a small quarrel into a bloody revolt and this proved what we had expected and had told Shaikh Isa too. Three days after this Col. Knox arrived in the British Man-of-war and we expected good from him and reversion from the injurious diplomacy. But he simply amazed us by his demanding from Shaikh abdication of his throne. That was a strange matter. Is this the result of the friendliness of Britain? So we did not agree as well as our Shaikh Isa won't. Then we assembled and resolved but the Colonel and the Major ignored our existence altogether and began to threaten us with punishment and the man-of-war started throwing on our country search light

at night warning us of danger should we not agree to this disgrace of ours, and within two days got over Shaikh Hamad by frightening and threatening him that he should administer the Government instead of his father and wrote to Shaikh Isa his deposition. Then the Major went to the Customs House, took possession of its revenue and deposited them in an alien Bank and then he encroached upon the Native Courts of Law, did away with them and started only one Court where should be submitted all complaints and petitions irrespective of their being long causes of criminal or summary suits and put himself with Shaikh Hamad in this Court thereby did away with the Native Government. He did all this without even taking us into consideration as if we were not from this country. Will Great Britain approve of her agent treading upon the honour of peaceful tribes which never stood but by the side of the Great Britain in a friendly temper of mind particularly at a time when she is trying to begin assisting Arab tribes:-

Your Excellency:-

One of the happenings that agitated and hurt the feelings and which took place at Bahrein is the seizure of our compatriot Ahmed bin Abdulla Aldosari in an annoying manner by sending the man-of-war to capture him at the Diving place. When he came to know of the ship's advent he presented himself when at once he was imprisoned without any trial and was fined Rs.15,000 (Rupees fifteen thousand) and was ordered to write admitting his crime which he declined to do and remained in the gaol a long time under

threats to himself and to his tribe if he won't pay up the fine and admit in writing his crime, the man-of-war would bombard and destroy their villages. Then he petitioned soliciting to know his crime or to be tried by a legal tribunal allowed to every accused. He was given no reply. After they made out his determination not to admit his crime they exacted the fine Rs.15,000 and set him at liberty. No doubt this is a sort of interference the like of which wont be found in the modern history and never has been heard a thing like that in our relations with the British Government nor in the relations of any other people than ourselves with other Diplomatic Agents.

Your Excellency:-

We have stated all this feeling fully. We have full confidence in you that the right will be given to the rightful and that our confidence in the justice and equity of Great Britain will be renewed. Should we and our Shaikh Isa be disappointed and what the ante British say of the above mentioned happenings having taken place by the order of the Imperial Government and under her knowledge then we intimate that we wont be able to suppress the feelings of the tribes some of which have determined to emigrate and agitation is already apparent in some of them.

We sue for justice and equity or mercy. Have mercy on us in our own country and leave for us our honour in our own hearth and home. 16th Rabiul Aval 1342 A.H.

We beg to remain,

Your Excellency's

Respectfully.

Sd. SHAIK ISA BIN ALI.

Ruling Chief of Bahrein.

A P P E N D I X VI

Memorandum written on the Political Control in the Persian Gulf

Arrangements prior to 1921

The first association of His Majesty's Government with the Persian Gulf is the establishment by the East India Company, in 1616, of the Factory at Jashk; and from that date until a very recent period the local interests of His Majesty's Government are substantially those of, or in the hands of, the Company and its agents. The date from which those agents can properly be spoken of as exercising political control is difficult to fix precisely : but it is not unreasonable to select, in an unbroken occupation of stations in the Gulf from 1616 onwards, the year 1763, when British headquarters were moved from Bunder Abbas to Basra and the Bushire Residency was established. During the century and a half between that date and 1921, political control in the Persian Gulf was exercised (with considerable intervals ending in 1873 during which responsibility rested with the Government of Bombay) by the Government of India on behalf of His Majesty's Government; and from 1824 onwards that control was concentrated in the hands of an officer in Indian Government service known as the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, who since 1878 held in addition His Majesty's Commission as Consul-General for the provinces of Fars, Khuzistan and Laristan, and the district of Lingah,

and for the coasts and islands of the Persian Gulf being within the dominions of Persia. This official qua Political Resident was under the Indian Government, but qua Consul-General under the Foreign Office. The cost of his establishment was divided between the British and Indian Exchequers, and his headquarters were at Bushire. His judicial powers and extra-territorial jurisdiction as Consul-General were and are exercised by virtue of the Persian Coast and Islands Order in Council, first approved by Her Majesty in Council in 1889, and since that date substantially modified from time to time.

2. Subordinate to the Resident in his political capacity, for which he was, prior to the War, solely responsible to the Government of India, were the representatives of the Indian Government (officers of the Indian Political Department) in Muscat,* the Trucial States, Bahrein** and Koweit,** and through these officers he exercised an undefined but considerable influence upon the political affairs of the States in question. On the Consular side, the Resident, in his capacity as Consul-General, had control of certain inland Consulates in South Persia.

* (Also holding H.M. Commission as Consultant Muscat, and exercising jurisdiction, subject to the Pol. Res., under the Muscat Order in Council of 1915.)

** (Exercising jurisdiction, subject to the Pol. Res., under the Bahrein and Koweit Orders in Council).

Arrangements since the Report of the Masterton-Smith Committee, 1921.

3. The question of redistribution as between His Majesty's Government and the Government of India of political responsibility in the Persian Gulf appears to have been tentatively under consideration in the years before the War, but, partly, no doubt, because of the desirability of reaching a comprehensive understanding with Turkey on the limits of British and Turkish interests in the Gulf, no decision had been reached in 1914. The pre-war system, the maintenance of which was the subject of considerable discussion from time to time during the War, continued in force until 1921. In that year the Masterton-Smith Committee, the conclusions of which were accepted generally, subject to the approval of the Government of India, by His Majesty's Government, recommended that henceforth the control of policy as affecting the Arabian littoral of the Persian Gulf should be transferred to His Majesty's Government and exercised through the Middle Eastern Department of the Colonial Office; that the functions on that littoral of the Government of India should be confined to administrative and local matters, the prior concurrence of the Colonial Office being obtained by them to any measures of political significance, and that the relations of His Majesty's Government with Ibn Saud (as Sultan of Nejd) should be conducted exclusively by the new Middle Eastern Department. The channel of control in all cases was to be the Political

Resident in the Persian Gulf and His Majesty's Consul-General, Bushire, who was, as hitherto, to be found from the service of the Government of India. The position of the Resident vis-a-vis the Government of India on the Persian littoral of the Gulf (in which area he had, of course, at all times worked in very close relations with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran) and in Muscat, remained unaffected.

4. While the formal concurrence of the Government of India in the recommendations of the Masterton-Smith* Committee has not been given owing to the necessity of disposing of the connected question of Aden, they have agreed to work provisionally on the lines which the Committee recommended, and it may be said that, broadly speaking, the arrangements approved by the Masterton-Smith Committee, so far as division of responsibility was concerned, have been in operation since 1921. Some discussion took place in 1922-3 on the question whether communications with Ibn Saud should take place through the Political Agent, Bahrein, rather than through the Political Resident at Bushire. The arrangement finally reached between the Colonial Office and India Office was that communications from His Majesty's Government as regards, and with, Ibn Saud and Nejd when sent through the Persian Gulf should

* Para. 3 of C.O. Desp. 13 to Pol. Res., April 15, 1924, p.1836/24.

pass through the Political Resident except in cases of a wholly exceptional character and of very great urgency; that the same should hold good in the case of Koweit (the internal administration and affairs of which were to remain a matter for the Government of India); that in the case of Bahrein, the India Office should continue to be the normal channel for the communication of the instructions of His Majesty's Government on matters of policy; that orders on a question involving both relations with Ibn Saud and local action or interests in Bahrein, should be prepared in consultation between the India Office and Colonial Office and should issue (probably) through the India Office to the Resident, but that in circumstances of a wholly exceptional character, the Colonial Office might communicate direct with the officers subordinate to the Resident who were in direct contact with Ibn Saud and the Sheikh of Koweit; and on a minor point, that questions affecting the development of the oil resources of the Arab littoral should for convenience be dealt with exclusively by the Colonial Office. The position as regards the Trucial Sheikhs and the Islands in the Gulf under the suzerainty of those Sheikhs has not been precisely defined, but, broadly speaking, it would seem to be similar to that in the case of Bahrein, and in dealing with the recent incident at Tamb the instructions of His Majesty's Government were communicated to the Political Resident through the India Office and the Government of India.

5. The general effect of these arrangements is that the Political Resident is directly responsible to, and corresponds directly with, His Majesty's Government (as represented by the Colonial Office) on questions affecting Ibn Saud, except when he is in the Hejaz, and the political aspects of the Arab littoral of the Gulf: that he is directly responsible in his capacity as Consul-General, Bushire, to the Foreign Office; and acts as a liaison between the Minister at Tehran and affairs in the Gulf which are of interest to His Majesty's Government as affecting their relations with Persia; that he is directly responsible to the Government of India for the internal affairs of the various States on the Arab littoral, for Bahrein, the Trucial Sheikhdoms, and Muscat, and for keeping them in touch both with affairs generally in South Persia and the Gulf, and with developments vis-a-vis Persia in that area, which, from the large Indian interests represented in it and its strategic importance, is of the first importance from the standpoint of the Government of India. The responsibility for co-ordinating action in times of stress in the Gulf inevitably and naturally falls on the Political Resident, who is alone sufficiently closely in permanent touch with the political, strategic and commercial interests involved adequately to discharge this function, and on whom accordingly the immediate responsibility must fall, in consultation with the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq, the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, or the Government of India as the case may be, for a decision as to

the points at which the assistance of naval, military or air units should be asked from the appropriate naval or air authority, or from the Government of India.

Persia and the maintenance of a "Political Resident" (as distinct from Consul-General) at Bushire.

6. A minor but connected question may conveniently be dealt with in this connection. Since 1878, as will be seen from para 1 above, the British representative at Bushire has discharged Consular functions, and has borne, in addition to the title "Political Resident," which dates from as early as 1824, the title "Consul-General". Qua Political Resident on the Persian littoral of the Gulf, his functions appear now to be almost negligible, but he still performs important duties in that capacity in respect of the Arab littoral from his headquarters at Bushire or Shiraz. In the last few months Persia has shown indications of a disposition to recognise and refer to the British representative as Consul-General only, while the presence of a flagstaff in the grounds of the Residency at Bushire appears recently to have roused the suspicions of the Persian Minister of Finance.

It is, perhaps, improbable that the title of the British representative, or the fact that functions in respect of the Arab shore are discharged by him from a headquarters in Persian territory, will be raised by Persia in the course of the forthcoming negotiations, but, in view of her present attitude, it may be placed

on record that the title, and the appointment, of Resident were specifically recognised by Persia thirty-seven years before the creation of a Consulate-General at Bushire in Article 2 of the Commercial Treaty with Great Britain of 1841 ("..... as for a series of years a Resident of the British Government has resided at Bushire, the Persian Government grants permission that the said Resident shall reside there as heretofore, and in like manner two (Persian) Commercial Agents shall reside in London and Bombay"), and that there is no record over the period since 1841 of any Persian objection to the existing arrangement.

INDIA OFFICE

J.G.L.

5th October, 1928.

APPENDIX VII

The Resolution of the Bahrain National Congress 1923

قرارات المؤتمر الوطني البحراني المنعقد في ٥ اربع الاول
سنة ١٣٤٢

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

نحن الموقعون ادناه من اعيان ورؤساء عشائر وعلماء وتجاربنا لنا من صفة التمثيل
لاهل البحرين فخرنا الى ما حل بنا في بلادنا وانتابنا في شرفنا وحقوقنا
وحقوق حكومتنا ربما اتنا على ثقة تامه من ان بريطانيا عادله منصفه لا ترضى
باهانه شجب مسالم ولا تسلم بما اجراه الميجر ديلي من نقض ما بيننا وبينها
من اتفاق ومعهده وحيث انه لا سبيل الى مرجع الحق الى نصابه الا باعلان
مطالبنا والثبات عليها حتى تتحقق °

احتمعنا وتماهنا للحصول على المطالب الاتيه التي لا سبيل الى عيشنا بالهدوء
في اوطاننا الا بها محافظين على شرفنا الا بها وهي °

اولا - استمرار حاكمنا واميرنا الشيخ عيسى في مباشره الامور الداخليه كما كان
سابقا بدون مداخله القنصل مع المحافظه على ما بيننا وبين بريطانيا من الروابط
الودييه بخير زياده او نقصان واذا اراد الشيخ عيسى ان ينسحب عنه الشيخ
حمدا مثلا فلنا عليه ما لنا على والده °

ثانيا - ان تجرى الاحكام جميعها بحسب الشرع الاسلامي وعلى قانون الصرف
المرضي الذي هو من الشرع ومطابق له °
ثالثا - مجلس شوري من عموم الوطنيه ينظر في مصالح البلاد وفيما يحدث
من الامور كالمجالس التي في كافة البلاد °

رابعا - تاليف هيئه محكمة من اربعة اشخاص مرضيه عالمين بعرف الخوص
مهمتهم النظر والفصل في جميع دعاوى الخوص °

خامسا - وقوف القنصل عند نص الاتفاق الذي بين الحكومه البريطانيه وحكومة
البحرين الشيخ عيسى فلا يتدخل في الامور الداخليه °

سادسا - انتخابنا منا اثني عشر شخصا وهم الشيخ عبد الوهاب الزباني والشيخ
عبد اللطيف بن محمود والسيد عبد الله بن ابراهيم وحسين بن علي المناعي

وشاهين بن صقر الجلاهमे ومحمد بن راشد بن هندی وعيسى بن احمد الدوسرى
واحمد بن جاسم بن جودر ومحمد بن صباح ومهنا بن فضل وجبر المسلم واحمد بن
لاحج °

لاجل القيام بهذا الامر والمطالبه بتحقيقه بكل الوسائل المشروعه فهم وكلاء
عنا مفوضون وقد رضى كل منا ان لا يتكلم فى هذه الامور بدون رايهم وعلى كل منا
عهد الله وميثاقه ان الكلمة واحده فى كل شىء °

التوقيعات

APPENDIX VIII

OWNER

Law regarding ~~OWNERSHIP~~ ownership of immovable property in
Bahrein by foreigners 1937

صورة طبق الاصل

حكومة البحرين

املان °

العدد ١٣٥٦/١٦

قانون املاك الاملاك الغير المنقولة في البحرين بواسطة الاجانب °

نصدر هذا بشأن املاك الاملاك الغير المنقولة في البحرين بواسطة الاجانب
١- بهذا صدر القانون والحكم على ان الاجانب الساكنين في البحرين الى

حكوماتهم تمنع فيما يخصها من البلاد املاك الاملاك الغير المنقولة من قبل
الاشخاص الذين ليسوا من جنسيتها ممنوعون من املاك مثل هذه الاملاك في
البلد سواء كان ذلك باسمهم او اسم اى شخص اخر لاجل منفعتهم الا ما
كان محصورا لاحتياج سكانها وتجارتهم او حرفتهم °

٢- لحكومة البحرين ان تعلن من وقت لآخر للحكومات التي يصبح جنسيتها
في البحرين خاضعين للمنع المنصوص عليه في المادة ١ ويسرى شعور هذا
المنع من تاريخ نشر الاملان المذكور من قبل بيت الدولة البريطانية في البحرين

٣- يمكن للاجنبي التبع لجنسية حكومة قد تم ايلانها بموجب المادة ٢
والذي عند نشر الاملان يملك من السابق املاكا غير منقولة تشملها المادة ١
ان يستمر على امتلاكها لمدة سنة من ذلك التاريخ ° ولحكومة البحرين في اى
وقت كان بعد انتضاء مدة سنة بان تستولى على الملك جبرا او ان تباعه وفي
كل الحالتين يكون الثمن الذي يتقاضاه المالك لا يقل من مبلغ ما يقرر بطريقة
التشين بالصوره المبينة بالمادة ٤.

٤- في خلال ثلاثة اشهر من صدور الاملان المنصوص عليه في المادة ٢
على كل اجنبي تشمله نصوص المادة ٢ ان يقدم الى محكمة باليوز الدولة
البريطانية قائمه تتضمن تلك الاملاك الغير المنقولة ° وتحمل نسخة من
القائمة الى حكومة البحرين التي بعد ذلك عليها ان تعين شئنا ° وفي
تلك الحالة للمالك ايضا الحق بان يعين شئنا ° وعلى الشئنا والشئنين

معا ان يثمننا قيمة الملك المذكور ويقدمنا تقريرنا الى محكمة باليوز الدولة البريطانية °
فاذا اختلف المثلثان تعين محكمة باليوز الدولة البريطانية مثلثا ثالثا وسيكون
قراره نهائيا ° ومعين محكمة باليوز الدولة البريطانية في كل قضية المدة التي
يقتضى انجاز التثمين بها ° ويدفع صاحب الملك مصاريف التثمين °
لقد ختمه صاحب العظامه الشيخ السرحمد بن عيسى ال خليفة حاكم
البحرين في اليوم السادس من ذي الحجة ١٣٥٥ الموافق ل ١٧ فبراير ١٩٣٧ °
الختم بامر محمد بن عيسى الخليفة حاكم البحرين °

حرر في ٢٧ صفر ١٣٥٦

الموافق ل ٨ مايو ١٩٣٧ °

APPENDIX IX

Text of Leaflet distributed in Bahrein during 1938

Political Upheaval

الى الشباب البحرينى الحر

الى الشباب الذى تحتلج نفسه بحب الوطن وتطلع روحه الى سماه الحريه
وتحطيم اصفاد الذل ودك هياكل الظلم والاصنام الى الشباب الابى فى
جزيرة اللؤلؤ والمرجان يرسلها صرخة داويه ترهب الطغاة وتقوض اركان
التحكم وتمهد محالم الاستبداد والجبروت °
ايها الشباب الفتاك لقد صور الغرور فى نفس بالكريف ان الحراب المشهوره
والمناورات المفزوحه تستطيع ان تخدم فى صدوركم شعله الوطنيه وتند فى
ارواحكم نبضات الطموح ان ذلك عبثا لخيال ووهم الخنجهية لقد ان للبحرين
ان ترفع عن عينها غشاوة الخمول وتطرح وساوس الخيره والتردد °
فالى النهضه الكبرى ايها الشباب الجرى والصرخه الداويه هيثوا نفوسكم
للمسؤوليه العمليه واغرسوا فى صدوركم بذور الحريه وقووها بصراحة الايمان
وشباب الحقيده °

ان الطغيان الفردى الذى يرفع رايته المستر بالكريف قد قلب معالم الحياه
فى اوضاعكم عاليها الى اسفل ورفع من الحفيظ والحثالات اوباشا صيرهم
فيكم سادة وكانوا هم العبيد والفضلات فلا تهنوا ولا تحزنوا فانما ذلك
بوادى الطوفان وطلائع ساعه الانفجار °

ايها المستشار بالكريف زد فان فى زياده الجور وتحكم الفرديه تطبيقا لروح
الثوره وتحريضا لجالى حياه الانطلاق والحريه °
صم اذنيك وامنع قلبك عن سماع اصوات الحق وتلبية نداء الديموقراطيه وطلالى
حياه الاستقلال والتحرير التى تبشر ببلادك ويناديك بها شعب عريق نبيل
بواك من نفسه مركز الاستشاره فصعدت الى سلطان الحكم ثم حكمت لتتحكم
وتقذف بالفحول من رجاله الى المعازل وبالاشبالي من شبابيه الى السجون صل
وتحكم فان فى ذلك خاتمة المطاف بك والقضاء على سلطانك °
ايتها الجائله الخليفيه المجيده

حنانا بابناء امتكم رفقا بالاحرار من مواطنكم ان الجميع يدينون لكم بالمحبه فلا
تجعلوا من اهلالم لحرارهم وتحكيم البقيض الدخيل فيهم سببا للضغينه عليكم

وللنفرة منكم فانكم ان فعلتم باعدتم بينكم وبين المخلصين من رعاياكم الى الابد
انكم ان فعلتم زدتم النار جذوة والقبس جمرة وحاشا لكم ان تفعلوا وان تقبلوا °
ايتها الحكومة الانكليزية :

لقد صافاك هذا الشعب الوداع الامين فمدى له يد المصافاة والاخاء اعينيه
على بلوغ غايته ليكون لك خير الحون ساعة الحون وحين الشدة °
ان البحرينيين قد ارتبطت مصائرهم بمصائركم ايها الانكليز في الخليج واشتبكت
بينهم وبينكم المصالح وتمازجت المنافع والغايات فمكنوا اهل الراى من اشد قائمكم
البحرنيين في ادارة شؤونهم وافسحوا لهم لمعالجة مقدراتهم بواسطة الاحرار
من رجالهم وكونوا من المرشدين المصافين لا تتركوا ايها الانكليز من عنجهية
فرد انكليزى ونبذه لتقاليد الديموقراطية التى اشتهرتم بها سببا للخط من
هيبتكم والزهد فيكم °

ايها الشباب ها قد دقت ساعة العمل فوحدوا صفوفكم وروصوا قواكم لا تقولوا
هذا سنى وهذا جعفرى كلكم فى محبة الوطن اخوان كلكم لى محمد وفى زفرة
محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم تحشرون ، روضوا نفوسكم على الشجاعه والصراحه
والتضحية ليقل كل منكم فى نفسه انى انا المسؤول وعلى الواجب وفى طاقتى
العمل فانما ذاك مبعث الرجولة ووحى الهمه ومثار الحزم صححوا الحزمه
فى نفوسكم فان من ورائكم انا سا عاهدوا الله ان لا تهن لهم عزيزه او تقعد بهم
همه حتى يصيروا من هولاء المتحكمين فيكم المتطهرسين سبة المثل ولوثة التاريخ
ولعنة البشرية °

قاوموا الخونه النفعيين الذين يحترضون سبيلكم ويقفون فى وجوهكم اذوهم
باحراق ما تصل اليه ايديكم من منافعهم وعقارتهم واملاكهم ، اما من كهاكم نفسه
فاكفوه شرانفسكم °

لا تقبلوا ان تكونوا هزوا يسخر منكم الخائن ويتهكم عليكم الجبان والذليل °
القوا عليهم درسا رائعا فى وطنية الشباب وعمرامة الشباب وقتك الشباب °
والى اللقا والحلياه يا مناط الرجاء ومهبط الامال °

البلاد العربيه فى ٢٠ شوال سنة ١٣٥٧

الشباب العربى الذى عاهد الله على نصره قضيتكم ما دمتم اهلا للنصرة والحياة

APPENDIX X

One of the H.E.C. Leaflets

بلاغ رقم (١٠)

الى المواطنين الاحرار:

عند مغرب شمس هذا اليوم (الجمعة) ينتهى الاضراب الشامل الذى قتم به مختارين للتعبير عن استيائكم من الاوضاع القائمة فى هذه البلاد ، ولتؤكدوا للملا ان الهيئه التنفيذية العليا تنطق باسمكم وتعبر عن ارادتكم . وانما لنتنهمز هذه الفرصه لنخبر للمواطنين جميعا عن عظيم تقديرنا وخالص امتناننا للروح السلميه العالميه رغم الاستفزازات التى اثارها بعض المخرضين التى سادت الاضراب - واصبحت مثار ساميا للحركات الشعبيه المسالمة . وبذلك اثبتتم ايها المواطنون الاحرار ان الشعب قادر ان يهدا عندما يجد ازمة اموره فى ايد قادره امينه يثق بها ويعتمد عليها ، وان يزجر غاضبا عندما تمس كرامته . لقد حاول خلال ايام الاضراب السبعه بعض الشخصيات التوسط بين الهيئه التنفيذيه العليا والمسؤولين فى البلاد للوصول الى حل عادل ولكن هذه الوساطات باءت بالفشل لاصرار المسؤولين على موقفهم وعدم اعترافهم بالهيئه التنفيذية العليا التى اصبحت حقيقة واقعه ، كحقيقة هذا الشعب الذى اختارها لتكون لسانا ناطقا بارادته ومشاعره ، وما كانت الشعوب فى يوم من الايام لعبه اولموا يتلمى بها المتلمون . نرجو من العمال والفلاحين واصحاب المتاجر وسائى السيارات وطلاب وطالبات ومعلمي ومعلمات المدارس وموظفى الدوائر والشركات وجميع اصحاب الاعمال والامهن الاخرى ان يعودوا الى اعمالهم ابتداء من الساعة السادسة مساء هذا اليوم الموافق ١٥ ربيع الثانى ١٣٧٤ ، ١٠ ديسمبر ١٩٥٤ بنفس الروح القوية الحارمه التى بداوا بها هذا الاضراب الشامل الذى قل ان حدث له مثيل فى هذه البلاد .

وليثق الشعب الكريم ان درب الكفاح طويل وشاق وان هذا الاضراب ما هو الا بداية السير فى هذا الطريق . وما كان الا صرخة مدوية اطلقناها جميعا للتعبير عن سخائنا ونقمتنا على الاوضاع المنحرفة الجائرة التى تسيطر على هذه الديار .

وليثق الشعب ايضا ان هيئته التنفيذية العليا سائره على الدرب بجد ونشاط
وكل من سار على الدرب وصل ، وفي القريب العاجل سنوافيكم بالخطوات التالية
الحازمة ° وان اعيننا بالمرصاد لكل خائن دساس °

وختاماً نكرر شكرنا وتقديرنا للمواطنين جميعاً واهضاء الجاليات الاجنبية
الذين برؤيتهم على انهم كتلة واحدة وجسد متراس لا يحترقه الباطل ولا ينفذ
اليه - بؤتان المفسدين °

والله ولي التوفيق °

حرره في ١٥ ربيع الثاني ١٣٧٤هـ

الهيئة التنفيذية العليا