



A Constellation of Outposts: French Intelligence Services and the Administration of the French Protectorate of Morocco, 1912-1937

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A Constellation of Outposts: French Intelligence Services and the Administration of the French
Protectorate of Morocco, 1912-1937

A dissertation presented
by
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to
The Department of History
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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in the subject of
History

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the metastasis of the French colonial intelligence state. It argues that rogue intelligence officers hijacked power in the French Protectorate of Morocco and created a covert regime to evade outside scrutiny into the practices of empire. Generally, scholarship on the French Empire has assumed that the security services were only tools of executive power and that they were without opinions on the situations they were called to handle. “A Constellation of Outposts,” however, shows that French intelligence and security services played a fundamental but previously unrecognized role in the formation of the colonial state in Morocco. In response to political instability in the Protectorate, intelligence officers organized an entire layer of institutions in which they doubled as magistrates, agronomists, economists, psychiatrists, teachers, and acquired technical expertise in a host of other areas necessary to making and administering the Protectorate. Their job was to not only collect information, but to also use it on the spot to create policies, institutions, and patronage networks that helped allay some of these tensions. Yet, the covert state created by intelligence officers also provided Moroccans with new options for resistance and accommodation. These negotiations are examined through the prism of environmental history and political economy. As Moroccans faced famines brought on by droughts and high rates of pauperization because of the Great Depression, the continued presence of the French in Morocco required French intelligence officers to provide everyday Moroccans with solutions to manage the effects of ecologic and

economic disasters. Nationalism is also an important part of this story. This dissertation recasts the volatile politics of empire not only as a response to the oppressiveness of colonialism, but also as demands for greater access to the political and economic opportunities that the French Empire offered.

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Introduction

Late in the 19th century, French politicians turned their sights on Morocco after colonizing Algeria and establishing a Protectorate in Tunisia. Although Morocco was coveted by rival European powers, and French politicians were weary of embarking on an inopportune colonial adventure, durably securing French interests in North Africa trumped fears of ballooning budgets and diplomatic struggles. Morocco was for the most part already under French influence. In order to sustain the modernization of the Sheriffian Empire, as Morocco was then known, successive Sultans exchanged concessions on future tax and customs receipts for loans to undertake broad reforms and pay foreign advisors to oversee their implementation. Poor economic management, and the predation of French and other European agents, however, compounded the dire situation of the Sheriffian Empire. As the Sultan's power weakened, new threats emerged on the edge of his empire. Banditry was rampant on the border with Algeria and threatened French interests there. Under orders to protect the border, intelligence officers exceeded them and guided columns of soldiers into Morocco to organize the tribes under French military command. Officially, military authorities argued that to protect the border they needed to interfere in Moroccan politics, but their actions only contributed to worsening the security situation.¹ Morocco was on the verge of collapse, threatening French interests not only in Morocco but in Algeria as well. In 1912, after fraught discussions with European powers, French politicians forced the Sultan to sign the Treaty of Fez. The Treaty allowed the French to introduce administrative and economic reforms that nominally restored the power of the Sultan

¹ On the political, commercial, and military destabilization campaigns mounted by French see Moshe Gersovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco: Colonialism and its Consequences* (London: Frank Cass, 2000) and Edmund Burke III, *Prelude to the Protectorate: Precolonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

and ensured the security of European interests by incorporating Morocco into the French Empire in the form of a Protectorate.

On the face of it, the Treaty of Fez marked the beginning of normal colonial administration in a Protectorate—or what passed for normal administration in colonial settings. The Treaty guaranteed the sovereignty of the Sultan and limited the French to indirect rule, meaning that French administrators ruled in association with traditional Moroccan authorities, such as tribal chiefs and pashas.²

The implicit premise of colonial administration in Morocco, however, was that if Moroccans did not consent to the Protectorate, that they were at least compliant with it. But colonial rule, based on the deprivation of political rights, economic and human exploitation, systemic discrimination, and the immoderate use of force, ensured that consent was never given, and that compliance was tested every day. The administration of the French Protectorate of Morocco stumbled from one crisis to the next, mitigating with more or less success the immediate challenges posed by Moroccans, but never fully managing to convince them of the benefits of French civilization. Indeed, at the heart of imperial governance lies the contradiction between a colonial state capable of dominating but incapable of governing colonial subjects.³ This was an unavowable reality for most French authorities who continued to believe that the benefits of French civilization were self-evident but for the activities of a few who stirred the masses against the French. While French politicians showed public confidence in their administration of empire, on the ground, officials were more skeptical. The fiscal responsibilities inherited from the Sultan and blowback from French interference on the Algerian border were

² On direct and indirect rule, see Raymond Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914*, with a new preface by the author c.1960 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2005).

³ Ranajit Guha, *Dominance Without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).

possibly catastrophic liabilities for the Protectorate, with equally dangerous repercussions on Algeria and Tunisia. For the cadre of French intelligence officers present in Morocco, the Treaty of Fez hid an empire in danger.

Over the course of the following chapters, I argue that French intelligence officers tore the Treaty of Fez into small pieces and discarded the principles of association between French and Moroccans that were supposed to characterize French rule in the Protectorate. They created a covert state parallel to the official administration of the Protectorate, and through it, they ruled Morocco directly. They called their new regime *Contrôle* and they called themselves the authorities of *Contrôle*. By burrowing deep into the administration of the Protectorate and with the support of the security forces and intelligence networks that they commanded, they committed to secretly transforming French imperial rule by changing one individual at a time, one institution after the other, impacting the built environment, and bending the ecology to the will of the French, to create a new model of governance that did not merely establish French rule in name only, but put down the foundations for lasting French power in Morocco.

The French Protectorate of Morocco was not unique in its reliance on intelligence officers. Intelligence was foundational to empires. The success or failure of imperial projects depended on the ability of intelligence officers to collect information about the people and places that the metropole sought to govern. Knowledge and intelligence gaps about local conditions were not inconveniences for imperial administrators, but vectors of failure with potentially catastrophic consequences.⁴ All colonial states were therefore intelligence states, as historian

⁴ C.A. Bayly, *Empire and Information: Intelligence gathering and social communication in India, 1780-1870*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Martin Thomas argues, since collection of information was vital to creating the policies that ensured the survival of the colonial state.⁵

Yet, to explain why French intelligence officers became the de facto government of the French Protectorate of Morocco, I take as axiomatic that colonialism was a system of perpetual war.⁶ It was an uninterrupted process of conquest and reconquest of land and people that resulted from the violent enforcement of a repressive system of shifting political boundaries that maintained Europeans in power. Political stability and civil order were consequently always elusive in colonial settings. In Morocco, the French had to manage jihads, urban riots, peasant rebellions, and endemic banditry between 1912 and 1937, as well as a full-scale war in the Rif Mountains (1925-1926/7). They also had to contend with the politics of Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism after the First World War, as well as the virulence of nationalist politics beginning in the 1930s.

French officials claimed to have equipped the Protectorate with a sophisticated administration modeled on the systems imported from the metropole and updated to take into account French administrative experiences in Algeria and Tunisia. But the reality in Morocco was that the entirety of the colonial state was geared to fight counter-insurgencies, and to mount counter-intelligence campaigns aimed at mitigating the fallout of global phenomena such as Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism. The continuous state of crisis normalized the militarization of civilian administration, and differences between military authorities and civilian ones were muddled. Everyday life in the French Protectorate of Morocco was characterized by what Carl

⁵ Martin Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 2.

⁶ Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, *Coloniser Exterminer. Sur la guerre et l'État colonial* (Paris: Fayard, 2005); see also Benjamin Brower, *A Desert Named Peace. The Violence of France's Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844-1902* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

Schmitt called “the integrating and disintegrating elements of an abnormal state, intermediate between war and peace.”⁷ Take for instance policing, an essential part of any government. What civilian administrators called “police operations,” “police patrols,” or efforts to “preserve public order” could easily take the form of aerial bombardments that killed women, children, and livestock. What soldiers called war was also building roads and markets and managing hospitals. Over time, war and administration became indistinguishable from one another. In Morocco, perpetual war was called “pacification.” It was an “endeavor of peace.”⁸

The French Protectorate of Morocco’s first Resident General, General Hubert Lyautey (promoted to *Maréchal* in 1921), embraced the contradictions inherent to colonial rule and turned them into governing principles and popular aphorisms, such as “a work site is worth a battalion.”⁹ He had learned to live with colonial ambiguities during his time in Madagascar, Tonkin, and Algeria and he learned from General Joseph Gallieni that concentrating administrative and military powers in the hands of a local French administrator was indispensable for effective colonial rule. Killing natives as part of conquest was one thing. Killing too many after a conquest was indicative of a bankrupt colonial project. According to theoreticians of “pacification,” local commanders were to employ just enough force “to obtain the submission of the native population to French authorities and encourage them participate in the colonial project.”¹⁰ Indeed, to limit our understanding of “pacification” to acts of violence would be to neglect that “pacification” was also a “multi-dimensional tool that sought to re-

⁷ Carl Schmitt, forward to the Fourth edition, *Dictatorship: From the origin of the modern concept of sovereignty to proletarian class struggle*, trans. Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2014), 32.

⁸ “La tactique de pacification,” *Journal des débats politiques et littéraires*, January 13, 1900.

⁹ Louis Hubert Lyautey, *Lyautey l’africain; textes et lettres du maréchal Lyautey*, vol. 2, ed. Pierre Lyautey (Paris: Plon, 1954), 115.

¹⁰ Archives of the League of Nations, hereafter LoN. LoN P153, General Joseph Gallieni, Instructions à MM. les administrateurs civils et militaires, chefs de province, au sujet du programme de pacification à poursuivre à Madagascar, 22 May 1895, 1.

establish order, prevent disorder, and repair. Repair. That is to say, to win over hearts and minds.”¹¹ To that end, successful “pacification” required soldiers and their commanding officers to first, organize an administrative framework that was in harmony with the wishes and customs of the natives to generate a consensual relationship and durably secure the gains made through combat. Second, once the administration was in place, it was up to the local commander to create in partnership with traditional authorities the conditions necessary to rebuild and improve the local economy.

It was what the French called “*action politique*” and “*action économique*” that thrust the intelligence officer at the center of French administration in Morocco. Colonial states developed only by fielding individuals with a tactical intelligence that stretched beyond the basics of colonial warfare. As Colonel Berriau, France’s first and most important spymaster in Morocco noted proudly: “one does not administer a colony as a *département*... we had to create a special corps of civil servants to treat indigenous affairs.”¹² Indeed, “pacification” placed the onus on the collection and analysis of local knowledge to render newly conquered territories and people legible to the colonial state.¹³ Besides assuaging the fears of outnumbered Europeans who did not comprehend and refused to understand what C.A. Bayly calls the native “information order,” intelligence officers were tasked with providing information necessary for routine governmental functions. Cataloguing customs and laws, interpreting political sentiments, and following market activity, were just some of the duties that were a part of their routine.

¹¹ Samia el Mechat, “Introduction,” *Coloniser, Pacifier, Administrer XIXe-XXIe siècles* (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2014), 8.

¹² Henri Berriau, *L’Officier de renseignements au Maroc*, (Rabat: Résidence Générale de la République Française au Maroc, 1918), 1.

¹³ On legibility as a tool of statecraft, see James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

The preponderance of intelligence officers in the Protectorate also reflected an empire that could not build an administrative infrastructure that matched the size of the metropole's ambitions. Protectorates and the principles of indirect rule that they nominally enshrined were simply attempts at creating "hegemony on a shoestring."¹⁴ The French Protectorate of Morocco was no different, and Lyautey believed that he could create political and economic stability by maintaining in power traditional authorities who were amenable to French rule and whose authority was legitimate in the eyes of Moroccans. However, in an environment where French rule was constantly on the verge of breaking down, intelligence officers became crucial points of connection in an administrative matrix composed of the various French institutions present in the Protectorate, the existing institutions of Moroccan government, religious authorities, and civil society.¹⁵ It was not only up to them to report on the health of the relationship between French authorities and their Moroccan protégés, but it was also up to them to repair fraying relationships to avoid potentially violent flashpoints. Until the very end, the French created the scenography necessary to perpetuate the fiction of indirect rule in Morocco, but it was apparent to French authorities in Morocco that indirect rule was a failing proposition. Within months of the Treaty of Fez, French intelligence officers went from supervising Moroccan intermediaries to doing their jobs. By 1920, it was widely acknowledged that the French Protectorate of Morocco had been hijacked by intelligence officers and that the Protectorate was a lie.

As Emanuelle Saada reminds us, differences between colony, protectorate, direct rule, indirect rule, association, and assimilation are hard to pin down when examined *in situ*,¹⁶ since

¹⁴ Sara Berry, "Hegemony on a shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to Agricultural Land," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 62, no. 3 (1992): 327-355.

¹⁵ Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence*, 5.

¹⁶ Emmanuelle Saada, "The History of Lessons: Law and Power in Modern Empire," in Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper and Kevin Moors, eds., *Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power* (New York: New Press, 2006).

the survival of colonial rule depended on a healthy dose of pragmatism and adaptability on the part of colonial authorities.¹⁷ Nevertheless, these categories mattered to those in charge of overseeing the empire from afar because they carried legal possibilities and obligations. The law in colonial settings served to provide “rhetorical cover” for colonialism and was an “alibi” for its abuses,¹⁸ but it was also central to the imperial project as a force that structured and organized the practice of colonial rule.¹⁹ Intelligence officers directly ruling their charges represented a radical departure from the notion of the Protectorate as established by the Treaty of Fez and it therefore became imperative to give intelligence officers not only the rhetorical cover that allowed them to exceed their mandates, but also give them the legal structure that organized the direct rule of intelligence officers. In other words, it was necessary to recreate the Protectorate and modify its regime.

It was impossible to re-negotiate the terms of the Treaty of Fez, and so, for the sake of expediency, Lyautey made use of emergency laws to overturn all of the legal systems that framed the Protectorate, namely those that restrained the French from ruling Morocco directly. In the process, he also subverted the normal hierarchy of power in which soldiers were subordinate to civilians. The use of emergency laws in colonial empires was not uncommon nor was it uncommon for emergency laws to become permanent,²⁰ and in Morocco, to ensure that the new

¹⁷ Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

¹⁸ On this see for example Gregory Mann, “What was the “Indigénat?” The ‘Empire of Law’ in French West Africa,” *The Journal of African History* 50, no. 3 (2009): 331-353. See also, Isabelle Merle, “De la “légalisation” de la violence en contexte colonial. Le régime de l’indigénat en question,” *Politix* 17, no.5 66 (2004): 137-162

¹⁹ Emmanuelle Saada, “The Empire of Law: Dignity, Prestige, and Domination in the “Colonial Situation,” *French Politics, Culture & Society* 20, no. 2 (2002): 98-120.

²⁰ For an erudite intellectual history on the use of emergency laws in colonial empires see for example Nasser Hussein, *The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003). For examples of emergency laws in the French context, see specifically Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, *De l’Indigénat Anatomie d’un monstre juridique: le droit colonial en Algérie et dans l’Empire Français* (Paris: Editions Zones, 2010) and Sylvie Thénault, *Une drôle de justice. Les magistrats dans la guerre d’Algérie* (Paris: La Découverte, 2001).

regime that was put in place persisted, Lyautey also ensured that emergency measures were made permanent. The permanency of emergency laws confirmed “pacification” as a process that stretched into time indefinitely. Perpetual war had a legal basis in addition to a tactical one.

In the post-World War I era however, as populations in the metropole began to question the morality of empire,²¹ as the League of Nations sought to impose limits on empires,²² and Arab nationalists and Pan-Islamists contested the notion that there were people who were somehow incapable of governing themselves,²³ it became imperative to hide the excesses of empire. In the Middle East, to evade oversight, British spies created what historian Priya Satia calls “covert empire” based on a regime of air control.²⁴ In Morocco, air power was only one of the tools of covert empire. Lyautey called his regime *Contrôle*, a flexible and subtle mechanism of influencing people and institutions that sought to avoid arousing the suspicions of French civil servants and native collaborators who worked for the “overt” empire. To prevent disorder, *Contrôle* covertly prolonged the administrative mechanisms of “pacification” into domains that were not generally the purview of intelligence officers. They strove, for example, to influence court decisions throughout Morocco’s plural legal jurisdictions. They acquired technical expertise in banking and farming and regulated commercial activities to mitigate economic distress. And when *Contrôle* by subtle administrative and political means failed, they instigated

²¹ On questions about the morality of the French empire in Morocco, see for example, Alain Ruscio ed., *La question coloniale dans l’Humanité, 1904-2004* (Paris: Dispute, 2005), Georges Oved, *La gauche française et le nationalisme marocain, 1905-1955*, vol. 1, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1984), as well as Tayeb Boutbouqalt, *La guerre du Rif et la réaction de l’opinion internationale, 1921-1926* (Casablanca: Moroccan Printing and Publishing Co., 1992).

²² Susan Pedersen, “Back to the League of Nations,” *American Historical Review* 112, no. 4 (2007): 1091-1117.

²³ To examine the early nationalist movement in North Africa see for example, Pierre Vermeren, *École, élite et pouvoir au Maroc et en Tunisie au XXe siècle* (Rabat: Alizés, 2002); James McDougall, *History and the Culture of Nationalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 74-76; as well as Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon, eds., *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). Additionally, because of the intellectual and religious networks that connected North Africa to the Levant see also Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

²⁴ Priya Satia, *Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 7-10.

crises that allowed them to orient the colonial state's technologies of death in such a way as to minimize public questioning of the legitimacy of the colonial project in Morocco.

Naturally, as the regime changed in Morocco and as intelligence officers took on more and more roles, new spaces for subversion of the colonial order and new opportunities to renegotiate the relationship with the French became available to Moroccans. I take as my point of departure Martin Thomas's argument that the forms of policing and violence observed in colonial settings must be studied alongside local political economies to fully tease out discrete mechanisms of imperial formation and rule.²⁵ Thus, I examine ordinary episodes of resistance and violence such as small rural protests and banditry to trace the evolution of *Contrôle* and the changing nature of intelligence work over time. By examining these episodes, I also show that the new forms of power that French intelligence officers proposed could be particularly attractive to Moroccans. Indeed, a regime based on direct rule would have had no more chances of success than one based on indirect rule if the right incentives were not put in place to entice Moroccans. *Contrôle*, the authorities of *Contrôle*, and direct rule were accepted because intelligence officers were able to create original patronage networks for everyday Moroccans.

To explore the role of *Contrôle* and French security services in the administration of the French Protectorate of Morocco, this dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 examines the causes behind the transformation of Morocco from a Protectorate to a regime of *Contrôle*. While French authorities touted Morocco as the *nec plus ultra* in French imperial governance, the reality on the ground was that the Protectorate could only boast a few fragile accomplishments. As the need for soldiers on the Western Front became pressing, French politicians widely accepted letting the Protectorate collapse if troops that were otherwise tied up

²⁵ Martin Thomas, *Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers and Protest in the European Colonial Empires, 1918-1940*, 9.

fighting insurgents could be moved to Europe. The security situation remained unstable after the war, too, and French intelligence officers were instructed to fend off the intriguing of European settlers and monitor the emergence of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism, considered threats against French imperial order. For Lyautey, the Protectorate was unmanageable even with the formidable powers at his disposition. Too many divergent interests prevented the administration of the Protectorate from developing a coherent program to stabilize the security situation of the Protectorate. I dwell on the legal landscape of the Protectorate to show how Lyautey made French and Moroccan legal codes subordinate to a novel code of emergency laws which expanded the notion of what represented threats to security and therefore expanded the role of intelligence officers in the administration of the Protectorate. Chapter 1 closes with a look at the French government's attempts at destroying the regime of *Contrôle* and bringing intelligence officers to heel.

The second chapter picks up in the mountains of the Rif and the Atlas where the French government attempted to put a stop to *Contrôle* by appointing Theodor Steeg, a civilian, as Resident General. The Young Lieutenants, intelligence officers in their 20s who were stationed near the Berber tribes that lived in Morocco's mountains and were *Contrôle*'s local agents, refused to obey the orders of the new Resident General to evacuate the mountains and leave the administration of Berber tribes to the Makhzen. At stake for the French government was respecting the principles of indirect rule established in the Treaty of Fez and avoiding at all costs another war with Berbers. For the Young Lieutenants, establishing security in the Protectorate was impossible so long as Berber tribes remained outside of their influence. Using the hybrid state of siege/martial law regime discussed in the first chapter and supported by the authorities of *Contrôle* in Rabat who sapped Theodore Steeg's ability to control what was happening on the

edge of the Protectorate, the Young Lieutenants instrumentalized banditry to convince French authorities of the necessity of maintain the authorities of *Contrôle* in place.

Chapter 3 keeps us in the Rif and the Atlas before transporting us to Morocco's cities to examine how climate and the ecology impacted local political economies and shaped the nature of French rule. Morocco experienced a number of droughts, crop failures, and invasions of locusts which destroyed the crops Berbers and their livestock depended on for survival. It also prevented trade between Moroccans living in the mountains and those living in the cities.

Whereas French authorities commonly understood Berber revolts as a refusal to bend to the will of the French because of their proud nature, French intelligence officers began to realize in the 1920s that banditry and rebellions in the mountains, as well as increased rates of pauperization and riots in urban centers were a function of hunger and poverty. Death rates in rural areas in the years following the Rif War were exceedingly high and were the subject of much attention among the French press and settlers, and among Moroccans, of course, who questioned not for the first time whether the French were capable of governing Morocco. The third chapter thus traces the metastasis of *Contrôle* in Morocco as it develops policies to modernize agricultural techniques and introduces a cooperative banking system for Moroccans farmers. Chapter 3 also examines how intelligence officers sought to transform urban economies through a similar system of production modernization and cooperative banking for guilds. In effect, by becoming commercial agents and extending cheap credit to Moroccans, the authorities of *Contrôle* created important patronage networks that drew Moroccans away from traditional authorities and permitted intelligence officers to exercise direct rule.

Chapter 4 revisits the Berber Dahir. Building on our examination of how the Young Lieutenants organized tribes in the Rif and the Atlas and how they integrated them into

patronage networks, I contend that the Berber Dahir was not a plot to divide Berbers from Arabs as it often claimed, but a policy introduced to finish the process of integrating the authorities of *Contrôle* into the lives of Berbers and to make direct rule effective. Initially, traditional Moroccan authorities had cautiously supported French interventions in Berber tribes as they thought it opened up possibilities for them to become interlocutors between the French and Berbers. Their position changed however when they realized that the French had sidelined them from power. The Berber Dahir marked the beginning of a global campaign against French rule in Morocco. By making the Berber Dahir a rallying cry for Muslims around the world, Moroccan nationalists attracted attention to the authorities of *Contrôle* and the direct administration of Morocco.

The final chapter, examines *Contrôle* in the metropole. I follow the archival trail left behind by Pozzo di Borgo, a freelance agent for the authorities of *Contrôle*, as he sought to better understand Moroccan nationalists. This chapter examines the animosity between metropolitan authorities and the authorities of *Contrôle* over the policing of migrant communities in Paris and the growing threat of nationalism. Pozzo di Borgo was charged with finding points of possible negotiation with nationalists to help defuse tensions in Morocco. I suggest that nationalists were perhaps not as categorical in their demands for independence as they may have seemed. In the 1930s they could still be convinced of the legitimacy of French rule and were eager to participate in the regime of *Contrôle* as native collaborators.

Chapter 1: *Contrôle*, 1912-1925

At the inception of the French Protectorate of Morocco, General Hubert Lyautey, the first Resident General of the Protectorate, inherited the infrastructure of nearly twenty years of intensive intelligence work in Morocco. During the decade prior to the French takeover of Morocco, French military intelligence orchestrated from the frontier between Algeria, Morocco, and the Sahara, known as the “*Confins Algéro-Marocains*,” covert military operations and political destabilization campaigns aimed at weakening the various institutions the Sheriffian Empire depended upon for proper government, and it ran concurrently counter-intelligence operations to thwart the ambitions of France’s rivals in Morocco. Five years before the Protectorate, French intelligence officers operating in Morocco established the legal foundations of the intelligence state: wherever French intelligence officers operated inside the Sheriffian Empire, a special ad hoc regime made intelligence officers de facto rulers of large portions of Morocco. The intelligence state in Morocco was not created *ex nihilo* with the Treaty of Fez in 1912. Morocco was an intelligence state long before it was a Protectorate.

The intelligence state was supposed to ensure that the French government respected its commitment to not colonize Morocco. Through the intelligence state, France was in theory better able to practice a light footprint imperialism that satisfied the notarial bent of the Parisian bourgeois whose capital was parked in imperial investments and whose tax rate depended on governments with a certain aversion for imperial expansion, the international community wary of French ambitions in North Africa, and Moroccans, who wanted to avoid the fate of their Algerian neighbors.²⁶ The French protectorate of Morocco was supposed to look like the one in

²⁶ Daniel Rivet, *Lyautey et l'institution du Protectorat Français au Maroc, 1912-1925* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1996), 1:109.

Tunisia where indirect rule, the association between French and natives to reform the ailing institutions, was practiced.²⁷ Yet, the French Protectorate of Morocco, according to historians of the colonial Maghreb, such as Daniel Rivet and Charles-André Julien, was in fact a highly centralized state that concentrated power in the hands of a few individuals and ruled directly over Moroccans.²⁸

The imperatives of intelligence work pervaded all aspects of life in the Protectorate, creating an expansive logic of security. Intelligence officers, busy legitimating French rule, turned colonial administration into the work of protecting the Protectorate. The colonial state faced no shortage of enemies. Morocco was a singularly difficult place to govern for the French. Lyautey and the intelligence state were decried by Morocco's elites, they were under siege from jihadists in southern Morocco and insurgents in the east. But the work of the Residency General and its intelligence apparatus also suffered from the political sabotage of the Quai d'Orsay and French settlers who contested Lyautey's vision of empire-building. Running the Protectorate became an exercise in managing perpetual war against the enemies of the colonial state which included dissident Moroccans, of course, but also against French settlers. In this volatile environment, the tightly knit corps of intelligence officers and sympathetic administrators made extensive use of emergency measures to transform Morocco in what was described by Jacques Berque, the famous historian of the Maghreb who had been an administrator in Morocco, as "an

²⁷ Although, as Mary Lewis argues in the case of Tunisia, the fraught international context of the Tunisian Protectorate forced the French to steadily administer Tunisia directly. See Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881-1938* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).

²⁸ See for example, Charles-André Julien, *Le Maroc face aux imperialismes, 1415-1956* (Paris: Les éditions du Jaguar, 2011), 95-118 and Daniel Rivet, *Lyautey et l'institution du Protectorat Français au Maroc, 1912-1925* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1996), 3:191-211.

island... a rogue territory (*pays d'exception*), the only place in the world where soldiers rule as soldiers.”²⁹

Intelligence officers created a regime in Morocco that differs substantially from the regimes scholars of the French Empire describe. Traditionally, territories of the French Empire are thought to be divided into two types of territories: those such as Algeria and Cochinchina, colonies, in which French authorities entirely replaced traditional native authorities and ruled directly, and indirect rule in protectorates and mandates such as Tunisia and the Levant.³⁰ There is in fact a third way the French ruled their empire. Intelligence states construct particular modes of government. In Morocco, intelligence officers created a regime they called *Contrôle*. It was designed to mimic indirect rule but to have the same effects as direct rule. It gave the appearance of actors in the Protectorate using their agency to make decisions, though the parameters and the processes of these decisions had already been influenced to provoke an intended outcome. In every French office, behind every Moroccan official, next to every judge, in the audience of any public meeting of interest, was an intelligence officer whose job was to surreptitiously guide discussions, orient decision-making processes, and manipulate outcomes. They were what the French in Morocco called the “authorities of *Contrôle*.”

The “authorities of *Contrôle*” used intelligence networks, designed to be hard to detect, to leverage seemingly invisible power over the military, the intelligence apparatus, the judicial

²⁹ Jacques Berque, “Pour une nouvelle méthode politique de la France au Maroc,” in *Sciences sociales et décolonisation* vol. 3 of *Opera Minora*, ed. François Pouillon (Paris: Editions Bouchène, 2001), 46-47.

³⁰ For a focused discussion on indirect and direct rule, or as the French called it, association and assimilation, see Raymond Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1960). For critiques of assimilation, see Martin Deming Lewis, “One Hundred Million Frenchmen: the ‘Assimilation’ Theory in French Colonial Policy,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 4, no. 2 (1962): 129-153; Alice Conklin, “‘Democracy’ Rediscovered: Civilization through Association in French West Africa (1914-1930),” *Cahiers d’études Africaines*, 145, no. 37 (1997), 59-84. For the practical difficulties of indirect rule see Mary Lewis, *Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881-1938* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).

system, and civil society, essentially directing the political course of the Protectorate.³¹ Thanks to the upper hand provided by intelligence in anticipating particular behaviors among individuals, groups of individuals, and institutions, the authorities of *Contrôle* manipulated colonial and traditional Moroccan bureaucracies by monitoring and creating political opportunities that advanced their agenda.

The intelligence state

Empires expand and collapse on the performance of their intelligence networks. Colonial empires especially, since they lacked the basic administrative infrastructure of modern states, depended on their intelligence services to gauge the populations they ruled. The fears of colonizers were important motivators behind the metastasis of intelligence services in empire. As C.A. Bayly put it, “the basic fear of the colonial official or settler was... his lack of indigenous knowledge and ignorance of the ‘wiles of the native.’ He feared their secret letters, their drumming and ‘bush telegraphy’ and the nightly passage of seditious agents masquerading as priests or old men.”³² Military occupation, curfews, and group punishments were not enough to pacify the natives and allay the fears of colonizers. Suspicion was the consequence of colonization. Inequality in rights between the French and their subjects, the lack of a common language and the paucity of efforts to create political harmony, in addition to the violence of conquest, ensured that not only was French rule always the subject of a conspiracy, but that the French always thought the conspiracy to be far more elaborate than it was. The rationale for intelligence therefore pervaded all aspects of colonial life. Discovering, observing, analyzing,

³¹ Eugénie Mérieau, “Thailand’s Deep State Royal Power and the Constitutional Court (1997-2015),” *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 46, no. 3 (2016): 445-466.

³² C.A. Bayly, *Empire and Information: Intelligence gathering and social communication in India, 1780-1870*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6.

and understanding conversations on dark street corners, rites in religious ceremonies forbidden to outsiders, and veiled domestic practices served not only as the basis for military strategy, but also as the basis for policy on everyday matters. Indeed, as Martin Thomas argues, what distinguishes the work of colonial intelligence services from their metropolitan counterparts is the manner in which intelligence services and civilian administrations interacted to form a wider intelligence community. Intelligence officers complemented thin civilian administration on the ground to form a larger bureaucracy. This synthesis of civilian administration and intelligence services is the point at which the colonial state became an intelligence state.³³

General Hubert Lyautey, Morocco's first Resident General, was the first French official overseas to make the synthesis between administration and intelligence explicit. Lyautey was a product of the "Colonial War School."³⁴ Its major tenet was the use of intelligence to create policies that advanced the greatness of France overseas with minimal bloodshed: "an officer who has established a fairly accurate ethnic geography of the region he commands is close to having obtained its complete pacification and figured out the [administrative] organization that suits it best."³⁵ Knowledge was power, but it took time to acquire. That is why they called their strategy the "*tâche d'huile*." Colonial conquest was slow, like a creeping oil stain: "we gain forward terrain only after we've organized entirely the terrain behind us."³⁶ Indeed, what years of colonial adventures proved to the Colonial War School's theorizers in Indochina, Madagascar, and the *Confins Algéro-Marocains*, was that conquest, intelligence collection, and administration

³³ Martin Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 14-15.

³⁴ Jean-David Mizrahi, *Genèse de l'État mandataire. Service des Renseignements et bandes armées en Syrie et au Liban dans les années 1920* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2003), 19.

³⁵ Mizrahi, *Genèse*, 19.

³⁶ LoN P153, General Gallieni, Instructions à MM. les administrateurs civils et militaires, chefs de province au sujet du programme de pacification à poursuivre à Madagascar, 1900, 15

were intimately entwined. The distinction between civilian and military in colonial settings was illusory.³⁷

Successive French governments that oversaw the expansion of the French colonial empire learned to be wary of their intelligence services. At stake for metropolitan governments was a liberal and bourgeois empire controlled by politicians, not one that required dealing with persons of dubious morals who inhabited a “demimonde of marginal characters...”³⁸ The role of intelligence officers in empire also accentuated fears of creating a Pretorian Guard beholden only to an empire of war rather than a civilizing empire.³⁹ Yet, successive governments and their envoys overseas continued to grapple in myriad ways with the rule of intelligence services because the empire expanded, reinforcing metropolitan dependence on intelligence officers in imperial administration. Reluctantly, civilian governments in the metropole and overseas accepted this conception of colonial government, though they implemented safeguards wherever possible. For one, the French colonial army depended on money, war materiel, and manpower from the metropole. The French colonial army was thus always subject to parliamentary oversight. For another, to ensure that the priorities of colonial officers never became more

³⁷ To examine the many ways in which the notion of civilian and military in colonial settings is dismantled see for example Vincent Denis and Catherine Denys, eds., *Police d'Empires XVIIIe-XIXe siècles* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2012); Samia El Mechat ed., *Les administrations coloniales XIXe-XXe siècles. Esquisse d'une histoire comparée* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009); as well as Jean-Pierre Bat and Nicolas Courtin eds., *Maintenir l'ordre colonial. Afrique et Madagascar, XIXe-XXe siècles* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2012).

³⁸ Douglas Porch, *The French Secret Services: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995), 42.

³⁹ In Algeria, the trial of Auguste Doineau, an intelligence officer who headed the *Bureau Arabe* (native intelligence office) of Tlemcen, in 1857, crystallized these concerns, revealing the vulnerability of the empire to the rule of rogue intelligence services. The *Bureaux Arabes* were the intelligence liaisons between the European settlements on the Mediterranean coast of Algeria and the tribes of the interior. The lack of civilian administration empowered the officers of the *Bureaux Arabes* to develop and implement imperial policy with little oversight. When Doineau was sentenced to death for having orchestrated the assassination of the charismatic but troublesome *agha* of the Beni Snous tribe, it was not just a rogue officer who was being put to death, according to Jacques Frémaux, a historian of the *Bureaux Arabes*, but an entire system of imperial administration run by intelligence officers: “many did not believe that Doineau was guilty, but instead saw him as the victim of the enemies of military administration in Africa.” Jacques Frémaux, *Les bureaux arabes dans l'Algérie de la conquête* (Paris: Denoël, 1993) 13-15.

important than those of the metropole, metropolitan administrators made the military subordinate to civilian governments.

This Republican vision of empire seemed to pervade every aspect of planning in the creation of the French Protectorate of Morocco. The Protectorate was the responsibility of the Quai d'Orsay, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Resident General, the head of the Protectorate, was appointed at the rank of Ambassador and Plenipotentiary Minister of the French Republic to indicate both that the Resident General was most powerful French envoy in Morocco, but that he was only a civil servant. He was the only French official in Morocco, short of a visit to Morocco of the Minister for Foreign Affairs or the Prime Minister, authorized to forge or destroy political agreements with Moroccan officials. His immediate point of contact with the French government was a small, but powerful cell of technocrats inside the Quai d'Orsay that advised the French government on policy matters in Morocco. The safeguards, in Morocco at least, were intended to offer political options to the Resident General that did not involve the colonial army and military intelligence.

Initially, in 1912, Henri Regnault, who had previously been the head of the Debt Control committee that oversaw Morocco's pre-Protectorate budget reforms, was chosen by the Quai d'Orsay to take the top post in Morocco.⁴⁰ However, the territorial security of Morocco was threatened by the discontent of traditional Moroccan elites which had let fester millenarian revolts. Begrudgingly, the Quai d'Orsay accepted the necessity of a military officer as the head of the Residency General to better combine political and military efforts in view of mounting a successful counter-insurgency campaign. Hubert Lyautey who had since 1903 been intimately involved in the Moroccan campaign from his post on the Moroccan-Algerian border at Aïn Sefra

⁴⁰ Edmund Burke III, *Prelude to the Protectorate in Morocco: Pre-colonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 75.

was chosen to manage the situation. He was appointed to the Residency General as Ambassador Resident General and General Commander of the Occupation Troops of Morocco. He was the supreme political and military authority in Morocco, though the Quai d'Orsay did not make him a Plenipotentiary Minister, technically reserving for itself the authority to accept or decline political arrangements made in Morocco.

Lyautey was a controversial choice. In 1891, Lyautey, at the time a captain in the French army, penned in the acclaimed *Revue des Deux Mondes* an article entitled “Du rôle social de l'officier” (On the officer's role in society).⁴¹ It was considered subversive for questioning the methods of training officers in the French army, but appreciated in colonial military circles. Lyautey was interested in officers and their men, their place within populations, and their power to transform societies. He believed that the French officer, ever since the universalization of the three-year military service to all French males in 1889, was an untapped, but formidable agent of change who could unite men of different backgrounds to pursue a common cause. At a time when France still lived with the trauma of the loss of Alsace and Lorraine and sought salvation through empire, Lyautey's message resonated well with the more adventurous young lieutenants and captains of the French colonial army. Lyautey bashed the preparation for command posts behind desks that the newly established *Ecole Supérieure de la Guerre* provided its students. He lamented the emphasis on technical training officers received to the detriment of their granular knowledge of the men under their command and the societies in which they operated. Knowing and understanding the men under their command could give officers an advantage in battle, sure, but in the larger scheme of things, Lyautey believed that young officers, given the opportunity, could detect the qualities of their soldiers and cultivate them, if empowered to do so:

⁴¹ Hubert Lyautey, “Du rôle social de l'officier dans le service militaire universel,” *Revue des Deux Mondes*, March 15, 1891.

as for [conscripts'] character, their morality, their origins, their backgrounds, that is to say the information that can provide insight into people otherwise impenetrable, and which can help facilitate their development, all of that is ignored. We harvested everything we could from the bark of the tree. As for the sap, capable of giving life to this complex mechanism [society], we ignored it... in the cavalry for example, it is extremely well regarded to know the horses of the troop better than their riders...⁴²

Colonial officers had a duty to educate their subordinates to fight well in combat, to administer well after conquest, and when, finally, colonial soldiers returned to civilian life, they possessed the mettle to reshape French and imperial society.

Lyautey's reputation was made in the empire. He crisscrossed Indochina, Madagascar, and Algeria before launching raids into Morocco. In the empire, he put to practice in small scale experiments the theories he had elaborated in the metropole on the role of officers in society. And under the mentorship of General Joseph Gallieni, he discovered the virtues of "civilizing conquest," and the political possibilities offered by ruling in association with traditional elites. Lyautey carried these experiences into Morocco. He learned that "civilizing conquest" required the know-how to build roads, telegraph networks, and cities. He also learned that these were merely the accoutrements of civilization. Native societies required deeper transformations. Lyautey thus turned his attention to rebuilding the societies that he conquered.

In Morocco, Lyautey's vision of the ideal officer, as he described him in the "Rôle social de l'officier," took on a new dimension. He turned the attention of the officer on the individual into a cult of human intelligence. If the young officer in the *bled* or in the city, imbued with the appropriate paternalistic fervor, could discover the spark that ignited the potential in each imperial subject, Morocco would be saved from the decay in which the French had found it, and France would surely be redeemed, too. Lyautey's Moroccan officer corps took on ecclesiastical

⁴² Lyautey, "Du rôle social de l'officier," 450.

proportions: it was “a caste, an order,”⁴³ of exceedingly competent officers devoted to carrying out his mystical vision of empire in Morocco.⁴⁴ Lyautey was the “suzerain of the intelligence *zawiya*.”⁴⁵

His early organization of the Protectorate reflected the preponderance of intelligence officers in military roles, of course, but also within the administrative apparatus, and set up the foundations for the future supervision of the entire Protectorate by intelligence services. The first mission of the *Service des Renseignements*, an intelligence office strictly controlled by the Residency General and limited to operations in Morocco, was to ensure that the Resident General always had an upper hand on events in the Protectorate by reading the political landscape and providing the Resident General and General Commander in Chief of the French Army in Morocco (Lyautey occupied both functions) with the information and the options necessary to retain political and military initiative.⁴⁶ The *Service des Renseignements* was also immediately put to the task of ensuring institutional, administrative, and political continuity in the Protectorate regardless of who occupied the top post at the Residency.⁴⁷

By April 1914, Lyautey clarified in a longer memo the full scope of the *Service des Renseignements* in the Protectorate. He categorized the responsibility of the *Service des Renseignements* in three parts. First, the *Service des Renseignement* was responsible for carrying out the Resident General’s policies. Lyautey, while always keeping a close eye on the process,

⁴³ Rivet, *Lyautey*, vol. 2, 352.

⁴⁴ Robert Billecard, “Lyautey et son équipe,” *Hommes et mondes* 1, no. 1 (1946), 52-67.

⁴⁵ Jean-David Mizrahi, *Genèse*, 91. Zawiyas were religious brotherhoods in the Maghreb and in West Africa. In rural areas, they served not only a religious purpose, but an educational one as well. They were an important point of contact between religious authorities and rural populations and were often the vector through which peasant rebellions transformed into jihad. Lyautey was convinced that zawiyas were run by shadowy figures with secret agendas and dedicated significant resources to mapping out zawiyas and their influence across Morocco. The use of the term *zawiya* to describe Lyautey’s cadre of officers illustrates the secretive manner in which Lyautey and his inner circle operated.

⁴⁶ LoN P153, Instructions générales pour l’organisation du commandement, 19 August 1912, 8

⁴⁷ Mizrahi, *Genèse*, 91.

preferred to provide a long-term political vision through broad strokes that freed the intelligence officer to adapt policy to actual conditions: “I wouldn’t be able to enter into detailed and rigid prescriptions; while taking into account the general guidelines I’ve put forth, it is up to the commanders of each region to find the right formula,” they “had to figure out a way” to realize his ambitions.⁴⁸ He trusted his subordinates to achieve the goals he set and gave them unlimited access to the “*Fonds Politiques*,” the bribes and gifts given to Moroccan actors who helped smooth out the implementation of policy written far away from its intended geographical application. Second, the civilian directors of bureaus (Diplomatic bureau, Public Works, or and Sherffian Affairs, for example) who were nominally independent civil servants responsible only to the Resident General and the Quai d’Orsay, received their orders from the *Service des Renseignements* which delegated tasks to them and therefore set their agendas. Finally, the *Services des Renseignements* was carbon copied on every single piece of political and administrative correspondence exchanged between central authorities in Rabat and local offices in the regions and territories.⁴⁹ In other words, theoretically, nothing was written by French officials that intelligence officers did not collect. With this information, in concert with the Resident General, the *Service des Renseignements* set the overall political course for the Protectorate, but intelligence officers had a free hand in implementing policy.

In effect, Lyautey authorized the intelligence services to conscript existing bureaucracies and the competences of their staff into the *Service des Renseignements*. This new bureaucratic superstructure, which Edmund Burke III calls the “technocolony,” was specifically geared toward obtaining ethnohistorical data.⁵⁰ Recall that the Colonial School of War considered this

⁴⁸ LoN, P153, Directives pour M. Le General Commandant les Troupes d’Occupation du Maroc Occidental, 1-3.

⁴⁹ LoN P153, 19/7 BP/2., instructions on the role of intelligence in the Protectorate, 20 April 1914, 1.

⁵⁰ Edmund Burke III, *The Ethnographic State: France and the Invention of Moroccan Islam, 1880-1930* (Berkley: University of California Press, 2014), 111.

type of intelligence key to administering occupied territories and necessary for the expansion of empire. Scholarly periodicals such as the *Archives Marocaines* and *Archives Berbères/Hespéris-Tamuda* provide accessible instances of this intelligence. Indeed, Lyautey ensured that the intelligence state vulgarized its information distribution and contributed to making France a significant producer of knowledge about the Arab, Berber, and Muslim worlds.

The raw intelligence, the data called up by intelligence officers to create analyses, was stored in various archival compartments, including a separate “secret archive.”⁵¹ The ethnohistorical data was transformed into a human geography and Protectorate policies could be plotted on a map much like rivers and mountains. The most complete examples of ethnohistorical datasets were compiled in the Moroccan hinterlands into what intelligence officers called *Fiches de Tribus*, or tribal datasheets.

Leaving aside the accuracy of the intelligence collected, the *Fiches de Tribus* compiled several types of intelligence. The first part was a complete environmental intelligence workup that included an overview of the topography and orography of tribal domains, access to water, unique topographical identifiers, and a complete list of practicable paths of access. The second part detailed the ethnographic composition of the tribe. When possible, intelligence officers took a census of tribes that included the number of households, and the number men, women, boys, and girls. The census also attempted to guess income levels and hidden assets by investigating the average lifestyle of tribe members and counting livestock. Intelligence officers spent time with members of the tribe or others familiar with the tribe in an effort to determine the ancestry of the tribe’s leaders, its origin story, and its relationship to the outside world. These two parts

⁵¹ Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes, hereafter CADN (2012) Epuración 1, Confidentiel/Renseignements SCHNEIDER, Robert, 21 March 1941. The special Epuración collection of documents at the CADN are important points of analysis to understand the Protectorate’s bureaucracy as the world around officials begins to fall apart. Language that was once guarded becomes careless.

served as introductions to the third, most important part, the political-economy of the tribe, which provided an overview of the dynamics that governed the tribe. These data sheets were then updated every time intelligence officers found a new piece of intelligence pertinent to the tribal data sheet.

Intelligence services also had a duty to guide the policy agendas of other offices. Raw intelligence had to be transformed into data comprehensible to others, exported in formats that matched the information systems of other intelligence services, and made available to other bureaucracies. Take, for example, the following two-column table.

(5)

AGGLOMERATIONS MAROCAINES	
dans le	
DEPARTEMENT de la SEINE.	

Tribu des <u>ATT-BA-AMRANE</u>	: <u>ALFORTVILLE</u>
comprenant les Régions	: <u>ASNIERES</u>
<u>ATT ABDALLAH</u>	: <u>AUBERVILLIERS</u>
<u>ATT BRAHIM</u>	: <u>BOULOGNE</u>
(insoumis au Maroc)	: <u>COLOMBES</u>
	: <u>GENEVILLIERS</u>
	: <u>NANTERRE</u>
	: <u>SAINT OURN</u>
	: <u>PARIS 1Vème et Vème</u>
	: --:--:--:--:--

Figure 1: CADN IMA/200/70, Note sur l'Etoile Nord Africaine, 5

It was drawn up by an intelligence officer working on understanding the importance of nationalism and the *Etoile Nord-Africaine* among Moroccan workers in Paris. The information it contains offered the Paris Police Prefecture and intelligence officers in Morocco an efficient means of understanding one another regardless of whether the officers involved knew the intricacies of Moroccan and Parisian political economies and ethno-social geographies. What is significant here is the metadata, in this case, the history of the data. In this table, two different sets of intelligence assumptions, one elaborated in Morocco and the other in Paris, could be

transferred onto various maps, in this case a map of the Seine *département* and a map of Morocco. By linking Moroccan communities in Paris with their connections to tribes in Morocco, intelligence officers were able to make connections that uncovered previously unseen networks. The Quai d'Orsay's intelligence cell, for example, had a team that monitored the flow of remittances from Moroccans in Paris to recipients in Morocco.⁵² Who received money and the amounts received served to confirm or disprove intelligence assumptions about familial relations and financial situations, which in turn could lead to new policy formulas.

These broad overviews, however, were only part of a larger flow of paperwork. Every day, intelligence officers kept statistical records of rainfall and dead livestock, for example, as well as agendas for meetings, summaries of arbitration work, and the weekly tally of the number of cases heard by judges and their outcomes. Much of intelligence work was devoted to administrative housekeeping and proper record keeping, and when the *Services des Renseignements* was not producing the paperwork, it collated information from other Residential services. Paperwork was the lifeblood of the intelligence state.

Perpetual war

The intelligence state, though it seemed to be the *nec plus ultra* of French imperial governmentality, was not infallible. At the heart of empire lay the question of administration. Military power opened the way for conquest, but continued recourse to force after the initial imperial moment was the sign of a failure to transition toward administrative normalcy, or the semblance of it in colonial settings. Pacification was therefore the stated objective of colonial governments and the intelligence apparatus in colonial settings was supposed to provide a

⁵² Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes, hereafter CADN. CADN 1MA/200/70, Note sur l'Etoile Nord Africaine, 5.

solution that facilitated the transition from military administration to civilian administration.⁵³

Yet, because colonial administration constantly alternated between military and political solutions to either obtain the assent of colonized populations or exhaust their capacity to revolt, the intelligence state created a “war without end in which each victory... each repression, each episode of horrific violence, contributed to systematically creating or recreating the conditions that led to new clashes and new repressions.”⁵⁴ Colonialism had no finality and created the situations that reinforced the perceived need for an intelligence state.

The history of the Protectorate in Morocco is a succession of wide-spread insurgencies, wars, bouts of localized violence, and political destabilization campaigns. No sooner had the Treaty of Fez been signed than the legitimacy of the Protectorate was questioned. As Abdellah Laroui argues, the French acquired Morocco only by provoking the tribes on the frontier between Algeria and Morocco into declaring jihad, and angering the political, bourgeois, and military elites of the Sheriffian Empire known as the Makhzen, who might have been able to control the tribes hostile to the French had they not been sidelined from the administration of the country or deprived of a bribe appropriate to their standing in society.⁵⁵ Morocco’s military, commanded by French officers, was on edge, too. On 17 April 1912, about three weeks after the Treaty of Fez, the garrison of *askar* (the Sultan’s soldiers) in Fez mutinied, after refusing to obey the new French infantry code forcing them to carry a rucksack. Within a matter of hours, a garrison of *tabor* (police) also mutinied in Fez. The mutiny became a city-wide riot. From the minarets, Imams called for jihad. From the streets, the rioters who had joined the mutineers shouted: “God

⁵³ Samia el Mechat, “Introduction,” in *Coloniser, pacifier, administrer XIXe-XXIe siècles*, ed. Samia el Mechat (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2014), 6.

⁵⁴ Olivier le Cour Grandmaison, *Coloniser, Exterminer: Sur la guerre et l’Etat colonial* (Paris: Fayard, 2015), 110.

⁵⁵ Abdallah Laroui, *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain (1830-1912)* 3rd ed. (Casablanca: Centre Culturel Arabe, 2009), 382.

will reward the mujahedeen.” The rioters continued to beat the bodies of French military advisors long after they were dead and then dragged their corpses through the medina.⁵⁶ Two weeks later, with Fez and the rest of Morocco still uneasy, Ahmed El Hiba, the leader of what had been only a small millenarian revolt in southern Morocco barged into the Tiznit mosque during Friday prayer to declare that the Sultan was dead and that he was the Mahdi and leader of the mujahedeen against the foreign occupiers. By early September 1912, in the heat of the late summer and the fervor of Ramadan, El Hiba, from his new headquarters in Marrakesh, threatened to take over the Atlas Mountains and Fez. From Fez, it was a straight shot to Casablanca and Rabat. Lyautey felt “Morocco give out from under his feet.”⁵⁷ The *hibistes*, as Al Hiba’s supporters were called, were everywhere. The situation progressively worsened as Moroccans took note of Al Hiba’s defiance, and three months before the beginning of the First World War, in response to Lyautey’s push into central Morocco to block Al Hiba’s move into the Atlas, the Zaian confederation of tribes also revolted, beginning another insurgency that lasted until 1921.

In the summer of 1914, from the perspective of the government in Paris, the situation in Morocco was worrisome, but the situation in Europe was more pressing. At the outbreak of the First World War, the French government, in need of soldiers for the Western Front, and having considered the situation in Morocco hopeless, accepted that the French should evacuate Morocco, save for secure enclaves in Rabat, Casablanca, and Kenitra. Morocco could go to Al Hiba and the Zaian; it mattered little anyway: “the fate of Morocco was to be resolved in Lorraine.”⁵⁸ In August 1914, the French Minister of War ordered Lyautey to send thirty-six of

⁵⁶ Rivet, *Lyautey*, 1:126.

⁵⁷ Rivet, *Lyautey*, 1:125.

⁵⁸ LoN P153, 130 GMC, Lyautey to Ministry of War, Situation du Maroc, 22 August 1914.

the sixty-four battalions at his disposal in Morocco to the European front.⁵⁹ For Lyautey, evacuating the interior of Morocco would have meant not only losing the Protectorate but also throwing Algeria and northern AOF (*Afrique Occidentale Française*), or French West Africa, into disarray. The Central Powers were also rumored to be funding the rebellions in Morocco and eager to disrupt the empire's contribution to the war effort in Europe. Lyautey pushed harder on the frontiers that were threatened by Al Hiba and the Zaian but evacuated the center of Morocco. He had "emptied the lobster, but kept the shell," as he liked to quip, but in 1918, Lyautey knew that he would never again command prewar troop numbers in Morocco, nor would he have access to the funds he needed to accelerate the peaceful penetration of Morocco.⁶⁰

In retrospect, the period 1912-1918 appears to have been a lot simpler to manage than the postwar era. Despite the complicated situation that French officials faced in Morocco, the politics of the Al Hiba and Zaian insurgencies were, all things considered, localized and dealt with by intelligence staff with the liberal use of troop columns. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Wilson's Fourteen Points, and the flow of ideas into North Africa that followed from hundreds of thousands of North Africans fighting on the Western Front, however, complicated the political landscape that intelligence officers had to manage. The politics of the Protectorate were not only negotiations on local issues, but in the interwar era, also local emanations of global phenomena.

In fact, what French intelligence officers were experiencing in Morocco was common across the French Empire. Fears of Bolshevik revolution,⁶¹ the return of colonial troops who

⁵⁹ Rivet, *Lyautey*, 2:8.

⁶⁰ Archives Nationales du Maroc, hereafter AN-Ma. AN-Ma F278, L'œuvre du Maréchal Lyautey, undated, 18.

⁶¹ Fears of communist influence on colonial subjects in the empire and in the metropole figures prominently among the threats colonial security services sought to monitor. For an overview see Peter Zinoman, *The Colonial Bastille: A History of Imprisonment in Vietnam, 1862-1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 129; Clifford Rosenberg, *Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control between the Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 45-63; Benjamin Stora, *Nationalistes algériens et révolutionnaires français au temps du*

were promised French citizenship but were barely awarded their service pension,⁶² the anger of mistreated colonial laborers in metropolitan factories,⁶³ and the need to monitor for radical politics, in general, required an increase in resources at a time when the French state was incapable of making the investments necessary to achieve either total surveillance capacities or total economic renovation in the empire that might have eased political tensions. Metropolitan elites accepted the reality of a declining empire.⁶⁴ The global geo-political landscape after 1918 worried Lyautey who warned the Quai d'Orsay in 1920 that Morocco was undergoing significant transformations, uncontrollable by the French intelligence apparatus in Morocco:

Ideas thrown out into the world about the right of people to govern themselves will not be without consequences... we can be certain that near us, unbeknownst to us, is being born a movement of ideas, of numerous hushed discussions on world events, on the treatment of Islam by the world, and that one of these days everything will gel and blow up...⁶⁵

Lyautey and the intelligence state had indeed identified an existential threat to the French Empire. He feared that Moroccans would combine religious and secular currents with the rhetoric of the “Wilsonian Moment” to accelerate the political awakening of colonized peoples apparent everywhere after 1918.⁶⁶

After the war, Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic movements particularly excited the minds of intelligence officers in Morocco. The idea that there should be political unity between Arabs, or an even larger union of Muslims, was antithetical to the supremacy of Europeans over the world,

Front Populaire (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987), 53-65; Martin Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 90-105.

⁶² On the enduring relationships of obligation and reciprocity between colonial soldiers and the French state after conflict, especially on matters of citizenship, see for example Gregory Mann, *Native sons: West African veterans and France in the twentieth century* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

⁶³ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 45-63.

⁶⁴ Martin Thomas, *The French Empire between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics, and Society* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 1.

⁶⁵ CADN (2012) DI 68, Coup de barre memo, 18 November 1920, 5.

⁶⁶ Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

and for the French, Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism was a blow to the narrative that the French were friends and protectors of Arabs and Islam.⁶⁷ Piecemeal implementations of a Muslim policy existed here and there, but Islam in imperial governance was mainly the preoccupation of intelligence officers and scholars since the early days of French Algeria. From Algeria, specialists had ventured into Morocco to unveil Islam at its most mystic, deep inside Beber territory. Years of developing intelligence on Islam was used to create surveillance networks that monitored the loyalty of Muslim troops.⁶⁸ At the end of the First World War those capacities were increased to tap into currents which were alleged to have the potential to activate fanatical and populist sentiments in Morocco.⁶⁹

Precisely how committed Moroccans were to the ideals of Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism is up for debate.⁷⁰ Moroccan students who had witnessed the decline of the Sultanate and the French takeover of Morocco were most sympathetic to the ideas of Arab or Muslim unity some of which would later inform nationalist manifestos and independence programs. But in the 1920s, Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism were popular because they offered intellectual frameworks that inspired self-worth and led to political awakening. Just as important, these movements were also well-funded and organized, and Moroccans took advantage of foreign patronage networks to strengthen their movement. Moroccan students organized in secret cultural clubs and political clubs that exchanged with students and intellectuals across the

⁶⁷ See Julia Clancy-Smith, "Islam and the French Empire in North Africa" in *Islam and the European Empires*, David Motadel, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 93-94.

⁶⁸ Martin Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence*, 82-83.

⁶⁹ John Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism, 1912-1944* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 119-134; see also William Hoisington, "France and Islam: The Haut Comité Méditerranéen and French North Africa," in *North Africa: Nation, State, and Region*, ed. George Joffé (New York: Routledge, 1993), 78-81.

⁷⁰ Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 128.

globe.⁷¹ Ironically, French and Moroccan repression of these clubs accelerated the globalization of the Moroccan public sphere. Students found some reprieve from heavy-handed authorities by establishing themselves for a while in Tetouan (Spanish Protectorate of Morocco) and Tangier, as well as traveling to cities, such as Cairo, Nablus, Damascus, and Paris where they became tutors to younger students receptive to their message and writers for periodicals that promoted Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism, further amplifying a movement that was already beyond French control.⁷²

Finally, Lyautey and the *Services des Renseignements* also had to monitor the activities of French and European settlers within Morocco. Morocco was not a settler colony, unlike Algeria, Indochina, or even Tunisia. Nevertheless, French intelligence officers devoted significant resources to monitoring Morocco's small French community, specifically the urban, cosmopolitan bourgeoisie. Lyautey's aversion to *colons* since his stint in Algeria is particularly well-known. He had witnessed the way settlers abused their political power in Algeria and pit the interests of Algerians against the interests of the French; consequently, he limited the influx of settlers to Morocco by making outrageous landgrabs more difficult than elsewhere in the empire. The French settlers in Morocco, however few they were, were also very well connected to capitalists and politicians in the metropole and could therefore exercise political and economic pressure disproportionate their numbers.

Lyautey was convinced that an economic crisis in October 1919, known as the Hassani Crisis, was in fact a plot to overthrow him and the Protectorate. He believed that the crisis had been fabricated to turn Morocco into a territory attached to France and run by a congress of

⁷¹ Abdelkabar Faouzi, "Mokhtar al Soussi et l'éducation dans l'œuvre de Mohamed Al-Mokhtar Al-Soussi, région du Souss (XXe siècle)," (PhD diss., Université de Lille 3, 2003), 37, <https://www.theses.fr/2003LIL30031>.

⁷² On Moroccan students in the Middle East see for example Toumader Khatib, *Culture et Politique dans le mouvement nationaliste marocain au Machreq* (Tetouan: Association Tetouan-Asmir, 1996).

French notables in Morocco. The Hassani was the currency of the Sheriffian Empire. It was made out of silver and issued by the Moroccan *Banque d'Etat*. In 1912, all transactions between Europeans and the Moroccans of the interior were conducted in Hassani while the franc was commonly used for transactions on the coast and accepted by most Moroccans living in cities, including Morocco's commercial and political notables. The rate of exchange of the Hassani depended on two factors: supply and demand, and the price of silver. 1 franc was worth 1.6 Hassani pesetas in 1907, 1.35 in 1914, and 1.25 in 1916.⁷³ The increase in the price of the Hassani against the franc is explained by a major influx of francs from the *Banque d'Algerie* to help the Protectorate and the French government in the metropole pay for the increase in wartime military expenditures in Morocco. At harvests, especially, after the senior quartermaster of the French army in Morocco paid Moroccan farmers in francs, the *Banque d'Etat* of Morocco experienced significant withdrawals of Hassanis. Though they were familiar with the franc, Moroccans in the hinterlands did not trust the value of the franc since the constant influx of paper bills to pay for ever increasing military expenditures steadily diminished the value of the Franc compared to Hassani.⁷⁴ In 1917, to facilitate the fluidity of transactions which were partially obstructed by the scarcity of 0.50 and 0.25 Franc coins, the Residency General and the *Banque d'Etat of Algeria* forced a 1:1 parity between the Franc and the Hassani and implicitly guaranteed that Francs were easily exchangeable for Hassanis. The *Banque d'Etat* of Morocco was put in the position of having to guarantee against its deposits currency issued by another bank, which was not a problem so long as the *Banque d'Etat's* reserves of Hassanis were replenished thanks to its role as the recipient of taxes, tariffs, and customs.

⁷³ Henry-Emile Barrault, "Le régime monétaire du Maroc," *Revue d'économie politique*, ed. Charles Gide (Paris: Librairie de la Société du Recueil Sirey, 1920), 152; see also "Le régime monétaire du Maroc," *France-Maroc: revue mensuelle illustrée*, February 1922, 56; see also "Maroc," *L'année mondiale illustrée*, 1914, 576-577.

⁷⁴ Réginald Kann, *Le protectorat marocain* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1921), 128-130.

After the war, in the second half of 1919, the price of silver increased dramatically as Mexican silver production plummeted just as China was reforming its monetary system and needed reserves of silver to back its policies.⁷⁵ Speculators rushed to take advantage of the possibilities of selling the Hassani as raw silver. At the height of the speculation, traders sold the Douro, or roll of five Hassanis coins, for 7.50 Francs (worth only 5 Francs). The volume of the trading is unclear, but according to *Afrique Française*—another mouthpiece for French colonial intelligence services—the French legation in Tangier warned the Residency General that a suspicious amount of Hassanis were being physically extracted out of Morocco and intelligence also revealed that Hassanis were being smuggled out through the Rif and Spanish Morocco for smelting in Germany.⁷⁶ The tabloids were less sure about the destination of the Hassanis and wondered whether the French diplomatic corps and the Protectorate’s civil servants weren’t in on the scam to line their pockets.⁷⁷ After all, the weight being moved out of Morocco would have required some sort of official help if only for the logistics of the operation.

Disaster struck on 15 October 1919 when the Director of Finances of the Protectorate, in the absence of Lyautey, who was apparently summoned to Paris, declared that the *Banque d’Etat* no longer guaranteed parity, and that the price of the Hassani/Franc exchange pair would be decided by markets. Within a matter of hours on the morning of the 15th, after the first cargo ship docked in Tangier with the previous days market report, the Franc dropped to 1.6 Hassanis.⁷⁸ Moroccans who held Francs thinking that they could exchange their French bills for the old Moroccan coins rushed to the *Banque d’Etat* to avoid losing their savings only to find that there

⁷⁵ Kann, *Le protectorat*, 130.

⁷⁶ “Le Temps, Colonies et Protectorats, Maroc, La crise du hassani,” *Le Temps*, October 30, 1919; see also “La Crise Monétaire et le Retour du Résident Général,” *Afrique Française*, November-December 1919, 325.

⁷⁷ “Le coup de grâce,” *Les Potins de Paris*, November 6, 1919, 17.

⁷⁸ Réginald Kann, *Le protectorat*, 129.

had already been a run on the Hassanis deposited in the *Banque d'Etat* offices across Morocco.⁷⁹ Unsurprisingly, the despair of small shopkeepers and big merchants turned into anger. The papers reported riots across Morocco as the drop in value of the Franc led to massive inflation and an important increase in the cost of living almost overnight.⁸⁰ It is important to remember that these events took place while the colonial army was only barely keeping the Zaian and Al Hiba insurgencies a day or two away from major urban centers in Morocco, and that many of the notables that French intelligence officers depended on to keep dissident tribes at bay had their savings wiped out.

What shocked observers was that rather than unite behind Lyautey and the military to protect them, French settlers and notables in Morocco aided by the French press began spreading rumors that the Residency General had invented the crisis to despoil Moroccans. In Casablanca, a committee of twenty-one of Morocco's most influential settlers resigned from their positions of leadership within the Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Agriculture, the Casablanca Municipal Commission, and other civic associations, in apparent protest of the economic management of Protectorate, giving further credence to rumors of government fraud and more reasons for Moroccans to riot. The committee of twenty-one, amplified by the press, demanded the creation of a Moroccan Parliament composed of members elected among French settlers who would replace "the military Resident General" and assist "a civilian Resident General."⁸¹ "Morocco was not conquered by one man in one day. Look at our undemocratic regime and how it can be toppled in less than thirty minutes," reported the indignant correspondent for *Afrique Française* who swore that he was transcribing word for word what he heard on the day no less

⁷⁹ "Colonies et Protectorats, Maroc, La crise du hassani," *Le temps*, October 30, 1919.

⁸⁰ Henry-Emile Barrault, "Le régime monétaire du Maroc," *Revue d'économie politique*, ed. Charles Gide (Paris: Librairie de la Société du Recueil Sirey, 1920), 566.

⁸¹ *Afrique Française*, November-December 1919, 322-323.

that the “military Residency General” was handing out free school supplies to the Protectorate’s children.⁸²

Lyautey, who could only follow the events from Paris, had been waiting on intelligence from Rabat to make up his mind on the subject. When it came, he wrote to the Quai d’Orsay that he had in his possession incontrovertible proof that the Hassani Crisis was less an economic crisis than it was a sophisticated ploy by professional agitators and French notables with political ambitions “directed principally against the regime of the Protectorate, against those who are entrusted with keeping it safe,” starting presumably with him and his intelligence staff.⁸³ Confirming the reports put out by *Afrique Française*, Lyautey argued that the goal of these agitators was to “obtain in the shortest delays political institutions similar to those of the metropole, and most of all the right to hold political elections to create municipal governments, a local *Assemblée* with the power to legislate in Morocco and represent Moroccan *colons* in France.”⁸⁴ These committees had hired “professional agitators” to run riot in the Casablanca medina and were using the aggravated economic context of postwar Morocco to delegitimize the legal and political foundations of the Protectorate.⁸⁵

Lyautey managed to defuse popular support for the movement when he came back from Paris as *l’Homme Providentiel* and announced that he had secured financing for major contracts to build two rail lines between Rabat and Casablanca, and Kenitra-Petitjean. The contracts he announced would create plenty of work for French and Moroccan laborers and allow the French and Moroccan bourgeoisies to make money supplying the materials and services needed for the

⁸² *Afrique Française*, November-December 1919, 324.

⁸³ CADN IMA/1/329, #1790, Lyautey to MAE, 29 November 1919, 1-2.

⁸⁴ CADN IMA/1/329, #1790, Lyautey to MAE 29 November 1919, 1.

⁸⁵ CADN IMA/1/329, #1790, Lyautey to MAE 29 November 1919, 3.

construction of the rail lines.⁸⁶ The Moroccan masses greeted Lyautey's arrival at the port of Rabat with fervor. He had managed to temporarily buy social peace and secure the colonial state.

Contrôle

The Hassani Crisis frazzled Lyautey. The lesson for him was that the First World War had not ended in 1918. On the contrary, it continued unabated, in a different form in the empire. The weapons of his enemies were not only rifles and canons, but mass information, too, which was weaponized to amplify intrigues and the dissention of political opposition groups. A year after the Hassani Crisis, Lyautey continued to warn the Quai d'Orsay that the Protectorate was at war:

The world is still at war and this is especially true in the Muslim world, of which we should not forget Morocco is a part. [You seem] to be certainly unaware of the most deplorable effects that are produced on the indigenous populations by the polemics written in the press, which in turn threaten French authority, its prestige, the very security of our work in Morocco. Peddled, translated, commented on the Moroccan street (*milieux indigènes*), and especially in dissident zones in which we are fighting, they [European intrigues and the polemics in the press] have significantly shaken our authority and degraded our military capacities. If there's something I should blame myself for it is having tolerated for too long and for not having taken the appropriate measures to sanitize (*assainissement*) the press.⁸⁷

Morocco was even less secure than Lyautey probably let on to his entourage, considering would-be plotters only had to wait for him to leave to turn the Protectorate inside-out. Lyautey may have also feared that the Quai d'Orsay and the French government might remove him from the Residency General or curtail his powers under pressure from French interests in North Africa advocating for a new regime. The attacks on what French notables during the Hassani Crisis

⁸⁶ *Afrique Française*, November-December 1919, 325.

⁸⁷ CADN IMA/20/112-119, #141 SGP bis, Le Général de Division Lyautey, Commissaire Résident General de France au Maroc, à Son Excellence Monsieur le Président du Conseil, et le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 6 April 1921, 2.

called the “military Residency,” were not innocuous. Lyautey could not have understood these attacks any other way than as an attempt at encouraging the Quai d’Orsay to undermine the intelligence regime. The Quai d’Orsay had already taken small steps to dilute military power in Morocco, and top diplomats in the metropole had imposed on Lyautey in July 1913 the *Contrôleurs Civils*, a civilian intelligence branch modeled on the *Contrôle Civil* of Tunisia.⁸⁸ If French settlers felt safe enough to publicly attack the military in Morocco, Lyautey might have had reason to believe that there was political backing in Paris for the move. What was certain, however, was that whatever the goal of his political enemies, the entire commotion was sure to embolden Moroccan insurgents and their sympathizers since the regime seemed to be illegitimate even by French standards.

On 27 October 1919, two weeks into the Hassani Crisis and in response to the threats that Moroccans, French speculators, diplomats, civil servants, and the press posed the Protectorate, Lyautey made the most consequential decision in the history of the French Protectorate of Morocco. Citing French political dissidence in Morocco, Lyautey extended indefinitely the 2 August 1914 order “establishing Martial Law.”⁸⁹ The immediate result of the order was to comfort Lyautey in his dual political and military role.

Before moving on to an analysis of the new state of affairs created by the 27 October 1919 order, it is important to first understand the order. The 2 August 1914 order that precedes the 27 October 1919 order established a state of siege, which was not the same as martial law. The state of siege was a statute planned for in the French Constitution that permitted the temporary transfer of all governmental powers into the hands of the military under supervision of

⁸⁸ Lyautey accepted begrudgingly, but quickly turned this inconvenience to his advantage by placing them under command of the *Service des Renseignements* thereby militarizing the entire organization.

⁸⁹ CADN IMA/1/329, #639, MAE to Resident General, Rabat, 8 November 1919.

the *Parlement*.⁹⁰ The state of siege, in French law, could only be used on metropolitan territory, and only in case of a threat to the security of national territory.⁹¹ At the beginning of hostilities in 1914, the French government in concert with Lyautey modified the state of siege as it appeared in France for approval by the Sultan before declaring a state of siege in the Protectorate. Martial law, on the other hand, never existed in French law, and had never been mentioned in the orders establishing the state of siege in Morocco. Martial law was, however, noted in French law as an internationally recognized regime of exceptions that emerged as an “*état de fait*,” martial law came into existence whenever a military official declared it, but unlike a regime created by the state of siege, a regime created by martial law existed outside the bounds of French law and

⁹⁰ The use of emergency powers to better seat French power in the empire was not unique to Morocco. In Algeria emergency laws had been used to transfer military powers to settlers and establish the *Code de l'indigénat*. *L'Indigénat* was also the result of an *état de fait*, an ad hoc solution to the problem of poorly seated French power. It was only supposed to last seven years, until the situation stabilized, but instead it had been repeatedly extended until 1946. *L'Indigénat* was considered a “legal monstrosity” and was contested as much by the Algerians as by the French because it legalized discrimination by codifying punishments specific to Algerians leading to the notion that Algerians living in Algeria—a colony composed of three French *départements*—were French subjects not citizens. *L'Indigénat* and the dilution of the notion of citizenship and the rights that go along with it emerged out of a process called “derogation” initiated by the state of siege in Algeria. Sylvie Thénault, “1881-1918: l’“apogée” de l’Algérie française et les débuts de l’Algérie algérienne,” *Histoire de l’Algérie à la période coloniale*, ed. Sylvie Thénault, (Paris: Editions la Découverte, 2012), 161-163. See also, Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, *De l’Indigénat Anatomie d’un monstre juridique: le droit colonial en Algérie et dans l’Empire Français* (Paris: Editions Zones, 2010). Derogation temporarily releases the State from its obligation to laws and treaties, creating in the process what legal specialists call “a double-layered constitutional system” in which, say in the case of French Algeria, the French state can legally transgress its commitments to the notion of citizenry. In such a situation a same government may at once recognize the sanctity of the Declaration of the Rights of Man but suspend it in the name of creating the maneuvering space necessary to deal with an emergency. Tom Hickman, *Public Law after the Human Rights Act* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 335. Constant and permanent derogation however is costly to the body politic that governs extra-legally, because, over time, as Carl Schmitt, the philosopher and Nazi sympathizer, remarked, a liberal democracy cannot remain faithful to the laws it claims to uphold and protect while successfully confronting the emergency. The dual-layered system that permits the balance of a state of siege and the rule of law will fail because emergency laws permeate everything, muddying the threshold between the two systems. Carl Schmitt, *Dictatorship*, trans. Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014). Giorgio Agamben, another philosopher, specialist of democracies in times of emergencies, called this merging phenomenon, “the state of exception:” once “the extension of the military’s wartime powers [permeate] into the civil sphere,” and constituting texts, in the case of Morocco, the Treaty of Fez, are suspended, “in time the two models merge into a single juridical phenomenon that we call the state of exception.” Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 5. For a look at the intellectual origins of the state of siege in other South Asia under British rule, as well as its implementation, see Nasser Hussain, *The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

⁹¹ Max Radin, “Martial Law and the State of Siege,” *California Law Review* 30, no. 6 (1942).

beyond the reach of the French government.⁹² Lyautey had used martial law in the years before the Treaty of Fez when he pushed from Algeria into Morocco covertly to secure for his troops, first, the right to riposte when attacked which allowed him to make further inroads into Morocco, and second, through the use of military courts, the right to politically organize the territory on which his forces were encamped.⁹³ The goal of martial law was to make legal what was an illicit French push into Morocco while destabilizing the political balance between the Sultan, the Makhzen, and the tribes of the Atlas, and better prepare the French occupation of the Sheriffian Empire. The discrepancy in the 27 October 1919 diplomatic record between state of siege and martial law is not a simple mistake. The state of siege was generally meant to preserve an existing regime whether in the metropole or in the empire. Martial law in Morocco was used to preserve the political force that was transforming the existing regime. Lyautey intended to use the intelligence state to change the core of the Protectorate through the 27 October 1919 order.⁹⁴ After the 27 October 1919 order, no one inside the Residency General, not even the Resident General, spoke honestly of a Moroccan Protectorate. “Our legitimacy in this country is based on the doctrine of the Protectorate,” Lyautey wrote a year after the Hassani Crisis. “We proclaim it, the government proclaims it every chance it gets,” he continued, “but is it anything other than a lie?”⁹⁵ The transfer of civilian powers to military powers effectuated by the 27 October 1919 order subordinated civilian bureaucracies within the Residency General and the civilian institutions of the Protectorate to the imperatives of the military effort as organized by Lyautey and the *Services des Renseignements*. Unbeknownst to the Quai d’Orsay, however, martial law

⁹² CADN 1MA/20/112-119 Etat de Siège, Printed Draft #3, 2

⁹³ CADN 1MA/20/112-119, State of siege, Final draft #1, 1

⁹⁴ CADN 1MA/20/112-119, State of Siege, Final draft #1, 1; There is a constant concern with the appearance of legality. In part, the interest of French intelligence in the activities of foreign powers in Morocco, particularly the U.S. and the U.K., stems from needing to be prepared in case one of the signatories to the Treaty of Fez or a foreign person in Morocco challenged the notion that “martial law” was applicable in Morocco.

⁹⁵ CADN (2012) DI 68, Politique de Protectorat (known as Coup de barre memo), 18 November 1920, 3.

suspended Lyautey from sticking to the Treaty of Fez and the legal framework of the Protectorate. Lyautey was no longer a simple Resident General, according to the Residency General's legal counsel. He had "acquired for himself the powers of a dictator" and transformed Morocco into a "police state."⁹⁶

If the Protectorate was a lie, as Lyautey claimed, then what was being hidden from public view? Interwar documents reveal at times that various actors within the security services and among the Residency's legal counsel called the regime a "special regime," at others a "hybrid regime," and at others still, "an exceptional regime." The vague terminology reflected the confused legal situation that Lyautey provoked, though it was also code in official correspondence to remind interlocutors of the sensitive political and legal environment in which they operated. It was important to be reticent when employing "certain formalities (orders, decisions, or decrees) that might attract attention and blow a hole (*battre en brèche*) in [the] special regime. It [had] indeed rendered the greatest services and its legitimacy [had] never been contested."⁹⁷

Nevertheless, the question of how to define the Protectorate attracted significant attention after the Second World War when a general order had been issued to lift the state of siege in the empire and it had proved impossible in Morocco. An "exorbitant number of laws" written by military authorities to establish themselves as ultimate political authorities in Morocco, and underwritten by the 27 October 1919 order, would be rendered illegal if the state of siege was lifted, which in turn risked causing the collapse of all French authority in the Protectorate.⁹⁸ A

⁹⁶ CADN (2012) SGP 159, Note du Service des études législatives a/s de l'organisation du contentieux administratif du Maroc et des garanties qu'il présente pour la protection des droits des particuliers, 12 April 1938, 10.

⁹⁷ CADN IMA/20/112-119, SGP to Cabinet Militaire, A/S état de siège, 12 March 1941, 2.

⁹⁸ CADN IMA/100/120-124, Note a/s loi martiale/état de siège et ordre public au Maroc, undated, but likely around 18 September 1946 according to context of memos about this particular document, 1; see also CADN IMA/100/120-124, Maintien de l'ordre en état de siège, 5 May 1941, 1.

legal taskforce composed of jurists specialized in wartime law and imperial law from across the empire, including the Residency General's office of legal counsel, began poring over the Residency General's archives to untangle the legal situation in Morocco.

There were as many interpretations of what had been established by the 27 October 1919 order as there were parties with a stake in the matter. Yet, the final answer accepted by the French government to the question of what was created with the 27 October 1919 order was a report entitled "On the notion, the meaning, and practice of political control in a Protectorate." It had been commissioned by the Residency General's office of legal counsel four months before the independence of Morocco to summarize and re-analyze the French government's previous attempts at understanding the 27 October 1919 order. The authors of the study argued that the Treaty of Fez, as best as they could recreate Lyautey's intentions, had merely offered a moral framework for the Protectorate rather than a contract stipulating hard legal rights and obligations for the protector and the protected. The Protectorate was designed to be flexible because it had to reconcile contradictory forces: maintaining the sovereignty of the Sultan while upholding the imperium of France. The implicit premise of the protectorate was that this tension would iron itself out once French charges recognized the genius of French civilization and the rationality of French bureaucracy. For French administrators the troubles of empire were the result of an invisible minority that was capable of agitating the masses against the French. But what if there was more than a minority that refused French civilization? For successive French governments the idea that the Protectorate in Morocco had not only failed to civilize Moroccans, but that it was also a flawed legal instrument of empire, was impossible. Indeed, in the metropole, imperial doctrines had taken on an inflexibility at odds with a philosophy of administration that required a degree of adaptability to conditions on the ground. The persistence in public, even in the face of

failure, to cling to an immutable notion of the Protectorate, was as one British observer noted, “a form of conceit, which unfortunately makes the French their own worst enemies; it is not their fault. They have always been told—perhaps rightly so—that theirs is the only language, theirs is the only culture, theirs is the only Marshall Lyautey. And they believe it just as much as some of us believe that the world’s only tailors are to be found in Savile Row.”⁹⁹ While the French claimed that Lyautey belonged in the Pantheon of great French imperialists for his commitment to the Protectorate, Lyautey, while he was alive and in charge of the Protectorate, was a lot less concerned with the principles that undergirded the Protectorate than it might have appeared. Pragmatism was one of the fundamental principles of the Colonial War School.¹⁰⁰ The Protectorate as Lyautey portrayed it, based on indirect rule and the association of Moroccans and French, was a nice bit of propaganda, but as far as he was concerned, it was not producing satisfactory outcomes. It was therefore important to rethink the principles of governance which engendered the outcomes desired.

The most important asset Lyautey possessed was the intelligence state. He had reason to believe that it was still capable of performing as intended. The *Service des Renseignements* had amassed a significant cache of intelligence since 1907, contributed to colonial policy in Morocco, oversaw the entirety of colonial institutions, and in spite of the troubles of the French in Morocco, they remained the only true guarantor of Lyautey’s visions of empire. Intelligence officers and the French colonial army had even remained faithful to Lyautey through the Hassani Crisis. Accordingly, Lyautey sought a new method to maximize the leverage of intelligence officers on civil society and colonial administration in Morocco.

⁹⁹ British National Archives, hereafter BNA. BNA FO 371 49360, Despatch No. 12 Morocco—Political, H.M. Consul Casablanca to H.M. Consul Rabat, 21 February 1945, 3.

¹⁰⁰ CADN IMA/20/54-56, étude, 6-7.

Thanks to the emergency powers conferred by the 27 October 1919 order, Lyautey transformed the “regime of the Protectorate” into a “regime of control.”¹⁰¹ *Contrôle* was an “opportunistic practice [emphasis original],” exercised on “the political environment,” that provoked outcomes seemingly arrived at by Moroccans and the French without overt intervention.¹⁰² Lyautey informed the Quai d’Orsay of his plans in a memo known as the “coup de barre” memo which horrified the civil servants there; they classified the memo and filed it away for fear of repercussions from Parliament.¹⁰³ Lyautey argued that what “dominates and characterizes the conception [of the Protectorate] is the notion of *Contrôle*, as opposed to the notion of *Direct Administration* [emphasis original].”¹⁰⁴ The memo has usually been cited to illustrate Lyautey’s devotion to the ideal of a Protectorate based on indirect rule and association,¹⁰⁵ but to the authors of the study, having looked at the relevant archives, and with the benefit of hindsight, concluded that the word *Contrôle* had significantly more meaning than initially thought. While Lyautey explicitly defined *Contrôle* in opposition to direct administration, by not equating with indirect rule, or explaining its relation to indirect rule, he implicitly also defined *Contrôle* as different from indirect rule. *Contrôle* was, indeed, unique among the various forms of administration in the French Empire.¹⁰⁶

Contrôle, though Lyautey sought to differentiate it from direct rule, could in fact be an insidious form of it, “since, in fact, the totality of power, political initiative, was in the hands of

¹⁰¹ CADN 1MA/20/54-56, “Etude sur la notion, le contenu et les modalités du *Contrôle* politique dans un régime de protectorat,” 8 December 1955, 3.

¹⁰² CADN 1MA/20/54-56, “Etude sur la notion, le contenu et les modalités du *Contrôle* politique dans un régime de protectorat, 8 December 1955, 3.

¹⁰³ Georges Spillman, *Souvenirs d’un colonialiste* (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1968), 194.

¹⁰⁴ CADN (2012) DI 68, Politique de Protectorat (known as Coup de barre memo), 18 November 1920.

¹⁰⁵ The coup de barre memo is often referenced in French literature on Lyautey and the Protectorate. See for example, Roger Gruner, *Du Maroc traditionnel au Maroc moderne: le Contrôle civil au Maroc, 1912-1956* (Paris: Nouvelles éditions latines, 1984), 22 and Charles-André Julien, *Le Maroc face aux impérialismes*, 115.

¹⁰⁶ CADN 1MA/20/54-56, Etude sur la notion, le contenu et les modalités du *Contrôle* politique dans un régime de Protectorat, 8 December 1955, 15.

the French.”¹⁰⁷ *Contrôle* was an exercise in persuading Moroccans and French settlers to arrive at particular outcomes that contributed to a policy objective designed by intelligence officers without them sensing that they were being manipulated and without ever seeming to be practicing direct administration. *Contrôle* reconciled the discrepancies first, between the will of the French and the agency of Moroccans, and second, between the fact that colonialism was perpetual war and the fiction that Moroccans accepted French tutelage, by perpetuating the legal notion that the Sultan was the sovereign under tutelage of the Resident General, as per the Treaty of Fez, while offering cover to French intelligence officers who used the information acquired by the intelligence state to discreetly nudge Moroccans and European settlers, who believed they were exercising free will, into administering according to the will of the intelligence officer.¹⁰⁸

Intelligence work in Morocco up until the early 1920s had seldom involved establishing dossiers on individuals, with the exception of detailed files on French and Moroccan elites. The intelligence state’s ever-increasing repository of highly organized knowledge was unsuited for the type of regime that Lyautey sought to create. Much of the intelligence archived concerned understanding groupings of individuals, such as tribes. Acquiring the kind of information that allowed the intelligence officers to exercise the subtle coercion on individuals that *Contrôle* demanded was a painstaking task. Lyautey’s *Contrôle*, which resembles Foucault’s notion of *dressage*, required establishing even closer contact with the objects of *Contrôle* to achieve the kind of deep transformation that Lyautey envisioned.¹⁰⁹ Lyautey was, we will recall, obsessed

¹⁰⁷ CADN 1MA/20/54-56, Etude sur la notion, le contenu et les modalités du *Contrôle* politique dans un régime de Protectorat, 8 December 1955, 6.

¹⁰⁸ CADN (2012) DAI 443, Le *Contrôleur* Civil au Maroc, 6-8; see also Berque, “Entrée dans le Bureau Arabe,” *Nomades et Vagabonds*, ed. Jacques Berque et al., (Paris: Union Générale d’éditions, 1975), 114-117,

¹⁰⁹ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison*, Alan Sheridan trans., (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 136. “A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved... It is a question not of treating the body *en masse*, ‘wholesale...’ but of working it “retail,” individually; of exercising upon it a subtle coercion.”

with the possibilities associated with enabling French officers to make an impact on individual soldiers which in turn transformed France. *Contrôle* became not only the name of the regime of the Protectorate, but also the title of offices and people who effected *Contrôle*. They are known in the archives as the “authorities of *Contrôle*.”

One of the characteristics of the French Empire is that although colonial subjects seemed to be governed only fitfully, at tax time for example, French imperial territories were wholly covered by a smattering of intelligence services and indigenous forces allied to the French. In Morocco, the *Services des Renseignements* was only a small piece of a much larger intelligence network. It monopolizes histories of native policing in Morocco because its officers were the primary interface between French and Moroccans, and because they left an organized archive readily exploitable by scholars. Yet, Morocco’s intelligence state was composed of many more formal and informal intelligence and policing layers. The French navy in Morocco, for example, had a small intelligence cell set up to monitor waterways, as did the French air service, which monitored air traffic and security around airports. There was also a number of police services that operated in Morocco, including the *Sûreté Générale* which imported metropolitan police techniques and modern forensic machinery to do its job and actively participated in intelligence operations in Moroccan cities.¹¹⁰

By far, however, the most important intelligence presence in Morocco was the Moroccan *Deuxième Bureau*, the French army’s military intelligence branch in the Protectorate. The *Deuxième Bureau* operated within the Residency General’s military cabinet. It had access to central archives Paris and in Algiers, and interfaced with them through two separate offices, the

¹¹⁰ For a comprehensive examination of the *Sûreté Générale* in colonial settings see for example Patrice Morlat, *La repression coloniale Vietnam 1908-1940* (Paris: Editions l’Harmattan, 1990), 52. The *Sûreté*’s techniques according to Morlat were a modern impulse in an otherwise backwards part of the French Empire.

Intelligence Liaison Office (OLR) and the Central Intelligence Bureau (BCR). On the ground, the Moroccan *Deuxième Bureau* selected and trained an intelligence officer per operational military unit. These officers reported directly to the general commanders of military territories in Morocco.

The *Deuxième Bureau*'s biggest contribution to the regime of *Contrôle*, besides an boost in the intelligence state's manpower, was its counterintelligence capabilities, suited precisely for the type of investigative work that uncovered weaknesses and points of leverage in the lives of people and in exploitable in a regime of *Contrôle*. These operations were directed specifically from an office called Section M/*Section de Contrôle* which centralized reports from far-flung military outposts on the Moroccan frontier, police in the cities, and whatever made its way upstream from the offices previously mentioned.¹¹¹

Section M/*Contrôle* was a back-office outfit set up to operate outside of normal hierarchy to avoid delays in the transmission of information.¹¹² It organized its activities along two lines. First, it examined the everyday problems the Residency and the military encountered in Morocco. It managed the submission of tribes to the French army, diplomatic relations between warring tribes, it kept an eye on the movement of tribes that crossed from the French zone to the Spanish one for pastures and trade, it exchanged political intelligence with other offices, kept tabs on the activities of Moroccan notables abroad, and tracked financial and commercial activities in Morocco.¹¹³

Once Section M/*Contrôle* acquired the intelligence it needed, the authorities of *Contrôle*, hatched a plan to execute the policies of *Contrôle*. Ideally, the authorities of *Contrôle* found a

¹¹¹ Service Historique de la Défense, hereafter SHD. SHD 3H 466, Cover sheet to folder.

¹¹² SHD 3H 434, Réorganisation du 2e Bureau, Undated but written at the end of 1926 or beginning of 1927 considering mention of Rif War and impending reorganization of military, 1.

¹¹³ SHD 7NN 2806, 5^e bureau Note pour la Section de Centralisation des Renseignements.

way that did not directly involve them. There were many methods of establishing plausible deniability, among them, the use of criminals that posed as security. Indeed, Moroccan security mafias supplemented French intelligence and police officers in Morocco.¹¹⁴ The French intelligence state was particularly capable of coopting the more violent elements of Moroccan society to the imperial project. Casablanca's *veilleurs de nuit*, or night watchers, were a notorious example of how the French allied with traditional Moroccan authorities and criminal elements to effect *Contrôle*. Although Casablanca's inhabitants were "relatively safe from break-ins, they were the victims of the theft of chickens and small objects" at night. To keep them safe, the Pasha of Casablanca, a political position dependent on the recommendation of the *Services des Renseignements*, organized the *veilleurs de nuit* to make rounds and watch over the city at night.¹¹⁵ The *veilleurs* were not paid through municipal taxes, but businesses subscribed to their services.¹¹⁶ To safeguard against the theft of chickens and small objects four hundred *veilleurs*, twelve supervisors, three sector commanders, and fifty cavalrymen were hired.¹¹⁷ The Chief of Police of the city "[couldn't] help but smile" at the outsized force. The budgetary requirements for the *veilleurs* and at the subscription rates for their services were out of all proportion with the services offered: "there's no way the business owners of Casablanca are paying these prices," noted a French police official, incredulous at the prices they were allowed the charge by the

¹¹⁴ For a look at the use of security mafias in corrupt authoritarian states see Jean-Pierre Filiu, *From Deep State to Islamic State: The Arab Counter-Revolution and its Jihadi Legacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015) 115-135.

¹¹⁵ CADN (2012) DACH 76bis, Colonel Huot, when communicating with the Ministry of Defense uses different stationary and a modified title compared to communications internal to the Residency General, where he is only Director of the *Affaires Indigènes*, see for example 7NN 2165 (Moscow Files) #1350 D.R. 3/c "Peut-être s'agit-il de GORDON CANNING?"

¹¹⁶ AN-Ma 1504, #3712 Commissaire Central de Casablanca to Secrétaire Général du Protectorat, On the organization of the *veilleurs de nuit*. 12 February 1917.

¹¹⁷ AN-Ma 1504, #2192 Chef du Service de la Police Générale à Monsieur le Secrétaire Général du Protectorat, 29 January 1917, 2.

Services des Renseignements.¹¹⁸ Businesses paid in full every month. The risk was presumably that not only would chickens be stolen, but that knee caps would be broken, too. At the end of every month, at night, the supervisors “presented themselves to the business owners to be paid an amount convened between them. No receipt is given.”¹¹⁹ Only the night watchers were allowed to patrol Casablanca’s streets at night. French police officers were expressly forbidden from scheduling activities past sunset.¹²⁰ While French intelligence officers looked away from the illegal activities of night watchers, the night watchers fed information to the intelligence state, made valuable by the fact that the information they provided from within Moroccan society was inaccessible to French spies, and when enemies of the intelligence state needed to be either made afraid or roughed up a bit, the night watchers acted when no one was allowed to watch, providing cover and deniability to French authorities.

Emergency powers also gave the authorities of *Contrôle* another more expedient manner of effecting *Contrôle*. As we have seen, the indirect control of individuals required new systems of administration capable at once of elaborating policy, gauging its effectiveness, correcting for previously unknown variables, and then manipulating the political environment to arrive at the right outcome. All of this could be done through Morocco’s judicial systems.¹²¹ Martial law made each intelligence officer or civilian appointed to the authorities of *Contrôle* a *Commissaire du Gouvernement*. They acquired the powers of supreme local judicial authority.¹²² Per the

¹¹⁸ AN-Ma 1504, #2192 Chef du Service de la Police Générale à Monsieur le Secrétaire Général du Protectorat, 29 January 1917, 2.

¹¹⁹ AN-Ma 1504, Extrait du rapport sur la patrouille indigène à Casablanca, undated but context places report in 1917, 2.

¹²⁰ AN-Ma 1504, Le Chef des Services de Police Générale à Monsieur le Secrétaire Général du Protectorat, 13 February 1917, 2-3.

¹²¹ CADN IMA/20/54-56, *Etude*, 3.

¹²² CADN (2012) SGP 159, Le Contôleur Civil Chef du Territoire de Port-Lyautey à Monsieur le Conseiller du Gouvernement Chérifien à Rabat, Compétence respective des juridictions françaises et chérifiennes 7 Septembre 1938, 1.

Treaty of Fez, France was mandated to safeguard the authority of the Sultan as the most supreme judge in Morocco and refrain from in-depth reforms of the Moroccan judicial system that deprived Moroccans of access to Berber and Muslim courts, save for those that weeded out corruption and incompetence.¹²³ To accommodate the plurality of European communities living in Morocco, a sophisticated and original legal system was also designed. Yet, with the 27 October 1919 order, Morocco's judicial system was effectively flattened to enable the authorities of *Contrôle* to give to their policies the appearance of being sanctioned by the judiciary, in effect politicizing the justice system.

Control of the judicial systems under the watchful eyes of "authorities of *Contrôle*" could be exercised through one of four ways: first, by approving sentences, second, by nullifying them, third, by suspending them, or fourth by substituting the rulings of a judge with their own. For the sake of maintaining the appearance of indirect rule and the independence of the judicial system, however, intelligence officers made use only of their power of approbation. According to a manual for use by French field intelligence officers, exercising *Contrôle* of the judicial system through approbation could be as crude as building a military structure in front of the house of the local judge's house, or sitting next to the *caïd* while he discharged his duties, or remaining silently seated in the audience until the judge pronounced the right verdict.¹²⁴

The effectiveness of *Contrôle* on the judicial system in Morocco is difficult to discern since legal archives are unavailable. What can be gauged, however, is the amount of pressure *Contrôle* placed on the legal system thanks to the multiplicity of complaints of French prosecutors in Morocco. Among the most common complaints was the request for information

¹²³ AN-Ma F215, "L'Oeuvre administratif du Protectorat," 4; CADN (2012) DAI 443, Le *Contrôleur Civil*, 6.

¹²⁴ CADN (2012) DAI 443, Le *Contrôleur Civil au Maroc*, 6-8; see also Berque, *Entrée dans le Bureau Arabe*, 114-117, in *Nomades et Vagabonds*.

from courts. Against the wishes from the *Procureur General* for Rabat, Lyautey issued an ordonnance requesting that all court cases, and especially those involving Moroccans, be communicated to authorities of *Contrôle* before being brought to local judicial officials. It was inconceivable, Lyautey argued, that “the authorities of *Contrôle* responsible for order and public peace not be in a position to be informed of all court activity.”¹²⁵ The ordonnance imposed a significant strain on carrying out justice, as cases were delayed until the authorities of *Contrôle* had a chance to sort through cases and then decide how judges should rule.¹²⁶

The Residency General’s legal counsel and the framers of the judicial apparatus were never very comfortable with the oversight exercised by the authorities of *Contrôle*.¹²⁷ They balked, for example, at the paternalism of the authorities of *Contrôle* who felt the need “to watch over the every move” (*tout surveiller*) of magistrates.¹²⁸ A 23 August 1920 letter from the *Procureur General* to the Resident General noted “serious objections” to ordering all correspondence between military authorities (gendarmerie) and police normally destined in the first instance to the courts, to be rerouted first to authorities of *Contrôle*.¹²⁹ Not only did this create an even longer delay between bringing charges against a suspect and bringing the suspect to trial—“I could mention how this is contrary to the principles of a speedy trial,” the *Procureur* wrote—but “I could also mention how the rule is contrary to article 298 of the 20 May 1903 decree, applicable in France as well as in Morocco, that details the process through which *procès-verbaux* are supposed to reach Judicial Authorities,” he continued, “but these arguments

¹²⁵ CADN (2012) SGP 159, #714 DR2, Lyautey to Monsieur le Chef d’Escadron, Commandant la Force Publique, Objet : Action de la Gendarmerie pour la contestation des délits, 1.

¹²⁶ CADN (2012) SGP 159 A/S de l’utilisation du Personnel de Police pour la distribution des avertissements judiciaires et administratifs, 1 February 1923, 2.

¹²⁷ Stéphane Berge, *La justice française au Maroc, organisation et pratiques judiciaires*, (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1917), 98.

¹²⁸ Berge, *La justice française au Maroc*, 98-99.

¹²⁹ CADN SGP 159 #4974 Cour d’Appel de Rabat, Procureur General, à Monsieur le Délégué de la Résidence, 1.

are secondary to the following one which is the principle that should inform our discussion.... The judicial branch in Morocco, as it is elsewhere, is independent of the administration... It takes neither orders, nor instructions, from anyone.”¹³⁰ Indeed, a later instruction took care to remind the “authorities of *Contrôle*,” that though they were in a special regime, their cover depended on them seeming to be mindful of the separation of powers between the branches of government of the Protectorate by ensuring that magistrates also received the paperwork police produced when dealing with offenders.¹³¹

Dismantling *Contrôle*

Contrôle was an unwieldy regime. It required subtlety and finesse, but instead, Morocco was ever more volatile and consumed increasing amounts of intelligence resources. Insiders in the Protectorate and at the Quai d’Orsay were concerned about the aggressive policies of the “authorities of *Contrôle*,” though they were happy to tolerate them so long as they were capable of keeping insurgents away from large urban centers and French economic interests.

The Rif War (1925-1927) was perfect opportunity to shake up leadership in the Protectorate. Recall that Lyautey had always been a choice forced on the metropolitan government in the first months of the Protectorate, and that he was disliked both within political and military circles in Paris. At the Quai d’Orsay and at the Place Beauvau (Ministry of the Interior), officials prepared to turn the Rif War into the perfect crisis that would make Lyautey’s ousting palatable to publics at home and abroad, and more importantly, to his officer corps. The French government and metropolitan military establishment intended to break the authorities of *Contrôle* in the Rif and

¹³⁰ CADN (2012) SGP 159 #4974 Cour d’Appel de Rabat, Procureur General, à Monsieur le Délégué de la Résidence, 2.

¹³¹ CADN (2012) SGP 159 Le Directeur des Affaires Civiles à MM les Commissaires Divisionnaires et Commissaires de Police, 12 April 1921.

reestablish metropolitan primacy over the political direction of the Protectorate. In exchange for reinforcements and war materiel, to save the lives of the officers who trusted him, Lyautey had to accept that he would be dismissed.¹³²

The Rif War began in 1920 in the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco when Spanish generals attempted to pacify the interior of their Protectorate but succeeded instead in uniting Berber tribes against them. In 1925, the Rif War was still a war between the Spanish and Berber tribes. Inevitably, the war would have spilled into the French Protectorate. Yet, *Contrôle* precipitated it. Indeed, in 1924, French intelligence officers hastily built a string of outposts north of the Ouerghla River in territory unclaimed by either the Rif or the French. Both sides knew, however, that the Ouerghla valley was one of the only parts of Morocco not affected by an ongoing drought. The Rif Republic depended on grain supplied from the Rif to feed Rif warriors as well as their families. On 12 April 1925, Rif forces overran the string of outposts that threatened grain supplies, and in the following weeks, they wiped out nearly twenty percent of the French forces stationed south of the Ouerghla valley.¹³³

Officially, the string of outposts in the Ouerghla valley was meant to protect the Fez-Meknes line, the main axis of communications with Algeria. The city of Taza, east of Fez, was the last safe major military base before Algeria. Unofficially, Taza was the eastern most crucial point of an operation to blow up very large confederations of tribes North of the Fez-Meknes line: the Riffain confederation, the Djebala bloc, and the Berber bloc in Taza.¹³⁴

¹³² This agreement was never explicit, but always implied in discussions between Painlevé and Lyautey. On this see Rivet, *Lyautey*, 3:298. On the inevitability of Lyautey's departure see Rivet, *Lyautey*, 3:296-302.

¹³³ Martin Thomas, *The French Empire between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics, and Society* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 212.

¹³⁴ 3H 107, "Les opérations de 1925-1926 au Maroc," Conférence par le Lieutenant-Colonel Legendre de l'Etat-Major de l'Armée, 16 January 1927, 7.



Figure 2: SHD 3H 107, Map #1, Situation on 20 December 1924. Black line with blue accents represents Spanish front. Black line with green accent represents French front and influence in Rif territory. Red lines represent principle roads. Red dots close to black line are recorded military outposts. Black dotted line is political border defined in the Treaty of Fez between French and Spanish Protectorates.

French intelligence officers therefore attempted to provoke a political outcome by applying pressure on a weak spot. Taking control over the wheat fields of the Ouerghla valley put the food and economic safety of all three confederations at the mercy of the French military. The strategy was a successful operation, as we will see in the next chapter.

Although Contrôle has successfully inserted themselves into the politics of food provision, observers in Paris thought that Lyautey and his intelligence officers had either grossly misread the situation or purposefully dragged the government into an embarrassing situation in which it would have to choose to either accept the creation of a self-governed Rif Republic thereby weakening any French claims to having a civilizing mandate on its empire, or give in to the militarists running the empire and commit to large scale operations and face a political

onslaught from the vocal anti-imperialist communist backbenchers and the pacifist socialists in the parliament, some of whom doubled as writers for popular dailies.¹³⁵

Quickly, the situation in the Rif deteriorated. The government blamed Lyautey for a flawed strategy. Lyautey blamed the government for not giving him the tools he needed. In the first stages of the war, before reinforcements from France arrived, the French government in the metropole starved the colonial army. Resupply was exceedingly slow. There was, for example, only one tent and one canteen for every three officers in the field; the situation was probably worse for French soldiers and terrible for colonial troops.¹³⁶ The metropole also prevented shipments of mortar shells which almost guaranteed that the French and Moroccan troops in the Rif would have to engage in close combat; the supply of shells was a “humanitarian necessity” (*une question d’humanité*) to avoid the prolonged bloodbath of close quarters, hand to hand combat, Lyautey entreated.¹³⁷ Casualty rates among French forces were so high that North African battalions could barely field a quarter of their normal numbers. Intelligence officers frequently reported of units incapacitating their commanding officers and delivering them to the Rif army.¹³⁸ In July 1925, the Rif armies were only a few kilometers from the rail line at Taza and threatened any possibility of resupply from Algeria; they had established lines in the Sebou valley a few kilometers north of Fez. At the western most part of the Rif front, war parties threatened the Ouezzane plains and the main roads leading to Tangier. It is against this backdrop that Lyautey was ousted and replaced by Maréchal Phillipe Pétain and Théodore Steeg and that troops and materiel flowed into Morocco.

¹³⁵ In fact, the Quai d’Orsay knew that there was a strong possibility of food shortages in the Rif and had assented to intelligence operations to take advantage of the possibilities offered by weaponizing hunger, SHD 3H 100, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à Résident Général, Affaires du Rif, 16 December 1924.

¹³⁶ SHD 3H 118, Ministre de la Guerre to Pétain, A/S Utilisation des effectifs 3, 18 October 1926.

¹³⁷ SHD 3H 100, Situation à la date du 6 Juin 1925, 7.

¹³⁸ SHD 3H 100, Ministre de la Guerre to Pétain, A/S Utilisation des effectifs 3, 18 October 1926.

What is important here is not how the Rif insurgents were defeated, but who defeated them. Once the metropole accelerated resupply, the war was wrapped up in less than six months.¹³⁹ In fact, there was so little to say about the war, that the depositions Pétain and Steeg left for the record of their actions contain respectively only eight and eleven pages. Many of these pages are about how they were thwarted in their plans not by the Rif, but by the authorities of *Contrôle*.¹⁴⁰

Maréchal Pétain's final report on the Rif War is the most telling example. His official *postmortem* of operations in Morocco is entitled "Maréchal Pétain's Role 15 July 1925-May 1926 or how the surrender of Abd el Krim was obtained in spite of the Fez Clan and M. Steeg who had adopted their point of view."¹⁴¹ Pétain was convinced that the war could only be decisively won if a combined French and Spanish offensive took out the political center of the Rif Republic deep in the Rif Mountains, in Beni Ouarighel territory. According to Pétain, however, the authorities of *Contrôle* were interested in scoring local victories that allowed for tensions to simmer down without completely dissipating so that they could perpetuate the low-intensity wars that had plagued the Protectorate.¹⁴² Indeed, the strategy of the authorities of the *Contrôle* was a continuation of the one that had led to the Rif War. It aimed to provoke political opportunities, but "constituted by no means a direct menace on Abd El Krim's power."¹⁴³ Much of Pétain's deposition is spent detailing the methods by which he attempts to "convince," "break through," and "circumvent," "the quiet opposition of the Fez Clan," that was eager to "expose

¹³⁹ A little over a year if we include the winter lull in hostilities.

¹⁴⁰ SHD 3H 100, Rôle du Maréchal Pétain 15 Juillet 1925- May 1926, "Comment la reddition d'Abd El Krim a pu être obtenue, malgré le clan de Fès et M. Steeg qui avait adopté la même manière de voir." Pétain alternates names for the authorities of *Contrôle* between "Fez Group," "Fez Clan," and "Fez Cartel."

¹⁴¹ SHD 3H 100, Rôle du Maréchal Pétain 15 Juillet 1925- May 1926, "Comment la reddition d'Abd El Krim a pu être obtenue, malgré le clan de Fès et M. Steeg qui avait adopté la même manière de voir."

¹⁴² SHD 3H 100, Rôle du Maréchal Pétain, 2.

¹⁴³ SHD 3H 100, Pétain, Rapport de fin de mission, 20 Octobre 1925, 4.

[France] to years of war” in the Rif.¹⁴⁴ That the Rif War ended at all is most miraculous according to his deposition.

The Rif War revealed that the authorities of *Contrôle* had acquired interests of its own and that it was ready to protect them against any interference by the metropole. There is no detailed explanation of what Pétain meant by the Fez Clan in his report and he never provides the names of the people he accuses of conspiring against him. But Pétain was not paranoid. The collaborators he brought in expressly from high-command in Paris to aid him in prosecuting the war had also noticed. For one, the officers in Pétain’s entourage were appalled by the vocabulary of frontline officers who spoke of native policy, politics, and administration, but had little time for unit organization and tactics. For another, most of the officers interested in native policy were, in the opinion of their observers, very nearly mutinous; in fact, the entire colonial army in Morocco required a vigorous shakeup and new leaders.¹⁴⁵

Contrôle and the independence of intelligence officers that went along with it did not mesh well with French ideas of territorial organization and administrative hierarchy. Ultimately, as the *étude* on the notion of *Contrôle* indicated, the successful application of *Contrôle* required a charismatic Resident General with an above average capacity to combine strategic and tactical thinking. For the average administrator or officer, there was far too much left up to chance and talent. Administrative systems were bureaucratic safeguards against systemic failures. For outsiders, *Contrôle* was bureaucratic chaos. Only Lyautey could make sense of the system he set up in Morocco. Controlling the Protectorate had disassembled the basic unit formation important to French command. *Contrôle* was about as anarchic to metropolitan general staff as the Morocco the French had come to set on the path of civilization. General inspections of the troops

¹⁴⁴ SHD 3H 100, Pétain, Rapport de fin de mission, 20 Octobre 1925, 6.

¹⁴⁵ Rivet, *Lyautey*, 3:301. See specifically passage on *capitaine* Mast.

after Lyautey always underscored the fact that there were more officers, scouts, sappers, and communications officers performing intelligence duties detached from their units than there were who still remained detailed to their units for the tasks they were trained.¹⁴⁶ In another report, Maréchal Franchet d'Espérey, the inspector-general of French North African troops, gave credit to Lyautey for being a great artist who had created a remarkably adaptable form of command, but argued that his system was successful only so long as he remained in control of the Protectorate. Without him, it invited chaos: "it is complicated, it seems arbitrary, and does not lend itself well to the centralized communication methods that should exist between subdivisions and their general commander."¹⁴⁷

With Lyautey out and his officers decimated, Parisian officials were ready to remold the Protectorate's administration. The plan was to concentrate political and administrative power within the hands of the Resident General, and therefore the Minister of Foreign Affairs, while cantoning the military to supporting the Resident General's political resolutions through military action as needed. Pétain was given two missions: to defeat Abd el Krim el Khattabi and to create a stable military organization.

Once the Rif rebellion was destroyed, Pétain employed himself to rebuilding command of the French army in Morocco along legible lines for the metropole. First, Pétain appointed General Boichut as commander general in Morocco, who by all accounts, was an able officer but hardly a charismatic one, which benefitted the Quai d'Orsay's plans to strengthen civilian leadership in Morocco by appointing a civilian administrator.¹⁴⁸ Second, he proposed to place

¹⁴⁶ SHD 3H 118, Extraits du Rapport du Maréchal Franchet d'Espérey sur son inspection des troupes du Maroc (février-mars 1926), 2.

¹⁴⁷ SHD 3H 118, Extraits du Rapport du Maréchal Franchet d'Espérey sur son inspection des troupes du Maroc (février-mars 1926), 2.

¹⁴⁸ BNA FO 371 11917, 5923 (Morocco) British Embassy (Paris) to War Office, 19 March 1926, 11.

generals, colonels, captains, lieutenants in appropriately formed divisions, regiments, battalions, and squadrons. With this organization in place, the French government ordered Pétain to consolidate his gains between the pacified Morocco and the tribes that had plagued Moroccan security.¹⁴⁹

Meanwhile, Steeg's proposed reforms to Quai d'Orsay and the Hôtel de Brienne (Ministry of War) built on Pétain's reorganization of the army and consolidation of a northern barrier. The first blow he struck against Lyautey's system removed the authority of the military from the intelligence apparatus of the Protectorate. He placed the Residency's intelligence services under civilian command and appointed an inspector general of intelligence to consolidate his power over them.¹⁵⁰ He then culled the intelligence budget (which depended on the Protectorate's budget, not the Defense ministry's), and insisted on a regular rotation of general command staff, which was to begin with the replacement of General Boichut by General Vidalon, another affable commander whom Steeg could trust.¹⁵¹ To ensure liaisons between the Residency General and the army, Steeg appointed General Mougin, though it was doubtful according to a British military attaché "whether [Mougin] possesse[d] either the ability or tact to deal with large problems."¹⁵² Armed, at any rate, with the political backing of the Quai d'Orsay and the tacit assent of the Hôtel de Brienne which had distanced itself from Lyautey, Steeg wanted Morocco to orbit closer to metropolitan decision-makers by preventing an entrenched and activist military leadership from regaining power, by replacing the terminals of intelligence

¹⁴⁹ SHD 3H 100, 56/PC, Maréchal de France, Vice-Président du Conseil Supérieur de Guerre à Monsieur le Président du Conseil Ministre de la Guerre, Rapport de fin de mission, 28 Octobre 1925, 1-3.

¹⁵⁰ BNA FO 371 11917, Despatch No. 32., British Consul Rabat to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 2 March 1926, 1.

¹⁵¹ SHD 3H 118, Réorganisation du Maroc, 16 July 1926.

¹⁵² BNA FO 371 11917, Despatch No. 20., British Vice Consulate (Fez) to Consul General Rabat, 5 February 1926, 2.

networks with civilians, and by ensuring that intelligence officers reported either to him or to officers he could trust.¹⁵³

Contrôle-Prime

Although Steeg and Pétain had swapped out senior commanding officers with docile metropolitan ones and seemed to have significantly curbed the capacities of the intelligence state, the French government's attempt to destroy *Contrôle* and return the Protectorate to its previous legal and internationally recognized regime was unsuccessful. Lyautey had introduced a failsafe into the system. On 10 December 1921, Lyautey nominated Urbain Blanc, a former official of the Tunisian Protectorate, to the position of delegate to the Resident General.¹⁵⁴ In the absence of the Resident General, the delegate became a minister of France with plenipotentiary powers and effectively ran the Residency General until the return of the Resident General. Blanc was chosen for his expertise in native and Muslim policies in Tunisia and because of his ability to “cover the entire surface of Morocco with his antennae at the end of which are the Agents of Contrôle [emphasis original].”¹⁵⁵ Urbain Blanc had neither the charisma nor the genius of Lyautey, and in fact, it is possibly because he blended so well into the background of the Protectorate that Lyautey might have chosen him, but Blanc, as we will see at the end of chapters 2 and 5, appeared precisely when he was needed to provoke a significant shift in the politics of the Protectorate against the wishes of the French government and in favor of the “authorities of *Contrôle*.”

¹⁵³ CADN (2012) CDRG 32, Untitled draft memo on reducing expenses, 2.

¹⁵⁴ LoN P153, 471 GL, nomination of Urbain Blanc to position of delegate to the Resident General, 10 December 1921.

¹⁵⁵ LoN P153, 471 GL, nomination of Urbain Blanc to position of delegate to the Resident General, 10 December 1921, 2.

Chapter 2: The Young Lieutenants and the Death Worlds of Empire, 1925-1930

On the morning of 27 April 1926, before the sun rose, three intelligence officers, Commander Martin, the senior officer, and his two subordinates Captain Ribaut, the political officer, and Captain Evrard, the topographer, met with their Moroccan guides, Sidi Maha Ahansalu, caïd of the Ait Hakem, and Si Mohamed Ouchettou of the Entifa tribe, caïd of the Ait Bou Guemmez and the Ait Abbes, and an escort of forty Moroccan irregulars. Their mission was to rekindle diplomatic ties with tribes on the other side of the Atlas Mountains in Oued Lakhdar and Oued Tessaout. These tribes had professed their loyalty to the Makhzen in 1923, but with the Rif War (1925-1926/27), diplomatic ties had ceased. Martin, flanked on both sides by caïds representative of the Makzen, hoped to remind these tribes of their prior commitments to the Makhzen.¹⁵⁶

The report that Martin wrote upon his return a month after his departure is a beautifully written political document that focuses as much on terrain as it does on people. It alternates between detailed observations of the marvels of his journey and the difficulties of riding through mountainous landscapes, between the beauty of the people he encounters and the certainty that death stalked them. Martin and the other riders feast on trout with rainbow-colored flesh which swim through clear water rivers. They are chilled when their escorts point to the bodies of two tribesmen from the Ait Bou Guemmez, murdered and dispossessed of anything of value by a *djich*, bandits, from the Ait Isha. Who was a bandit and who was not was often a question of politics as Martin discovered when he was introduced to the three sons of a marabout loyal to the Makhzen. They had legendary reputations in the region for their *coups de main*, heists, which

¹⁵⁶ SHD 3H 126, Rapport de reconnaissance effectuée du 3 au 9 Mai 1927, par le Chef de Bataillon Martin, Commandant le Cercle d'Aslilal, en pays Ait Abbes et Ait Bou Guemmez et au Tizi N'Ait Ini.

supported even their extended families. The *coup de main* involved equal parts cunning, agility, audacity, and cruelty since those who did not die defending their livestock and grain died or likely suffered hardship and poverty, though there were ways of seeking some succor by petitioning tribal elders.¹⁵⁷ Martin indulged in the “you-yous” of the friendly, unveiled women who spoke freely with him—each time a surprise—and who greeted the riders when they arrived at their rest stops in allied tribes. There was sadness, too, on days when it snowed and the paths were impracticable, and though surrounded by forty-four other people, Martin was lonely. But his mood always improved when he shared with the “Lords of the Mountains,” as he called them, “a special, and warm hospitality reserved only for the few who serve in arms and lead in battle.” Really, though, there was only one sour note for Martin: the realization that what he had witnessed “would come to an end, fatally, inevitably, because progress [was] too formidable a force to be resisted.”¹⁵⁸

Martin’s mission was one of many in 1926 to push the boundaries of the Protectorate into the mountains of the Atlas and to bring the Berbers that inhabited them to recognize the legitimacy of the Protectorate and the Sultan. It was spurred on by the aggressive contacts their lieutenants were making with local populations. Tribal policy had always been the job of the twenty-something year old lieutenants who manned frontier outposts. Their orders in 1926 were to hold and secure their positions on the Fez-Meknes line. French authorities in Paris and in Rabat, weary of the French war effort in the Rif (1925-1927), feared the conflict spilling into the Atlas. But as the Young Lieutenants interpreted their orders, they realized that security could

¹⁵⁷ Rahma Bouria, “Vol, pillage et banditisme dans le Maroc du XIXe siècle,” *Héspéris-Tamuda* 29, 2(1991), 191-228, 198.

¹⁵⁸ SHD 3H 126, Rapport de reconnaissance effectuée du 3 au 9 Mai 1927, par le Chef de Bataillon Martin, Commandant le Cercle d’Aslilal, en pays Ait Abbes et Ait Bou Guemmez et au Tizi N’Ait Ini.

only be achieved by expanding on the successes of their colleagues' work in the Rif.¹⁵⁹ It was a widely shared position among senior officers, though most of them begrudgingly obeyed orders from Rabat. Intelligence from Martin and others, collected during diplomatic missions in the waning days of the Rif War, revealed unique opportunities to durably seat French power—the power of the Young Lieutenants of what come to be known as the Fez Cartel—in Morocco.

Young Moroccan warlords were particularly amenable to the message of protection the Young Lieutenants carried with them and saw the opportunity to flout oppressive bloodlines and strike out on their own. The demonstration of force the French put on in the Rif made many young men in the Atlas question the order of things. Martin's reports, like the hundreds of other reports from intelligence officers across the Sherrifian empire contained notes to the effect of "the young Si Ali Mezguiti who recently married the daughter of the Si Hammou chief wants our authorization to declare his independence from him. I explained that we would sort this out once we created an outpost for the region. Some, more dignified, like the Sheikh el Arabi, say nothing, but they also seek to strike out on their own with our blessing."¹⁶⁰ Absent strong traditional leadership, the Young Lieutenants became the *de facto* arbiters of feuds between tribes that seemingly dated from time immemorial and nascent political intrigues that accompanied the turbulent nature of politics in the Protectorate after the war. Although the caïds that accompanied Martin were the representatives of the Makhzen, it was with Martin that Moroccan chiefs parlayed.

There was an awareness amongst politicians in Paris that authority in Morocco had slipped away from them. They blamed the Rif War on the French military and particularly the

¹⁵⁹ CADN (2012) Meknès 188, Le chef de Bataillon Tarrit à Monsieur le Commandant du Territoire Tadla Zaïan, 14 February 1922, 1.

¹⁶⁰ SHD 3H 126, Rapport de reconnaissance effectuée du 3 au 9 Mai 1927, par le Chef de Bataillon Martin, Commandant le Cercle d'Aslilal, en pays Ait Abbes et Ait Bou Guemmez et au Tizi N'Ait Ini, 6.

sanguine attitude of the Fez Cartel (chapter 1). In 1925, in the middle of the Rif War, they ousted the officers' revered leader, the first Resident General, *Maréchal* Lyautey. Officials in Paris and Rabat no longer tolerated the political adventurism of intelligence officers and the silent approval of their commanding officers. As we read in the previous chapter, to ensure Morocco remained firmly within control of the French government after the Rif War, civilian officials purged the commanding ranks of *la Coloniale* in Morocco, reorganized military intelligence, reduced the scope of its responsibilities, and ordered the pullback of the intelligence officers from the mountains. The military outposts that had for more than a decade been the only French presence in the Rif and the Atlas were to remain unoccupied. To compensate for the military drawdown, Parisian officials strengthened the administrative framework of the Protectorate to bring it in line with imperial techniques of administration practiced in Algeria and Tunisia and opened the way to allow more settlers in Morocco. In short, they signaled the end of major military operations and made clear that they did not want to aggressively encroach on the territory of the Berber tribes of the Rif and Atlas.

The differences between officials in Rabat and frontline officers were not mere tactical disagreements, but fundamental divergences on empire-building and the viability of the imperial project in the interwar period.

Lyautey's legacy boiled down to two principles for the Young Lieutenants. First, since initiative in politics, of all the virtues, was his favorite, protecting the empire meant seeking opportunities for expansion.¹⁶¹ In colonial politics as in colonial war, perpetual movement was key to perennial empire. Political stasis was regressive, imperiling the existence of the Protectorate. Second, though Lyautey encouraged aggressive political maneuvering, he also

¹⁶¹ Robin Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule: French Administration of Tribal Areas, 1912-1956* (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1973), 20.

entreated his officers to be mindful of their charges' customs and traditions. The Protectorate was a space of conservation, and this was especially true for the Atlas. The Young Lieutenants were the guardians of a Berber way of life. Reconciling both imperatives, however, proved impossible. The very presence of French officers who continued to linger near the Atlas, though they had been ordered to pull back, was enough to unbalance the political order of the entire mountain chain.

Beginning in 1926, Lyautey's words were used to better subvert his original intentions. Initiative became disobedience, and protecting the space of the Lords of the mountains meant setting the mountain ablaze to maintain a backward conception of life there. Perhaps the worst perversion of Lyautey's vision of empire was the belief that only intelligence officers could fulfill it. To protect their turf, the Young Lieutenants of the Fez Cartel terrorized the Protectorate and blew a hole right through the *modus vivendi* that characterized life in the great mountain chains. They willingly exposed to death not only Moroccans but Europeans, including the family of the Resident General, to preserve their hold on power and expand the Protectorate. Their motto was to "work the territory beyond the front line politically, know the clans, exploit dissensions, stoke them without ever committing yourself, pour oil on all the fires, divide to conquer... and remain hidden."¹⁶² Fatally, indeed, what Commander Martin called progress came to the Atlas in the form of a warm gun.

Berberistan

Jacques Berque possessed a unique way of turning his shrewd observations into critiques of colonial power in just a few words. One of his most devastating was encapsulated in the term

¹⁶² SHD 3H 1620, Note sur la recherche et la diffusion des renseignements, 28 October 1926, 4.

Berberistan. Berberistan referred to the space encompassing the *bled siba*, the land of dissidence, roughly corresponding to the Atlas Mountains, from the valleys below them to the *maquis* of the Middle Atlas, and the deep caves in the mountains of the High Atlas, where Berbers live.¹⁶³

Berberistan initially appeared in Berque's first edition of *le Maghreb entre deux guerres* in 1962.

It was the tamed critique of a brutal evaluation he made during his short tenure as a high functionary in the Residency General. Berberistan was "*un parc à bon sauvage*," the noble savage's nature preserve.¹⁶⁴ It was a "land of exceptions, ruled by soldiers."¹⁶⁵ Politicians and generals knew of its existence, but never spoke of it. Berberistan was the name Berque gave to a legal aberration created by French intelligence officers that served to justify the direct administration of the Protectorate. It disappeared only with the departure of the French from Morocco in 1956.

Berberistan was the perverted expression of a native policy that was supposed to respect the traditions of Berbers of the mountains and the Arabs of the cities while permitting European settlement. It was an example of what historian Jonathan Wirtzen calls "preservationist logics," the work undertaken by Lyautey and his team to make Morocco legible by "marking off, codifying, and protecting" an authentic Morocco.¹⁶⁶ The work of ethnographers and sociologists who specialized in Morocco in the early 20th century was crucial to elaborating "Othering" fantasies of Moroccans—Berbers and Arabs—as deeply committed to tradition. Indeed, without rituals, the French figured, Moroccans were unmoored from authority and existed in a state of anarchy—in *siba*. It was why Lyautey insisted on restoring precolonial ceremonies, and

¹⁶³ Jacques Berque, *Le Maghreb entre deux guerres*, 3rd ed. (Paris: Seuil, 1979), 240.

¹⁶⁴ Jacques Berque, *Sciences sociales et décolonisation*, *Opera Minora* vol. 3 (Saint-Denis: Bouchène, 2001), 49.

¹⁶⁵ Berque, *Sciences sociales et décolonisation*, *Opera minora*, 3:47-49.

¹⁶⁶ Jonathan Wirtzen, *Making Morocco: Colonial Intervention and the Politics of Identity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017), 79.

sometimes performed Moroccan authenticity himself.¹⁶⁷ In cities like Fez and Casablanca, for example, preservationist logics expressed themselves as a freezing in time of space, people, economies, and architecture. Paul Rabinow shows how preservation efforts in Casablanca's medina resulted in a "cordon sanitaire" that protected the medina from European population growth and new building projects. The cordon sanitaire segregated the modern colonial project from the Moroccan past, "theatralizing" Moroccan life and making the medina its stage, though it seemingly preserved a Moroccan way of life, it was inevitably adulterated by the French colonial project.¹⁶⁸

Colonialism everywhere was predicated on violence. In the Atlas, pursuing preservationist logics was conditioned by military power and the twenty-something year old lieutenants stationed in mountain outposts. But preservationist logics in the middle of a wide-spread insurgency, the creation of Berberistan, was predicated on death.

The Young Lieutenant of the Fez Cartel was a practitioner of what Achille Mbembe calls necropolitics. Styled as the transgressive obverse to Foucault's principle of biopolitics, the state's concern "to make live and let die,"¹⁶⁹ Mbembe's necropolitics is concerned with the sovereign's prerogative "to make die or let live."¹⁷⁰ The sovereign is responsible for more than binary decisions of life and death, establishing the parameters and contours of the human condition by

¹⁶⁷ Wyrzten, *Making Morocco*, 79-81.

¹⁶⁸ Paul Rabinow, *French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 299-300

¹⁶⁹ Michel Foucault, "Society must be defended." *Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76*, ed. Mauro Bertani et al., trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 241.

¹⁷⁰ Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitique," *Raison Politique* 21, no. 1 (2006): 29-60. The original text in French reads "Faire mourir ou laisser vivre." The English translation reads "to kill or to allow to live." But then why did Mbembe not use the verb *tuer* if he meant to kill? Faire mourir, to make die, is a process, unlike to kill which perhaps connotes an instantaneous action. To make die conjures images of a messy, imperfect process requiring continuous effort, in much the same way making live is the complicated process to which state administrators endeavor every single day. To kill does not produce a "state of living injured." To make die, however, results in what Mbembe says is the subjugation of life to the power of death.

inventing and reinventing the “forms of subjugation of life to the power of death.”¹⁷¹ A state of siege, according to Mbembe, is the central mechanism necessary to the creation of “death worlds” inhabited by the “living dead.” An example of a death world was the concentration camp of the Second World War, which as Giorgio Agamben argues, “*is the space that opens up when the state of exception starts to become the rule* [emphasis original],” a “permanent spatial arrangement,”¹⁷² a “political-juridical structure whose vocation is precisely to realize permanently the exception.”¹⁷³ Death in such a space is normalized by the systematic appeal of the sovereign to the urgency of protecting the collectivity. In such a space, war is no longer the Clauswitzian prolongation of politics. Politics and war are indistinguishable from one another, producing terror by activating the state’s access to technologies of death and the production of cultural and scientific narratives necessary to create a fictionalized enemy, a dangerous Other, that in turn legitimates the perpetuation of the state of siege and makes war permanent. Individuals in these necropolitical death worlds live on a spectrum between a “state of injury” and the fear of annihilation; their lives are subject to the vicissitudes of living in a permanent state of war.

The emergence of the authorities of *Contrôle* as administrators of the Protectorate ushered in period of low intensity war between the Residency General, the French army, and the Berber tribes of the Atlas. The politics of the authorities of *Contrôle* were intimately entwined with the politics of death. They conceived of their mission within a logic of preservation—to protect what they saw as the original mission of the Protectorate as envisioned by Lyautey.

¹⁷¹ Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics” trans. Libby Meintjes, *Public Culture* 15, no. 1 (2003): 11-40, 39.

¹⁷² Giorgio Agamben, *Means without an End. Notes on Politics* (University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 38.9.

¹⁷³ Agamben, *Means without an End*, 40.1.

Paradoxically, their war to preserve Lyautey's vision exposed the entire Protectorate to destruction.

Berberistan came into existence because Lyautey believed that the signing of the Treaty of Fez had occasioned a sea change in the social constitution of Morocco.¹⁷⁴ What Lyautey hoped to achieve was the "restoration" of the political and social structures that existed prior to 1912,¹⁷⁵ but he could not restore the Sultan to grandeur so long as the Sultan was besieged by the Berber tribes of the Atlas.¹⁷⁶ The *bled Makhzen*, the land of government, had to be protected from the attacks of Berbers launched from the *bled siba*, the land of chaos. Restoration required first preventing the overflow of chaos into the *bled Makhzen*. Second, in the long term, it required incorporating the *bled siba* into the *bled makhzen*. There were questions about the capacity of the Berbers to assimilate into the Protectorate. Lyautey feared moving too quickly and severing them from the traditions that anchored them to Morocco's socio-political fabric, creating the potential for uncontrollable political turmoil that imperiled the entire imperial project in North Africa.

Indeed, preservationist logics in Berberistan revolved around a series of indigenous policies meant to securely encase the political structure of the tribes of the Atlas. That Berbers could not be governed the same way the Arabs of the cities and the valleys were governed was a given for the first officers of the *Affaires Indigènes* who had previously patrolled the Tell Atlas, home of the Kabyles in northern Algeria. The principles taught at the officer schools were the

¹⁷⁴ Daniel Rivet, *Lyautey et l'institution du Protectorat Français au Maroc*, vol 1, (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1996), 161.

¹⁷⁵ Rivet, *Lyautey*, 1:162.

¹⁷⁶ See for example, Edmund Burke III, *Prelude to the Protectorate in Morocco: Precolonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), especially chapter 7. Burke III shows how against the backdrop of famine in 1910-1911 not a single part of Morocco was safe from either the Sultan's *harkas*, the plotting of the Sultan's allies who were also his secret enemies, the incursions of upstart warlords, and French intelligence officers who set tribes against the Sultan. The result was the rebellion of the tribes around Fez and Meknes and the eventual creation of the French Protectorate.

lessons learned in Algeria with the Kabyles, namely, that the Arabization and Islamization of Berber customs and the destruction of indigenous leadership had led to Kabyle revolts.¹⁷⁷ Consequently, French ethnographers, “berberophiles,” and scholar-soldiers like Lieutenant Colonel Huot, deputy director of the *Affaires Indigènes*, promoted the idea that modern empire in Morocco depended on “a veritable Berber policy that respected the social organization and customs of the Berber population and [adapted] administrative and political reforms accordingly.”¹⁷⁸ The entire effort was based on educated guesses about the degree of Islamization of Berbers and their tolerance to Muslim notables. Berbers fell roughly in one of three categories. First, as one intelligence officer remarked on his patrol of the religious landscape of tribes like the Beni M’Tir, “of a simple nature, great naïfs, Berbers will tell you that they are believers, but that they do not practice.”¹⁷⁹ Second, the Berbers like those of the Beni Mellal, reported another intelligence officer, appreciated the work of Muslim notables in helping resolve disputes with other factions.¹⁸⁰ Third, many other Berbers, like those in the Haute Moulouya region, were accommodating of Muslim notables and traded with religious brotherhoods.¹⁸¹ Cohorts of *Affaires Indigènes* trainees were inculcated with the necessity to

¹⁷⁷ The myth of the degenerate Arab pushing the simple Kabyle to violence owes more to the propaganda of Algerian settlers eager to exterminate Arab land-owners than to the reality on the ground. As for the Islamization of Kabyle customs, the problem ultimately resides in rendering uniform the administration of Kabylia to better allow administrative control. As Charles-Robert Ageron demonstrates, the *qadi* (Muslim judge) and sharia’a were tolerated only where they were implanted. Elsewhere, Islam was the enemy of Kabylia because it complicated the work of making Kabyle society simple and legible. On the transfer of the Kabyle myth to the Berbers of Morocco, see Charles-Robert Ageron, “La politique berbère du protectorat marocain de 1913 à 1934,” *Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine* 18, 1 (1971) : 50-90; Charles-Robert Ageron, “La politique kabyle sous le Second Empire,” *Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer* 53, 190 (1996): 67-105; and Daniel Rivet, *Lyautey et l’institution du Protectorat Français au Maroc*, vol 1, (Paris: l’Harmattan, 1996), 198; and Patricia Lorcin, *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995).

¹⁷⁸ Résidence Générale de la France au Maroc, *La renaissance du Maroc: dix ans de Protectorat, 1912-1922* (Rabat: Résidence Générale de la France au Maroc, 1922), 180.

¹⁷⁹ CADN 14MA/900/134&135, Notice sur les Confréries religieuses, Zaouias et Sanctuaires en pays Beni M’Tir, 1926, 1.

¹⁸⁰ CADN 14MA/900/134&135, Notice sur les Confréries religieuses, Zaouias et Sanctuaires en pays Beni M’Tir, 1926, 1.

¹⁸¹ CADN 14MA/900/134&135, Confréries Zaouias, Sanctuaires dans le Cercle de la Haute Moulouya, 1926, 4.

develop an adaptive administrative method that preserved a multiplicity of social, religious, economic, and political situations, but calibrating methods to local conditions was more art than science, and so difficult to implement.

Between 1912 and 1925, Lyautey and his team attempted to systemize a method of colonial statecraft adapted to conditions in the Atlas. They developed three iterations of a Berber policy. The policies were derived from *la politique des Grands Caïds* and focused on rallying the great tribal leaders of southern Morocco in defense of the Residency General and the Sultan. Indeed, shortly after the Treaty of Fez, the al Hiba uprising in southern Morocco threatened to engulf the entirety of the Protectorate. Son of a Mauritanian warlord and religious leader, al Hiba, Edmund Burke III explains, led a powerful armed force “aimed at nothing less than the overturning of the existing political regime, that of the great *qaid-s* and the *makhzan*...”¹⁸² To hold on to Morocco, Lyautey needed either more troops or more allies, and since the French government refused Lyautey’s repeated requests for more soldiers, Lyautey was forced to make new friends.¹⁸³ In pre-Protectorate Morocco, the lords of the Atlas, heads of the M’touga, the Goundafa, and the Glaoua clans, were entrusted with the control of the passes between the southern Atlas and the valleys below, and in exchange for their cooperation, the Sultan allowed them to live in splendor in Marrakesh and to procure for their warriors modern guns and German-made canons.¹⁸⁴ Their power, however, was no match against the numbers put up by either the French or al Hiba in 1912 and so they hedged their bets by dispatching representatives to both camps as warriors and advisors. Initially skeptical of how far the French would go to help them retain their status, the *Grands Caïds* were initially taken by the possibilities offered by the

¹⁸² Burke III, *Prelude*, 202.

¹⁸³ Rivet, *Lyautey*, 1:184.

¹⁸⁴ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, 101.

al Hiba rebellion.¹⁸⁵ It was only once Lyautey unleashed Colonel Mangin and a French column of 1500 men in the autumn of 1912 that the Lords of the Atlas fully cooperated with the French. Mangin restored the power of the great caïds by stationing his column for prolonged periods near their kasbahs to clearly signal that the Lords of the Atlas fought alongside the French and were secured by them.¹⁸⁶ Mangin's column, however, was not enough by itself to hold on to the south of Morocco. Lyautey recognized that an alliance between the Protectorate and the Lords of the Atlas was a necessary and mutually beneficial measure for the long-term survival of the Protectorate. In exchange for providing war parties, political intelligence, and working with the French, the Lords of the Atlas received reassurances from Lyautey that their political authority remained supported by a French column if necessary. Thus was born the first iteration of Lyautey's indigenous policy.

In 1914, as Paris redeployed most of Morocco's French troops to the Western Front, Lyautey attempted to extend the great caïd policy to the Middle and High Atlas, and called it *la politique berbère*, or Berber policy. He encountered two problems, however. The first was that unlike in the south of Morocco, Makhzen officials with any kind of political legitimacy in the Atlas and knowledge of the populations in question were scarce, and the few with any local knowledge were not interested in the job of caïd in the mountains.¹⁸⁷ The second problem was that power in the Atlas was too fractured. French officials were incapable of finding local leaders with the same kind of political charisma as the great caïds of the south.

¹⁸⁵ Gavin Maxwell, *Lords of the Atlas: The Rise and Fall of the House of Glaoua, 1893-1956* (London: Eland, 2004), 138.

¹⁸⁶ Rivet, *Lyautey*, 1:182.

¹⁸⁷ Rivet, *Lyautey*, 1:196-198.

The only solution left was for the French to invite tribes to rally to the “*makhzen des Français*,”¹⁸⁸ the Protectorate, represented by the *Affaires Indigènes* officers, who did “the work of a Lord” (*un métier de seigneur*).¹⁸⁹ Lyautey intended for his officers to attract tribes to the “French makhzen,” and hoped that by performing Moroccan authenticity and showing publicly his deference to the Sultan, he would communicate to the rallied factions of the Atlas that the Sultan was truly the sovereign.

Not surprisingly, many Moroccans decried Berber policy as the cynical ploy of the French to divide Morocco’s Muslim Arabs from Berbers to better rule Morocco by sapping the Sultan’s authority over Berber tribes. French insistence on drawing cleavages between Arabs and Berbers that were more academic than beneficial to statecraft in the Protectorate naturally raised suspicions,¹⁹⁰ but in the initial stages, native policy, whether it was called *la politique des Grands Caïds*, *la politique berbère*, or *le Makhzen des Français*, was merely a narrative couched in racial stereotypes in vogue with contemporary imperial elites that helped mask the lack of French military power, the fear of systemic rebellions, and the inability of Lyautey’s tribal policy to deal with the complicated politics of the Atlas. Ever the idealist, Lyautey never publicly gave up on finding a light footprint method of governance in the Atlas, but as an exceptional military commander, he was also painfully aware of his responsibility to the French Empire.

The First World War aggravated the tensions between the necessity of preserving the socio-political fabric of the Berbers and protecting the Protectorate, though it masked the Residency General’s failures and muted the attendant grumblings of Moroccans. In 1914, to

¹⁸⁸ Berque and Rivet commonly use this term though they never define it. The idea of a French Makhzen seems to have originated in Algeria during the 1840 conquest of the country. To avoid being pillaged by French columns tribes rallied the French and supplied soldiers in the name of the makhzen. On the French Makhzen in Algeria see for example Jacques Frémaux, “Les premières troupes supplétives en Algérie,” *Revue Historique des Armées* 255, (2009): 61-67.

¹⁸⁹ Vincent Monteil, *Les Officiers* (Paris: Seuil, 1958), see chapter entitled “Un métier de seigneur.”

¹⁹⁰ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, 56.

preserve the Protectorate, protect the Arabs from the Berbers, the Berbers from one another, and settlers from everyone, Lyautey militarized the distinction between Arabs and Berbers. Slightly before the signing of the Treaty of Fez, Lyautey and the French government drew plans to place the *bled siba* (land of chaos) under a temporary special regime that exonerated the French government of damages to private property and persons in the *bled siba* in the case of the rapid redeployment of soldiers from the Atlas to a front in Europe. On 4 July 1914, the plan was activated and the *bled siba* was officially named *la Zone d'Insecurité*, the Insecurity Zone.¹⁹¹ The possibility of a European war did not figure as an explanation for the creation of the *Zone d'Insecurité*. It was instead justified to observers by explaining that the French had found the Atlas in a state of chaos—one only need to see that even the locals called it the land of chaos to conclude that it warranted emergency administration to stabilize the politics of the region. The intent was to make fear an integral part of any calculations to interfere with military administration or to question the necessity for a regime of exceptions. “The Berber is always ready to come down from his mountain,” one pundit wrote for the benefit of settlers who might have harbored plans of establishing themselves in the *Zone d'Insecurité*; they could be killed, maimed, and ruined in the *Zone d'Insecurité*.¹⁹² There was little time for discussion about the necessity of imposing emergency measures in the *bled siba*. A month later, on 2 August 1914, Lyautey declared a state of siege throughout Morocco in response to the outbreak of the First World War.¹⁹³ The entirety of the Sherffian Empire was under control of the French colonial army.

¹⁹¹ CADN IMA/200/332, #164 D, Zones de sécurité, Lyautey to Minister for Foreign Affairs, 4 July 1914, 6.

¹⁹² AN-Ma F278, Georges Duhamel, *Le Maroc Désert*, 13 February 1935, 18.

¹⁹³ CADN IMA/20/112-119, Printed Draft #3 *Etat de Siege*, 2.

In a curious development, however, most officers in the *Zone d'Insecurité* did not refer to the regime that governed them as the state of siege but as martial law. The state of siege was a statute that was planned for in French law. It was a “*régime de légalité*,” a lawful regime.¹⁹⁴ The state of siege was limited in time, in scope, and was subject to Parliamentary oversight. Martial law was none of those things. It did not exist in French law. Yet, French officers in the Atlas frequently invoked it. Martial law, they argued, creating their own jurisprudence, resulted from an “*état de fait*.”¹⁹⁵ It was a situation that appeared and disappeared outside of any formal legal act and was subject to no oversight save that of the French officer who decided that martial law was a perfectly appropriate regime for the circumstances he faced at a particular moment in time. While most of the *bled Makhzen* was recognized as being under a state of siege, and so subject to at least nominal oversight by civilian, the *bled siba* belonged to French officers who ruled it under martial law. Berberistan, until the independence of Morocco, was a fiction governed by a regime with no legal basis but for the whim of French intelligence officers. It was, to paraphrase Agamben, the space that opened up once the state of exception became the rule; it was a politico-juridical structure that devolved power to the Young Lieutenants. Under that regime, they radically transformed the social and political landscape of the Atlas.

In retirement, Lyautey was more poetic when rationalizing his decision to permanently extend emergency measures and bind them to the *bled siba*. Lyautey gave his junior officers wide berth to maneuver because “the Berber element [could] only ever be understood by a soldier.”¹⁹⁶ To be clear, Lyautey’s soldiers in the Atlas were intelligence officers, and perhaps, if intelligence officers were the only ones to understand the Berber element, per Lyautey, it was

¹⁹⁴ Gaston Jèze, “L’état de siege,” *Revue de droit public et de la science politique en France et à l’étranger* 22, no. 1 (1915): 700-713, 701.

¹⁹⁵ CADN IMA/20/112-119, Etat de Siège, Printed Draft 3, physically cut and pasted marginalia, 2.

¹⁹⁶ Lyautey, cited in Berthe Georges-Gaulis, *Lyautey intime* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1938), 209.

mainly because they were the only ones present in the mountains as representatives of the Resident General and the Sultan. They were the only ones thrust into the Atlas and the Rif to untangle the complicated and seemingly illegible political systems of tribes. If they were the only ones to understand the Berber element it was because they were the ones administering them. Intelligence officers had become the *Grands Caïds* of the Atlas.

As we noted in the previous chapter, the Rif War pushed French officials in Paris to replace Lyautey with Theodore Steeg, who was hostile to the power of intelligence officers. The Rif War was widely blamed on activist intelligence officers who had overreached and provoked Abd el Krim el Khattabi, the leader of the Rif forces. Steeg cut intelligence budgets in 1926, while creating new civil service positions and providing salary raises across the board of no less than thirty-five percent and up to one hundred and fifty percent when compared to similar occupations in the metropole.¹⁹⁷ Steeg was “first and foremost a French politician of the first rank,” who harbored ambitions of “becoming premier or president, or both” and who consequently understood imperial governance in metropolitan terms.¹⁹⁸ He created jobs with higher wages, proposed administrative reforms, and at a time of animosity toward the military, he offered to rein-in *la Coloniale* by using the intelligence officers of the Atlas as scapegoats for everything wrong in the Protectorate.

French intelligence officers were making do with fewer resources in 1926. With little time to tour their circumscriptions, cultivate relationships, peer into the inner lives of their

¹⁹⁷ CADN (2012) CDRG 32, increase in functionaries since 1925 Untitled draft memo on reducing expenses, 2; On salaries: Note sur l'organisation des administrations publiques du Protectorat, les réformes à envisager, les économies à réaliser, 20 January 1937, 5.

¹⁹⁸ BNA FO 371 11917, Situation on the northern frontier of the French zone, 17 February 1925, 18.

charges, and without the possibility of delegating to dependable and knowledgeable intermediaries, intelligence officers had little choice but to continue to directly administer tribes. Direct administration in Morocco was an already visible phenomenon in 1920 when Lyautey penned his infamous Coup de Barre memo: “Our establishment in this country is legitimated by the doctrine of the Protectorate. We proclaim it loudly; the Government proclaims it at every occasion. But isn’t it just a fiction?”¹⁹⁹ Indirect administration, tribal policy, the policy of association, was an impossible ideal: “I know very well the difficulties... First, direct administration is in our blood, functionaries from France, officers from Algeria; we do not speak Arabic; we are not patient. And to establish meaningful rapport with the indigenous, we would need, now and for the foreseeable future, lots of patience.”²⁰⁰ In 1926, the trends that Lyautey had detected and described in his memo were accelerating.

An intelligence-driven tribal policy required time to do the work of intelligence gathering and analysis and it required intelligence officers to function, but budget contractions on intelligence credits after the Rif War doomed tribal policy in Morocco. Furthermore, the task of indirectly controlling the government of tribes—if it were an achievable goal—demanded a constant attention to cultivating informants and collecting human intelligence. Most intelligence officers, however, were unable to maintain a capable stable of informants. As one intelligence officer explained, his methodology for writing reports was based on interviews with “a great number of people: poor people, notables, marabouts,” but that any conclusions he offered had to be tempered by the fact that he could not find informants knowledgeable about the world beyond the tribes that neighbored theirs.²⁰¹ “It is hard to distinguish what is accurate from what is false,”

¹⁹⁹ CADN (2012) Maroc DI 68, Politique de Protectorat (known as Coup de barre memo), 18 Novembre 1920, 3.

²⁰⁰ CADN (2012) Maroc DI 68, Politique de Protectorat (known as Coup de barre memo), 18 Novembre 1920, 3.

²⁰¹ SHD 3H 440, Les Ida Ou Tanan, Etude Géographique et Politique, 18, April 1927, 48.

he wrote, “and often the indigenous themselves are not entirely sure of what they think.”²⁰²

Intelligence products in such conditions were rushed, incomplete, and useless.

To fully assume the role Lyautey had intended for them, intelligence officers needed a way of acquiring the intimate knowledge of the people and the terrain, including “hydrography, toponomy, the history of the tribes under scrutiny, their political and religious affinities, their political economies and commercial links, as well as influential religious authorities.”²⁰³ They needed to map out the ancestral quarrels and recent ones. Knowledge of disputes was a way of integrating into the life of the faction by mediating crises: “the *Affaires Indigènes* officer must be an advisor and a friend to all; he is the natural advocate of those he administers.”²⁰⁴ Successful crisis resolution provided credibility to *Affaires Indigènes* officers as possible alternatives to religious and traditional authorities, and helped cement their presence in the *bled siba*.

Comprehension of these dynamics was thought to also be a way of preserving them.

From the perspective of intelligence officers, direct administration though it was never called that, was a welcome solution to the problems at hand. The overall intelligence assessment promoted by officials in Rabat based on the information they had from forward outposts had always been that “proper government” in Morocco, that is to say one that embodied the principles of the Protectorate, was impossible so long as “half of the country’s indigenous population [was] still rebellious, and agitated moreover by various unsympathetic European elements.”²⁰⁵ The Rif War was confirmation of these long-standing concerns and it was not the

²⁰² SHD 3H 440, Les Ida Ou Tanan, Etude Géographique et Politique, 18, April 1927, 50.

²⁰³ SHD 3H 434, General Naulin to General Commander of the Marrakesh Region, 19 November 1925, 1.

²⁰⁴ CADN 13MA/900/587, Note sur la situation politique de la region de Marrakech, à la fin de 1928 et Directives pour 1929, 18 January 1929, 16.

²⁰⁵ CADN 1MA/20/124, A.S. de la loi martiale, 19 February 1920.

high-paid functionaries Steeg brought in from Paris who would save the Protectorate from the occult forces that thwarted “proper government.”

Indeed, the specter of foreign conspirators in Morocco was ever present and intelligence officers warned daily that Europeans with secret and nefarious agendas roamed the country, specifically Berberistan, looking for ways of exploiting French vulnerabilities. There are hundreds of thousands of reports only a sentence-long on foreign nationals. Intelligence officers expended a seemingly incomprehensible amount of energy, not to mention paper, to watch and report on foreign nationals who presented no suspicious behavior. Everyone was a potential carrier of a bigger ideological infection.

Away from the halls of diplomatic power where ministers complained of being “flooded under a mess of intelligence”²⁰⁶ sent from Morocco and away from the bustling war rooms where the generals maligned *la Coloniale*, French intelligence officers in the Atlas believed they had as Hannah Arendt writes of the British secrets agents in the Middle East, “entered—or been driven into—the stream of historical necessity or the stream of forces which rule the world.”²⁰⁷ Consequently, “[t]he only ‘law’ they obeyed was the law of expansion and the only proof of their ‘lawfulness’ was success.”²⁰⁸ Indeed, even as the French state reduced spending on its military-run intelligence apparatus in the Protectorate, military intelligence departments in Morocco still managed to hire at a rapid clip *officiers brevetés*, officers from the *Ecole de Guerre* or another *grande école* capable of being integrated into strategic planning staff, “who are particularly interested in all questions related to French colonial expansion.”²⁰⁹ Expanding the empire

²⁰⁶ SHD 3H 100, Le President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, “Affaires du Riff,” 16 December 1924, 1

²⁰⁷ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harvest, 1973), 220.

²⁰⁸ Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 215.

²⁰⁹ SHD 3H 434, Note sur l’organisation et le fonctionnement du 2e Bureau de l’Etat-Major du Général Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Maroc, Undated but likely late 1926 or early 1927, 5.

became synonymous with detecting opportunities for expansion in Morocco and required further interest in “the history of Muslim countries and the circulation of opinions that traverse it.”²¹⁰ Expansion was not just a matter of pride and faith in protecting the power that intelligence officers acquired during the Lyautey era, but an inherent mission—the sworn duty, according to one knowledgeable officer—of military intelligence officers who protected the empire by expanding them.²¹¹

And if success was the true measure of their righteousness and of the legality of their actions, their interactions with Moroccans were proof of it. Recall how Commander Martin was met at each stop on his mission. The “you-yous” he heard were ovations, overwhelmingly favorable plebiscites on the work of the intelligence officers in the Atlas. Even seasoned officers, like General Huré, an early *Marocanisant* with counter-insurgency experience, were taken in by such displays. In one telling example, he recounted how upon disembarking from the plane that carried him deep into the High Atlas, in lands belonging to the Mezguiti, he was escorted into the circumscription by three or four thousand warriors” under the “welcoming you-yous of women.”²¹² It was at that moment that he knew that “the definitive establishment of [French intelligence officers] would be greeted with joy by tribe leaders and tribesmen alike.”²¹³ Displays like these secured intelligence officers in the knowledge that even if they were decried by civilian and military authorities in Paris and in Rabat, the Berbers had given them a mandate to operate as they saw fit in the interest of preserving Berber tribes.

²¹⁰ SHD 3H 434, Note sur l’organisation et le fonctionnement du 2e Bureau de l’Etat-Major du Général Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Maroc, Undated but likely late 1926 or early 1927, 5.

²¹¹ SHD 3H 434, Cover to Note sur l’organisation et le fonctionnement du 2e Bureau de l’Etat-Major du Général Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Maroc, Undated but likely late 1926 or early 1927.

²¹² SHD 3H 126, Situation dans la circonscription de Ouarzazate, 19 May 1930, 5.

²¹³ SHD 3H 126, Situation dans la circonscription de Ouarzazate, 19 May 1930, 5.

Death Worlds of Covert Empire

Confident in the moral imperative of their mission, the Young Lieutenants pushed out from the Fez-Meknes line, the frontier between *makhzen* and *siba*, deeper into Berberistan. They went in spite of the orders Theodore Steeg handed to the French army in Morocco. Steeg firmly warned them that he intended to pursue a strategy of “prudent progress” that ensured stability in Morocco from the Atlantic littoral to the first mountain slopes of the Atlas and managed “the susceptibilities of indigenous leaders.”²¹⁴

Meanwhile, in clear contradiction with Steeg’s orders, Commander Martin’s mission, like all the other scouting and diplomatic missions undertaken between 1926 and 1928, had for objective to retake “the constellation of outposts evacuated under the pressure of Abdelkrim’s advance” during the Rif War. The intelligence officers manning the outposts would once again pump information on Morocco’s frontier into the state’s decision-making apparatus, and begin again the work of administering the Protectorate, including the Atlas.²¹⁵

Deep in the mountains, alone for the most part, the Young Lieutenants began to develop with the encouragement of a few superior officers “doctrines” of tribal governance that differed dramatically from policies established under Lyautey and Steeg.²¹⁶ In many cases, commanding officers found the methods of their subordinates questionable and dangerous, but resigned themselves to accepting them:

the systematic spreading thin of intelligence officers—one per outpost—is gravely prejudicial to the technical training of these officers, to their productivity. Too often left to their own devices in front of their paperwork, they risk developing their own methods of administration, dangerous ones as experience has demonstrated.²¹⁷

²¹⁴ SH 126, A/S. de la situation dans le cercle de Ouarzazate, 7 Septembre 1929, 2.

²¹⁵ SHD 3H 445, unnamed, undated report on necessity of reoccupying outposts in complicated political situation, probably 1926 or 1927 given context.

²¹⁶ SHD 3H 1620, Note sur la recherche et la diffusion des renseignements. 28 Octobre 1926, 1.

²¹⁷ SHD 9M 651/3H 1824, Réorganisation du Cercle d’Alilal, 26 June 1923, 1-2; 2.

Indeed, in a bizarre twist on “preservation logics,” the Young Lieutenants embraced in the name of protecting Berbers the “disassociation,” “disaggregation,” and “dislocation” of tribes into factions to aggressively recombine them into political structures that could easily integrate into the “French Makhzen,” or in other words, that could easily be administered by a single intelligence officer.²¹⁸ Senior officers wrote to their subordinates warning them to tread carefully, unsure of whether the Young Lieutenants were prodding Berbers to reject traditional leaders or if Berbers were naturally moving away from traditional leaders: “the commander of the outpost will have to push back with all his might against the tendencies of the population to believe that our arrival signals their emancipation from their traditional leaders.”²¹⁹ These same senior officers, however, also encouraged their subordinates to act like warlords: “the spring lamb, the *hédeya* of religious occasions, if they are reasonable and have the character of a vassal freely giving homage to his lord... these little gifts which are not regular but are in agreement with their traditions do not constitute abuses.”²²⁰ Unsurprisingly, the Young Lieutenants indulged in their roles as caïds with the complicity of their superior officers whose rules helped junior officers cross the line from interested observers in the activities of Berbers to active participants in their lives. The more virulent the efforts to preserve a mythical Berber way of life, the more the Young Lieutenants destroyed the real social fabric of life in the Atlas.

Destruction in Berberistan radiated out of the French military outpost, the pillar of native administration, the only established point of contact between the French, the Makhzen, and

²¹⁸ CADN 13MA/900/587, Note sur la situation politique de la région de Marrakech, à la fin de 1928 et directives pour 1929, 18 January 1929, 13-16.

²¹⁹ SHD 9M 651/3H 1824 Directives au Chef de Bureau de Demmat pour la période transitoire, 1925, 1-2.

²²⁰ SHD 9M 651/3H 1824 Directives au Chef de Bureau de Demmat pour la période transitoire, 1925, 1-2; Hédyā is a gift given on religious occasions. Traditionally, Hédyā is a gift given to the Sultan during times of religious festivities to signal allegiance Roger Gruner, *Du Maroc traditionnel au Maroc Moderne. Le Contrôle civil au Maroc, 1912-1956* (Paris: Nouvelles éditions latines, 1984), 25.

Moroccans, and the point from which all disaggregation efforts emanated.²²¹ Usually composed of a single *Affaires Indigènes* officer around whom pivoted a caïd or two to maintain the pretense of indirect rule, as well as a group of Moroccan irregulars, the outpost in Morocco was the local declension of the Residency General and the most potent vector of French power. The commander of the outpost, frequently a lieutenant, established first contact with a faction by negotiating the terms of *aman*, the terms of security and serenity that underwrote life for any tribe that existed within the sphere of influence of an outpost. In theory, *aman* was different from submitting to the French, which, because of the Treaty of Fez, was impossible, the Sultan remaining sovereign of his people. Submission, or *terguiba*, was a political act performed in front of the Sultan or his Moroccan representatives, vizirs, pashas, and caïds. In practice, however, *aman* and *terguiba* were synonymous. Since the French protected the sovereignty of the Sultan with their military, an attack on the Sultan was an attack on the French. French officers spoke of “*nos soumis*,” or Moroccans who submitted to the French. The difference between submitting to the Sultan or to a French column was illusory, anyway. As we saw from Commander Martin’s report, Moroccan tribesmen understood regardless of the stipulations contained in the Treaty of Fez that power resided with the French officer and spoke with him about how they envisaged their futures, not with the caïds, representatives of the Sultan, that accompanied them.

Outposts were “a sanction, the consequence of having to resort to military occupation,” and marked the limits of the French empire.²²² They formed with the outposts behind frontlines “a network that prolong[ed] pacification, which include[d] taming populations and administering

²²¹ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, 15.

²²² SHD 3H 444, Départ du 5e goum pour Kasba Tadla, 29 October 1928, 2.

them.”²²³ Outposts were placed in carefully chosen locations; science officers (topographers and geodesic specialists), like the one that accompanied Martin on his mission, were as important as the political officers in diplomatic missions. An outpost was a political statement, and location was its thesis. Officers establishing outposts looked for elevation, a medium-sized hill usually, to extend their line of sight and the range of their guns on at least four other adjacent hills and the slopes of mountains practicable for descent into valleys.²²⁴ The elevation increased surveillance capacities and the potential for destruction, but also made assaults on the expression of French power more difficult. Elevation was also useful for outposts that relied on optical signals and radiotelegraphy for communications. Preference was given to hills directly overlooking a field or an orchard, and not too far away from a water point, the better to identify and catalog the habits of the inhabitants living within the jurisdiction of the outpost that used the land for sustenance; the better, too, for sharpshooters to police unruly tribes by taking aim at isolated targets, and making terror a part of the calculus of dissent and life.²²⁵ The outpost also had to be located within proximity of a traffic chokepoint to control identities and property. But the single most important geographic criteria was proximity to a market. Outposts always overlooked a market, preferably one created before the arrival of the French, or ones created by the French precisely for the work of “taming” (*apprivoiser*) and administering.

For the tribe, *aman* was about access to markets to supplement diets and sell produce, raw materials, and the wares of their artisans. There was also a lot of money to be made supplying the outpost. In exchange for submission, the Young Lieutenants awarded various

²²³ SHD 3H 444, Départ du 5e goum pour Kasba Tadla, 29 October 1928, 2.

²²⁴ SHD 3H 446, Plan de Renseignements en vue d’une progression éventuelle jusqu’à la frontière du pays Ghezaoua, 15 April 1927, 1.

²²⁵ SHD 3H 445, unnamed, undated report on necessity of reoccupying outposts in complicated political situation, probably 1926 or 1927 given context, 4.

tribes, or factions of tribes, contracts to supply outposts at market rate or above.²²⁶ Degrees of loyalty determined the scope of the contract. Newly compliant tribes were authorized to supply wood. Tribes with a longer history of submission supplied wood, water, grain, and sometimes fresh meat.²²⁷ To avoid putting too much money in the hands of a single tribe, intelligence officers usually attempted to divide supply contracts among various tribes, but were not afraid of creating a situation in which factions competed in docility and vice for the contracts of a more favored grouping.

Tribes also negotiated their submission to secure access to local and regional souks. Unlike the famous souks of Fez and Marrakesh for example, which operated daily, the souks of the Atlas were ephemeral, weekly affairs, with Fridays being the most well-attended market days.²²⁸ Markets were the dominant spheres of political, cultural, and economic exchange in the mountains of Morocco.²²⁹ The weekly market was a vital space of intertribal relationships between friendly factions and the occasion to reaffirm social ties and familial obligations between tribes.²³⁰ They were also days when the *jemaâ*, councils of elders from various families, announced important decisions and when the *qadi*, the Muslim judge, arbitrated disputes. Access to the traditional market also allowed tribes to trade loot acquired from raids on unfriendly tribes.

The market was also a major hub of information sharing. Rumors and gossip were staples as sought after as good grain and hearty cattle. The Rif and the Atlas, though seemingly cut off from the outside world to the host of scholars who travelled the region before the Treaty of Fez,

²²⁶ CADN Meknes 188, Rapport de mission du Chef de Batallion Vignon a/s Bou Mia, 14 August 1926, 2.

²²⁷ CADN Meknes 188, A.S. Pourpalers avec Aït Lahri, 28 August 1926.

²²⁸ Julia Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800-1904)* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1994), 27-29.

²²⁹ On the importance of markets in the Rif see for example David Hart, *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif: An Ethnography and History*, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), 69-92.

²³⁰ Ali Amahan, *Mutations sociales dans le Haut Atlas. Les Ghoudama* (Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 1998), 127.

were connected to the world beyond their mountains in myriad intricate ways. For one, public criers and poets travelling from one market to the next accelerated the spread of information and combined it with information gathered at previous stops.²³¹ Criers were particularly well paid by *jemaâs*, councils of tribal elders, to announce the news. For another, caravan routes from the Mediterranean to the Sahara, that ran through the Atlas were high traffic areas that were especially well frequented after the Spanish abolished customs on merchandise entering through Mediterranean port of Mellila in 1884.²³² Traders carried cheap flour, candles, tea, textiles, coffee, sugar, in addition to news from Europe, the Mediterranean, and Africa. From the east and the west, caravans departing from the Atlantic coast encountered those originating from Algeria and the Sahara on their way to Fez and Casablanca. This was an opportunity for the Makhzen and dissident tribesmen to reaffirm a relationship with one another, however uneasy it was to manage, and to create ties with notables and merchants from Algeria and Tunisia. Perhaps most important of all, by the time Commander Martin ventured back into the Atlas in 1926, the Rif War had created a market for mass media in the mountain chains of Morocco. There was a “veritable intellectual revolution” taking place in the mountains, according to one Moroccan informant, fueled by the wide dissemination of Riffi propaganda materials in the form of tracts, articles, and books in print, of course, but increasingly by the Moroccan appetite for news, songs, poems, and lectures recorded on discs in Cairo and Berlin and played on phonographs, which, like everything else in Morocco, could be purchased at a market.²³³

There was nothing serene about the process of *aman*, however. French officers who negotiated *aman* with *jemaâs* attached conditions to market access. First, tribes paid market

²³¹ Wyrzten, *Making Morocco*, 115.

²³² Ross Dunn, “Bu Himara’s European Connexion: The Commercial Relations of a Moroccan Warlord,” *The Journal of African History* 21, 2 (1980): 235-253, 241.

²³³ SHD 3H 247, A/s d’un ouvrage de propagande anti-française, 27 Novembre 1928, 2.

rights in lives. The conditions of *aman* included that each outpost receive hostages. They were not the most important members of the tribe and archival records do not mention any hostages being killed by the French. They were used for petty tasks around the outpost, such as collecting wood, cleaning, and drawing water from the well. The French, throughout the empire, relied on forced labor, the *corvée*, to meet demands for labor. The *corvée* existed as part of a legal framework to extract resources from native populations either in the form of forced labor for a limited amount of time or taxes to avoid the *corvée*.²³⁴ Hostages in Morocco that performed work for the French, however, existed outside of any legal framework—indeed, martial law precluded any such development—and remained in an outpost until such time as the commander released them. The practice was never questioned. Hostages, like martial law, were an “*état de fait*.”

Tribes were also expected to provide manpower to help patrol the lines between outposts and police dissidence within their ranks. Dissidence included reneging on promises to submit to the Makhzen, as well as brigandage and violence against factions rallied to the French. There was a range of responses available to the French when confronted with a failure to comply. Typically, the French penalized dissident tribes by taking away their contracts to supply outposts. Harsher punishment consisted in forbidding tribes to access friendly markets, forcing them to cross into territories that were either unfriendly or outright hostile, ultimately preventing them from taking advantage of the more favorable pricings available at a friendly market. Such a punishment also deprived tribes of access to information and the facetime necessary to managing alliances. The most severe punishments consisted not only in the termination of market rights, but in “aerial bombardment and violent reprisals” as well.²³⁵ A typical response to dissidence

²³⁴ See for example Louis Rolland and Pierre Lampué, *Précis de législation coloniale (Colonies, Algérie, Protectorats, Pays sous mandat* (Paris: Dalloz, 1936), 230-231.

²³⁵ SHD 3H 446, Note personnelle et secrète pour le Général Commandant la Région de Fez, 8 June 1927, 3.

began with a small artillery barrage, followed by air patrols that could drop as many as three hundred and sixty-eight bombs a day on a single circumscription.²³⁶ People were of course targets of aerial bombardments, but the small ten kilogram bombs airplanes carried proved particularly useful for hitting compact groups, like herds of sheep. One intelligence officer reported that “the daily aerial bombings cause those who have not submitted such cruel losses to persons and property that they are forced to sell what they have left at vile prices.”²³⁷ Artillery and air raids were most effective during the day against pockets of resistance. At night, the French operated patrols between their outposts with the goums, and called them “*operations de nettoyage*,” mop up operations. The goums trained in night combat and mountain warfare, where silence and speed are critical. That was how on the night of 14 to 15 June 1927 a force composed of goums and irregulars surprised a starving group of about one hundred and fifty dissidents harvesting a field. At the end of the quick but violent battle, the warriors had fled leaving their dead and all the women of their faction in the hands of the French and Moroccan troops.²³⁸ The women ceased to exist in the archival record. The French war party moved on to the next situation that needed mopping up. Raids like these were a daily occurrence. The story of French destruction wrought in the name of preservation, as told through the archival record, is dry, restricted to simply tallying casualties and confirming the next day’s marching orders.²³⁹

The space between the concentration of outposts created a death world, and in the lines between outposts, destruction took on many forms. A sniper’s round, an artillery shell, or a bomb dropped from a plane were formidable killing tools. There were also ways of provoking death, of

²³⁶ SHD 3H 408, Compte rendu hebdomadaire du 12 au 19 août 1929. Planes on air policing missions carried 10kg bombs. The intelligence report notes that every day for a week, bombers dropped 3680kg of bombs.

²³⁷ SHD 3H 407, Bulletin périodique du 30 Septembre au 4 Octobre 1925, 2.

²³⁸ SHD 3H 446 Télégramme chiffré #302/PC3, 16 June 1927.

²³⁹ SHD 3H 446, situation report, telephone conversation transcript, 16 June 1927.

“making die.” Restricting access to friendly markets was one way. Without an outlet to sell their wares, tribe factions could not make up for potential caloric deficits or diversify their food sources, ensuring that faction members lived in a physically injured state. Restricting market access was also a way of provoking the slow political death of the faction. Without access to the contacts necessary to maintaining friendships and political networks their alliances withered and made them vulnerable. By forcing factions to frequent markets in territories in which they had no alliances, the French made refractory factions live in insecurity. Would their merchants be safe or would they meet the same fate as the two lifeless bodies Commander Martin saw on his way to the Oued Lakhdar? If they made it to market, would they be extorted by the merchants of other tribes, forced to sell their goods at lower prices and buy goods at inflated ones? Would they have access to the *jemaâ* to mediate disputes? And how would they keep up with news of the world? Restricting market access was a slow death sentence for the faction. The French officers had a name for Berberistan, the “land of Fear,” and the various forms of death meted near the outpost helped subjugate the forms of Berber life to the necropower of the French officer.²⁴⁰

Death made the outpost a successful pole of attraction of factions in the Atlas. Factions rallied to the Young Lieutenants by the thousands and the more factions rallied, the more they attracted factions previously weary of joining the French Makhzen. In May 1926, the intelligence analyst for the Meknes region noted that the installation of three new outposts engendered the definitive submission within a month of three factions of the Beni Mestara which in turn convinced another faction of about 1800 families, or about 9000 individuals, from the Ouled Kheiroun to submit to the French.²⁴¹ Throughout Berberistan, every month, similar stories were

²⁴⁰ CADN 13MA/900/587, Note sur la situation politique de la Région de Marrakech, à la fin de 1928 et Directives pour 1929, 18 January 1929, 16.

²⁴¹ AN-Ma F258, Rapport Politique Mensuel Mai 1926, 19 June 1926, 3.

reported as successes. The total number of families that rallied to the French Makhzen was estimated to be about 150,000 individuals over two years.²⁴²

The rapid rate and size of defections, however, was deeply troubling for officers and political authorities in Rabat and in Paris who realized that ground forces were dragging the Protectorate deeper and deeper into governing parts of Morocco they had no interest in governing. The Young Lieutenants, however, suffered rebukes neither from Paris nor Rabat, and not even from their immediate superiors. Subtle insubordination is part of the fabric of intelligence reports of the era. In the Souss, an intelligence officer balked at the “grave preoccupations of Morocco’s High Command that force[d] [them] to exist in a status quo based on tacit arrangements that create a frontier between the *bled siba* and the *bled Makhzen*... al Hiba’s successors believe they have created a kingdom independent of the French and the Makhzen.”²⁴³ Another intelligence officer, a captain, had to respond to concerned queries from High Command about the actions of his subordinates. The subordinates pestered High Command with “acerbic letters about the so-called policy of truce” between French forces and the Berbers of the Beni Mellal.²⁴⁴ The Young Lieutenants took initiatives and rarely bothered to inform anyone of their actions. Steeg complained on more than one occasion that his only insight into military operations in the Atlas was through “the daily press which relates the events with more or less accuracy.”²⁴⁵

The problem with large and small defections was that they “ruptur[ed] the state of equilibrium” that existed in the Atlas.²⁴⁶ Traditional authorities weakened with every defection.

²⁴² AN-Ma F75, Discours de M. Th. Steeg au Conseil du Gouvernement du 24 Novembre 1927, 24 Novembre 1927, 13.

²⁴³ SHD 3H 126, Rapport du Lieutenant-Colonel, Commandant le Territoire d’Agadir, sur l’action politique en 1928

²⁴⁴ CADN (2012) Meknes 188, Secret, # 72 SRC, 14 August 1926.

²⁴⁵ SHD 3H 1620, Circulaire #92 SCCI/2, 1 December 1928.

²⁴⁶ SHD 3H 126, Rapport du Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant le Territoire d’Agadir, sur l’action politique en 1928, 4.

In some cases, defections of single large blocs were so detrimental to a tribe or confederations of tribes that they were met with calls to holy war, though most of these were unsuccessful and merely betrayed the desperation of traditional leaders to keep their charges from succumbing to the propositions of the Young Lieutenants. To prevent future defections and retain credibility, tribal leaders saw no other recourse than to harass factions that had rallied to the French.

Ambushes, banditry, and vengeful raids on defectors had for “only objective to sustain a state of war,” according to an intelligence officer, perhaps unaware that martial law, direct administration, and subjugating Berbers to the constant threat of death had already contributed to that permanent state of war.²⁴⁷ Intelligence officers responded to harassment by forming war parties to avenge the violence on factions they administered. Inevitably, however, this further weakened traditional authorities who witnessed more factions choose to rally the French than remain tied to weakening leaders.

Many officers spoke of their work as a prolongation of the Republic’s benevolence. “Everywhere we will practice a policy of trust and attraction toward a generous France, a France protector of the humble, a France creator of the Ideal of Justice, order, and progress through peace,” wrote one intelligence officer.²⁴⁸ Yet, terror and pain were the real motivating factors in a faction’s decision to submit and remain in the French Makhzen. Progress through peace came at a dramatic cost to the Berber populations who suffered insurgent-led raids, followed by attacks from regulars, and aerial bombardments to accelerate the process of disaggregation: “the utilization of local partisans, supported by Makhzen soldiers and the goums, preceded and accompanied by massive aerial bombardments, is today, the most effective formula to convince

²⁴⁷ SHD 3H 446, Rapport du Capitaine Touche du 2e Bureau au sujet de sa mission auprès du Général Commandant la 128e Division, du 5-7 Février 1926, 10 February 1926, 4.

²⁴⁸ CADN 13MA/900/587, Note sur la situation politique de la Région de Marrakech à la fin de 1928 et Directives pour 1929, 18 January 1929, 14.

wavering tribes.”²⁴⁹ Success of this method, as Lieutenant Colonel Huot, the director of the *Affaires Indigènes*, explained, could be accurately measured by looking for how quickly the Berber came to meet the intelligence officer once they had made eye contact. In an uneasy situation in the Fez region that prompted Huot to dress down another officer, he noted: “the attitude [of the Berbers] was not unfriendly, but I did not see in their eyes the desire to promptly direct themselves toward the uniformed officer.”²⁵⁰ In the *parc à bon sauvages* Berbers had to seek officers the way captive animals seek their handlers.

No outpost was of course invulnerable and French power was always precarious. Outposts depended on the outside world. Moroccans attacked relief convoys, cut telephone lines, and took pot shots at Berbers contracted to supply the outposts.²⁵¹ At night, a lieutenant stationed in a forward outpost noted, Moroccans advanced within two hundred meters of his outpost to set up a small wall that protected their surveillance operations at night.²⁵² At night, too, there were daring raids to harass the French by sowing grain directly below the canons of the outpost, at the foot of the outpost’s wall. Munitions were limited, especially if they had to be transported by mule across a perilous landscape, and Moroccans knew that each shot the French took on an unarmed Moroccan was a shot they could not take on an armed one.²⁵³ The French could tolerate their casualties, though, especially since the Moroccan auxiliaries and irregulars who formed the bulk of the fighting force of the French Makhzen were doing most of the fighting. Moroccan tribes on the other hand were losing warriors, as well as property, livestock, orchards, and fields.

²⁴⁹ SHD 3H 446, Objet: réponse à #1192/2 du 17 Septembre et 1235/2 du 22 Décembre 1925.

²⁵⁰ SHD 3H 444, Départ du 8e Goum pour Kasba Tadla, 29 October 1928, 3.

²⁵¹ SHD 3H 446, Rapport du Lieutenant Rivalland de l’Etat-Major du Général Commandant Supérieur (2e Bureau) (Suite à mission définie par la Note #86 S/3 du 23 Mars.), 2, 7 April 1926.

²⁵² SHD 3H 446, telephone transcript, situation report Colonel Buchsenschutz, 27 April 1927.

²⁵³ SHD 4H 445 (9M 715), unnamed, undated report on necessity of reoccupying outposts in complicated politics situation, probably 1926 or 1927 given context, 3.

In 1927, French intelligence officers intensified their efforts to directly administer Berberistan, this time using credits for *mise en valeur* projects. The French government, eager to make its empire profitable, embarked on a large-scale program to outfit its overseas territories with modern infrastructure.²⁵⁴ Roads were an essential part of that effort. In Morocco, hundreds of millions of francs were earmarked every year for road construction, mostly in the *bled Makhzen* in service of the existing economic centers. The French army in Morocco, traditionally the most important builder and user of roads in the empire, was also given access to *mise en valeur* funds, but in the fog of war, where, how, and why roads were constructed was not always dictated by rational economic motives. Credits for roads were siphoned into new patronage networks that the Young Lieutenants used to strengthen their hold on rallied factions and further accelerate disaggregation efforts.

An accountant at the Residency General explained how French intelligence officers manipulated metropolitan and Residential budgets to subvert the intent of the French government in the Atlas. Public works were of course intended to be performed by Moroccans under supervision of Europeans, but while many roads were built, a great number of them lingered at the stage of construction site and appeared on multiple budgets over the course of several years to cement the role of the intelligence officer as economic benefactor. Rather than contract the Residency's department of public works to build roads, the process of building a road first began with the army's engineering corps (budget from the Ministry of Defense) who relied on the *Affaires Indigènes* officer for local expertise. Responsibility for the road was then officially transferred to the *Affaires Indigènes* office (budget of the Residency General) which used its

²⁵⁴ On French efforts to reap profits from their empire and civilize through large infrastructure projects see Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), especially chapters 6 and 7.

funds to pay local labor (budget of the Ministry of Defense if the choice of labor depended on local politics and was considered a “war” expenditure). Invariably, however, because little was built, and shoddily at that, building the road in question always became the responsibility of the public works department (budget of the Residency General)—and thus the responsibility of the European and Moroccan taxpayers—so that the cost for one kilometer of road when all was said and done was approximately one million francs. The budget for any particular road was thus taken three times, each time from a different source to the benefit of the intelligence officer, and it was not uncommon for the Ministry of Defense to pitch in with a “few million extra,” especially for roads beyond the front lines.²⁵⁵

In spite of these inefficiencies, the French military built a road system that permitted not only the construction and upkeep of outposts and their attendant economic activities, but also supported a burgeoning mass transportation system in and out of the Atlas.²⁵⁶ *Jemaâs* and the Moroccan representatives of Mixed Chambers of Commerce in regions newly endowed with outposts lobbied French military authorities aggressively to bring road and bridge construction to recently rallied factions since transportation systems helped alleviate some of the misery in the Atlas which in turn helped traditional leaders retain some power over their charges. The *Compagnie de Transports au Maroc, la CTM*, whose white buses with blue and red accents crisscross Morocco today still, offered Berbers in the 1920s new opportunities outside of the mountain economies that the French devastated, though the mining towns and city slums they migrated to were hardly places where they thrived.

²⁵⁵ CADN 1TU/1S/5, Régime fiscal du Maroc, 5.

²⁵⁶ SHD 3H 126, Note sur la situation politique de la région de Marrakesh à la fin de 1928 et directives pour 1929, 16 January 1929, 18.

Before riding a bus out of the Atlas, however, Berbers were required to stop by their regional control office where the officers and technicians of *Identification Générale* used cutting-edge machines specifically made for the Paris Police Prefecture's forensic division and the Protectorate's intelligence services to take photographs, fingerprints, and anthropometric measurements of Moroccans.²⁵⁷ Between 1925 and 1929, the *IG* accumulated dossiers on 133,164 Moroccans and delivered against a 10 franc-tax travel and work permits to Berbers.²⁵⁸ The same state-building and administrative frameworks that transformed peasants into Frenchmen,²⁵⁹ worked to make Berbers into French subjects. Moroccans picked up identification cards crafted by French authorities based on information collected by French authorities that carefully noted tribes of origin, but in effect marked them as protégés of the French Empire. Together, outposts and roads broke up Berberistan into pockets manageable by a few intelligence officers, and what could not be managed directly from an outpost or by a mobile column was policed by air.

Indeed, the terminus for most roads in the Atlas was always an airbase.²⁶⁰ Many were properly planned and supported to land heavy transporters and bombers, but there were also a number of small landing strips built deep inland that were of low strategic value and were unoccupied most of the time. The obvious purpose for an airbase was to launch and land aircraft that killed men and livestock, but small airstrip construction, however, was intended to be far more malicious. Airstrips confounded leadership in the Atlas by masking French intentions and

²⁵⁷ CADN 1MA/200/281, note sur l'organisation et le fonctionnement du Service de l'Identification Générale, 30 November 1936, 3-4.

²⁵⁸ CADN 1MA/200/281, note sur l'organisation et le fonctionnement du Service de l'Identification Générale, 30 November 1936, 5.

²⁵⁹ Eugene Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).

²⁶⁰ SHD 3H 126, Objet: Police du Sahara Occidental, 29 January 1929, 8.

were meant to convey “inevitable progress through constant motion.”²⁶¹ Whereas road construction provided a fairly accurate indication of the direction of French penetration efforts, airstrips built for no apparent reason in remote areas “violently grabbed the attention of dissident tribes.”²⁶² Seemingly abandoned airstrips terrified factions nearly as much as the sound of approaching aircraft and caused “palpable anxiety” among nearby inhabitants who then trekked to the nearest outpost to initiate contact with French officers.²⁶³

Bombs killed, maimed, and destroyed, but the very existence of aircraft, their presence nearby, was enough to subjugate life to the forms of death proposed by French intelligence officers. Air power in empire did not simply extend the gaze of the state in remote areas where French presence was scarce. Flights in formation over strategic targets operated with advanced warning, called “intimidation flights,” were important tools of empire building.²⁶⁴ In the minds of French intelligence officers, they forced Berbers to reveal themselves to the gaze of the state, to “make those who refuse to make known their intentions” bear their conscience to French intelligence officers.²⁶⁵ The goal of Berberistan after all, as explained earlier, was to tame the Berber and bring him to seek contact with the uniformed officer.

French officials in Paris and Rabat were enthusiastic supporters of airpower and supplied credits in 1927 for the construction of a network of airbases that supported heavy bombers and

²⁶¹ SHD 3H 126, Rapport du Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant le Territoire d’Agadir au sujet de la soumission des Ait-ou-M’Rihet, 2.

²⁶² SHD 3H 126, Rapport du Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant le Territoire d’Agadir au sujet de la soumission des Ait-ou-M’Rihet, 2.

²⁶³ SHD 3H 126, Rapport du Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant le Territoire d’Agadir au sujet de la soumission des Ait-ou-M’Rihet, 2.

²⁶⁴ For the best treatments on air power and the extension of modern empire see for example Priya Satia, *Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), chapter 7, as well as Martin Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 194-198.

²⁶⁵ SHD 3H 440, Notice du Lieutenant de Vaisseau Montagne sur la tribu dissidente des Ida ou Tanan, 18 April 1927, 57.

transporters across the Atlas. Aircraft covered more ground more effectively and were a visible and audible presence in the lives of Berbers. Airpower was so devastating to traditional leadership in the Atlas and so intrusive, that the standing practice among dissident factions was to kill downed aviators where they crashed if they were not already dead, not capture them and return them for ransom.²⁶⁶ More importantly, from the perspective of French officials, aircraft had the potential to replace intelligence officers and so curb the ambitions of the Young Lieutenants and the authorities of *Contrôle*.

There was little understanding among administrators in Paris and in Rabat of the logistical network that supported aircraft in colonial policing and warfare; it was only in 1929 that French High Command began strategizing the use of airpower, and only after the Young Lieutenants published a series of books on the subject.²⁶⁷ Airbases, especially those built for heavy aircraft, required, at a minimum, regular deliveries of fuel, engine oil, water, and ammunition. The five-ton truck convoys that supplied the airbases in necessities and ran up and down the Atlas needed drivable roads at least part of the year, and war-ready outfits for reprisal missions on the inevitable attacks by dissidents on convoys. Building new roads and maintaining them consequently required building crews, funds to pay the crews, and soldiers to protect them. Regular air operations also required meteorological information obtainable only through advanced meteorological outposts. New radio transmission towers had to be erected throughout areas of operation to ensure timely coordination of efforts between ground troops and aerial support. Finally, because aircraft were important intelligence gathering tools, aerial photography

²⁶⁶ SHD 3H 126, Objet: Action de l'aviation dans la region de Marrakesh, 13 April 1929, 2.

²⁶⁷ Lieutenant Spillman and Capitaine-Aviateur Pennés, *Les pays inaccessibles du Haut Draâ. Un essai d'exploration aérienne en collaboration avec le service des affaires indigènes du Maroc* (Paris: Comité des travaux historique et scientifiques, Bulletin de la section de géographie, 1929). Spillman and Pennés, both intelligence officers were intelligence officers, and Pennés had been with the AI before becoming an aviator

and the intelligence contained on the glossy black and white images taken from a height of five thousand meters had to be interpreted by separate teams of native informants recruited from air patrolled areas. In other words, what French officials, including officers of the French colonial army, failed to understand was that colonial air power, in Morocco at least, did not replace intelligence officers and certainly did not slow down their encroachment on the Atlas. In fact, it was the opposite. Aircraft provided the ability to project the Young Lieutenants' power from afar, and the ground operations that permitted airpower to be effective required deeper and deeper penetration of the Atlas and broadened the scope of the Young Lieutenants' duties within the Protectorate. Everything from building roads, meteorological outposts, and radio relay stations, to the final intelligence output and the drafting of aerial "mop up" missions was within the purview of the Young Lieutenants. The generals supplied the planes, but the lieutenants decided how to use them.

It was hard for contemporaries to realize the ever-increasing scope of the Residency General's mission in the Atlas. French intelligence officers, for one, obfuscated their actions, and senior officers aware of the aggressive push into the Atlas had little incentive to report them lest they be sent back to the metropole for failing to keep a firm grip on their subordinates. For another, the Residency General under Steeg's impulse continued to squeeze military budgets while attempting to strengthen the *bled makhzen* to weaken the grip of the Young Lieutenants in the Atlas.

Steeg launched a series of irrigation and agricultural projects and worked tirelessly to encourage European immigration into Morocco.²⁶⁸ His efforts earned him the sobriquet

²⁶⁸ On irrigation, agriculture, and immigration under Steeg's tenure see Will Swearingen, *Moroccan Mirages: Agrarian Dreams and Deceptions, 1912-1986* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), especially chapters 2 and 3; see also Diana Davis, *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and French Colonial Expansion in North Africa*, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 136-140.

“Governor of Water.”²⁶⁹ He hoped to offer Berbers an alternative to the death worlds. In 1927, he inaugurated the construction of five hydro-electric dams and planned on constructing another two in 1928. The dams supplied electricity and irrigated nearly a million hectares of farmland created between 1926 and 1928 that was divvied up between two thousand forty-four European settlers.²⁷⁰ The scope of the projects gave new power to the functionaries who worked for public works and agriculture offices of the Residency General, as well as the administrators who worked in service of the official colonization of Morocco.²⁷¹ The resulting influx of money into the Moroccan economy resulted in an “economic boom” between 1927-1930.²⁷²

In the face of Steeg’s plans to attract Moroccan dissidents by promising good wages and work on large construction sites and farms, the Fez Cartel saw in the Residency General’s work an attempt at undoing the work of the Young Lieutenants.

Breaking bad

The British Consul in Rabat, whose sources seemed to have run deep within the French intelligence community in Morocco, began noticing worrisome developments in the Protectorate corroborated by a number of European and Moroccan witnesses from Fez. He wrote to the Foreign Office his concerns with the way French intelligence officers were handling proposals from Rabat and Paris to break the hold of the Fez Cartel on the administration of the Protectorate. *Affaires Indigènes* officers were whipping Moroccan tribes into a frenzy of violence against settlers. They “had no hesitation in teaching the native population to despise civilians;

²⁶⁹ Jean Jacques Perennes, *L’eau et les hommes au Maghreb. Contribution à une politique de l’eau en Méditerranée* (Paris: Karthala, 1993), 126.

²⁷⁰ AN-Ma F75, Discours de M. Th. Steeg au Conseil du Gouvernement du 24 Novembre 1927, 24 November 1927, 9-11.

²⁷¹ Swearingen, *Moroccan Mirages*, 42

²⁷² René Gallissot, “Le Maroc et la crise,” *Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer*, 63, 232 (1976): 477-491, 478.

“civil; c’est rien is the pidgin slogan which, it would appear, is popularly employed.”²⁷³

“Civilians are nothing” was precisely the type of message that aggravated the already volatile situation in the Atlas. Every European slaughtered and abducted by Moroccans received front page treatment in Parisian newspapers and forced the hand of the Resident General to reconsider his plans to sever intelligence officers from their powers in Morocco.

There was more, however. French intelligence officers had also been encouraging tribes to heavily rearm. No one seemed to know who had initially given the order to encourage tribes to procure weapons for themselves. Indeed, one officer claimed that there was no written order to encourage weapons purchases, but that had it had been transmitted verbally.²⁷⁴ Another claimed that the orders were likely in either the “Intelligence” archives or in the “High Command” archives, “but that ever since these archives were relocated to another part of Morocco, written orders [were] hard to find.”²⁷⁵ The ex post facto rationale for rearmament was that tribes that declared their loyalty to the French Makhzen could be trusted with weapons to defend themselves against banditry and to secure French lines between outposts.²⁷⁶

Weapons were expensive. Moreover, since the French army was not supplying weapons—they had few for themselves—and was not directly supplying the money for the purchases, only the richest tribes could seriously engage in weapons trade, though, there also existed a special taxation scheme to incentivize the purchase of weapons by poorer tribes, which were also the most likely tribes to shed their male population to gangs of bandits.²⁷⁷ Weapons were a worthy political investment for tribes and represented assets for individuals. A tribe with

²⁷³ “Civilians are nothing,” BNA FO 371 11917, Aide-mémoire. Militaristic spirit of the French officers now serving in Morocco, 20 January 1926, 4.

²⁷⁴ SHD 9M 715/3H 445, Objet: Armement des Aït Mesrouch, 13 April 1927, 4-5.

²⁷⁵ SHD 9M 715/3H 445, Objet: Armement des Aït Mesrouch, 13 April 1927, 6.

²⁷⁶ SHD 9M 715/3H 445, Désarmement des tribus, 20 November 1926, 6; see also in same carton, Désarmement des tribus, 15 April 1927, 1.

²⁷⁷ SHD 9M 715/3H 445, Désarmement des tribus du Cercle Des Gourrama, 4 May 1927, 2.

weapons was an ally the French and the Makhzen needed to respect. A man with a rifle was a man who could hold his head up high.²⁷⁸ He could borrow against his rifle enough to purchase livestock, and could declare his symbolic independence from traditional authorities, whether the Makhzen or his tribe.

French intelligence officers only supplied verbal authorization for the purchases and looked away from the logistics of the matter. It was not just small quantities of weapons that were being smuggled into Morocco. Quick counts in the late 1920s estimated thousands of weapons of war per tribe, including machine guns and grenades, but not counting hunting rifles and ceremonial rifles for fantasias. In the 1930s, as French authorities destroyed and confiscated the weapons of newly “pacified” tribes, more scrupulous calculations revealed tens of thousands of rifles and machine guns and millions of rounds of ammunition. While the authorization to buy weapons was made on condition that they purchase them in the *Zone de Sécurité*,²⁷⁹ intelligence officers were well aware that Moroccans coming down from their mountains to purchase guns in large quantities from shops run by French settlers (the state of siege made it illegal for Europeans and Moroccans to possess firearms without special military authorization) would have quickly been stopped by local politicians and metropolitan ones would have brought some sort of formal inquiry into the matter. The only recourse was to resort to smugglers.

In a noteworthy example of how international gun-running networks intersected with the Atlas, a *chargé d'affaires* at the French embassy in Romania reported back to the Quai d'Orsay that Romanian police asked him if he had any idea why large quantities of German Mausers and British Martini rifles, old Boer War and World War I stock, were being shipped out of Romania into Morocco. They had tracked the gun-runners from Romania into Belgium and the

²⁷⁸ SHD 9M 715/3H 445, Désarmement des tribus du Cercle Des Gourrama, 4 May 1927, 2.

²⁷⁹ SHD 9M 715/3H 445, Désarmement des tribus, 15 April 1927.

Netherlands, through the Azores, and were certain that the rifles were destined for the Rif and the Atlas.²⁸⁰ There were other reports of Italian submarines surfacing to unload crates of rifles off the coast of the Spanish zone in the contraband havens of Ceuta and Mellila, of German yachts unloading weapons in Tangier, and that there was money to be made too, by French settlers from Algeria who promised weapons in exchange for land.²⁸¹

French intelligence officers knew they were creating a volatile situation. In addition to the political effervescence after the Rif War and the gunrunning, reports from across Morocco noted that harvests were halved across the Protectorate due to lower than normal rainfalls throughout 1926 and 1927, and that in many places, tribes were down to a third of their normal rations compared to previous years.²⁸² Intelligence officers forecast that there was no way for these tribes to make up the caloric deficit until after the 1929 harvest.²⁸³

Consequently, between 1926 and 1929 the Protectorate experienced bloodletting between tribes on a scale that horrified even European commentators. Indeed, hunger, the availability of guns, and authorities who abetted criminal enterprises and told those who suffered the most that their problems were due to the arrival of the settlers Steeg encouraged to come to Morocco, set the entire Atlas ablaze. Intelligence officers lamented their powerlessness to curb the numerous kidnappings and murders of Europeans inside the French Zone. Events on the Fez-Meknès line and on the Algerian border made for bloodcurdling headlines and sparked fears within communities of European settlers concerned for their lives and metropolitan politicians concerned with preventing another war.

²⁸⁰ SHD 3H 135, Transmission d'un document emanant de la Sûreté Générale roumain sur la possibilité d'une nouvelle revolte au Maroc, 4July 1937, 1-4.

²⁸¹ SHD 7NN 2165, Tanger-A/S des frères Petri, 3 November 1927.

²⁸² SHD 9M 715/3H 445, A/S Désarmement des tribus, 15 April 1927, 1.

²⁸³ SHD 9M 715/3H 445, A/S Désarmement des tribus, 15 April 1927, 2.

Thousands of heavily armed and hungry bandits freely roamed the Moroccan Atlas and the French army let them. The bandits were not only causing violent deaths, but they were also starving people who then made their way into Algeria because their access to the *Zone de Sécurité* was blocked by bandits. “We’ve been invaded by hordes of poor and hungry people,” wrote Maurice Viollette, the Governor General of Algeria, “... and we’ve had to set up an entire organization to house and delouse them.”²⁸⁴ Commentary from frontier officers amounted to an I told you so: “the situation is absolutely normal... these are unavoidable incidents in a country in which our actions cannot be felt.”²⁸⁵

Intelligence officers offered little support in combating insecurity. First, they argued that they were powerless since they were not allowed to concentrate political and military powers in their hands and could not push French influence into the mountains. Second, their budgets had been reduced so dramatically after the Rif War, intelligence officers argued they had only been able to concentrate on what they tragically called the “moral disarmament” of insubordinate factions.²⁸⁶ As we read, neither of these accusations was entirely accurate. True, budgets had been culled dramatically, but the intelligence services seemed to manage well enough and could supplement their finances by rerouting money from *mise en valeur* projects. As for concentrating political power, the Young Lieutenants had been doing just that in spite of the orders forbidding them to do so. The point the military authorities who had formed the Fez Cartel in 1925 were making, however, was that empire-building in Morocco required the concentration of political and military power and unity of command, and that they alone could manage a country that had

²⁸⁴ SHD 3H 118, Maurice Viollette to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Resident General Morocco, A/S du Tafilalet, June 1927, 2.

²⁸⁵ SHD 3H 118, Rapport du Général Huré, Commandant la Région de Marrakech, sur les événements qui se sont produits récemment au Dadès et au Ternata, 31 August 1927, 1.

²⁸⁶ CADN 13MA/900/587, Note sur la situation politique de la Région de Marrakech, à la fin de 1928 et Directives pour 1929, 18 January 1929, 15.

been plagued by insurgents since 1907. Instead, officials in Paris and Rabat, including the Parisian generals, not only refused to acknowledge the situation ground forces described to them, but denigrated their work. At a dinner organized by the Residential representatives in Fez and at which Steeg first laid out his policy for Morocco, the British Vice Consul to Fez noted that Steeg “managed to annoy the military guests by giving veiled utterance to the somewhat stupid propaganda of certain civilian administrators that the military were bent on prolonging the [Rif] war for the better amassing of honours.”²⁸⁷ Without allies in power, French intelligence officers instigated the violent episodes of 1927-1929 as retribution against French authorities who broke the French army’s unified political and military powers when Lyautey was ousted and who compromised by their actions the integrity of the Protectorate when they forbid the Young Lieutenants from crossing the Fez-Meknes line into the Atlas. Having poured oil all the fires, intelligence officers watched the Atlas and the valleys below burn knowing that the smallest of incidents anywhere in Morocco translated into weakness and ridicule elsewhere in the empire.

Almost as if to underscore the point, on 20 October 1927, Steeg’s nephew, his son-in-law, as well as two of their friends, the baroness Steinheil and her daughter Marie Prokoroff, were abducted near Meknes by a rogue faction of the Beni Mellal tribe. The frequency of communications in the first days of the brazen attack on Europeans betrayed no panic or belief that the hostages were in danger, which was unusual, since young officers in forward areas were prone to information panic when they were caught off-guard, dispatching dozens of telegrams a day of fresh intelligence gathered from informants without corroborating information.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁷ BNA FO 371 11917, Despatch No. 20., British Vice Consulate Fez to Consul General Rabat, 5 February 1926, 1.

²⁸⁸ SHD 3H 1620, Circulaire, 17 June 1933; C.A. Bayly defines the term information panic as occurring “in the zone of ignorance where the knowledgeable colonial institutions met, but failed to mesh with, the sentiment of the knowing people of the locality.” C.A. Bayly, *Empire and Information*, 143.

According to newspapers and early reports on the matter, Steeg and his friends were hunting near the family farmstead when they were suddenly ambushed by a *djich* from the Beni Mellal. The Beni Mellal belonged to the Zaian confederation of tribes whose insurgency nearly toppled the Residency until a truce was concluded in 1921. Their capacities to rebel against the French were alleged to be meager: they had sustained significant casualties during the rebellion, and as part of the truce they were surrounded by three *Affaires Indigènes* bureaus and agreed to the presence of another three on their lands. Intelligence officers used forced labor to check-in on the population through rotating shifts of about one hundred days each, and regularly patrolled the area by air and cavalry.²⁸⁹

By all accounts, the tribe was perhaps not entirely docile, but it was at least accommodating of settlers and the Residency. The region in which the group was captured was a favorite of local day-trippers and hunters from around Morocco,²⁹⁰ and *colons* like Yves Steeg and Jean Maillet, the Resident General's son-in-law, invested millions in experimental farms in the region.²⁹¹ A civil servant in the region also noted that settlers usually had very cordial relations with local notables and frequented the weekly indigenous market.

However, the warnings of the authorities of *Contrôle* against the French government's plan to reduce the influence of intelligence officers in came to pass as disaffected tribes and rogue elements from subdued tribes raided the valleys in the *bled al Mahkzen* as far as the Rabat suburbs. Lucien Steeg, the Resident General, had been encouraging civilian settlements in the valleys below the Middle Atlas, on the Fez-Meknès line, on lands bought or confiscated from

²⁸⁹ SHD 3H 118, Arrêté du 21 Avril 1927 portant réorganisation administrative de la région de Meknès; on patrols in Beni Mellal see also SHD 3H 118 "Tractations avec les dissidents marocains pour la libération des captifs de Beni Mellal," 1-3.

²⁹⁰ CADN (2012) Meknès 188, #4353 *Contrôleur* Civil Oued-Zem to Résident Général, A/S Enlèvements de Beni-Mellal et de Khenifra, 1.

²⁹¹ Le Matin, "Captifs au Maroc inconnu," 29 November 1927; on the situation in the Beni Mellal see also SHD 3H 118, Note sur la "courtine" de l'Oued el Abid, Note faite à la fin de 1926, 2.

previously dissident tribes as a way of increasing civilian pressure on military administrators. European settlers, he thought, might empower the Residency to further constrain the political and administrative power of intelligence officers if settlers could prove their ability to work in peace with Moroccans, and indeed, many Moroccans found work either on farms or supplying them. The relationship was of course exploitative, but Steeg was banking his political career on the risks pioneers were willing to take to enrich themselves even if it meant possible contact with Moroccans turned hostile.

During the hostage crisis the officers of the French army in Morocco did everything in their power to sabotage Steeg and make him look like a fool. The state of siege gave the French military the power to authorize or deny press passes for the *Zone d'Insecurité* and to censor the press in the *Zone de Sécurité*. The Beni Mellal hostages were located in the *Zone d'Insecurité* and thus subject to stricter rules governing the authorization of press passes and the circulation of Europeans in the area. Inexplicably, press passes were awarded to anyone who asked and news of the kidnapping quickly went global.

The New York Times dedicated three full columns on page 2 of its 6 November 1927 paper to the story and introduced the dramatic event in language that echoed the warnings of intelligence officers to all those who entered the “Land of Fear:”

It is customary to speak of impenetrable fastness in referring to mountains. It is essential when the mountains referred to are those that form the Atlas range in Morocco. The way in which Yves Steeg, nephew of the French Resident General of Morocco, and his three companions have entered the Atlas Mountains is the only way in which Europeans or other “outsiders” enter them. They went in as prisoners.²⁹²

Le Matin devoted over half of its front page every day for nearly two weeks to their special correspondent who told the story of Yves Steeg and his companions’ captivity, and spared

²⁹² “Where the Moors hold Four Prisoners,” The New York Times, November 6, 1927, 2.

readers none of the gruesome details of their plight, including how their hunting dogs were gutted in the arms of their owners. Intelligence officers were only too happy to perpetuate the stereotype that Europeans in Morocco—even the most powerful—could have their lives snuffed and their children carried out of civilization and into a mountainous heart of darkness.

The Steeg saga, indeed, had come on the heels of another gruesome incident: the murder of a public works inspector and his wife in Khenifra and the kidnapping of their daughters, which the press named *l'affaire des fillettes Arnaud*. The whereabouts of the girls were unknown until an informant revealed that they were being held for ransom which further moved public opinion in France and abroad, but especially in Algeria and Tunisia, where the public and administrators were pressing for action to avoid restless tribes in the rest of North Africa committing similar acts.²⁹³

These crimes were initially treated as separate incidents, but soon after negotiations to liberate Steeg's nephew and his companions began, reporters received information that the fate of the Arnaud girls was tied to the Yves Steeg negotiations. Reporters needed no help spinning a story that involved white women and brown savages considering intelligence officers were feeding them gruesome details. Colonel Huot, for example, the deputy director of the *Affaires Indigènes*, wrote with melodrama uncharacteristic for the man or his position that “as for myself, I fear for the European inhabitants in Beni Mellal, especially for the children, and especially on market days.”²⁹⁴

Steeg was not only under pressure by public opinion in Morocco and in Paris to stabilize the security situation in Morocco, but he also faced the recriminations of the intelligence officers he denigrated when he denied that expanding the Protectorate into the *bled siba* was the only

²⁹³ “La tragédie de Khenifra,” *Le Matin*, October 13, 1927.

²⁹⁴ CADN (2012) Meknès 188, #286AI/C Secret, “Sécurité,” 17 November 1927, 4.

way of holding on to the *bled Makhzen*. Both abductions fanned doubts about Steeg's ability to handle Morocco and leaks from his spymasters at the *Affaires Indigènes* added to the panic. Intelligence coming from multiple offices revealed that news of the abductions and the lack of military response against the offending tribe was causing other tribes to think about developing a "cottage industry" in kidnapping.²⁹⁵ In a letter to the Pasha of Meknès, the caïd of the region, a minor tribal chief, was of the opinion that there was a vacuum in leadership: "now the Sultan of dissidents is envy, cupidity, and anger."²⁹⁶

What precisely transpired in the mountains where the hostages were held is hard to ascertain; it was not entirely clear to the intelligence officers in charge of negotiations. The victims' depositions, written when they were released, were imprecise and contained contradictory information including the identity of their captors, but they were in agreement that their captors included three deserters, regulars from either the French army or the Foreign Legion, and several discharged Moroccan veterans who spoke French and possibly read it, too; the captives switched between French, German, and English when communicating with French intelligence officers to confuse the French-speaking captors who also served as interpreters for the group.²⁹⁷ The bandits were unusually well armed, possessing two or three rifles per person and, based on the description of the rifles, estimated that they were models that cost between 270 and 300 douros Hassani a piece, or anywhere between 3,375 and 3,750 francs.²⁹⁸ Neither did the captors seem mangy: they were well-dressed, ate meat at each meal, and had plenty of grain.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁵ CADN (2012) Meknès 188, Confidentiel Réponse à télégramme 486. C, 11 Novembrer 1927.

²⁹⁶ CADN (2012) Meknès 188, Translation, Caïd Ben Naceur to Pasha Meknès, 1, undated, but about Beni Mellal kidnapping negotiations in November 1927.

²⁹⁷ CADN (2012) Meknès 188, A/S Déclarations de M.M. y. Steeg et Mallet, 19 Novembre 1927.

²⁹⁸ CADN (2012) Meknes 188, Déclarations faites par Monsieur Y. Steeg et Maillet, aussitôt après leur arrive à Kasbah Tadla, 19 November 1927, 5; The price in the mountains for a rifle is approximately 3,125 francs and the exchange rate Hassani/Francis is 1/12.50, see CADN (2012) Meknes 188, Telegramme officiel #535/AIT, 30 October 1927.

²⁹⁹ CADN (2012) Meknes 188, Télégramme officiel, # 539 AIT, 1 November 1927.

While identities were hard to confirm, it was clear that the Moroccan bandits who abducted the Steeg party and the daughters of the Arnaud family were savvy criminals, well-equipped, and not just brutes. Combining hostages was an opportunistic move to ask for an even bigger ransom, and when negotiations stalled, they played to European fears of violence on white women by leveraging the threat of either killing the male hostages or separating the women from the men and carting them off to an even more remote area where they would never be found.³⁰⁰

Intelligence officers in charge of negotiating the release of the hostages, however, were unconcerned by those threats. By and large, intelligence from caïds and regional pashas informed French authorities that most tribes and most Moroccans in valleys were of the view that the hostage-takers were wrong to have taken women as captives, and were well out of line holding on to the Arnaud girls for ransom.³⁰¹ Harming the women would have made pariahs of the bandits and prevented them from obtaining succor from their tribes of origin or from regional factions who were already afraid of French reprisals for the original crimes. At any rate, as Moroccan authorities explained, the hostage takers knew they were holding valuable assets.³⁰² Indeed, negotiations began at the price of 10,000 Hassanis per hostage, or 750,000 francs for all six hostages.³⁰³ The captors asked for Hassanis which were the silver coins in use in the Sherrefian empire before the creation of the French Protectorate. They had been phased out of circulation with difficulty after the First World War in an effort to rationalize the Moroccan economy and facilitate commerce across the French empire, but the tribes of the Atlas had

³⁰⁰ CADN (2012) Meknès 188, Translation to Commandant de Cercle, Capitaine Chef de Bureau, Officier Interprète, Pasha, 1 November 1927.

³⁰¹ CADN (2012) Meknès 188, Sécurité/Réponse à Questions/Confirmation d'un telegramme chiffré, 17 November 1927, 3.

³⁰² CADN (2012) Meknès 188, Sécurité/Réponse à Questions/Confirmation d'un telegramme chiffré, 17 November 1927, 2-3.

³⁰³ CADN (2012) Meknès 188, Déclarations faites par Monsieur Y. Steeg et Maillet, aussitôt après leur arrive à Kasbah Tadla, 19 November 1927, 3.

resisted the change, mistrustful of switching to paper currency, and because the exchange rates were unfavorable to them. Indeed, the conversion scheme was also a substantial transfer of wealth from Moroccan coffers to French ones.³⁰⁴ So while Hassanis were no longer the official currency of the Protectorate there was still a thriving market for Hassanis in the Atlas. Acceding to the captors demands for Hassanis was a problem on several points. First, paying the ransom encouraged further kidnappings of Europeans. Second, paying the ransom in Hassanis was contrary to French economic policy in Morocco: it fed contraband networks, but also removed incentives for Moroccans in the mountains to seek contact and trade with settlers and army outposts that transacted only in francs. This was not a technical point, but an integral part of the civilizing mission in the empire. Thirdly, and most importantly, the French did not have the sums demanded in Hassanis. The prices were too steep for the French, but the captors figured they were fair since they were holding Europeans.

Then news that the Steeg family was worth eight million francs, or so the rumor went, quickly drove prices to 50,000 Hassanis per hostage (3,750,000 francs total).³⁰⁵ French negotiators using pashas and their caïds attempted to reason with the hostage-takers. There was no way the French were paying that much, the pashas argued with the captors. The Protectorate was indebted up to the hilt and did not hold many Hassanis in reserve. Some officers panicked. A few tribal leaders reported that French officers were shaking down loyal tribes for the ransom in Hassanis claiming it was proof of their fealty, but the sums raised (32,000 Hassanis) were still far from the count demanded by the hostage takers.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁴ “La Question du Hassani,” *France-Maroc: revue mensuelle illustrée. Organe du Comité des foires au Maroc*, 15 February 1918, 3-40, 37.

³⁰⁵ “La Question du Hassani,” 37.

³⁰⁶ CADN (2012) Meknes 188, Bulletin de Renseignements #161, 1 November 1927, 2.

Far from being uninformed thugs, the bandits countered claims of poverty with an impressive knowledge of the arcane intricacies of French legal obligations toward hostages in Morocco. Khalifa Ould Ziza, an *insoumi*, as the rebels were called, walked into the Ksiba outpost on 2 November 1927, where the commanding officer in charge of negotiations was stationed. He was instructed by the hostage-takers to inform his French interlocutor that they knew that while French authorities were absolved from reimbursing Europeans who suffered damages to their person or property in the *Zone d'Insecurité*, those who were injured in the *Zone de Sécurité* were the responsibility of the French state, which meant *a fortiori*, that if the Protectorate was incapable of assisting Europeans in civilian controlled zones of the Protectorate, ultimately, the French metropolitan government was responsible for paying damages. Furthermore, the hostage-takers were certain that their captives could pay for the ransom out of their personal fortune—at least the Steeg party could—but Ziza made sure to remind the officer that all of the hostages were captured in the *Zone de Sécurité* and that if the Protectorate did not have the money to pay the ransom, he knew that the Banque de France stocked enough Hassanis to avail the French government of its obligations toward Europeans in the Protectorate.³⁰⁷ Ziza, perhaps a smuggler himself, also demonstrated impeccable knowledge of shipping times between Paris and the Moroccan hinterland. The French government had eight days to get the money to free the hostages: “five days by boat, one day of travel by truck from Casablanca to Kasbah-Tadla, one day from Kasbah-Tadla to Beni Mellal, and one day from Beni Mellal to Ksiba.”³⁰⁸

Emboldened by the fix the French were in, the bandits also made political demands. The captors wanted an eight-year truce in the region with the promise of no aerial bombardments or reprisals on neighboring tribes for their actions, and demanded the release of what they called

³⁰⁷ CADN (2012) Meknès 188, Bulletin de Renseignements #162, 2 November 1927.

³⁰⁸ CADN (2012) Meknès 188, Bulletin de Renseignements #162, 2 November 1927.

political prisoners, bandits punished for crimes against the state with sentences ranging from five to twenty years of imprisonment or hard labor.³⁰⁹ Every single one of the forty-three prisoners included on the list passed on to intelligence officers was tried in front of a war tribunal for gun-running. Military advocates did not need to ask for permission either from civilian courts or Moroccan ones to try weapons smugglers, since any form of contraband-dealing was a straight infraction of the state of siege. The hostage-takers had likely called these prisoners political because they were sentenced for participating in an illicit economic network that was in fact condoned by military authorities for Berbers loyal to the French Makhzen, but not for those in dissidence, and recall from Captain Martin's mission report, the appellation bandit was often more of a political category than a legal one.³¹⁰

The prisoner release scheme, however, was orders of magnitude more fraught than getting Hassanis from Paris to the hostage-takers. Although the use of formal and informal military courts and the transformation of misdemeanors and felonies into crimes against the state subjected Moroccans to the harshest penalties of French military law, trial by military courts also allowed those condemned to petition the highest instances of justice to obtain redress. To release the forty-three criminals tried in front of a *Conseil de Guerre* required a pardon from the President of the Republic after lengthy ministerial consultations.³¹¹ Metropolitan authorities had resisted becoming implicated in the Protectorate's daily workings because Moroccan affairs discussed privately by the government had a way of making their way into embarrassing Parliamentary debates. Studying each case, interviewing officers, the prisoners, their lawyers,

³⁰⁹ CADN (2012) Meknès 188, Liste des prisonniers Ait Ouirah condamnés par le Conseil de Guerre de Fez pour contrebande d'armes/Réponse à télégramme #4480, 4 Novemeber 1927, 1-3.

³¹⁰ Of course as Eric Hobsbawn has shown, the term bandit has always had political connotations Eric Hobsbawn, *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1965).

³¹¹ CADN (2012) Meknès 188, A/S/ Ait Ouirrah Condamnés par le conseil de Guerre, 4 November 1927.

discovering maladministration, dealing with the attacks of political adversaries of the government who were sure to make hay of the situation, and then deciding the fate of forty-three criminals was as good as inviting calls for a new government.

The developments in the Atlas attracted attention to a situation civilian authorities had shrugged off as a caprice by the Young Lieutenants of the Fez Cartel to have more medals pinned to their chest. The immediate consequence of the kidnappings and murders of European settlers was a spate of letters to the Residency General and military authorities demanding the immediate disarmament of tribes and empowering intelligence officers to rid the Protectorate of dissidents. Chambers of commerce and agriculture, as well as regional associations of settlers pushed Paris and Rabat to intervene beyond the Fez-Meknes line to disarm tribes and police the hinterlands for bandits, precisely where officials in Rabat and in Paris did not want to send in the army. The alternative was that violent crimes would eventually discourage the settlement of Morocco and dampen economic prospects and the revenue imperial administrators hoped to receive from the Protectorate.

The situation was unpalatable for both Paris and Rabat. What could not be explained away was the mismanagement of a problem to which everyone seemed to have the same solution, save the Protectorate's leading administrators. As the Chamber of Agriculture explained it to the Secretary to the Resident General, the problem was that civilian administrators suffered from not being subordinate to military intelligence, "an organization that allowed them to be very precisely informed of everything that happened in their circumscription."³¹² Settlers demanded the concentration of political and military powers in the hands of intelligence officers.

³¹² SHD 9M 715 (3H 445), Le Président de la Chambre d'Agriculture à Monsieur le Secrétaire Général du Protectorat, 30 August 1928, 2.

Faced with the political backlash from civil society and the military, and political masters in Paris eager to stay away from the mess in Morocco, officials in Rabat stopped answering phone calls from intelligence officers concerning negotiations.³¹³ Steeg and his advisors were out of options and left the hostage negotiations to intelligence officers, conceding that the best administration for the Atlas was the one intelligence officers provided.

On 14 November 1927, without much fanfare, the hostage-takers and French intelligence officers settled on 31,000 Hassanis per hostage, twenty caftans, twenty burnous (Berber cloaks made of coarse wool), twenty shirts, one small ceremonial horse saddle, and the liberation of six political prisoners serving sentences in military prisons in Morocco.³¹⁴

A year later, in January of 1929, Steeg was called back to Paris. He had never commanded the respect of the army, but losing the confidence of settlers and businesses ensured that Paris looked unkindly on the ransoms paid for the Arnaud girls, the Steeg party, and the others unfortunate victims caught in the death world of the Young Lieutenants.³¹⁵

It is unlikely that intelligence officers manufactured the complex hostage situation in Beni Mellal territory to orchestrate the recall of Steeg and obtain a free hand in the Atlas, though they certainly did everything they could to encourage violence there. The violence, they hoped, would underscore the value of intelligence officers in Morocco and highlight their necessity in the face of dissidence in the Atlas. On that count, intelligence officers made a resounding point: as the chambers of commerce and agriculture explained to the Residency General, settlers were willing to tolerate outsized military presence so long as their lives and property were protected.

³¹³ CADN (2012) Meknès 188, Très confidentiel/Bulletin de Renseignements, 9 November 1927.

³¹⁴ CADN (2012) Meknès 188, BR #54, Confidentiel, 14 November 1927, 2.

³¹⁵ Ahmed Bel Madani Ben Haïoun, *Coupable de fidélité. Heurs et Malheurs de l'amitié Franco-Marocaine* (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 2008), 48.

What was noticed, yet remained unsaid, however, was the catastrophic failure of tribal policy and the phenomenal success of the French Makhzen. The Beni Mellal affair seems to indicate that the Young Lieutenants succeeded beyond their wildest dreams in bringing the Berbers into the fold of the Protectorate, though perhaps not always in the way they intended. The death worlds that radiated from the outposts were, as we noted, important rally points for the Berbers of the Atlas. But those who resisted the death worlds seemed also to have been integrated into the French Makhzen. Indeed, the hostage-takers might have been criminals, but if we overlook how they earned a living we notice that they could have been model subjects of the French Empire. They spoke French having learned the language during their military service, they understood the intricacies of the military laws that organized Europeans and Moroccans, or at least they understood the laws that interested them the most, they manipulated the culture of empire in Morocco to maximize the impact of their actions by threatening women and girls, they understood how a modern banking system and global shipping networks could be made to support grey and black-market economies in the Atlas, and they were also adroit political operators by French standards.

In January 1929, Lucien Saint replaced Theodore Steeg as Resident General. He quickly became an advocate of “Pacification,” and as we will see in chapter 5, he was also a friend to the Fez Cartel. Saint’s insistence on mobilizing troops and expanding the role of intelligence officers worried the Parisian political establishment.³¹⁶ Shortly after being put in place, the French Parliament formed a commission under the leadership of Dr. Péchin, a *député*, to study the state

³¹⁶ Moshe Gersovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco: Colonialism and Its Consequences* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 149. See also General Juin’s preface to General Huré’s *La pacification du Maroc. Dernière étape* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1952).

of military affairs in the Protectorate. Usually, if the chain of command were respected, such a commission would examine how the army was prosecuting operations approved by civilian officials, but Péchin's commission had the unusual task of discovering the mission the army had set for itself. Chief among the questions the government wanted answered was "are the Resident General and the officers of the high command attempting to get us involved in large-scale military operations?"³¹⁷ "The answer is clear," he wrote, "every single interaction I have had with the Resident General and the officers of the high command indicates that they are unfavorable to a large-scale operation to reduce the scope of the dissidence, though one general seems to have a slightly different point of view."³¹⁸ Péchin asked the right questions but it seems he received specious answers.

The question of how to ensure stability in the Protectorate continued to preoccupy settlers and business interests with concerns in Morocco. The banditry that the Young Lieutenants encouraged as a side effect of their interference in the Atlas also had an impact on sectors of the French economy that were of strategic importance, such as commercial aviation. Latécoère, the Toulouse-based aircraft manufacturer and l'Aéropostale, the French airline, directly petitioned the Air Ministry to weigh in on events in Morocco and lobby for an aggressive military response to banditry. They wanted the area around their ground operations pacified. Both companies jointly operated the "France-Americas line" with service between Toulouse, Casablanca, Dakar, and South America, which transited through southern Morocco for re-fueling and repair on the forward airstrips the Young Lieutenants built. Latécoère and l'Aéropostale complained that their planes were regularly attacked on the ground by bandits. The pilots were taken hostage—the bandits knew the difference between a war plane and commercial

³¹⁷ SHD 3H 119, Rapport de M. Péchin, député membre de la commission de l'armée, October/November 1929, 2.

³¹⁸ SHD 3H 119, Rapport de M. Péchin, député membre de la commission de l'armée, October/November 1929, 2.

aircraft—and were released at the going rate of about seven thousand francs.³¹⁹ The cargo, however, was the real prize. Bandits attacked the planes for the post they carried between Europe, Africa, and South America.³²⁰

Urbain Blanc, whom I called *Contrôle Prime* at the end of the last chapter, answer on behalf of the Residency General. He responded favorably to their request and assured both companies that Saint had given instruction “to politically prepare the submission of tribes and... undertake the construction of roads that will feed into outposts to achieve a permanent occupation of the land and guarantee peace in the area.”³²¹ The Residency General was authorizing the creation of new death worlds, and condoning the direct administration of the tribes of the Atlas by the Young Lieutenants.

³¹⁹ SHD 3H 126, A/S. Avion Latécoère tombé le 11 août 1929 en zone dissidente, 22 August 1929.

³²⁰ SHD 3H 126, Sécurité de la ligne aériennes France-Amériques dans le Sud-Marocain, 10 Octobre 1929, and SHD 3H 126 Ligne aérienne France-Amériques. Mesures de sécurité à prendre dans le Sud-Marocain, 2 Octobre 1929, 3.

³²¹ SHD 3H 126, Sécurité de la ligne aériennes France-Amériques dans le Sud-Marocain, undated, but follows request contained in letter from 2 Octobre 1929, 2.

Chapter 3: Intelligence is governing, 1929-1936

This chapter turns away from the use of intelligence in war to examine its use in governing. Between 1929 and 1936, the work of French intelligence officers in Morocco underwent a dramatic transformation as capricious weather, a difficult physical environment, economic maladministration, and colonial wars destabilized the Protectorate. French intelligence recognized that the series of insurgencies that had plagued the Protectorate from its inception were due to deteriorating economic conditions. Policies elaborated in Paris and implemented by the Residency General and European settlers were to blame. A terrible situation for Moroccans only worsened when foreign investments declined during the Great Depression and when goods manufactured in Japan flooded Moroccan markets putting countless artisans out of business. To subdue nascent rebellions and stabilize the politics of the Protectorate, French intelligence officers, took control of the Protectorate's economy, but in the process destroyed what little remained of the pretense of indirect rule in Morocco.

In 1927, reports from panic-stricken civil servants in Rabat and Casablanca poured into the office of the Secretary to the Residency General, Urbain Blanc. "Hordes of vagabonds" were entering these cities. At first, officials attempted to push the "vagabonds" back to their regions of origin, but that was impossible. They had suffered severe malnourishment prior to the exodus from their homes and were further exhausted from their journey. "The physiological state of these poor souls prevents even their slow evacuation," one official wrote, though he had

apparently arrived at that conclusion only after forcing the “vagabonds” on a death march back to wherever they came from and witnessing their deaths where they stood.³²²

Authorities naturally blamed the military’s aggressive posture in the Rif and Atlas for the outflow of refugees, but as the “vagabonds” continued to pour into Casablanca and Rabat, it became clear that they also originated from places where there were no military operations. The crisis was indeed so widespread that the official response to it was to build permanent housing centers, not only in areas bordering Casablanca and Rabat, but in every circumscription in Morocco.³²³ Each housing center was run by French intelligence officers and was built to accept two hundred occupants for two months at a time. During that time they were sheltered and fed, and once they were healthier, the men were enlisted into the Goums (Moroccan shock troops under French command) or redirected onto public and private work sites and farms, while the women, children, elderly, and infirm were sent back to their regions of origin and entrusted to local Moroccan authorities.³²⁴ Many more men and women, young and old, healthy and infirm, had likely died of hunger and exhaustion before they made their way into the housing centers, though their deaths are not recorded.

Hunger is the subtext of most archival material emanating from the French Protectorate of Morocco during the interwar years. While French intelligence officers went to great lengths to never have to use the word famine to describe the condition of Moroccans during this period, they frequently employed the word *disette*, or hunger and scarcity. As James C. Scott argues in the case of peasant communities in Southeast Asia, peasants demanded from their political masters—regardless of who they were—only the opportunity to eke out subsistence minimums

³²² CADN 11MA/900/755, Création de centres d’hébergement pour les miséreux, 13 April 1927, 4.

³²³ CADN 11MA/900/755, Lutte contre la misère/Utilisation des miséreux hébergés. 25 April 1927, 1.

³²⁴ CADN 11MA/900/755, Lutte contre la misère/Utilisation des miséreux hébergés. 25 April 1927, 2-3.

and fulfill basic needs. In Southeast Asia, if colonial rebellions were recurrent it was because colonial officials introduced peasant economies to the vagaries of global markets and heavily taxed peasants which frequently drove them to the brink of famine.³²⁵ Furthermore, when erratic weather phenomena, such as El Niños, added to the woes of poor farmers who suffered terrible colonial governance and the vicissitudes of market economies, the consequences were devastating, leading to what Mike Davis has called, in the case of 19th century South Asia, Victorian Holocausts.³²⁶ In Morocco, as in South and Southeast Asia, peasant rebellions were not the consequence of normal governmental functions on the lives of peasants, but a response to the very strong possibility of famine. With this analytical lens, the lexicon used by intelligence officers to describe the hostile populations they faced—xenophobic, jealous of their freedoms, protective of their land, resistant to change—were terms that masked the hunger and the physical suffering that Moroccans endured. Colonial wars and nationalist protests masked this pain and prevented authorities from coming to grips with the fact that if the Protectorate was in a state of permanent turmoil it was because it existed on the precipice of a humanitarian catastrophe. Several years of drought and failed harvests had led to the crisis of “vagabonds” at the doors of Casablanca and Rabat. Traditionally, the fellah, or peasant, from the Moroccan hinterlands who had fallen on hard times had sought refuge and work in nearby cities such as Fez, Meknes, and Marrakesh. It was estimated, for example, that one seventh of the population in Marrakesh was comprised of economic migrants who migrated from the Atlas to the city specifically because of terrible economic conditions in the Atlas.³²⁷ If the “vagabonds” had bypassed these cities and

³²⁵ James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

³²⁶ Mike Davis, *Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World* (London: Verso, 2002).

³²⁷ René Hoffher, *Revenus et niveaux de vie indigène*, (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1934), 177.

travelled further west to Casablanca and Rabat, it is probably because economic and political conditions in those cities prevented the assimilation of more economic migrants.

By 1929, dire poverty was such a pervasive phenomenon that it was the subject of daily commentary among the inhabitants of the rural regions the “throngs of vagabonds” crossed. Intelligence officers noted growing discontent over the treatment reserved for the poor by the French and about French management of the Protectorate in general.³²⁸ These grumblings fed into another, more important problem. Against the backdrop of “Pacification,” “vagabonds,” poor migrant workers in cities, and people who were not yet paupers, but not too far away from being completely destitute and who witnessed the misery of others, posed serious security risks to the Protectorate.

Indeed, in the summer of 1929, hunger turned to upheaval. Laborers in cities were recalled by their tribes of origin.³²⁹ It started with small groups of workers originally from the south of Morocco who were employed in farms and factories in the Casablanca and Rabat regions. On their way south, they stopped in several cities to spread news that their tribe was going to war against the French.³³⁰ French police and intelligence noted that hundreds of migrant workers responded to this call. The tribe in question was in an already dire economic situation—it had shed hundreds of able-bodied men for remittances from cities—but its leadership saw no other recourse to the tribe’s problems than a desperate insurrection. “Pacification,” was made up of myriad small episodes that seemed to be about political differences between Moroccans and the French but were really about access to resources and alleviating hunger.

³²⁸ CADN 11MA/900/755, Refoulement des miséreux, 23 June 1927.

³²⁹ CADN 11MA/900/755, Circulaire #10 SGP, situation dans le Sud Saharien, 10 August 1929.

³³⁰ CADN 11MA/900/755, Circulaire, 10 August 1929; Circulaire 45 SCC 1/2, 23 July 1929; Circulaire 12 SGP, 20 July 1929; Passage d’étrangers sur le territoire de l’Annexe.

Data and colonial administration

The arrival of the “vagabonds” at the walls of Casablanca and Rabat and the suspicion in 1929 that most of Morocco was on the verge of a calamity set intelligence officers on the hunt to find out the causes of the crisis. The French colonial military apparatus was readying itself to “pacify” Morocco. It was therefore imperative, first, to secure areas behind front lines which included ensuring that columns of hungry and desperate people were not roaming the country side or rioting in cities. Second, there were questions about how to secure the gains made by “Pacification.” There would be no mercy from the French for insurgent tribes, but the surge in military personnel and materiel was only temporary and it was important to think about the peace that would have to be negotiated after the French had exhausted Moroccans’ capacity to revolt. The problem intelligence officers faced was the lack of data on the economy of rural Morocco. What is surprising about the content of Morocco’s colonial intelligence archives created prior to 1942 is at once the mass of information available and the conspicuous lack of economic intelligence. For historians of the French empire, such as Martin Thomas, gaps in colonial information systems resulted from having to administer large swaths of land filled with unfamiliar and hostile people with too few bureaucrats and too little infrastructure.³³¹ For René Gallissot, an economic historian of the colonial Maghreb, the paucity of data owed mostly to the fact that French administrators saw no need to rationalize the bureaucratic processes associated with the collection of statistics necessary for good government until 1935, when the effects of the Great Depression in Morocco became so grave that systematic collection of such data became necessary.³³²

³³¹ Martin Thomas, *Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers and Protest in the European Colonial Empires, 1918-1940*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 3.

³³² René Gallissot, “Le Maroc et la crise,” *Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer* 63, no. 232-233 (1976): 477-491, 478.

In the case of Morocco, the lack of economic intelligence and quantitative information available in the archives also reflects a tension unique to the Protectorate's colonial bureaucracies of the interwar period. To ensure that it did not stray too far off from the stipulations of the Treaty of Fez, the Residency General, by design, prevented its bureaucracies from collecting too much information and regularly evaluated whether it could decentralize some of its functions to regional and local administrations to avoid the appearance of direct administration. The most significant decentralization measure was a 1927 ordonnance that offloaded the regional budget process from Residential to regional authorities, curbing the intake of economic intelligence for one of the most sensitive aspects of colonial government in Morocco.³³³ Prior to 1927, the Protectorate's regional budgets were drafted either at the Residency General or at the Ministry of Defense, but without information on living conditions on the ground neither Rabat nor Paris were in possession of the tools necessary to draft local budgets and neither were they in possession of a gauge to determine the effectiveness of colonial government.³³⁴

The environment, wheat, debt, and the politics of hunger

French intelligence officers thus pursued their mission of "pacifying" Morocco with only approximate knowledge of the political and economic topography they were entrusted with administering. It was not long, however, before it became abundantly clear why emaciated Moroccans had come streaming out of the countryside. Morocco endured a series of droughts, followed by excessive cold, punctuated by acridian infestations that blighted harvests, which,

³³³ CADN 2mi 2361, Guy Scalabre, *Le budget special des régions*, 1936, 5-15.

³³⁴ CADN 2mi 2355, Jean Leblanc, *Le pénitencier Agricole d'Ali Moumen (Chaouia Sud)*, undated, 29. See general discussion on the relationship between region, technical services, and institutions in budget-making.

when taken together, created the right conditions for hunger among fellahs, and the right conditions for banks, settlers, and usurers to squeeze fellahs of what little they had left. For French intelligence officers, there would be no lasting peace so long as Moroccan fellahs were hungry.

Agriculture in Morocco required regular and even precipitation. In fact, today still, despite modern irrigation and advanced agricultural techniques, the primary indicator in Morocco of crop success or failure is precipitation levels.³³⁵ Climate datasets for the interwar years in Morocco are incomplete owing to different standards for record collection, but forensic climate scientists reckon that North Africa experienced El Niños in 1925, 1926, 1931, 1932, and 1934.³³⁶ El Niños occur irregularly when the tropical eastern Pacific Ocean warms in response to weakening trade winds that normally blow westward from South America toward Asia.³³⁷ The warm phase of the this phenomenon, known as El Niño, has particularly noticeable effects on the regions bordering the Pacific region, but also results in droughts in North Africa. The cold phase of the phenomenon, La Niña, is associated with both below and above average rainfalls depending on the region. It is likely that between 1925 and 1933 Morocco experienced average year over year rainfall deficits of sixteen per cent during planting seasons, while also experiencing during the same period a sixteen per cent rainfall overage during harvests, which

³³⁵ Simone Gregaglio, et al., “New multi-model approach gives good estimations of wheat yield under semi-arid climate in Morocco,” *Agronomy for Sustainable Development* 35, no. 1(2015): 157-167, 157. As the authors note, the difference between a dry season and a wet season is dramatic: 1994-1995 yielded only 1.1 million tons of wheat, whereas the wetter crop season 1995-1996 yielded 5.9 million tons.

³³⁶ Klaus Wolter and Michael Timlin, El Niño/Southern Oscillation Behavior since 1871 as diagnosed in an extended multivariate ENSO index (MEI.ext), *International Journal of Climatology* 31, 7(2011), 1074-1087. While the index used by the authors of the article indicate strong possibilities of El Niño events in 1925 and 1931, they are more cautionary in their assessments of climate events in 1932 and 1934.

³³⁷ David Enfield, “The ‘El Niño’ FAW: Frequently Asked Questions About El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO),” Atlantic Oceanographic & Meteorological Laboratory of the National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, April 2003, www.aoml.noaa.gov/general/enso_faq/; see also Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World* (London: Verso, 2002), 17.

either dried or drowned crops and also killed livestock.³³⁸ French authorities recorded a major drought from 1929 through 1933, and French intelligence reports point to numerous periods of excessive cold and precipitation generalized throughout Morocco. El Niños caused very mild winters in the mountains of the Rif and the Atlas which negatively impacted fruit trees that required prolonged near-freezing temperatures to regenerate and yield a good crop. Mild winters also inhibited precipitation in the plains down-valley from the Atlas Mountains where French settlers had long been encouraging the speculative large-scale production of water intensive crops, especially wheat.³³⁹ The years after El Niños were also difficult. The cold and rainy weather that followed a year of poor harvests created conditions for disease among people and their animals. Finally, during this period, while some years were better than others, the good years were often blighted by invasions of locusts originating in the south of Morocco that made their way into central Morocco, precisely where crops grew best.

Locusts had been the first indicator for intelligence officers that Morocco's ecology had not been adequately accounted for in earlier intelligence estimates of Morocco. In 1915, advanced reconnaissance teams working just over the Fez-Meknes line to monitor the activities of hostile tribes witnessed an impressive invasion of locusts. The damage to crops was significant and, in the context of a drawdown of French forces in Morocco because of the war in Europe, some officers feared that the material destruction occasioned by the locusts might lead to an uncontrolled displacement of several of the worst affected tribes into the *Zone de Sécurité*. It was then that intelligence officers began to suspect a link between Morocco's environment and

³³⁸ Clive Spina, *African Ecology: Benchmarks and Historical Perspectives* (New York: Springer, 2012), 144.

³³⁹ Edmund Burke III and Kenneth Pommeranz, *The Environment and World History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 105; see also Will Swearingen, *Moroccan Mirages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), chapter 2. For the best overview of Moroccan climate, see "A Note on the Geography and Ecology of the Maghreb" in Diana Davis, *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and the French Colonial Expansion in North Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007).

political insurgency. The investigation that followed to determine the origin of locusts and their effects on the Protectorate was small, but it was conducted by a crack team. Colonel Simon, Lyautey's chief of intelligence, was personally involved in collecting and analyzing the intelligence his subordinates collected from the frontier. The field officers were fluent in Arabic and in local dialects, but they were also savvy diplomats who survived weeks living with tribes that were overtly hostile to French authority.

Locusts initially only appeared during the "good years," when precipitation was normal, "usually after a year of drought, but never two years in a row," though the latter condition was no longer true in the 1930s when locusts appeared on a yearly basis.³⁴⁰ The flight paths of locusts impressed Moroccans and French alike. They moved in columns, and some, spotted by intelligence officers, averaged 400 meters in length, 400 meters in width, and 10 meters in height, which meant that about 1.6 million cubic meters of locusts spilled in a highly concentrated manner on crops. A column destroyed everything in its path. As one intelligence officer reported tersely: "bark eaten, olive groves completely devastated, more damage to wheat than to barley because more tender—not an orange left."³⁴¹ News of a column of locusts was enough to dispirit Moroccans, according to an intelligence officer who could not get his charges to mobilize against the threat: "neither fines, nor imprisonment stimulates them."³⁴² There were plenty of reasons for discouragement. Rivers did not stop locusts: they used floating islands of drowned locusts to cross from one bank to another. Fire did not stop them: burning walls of hay two meters high were a mere hinderance. Corrugated steel walls enclosed small columns of locusts until they starved to death, but there was not enough steel to contain all the locusts. The

³⁴⁰ CADN IMA/300/73, Enquête complémentaire: invasion de sauterelles assez forte à Mazagan en 1901, à Rabat et un peu partout en 1904, 1905, 1907, 1911, 1915, undated but from mid-1916 based on context of related documents.

³⁴¹ CADN IMA/300/73, Enquête complémentaire, 1.

³⁴² CADN IMA/300/73, Enquête complémentaire, 1.

only remedy to stop the advance of a column was to coat arable land in coal oil and set it alight. The toxic inferno killed the locusts but poisoned the land. Fellahs in the flight path of locusts were spared, but others, ultimately, suffered long-term consequences from the loss of land, or were altogether forced to relocate. The devastation locusts occasioned in the space of a few months was sufficient to set back Moroccan peasants for years. Locusts caused famines only occasionally, according to the data intelligence officers collected, but they caused significant long-term harm to local economies based on agriculture and urban economies that relied on trade with Moroccan peasants.³⁴³

The history of locust invasions made its way from Colonel Simon to General Lyautey, the Resident General. It was a simple tally of the years locusts had been sighted and the damages they occasioned, as reported by Moroccans to French intelligence officers. There were no explicit conclusions, but both Simon and Lyautey—intimately familiar with the history that had preceded the French Protectorate of Morocco—read the suggestions of their subordinates who showed that there was a correlation between the appearance of locusts and political unrest in the years that preceded French Protectorate and that political unrest was likely to continue to follow the appearance of locusts even with the French in control.³⁴⁴ The damage locust invasions occasioned aggravated the already terrible economic conditions of the Sherifian Empire. The desperation of the hungry could be exploited for political gain.

³⁴³ CADN IMA/300/73, Enquête complémentaire, 1.

³⁴⁴ The implicit connection made in the report, but which would have stood out to Lyautey, is that the Abu Himara revolt (1902 and 1909), came in the wake of an invasion of locusts in 1901 that covered principally the regions of Fez and Sefrou, as well as the fertile Ouerghla valley. Abu Himara's rebellion is mainly told as the insurgency led by a pretender to the throne of Morocco, but Abu Himara's foot soldiers came mostly from the Fez region and the parts of the Rif just north of the Ouerghla valley that relied on wheat purchases to supplement their diets. These were regions devastated by locusts and inhabited by populations that also suffered from the Sultan's economic mismanagement and heavy-handed tax collection. Abu Himara's rebellion, as Ross Dunn, a historian of Morocco, argues, accelerated the takeover by France. Ross Dunn, "The Bu Himara Rebellion in Northeast Morocco: Phase 1," *Middle Eastern Studies* 17, 1 (1981):31-48, 33-34.

Environmental factors, locusts and droughts, were archived as threats to the politics of the Protectorate, but in the middle of the First World War, Morocco's ecology remained a low priority for intelligence officers too busy with daily emergencies to focus on long-term planning. The ecology continued to be a low priority after the First World War, when intelligence officers were busy putting down the rebellious Zaian confederation of tribes in central Morocco; and it was still a low priority after the Zaian War when the Rif overran the Protectorate. As time passed and as intelligence officers redeployed, retired, and died, the capriciousness of nature in Morocco and its power to influence politics was erased from the institutional memory of French military intelligence.

Years of droughts and acridian infestations, however, were only one facet of a bigger macroeconomic problem for Moroccan fellahs, and the Protectorate in general. Residential policy, European settlers, and credit institutions heavily incentivized the production of wheat. It was estimated that by 1929 nearly ninety-five percent of Morocco's arable land was dedicated to wheat production.³⁴⁵ The dramatic increase in wheat cultivation came at the expense of livestock, which had traditionally been a reliable store of value for Moroccans. In a little more than decade, Moroccans had gone from polyculture, precisely to mitigate environmental concerns, to banking on having enough saved away during hard times by speculating on the continued increase in wheat prices.³⁴⁶

Wheat, however, is a water intensive crop with soft textures making it not only vulnerable to Morocco's capricious precipitation patterns but also to locusts. Yields varied widely from year to year—they were easily halved or doubled—as a result of these factors,

³⁴⁵ CADN 2mi 2351, La protection de la production marocaine, 1933, 16.

³⁴⁶ CADN 2mi 2350, Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation économique indigène dans les Duokkala, undated but likely to be 1932.

though intensive speculation spurred by cheap credit to encourage and sustain European settlement in Morocco kept wheat prices artificially high even when yields exceeded demand.³⁴⁷ Speculation intensified between 1926 and 1929 when France agreed to purchase nearly all of Morocco's wheat production destined for export as part of the Protectorate's integration into the imperial market. In France, Moroccan wheat sold for 80 francs more per quintal/hectare than domestic, French, wheat.³⁴⁸ It was inefficient and costly to produce wheat in most of Morocco and only a few European farmers with large holdings in the Chaouia and the Gharb were thought to have made a profit from wheat.

In 1929 wheat prices collapsed in Morocco. The credit that sustained speculation froze at the same time as wheat imports into Morocco became cheaper.³⁴⁹ The collapse of the wheat market revealed the enormity of the debt held by lenders and the probable collusion between big farmers and lenders to artificially drive up prices.³⁵⁰ French farmers were deeply indebted; the French government had to bail out French farmers *en masse* in 1930 and nearly every year after.³⁵¹ Moroccan fellahs, on the other hand, faced the vicissitudes of market forces alone. In fact, Moroccans were probably significantly more exposed to the collapse of wheat prices than Europeans as a result of predatory lending practices. The number of Moroccans in debt was unknown because no one had bothered to record for the Residency the total amount of credit in circulation among Moroccans, but it became official Residential policy after 1934 to assume that nearly every single Moroccan—farmer or not—was in hock to predatory lenders.³⁵²

³⁴⁷ Marcel Amphoux, "L'évolution de l'agriculture européenne au Maroc," *Annales de Géographie* 42, no. 236 (1933): 175-185, 176.

³⁴⁸ Amphoux, "L'évolution," 176.

³⁴⁹ Amphoux, "L'évolution," 176.

³⁵⁰ Amphoux, "L'évolution," 178.

³⁵¹ Amphoux, "L'évolution," 178.

³⁵² CADN 2mi 2355, François Lefort, *Le crédit indigène au Maroc et dans les autres pays de l'Afrique du Nord*, undated but probably 1935, 2.

It is precisely during this period, that the role of the intelligence officer underwent a dramatic transformation. Prior to 1930, intelligence officers had sought to answer in their monthly situation reports questions about individuals: who was powerful enough to be a French collaborator, who was powerful enough to be an enemy, how power was employed, the number of supporters would-be collaborators commanded, and the results of French pressure on specific individuals. Indirect rule required intimate knowledge of persons and manipulating them was a sophisticated affair. Hungry Moroccans roaming the Protectorate proved however that there were limits to indirect rule. Governing through a privileged interlocutor was not enough to control starving masses. As a result, intelligence officers ceased focusing on individuals in their reports. The new priority was collecting environmental and economic data.

The most important paragraph of the new field reports intelligence officers wrote every month for the superiors was the one on meteorological conditions. The weather became the preeminent political signal of the Protectorate. Under the header “*A-Situation Politique Générale*,” the first paragraph on the first page of the report was no longer about people, but a sentence on whether it had rained or not. The December 1930 briefing for the Rehama region in the Marrakesh military region thus began:

Regular and abundant rains allowed the fellahs to sow grain in their fields... vegetation blocked by a very cold spurt which has slowed growth, but all the grains sprouted normally... Climatic conditions have given new hope to farmers... Overall hardship continues to exist among tribes, but there is no famine.³⁵³

Rehama was just one of many regions that year in which intelligence officers and Moroccans looked to the sky to divine their political future. Indeed, the first and most important conclusion arrived at by French intelligence officers on the overall situation of the Protectorate was that given the conditions they faced, establishing a durable French presence was likely to be

³⁵³ SHD 9M 1841, Rapport Mensuel Marrakesh/Rehama, January 1931, 1.

impossible. There had been years of food deficits that had gone undetected. The 1930 harvest was average, but 1931 was an especially bad year for Moroccan agriculture as droughts just after planting season continued to deprive fellahs of a good harvest. The only good news coming out of tribes, according to one military surgeon at the end of 1930, was that children were generally in good health, which proved that there was no famine.³⁵⁴ There was little else, however, to be optimistic about from the officer's perspective. Livestock was exhausted by the cold and the lack of pastures and there were reports that tribes were losing as much as fifteen percent of their livestock every month. In addition to the previous years of poor harvests and the high livestock mortality rate, there was also an abundant population of unemployed labor.

The new intelligence field report also contained an "Economic Section," a summary of political news, environmental data, and an agricultural report that was analyzed against a market price barometer (*mercuriale*). The barometer was a sophisticated mix of commercial activities in the local market and included a calculation of the type and amount of currency that circulated, the number of transactions completed per market day, as well as an average of prices on the most important household commodities.³⁵⁵ It also included a list of prices charged for the transportation of goods (truck, bus, and caravan), the average daily wages for laborers, as well as health indicators of livestock and people.

The new analyses permitted a fairly accurate estimation of when French intelligence would encounter trouble. The most difficult part of the year for Moroccans was *la soudure*, the period between when food ran out and the following harvest. Every year, "*la soudure*" was the tensest moment of the year for both Moroccans and French. The choices for Moroccans during

³⁵⁴ SHD 9M 1841, Rapport Mensuel Marrakesh/Rehama, January 1931, 8.

³⁵⁵ SHD 9M 1841, Rapport Mensuel Marrakesh/Rehama, January 1931, 6. Household commodities included in the barometer: wheat, bulgur, corn, coal, wood, tea, sugar, cooking oil, eggs, hens, beef (meat), mutton (meat), goat (meat), cows (livestock), goats (livestock), sheep (livestock), goat skins, sheep skins, cow skins.

this period were four-fold: tap into savings to buy food for the current season and buy fewer seeds for planting season, only tap into savings to buy seeds and go hungry until harvest, send families to work in the cities and balance sowing fewer acres with remittances from city-folk, or resort to banditry. These were at best measures that could be adopted occasionally, but not year after year without risking completely breaking families and upsetting traditional Moroccan society. These were tense moments and the decisions that were taken were heavy with consequences. As one intelligence officer noted in his briefing, each year, at the same time, as rural society buckled, “an indescribable and unsettling climate of worry settled in the region.”³⁵⁶ This unsettling feeling was made more tense by the fact that there were “no jobs in the north resulting in the loss of revenue that most families relied on to balance their budgets,” and to a “drop in the price of animals and grains which was not followed by a proportional drop in imported goods (sugar, tea, cotton stuffs) [and the] depletion of cash and food reserves following a series of bad years.”³⁵⁷

La soudure was also a difficult moment for Moroccans and French authorities because it was also the time during which fellahs were taxed. The *tertib*, as the tax was called, was calculated on the size of a field and its estimated output. While it may have been a fair tax at some point, the Residency’s loose oversight on the countryside encouraged abuses by French and Moroccan authorities. The easiest fraud to commit was to index individual tax estimates on years when harvests were good and to never update the index. The egregious practice did not benefit the state but rather the tax collectors and *caïds* who lined their pockets with the difference between what the fellahs were forced to pay and what the state expected.³⁵⁸ By all accounts,

³⁵⁶ SHD 9m 1844, Rapport Trimestriel, 4e trimestre 1933, Deuxième Partie, 1.

³⁵⁷ SHD 9m 1844, Rapport Trimestriel, 4e trimestre 1933, Deuxième Partie, 1.

³⁵⁸ CADN IMA/200/493, Circulaire aux Caïds, 31 August 1926.

fellahs were diligent tax payers, who often paid more than what they were estimated to owe because they were afraid of the consequences of mistakenly declaring too little to the tax collector.³⁵⁹ Intelligence officers were able to intercede on behalf of their charges to block the worst abuses, but ultimately, what all of this proved to intelligence officers was that it would take very little to push tribes squeezed too thin by the Residency and the Makhzen toward dissidence.³⁶⁰

Shifting methods of intelligence collection and analysis profoundly modified the strategy of French intelligence in Morocco. By appreciating the impact of Morocco's environment on the economy and the politics of the Protectorate, intelligence officers no longer courted caïds, tribal elites, and Muslim notables as sources of information into Moroccan society. They were biased middlemen who influenced the work of intelligence analysis negatively. A new method of governing was needed.

The *Société Indigène de Prévoyance*

In the 1930s, "Pacification" brought with it not only a surge in soldiers and war material, but a massive surge in cash as well. Brute force and bribes were traditionally the principal tools of empire. The initial French occupation corps in Morocco brought with it in tow behind munitions carts, caravans laden with gifts worth hundreds of thousands of francs. Gold chronometers, cars, silver tea sets, grandfather clocks, silver-framed mirrors, desert plates and silverware, silver salad bowls, crystal boxes, automatic weapons from the United States, binoculars, and chandeliers had served as the lubricant of diplomacy between French authorities

³⁵⁹ CADN IMA/200/490, A.S relevé des vérifications, 14 April 1934, 1-2.

³⁶⁰ CADN IMA/200/491, Recouvrement de l'impôt des prestations des indigènes, 28 July 1934.

and would-be collaborators of empire.³⁶¹ But new intelligence sources provided new perspectives and thus created new tactics of empire-building. Moroccan fellahs were not responding to the traditional levers of power that had been employed. Dissidence in the 1930s was recognized as the consequence of poor economic conditions and a dearth of credit. As one intelligence officer wrote to another: “economic misery is politically unsustainable.”³⁶² The new influx of cash was destined to remedy this state of affairs and attempt to allay the propensity toward violence during “*la soudure*.”

Rather than distribute bills across the countryside as an obvious bribe, however, French intelligence officers introduced a novel way of distributing money. The *Société Indigène de Prévoyance* (SIP) was a cooperative credit institution. On the books, SIPs were necessary, according to the French, because “there exists an indigenous population composed of Arabs and Berbers whose dominant personality trait is to be insouciant about the future. This future, it belongs to God, and when there are bad times, the indigenous congratulates himself for not being even more miserable.”³⁶³ Indeed, “insouciance [was] one of those charming little traits so typical of Muslim populations.”³⁶⁴ For Moroccans, “festivities, a wedding, [were] so many pretexts to spend inconsiderately.”³⁶⁵ Inevitably, the supposedly spendthrift Moroccan, having fallen sick or become unemployed, sought help from usurers (who charged often as much as 300 percent interest), or became an indentured laborer to landed Moroccans and French settlers, or lost his

³⁶¹ CADN 1MA/100/237, Dossier Cadeaux Politiques.

³⁶² SHD 3H 1470, Capitaine le Davay Chef du Bureau AI Berkine à Chef de Bataillon Commandant le Cercle AI de Missour, 19 August 1935.

³⁶³ CADN 2mi 2355, François Lafort, *Le crédit indigène au Maroc et dans les autres pays de l’Afrique du nord*, undated but probably after 1937, 1.

³⁶⁴ Jean Célérier, “Le développement du crédit et des coopératives indigènes au Maroc,” *Annales de Géographie*, 275-276 (1939): 538-542, 539.

³⁶⁵ Célérier, “Le développement,” 1.

land and his animals to creditors and was forced to live in city slums or become a bandit.

Immigration to the metropole increased, too, as a result of this trend.

In practice, however, where and how SIPs were first created betrayed the actual mission of the institution. SIPs were often established in an emergency. They pumped money rapidly into depressed local economies,³⁶⁶ where Moroccan fellahs “survived only at the expense of continual privations... for only food a bit of flat bread, a few cups of tea, and, where at night, a candle is a luxury, and heat comes from burning dried cow dung.”³⁶⁷ Indeed, the first SIP was created in 1917 in the Chaouia, the region bordering the Rabat and Casablanca suburbs, at a time when the French feared that insurgents might use the Chaouia as a staging ground to overrun Casablanca during the Zaian revolt.³⁶⁸ SIPs popped up across Morocco after 1917, and at increasingly rapid clip after 1929. French authorities aware of the Protectorate’s security situation understood that they could not ask Moroccan fellahs to endure droughts and unfavorable market forces when the French government would not ask the same of settlers.³⁶⁹ A wire sent in haste asking for tens and even hundreds of thousands of francs and approved within less than twenty-four hours was indicative of a negotiation between French intelligence and Moroccans that would end either in violence or in an agreement stipulating that Moroccans would stay on their land in exchange for financial help.³⁷⁰ Intelligence officers were especially quick to create SIPs after “pacifying” regions. Just outside the Meknes military region, some of the last tribes to submit to the French

³⁶⁶ For a complete exchange between intelligence officers on an emergency transfer of credits see CADN 11MA/100/337, Objet: Société de Prévoyance, 4 December 1919; see also CADN 1MA/100/338, Procès-Verbal de réunion du Conseil de *Contrôle* et de Surveillance des Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance, 27 March 1935, 8 for a list of monies disbursed urgently.

³⁶⁷ CADN 2mi 2350, Rapport d’ensemble sur la situation économique indigène dans les Duokkala, undated but likely to be 1932, 3.

³⁶⁸ SIPs were not an original creation of French intelligence in Morocco. They first made their appearance in Algeria in 1893, Robert Noumen, “Les cooperatives: des utopies occidentales du XIXe aux pratiques africaines du XXe,” *Revue Française de Gestion* 188-189, no. 8(2008), 271-282, 276 .

³⁶⁹ CADN 2mi 2355, François Lefort, Le credit indigène au Maroc et dans les autres pays de l’afrique du nord, 17

³⁷⁰ SHD 3H 1470, A/S demande de secours en vue de l’ouverture d’un chantier de charité, 19 August 1935

were entirely ruined: the households of some factions counted only “elderly, women, and children... there weren’t any men fit for work.”³⁷¹ There however, there was no one left to receive aid except the incredibly poor.³⁷² Such a sight was likely to convince more tribes to either take up arms against the French or prolong the fight to avoid such a fate.

In theory, SIPs were merely a public initiative supported by the state.³⁷³ SIPs were run neither by the Residency General nor by the Makhzen, but merely observed by the state. At the local level, it was caïds, special local tribal councils known as SIP djemâas (usually but not always the same as the regular tribal djemâas), and a qadi, or Muslim judge, who oversaw the general operations of the SIP and acted as the representatives of the general will of the tribe by proposing projects to ameliorate the Moroccan commons. The djemâa then worked with an *Affaires Indigènes* officer or a *Contôleur Civil* to see the project through. A central oversight commission composed of top French and Makhzen officials convened in a *Conseil d’Administration* at the pleasure of the director of the *Affaires Indigènes* to review budgets and projects and audit the results.

Funding SIPs was officially the responsibility of Moroccan fellahs who paid the Tertib, the tax on estimated agricultural production. Every year, five percent of the fellah’s yearly taxes were transferred to a local SIP and pooled with the contributions of other members.

Contributions were mandatory: every fellah who paid the tertib contributed to the SIP and was thus enrolled in a SIP and benefitted from the projects the SIP funded. In addition to the yearly

³⁷¹ CADN 1MA/100/338, Enquête sur la situation économique en 1935, see specifically report on SIPs in Meknes, undated but early 1936, 2.

³⁷² CADN 1MA/100/338, Enquête sur la situation économique en 1935, Meknes report, 2.

³⁷³ CADN 2mi 2355, François Lefort, Le crédit indigène au Maroc et dans les autres pays de l’Afrique du nord, 14-17.

contributions of each member, SIP assets were augmented by the profits on sales of produce, interest on loans in kind between SIPs and to individuals, and rent from real estate.

Taken together, however, the initial sum of an individual SIP's assets was negligible considering most of Morocco was going hungry. An injection of cash was therefore necessary to make the cooperative immediately effective. Sometimes, seed money from military authorities sufficed, but the real money came from the ability of SIPs to take out loans from a central savings account, the *Caisse Centrale de Crédit Agricole et de Prévoyance Indigène*, against communal assets and future estimated tax receipts.³⁷⁴ The credit line extended against future tax receipts, of course, came out of French budgets at the request of local intelligence officers supported by their superiors at the *Conseil d'Administration*. In practice then, intelligence officers were at the center of SIPs: they created them, approved funding for them, and oversaw their operations. Indeed, intelligence officers, committed themselves to “ameliorate indigenous agricultural production and to repair the damages caused by pests thanks to loans in kind or in money.”³⁷⁵ However, facilitating access to credit was only part of the solution. To improve indigenous agriculture, it was imperative that Moroccan fellahs move away from wheat and that was impossible so long as they were in debt and so long as speculators offered easy money to the most desperate. SIPs would have merely been moving money from the French government onto the balance sheets of banks and predatory lenders, and the French government was already doing that to prevent settlers from going under.

The association of intelligence officers to SIPs, however, gave SIPs and Moroccans a tool to achieve similar results. Thanks to the statutes of the state of siege (see chapter 1), French

³⁷⁴ CADN 2mi 2355, François Lefort, Le crédit indigène au Maroc et dans les autres pays de l’afrique du nord, 15.

³⁷⁵ CADN 2mi 2355, François Lefort, Le crédit indigène au Maroc et dans les autres pays de l’afrique du nord, 14.

intelligence officers legally substituted indebted fellahs with SIPs as holders of debt.³⁷⁶ It had been impossible to stop speculators, commercial agents, usurers, whether European or Moroccan, from interacting with Moroccan fellahs because the military was understaffed to take on that kind of a surveillance mission.³⁷⁷ But, by simply erasing debts in cases of usury and renegotiating and reducing debts in other more legitimate cases, French intelligence officers made predatory lending and speculation a bit more risky and were thus able to offer some relief to fellahs.

Once loans and excessive interest rates were renegotiated, intelligence officers used the state of siege to further increase available liquidities for individuals and maximized the impact of SIPs with few assets by halting the collection of taxes in the name of preserving law and order. Not only did fellahs keep what they would have given to the tax collector, but they also did not have to pay back loans or interest on loans taken out by SIPs against future tax receipts. Every year after 1929, the Director of Finances for the Protectorate wrote scathing letters to the Director of the *Affaires Indigènes* and to French intelligence officers complaining that Moroccan tax agents and their French supervisors were barred from collecting either taxes or examining the books of the SIPs when these existed.³⁷⁸ Each year, French intelligence responded in the same manner: “we must be considerate of the economic conditions that affect our charges by being prudent and flexible to avoid creating situations that would be detrimental to Moroccans as well as our political objectives.”³⁷⁹

It is difficult to estimate with any precision how much money was redistributed through the SIPs during this period since the archives of the oversight committee, the *Conseil*

³⁷⁶ CADN 2mi 2355, François Lefort, Le crédit indigène au Maroc et dans les autres pays de l’Afrique du nord, 14.

³⁷⁷ CADN 11MA/100/337, Tertib de 1920 Tarifs de l’impôt, 11 May 1920, 2-3.

³⁷⁸ CADN 1MA/200/493, A/S recouvrement des créances de l’état, 4 January 1935.

³⁷⁹ CADN 1MA/200/493, Recouvrement des impôts en milieu indigène, 8 September 1932.

d'Administration, are missing for the period 1929-1934 and since any paperwork created by SIPs would have been stored in a regional archive per the 1927 decentralization ordonnance.³⁸⁰ It is possible, however, to determine how intelligence officers used the SIP thanks to the monthly schedule of intelligence officers (*rapports de tournées*). In regions “pacified” prior to 1930, recently “pacified,” and even in regions not entirely “pacified,” intelligence officers began to account for their time differently. Since environmental and economic data became primary points of analysis in intelligence work, naturally, intelligence officers spent most of their time transforming the environment and the stabilizing the economy. Examining the schedules of the Marrakech region intelligence officers, we note that in January 1931, much of the work accomplished involved finding and destroying locust eggs, oversight of work sites, road repairs, mending broken caravans, planting cacti, vaccination campaigns, consultations over the future placement of a communal slaughterhouse to be built using SIP funds, agro-hydraulic improvements, as well as the policing of markets (monitoring prices, solving petty crimes, preventing fraud, confiscation of contraband).³⁸¹ By 1934, all military personnel, not just intelligence officers, dedicated almost all of their time to what they began to call “administrative affairs.” In Taza, a war-torn region, “all military manhours [were] spent collecting the Tertib, constructing administrative buildings, building new markets, policing contraband, combatting malaria, and putting fences around communal forests.”³⁸² Looking back on his time spent as an intelligence officer in Morocco, Georges Spillman, remembered 1930-1935 as the time during which the intelligence officer:

³⁸⁰ Archives of the Conseil d'Administration are available for 1917-1927 and 1934-1956 at the CADN. As of 2014, the National Archives of Morocco, the repository for technical archives, do not have, or have not yet released SIP archives.

³⁸¹ See SHD 9M 1841, Bilans Administratifs and Rapports de tournées for each intelligence report in 1930-1931.

³⁸² CADN 1MA/140/384i, Rapport Politique Trimestriel (TAZA), September-December 1934, 4e Partie, Bilan Administratif, 1.

reconnoitered, took topographical measurements, supervised the construction of roads and buildings. [He] learned to make plaster, to make whitewash, to put a roof down, to work a plumb-line, to mine, to trace a road with an inclinometer... year after year the conditions that made life possible were made better... there was more arable land, its yield was better, and livestock was numerous. That was [his] legacy. It filled [him] with pride.³⁸³

SIPs were cited as one of the great accomplishments of French intelligence in Morocco. In partnership with Moroccans, French intelligence began promoting polyculture, modernized agricultural production techniques, introduced colonial medicine and veterinary practices, and employed Moroccans who had fallen on hard times to build communal infrastructure. They reflected the ideals of the civilizing mission in Morocco and were touted as the premier tool of indirect rule.

From the very start, however, Makhzen authorities realized that SIPs further undermined what little power the French had left them after the Treaty of Fez, violating the principles of indirect rule supposedly underpinned the relationship between France and Morocco. The Makhzen had profited nicely from speculation on wheat. Indebtedness had been a way of ensuring fellahs remained tied to local Makhzen officials. In the early years of the Protectorate, with the tacit approval of French intelligence officers and the Residency General, Makhzen officials had forged titles to peasant lands which had then been sold to Europeans, they had acted as middlemen for European commercial agents, and had loaned money to Moroccan fellahs who had fallen on hard times. Makhzen officials kept indebted fellahs as indentured servants, and the Residency General claimed that it was shoring up the power of the Sultan per the stipulations of the Treaty of Fez. The SIP however, represented a reversal of this unspoken arrangement. Indeed, the SIP permitted the emancipation of the fellah from his financial relationship with representatives of the Makhzen. It was another blow to the power of traditional authorities.

³⁸³ Georges Spillman, *Souvenirs d'un colonialiste*, (Paris: Presse de la cite, 1968) 42-43.

As early as 1924, the Grand Vizir had relayed the worries of the Sultan and the Makhzen through the French advisor to the Sheriffian Government over the form of Moroccan representation at the SIPs and the methods of deliberation that determined how SIPs disbursed funds.³⁸⁴ The Grand Vizier feared that money directly distributed to Moroccans without Makhzen intermediaries created inappropriate patronage networks that weakened traditional authorities by giving intelligence officers too great of a say in local politics. The sums disbursed were especially problematic for the Grand Vizir. In 1924, SIPs managed portfolios worth seven million francs in loans.³⁸⁵ In 1935, SIPs managed a portfolio approximately four times as large and SIPs were implanted everywhere.³⁸⁶ The Grand Vizir had therefore been eager to ensure that he received regular updates on the activities of SIPs through the central *Conseil d'Administration*.³⁸⁷ For the sake of form, then, every month the Grand Vizir and two other representatives of the Makhzen sat around a table with eleven of the French counterparts in the Residency General, eight of which were under the orders of the other three who were intelligence officers.³⁸⁸ Together, they decided how many jack stallion donkeys to purchase, but not much else.³⁸⁹

French intelligence had little time to balance the priorities of the Residency and the Makhzen with the political imperatives dictated by insurgency. As Colonel Huot, the French spymaster in Morocco, explained, the pedagogical and deliberative process that guided the

³⁸⁴ CADN 1MA/300/76, Nomination des membres des Djemâas de tribu, de fraction et des membres des Conseil d'administration des SIP, 26 February 1924, 1.

³⁸⁵ CADN 1MA/300/76, Rapport sur le fonctionnement des Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance en 1924, 16 February 1925, 3.

³⁸⁶ SHD 3H 1470, L'assistance aux tribus, 29 July 1935. See SHD 3H 1470, Projets établis pour améliorer la production indigène, 14 August 1935, for an enumeration of the types of projects intelligence officers managed and their cost.

³⁸⁷ CADN 1MA/100/337, Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance, 21 Mars 1928, 1-2.

³⁸⁸ See roster of attendance of the Procès-verbaux de réunion du Conseil de *Contrôle* et de Surveillance des Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance contained in CADN 1MA/100/338.

³⁸⁹ CADN 1MA/100/338, Procès-Verbal de réunion du Conseil de *Contrôle* et de Surveillance des Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance, 27 March 1935, 5.

selection and funding of projects was cumbersome and incompatible with the emergencies that intelligence officers faced daily.³⁹⁰ Pushing requests up the chain of command, respecting bureaucratic procedures, ensuring that the Makhzen was at least informed of activities, and waiting for responses limited the utility of SIPs at crucial moments when the immediate disbursement of emergency money could dissuade a tribe from dissidence. In other words, oversight was a hindrance, and it was perhaps better to avoid revealing how badly French intelligence had damaged the relationship between the Makhzen and fellahs by using SIPs. Indeed, along with the money SIPs provided came a little-known statute that extended the powers of local French authorities beyond those allowed by the Treaty of Fez. The disbursement of loans was conditioned by the attribution of powers to nominate and dismiss members of djemâas, and the power to limit the powers of djemâas.³⁹¹ These powers were normally the subject to Vizirial and Residential rulings, but for the sake of efficiency, and “out of a concern to decentralize powers,” those powers were attributed to regional and local authorities, that is to say, intelligence officers.³⁹² The same decentralization measures that the Residency General had put in place to prevent it from slipping into direct rule shielded French intelligence from being accused of overstepping its powers. Perhaps that was what decentralization measures were meant to do in the first place.

However, with the extension of SIPs into urban economies, the influence of French intelligence in the administration of Morocco became plain to see. Indeed, while weather had been the catalyst for the intervention of French intelligence into the Protectorate’s rural

³⁹⁰ CADN IMA/300/76, Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance, 10 June 1920, 2-3.

³⁹¹ CADN IMA/300/76, Nomination des membres des djemaas de tribus, de fraction et des membres des Conseils d’Administration des SIP, 15 February 1924, 2.

³⁹² CADN IMA/300/76, Nomination des membres des djemaas de tribus, de fraction et des membres des Conseils d’Administration des SIP, 15 February 1924, 2.

economy, inter-imperial competition between France and Japan in 1934 forced intelligence officers into also taking an active role in protecting and developing urban economies. As they had in the Moroccan hinterlands, French intelligence officers used credit to first stabilize local urban politics and economies, and then acquire power over local governing institutions.

The Japanese Crisis, luxury consumer markets, and the “*style berbère*”

Japan had since the late 19th century expanded its influence in Asia to sustain its rapid industrial development and significant population increase.³⁹³ The colonization of Manchuria in 1931 and the subsequent withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations in 1932 signaled Japan’s intent to aggressively compete beyond Asia. Japanese officials used the Great Depression in 1929 and the subsequent unpegging of the Sterling Pound to gold in September 1931 to unpeg the Yen from the Sterling, allowing the Yen to undergo a significant devaluation beginning in November 1931, which made their exports cheaper than they had been.³⁹⁴ The commercial advantages of a weak currency on exports were increased by Japan’s Important Industries Control Law which formalized the control of cartels over strategic economic sectors, rationalized production through forced cooperation between would-be competitors, and increased the productivity of workers while maintaining low wages.³⁹⁵ Within a matter of months, cheap

³⁹³ Japanese population increases from 56 million in 1920 to 73 million in 1940. Chalmers Johnson, *Miti and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy: 1925-1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 107

³⁹⁴ On the events leading to the end of the Sterling-Gold peg see Sir Alec Carincross and Barry Eichengreen, *Sterling in Decline: The Devaluations of 1931, 1949 and 1967* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), chapter 2. See also Laurent Carroué, Didier Collet ed. *Les mutations de l’économie du début du XXe siècle aux années 1970* (Paris: Bréal, 2005), 193.

³⁹⁵ On the Important Industries Law see Chalmers Johnson, *Miti and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy: 1925-1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 108-109; Bai Gao, “The State and the Associational Order of the Economy: The Institutionalization of Cartels and Trade Associations in Japan 1931 to 1945” in *The Sociology of the Economy*, Frank Dobbin ed., (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 2004), 55. Critics of Japan’s global commercial policies pinpointed the Japanese workers’ low wages and forced productivity introducing to the the term “social dumping.” See for example, Ehud Harari, *The Politics of Labor Legislation in Japan*, (Berkley: University of California Press, 1973), 45-47; and Dietmar Rothermund, *The Global Impact of the Great Depression, 1929-1939* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 117-118, for the human cost of “social dumping.”

currency, low wages, resource extraction from Japanese colonies, and the productivity gains associated with cartel control of entire economic sectors and labor, allowed Japanese concerns to flood global markets with cheap consumer goods.

Unsurprisingly, well-priced Japanese goods found welcoming markets in places with low purchasing-power. Many European imperial possessions suffered the brunt of Japan's cheap exports. Japan became the second largest exporter of goods to many French overseas territories, and in the case of Ruanda-Urundi, a Belgian mandate, Japan was the primary exporter of goods.³⁹⁶ For metropolises, the most common response to what became known as the 1934 Japanese Dumping Crisis was the institution of quotas and tariff increases on Japanese goods, and a generalized trend toward protectionist measures to shield domestic industries and workers.³⁹⁷

Morocco's customs and tariffs, however, were governed by the 1906 Treaty of Algeciras which bound the French from unilaterally modifying Morocco's customs regime without the agreement of the twelve signatories to the Treaty.³⁹⁸ There had been little incentive to modify the agreement in the years since 1906 because although Morocco was integrated into the metropole's economy, Moroccan tariffs remained lower than the metropole's, and direct imports of low-tariffed goods into the Protectorate fueled the initial *mise en valeur*. At any rate, by 1934, the situation in Europe was unlikely to produce an agreement favorable to the French. The effects of Japanese competition on colonial markets was recorded but never seemed to generate an official

³⁹⁶ Guy Vanthemsche, *La Belgique et le Congo (1885-1980): L'impact de la colonie sur la metropole* (Cork: Primento Digital Publishing, 2017), see especially chapter entitled "Le problème de l'interprétation économique entre la Belgique et le Congo."

³⁹⁷ American Council Institute of Pacific Relations September 21, 1934, Memorandum on Japanese Trade Expansion; In the case of the French Empire, Algeria, since it was a part of France, was protected by metropolitan measures, CADN 1MA/140/384g, Situation Politique et Economique, 16-31 Octobre 1934, 6.

³⁹⁸ CADN, 2mi 2351, Claude Ecorcheville, La protection de la production marocaine, 1933, 1-5; see also Anthony Eastman, "The Algeciras Conference, 1906," *Southern Quarterly* 7, no. 2 (1969): 185-205.

public response from the French government in Paris or the Residency General in Rabat.

Between 1926 and 1932, the tonnage of exports shipped into Morocco increased from 706 thousand tons to 1.1 million tons, while the value of the goods imported dropped year after year.³⁹⁹ Morocco was flooded with cheap imports.

Japanese imports into Morocco in 1934 totaled only 72.9 million francs (while Morocco exported only 976 thousand francs worth toward Japan), but the imported goods were mostly consumer goods that competed directly with the output of small Moroccan storefronts.⁴⁰⁰

Japanese imports not only impacted commercial balances, but also changed long-term consumer behavior in Morocco: when the Sino-Japanese war halted imports of Chinese tea (a Japanese import), the only tea really worth drinking for Moroccans according to one intelligence officer citing his own informal poll of consumer sentiment, Moroccans turned to the black market for untaxed Chinese tea of questionable provenance to make up for dwindling stocks of real Chinese tea.⁴⁰¹ Japanese exports to Morocco further depressed local economies, and the human misery they engendered in cities became the subject of numerous comments across the Middle East. The francophone magazine *L’Egyptienne*, edited by the celebrated Egyptian feminist, Huda Sha’arawi, dedicated a small column in its June 1934 edition to comment Morocco’s woes: this newspaper notes that Japanese industry gravely menaces Moroccan industries who are competing against canned fruits, vegetables, fish, etc., at extremely low prices. In 1933, two and a half million rubber-soled shoes paralyzed the sale of Moroccan sandals and *babouches*, causing unemployment in the very interesting cobbler’s guilds of Fez and Marrakesh.⁴⁰² The Residency

³⁹⁹ CADN 2mi 2351, in 1926, 706 thousand tons of goods imported into Morocco was valued at nearly 1.7 billion francs. In 1928, 1.1 million tons of imports was valued at 1.8 billion francs.

⁴⁰⁰ CADN 11MA/900/1051, Situation Politique et Economique du 16 au 31 Octobre 1934, 14 November 1934, 1

⁴⁰¹ CADN 1MA/200/344, Le nationalisme Marocain et l’émeute de Meknès (2 Septembre 1937), undated, 44.

⁴⁰² “Brèves,” *L’Egyptienne* 103, (1934), 46.

General's management of the Japanese Dumping Crisis was yet another blow to the French claims of superior governance. For the Fez Cartel, Japan was a new foe that fueled imperial paranoia and further justified direct control of Moroccan affairs.

French counterintelligence in Morocco immediately went to work on Japanese businessmen and officials. Japanese businesses required Moroccan intermediaries to sell their products. Moroccan agents controlled by a hostile foreign government were of course vectors of instability that needed to be closely monitored. Japanese commercial power gave Japanese officials and merchants influence on Moroccan public opinion. A French intelligence operative in Paris, for example, obtained information from an employee at the Japanese embassy in Paris that a new Japanese military attaché was flying to Paris with a suitcase full of cash to fund a newspaper to be published in French and in Arabic that would report on “political, economic, and social news and have for mission the defense of Muslim interests around the world.”⁴⁰³ To further monitor Japanese influence in Morocco, Japanese businesses were infiltrated by secretaries moonlighting for the *Deuxième Bureau*, French counterintelligence, and the travel of Japanese nationals in Morocco, while not restricted, was covertly monitored, and reported, not by beat cops, but by *Commissaires* and heads of departments who personally typed reports of their surveillance.⁴⁰⁴

While counterintelligence attempted to thwart the economic and political threats the Japanese posed to the Protectorate, intelligence officers in Morocco attempted to mitigate the damage caused by Japanese imports on Morocco's fragile economy.

⁴⁰³ CADN 1MA/200/70, Un nouveau journal de propagande musulmane, 22 August 1935.

⁴⁰⁴ CADN (2012) DI 268 & 269, Dossier “Japon.”

The involvement of French intelligence in the traditional the Moroccan economy of the cities had up until 1931 simply been focused on controlling union activity.⁴⁰⁵ Monitoring urban markets, checking on the quality of produce and meat, verifying weights and balances, and policing fraud and theft was the job of local French and Moroccan police.

For the most part, however, commerce in Moroccan cities was self-organized in the form of guilds. Guilds regulated the economic and political life of the city; they were a source of stability, though they could also be the source of revolts.⁴⁰⁶ As such, the leadership, labor, and production of guilds was overseen by traditional Moroccan authorities, though the need for social peace to maintain political as well as economic stability led traditional authorities and guilds to seek relationships based on consensus. In the 1930s, the consensus between political and economic power seemed to express itself in the search of urban political stability through the partial absorption of the unemployed masses who suffered the consequences of the rapid disinvestment of European capital in Morocco.⁴⁰⁷

By 1934, however, guilds across Morocco were either collapsing or on the verge of collapsing. The *babouchiers* of Fez for example, mentioned in Huda Sha'arawi's article cited earlier, were the most spectacular case. The *babouchiers* numbered over seven thousand, produced three hundred thousand pairs of *babouches* (traditional, handcrafted Moroccan leather slippers) a year, of which nearly a third were destined for markets in *Afrique Occidentale Française*.⁴⁰⁸ Rubber-soled shoes from Japan, however, caused sales of *babouches* to plummet. It is unclear how many Fassi *babouche*-makers were unemployed as a result of the introduction

⁴⁰⁵ CADN 11MA/900/836, Carnet d'identité civil, 29 May 1930.

⁴⁰⁶ CADN (2012) Maroc, Cabinet Civil, Reserves, Télégramme, Meknes Riots, 28 Octobre 1937, see especially paragraph on the political history of guilds in Meknes prior to 1937 Meknes water riots; see also SHD 3H 466, Situation en Zone Espagnole, April 1931, for a look at the role of the baker's guild in promoting peace or violence in the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco.

⁴⁰⁷ SHD 7NN 3099, Note sur l'activité du panislamisme à Fés, 22 Septembre 1937, 2-4.

⁴⁰⁸ Jacques Berque, *Le Maghreb entre deux guerres* (Paris: Seuil, 1978), 189.

of rubber-soled shoes, but intelligence officers used the phenomenon as a cautionary tale against timid administration of the Protectorate's economy. Rubber-soled shoes did not simply jeopardize the livelihoods of the thousands of *babouchiers* of Fez, but also the livelihoods of the leather, dye, and textile workers, as well as their raw material suppliers, the farmers from the mountains who supplied the hides for the tanners and the wool for the textile guilds. As a result of the *babouches* crisis, scores of artisans joined the ranks of farmers and unskilled laborers in *bidonvilles* (shantytowns), and became a part of a volatile lumpenproletariat ready to lash out at the first occasion.

Other employed artisans simply stopped respecting the rules that governed guilds and set up their own. Insurgent guilds used raw materials from Japan to make their products, and competed not only against similar guilds within city limits, but sold their products in other cities, too, which was forbidden, creating chaos among the struggling guilds of that city and aggravating the situation of traditional suppliers. The heads of guilds no longer controlled their profession, and traditional authorities whose power was confined to a single region were powerless to police interregional strife. The social, political, and economic ties that bound artisans within a same guild, that bound different guilds together, and that bound guilds to their communities snapped.

It occurred to the Director of the Indigenous Arts Services some time toward the end of 1934 that military authorities might be able to assist guilds through the economic crisis. *Directeur* Ricard was extremely skilled at his job. He managed a skeleton crew of experts in indigenous arts on a shoestring budget knowing that his department, in the economic situation of the Protectorate in the 1930s, was among the least necessary of the Residency General's technical services. He also managed cordial relationships with the intelligence officers and

military authorities who protected his staff when they were in the field. Intelligence officers assisted Ricard in scouting for new talents that justified the continued existence of the arts services. The best precious metal worker in Morocco, for example, the young Hocine Benmohamed, was discovered by an intelligence officer investigating a small zaouia forty kilometers outside of Marrakech, “in the middle of nowhere.”⁴⁰⁹ Mentored and protected by the arts services and the intelligence officer who discovered him, Benmohamed became an artisan whose work presented “real artistic value” that could be showcased at colonial expositions to illustrate France’s *mise en valeur* of Morocco’s arts and human resources.⁴¹⁰ The director was also good at flattering—tastefully, though—and did not hesitate to nominate any intelligence officer with a bit of interest in the arts for the merit of *officier de l’académie*.⁴¹¹ The director was aware that his work and his department, likely everything he had trained and worked for his entire life, and his mission of preserving Moroccan arts, rested in the hands of the *Affaires Indigènes*. Indeed, it was to French intelligence services that the director answered to, and it was French intelligence officers who reported to the Residency General on the activities of the Arts Services, though Ricard’s department was nominally responsible only to the Residency General’s office for Public Education, and Fine Arts and Antiquities.⁴¹²

At any rate, Ricard needed a way of preserving local arts and crafts, and he needed a way of doing this that incorporated the skills of as many guilds as possible in order to alleviate some of the economic suffering. Ricard knew that the Japanese crisis had upset the consumer market

⁴⁰⁹ CADN IMA/200/289, Copies du Rapport Annuel du Service des Arts Indigènes à Marrakech, Le General de Division Catroux à Monsieur le Directeur des Affaires Indigènes, 17 January 1935, 2.

⁴¹⁰ CADN IMA/200/289, Copies du Rapport Annuel du Service des Arts Indigènes à Marrakech, Le General de Division Catroux à Monsieur le Directeur des Affaires Indigènes, 17 January 1935, 2.

⁴¹¹ CADN IMA/200/289, Copies du Rapport Annuel du Service des Arts Indigènes à Marrakech, Le General de Division Catroux à Monsieur le Directeur des Affaires Indigènes, 17 January 1935, 1.

⁴¹² The monthly reports of the Arts Services are sent to military authorities before being compiled into official reports for archival at the Residency General.

for cheap goods, however, he believed that guilds could continue to exist and that the very best Moroccan techniques could be passed on to future generations of artisans if he could find an outlet for Moroccan production in luxury markets. guilds would move fewer units, but the increased quality of each unit would fetch higher prices. Ricard's concern was not creating conditions for full employment, but preventing the same type of catastrophe that nearly wiped out the *babocuhes* industry in Fez only months earlier.

The perfect opportunity to test his ideas presented itself when General Loustal, Commanding the Autonomous Territory of Tadla, agreed to sponsor one of Ricard's projects. The General Commanders of Morocco were as avid of dinner parties as they were of starving the irreducible tribes of the Atlas. The nature of the regime in Morocco, their involvement in nearly every single, minute matter, made the generals the center of social and political life of colonial high society. Mixing within the circle of a General Commander was an opportunity to request that the lines of the *Zone d'Insecurité* be moved ever so slightly to expand the farm of a settler, or to obtain more security to police miners, or to make questionable titles to land more official thanks to the signature of a General Commander. The salon of a General Commander was the perfect showroom for the director's project: sycophants were likely to emulate his lifestyle and thus support local industries. It was also a way of getting military authorities further implicated in the more commercial aspects of the Indigenous Arts Services' work.

Ricard submitted to the General the designs for a dining room to match his standing. Inspired by the Atlas Mountains in which resided the proud and formidable enemies the General was in the process of defeating, Ricard called his design "*le style Berbère*."⁴¹³ There was, of course, no *style Berbère* until Ricard invented it. It was "a unique project that had never existed

⁴¹³ CADN IMA/200/289, 1634 A.I., letter detailing the creation of Berber Style, 13 December 1934.

in the Moroccan world,” but more importantly, “the creation [would] be the collaborative accomplishment of a diverse set of artisans: from the carpenter to the sculptor, the steamfitter and the precious metal worker, the ironworker and the leather tanner, from the dye-maker to the textile worker.”⁴¹⁴ The design was a locally inspired French creation that kept its Moroccan character thanks to the assembly of a team of Moroccan artisans who used techniques which the French had scrupulously documented since the inception of the Protectorate. Ricard’s letter to his superiors also mentions Loustal’s discerning eye and his active part in designing “down to the smallest detail” the four-thousand-franc dining room set. Loustal, in fact, cared little for the artistic quality, the materials used, or the range of techniques that was required to make the furniture. His only specifications, as he reminded Ricard in the very first sentence of the letter confirming his order, was that the furniture be “big, strong, and give an imposing impression.”⁴¹⁵

For Ricard, the style *Berbère* had the potential to create new tastes among settlers and dignitaries who visited Loustal. New tastes might create new markets for Moroccan artisans. Indeed, Ricard aimed to recruit a host of other guilds that catered to clients interested in decorating their homes in *le style Berbère*. The General’s order was at least somewhat successful in provoking others to place Berber-styled furniture. His subordinate, Colonel Girier, at the insistence of his wife, purchased a similar set of furniture, though one assumes that, for the sake of his superior’s ego, the furniture was perhaps slightly less massive.⁴¹⁶

Producing high-quality goods for luxury markets was an elaborate and time-consuming project. *Le style Berbère* was only one of many purely French creations that were adapted to

⁴¹⁴ CADN IMA/200/289, 1634 A.I., letter detailing the creation of Berber Style, 13 December 1934.

⁴¹⁵ CADN IMA/200/289, Exposition arts indigènes au Congrès de l’Institut des Hautes Etudes Marocaines en 1933, 18 August 1932, 2.

⁴¹⁶ CADN IMA/200/289, Exposition arts indigènes au Congrès de l’Institut des Hautes Etudes Marocaines en 1933, 18 August 1932, 2.

European tastes, but that had to be rendered authentically Moroccan. To create a successful luxury market for Moroccan guilds, Ricard had to ensure that customers received products manufactured with the highest quality materials available in Morocco and assembled by talented Moroccan artisans using the very best Moroccan techniques. Quality control involved not only examining the final product, but also supervising the recruitment of artisans and the interactions between the artisan and his materials. It was also imperative to exercise the same kind of supervision upstream and control the origin of raw materials: the wood used for Loustal's dining table, for example, had to be locally sourced and cut by local lumberjacks to meet Ricard's standards for what constituted a Moroccan luxury item.⁴¹⁷

Not all Moroccan guilds, however, were thrilled by the Arts Services' focus on producing for luxury markets. Guilds and artisans who had managed local economies through consensus were now forced to fiercely compete with one another to garner the favors of French authorities. Inevitably, many of the lesser-skilled artisans would be put out of work and many guilds would disappear. Military authorities were thus petitioned to rule on whether or not the Arts Services should dictate what guilds should produce. In an open letter to French military authorities, the artisans of the city of Meknes, for example, listed grievances against the Indigenous Arts Services aimed primarily at the services' insistence on encouraging traditional Moroccan arts and crafts. They complained to military authorities that the indigenous arts were outmoded: "the use of old-fashioned techniques does not allow to market modern products that cater to today's tastes."⁴¹⁸ Many artisans felt constrained by what constituted Moroccan authenticity acceptable to the Arts Services and wanted to sell to a larger market even if meant shifting away from traditional Moroccan techniques.

⁴¹⁷ CADN IMA/200/289, A/S Commande salle à manger, 7 December 1934, 1.

⁴¹⁸ CADN IMA/200/289, 1591 A.I, grievances against the Indigenous Arts Service, 10 December 1934, 1.

Ricard and his team at the Indigenous Arts were not in a position to redress the distress of all artisans, but Ricard insisted that if Moroccan artisans ameliorated the quality of their production they could easily find outlets in luxury markets. Intelligence officers were convinced by this argument, too.

To reward the efforts of the artisans who adhered to the Indigenous Arts Services' stringent requirements, and to brand products as authentically Moroccan and thus suitable for luxury markets, the Indigenous Arts and French military authorities extended the privilege of issuing official stamps that certified the provenance of products put up for sale in markets across Morocco.⁴¹⁹ The stamp was initially reserved for products presenting exceptional artistic qualities and worthy of being put on exhibition in expositions in Paris, but the decision by French intelligence to make it a mark of distinction accessible to more consumer products manufactured was supposed to encourage more artisans to produce for luxury markets, rather than continue to compete against foreign-made products. The visibility of the stamp proving the quality of the product as well as its authentic Moroccan character was meant to appeal to tourists, but also to buyers in the metropole. Of course, since the stamp was made available to more producers, and to avoid harming the distinction or the new luxury market associated with it, intelligence officers began establishing protocols to verify the entire production process, from the choice of raw materials to the sale of products. This was "an effort requiring intensive monitoring" of all aspects of the manufacturing process.⁴²⁰ The intelligence officer, forever reinventing himself in colonial settings, became a "technical advisor and marketer" (*agent commercial*) to Moroccan artisans.⁴²¹ He "ensured that artisans made quality products and that

⁴¹⁹ CADN IMA/200/289, Industrie des tapis Chichaoua, 23 February 1937, 4.

⁴²⁰ CADN IMA/200/289, Exposition arts indigènes au Congrès de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes Marocaines en 1933, 18 August 1932.

⁴²¹ CADN IMA/200/289, Industrie des tapis de Chichaoua, 23 February 1937, 3.

there was always a market for their products.”⁴²² Seconded by the bureaucrats at the Indigenous Arts Services, intelligence officers incorporated artisans and guilds into an economy that they directed. They spoke of “renovating” Morocco’s moribund urban economy, but what the intelligence officers actually acquired with the extension of a new patronage network into urban economic life, was a privileged foothold in street-level politics that bypassed the need for local Moroccan authorities altogether.

To further draw Moroccan artisans to the new project of producing for luxury markets, and also as a way of further burrowing into local urban politics, French intelligence officers began informally extending loans from SIPs to guilds. Loans to artisans were added under a vague “urgent loans” line of the local SIP’s accounting book, since the SIP’s loans were technically the redistribution to Moroccan farmers of tax receipts on agricultural products locally collected from Moroccan farmers. The vague accounting line was an ad hoc fix to mask an administrative contravention, but an official marker reminding debtors in cities that in exchange for loans from the SIP, intelligence officers acquired the same kind of political oversight they had acquired in the Moroccan hinterlands, and that they also controlled the production of guilds.⁴²³

In 1936, for example, the straw weavers of Fez requested military authorities intervene on their behalf to sort through differences between them and five renegade straw weavers who had broken away from the straw weavers’ guild of Salé, near Casablanca, and were selling inexpensive, poor quality straw products in Fez and stealing customers who had been loyal to the Fez guild. The renegades had gone from Meknes, to Marrakech, to Fez, stealing customers along the way and putting the artisans of those cities out of work. The Fassi straw weavers had initially

⁴²² CADN IMA/200/289, Industrie des tapis de Chichaoua, 23 February 1937, 2.

⁴²³ Officially, SIPs for artisans were only created in 1938.

drawn the attention of the Makhzen to the problem, to no avail.⁴²⁴ The only solution for the Fassi straw weavers was to ask French military authorities in the city for help: “our profession barely manages to feed us, and each city has just the right number of artisans to avoid us going hungry,” the letter explained. Solidarity amongst guilds had once upon a time prevented this type of competition, and renegade artisans were usually shunned from raw material suppliers, but this episode was merely the latest of series similar ones showing the worsening “disorganization of guilds” and the “necessity of urgent action against their further disorganization.”⁴²⁵ The use of the word “hunger” by the authors of the letter was not innocent. Hunger was also a part of life in cities. It was also code to warn French authorities that violence was a strong possibility if the problems presented by the straw-weavers guild were not resolved. “We’ve come to you because we know there is financial aid,” they added, hoping to strike a bargain with intelligence officers.⁴²⁶

The realization that economic conditions prevented intelligence officers from making a positive political impact on the Protectorate created a dramatic shift in the way intelligence work in Morocco was conducted after 1929. Yet, the accumulation of functions in the hands of French intelligence officers also highlighted an important deficiency in the Protectorate’s administration. There was no bureaucratic structure suitable to exploiting the new types of intelligence that were collected across Morocco. Nor was there a structure in place to create and disseminate policies that addressed at the level of the Protectorate the complex economic and environmental problems intelligence officers attempted to solve through local, ad hoc initiatives.

⁴²⁴ CADN IMA/200/289, Letter from the Fassi straw weavers, 27 October 1936, 1.

⁴²⁵ CADN IMA/200/289, Demande des nattiers de Fès, 9 December 1936, 1.

⁴²⁶ CADM IMA/200/289, Letter from the straw weavers to military authorities, 27 October 1936, 2.

On 20 June 1936, the Residency General created a new department, the Direction des Affaires Politiques. The new office, led by an intelligence officer, incorporated the various Moroccan intelligence services, the *Contrôle civil*, the administration of municipalities, and the security services (prisons, customs, and French and Moroccan police). In other words, it acquired the technical expertise to deal with “anything having a political character,” including, amongst many, many other things, school lunches, labor questions, general administration, “work—social matters,” “The political, economic, and administrative control of the *Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance*,” “everything related to seeding and harvesting,” “the renovation of guilds,” “control of production of guilds,” and “assistance bringing wool products to market.”⁴²⁷ Through SIPs in rural and urban areas, French intelligence had acquired a stake in every part of Morocco’s domestic economy and made it a point of making Moroccan products competitive abroad. The all-powerful *Direction des Affaires Politiques* constituted a “veritable state within the state.”⁴²⁸ It was, however, nothing more than the administrative recognition that French intelligence had captured much of the Protectorate’s administration. The Direction des Affaires Politiques hallowed the rule of intelligence officers in Morocco.

⁴²⁷ CADN 11MA/900/741, Note relative aux attributions de chacune des Section de la Direction des Affaires Politiques, 29 Octobre 1940.

⁴²⁸ Roger Gruner, *Du Maroc traditionnel au Maroc modern: le Contrôle civil au Maroc, 1912-1956*, (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1984), 230-233.

Chapter 4: The Berber Dahir and the decline of *Contrôle*

On 20 June 1927, the head of the *Sûreté* in Fez forwarded to the authorities of *Contrôle* a letter written by one of his best informants, a person “very well informed of the undercurrents of Muslim politics.” The informant corroborated intelligence previously gleaned from other sources about the political ambitions of the Makhzen, Morocco’s traditional elites. The end of the Rif War, the informant explained, had created a new era of hope among the old families of notables. Every offensive that brought the French deeper into the Rif and the Atlas was followed by a rearguard of Makhzen patriarchs. Under guise of commerce, many of the trips notables took to the mountains ended in marriage. They married into leadership positions in tribes, purchased land and livestock, and because they claimed to be the Sultan representatives, they were honored as caïds, and qadis, Muslim judges. Makhzen officials who had not been interested in the Rif or the Atlas since their families had left the mountains for the city suddenly exhumed old titles to land and remembered long lost relations in the mountains who no longer seemed so provincial. No sooner had Makzhen officials become acquainted with their new in-laws and finalized the details of their real estate dealings than they embarked on extended diplomatic trips to reestablish ties with the old Berber notables of the Rif and Atlas who spent their winters in the more clement weather of the valleys and coastal cities thus ensuring their power was recognized everywhere in Morocco.⁴²⁹

The source of this exuberance was a 1924 dahir (decree) that gave formal organization to tribal djemâas, or tribal courts.⁴³⁰ Notables of the Makhzen interpreted the dahir as permission to

⁴²⁹ SHD 3H 247, 4440 SR, Chef de la Sûreté Régionale à Fès to Chef du Bureau Régional des Renseignements, Le Rif, Fès, et les Puissances, 20 June, 1927, 2.

⁴³⁰ William A. Hoisington Jr., “Cities in Revolt: The Berber Dahir (1930) and France’s Urban Strategy in Morocco, *Journal of Contemporary History* 13, no. 3 (1978): 433-448, 434.

permanently settle in Berber territories in the name of the Sultan and negotiated new roles as caïds and qadis, powerful arbiters of life in Berber tribes. While Moroccans would later criticize French “pacification” efforts as a violent opening of new lands for European colonization, in the mid-1920s, Moroccans believed that “pacification” would open new political and commercial opportunities for them. As the *Sûreté*’s informant explained in his letter, the Makhzen’s moves were in line with an agenda that had been developed in the years after the Treaty of Fez but had been interrupted by the authorities of *Contrôle*. The replacement of Lyautey by Steeg, seemingly more mindful of the necessity of implementing a policy of association between French and Moroccans that was enshrined in the Treaty of Fez, gave new hope to traditional authorities. According to the informant, no doubt in on the scheme, the Makhzen was in an ideal position to take advantage of “pacification” since “no conquest could be complete nor could it be sustained without diplomacy aided by money and corruption.”⁴³¹ Officials of the Makhzen intended to become the middlemen of the French empire in Morocco. The titles purchased by the Makhzen were an investment in the Protectorate and traditional authorities intended to reap the dividends of buttressing French authority.

However, by 1930, the Makhzen’s hopes had been dashed. On 16 May 1930, French authorities introduced a new dahir, known as the Berber Dahir, to supplement the 1924 dahir mentioned earlier. Contained in the dahir were provisions which sidelined the Makhzen from their traditional roles as judges and administrative arbiters among Berbers. Articles 5 and 6 made decisions rendered by djemâas legally binding and appointed French military tribunals as appellate courts, making the Makhzen redundant and taking away from the Sultan the only power he had left as the sovereign of Berbers, his right as supreme judge. The Sultan’s signature

⁴³¹ SHD 3H 247, 4440 SR, Chef de la Sûreté Régionale à Fès to Chef du Bureau Régional des Renseignements, Le Rif, Fès, et les Puissances, 20 June, 1927, 2.

on the Berber Dahir consecrated sixteen years of direct administration by intelligence officers and effectively turned most of Morocco into a French colony.

This state of affairs was not why the Berber Dahir became infamous, however. Initially, opponents to the Berber Dahir attempted to draw support to their cause by arguing that the French had despoiled the Sultan of his “territory,” but that did not matter to everyday Moroccans who cared little for the difference between direct and indirect rule and were used to the presence of the French on their territory. Instead, Moroccan nationalists who had previously been concerned with cultural and intellectual reform, developed a political message that played to Morocco’s religious inclinations. Nationalists argued that the French promulgated the Berber Dahir to cut off Berbers from Islam and bring them into the fold of Christianity. Against the backdrop of hunger and economic crisis in Morocco, these alleged divisions created by the French mobilized Moroccans in several cities, but to the surprise of the French, it was abroad that the Berber Dahir took on its full force, attracting far too much attention to French governance and providing anti-imperial activists everywhere a lens through which to examine colonial administration in general.

What was initially a moment of jubilation for French intelligence officers in Morocco quickly turned out to be the beginning of the long and protracted end of the French Empire in Morocco. The effects of the Berber Dahir were felt immediately. The old guard of Moroccan notables that had sought to be accommodated by French power gave up, and the generation that had anticipated replacing the old guard felt betrayed. Empire requires native collaborators and however unreliable French collaborators had seemed to be, their partnership with the French had been essential to the expansion of French power in Morocco, if only the moral cover they gave to the French. Without Moroccan intermediaries, the authorities of *Contrôle* were ineffectual. The

power of the authorities of *Contrôle* rested on their understanding of Moroccan opinion and their ability to manipulate it, which had always been a difficult task, but was by the end of 1930 the source of the Protectorate's disarray. As *Contrôle* faltered, the regime embarked on a campaign of urban pacification that mixed displays of overt physical violence with an oppressive surveillance machine.

The Berber Dahir

The Berber Dahir, promulgated on 16 May 1930, refined the administration of civil and criminal justice for Berber tribes in Morocco by placing Berbers and Arab Muslims living in the areas concerned by the Berber Dahir under the jurisdiction of tribal and French appellate courts and away from traditional instances of Islamic justice. By abridging the Sultan's spiritual and temporal powers over Moroccans living in the areas concerned by the Berber Dahir, French authorities removed the Sultan, his representatives, and on the surface, seemed to have removed Islam from one of the most important aspects of life in society: the resolution of disputes. The dahir was immediately repudiated by Moroccan nationalists who accused the French of using it to divide Berbers from Arabs to better rule Morocco by leveraging the varying degrees of Islamization of tribes to create fissures in Morocco's religious unity.⁴³²

Much of the scholarship on the Berber Dahir suffers from a paucity of archival material on the matter which has created a homogenous interpretation of its importance. Part of the problem lies in the tight censorship applied in the days after the dahir's promulgation and the

⁴³² For the best treatments of the Berber Dahir see Gilles Lafuente, "Dahir Berbère" in *Encyclopédie Berbère* Aix-en-Provence, 1994. Article published March 1, 2012. <http://journals.openedition.org/encyclopedieberbere/2361>; Gilles Lafuente, "Dossier Marocain sur le dahir berbère de 1930," *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée* 38 (1984), 83-116, Gilles Lafuente, *La Politique berbère de la France et le nationalisme marocain* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1999); Charles-Robert Ageron, "La Politique berbère du protectorat marocain de 1914-1939," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 18, no. 4 (1971): 50-90

surprising absence of intelligence reports describing the situation on the ground as it unraveled in May, June, July, and August 1930. Part of the problem also lies in the fact that scholars, lacking pertinent archival material, have not been able to adequately challenge the nationalist narrative that made the Berber Dahir infamous: that France formally established legal pluralism in Morocco to divide Arab Muslims from Berbers to better rule Morocco, and that not content to have enacted a policy of ethnic separation, French authorities were also secretly converting Berbers to Catholicism.⁴³³ To bolster this assertion, treatments of the Berber Dahir reproduce vivid citations taken from the essays published by famous intelligence officers, such as Maurice Le Glay and Commandant Paul Marty—that vividly illustrate how the French feared Islam and mistrusted the Arab, leading to the fateful decision to proclaim the Berber Dahir. These treatments of the Berber Dahir accept that it followed a trend begun at the turn of the twentieth century when the necessity of slowing the costs of empire through the establishment of Protectorates required the French to prop up existing legal institutions to avoid having to create new ones.⁴³⁴ The numerous studies and reports put out by the various bureaucracies in charge of understanding and monitoring the legal customs and institutions they supported, inevitably led to an emphasis on the particular and the standardization of the exception that in turn propped up ruling local potentates.

Recently, however, scholars of Morocco have eschewed the simplicity of explaining the Berber Dahir as the product of divide and rule tactics.⁴³⁵ Katherine Hoffman, an anthropologist,

⁴³³ Jonathan Wirtzen, *Making Morocco: Colonial Intervention and the Politics of Identity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016), 156.

⁴³⁴ Richard Roberts, *Litigants and Households: African Disputes and Colonial Courts in the French Soudan, 1895-1912* (Porthsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2005), see chapter 2 in particular.

⁴³⁵ See for example, Jonathan Wirtzen, "Performing the nation in anti-colonial protest in interwar Morocco, *Nations and Nationalism* 19, 4(2013): 615-634; Katherine Hoffman, "Berber Law by French means: Customary Courts in the Moroccan Hinterlands, 1930-1956," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 2010 52(4): 851-880; Mustapha El Qadéry, "La justice coloniale des 'berbères' et l'Etat national au Maroc," *L'Année du Maghreb* 3, (2007), 17-37.

argues, for example, that recognition of customary law and the imposition of customary courts was a way for the French to insert themselves into the lives of Berbers to better integrate them into systems that incorporated French legislation.⁴³⁶ Indeed, juggling competing jurisdictions was impossible. As Mary Lewis has argued in the case of Tunisia, jurisdictional and legal plurality, dividing and ruling, did not lead to uncontested power. On the contrary, legal pluralism resulted in what she calls “divided rule,” the fragmentation of authority between various parties that dissipated French power and forced the French into directly administering the Tunisian Protectorate to maintain their rule.⁴³⁷

Indeed, the Berber Dahir was just one part of a wider plan to flatten Morocco’s legal pluralism and do away with Islamic law, jurisprudence, and Islamic courts, as well as customary courts throughout Morocco, though the kind of replacement the authorities of *Contrôle* envisaged establishing was never made explicit in part because of the fallout from the Berber Dahir.⁴³⁸ Controlling the judicial system was key to *Contrôle*’s power. It was through the politicization of the judicial system, controlling the process to generate the outcomes that supported French power, that the authorities of *Contrôle* hoped to achieve covert direct administration of the Protectorate. As Lyautey’s second chief of intelligence put it, the Berber Dahir was nothing less than a “coup d’état.”⁴³⁹

Officially, the Berber Dahir was portrayed as just one dahir in a series of dahirs that formed part of the Residency General’s Berber Policy.⁴⁴⁰ Berber policy, the French claimed, was the result of carefully studying the situations French intelligence officers encountered on the

⁴³⁶ Hoffman, 853-854.

⁴³⁷ Mary Lewis, *Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881-1938* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 2.

⁴³⁸ CADN 2mi 2354, Le problème du Statut Judiciaire applicable aux Tribus de Coutume Berbère, 20-24

⁴³⁹ Compte-rendu du Rapport du General Simon, Bulletin du Comité de l’Afrique Française, March 1931

⁴⁴⁰ SHD 3H 1418, Etude sur l’organisation des Tribunaux Coutumiers, 2-3.

ground as “pacification” efforts led them deeper and deeper into Berberistan. Among the situations that they encountered was the “chimeric and easily disproven fallacy” that Berbers and the French were somehow related as freedom-loving peoples who cherished democratic institutions.⁴⁴¹ Intelligence officers, however, were not anthropologists living as self-effacingly as possible among tribe members, describing with as little bias as possible the situations they encountered, though they certainly gave that impression by turning their notes into scientific articles published in journals such as *Archives Berbères*. “Pacification” was noisy, messy, violent, and destabilizing. Thus, the situations that intelligence officers described on the ground were actually the ones that they created, and so, what French authorities claimed were dahirs that framed existing situations, were actually dahirs that sanctioned the actions of intelligence officer.

The first dahir in the series, promulgated on 11 September 1914, recognized the existence of tribes that “followed so-called Berber customary law (*tribus dites de coutume berbère*).”⁴⁴² Officially, French authorities presented the dahir as a “*petition de principe*,” a way of experimenting with administrative rules without committing to a permanent solution.⁴⁴³ Indeed, the recognition of tribes that used customary law to adjudicate disputes raised eyebrows among officials in the Sultan’s palace and the Makhzen since the Sherffian Empire was a Muslim empire that administered justice in accordance with Islam. The Sultan and French authorities

⁴⁴¹ CADN 2mi 2354, Le problème du Statut Judiciaire applicable aux Tribus de Coutume Berbère, 1. For a closer look at the literature that expounds on the similarities between French and Berbers see for example Robert Montagne, *La vie sociale et la vie politique des Berbères* (Paris: Editions du Comité de l’Afrique française, 1931)

⁴⁴² Literally, “the so-called tribes that follow Berber custom.” I have opted to translate this as “the tribes that follow so-called Berber customary law.” Another point to note is that officially the title of the dahirs indicates that they apply to tribes that “follow Berber customary law” (*tribus de coutume berbère*). In discussions prior to the promulgation of the dahirs, intelligence officers and jurists referred to the dahirs as the “dahirs applicable to the tribes that follow so-called Berber custom” (*tribus dites de coutume berbère*). See for example, 3H 1418, Etude sur l’organisation des Tribunaux Coutumier, 8. Commandant Izard, the author of this report and the foremost expert on Berbers in the French Empire, was involved in most of the dahirs that made up Berber Policy and only used the formula “tribes that follow so-called Berber custom.”

⁴⁴³ CADN 2mi 2354, Henri Herse, Le problème du statut judiciaire applicable aux tribus de coutumes berbères, 1939, 10.

reached a compromise that ensured that Berbers remained the Sultan's subjects and that guaranteed the primacy of Islam when the Sultan extended his privilege (*haute convenance*) to sign dahirs to his Grand Vizir. With this arrangement the Sultan kept what was left of his sovereignty intact, since he had not technically signed the dahir and not provided any legally-binding framework for the French to encroach on his power.⁴⁴⁴

Lyautey accepted that the dahirs applicable to tribes that followed so-called Berber customary law only provided an administrative framework because it was better than not having a framework at all in the context of pacification. The dahirs were an ad hoc solution that created a more stable political environment. Indeed, at the time of the initial French penetration of Berber country in 1914, some Berber tribes had neither *qadi*, a Muslim judge, nor *caïd*, a representative appointed by the Sultan. Berbers made do with *djemâas* to administer justice according to customary law.⁴⁴⁵ For French authorities, until the authority of the Sultan was restored throughout the Sherffian Empire—the very reason for the existence of the French Protectorate of Morocco—decisions rendered by *djemâas* required a framework to make them binding, especially in areas which were active theaters of military operations or prone to insurgencies. Each new step into the Moroccan hinterlands, each attempt at stabilizing a volatile political situation, was thus followed by a new administrative dahir to create a framework that organized the reality French officers claimed they had encountered on the ground.

The recognition of tribes that followed so-called Berber customary law was immediately followed by what some called the Berber problem: what was customary law and which tribes followed it? Indeed, not all Berbers were initially concerned by the dahirs. At the time of the Berber Dahir's promulgation, French intelligence officers claimed that only fifty-four tribes or

⁴⁴⁴ CADN IMA/200/732, Le problème Berbère et l'organisation des tribunaux coutumiers, 1 May 1929, 7.

⁴⁴⁵ CADN ITU/1S/5, Justice indigène, 8.

fractions of tribes, none of which were located south of the Middle Atlas Mountains where most Berbers lived, could be considered tribes that followed so-called Berber customary law.⁴⁴⁶ Furthermore, although scholars in service of the empire had posited an obvious division between Berbers and Arab Muslims, intelligence officers knew before the conquest of the Atlas that Berber tribes had already experienced varying degrees of Islamization.⁴⁴⁷ Living among Berbers, intelligence officers confirmed that their charges refused to follow sharia law, especially in matters of marriage, divorce, and inheritance, that they did not strictly follow Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), but that they also did not strictly adhere to non-Islamic customary law (*orf*) either.⁴⁴⁸ Whatever the differences between the way Berbers practiced Islam and what Islam required out of believers, Berbers by and large considered themselves to be good Muslims, and Arab Muslim tribes did not hesitate to contract alliances with Berber tribes. In fact, according to intelligence officers, tribal *djemâas* heard cases presented by both Arab Muslims and Berbers, combining both elements from *fiqh* and *orf*, and issued rulings according to hybrid codes.⁴⁴⁹

This legal pluralism brought up the second question: what was Berber custom? For the sake of administrative uniformity customary law had to be put down on paper. However, what constituted customary law and which laws were appropriate in the context of the Protectorate was a matter of debate. As French intelligence officers discovered, not only did customary law differ from tribe to tribe and even between factions of a same tribe, but customary codes were transmitted orally between *djemâa* members adding to the complexity of determining what actually constituted customary law. Indeed, unwritten and complex codes were useful in myriad

⁴⁴⁶ SHD 3H 1418, Etude sur l'organisation des Tribunaux Coutumiers, 3-5.

⁴⁴⁷ For an exhaustive look at the colonial literature on the *modus vivendi* between Arabs and Berbers in Morocco see Charles-Robert Ageron, "La politique berbère du protectorat marocain de 1913 à 1934," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 1 (January March 1971).

⁴⁴⁸ Gilles Lafuente, "Dossier Marocain sur le Dahir Berbère," *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée* 38(1984), 83-116, 84.

⁴⁴⁹ SHD 3H 1418, Etude sur l'organisation des Tribunaux Coutumiers, 21.

ways to keep existing power configurations within a tribe and preserve social cohesion, but they also helped accommodate the political needs of the various alliances between Arabs and Berbers.⁴⁵⁰ Customary law was a peace treaty between neighboring Arabs and Berbers. Thus, transcription required not only understanding law among Berbers, but also how Arabs nearby understood customary law as part of their *modus vivendi* with Berbers.

Transcribing *orf* also presented French intelligence officers with the opportunity to enter the political arrangements made between Berbers and between Berbers and Arabs. The vagaries of unwritten legal codes that worked to create social and political harmony between Arabs and Berbers also worked to accommodate French power.⁴⁵¹ Naturally, between what was lost in translation and what French intelligence officers wanted to hear, successive codification efforts of the idiosyncrasies of each tribe's legal practices dramatically adulterated what was called Berber customary law, especially when it was culled of elements explicitly incompatible with French rule, such as slavery, or more importantly, when elements that had not existed before were introduced, such as prison and penitentiary sentences that replaced blood debts that were the custom retribution in cases of murder, theft, and rape.⁴⁵² By 1930, what was called customary

⁴⁵⁰ SHD 3H 1418, Etude sur l'organisation des Tribunaux Coutumiers, 2.

⁴⁵¹ Customary law was "the outcome of historical struggles between native elites and the colonial or post-colonial overlords." June Starr and Jane Collier, "Introduction: Dialogues in Legal Anthropology," in June Starr and Jane Collier, eds., *History and Power in the Study of Law* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 8-9; On the confection of "customary law" in colonial settings see for example Joan Vincent, "Contours of Change: Agrarian Law in Colonial Uganda, 1895-1962," in June Starr and Jane Collier, eds., *History and Power in the Study of Law* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 164-165.

⁴⁵² In the months that led up to the Berber Dahir, control of criminal justice to secure the ability for djemâas—supervised by the authorities of *Contrôle*—to legally issue prison sentences was frequently brought up. The primary goal was of course to avoid isolated crimes from becoming vendettas, which in turn had the potential to become full-blown insurgencies. But, send Berbers to prison was also a part of France's civilizing mission. Indeed, the prison system in Morocco had been unevenly updated to become a tool of the civilizing mission in Berberistan. The use of irons and corporal punishment was allegedly phased out, and technical and agricultural training were vaunted as modern tools of discipline that ensured a smoother transition back into the pastoral society French intelligence officers created in Berberistan. For a fantastic example of the use of penitentiaries by intelligence officers in Morocco see the fantastic mémoire on the Ali Moumen farm penitentiary in the Southern Chouia region, CADN 2mi 2335, Jacques Leblanc, "Le pénitencier Agricole d'Ali Moumen," 1939. On penitentiaries in service of the civilizing mission of the French Empire and their use in making collaborators out of enemies, see Dzavid Dzanic, "Between fanaticism and loyalty: Algerian prisoners within the French Mediterranean Empire," *Journal of North African*

law was a legal code that was far from traditionally Berber. “Let us not kid ourselves about respect of custom,” wrote a jurist in the Residency General, “we have violated custom over and over again... we are submitting our Berbers to a new civilization,” “France has intervened on a number of occasions to change the custom of Berbers and has imposed on them new rules,” another jurist concurred.⁴⁵³ Customary law continued to represent the consensus brought by the mixing of Islam with traditional Berber elements, but *orf* in the Protectorate was ultimately the consensus negotiated between French intelligence officers, local political notables, and religious authorities.

With the creation of *Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance* (SIP), the cooperative farms and credit institutions examined in chapter 3, the cadence of dahirs that organized tribes that followed so-called Berber customary law accelerated. Securing loans and subsidies necessary to conduct the agricultural projects that mitigated the series of droughts that blighted Morocco, required an accurate estimation of property and future taxes as collateral. Dahirs promulgated in 1921, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1927, and 1928, specifically aimed to help djemâas expedite litigious situations in Berber territories between property owners. They also prevented abusive transfers of wealth by enabling djemâas to hear civil and personal statute cases, but mostly commercial, property, and inheritance cases which had previously been presented to a qadi or a caïd.⁴⁵⁴ To ensure seamless operations between SIPs and djemâas, *Contrôle* created a new *Service de la Justice Berbère* and placed it under the aegis of the *Affaires Indigènes*.⁴⁵⁵ The power of *djemâas*

Studies vol. 2 issue 2 2016, 204-224; For a look at the horrors of penitentiaries and penal colonies in the French Empire see Stephen A. Toth, *Beyond Papillon: The French Overseas Penal Colonies, 1854-1952* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), Peter Zinoman, *The Colonial Bastille: A History of Imprisonment in Vietnam, 1862-1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), and Sylvie Thénault, *Violence ordinaire dans l'Algérie coloniale: camps, internements, assignations à résidence* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2012)

⁴⁵³ CADN IMA/200/732, Le problème berbère et l'organisation des tribunaux coutumiers, 2.

⁴⁵⁴ SHD 3H 1418, Etude sur l'organisation des Tribunaux Coutumiers, 5-6.

⁴⁵⁵ CADN IMA/200/732, Le problème berbère et l'organisation des tribunaux coutumiers, 5.

was wholly dependent on French intelligence officers who guaranteed the prestige of the members of the *djemâas* by backing the court's decisions, in addition to authorizing the loans and subsidies that were distributed through the *djemâa* to tribe members. If French intelligence officers put so much effort into creating the legal infrastructure to enshrine customary law it was because it was key to creating the institutions that served French power in Morocco. Indeed, French intelligence officers called the head of the *djemâa* the "interpreter of *Contrôle*."⁴⁵⁶

By 1929, there were approximately eighty-one *djemâas* serving about two million Moroccans, or about a third of Morocco's population. Some *djemâas* heard as many seven hundred cases a year and notarized 2,850 acts a year. In 1931, the first year with complete official statistics, *djemâas* in the Meknes region heard 4,697 cases, created twenty-one new points of law, and the *djemâas* secretariat issued 8,885 official documents. One of the reasons for the success of *djemâas* was also the low cost of bringing a complaint in front of a *djemâa*. French authorities subsidized legal and notarial fees and took on the entire cost of operating courts. They also guaranteed the clarity and stability of judgements, inspiring confidence among Berbers.⁴⁵⁷

There were, however, significant impediments to the operation of *djemâas*. The popularity of *djemâas* put a serious dent in the credibility of the Makhzen as an administrative body in Morocco. *Djemâas* had either supplanted or prevented the installation of scores of Makhzen notables who had invested in titles and land in areas regulated by the dahirs that organized customary courts. In Marrakesh, for example, the General Commander of the region noted that *djemâas* were so popular that the qadis' courts were deserted and that Muslim notaries

⁴⁵⁶ CADN IMA/200/732, Procès-Verbal de la commission réunie le 26 février pour étudier le fonctionnement & l'organisation de la justice berbère, February-March 1930, 14.

⁴⁵⁷ CADN IMA/200/733, Extraits des rapports des autorités locales et régionales sur le fonctionnement de la justice berbère, January 1932, 10.

and lawyers had been put out of business.⁴⁵⁸ In the Rabat military region, intelligence officers reported that the Makhzen had lost its traditional clientele: Muslims who sought redress were put off by the political barriers and the cost of entry into a qadi's court, and consequently brought their complaints to the nearby *djemâa*.

Members of the Makhzen with appointments as caïds were also upset. They felt that French authorities did not adequately appreciate the "enthusiasm with which they guided pacification columns" nor their statute as "facilitators of official colonization."⁴⁵⁹ They felt that their emoluments to officiate as judges among Berber tribes, 6% of the Tertib, the tax on estimated agricultural production, were insufficient.⁴⁶⁰ French officials who supervised caïds countered that their lifestyles were disproportionate to their income, especially since agricultural output had suffered from chronic droughts since at least 1925 (chapter 3). Indebted qadis and caïds, who lived above their means supplemented their income, according to intelligence reports, by selling judgments, but mainly by taking advantage of their position to acquire land at well below market value and resell it to Europeans for a 2000% average profit.

Indeed, Makhzen officials began filling the courts of qadis with lawyers who challenged cadastral surveys, inheritance settlements, and land sales that were not in their favor. They found willing supporters of their cause among European investors attracted by the economic opportunities available in Berber territories but who could not get past the administrative controls imposed by the French on real estate sales. Qadis overturned the decisions of *djemâas* by the hundreds providing an opportunity for Europeans to circumvent the restrictions of

⁴⁵⁸ SHD 3H 1418, Etude sur l'organisation des Tribunaux Coutumiers, 9.

⁴⁵⁹ CADN IMA/200/732, L'organisation administrative et la Justice Pénale, 8.

⁴⁶⁰ CADN IMA/200/732, L'organisation administrative et la Justice Pénale, 8.

Contrôle in Berber territories while the Makhzen attempted to force recognition of its primacy among Berbers and secure their investments against French regulations.⁴⁶¹

Naturally, between angry Berbers despoiled by falsified titles, Berbers forced to sell for less than their land was worth under threat of sanctions by a caïd, and those who had to sell because they were hungry, French authorities feared a wholesale rejection of the dahirs put in place since 1914 and sensed a collapse of their authority in Berberistan. To preserve the existing rulings and maintain the power of authorities of *Contrôle* over tribal chiefs, intelligence officers referred every contested decision to the *Conseils de Guerre*, military courts, which were the highest de facto courts in Berberistan thanks to the state of siege (chapter 1) to uphold rulings overturned by rogue qadis. But *Conseils de Guerre* were only a temporary solution. Most military tribunals after 1929 were busy south of the Middle Atlas where most French forces were stationed for “pacification.” There were only seven military tribunals left for the tribes that followed so-called Berber custom and there were also fewer intelligence officers available to mitigate the effects of rogue Makhzen officials.⁴⁶² The entire judicial system constructed around the recognition of customary law and courts ground to a halt, threatening to collapse the economic system intelligence officers built to stabilize Berber politics, just as French authorities were planning major military operations to “pacify” the rest of the Sherffian Empire.

French authorities also had questions about the long-term effectiveness of djemâas. Djemâas were the bulwarks of *Contrôle*. They were useful only if the judgments they rendered were in accordance with *Contrôle*. The young Moroccan Arab elites who had received an education in French schools and trained under French magistrates, would naturally demand to

⁴⁶¹ Adam Guerin, “Racial myth, colonial reform, and the invention of customary law in Morocco, 1912-1930,” *Journal of North African Studies* 16, 3 (2011): 361-380, 371.

⁴⁶² CADN IMA/200/732, Le problème Berbère et l’organisation des tribunaux coutumiers, 1 March 1929, 10.

take up the administrative positions left vacant by the caïds and qadis in power who retired or died. French officials in the Residency General pressed by *Contrôle* to take action on Berber justice feared that a new crop of young and idealistic jurists would prove to be uncontrollable.⁴⁶³ Typically, whenever French authorities were forced to justify why they refused to promote the young educated subjects of the empire to positions within the imperial administration, or dealt with the general discontent of educated subjects, they cited the need to temper the ardors of a youth not quite used to French modernity. In the case of the French administration of Morocco, the clash between French modernity and Moroccan youth was likely that they would be too conscientious in availing themselves of their duties: “if we can expect that they will always look for the most rigorous application of the principles of the Protectorate and of the laws the Protectorate has birthed, do we not already foresee the problems the difficulties that will menace the work of France in Morocco?”⁴⁶⁴ The delta between what French authorities claimed was modern, rational administration and what *Contrôle* was doing was enormous. How would France’s “protégés react once they discovered they had been duped?”⁴⁶⁵ The official rules of the Protectorate were created “with auxiliaries whose loyalty was unquestionable,” however, the experiences of the previous sixteen years taught the authorities of *Contrôle* to be “extremely prudent not to give to indigenous agents powerful weapons that will one day be turned against us, considering the traditionalism and the nationalism that we see in Moroccans.”⁴⁶⁶ The authorities of *Contrôle* anticipated a blowout: “it is our duty towards ourselves (*notre devoir*

⁴⁶³ CADN IMA/200/732, Note sur la justice (au pénal et au civil) en Pays Berbère—Erreurs commises. Améliorations possibles, 17.

⁴⁶⁴ CADN IMA/200/732, Note sur la justice (au pénal et au civil) en Pays Berbère—Erreurs commises. Améliorations possibles, 46.

⁴⁶⁵ CADN IMA/200/732, Note sur la justice (au pénal et au civil) en Pays Berbère—Erreurs commises. Améliorations possibles, 38.

⁴⁶⁶ CADN IMA/200/732, Note sur la justice (au pénal et au civil) en Pays Berbère—Erreurs commises. Améliorations possibles, 48.

envers nous-même)” wrote another jurist who meant the duty of *Contrôle*, not of France, the duty to build a perennial empire, not a Protectorate, “to reduce while there is still time... the powers of indigenous authorities, to codify in the most minute details the procedures and rules of justice, and to reinforce, as planned, extreme control.”⁴⁶⁷

In late 1929, the Residency General’s military and legal cabinets concluded that a major reform of Morocco’s judicial system was needed to consecrate this current “*état de fait*.” It was necessary to obtain an “act of the sovereign,” the signature of the Sultan, to give full power to the dahirs that organized the tribes that followed so-called Berber custom.⁴⁶⁸ On 16 May 1930, the young Sultan Muhammad Ben Youssef, known later as Muhammad V, signed eight articles affirming the existence of tribes that followed so-called Berber customary law. The dahir was a moment of jubilation for intelligence officers. As Commandant Izard, the foremost expert on Berber matters in the French Empire, proudly put it, the success was absolute: “the grands caïds have disappeared and with them, every middleman, every screen between the tribes and us has as well... intimate contact has been created between the Berbers and the authorities of *Contrôle*.”⁴⁶⁹

The Berber Dahir from Geneva to Java and back to Casablanca

Unbeknownst to the authorities of *Contrôle*, news of the Berber Dahir leaked weeks before it was promulgated. Abdellatif Sbihi and Mohamed Lyazidi, both interpreters for the land registry division of the *Affaires Indigènes*, managed to sneak a copy of the dahir out of their offices after loudly protesting its implications to their superiors and subsequently resigning in

⁴⁶⁷ CADN IMA/200/732, Note sur la justice (au pénal et au civil) en Pays Berbère—Erreurs commises. Améliorations possibles, 48.

⁴⁶⁸ CADN IMA/200/732, Etude sur l’organisation des tribunaux coutumiers, January 1930, 10.

⁴⁶⁹ SHD 3H 1418, Etude sur l’organisation des Tribunaux Coutumiers, 2.

protest.⁴⁷⁰ It is unclear why neither Sbihi nor Lyazidi had not been closely watched after their falling out with the *Affaires Indigènes*, because it was obvious at once that they were intent on making trouble for French authorities. As soon as Sbihi left the *Affaires Indigènes*, the *Contrôleur Civil* for Rabat alerted his superiors in the Residency General that Sbihi was organizing the students of the *Collège de Rabat* and rallying support against the dahir among the region's notables. Intelligence officers reported in late April that the political situation in Morocco was more disquieting than normal. French authorities were used to the provocations at the same time every year of Moroccan students exhausted by their end of year exams and anxious to enjoy the quickly approaching summer break, but during spring 1930 they seemed to be particularly keen on antagonizing French officials by criticizing the policies of the Residency General. The *Contrôleur Civil* for the Rabat-Salé region reported being unnerved by verses of a song in the style of the Marseillaise he had heard hummed by students.⁴⁷¹ The "Moroccan Marseillaise" as the students called their song seemed to call for violence, according to the *Contrôleur*: "How after our past, so full of glory, can others enjoy our lands... Persevere in combat. Be valiant, O youth of today! Be valiant! We depend on you."⁴⁷² The *Contrôleur Civil* suspected the verses of having made their way into other cities. He requested a priority transmission of his report to other cities. There was no return to his queries. A few weeks later, in Salé, Rabat, Casablanca, and Fez, French security forces fought off scores of angry rioters barricaded in medinas.

⁴⁷⁰ The best timelines of the events surrounding the proclamation of the dahir come from Kenneth Brown's interview with a Moroccan nationalist in Kenneth Brown, "The Impact of the Dahir Berbère in Salé" in *Arabs & Berbers*, ed. Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1972), 201-215; see also John Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967,) Chapter 10. The lack of press coverage, even among local French newspapers, suggests mass censorship of the event.

⁴⁷¹ CADN (2012) Rabat 19, Moroccan Marseillaise, 28 April 1930, 1.

⁴⁷² CADN (2012) Rabat 19, Moroccan Marseillaise, 28 April 1930, 3.

For French authorities, officially, there was nothing that seemed to justify the violence of the summer of 1930. For months, the Residency General remained uncertain as to how to either approach the problem or respond to it, and the official intelligence bulletin contained no indication that the Berber Dahir was a problem. The riots, while an obvious breakdown in the colonial order, were localized to a few cities and there was not one field report to indicate that anyone in the areas affected by the Berber Dahir actually cared about it. It was not until mid-September 1930 that French security forces in Morocco officially attributed the events of June, July, and August 1930 to the Berber Dahir.

Part of the confusion among French authorities stemmed from conflicting messages they heard from the authorities of *Contrôle* and from rioters on the street. Most of the civil servants in the Residency General and at the Quai d'Orsay were unclear why the Berber Dahir mattered: they were told that it was just a bit of paperwork, that it was “a dahir like any other.”⁴⁷³ On the street, the situation was also confusing. Rioters claimed that the Berber Dahir was an insult to Islam, but French intelligence officers reported that Sbihi had spent the weeks that followed his resignation from the *Affaires Indigènes* talking to students in Salé about the dangers that the Berber Dahir posed to the territorial integrity of Morocco.⁴⁷⁴ The reports also mentioned that “territorial division” was not an emotional lever for Moroccans who had long been living split under French, Spanish, and international tutelage (in Tangier) and who perhaps expected that the French would finally make official their plans to directly administer Morocco. As we have seen in the previous chapters, Moroccans with some power, such as guild and tribe leaders, readily replaced traditional Moroccan authorities with French ones in exchange for new lines of patronage. As for the masses, another intelligence report gauged, “they are fatalists and resigned

⁴⁷³ Lafuente, “Dossier Marocain,” 1.

⁴⁷⁴ Brown, “Impact,” 209.

to this fact, and can only hope for divine intervention to save them.”⁴⁷⁵ Coincidentally, this was also something Sbihi realized.⁴⁷⁶

Events across North Africa during the first half of 1930 gave Moroccan dissidents the right narrative to push to anger Moroccans. 1930 marked the grand centennial celebrations of French Algeria, which included a parade in Sidi Ferruch where the first French troops had disembarked, and in Carthage, for the Eucharistic Congress, the presence of thousands of French youth created fears of a new crusade. These events compounded a lingering spiritual trauma among Muslims in Morocco inflicted from within their community in 1928. In Fez, Morocco’s religious capital, Mohamed Abdeljalil, brother of the famous nationalist, Omar Abdeljelil, and scion of a venerable Fassi family, converted to Catholicism and took the name of Jean Mohamed Adeljelil before joining a Franciscan order.⁴⁷⁷ His godfather was the famous French orientalist, Louis Massignon, whose work had been instrumental in developing the Protectorate’s Berber schools that would be targeted by the groups claiming the Berber Dahir was an affront to Islam and that it divided Arabs from Berbers.⁴⁷⁸ In the deleterious climate of Fez, the intellectual gap between Jean Mohamed Abdeljelil’s conversion as just a bit of gossip and the latest example of a French plot to evangelize and convert Moroccans was trivial to bridge for Moroccans. Rumors that the French harbored secret plans to make their North African empire Catholic had always been in circulation, but the Berber Dahir, storytellers told engrossed audiences, was proof that the French were converting Berbers into Christians.

⁴⁷⁵ CADN IMA/200/732, Procès-Verbal de la commission réunie le 26 février pour étudier le fonctionnement & l’organisation de la justice berbère, February-March 1930, 45.

⁴⁷⁶ Brown, “Impact,” 209.

⁴⁷⁷ Oissila Saaïdia, “De Mohamed à Jean-Mohamed: Abd El-Jalil ou l’itinéraire d’une conversion au catholicisme,” *Histoire, monde et cultures religieuses* 28, (2013):15-31, 18-19.

⁴⁷⁸ Ageron, “La Politique berbère du protectorat marocain de 1914-1939,” 70.

For nationalists such as Abdellatif Sbihi, Islam dramatized the implications of the Berber Dahir and galvanized the poor masses who would otherwise have had little time for the complaints of the patriarchs of wealthy families or the political pretensions of Moroccan students. Notables of the Makhzen agreed and worked with Sbihi to spin the Berber Dahir into a religious message that was sure to be heard by Moroccans, who, according to one nationalist, “were always eager for a religious experience—without demanding why.”⁴⁷⁹ On 20 June 1930, a little over a month after the promulgation of the Berber Dahir, Fassi notables, youth from the schools in the Rabat-Salé region, and nationalists convinced the Imam of the Grand Mosque in Salé, Hajj Ali, to recite the *latif* at Friday-noon prayer.⁴⁸⁰ The *latif* was usually reserved for natural disasters, wars, and other calamities. But the Imam preached with fervor and Moroccans recited the *latif* along with the Imam.⁴⁸¹ The masses knew nothing of the exact implications of the Berber Dahir, but the lived experiences of everyday Moroccans seemed to confirm what they were being told: the more French troops poured into Morocco for “pacification” purposes, the more circulation around areas of operations were tightly restricted, the more the stories of a secret crusade seemed true. Rumors of catholic conversions only added to the psychological weariness of Moroccans who had since 1912 endured bouts of famine, plagues of locusts, disease, insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, economic crises, the destruction of traditional Moroccan arts and crafts, in addition to having become a French imperial possession that was officially an association between Moroccans and French, but practically, a French colony ruled

⁴⁷⁹ Brown, “Impact,” 211.

⁴⁸⁰ Brown, “Impact,” 211. See also Wyrzten, *Making Morocco*, 144-147.

⁴⁸¹ Brown, “Impact,” 211. According to Hassan el Ouazzani, the *latif* was recited for the first time on the 27th of June, Mohamed Hassan Ouazzani, *Combats d'un nationaliste marocain, vol. 1, 1930-1937* (Casablanca: Fondation Mohamed Hassan Ouazzani, 1987), 194.

directly. In other words, the *latif* resonated with Moroccans because it seemed to confirm what everyone already believed: that they were living a calamity.

Throughout the summer of 1930, imams across Morocco recited the *latif* while Moroccans rioted. But to the surprise of French authorities, it was abroad that the *latif* was most consequential. Indeed, the Berber Dahir was not a plot to evangelize in Morocco, but the recitation of “the *latif* made the Berber Dahir a matter of Islam” and alerted the rest of the Muslim world to the plight of Moroccans under French rule.⁴⁸² Resistance to the Berber Dahir in the form of the *latif* not only created Moroccan solidarity between generations and classes, each with their specific set of grievances, but it also tightened the bonds between Muslims living in colonial regimes abroad.

Moroccans students had since at least 1925 cultivated special relationships with their counterparts from the Middle East and beyond thanks to French programs that funded the education of imperial elites in French universities. The associations they created as a result of their time in Paris were instrumental in developing critiques of imperialism which quickly attracted the attention of other anti-imperial activists. Among them, Shakib Arslan, the most prolific Arab journalist of the interwar period, was instrumental in helping Moroccan students publicize the Berber Dahir to a wider public.⁴⁸³ Arslan, who had been a person of special interest for French intelligence officers ever since his involvement in the Syro-Palestinian Committee and his broadsides against French administration of the mandates in the Levant, wrote extensively about the Berber Dahir and lent his publication, *La Nation Arabe*, as a platform for

⁴⁸² Brown, “Impact,” 211-215.

⁴⁸³ William Cleveland, *Islam against the West: Shakib and the Campaign for Islamic Nationalism* (Austin: University of Texas, 1985), 2; 94-95.

Moroccan students to develop their ideas.⁴⁸⁴ Arslan consciously published *La Nation Arabe* in French and made it an important vector of communication for colonized peoples and their sympathizers to reach educated and influential Europeans. *La Nation Arabe*'s editorial line gradually made the publication popular among educated communities in the Middle East and North Africa, but it was an instant hit among diplomatic and intelligence circles across the world.⁴⁸⁵ For many in French colonial circles it was Arslan's popularity and the firebrand tone of *La Nation Arabe* that made the Berber Dahir into an international crisis.⁴⁸⁶

Indeed, Arslan quickly picked up on the potential of the Berber Dahir to derail French imperial administration. Beginning June 1930, *La Nation Arabe* made coverage of the Berber Dahir a priority, amplifying the narrative spun by Moroccan students of France's alleged systematic efforts to achieve the separation of Arabs from Berbers.⁴⁸⁷ He travelled clandestinely to Tetouan in Spanish Morocco in August 1930 where he met with Hajj Abd al-Salam Bennouna, a prominent Tetouani notable and indefatigable political activist, to create a transnational fund to defray travel and living expenditures in Paris for several of these students.⁴⁸⁸ The fund subsidized the work of these students who had lived firsthand the clash between Islam and French imperialism and made Moroccan nationalism a another pole of Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic activism.⁴⁸⁹

Arslan's network of patrons, publishers, and intellectuals, such as Rashid Rida and Muhib al-din al-Khatib, influential Salafists from Cairo who published, respectively, al-Manar

⁴⁸⁴ Martin Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 204.

⁴⁸⁵ Anne-Claire de Gayffier-Bonneville, "Renaissance arabe et solidarité musulmane dans *La Nation Arabe*," *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 95-98, (2002) : 71-93, 73.

⁴⁸⁶ *Le Temps Colonial*, November 4, 1930.

⁴⁸⁷ *La Nation Arabe*, June 1930.

⁴⁸⁸ David Stenner, "Centering the Periphery: Northern Morocco as a hub of Transnational Anti-Colonial Activism, 1930-1943, *Journal of Global history* 11, (2016): 430-450.

⁴⁸⁹ SHD 7NN 2165, A/S de l'action du comité syro-palestinien-moghreb de Genève, 25 Octobre 1931.

and al-Fatah, provided the Arabic-language outlets necessary for the dissemination of anti-imperial propaganda centered around the Berber Dahir. But Arslan and his Moroccan protégés did not hesitate to write for smaller periodicals that published in Arabic, flooding post offices across the world with propaganda concerning French evangelization of Berbers.⁴⁹⁰

In addition to contributing to a global discourse on empire, Moroccan students also built on their success by putting North African problems in global perspective. In Paris, Ahmed Balafrej, Mekki Naciri, Mohammed El Fassi, Mohammed Kholti, Abdelmalek Faraj, and Mohammed el Ouezzani, students who later played a crucial role in the organization of Moroccan nationalist and independence parties published under the pseudonym Mouslim Barbari (the Muslim Berber) a pamphlet entitled “*Tempête sur le Maroc ou les erreurs d’un politique Berbère*” (Morocco in the eye of the storm or the errors of Berber Policy) dedicated to explaining how the Berber Dahir was typical of colonial regimes in general: “many of the countries colonized or ‘protected’ by England and France are, to put it mildly, the victims of a grave malaise.”⁴⁹¹ The book was dedicated to people across North Africa and the Middle East and to that end it was translated into Arabic ahead of the Islamic Conference in Jerusalem (December 1931), though its authors also hoped that people in India and Indochina would identify with the malaise and contribute to a broader critique of imperialism.⁴⁹²

The intellectual output surrounding the Berber Dahir established the event as one of the most important rallying points of the Muslim world against colonialism. Although, the Berber Dahir was mentioned only three times in the monthly intelligence briefing sent from Rabat to Paris between May 1930 and December 1932, it seemed to be a popular topic of conversation on

⁴⁹⁰ Gilles Lafuentes, *La politique berbère de la France et le nationalisme Marocain*, (Paris : l’Harmattan, 1999), 232

⁴⁹¹ Mouslim Barbari, *Tempête sur le Maroc* (Paris: Editions Rieder, 1931), 1.

⁴⁹² Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 186; see also Abdelmajid Benjelloun, *Le mouvement nationaliste marocain dans l’ex-Maroc khalifien*, 1930-56 (Rabat: El Maârif al Jadida, 2011), 250-252.

the Arab Street according to daily intelligence briefs. The Rabat intelligence station received telegrams from stations in Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Palestine, and during the Hajj, the military mission of the French embassy in Mecca submitted summaries of overheard conversations mentioning the Berber Dahir.⁴⁹³ Every year, on the anniversary of the Berber Dahir, thousands of telegrams poured into the Quai d'Orsay and the League of Nations in Geneva to call on the French government to abolish the dahir and to alert diplomats to the crimes committed against Islam.⁴⁹⁴ In the spring of 1931, Libyan fighters resisting the Italian invasion paused for a few moments to dispatch a telegram of support to their "Moroccan brothers suffering martyr."⁴⁹⁵ In Java, Muslims used the anniversary of the Berber Dahir to also criticize Dutch imperialism,⁴⁹⁶ and Malaysian Muslims looked at the French empire in Indochina through the lens of the Berber Dahir.⁴⁹⁷

In a way, the Berber Dahir marked the end of a long, collective delusion among Moroccans about the nature of empire; or perhaps it marked a Moroccan refusal to continue to live a lie which they had eagerly perpetuated so long as they believed there was a place for them in the empire. Moroccan students built on their success abroad by publishing a periodical of their own to bring attention to the problems of imperial governance in Morocco specifically, though North African affairs in general were also treated. *Maghreb*, a monthly magazine published in Paris, was principally the collaboration of Hassan el Ouezzani, a Moroccan nationalist, and Jean Longuet, a left-wing member of the French parliament, that frequently featured articles from

⁴⁹³ SHD 3H 247, Renseignements a/s activité de la délégation syro-palestinienne maghrébine, 16 April 1931

⁴⁹⁴ CADN 11MA/900/1051, Situation Politique et Economique, 16-31 Mai 1934, 4 June 1934, 1; On Java and the Berber Dahir see CADN 1MA/200/73, cover sheet to Traduction d'un passage de l'article intitulé "Le fanatisme européen ou le fanatisme musulman ?" rédigé par Chekib Arslan dans "Hadir el Alam el Islami," undated; see also CADN 14MA/900/138, Récit d'un voyage fait à la Mecque en 1939 par un jeune musulman de la région de Meknès, 1939.

⁴⁹⁵ SHD 3H 247, Renseignements, 566 Ia18, 15 April 1931.

⁴⁹⁶ SHD 3H 247, Renseignements, 579 Ia18, 15 July 1931.

⁴⁹⁷ SHD 7NN 2165, Note sur les relations politique du Maroc avec les Musulmans de l'extérieur, 3.

renowned scholars, such as Louis Massignon. Like *la Nation Arabe*, *Maghreb* was consciously published in French to reach people in power and like *la Nation Arabe*, *Maghreb* counted numerous intelligence offices among its subscribers.⁴⁹⁸

Maghreb naturally took up the cause against the Berber Dahir, but the publication's editorial line was muted in its criticisms of France's handling of Islam. *Maghreb* offered to expose "what is commented on and judged in Baghdad, in Cairo, in the tents of the Senoussis, but is ignored in Paris."⁴⁹⁹ If the French failed to see what was going on in Morocco, it was because "the militarists kept the French shielded from the way they protected Moroccans."⁵⁰⁰ What mattered to Ouezzani and his acolytes was exposing the regime in Morocco to French citizens, duped by their institutions, the colonial army and the civilians in parliament who provided cover for its abuses. "Berber Policy" was a "war machine," the Berber Dahir was a tool of "*Contrôle*," in the sense Lyautey meant it, literally, when he wrote about it in the "coup de barre memo," as "an attenuated form of colonialism," a "way of governing extra-legally," by placing Moroccans under the jurisdiction of "military courts."⁵⁰¹ And what of "French military intelligence services?" *Maghreb* aimed to expose the intelligence officers who ruled as "emperors of Fez," who constituted "secret archives," armed "native police" in preparation for "days of blood" that ensued after fabricated incidents.⁵⁰² It would also reveal to the French how Urbain Blanc, the head of *Contrôle*, was a "dictator."⁵⁰³ Yet, even with insights that could only have come from access to secret intelligence material—the Lyautey coup de barre memo, for

⁴⁹⁸ "Pourquoi nous lançons *Maghreb*," *Maghreb*, July 1932.

⁴⁹⁹ Ouezzani, *Combats d'un nationaliste*, 200-201; see also *Maghreb*, May-June 1933.

⁵⁰⁰ SHD 7NN 2165, Traduction/Mémoire sur la question marocaine présenté à M. Herriot, Président du Conseil des Ministres de la République Française à Paris, intercepted 6 September 1932, 1.

⁵⁰¹ Ouezzani, *Combats d'un nationaliste*, 129, 185-201.

⁵⁰² SHD 7NN 2165, Traduction/Mémoire sur la question marocaine présenté à M. Herriot, Président du Conseil des Ministres de la République Française à Paris, intercepted 6 September 1932, 7.

⁵⁰³ SHD 7NN 2165, Traduction/Mémoire sur la question marocaine présenté à M. Herriot, Président du Conseil des Ministres de la République Française à Paris, intercepted 6 September 1932, 7.

example, which was censured by the Quai d'Orsay—Maghreb failed to achieve the desired effect of awakening the French public to realities of empire in Morocco, even though it was essential reading for European intellectuals and politicians looking for coverage of the Muslim world.⁵⁰⁴

A New Intelligence Network

Whatever the shortcomings of the Moroccan press abroad in getting the French to react to events in Morocco, it was spectacularly successful in attracting the attention of the authorities of *Contrôle*. The infrastructure that supported empire—the roads, the rails, the telephone and telegraph wires, the ports and airports, and the post offices—that transported information, people, goods, and armies was also used to carry the ideas and techniques that destabilized it. Fluency in these tools was an essential part of being modern for subjects of the French Empire. They interacted with the world as they always had, but these tools multiplied, accelerated, and amplified their exchanges, created new ways of understanding events, and built communities of thoughts and ideas that spanned the globe. Henri Ponsot, the Moroccan Resident General from 1933 to 1934, noted that intelligence sources “demonstrate[d] that the leaders of the Moroccan nationalist movement [were] very interested in international, French, and local politics,” a revelation in French policy circles leading to a new intelligence mission: “being exactly informed on indigenous opinion, the reactions of natives to events, and their allies is our most critical mission.”⁵⁰⁵ What French authorities in Morocco had once called *les affaires indigènes*, indigenous affairs—vendettas between members of different tribes, the size of a bribe to give to a member of the Makhzen, loans for crops—grew to encompass how events around the world

⁵⁰⁴ Guillaume Denglos, *La revue Maghreb (1932-1936). Une publication franco-marocaine engagée* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 2015), 5.

⁵⁰⁵ CADN (2012) Rabat 15, a/s des mesures préventives à prendre en cas de menaces de troubles publics, 27 February 1934, 2-3.

intersected with what had been once considered the parochial politics of natives. Indeed, in the context of a global economic crisis that compounded the economic precarity and food insecurity of Moroccans, all politics, but especially local, urban politics, were global politics, and took on a volatility that the French were only able to dissipate by calling in the tirailleurs and the Foreign Legion. General Simon, who had called the Berber Dahir a “coup d’état” was pessimistic about the future of the empire: Moroccan nationalism was “a force of nature,” unstoppable, though it perhaps could be “channeled.”⁵⁰⁶ It is in this context that the French Protectorate of Morocco took on its full character as a police state and led to what William Hoisington called “urban pacification.”⁵⁰⁷

One of the overlooked aspects of the infrastructure that networked the French empire in North Africa and the Middle East is that it was almost entirely planned and controlled by French intelligence officers, when it was not directly operated by them.⁵⁰⁸ In Morocco, as we have seen, building telegraph lines, constructing airports, and planning road infrastructure, were among some of the direct responsibilities of French intelligence services, but across North Africa the roles of intelligence officers extended to chartering steamers for the Hajj for example, supervising (and tapping) telephone switchboards, checking passports at various ports of entry and exit, issuing licenses for printers, monitoring the mail, and scheduling radio programming, to name just a few more of their responsibilities. These activities produced a paper trail that

⁵⁰⁶ “Compte-rendu du Rapport du General Simon,” *Bulletin du Comité de l’Afrique Française*, March 1931

⁵⁰⁷ William A. Hoisington Jr., “Cities in revolt: The Berber Dahir (1930) and France’s Urban Strategy in Morocco,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 13, no. 3 (1978): 433-448, 441.

⁵⁰⁸ For an overview of the role of the French colonial army in building and operating empire-wide infrastructure see reports contained in AN-Ma C907, such as #3605 DAI/3, Indemnités port travaux de pistes, 27 December 1933, and AN-Ma S18, réorganisation territoriale du Maroc, 29 December 1932. The brochures of the French North African conferences (Conférence Nord-Africaine) also highlight the work of the French colonial army in connecting various parts of the empire.

described the people, objects, and information carried across the various networks that connected the French Empire and make up most of the intelligence archive after 1930.

The new intelligence network was formed by intertwining previously unconnected intelligence networks to protect the metropole and the empire from the incandescent mix of Islam, nationalism, and opportunistic foreign agitation. The new intelligence net was a dense network of intelligence offices from Damascus to Paris and extended as far as Moscow, Teheran, and Buenos Aires through France's various consular missions. In 1934, with the end of pacification in the borderlands between Algeria and Morocco, French intelligence officers connected *Afrique Occidentale Française* to the network through a new airstrip, road, and telegraph network that ran the whole of Africa's Atlantic coast before branching off first, into the desert, from Rabat to southern Tunisia, and then joining the North African Maginot Line.

The net was especially tight over the major transportation lanes of the Mediterranean, overlapping the travel and support networks used by nationalists as depicted above. But the Berber Dahir's international ramifications, and Morocco's strategic location at the crossroads of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, as well as the declension of *Contrôle*'s powers throughout the administration of the Protectorate, ensured that Morocco was one of the most intelligence-saturated points in the French Empire. Indeed, the net tracked the lives of hundreds of thousands of persons of interest and controlled the mass movements of people at various checkpoints across the line. However, because *la Nation Arabe* and *Maghreb* were clearinghouses for the latest thinking in anti-imperialism and because Morocco was the barometer of the Muslim world, the North African Maginot Line's main purpose was to catch signals for intelligence officers who specialized in intercepting information and interpreting trends.

At the center of intelligence work in the post-Berber Dahir era were the *Carnet A* and *Carnet B*, the A and B files. In the metropole, the Carnet B was the principal surveillance file for enemies of the state. French citizens and foreigners were listed on registers kept by the Interior Ministry for general surveillance purposes.⁵⁰⁹ In the French Empire, the Carnet B listed known nationalists and their sympathizers. The Moroccan Carnet B included members of the Makhzen, nationalists, and other persons of interest to be placed under special surveillance. The Carnet A was a declension of the Carnet B and listed only a few individuals to be placed under special surveillance and, if need be, “neutralized at the first sign of trouble:” imprisonment, house arrest, exile, and more if needed.⁵¹⁰ Intelligence officers shared A and B files through special liaison officers who also transmitted records of individual movements and guided police efforts to track individuals across North Africa.

Along with nationalists and known foreign agitators, North African students figured prominently on these lists and were particularly vulnerable to French abuses. Their engagement during the Berber Dahir made them obvious targets, but French authorities feared that since many also sought educational opportunities abroad, especially in Egypt and Syria where tuition and board were affordable even for students of modest families, there would likely be a cross-contamination of anti-French ideas and methods of resistance. In the post-Berber Dahir era students’ travel plans were considered attempts to evade surveillance making them suspects. The Carnet A and B helped prevent students from slipping entirely out of the control of French intelligence, but the deputy director of the *Affaires Indigènes* also suggested to the authorities of

⁵⁰⁹ On the Carnet B, see Donald N. Baker, “The Surveillance of Subversion in Interwar France: The Carnet B in the Seine, 1922-1940,” *French Historical Studies* 10, no. 3 (1978): 486-516; Jean-Jacques Becker, *Le Carnet B. Les pouvoirs publics et l’antimilitarisme avant la guerre de 1914* (Paris: Editions Klincksieck, 1973); Olivier Forcade, *La République secrète. Histoire des services spéciaux français de 1918 à 1939* (Paris: Nouveau Monde, 2008)

⁵¹⁰ CADN (2012), Rabat 15, a/s des mesures préventives à prendre en cas de menaces de troubles publics, 27 February 1934.

Contrôle that they conduct “discrete action with the families of students to remind them of the high quality of instruction in Morocco, while also hinting at (*leur faire toucher du doigt*) the inconveniences of a prolonged separation in a country far away, as well as the dangers that such a separation entailed... [emphasis original]”⁵¹¹ Had the deputy director of the *Affaires Indigènes* authorized harming students unmoved by the warnings intelligence officers conveyed to their families, or was he simply trying to leverage the fears parents have for their children when they leave home?

As one intelligence officer put it, Moroccan students had a lot in common with their French counterparts: “they are contrary and eager to critique everything as a side effect of their education... naturally they believe in the right of people to govern themselves... and if we add to these diverse influences, films, we note in this country a dangerous evolution.”⁵¹² The only way to remedy the situation was to select a few of the more meritorious students for civil service, and orient a majority of students toward jobs in manual labor so that they learned discipline and respect for authority. They would be at the mercy of their foremen, who were under obligation by police and intelligence officers to provide certificates of good moral character.⁵¹³ It gave the regime in Morocco a spiteful quality, appearing according to the famous French Orientalist, Robert Montagne, to be run by corporals (*kabran*), petty tyrants who exercised power endowed by the French for a slight increase in pay, and sometimes not even that.⁵¹⁴ French intelligence officers planned to either beat out of students the critical thinking they had acquired at school, or

⁵¹¹ CADN (2012) Rabat 19, Indigènes désireux d’aller poursuivre leurs études au Collège Islamia de Beyrouth, 27 August 1931, 2.

⁵¹² 4440 SR, Chef de la Sûreté Régionale à Fès to Chef du Bureau Régional des Renseignements, Le Rif, Fès, et les Puissances, 20 June, 1927, 3.

⁵¹³ AN-Ma F217, A/S Elie Hazan, letter from Elie Hazan’s lawyer requesting certificate of good moral character from police, 1 September 1939.

⁵¹⁴ See Daniel Rivet, “Introduction” in Robert Montagne, *Naissance du prolétariat marocain: Enquête collective exécutée de 1948 à 1950*, (Rabat: Centre Jacques Berque, 2016), 9.

make sure that the thugs on their payroll dulled it through blistered fingers, long hours, and low wages.

The violence directed at Morocco's students was according to Hassan el Ouezzani, the famous Moroccan nationalist, part of a wider plan to stifle not just dissenting voices, but all voices and "put a leash on the Moroccan mind."⁵¹⁵ In an essay on life in Morocco under the "surveillance regime" (*régime d'espionnage*) put in place by the French, Ouezzani listed events that exposed the wide network of "unemployed losers" French authorities deployed to snitch on honest Moroccans: a man who happened to tell his friends that he refused to smoke because of the health effects of tobacco was arrested by the *Surêté* and put in jail for a year; a writer who distributed an essay to a couple of friends was also jailed arbitrarily for distributing a publication not on the approved publication list; a professor whose syllabus was not to the liking of *Contrôle* was fired after refusing to modify it. Ouezzani usually wrote to exhort people to action, but in this particular article, there is little rousing language and no plan of action to fight the injustices he described. The surveillance regime functioned thanks to "a police state more or less stretching from one end of Morocco to the other aimed at tracking free thinking, at denouncing those who speak freely."⁵¹⁶ There is no way to quantify the effectiveness of the North African Maginot Line, but the fear of "prison, beatings, or a bullet to the head" was very real for average dissidents and sympathizers.⁵¹⁷

Indeed, while the leaders of the nationalist movement were tracked through the Carnet A, it was their followers on the Carnet B and those listed in the secret archives who were the most likely to suffer. The importance of these lists lay in the insight they gave into the thought-worlds

⁵¹⁵ Hassan el Ouazzani, "La Croisade contre la pensée," *La volonté du peuple*, January 23, 1934, 4.

⁵¹⁶ Hassan el Ouazzani, "La Croisade contre la pensée," *La volonté du peuple*, January 23, 1934, 4.

⁵¹⁷ SHD 7NN 2165, Traduction/Note de Renseignement, 821C, 19 Octobre 1931, 6.

of Moroccans. Files required folders which in turn required classification. The intellectual exercise that listing and filing engendered created categories that permitted the passive surveillance of innumerable persons by a variety of intelligence services without having to mobilize tens of thousands of intelligence officers. A routine report from Paris detailing a conversation between an intelligence officer and his informant about the return of a suspect named Si Omar El Hajoui triggered, for example, the sharing of intelligence between Paris, Tangier, Madrid, Rabat, and a dusty outpost in southern Morocco. After a trip with his family to France, El Hajoui had reportedly ordered shipped from Cairo to his residence in Fez copies of a brochure entitled “Marrakesh in the eye of the storm, or the failures of Berber policy,” according to the intelligence officer, who was probably new to the Moroccan desk.⁵¹⁸ The officer reported that the brochures were headed for distribution in Tangier and that El Hajoui was supposed to meet with some of the nationalists in the Spanish Protectorate. A little over two weeks later, on 1 October 1931, the Military attaché to the French consul in Tangier, followed up on the report from Paris by providing the contents of an article published in *al Fath* detailing the many ways in which nationalists could share forbidden publications. The newspaper was intercepted thanks to a vigilant postal worker who noticed that the article had been “mistakenly” sent via regular Moroccan post, rather than the diplomatically protected British Post of Morocco favored by Moroccans who shipped contraband, and immediately reported it to the intelligence liaison officer in Tangier.⁵¹⁹

On 14 October 1931, an officer in Rabat supplemented the paper trail, with known information on the brochures. The publication was entitled “Morocco in the eye of the storm” and not “Marrakesh in the eye of the storm,” and was published in French by Editions Rieder, 7

⁵¹⁸ SHD 7NN 2165, Note de Renseignements 711/C, 12 September 1931.

⁵¹⁹ SHD 7NN 2165, Journaux interdits, 768C, 1 October 1931.

Place St-Sulpice in Paris, and in Arabic in Cairo. It had been banned from the French Protectorate since April 1931. The officer then collated the information he had received from Paris and Tangier with information he already possessed. He was able to further surmise that the brochures might be distributed by Driss El Harichi, the owner of a bookshop whose name had come up in similar investigations of forbidden publications headed to Tangier. The officer in Rabat then sent to his Parisian counterpart the file on Si Driss El Harichi with relevant information dating back to 1928, such as his previous travel to Nablous. A look at his file also revealed that he had previously been in contact with Hassan el Ouezzani.⁵²⁰ To his interlocutor in Tangier, the officer in Rabat asked if it was possible to stake out Driss el Harichi's bookstore in view of possibly executing a search warrant.⁵²¹ A day later, on 16 October 1931, investigations in connection with the paper trail brought up another name, Ahmed Balafredj, a student in Paris known for his nationalist connections and known to have recently communicated with el Harichi.⁵²²

The addition of Ahmed Balafredj's name prompted the military attaché in Tangier to contact the Spanish deputy-chief of the Gendarmerie in Tangier, Lieutenant-Colonel Puig. Balafredj was known to visit Sevilla frequently. As far as Puig knew, based on intelligence from Madrid, el Harichi had stopped distributing contraband publications. He knew he was being watched. As a matter of fact, Puig wrote, Editions Rieder had indeed sought to make him a distributor of "Morocco in the eye of the storm," but he had refused. If there were indeed copies of "Morocco in the eye of the storm" in Tangier, Puig proposed to discreetly watch the British Post in Fez and Tetouan to see if Moroccans who worked within the administration of the city of

⁵²⁰ SHD 7NN 2165, Fiche Driss El Harichi.

⁵²¹ SHD 7NN 2165, Publications Interdites, 804C, 15 Octobre 1931.

⁵²² SHD 7NN 2165, Publications Interdites, 812C, 16 Octobre 1931.

Tangier and were suspected of nationalist sympathies showed up.⁵²³ Naturally, another list was established with the names of the civil servants who worked for the city of Tangier and dispatched to officials in Fez and Tetouan. As the French had in Tangier, a well-placed informant in the British Post in Tetouan or Fez could inform local officials if someone from Tangier showed up. From there it was easy to work up the chain of distribution to discover who was distributing the publication in question. Six months later, a three-line note revealed the distributor, Ou Belaid. He was originally from the Souss, but the Soussi intelligence outpost had no information on him, not even a birth certificate. He was probably an impoverished and illiterate *fellah*, a peasant, who had fled “pacification” and the horrible droughts that plagued southern Morocco and who was unaware of what he was selling. He was spotted in the petit Sokko neighborhood, not too far away from the busy rue des Postes, selling “Morocco in the eye of the storm” from the spot on the street on which he laid his newspapers and books waiting for the rush of literate Moroccan workers who would eventually emerge from the Spanish Legation, the Société Générale, and the many luxury hotels.⁵²⁴ The archival record stops there, but if he was picked up by the Tangier gendarmerie, he would probably have been beaten during his interrogation. The Moroccan Tabors and their Spanish officers were known to systematically abuse their prisoners and to sometimes even go too far.⁵²⁵

A name on a list was thus the point of departure into a six-month investigation that followed bills of lading from Cairo to Paris to Fez to Tetouan and Tangier. Along the way, those who were associated with the names on the bills of lading and the contents of the shipments were added to new lists, giving new material for the intelligence officers who drew social networks.

⁵²³ SHD 7NN 2165, Traduction/Note de Renseignement, 821C, 19 Octobre 1931, 2.

⁵²⁴ SHD 7NN 2165, Note de Renseignements, 12 May 1932.

⁵²⁵ CADN (2012) Tanger 675PO/C/22, “La police urbaine de Tanger-La population attend les innovations du nouveau chef de la police,” article detailing the many abuses of the police in Tangier, 19 August 1928.

By mid-1931, intelligence officers from the *Deuxième Bureau*, French military intelligence, were fairly confident in their ability to identify the main actors of the Moroccan nationalist movement, their communication network inside Morocco, and their contacts abroad.⁵²⁶ They had infiltrated the inner circle of some of its leaders, and thanks to a well-placed informants—a delivery boy, for example—they had gone so far as to inserting among prominent nationalists typewriter ribbons with unique shades of blue ink that were immediately recognizable by selected postal workers who knew what to look for and who only had to look at the color of the ink on a letter to know that it would be interesting to an intelligence officer.⁵²⁷ Moroccan nationalists, Ouezzani recalled, were “unprepared for an omnipotent administration, zealous in its repressive anger... and [they] were not exaggerating.”⁵²⁸ Native policy was resented to be sure, but the surveillance state was hated.

To be clear, although the authorities of *Contrôle*, sought and appeared to be omnipresent, they were not. It is not clear that the capacity of French intelligence officers to collect and organize information was matched by a capacity to transform intelligence into actionable policy.⁵²⁹ As the French ramped up the infiltration of nationalist movements and the repression of their sympathizers, and as Moroccan authorities grew more and more suspicious of the motives of the French in Morocco, so too did the incomprehension between both parties reach its paroxysm. *Contrôle* was at its most effective when French authorities established close contact with their charges. Without that contact, French intelligence was listless and so was the administration of the Protectorate.

⁵²⁶ SHD 7NN 2165, Note au sujet des associations secrètes des Jeunes Marocains, 31 March 1931.

⁵²⁷ SHD 7NN 2165, Renseignement 358BM, 8 September 1932.

⁵²⁸ Ouezzani, *Combats d'un nationaliste marocain*, 221.

⁵²⁹ Martin Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence*, chapter 7.

After 1931, the only method for French intelligence in Morocco to gauge with any degree of accuracy the effectiveness of its administration in urban areas was to scour the international press for clues. Indeed, one of the most obvious shifts in intelligence reports is that while the quality and quantity of reporting in areas affected by the Berber Dahir increased dramatically, there were only a few lines dedicated each month to the politics of Moroccan cities. To help field officers get a better grip on their subjects, the existing Muslim Press cell set up within the *Affaires Indigènes* headquarters of the Residency General was bolstered precisely to poll various intelligence offices across the North African Maginot Line for pertinent articles on Morocco. Its signature publication was a two hundred-page bi-monthly report entitled the Arab Press and Muslim Question Review. Every two weeks, the review examined approximately thirty newspapers per issue, treated an average of sixty articles divided into themes, and in addition to providing an integral translation of articles not in French, it sometimes added commentary sourced from relevant intelligence.⁵³⁰ Since writers the world over had taken notice of Morocco as a result of the Berber Dahir, the articles intercepted by French intelligence officers offered a wide array of opinions on an even wider array of topics. Did Moroccans appreciate the efforts of French authorities to facilitate festivities during religious holidays? French intelligence officers only had to wait until the following issue of the Review to get a digest of opinions on the matter.⁵³¹ Were the subjects examined during the Moroccan *baccalauréat* too complicated? There was an article inserted into the Review to inform readers of Moroccan opinion on the matter.⁵³² The Review also made efforts to place the themes it treated within the context of the

⁵³⁰ For a representative sample see AN-Ma F35, Service de la Presse Musulmane, Revue.

⁵³¹ AN-Ma F35, Réflexions sur nos fêtes, Service de la Presse Musulmane Revue Bi-Mensuelle, January 1934, 42-45.

⁵³² AN-Ma F35, Le baccalauréat marocain, Service de la Presse Musulmane Revue Bi-Mensuelle, January 1934, 32-36.

French Empire in North Africa and the broader situation in Middle East and Muslim world by incorporating sections on Tunisian, Algerian, and European press, as well as providing bibliographies of noteworthy scholarly publications. The Review provided intelligence officers across the empire with one of the most comprehensive intelligence digests available at the time. Summaries of relevant passages of the Review were even added as context in the monthly briefings for the Algerian Governor General and the Tunisian Resident General.⁵³³

Yet, for all of the intelligence collected, intelligence officers were unable to transform it into policies which “channeled,” as General Simon put it, nationalism into a force that worked for French authorities. Invariably, the opinions that French intelligence collected were that France could do better, or more often than not, that the French were stuck in a logic of repression that prevented them from ameliorating the situation of their charges. The intelligence, of course, was warped. The goal of anti-imperialists was not to advise the French on how to make their empire better, and yet, that what the intelligence that French intelligence officers mostly collected. When combined with intelligence from across the North African Maginot Line, the situation looked even darker. By 1934, the only solution French intelligence officers could suggest to maintain French power in North Africa was to increase the presence of security services, firmly entrenching the French in the logic of repression that anti-imperialists decried.

Conclusion

In 1934, in a last-ditch attempt to control the damage done by the proclamation of the Berber Dahir, French authorities rescinded Article 6, restoring the power of qadis and Islamic law courts in criminal matters. There is no evidence, however, that rescinding Article 6 changed

⁵³³ AN-Ma F35, Annex to March 15 issue of Service de la Presse Musulmane Revue Bi-Mensuelle, 15-31 March 1934.

the situation on the ground, nor should we expect to find any such evidence: since 1914 French intelligence officers worked hard to make control of the judicial system the very basis of *Contrôle*. The covert direct administration of Morocco necessitated doing away with legal pluralism and dependence on unreliable intermediaries to issue rulings that upheld French power rather than challenged it.

Nevertheless, rescinding Article Six of the Berber Dahir handed Moroccan nationalists a moral victory. French authorities gave legitimacy to the cause of Moroccan nationalists and gave nationalists across North Africa new weapons with which to counter French imperialism. Although intelligence officers equipped with a powerful surveillance machine and a repressive judicial system attempted to quell the nationalist surge, it was impossible. Losing contact with old notables and the ones that were being groomed significantly impacted the ability of intelligence services to do their job correctly in Morocco. They were unable to accurately gauge the effectiveness of the regime, and only managed to ensure that the repressive policies they implemented continued to pit nationalists against French authorities.

As we will see in the next chapter, however, repression was not a sustainable form for government and the authorities of *Contrôle* traveled to Paris to meet Moroccan nationalists on neutral ground and find a way to lessen tensions.

Chapter 5: The Young Moroccans and the Paris Outpost, 1934-1937

Joseph Jean Mathieu Jérôme Pozzo di Borgo was known to everyone as Pozzo di Borgo, a landed duke in Corsica. He was a man whom senators, ambassadors, and colonels called “my friend,” and sometimes “my dearest friend.” He, in return, called them “sir,” “excellency,” and “*mon colonel*.” Pozzo di Borgo knew his place in the French Empire. He was a middleman of empire. His contemporaries knew his place in the empire, too. He was an agent of empire of exceptional value. He was trusted. He was discreet. But above all else he could translate the language of empire to its subjects, and the language of opposition to its leaders. He was comfortable lounging in the clubs where the colonial lobby gathered to sip cognac and sitting in the cafés near the *Assemblée Nationale* where the *députés* ate lunch. He felt at home, too, drinking mint tea with Moroccan factory workers in Genevilliers, and sharing couscous on Fridays with the North African students who occupied the coffee houses around Clichy. Such a man was worthy of a senator’s familiarity. At a time when imperial administrators and imperial subjects were increasingly at daggers drawn, and metropolitan officials were increasingly preoccupied with the more immediate concerns posed by Hitler and Mussolini on the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, Pozzo di Borgo’s job was to find a way to mend the empire.

Pozzo di Borgo’s name appeared frequently in the celebrity sightings section of the big Parisian newspapers. *Le Figaro* always gave him good press; François Coty, a Corsican, too, and the director of the paper, was an intimate acquaintance.⁵³⁴ He was regularly seen and photographed in good company: here, at the funeral for the Count of Charles de Saint-Léon, next to his excellency the minister to the Swedish Court, the Dowager Princess de la Tour d’Auvergne, and a number of other nobles whose names and titles took up two full-length

⁵³⁴ Robert Soucy, *French Fascism: The Second Wave, 1933-1939* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 124.

columns in the “Courts, Embassies, the World and the City” section of the 30 January 1933 issue of *Le Figaro*,⁵³⁵ there, *noblesse oblige*, presiding over the various committees for the Corsicans of Paris, like the *Comité Général des fêtes Corses de Paris*, which organized holidays and chartered trains for the bourgeois of Paris who sought the authentic sights, sounds, and tastes of Corsica;⁵³⁶ elsewhere, at a ceremony to remember *Maréchal* Foch, sitting among the host of officers from High Command and civilian notables, near aides to Pétain and Lyautey, and rubbing shoulders with Generals Weygand, Gouraud, Ragueneau, and Prételat, the commander of Paris, and next to Colonel de la Roque, the president of the *Croix de Feu*.⁵³⁷ True, Pozzo di Borgo was most famous for being a first-rate fascist who helped bankroll the *Croix de Feu* and its newspaper, *Action Populaire*.⁵³⁸ He was involved in the 6 February 1934 riots in Paris and the short-lived takeover of the Ministry of the Interior. He was disappointed that the Third Republic had not toppled that day. Writing in his tell-all book about the *Croix de Feu*, la Roque, and the 6 February riots, Pozzo explained that:

[h]istory teaches us that he who wants to topple a regime and institute in his favor dictatorial powers (*un pouvoir personnel*) must, to succeed, justify himself; that is to say, claim his right to do so. The conquered or surprised masses will recognize his audacity and endorse him... (The Third Republic) was in fact never threatened, except by movements aimed at restoring public morality... This was the movement that animated the scandalized people that day (Stavisky Affair)... But their leader (Colonel de la Rocque) was merely a beggar, a mendicant who draped the mediocrity of his soul, his lowly ambitions, with the moral greatness of his admirable followers.⁵³⁹

Pozzo di Borgo attributed the failure of the *Croix de Feu* to press their advantage in Paris once they had taken the Ministry of the Interior to la Rocque whom he accused of having been bought off for a hundred and thirty thousand Francs by André Tardieu and Pierre Laval, influential

⁵³⁵ “Les cours, les ambassades, le monde et la ville,” *Le Figaro*, January 1, 1933.

⁵³⁶ “Les cours, les ambassades, le monde et la ville,” *Le Figaro*, October 28, 1933.

⁵³⁷ “Les cours, les ambassades, le monde et la ville,” *Le Figaro*, March 22, 1933.

⁵³⁸ Soucy, *French Fascism*, 124.

⁵³⁹ Joseph Pozzo di Borgo, *La Rocque: fantôme à vendre* (Paris: Fernand Sorlot, 1938), 12-13.

politicians and prime ministers at various points during the Third Republic.⁵⁴⁰ In his book, Pozzo di Borgo, also revealed his numerous contacts with the Deuxième Bureau, French military intelligence, and acknowledged that there was an agreement to receive a supply of weapons that never materialized on the day of the riot.⁵⁴¹

Pozzo di Borgo's contacts with French intelligence circles dated back to his time as an officer-interpreter in the 25th *Regiment de Tirailleurs Indigènes* in Morocco where he cultivated his fluency in colloquial Arabic while commanding Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian soldiers during the Rif War. In 1931, for services rendered and with the rank of Commander, Pozzo di Borgo retired from active service and established for himself a *cabinet d'affaires* at the *Office du Protectorat*, also known as the *Office du Maroc*, 21 rue des Pyramides, a short walk away from the left bank headquarters of the *Deuxième Bureau*, Boulevard Saint Germain, and the Prefecture de Police, Boulevard du Palais, and smack in the middle of the growing malaise that gripped French officials in charge of the empire.⁵⁴²

It was there that the Director of the *Affaires Indigènes*, Leopold Bénazet initiated contact with Pozzo di Borgo. Their initial exchanges were indirect at first, brokered by Lucien Saint, the former Resident General of Morocco (1929-1933) and, in 1933, a Senator. Lucien Saint, it was rumored, was also part of *Contrôle*: the intelligence services had secretly supported his campaign by funneling "pacification" credits from the Ministry of Defense, through the Residency General, and into his campaign coffers.⁵⁴³ The investment, if it was more than simply rumor, was worthwhile it seems. Bénazet took great care to cultivate his relationship with Pozzo di Borgo,

⁵⁴⁰ Pozzo di Borgo, *La Rocque*, 39.

⁵⁴¹ Pozzo di Borgo, *La Rocque*, 5-7.

⁵⁴² CADN DAI 120, Chef de Bataillon Auroux to Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant le Cercle des Haha-Chiadma
Objet: Rapport des opérations de la harka de Tiznit, undated, 4.

⁵⁴³ Mohamed El Beidaoul, "la colonisation... à longue échéance," *Maghreb* 2, no. 2 (1933), 32.

systematically and effusively complimenting the quality of the information he provided. Bénazet also lavishly provisioned Pozzo di Borgo in funds for his missions (*provision politique*), which aggravated Bénazet's right-hand man, Lieutenant Colonel Coutard, to no end. "Here we go again," Coutard scribbled in the margins of the note he was reading.⁵⁴⁴ As second in command at the *Affaires Indigènes*, Coutard frequently annotated correspondence that his boss, Benazet, later read. "Today, March 21st, he asks us again for money." Coutard's red grease pencil left three deep marks in the paper where he underlined the date the letter was stamped, 26 February. "What has he done with the money we sent him three weeks earlier," he asked.⁵⁴⁵ The job, no doubt, demanded that Coutard exercise some skepticism when it came to doling out funds for operations, but, in the end, he used his blue grease pencil to signal that he would authorize another thousand francs. Coutard, like his colleague, Colonel Huot, and his boss Bénazet took great care to cultivate their asset.

Pozzo di Borgo marched to the beat of his own drum, but he found in the authorities of *Contrôle* kindred spirits, driven by a sense of mission, and however much Coutard might have complained, Pozzo di Borgo's information was markedly different than the intelligence that usually came across the desks of *Contrôle*. More than a marriage of convenience, what united the two parties was the notion that France was great because of its empire, whereas most metropolitan French figured they owed nothing to their empire. Ensuring the survival of both France and the empire—and in 1933/4 there were serious concerns about the security of both—required a change in leadership or at the very least a change in the politics that governed the French Empire, including the metropole.

⁵⁴⁴ CADN IMA/200/70, Pozzo to Coutard, 26 February 1935.

⁵⁴⁵ CADN IMA/200/70, Pozzo to Coutard, 26 February 1935.

At stake for the authorities of *Contrôle* was establishing one of their own in the Residency General so as to once again unify political and military command in the hands of an intelligence officer, a bond which had been broken after Lyautey had been ousted. Perpetual war was the natural state of the empire and the imperatives of security in the colonial state shaped the politics of the Protectorate. Yet, while the authorities of *Contrôle* had managed to surreptitiously take over the administration of the Protectorate under the guise of “pacification,” in 1934, covert administration of the Protectorate seemed to be resulting in diminishing returns. “Sure, we could break civilians, that is to say break physical persons,” remembered Captain Spillman, an intelligence officer in Morocco, “we’d gotten very good at it.”⁵⁴⁶ “But,” he continued, “those who are in favor of such methods seem to ignore that it is a lot harder to break ideas... what did [North Africans] think, what did they desire, what did they no longer want?”⁵⁴⁷ Those were essential questions for intelligence officers, unable to govern without native intermediaries, and widely contested because of the successful propaganda campaign orchestrated from Paris by anti-imperial activists. A second objective for the authorities of *Contrôle* and Pozzo di Borgo was thus to reestablish contact with Moroccan nationalists in Paris and convince them to reintegrate the French Makhzen. The authorities of *Contrôle* adapted for use in the metropole techniques of administration elaborated in the empire to bring the authorities of *Contrôle* closer to manipulating the centers of power in Paris to also unify imperial policy. Pozzo di Borgo was at the center of these operations.

⁵⁴⁶ Spillman, *Souvenirs d'un colonialiste* (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1968), 132.

⁵⁴⁷ Spillman, *Souvenirs*, 132.

Autumn 1933-Winter 1934

Not for the first time in North Africa, environmental conditions mixed with poor economic prospects to create an explosive political mix. North Africans experienced an overall poor harvest in 1933 and were in for more bad news in 1934 (and 1935). In Algeria, riots in Constantine pit Arab Jews, Muslims, and French security forces against one another from 3 to 6 August 1934 in what the press of the French Left denounced as a pogrom against the Jews of Constantine and the failure of the French administration in Algeria. Few commentators had bothered to take a look at the conditions of Muslims in Algerian cities and explained away the violence wrought on Jewish quarters and against the Jews who had co-habited in the Muslim quarters peacefully for years as primitive confessional tension. Others, however, sought to explain the confessional violence to colonial authorities in economic and political terms: blame for the riots could be imparted on the Crémieux Decree which made all Algerian Jews French citizens while leaving Algerian Muslims subject to the hated *Code de l'Indigénat*. In the increasingly difficult economic context, the Crémieux Decree gave Algerian Jews access to many of the jobs that Algerian Muslims were denied enflaming confessional tensions.⁵⁴⁸ The economic context worsened the situation. The droughts experienced in North Africa reduced agricultural output which further ate into the operating capital of farmers who also faced lower export profits due to the decrease of exchange rates during the Great Depression. Taxes in Algeria, meanwhile, increased 40% between 1928 and 1932 and continued to increase thereafter.⁵⁴⁹ The consequences were hardly unimaginable for small farmers: many resorted to predatory loans, failed to make repayments, became unemployed and homeless, and contributed

⁵⁴⁸ Charles-Robert Ageron, "Une émeute anti-juive à Constantine (août 1934)," *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée* 13-14, no. 1 (1973), 23-40, 34.

⁵⁴⁹ Qadi cited in Ageron, "Une émeute anti-juive à Constantine (août 1934)," *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée* 13-14, no. 1 (1973), 34.

to the growing ranks of the vagrant populations of Constantine's cities. There they mingled with the unemployed and those deported from the metropole. The mix was unstable. European populations in Algeria, also affected by the economic downturn and fearful of "the downtown riffraff" (*racaille de la ville basse*), developed noxious anxiety levels that soon infected the intelligence specialists of the Algiers station.⁵⁵⁰

Tunisians also faced significant hardship in 1934 when that year's poor harvest coupled with a dismal one the previous year forced a mass exodus from the Tunisian countryside to the cities. Approximately eight hundred thousand Tunisians, a third of the country's population, were severely affected by falling prices on agricultural staples, such as wheat, barley, and olives, an ongoing trend since 1928. Of the three thousand compulsory sales ordered by French tribunals in Tunisia that year, almost all of them involved the foreclosed properties of small indigenous farmers: "the situation was, in fact, dire: famine threatened the bled, and thousands of malnourished *indigènes* fled to the cities of the north."⁵⁵¹ The economic crisis and the human misery that accompanied it fueled the burgeoning political crisis the Residency in Tunis faced when confronted by the pushback against the gradual encroachment of the Residency in matters of faith and religious administration, namely on the administration of the *habous*, inalienable and immobilized real estate administered by religious authorities for the good of society. Long-standing grievances against French mismanagement of land, and particularly arable land, crystallized around the burial rites of Tunisians naturalized French in Muslim cemeteries.⁵⁵² The crisis was so fraught that it also occasioned the splintering of the Destour Party, which had up

⁵⁵⁰ SHD 7NN 2387, Questions Nord-Africaine, January 1935, 7.

⁵⁵¹ André Nouschi, "La crise de 1930 en Tunisie et les débuts du Néo-Destour," *Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 8, no. 2 (1970): 113-123, 115.

⁵⁵² Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881-1938* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), chapter 5.

until 1934 been the main source of opposition against French rule in Tunisia. The Neo-Destour, the new faction, headed by Habib Bourguiba who eventually negotiated independence from France, adopted radical politics of protest and violence that made it popular with young intellectuals and the impoverished *fellahs* for whom collective action and destruction resonated more and more with the creation of a national identity and a recapturing of power over subaltern lives. Protests shook French power to the core because of their volatility and their violence, sometimes, but mainly because the political and economic processes behind the protests remained misunderstood or ignored by French officials who only heard the religious incantations of the dissenters. Accordingly, what should have been understood as legitimate political discourse could not be seen as anything but anti-state behavior that required eradication rather than negotiation between power and local collectives.

Morocco offers a case in point. In Morocco, though the security situation did not make frontpage headlines, “pacification” had been producing casualties by the thousands since 1912, French security services across the empire were caught off guard when on 1 December 1934, Moroccan nationalists announced a *Plan de Réformes*. Like the violence in the waning days of “pacification,” the plan barely registered in French newspapers, though it represented a problem to French authority in Morocco as serious as the episodes of violence in Algeria and Tunisia. The one hundred fifty-three-page plan had taken months to draft in secret, before being published in Paris and in Cairo and subsequently smuggled into Morocco. The *Plan* was a call for universal male suffrage, freedom of the press, and association, mandatory education, and a host of other ideas to improve the political and economic outlook of the Protectorate. As one nationalist put it, the challenge to French authorities was not a test of the empire’s security services, but a test of

its willingness to take its empire seriously: “here’s our program. Where’s yours? Do you plan on elaborating one or will you continue to operate without a strategy?”⁵⁵³

That France was ungovernable and the French Empire went ungoverned was an open secret in 1934. Unanimously, French intelligence officers across the empire blamed metropolitan politicians for the woes in the empire, though the loudest remonstrances came from the highest authorities of *Contrôle*. Divisions between the empire and metropole did not date from 1934, however. In 1912, Lyautey had anticipated the retreat of the metropole from matters of empire, and to that end had established the *Office du Protectorat*. Over the years, the *Office du Protectorat* worked closely with the colonial lobby to promote economic opportunities in Morocco and find outlets for Moroccan products in France, though, on the whole, France’s expenditures on the empire far exceeded any economic benefits it might have reaped,⁵⁵⁴ possibly explaining part of the French public’s reticence to embrace empire.⁵⁵⁵ It seems that in the 1930s, to get officials in the metropole sufficiently interested in the empire, the agents of the *Office*, in addition to taking advantage of the greed of politicians, tried to scare them into action. Indeed, while Moroccan intelligence concerning the nefarious activities of communists, fascists, and Nazis to turn Moroccans against their French protectors was seldom corroborated, the *Office du Protectorat* nevertheless warned influential metropolitan politicians of impending danger if they failed to act immediately. The more their warning were dire, the more likely politicians were to request a face-to-face briefing with people in the know. Pozzo di Borgo’s connections on both sides of the Mediterranean ensured that he was one of the most sought after colonial agents in the business. But it was his ability to spin rumors of communism in the empire into full-scale Soviet

⁵⁵³ Comité d’Action Marocaine, *Plan de Réformes*, 1 December 1934, XVI.

⁵⁵⁴ Charles-Robert Ageron, *France coloniale ou parti colonial* (Paris : Presse universitaire de France, 1978).

⁵⁵⁵ Jacques Marseille, *Empire colonial et capitalisme français. Histoire d’un divorce* (Paris : Albin Michel, 1984).

ideological invasions that really made him famous. As president of the anti-Marxist institute in Paris, he gave rousing lectures on the “communist peril in the colonies” and published an essay entitled “The Soviets and the Dutch Indies,” that was hailed in political and business circles as an important synthesis of imperial problems.⁵⁵⁶ The essay established him as one of the foremost experts on native susceptibility to radical politics in the colonized world and made him a regular fixture at all the ultra-right-wing meetings where it was smart to peddle conspiracies alternatively blaming government infiltration by communists, Masons, Jewish bankers, and “occult foreign networks that excite[d] North Africans against [France].”⁵⁵⁷

In spite of the efforts of the agents at the *Office du Protectorat* to secure the right leadership and the right policies for the empire, they remained unsuccessful. “For those who have not visited Morocco in a while,” wrote a French informant embedded in General Weygand’s staff, codenamed YOUSSEUF, “an unfavorable change in the state of mind of the population is immediately palpable.”⁵⁵⁸ It was most visible in the strained relationships between native elites and French administration, and the insults, sneers, and hushed mockeries proffered at police officers who pretended not to notice when walking their beats but worriedly included in their reports. Without going into too much detail,” YOUSSEUF offered, “the problem is that Morocco suffers from not having any direction,” resulting in a “crisis of authority.”⁵⁵⁹ Indeed, there was no political appetite for empire. The metropolitan political situation was far too complicated to handle, especially as the Third Republic’s notorious governmental instability increased. As Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, the famous historian of France, wrote: “1933 was one of the worst (*lamentable*) years in terms of governmental instability, economic misery, and

⁵⁵⁶ “Ça et là,” *Le Figaro*, April 18, 1928, 2.

⁵⁵⁷ CADN 1MA/200/71, Pozzo di Borgo to Coutard, transcript of Redressement Français talk, 6 March 1935, 8.

⁵⁵⁸ SHD 7NN 2358, Youssouf, Maroc, Etat d’esprit de la population indigène, 1 December 1933, 1.

⁵⁵⁹ SHD 7NN 2358, Etat d’esprit des indigènes Marocains, 30 October 1933.

financial scandals.”⁵⁶⁰ Naturally, given the little impact of the empire on France’s imagination, there was little public pressure to enact reforms, or at least think about the role of empire in France. Worse, a 1938 IFOP poll forty-four percent of respondents replied No to the question: “are you willing to fight rather than cede any part of our colonial possessions;” forty percent responded Yes, and sixteen percent were unsure.⁵⁶¹ There had been attempts to instill within the French and their government a culture of empire, to get them to “think imperially,” but the French public remained unmoved.⁵⁶² The result was the estrangement of French authorities on either side of the Mediterranean from each other, especially within the military establishment: “military life in France was demoralizing,” recalled Henri Navarre, a French officer in Morocco, “the army’s façade hid its decay.”⁵⁶³ The rot had spread throughout the empire in the opinion of Lieutenant-Colonel Coutard, Pozzo di Borgo’s handler in Morocco. The empire was a dumping ground for second-rate administrators:

bad and rotten fruits... traffickers, dealers, usurers, individuals and corporations, the politicians of the parties and in the press, creators of division and hate in search of money or clients, the civil servants of the ministry of education and other administrations, militant unionists, socialists or communists, obstructing the Government, more preoccupied by being able to benefit from the government than from cooperating for the common good, the parasites and the incapables occupying jobs and begging for welfare...⁵⁶⁴

Decay was present everywhere, including among the Residents General who contributed to creating political instability either maliciously or through sheer incompetence. Among them, Henri Ponsot, the newly appointed Resident General to Morocco in late 1933 who in spite of his

⁵⁶⁰ Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *La Decadence (1932-1939)* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1979), 54.

⁵⁶¹ Charles-Robert Ageron, “Les colonies devant l’opinion publique française (1919-1939),” *Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer* 77, no. 286 (1990) 31-73, 70.

⁵⁶² Martin Thomas, *The French Empire between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and Society* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), chapter 6.

⁵⁶³ Henri Navarre, *Le temps des vérités* (Paris: Plon, 1979), 24.

⁵⁶⁴ CADN (2012), Maroc/Cabinet Civil/Reserves/283, Coutard, Politique des Contacts, undated, but some time in late 1940, 4-7.

long career in the empire was intent on making his position, which was to begin with “excessively difficult, and it is said in official circles, probably untenable,” even harder by announcing that he would spend most of his tenure as Resident General away from Morocco, adding more grist to the mills of those who felt that the empire was being set up to fail. As Lieutenant Coutard revealed, from the perspective of the authorities of *Contrôle*, the survival of the empire depended on “harmonizing in spirit and in action” the idea of having an empire with running an empire.⁵⁶⁵

Edge of Empire

Of course, harmony to French intelligence officers meant creating discord for others, or *Action Politique*, as the French called it. Discord was a tool honed over the years, as we have seen, on the frontiers where control was crucial to the stability of the interior.⁵⁶⁶ Generally, to unsettle local politics in the empire, intelligence officers established a physical presence—an outpost—in a desired area of control to establish contact with the local populations. Intelligence officers offered them safety or death as the only two options while simultaneously delegitimizing local, traditional authorities. By creating political uncertainty while seeming to appear to be a beacon of stability, French intelligence officers thus hoped to offer an attractive alternative to populations targeted for colonization. Paris in 1934 offered the authorities of *Contrôle* ideal settings to implement *Action Politique*. Metropolitan politicking and intriguing occluded from

⁵⁶⁵ CADN (2012), Maroc/Cabinet Civil/Reserves/283, Coutard, Politique des Contacts, undated, but some time in late 1940, 4.

⁵⁶⁶ Charles Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 89 “Precisely because it constitutes the edge of empire, where the maintenance of political authority entails likely ramifications for national security and certainly for national prestige, the frontier is critical for the center.”

view the growing discontent not only among the French, but also among the various immigrant communities that resided in Paris making them populations ripe for the picking by *Contrôle*. News that *Contrôle* was meddling in metropolitan affairs reached intelligence officers at the Deuxième Bureau, boulevard Saint Germain in Paris, in late 1933. In a numbered, four-copy report, labelled, “Confidential/Do not share outside of High command,” unique for the clearance level required to read it, a high-level informant speaking to an intelligence officer high on the chain of command was adamant that Urbain Blanc, the head of *Contrôle*, was exploring ways of destabilizing Morocco. Blanc had activated agents at his disposal to “orchestrate economic crises in view of causing serious political damage.” The threat was significant according to the intelligence source, and it extended beyond Morocco to France.⁵⁶⁷ Out of precaution, metropolitan authorities walled *Contrôle* off from metropolitan intelligence networks.⁵⁶⁸ Pozzo di Borgo, however, operated the interstices of politics and intelligence and made a living cultivating backchannels. Thanks to Pozzo di Borgo, the authorities of *Contrôle* could therefore continue their operations in France, and in fact, operated with even more freedom once Pozzo di Borgo provided them plausible deniability. Indeed, at around the same time Blanc was reportedly causing trouble in Morocco, Bénazet, Coutard, and Huot multiplied their contacts with Pozzo di Borgo and accelerated their plans in Paris.

Phase 1: An alternative to traditional authorities

On 20 January 1934, Abdelatif Sbihi, the Moroccan nationalist we met in the previous chapter as the instigator behind the protests of the Berber Dahir, was scheduled to speak in front

⁵⁶⁷ SHD 7NN 2358, Maroc/Accueil fait à M. PONSOT, 4 Octobre 1933.

⁵⁶⁸ CADN 1MA/200/70, A.S. du IIIe congrès des étudiants musulmans nord-africains en France, post script, 5 July 1934, 2.

of the executive committee of the SFIO, the *Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière*. At the time, the SFIO was the most-important political party on the French left and was part of the future governing coalition that made up the *Front Populaire*.⁵⁶⁹ As part of its political strategy, the socialist party was preparing to ask the French government for answers in Parliament on the “endless wars of pacification in Morocco.”⁵⁷⁰ The heavy hitters of the socialist party, including Léon Blum, Vincent Auriol, and Jean Longuet offered the following opening statement for comments: “What disillusion! What irony that the most useless, the most revolting, the cruelest acts of war have been authorized these last few years in Morocco...”⁵⁷¹ When the staffers invited Sbihi, they had no doubt expected him to rail against the violence in Morocco perpetrated by the intelligence state, but to everyone’s surprise this is what he said:

I must say that I categorically disagree with you. The objective of the projected operations is not military but political: the result must be to extend the legitimate authority of the Sultan to all of Morocco... the ‘bled siba’ must disappear... and until this is realized we will stand by the imperious need for military operations, which, by the way, are always preceded by a methodical, tenacious, patient political preparation that neglects no angle and no one can deny that this is true.⁵⁷²

The audience was stunned into silence. Encouraged by the effect of his statement on his audience, Sbihi gave his socialist hosts something else to consider: “the cruelty of French troops in Morocco,” he said, “exists only in the pages of l’Humanité,” the communist news outlet, “you really should consider what that kind of language does to excitable minds.”⁵⁷³ In the stillness, Pozzo di Borgo got out of his seat in the back of the audience and quietly exited the conference

⁵⁶⁹ Abdelatif Sbihi was the former secretary at the *Direction des Affaires Chérifiennes* who helped foment the protests against the Berber Dahir in 1930. See chapter 4.

⁵⁷⁰ CADN IMA/200/70, Note sur le Parti Socialiste et le Maroc Militaire, 20 January 1934, 1.

⁵⁷¹ CADN IMA/200/70, Note sur le Parti Socialiste et le Maroc Militaire, 20 January 1934, 1.

⁵⁷² CADN IMA/200/70, Note sur le Parti Socialiste et le Maroc Militaire, 20 January 1934, 2.

⁵⁷³ CADN IMA/200/70, Note sur le Parti Socialiste et le Maroc Militaire, 20 January 1934, 3.

hall satisfied by his asset's performance. *Contrôle* had turned one of the most important Moroccan nationalists into an informant.

Why had Sbihi become a spokesperson for *Contrôle* in 1934 when he had instigated what would turn out to be the beginning of the end of the Protectorate in 1930? There is no readily available answer. We know that the authorities of *Contrôle* were capable of exercising immense pressures on Moroccan students and their families and that they did not shy away from threatening bodily harm, but the timing of Sbihi's cooperation suggests that French authorities might have negotiated with Sbihi on a particular point of interest for Moroccan nationalists. Indeed, the most egregious aspect of the Berber Dahir for Moroccan nationalists was that Moroccans who had spent most of their lives training to replace the old guard of native administrators were officially dismissed by intelligence officers as incapables. In fact, as we discovered in the previous chapter, sidelining Moroccan students from jobs they had trained to perform in the areas concerned by the Berber Dahir was a political necessity for French intelligence officers who feared that the new generation of Moroccan functionaries would not prove as amenable to the undue influence of French intelligence in the judicial process. In April 1934, about six months after Sbihi's performance in Paris, French intelligence officers repealed Article 6 of the Berber Dahir theoretically opening the way for *qadis* to resume hearing court cases in territories concerned by the Berber Dahir.⁵⁷⁴

Bringing Sbihi into the fold of French power presented the authorities of *Contrôle* with an opportunity to turn the situation in Morocco in their favor. Urban pacification had been detrimental to the administration of the Protectorate. A generation coming of age in 1934 had been alienated by the aggressive tactics of French intelligence officers who refused to integrate

⁵⁷⁴ Katherine Hoffman, "Berber Law by French Means: Customary Courts in the Moroccan Hinterlands, 1930-1956," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42, no. 4 (2010): 851-880.

them into the administration of the Protectorate. As a result of what William A. Hoisington called Urban Pacification,⁵⁷⁵ a number of students fled Morocco, often with the blessing of French authorities in Morocco who believed, mistakenly as we will see, that metropolitan authorities had an interest in tracking them closely and preventing them from causing further trouble.

France, and Paris in particular, had since the end of the First World War been destinations of choice for North African students. Students from families with some wealth came to France to study in schools and universities and supplement their allowances by working part-time jobs as tutors, newspaper correspondents, and other “occupations that amused the intellect.”⁵⁷⁶ The Young Moroccans, so called because they cultivated a spirit of rebellion in the style of the Young Turks, were mostly from Fez, Salé, Rabat, and Casablanca, the sons of the bourgeois and notables of these cities and had expected to join the French administration of the Protectorate.⁵⁷⁷ Yet, in 1933, they were in their mid-twenties and early thirties, educated, but idle. Successive Residents General since 1928, under economic pressure to compress budgets, had dramatically reduced the number of higher education classes elites attended as well as the number of administrative positions available to them. The protests over the Berber Dahir as we discovered in the previous chapter were as much meant to shed light on the administration of the Protectorate as they were a means of bringing attention to the problem of a young generation of would-be imperial administrators who were cast out as enemies of the state. Indeed, the Berber Dahir was the result of Young Moroccans fearful of their political prospects in the Protectorate. Caught in a cycle of provocation and repression, neither the Residency General nor the Young

⁵⁷⁵ William A. Hoisington Jr., “Cities in Revolt: The Berber Dahir (1930) and France’s Urban Strategy in Morocco,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 13, no. 3 (1978): 433-448.

⁵⁷⁶ CADN IMA/200/70, *Propos de Jeunes Marocains*, 12 June 1934.

⁵⁷⁷ SHD 3H 1614, *Le Nationalisme Marocain*, 12 October 1933, 2.

Moroccans were able to rectify the course of the Protectorate's policies and lost contact with each other.

Indeed, to escape repression in Morocco, the Young Moroccans left for France. The Residency General eagerly stamped their visas, glad to be rid of the trouble makers. Their parents were also happy to send them to the empire's capital. They bragged to other parents about the quality of education in Parisian schools and all of the extra-curriculars their sons enjoyed and marveled at the reasonable cost of an education in the metropole (15 francs on average for tuition, room, board, three meals every day, and trips to museums and parks on Thursdays and Sundays), while still being reassured that their children's religious convictions would not be attacked.⁵⁷⁸

Their departure occasioned no special surveillance measures, though, presumably, the Residency General and intelligence officers in Morocco expected intelligence about the Young Moroccans from Paris. But surprisingly, North African students went mostly unmonitored, perhaps because they never totaled more than three hundred, and there were officially no more than "thirty-three Moroccan students in Paris, barring any errors or omissions," between 1930 and 1934.⁵⁷⁹ The French did not bother to perform official counts of North African students.⁵⁸⁰ They somehow did not seem to pose a critical threat to imperial order in the metropole, and in spite of their militant pasts in the empire, they were ignored as threats to imperial order. It was not that immigration, and North African immigration in particular, went unnoticed by French officials. On the contrary, metropolitan bureaucrats were obsessed with controlling

⁵⁷⁸ CADN IMA/200/70, Note sur l'institution Courbis, pour jeunes gens, undated, 2.

⁵⁷⁹ CADN IMA 200 70, Note sur les étudiants marocains de Paris, 30 Novembre 1933.

⁵⁸⁰ Charles-Robert Ageron, "L'Association des étudiants musulmans nord-africains en France durant l'entre-deux-guerres. Contribution à l'étude des nationalismes maghrébins," *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer* 70, no. 258 (1983), and Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 119-120.

borders and monitoring North African laborers whose numbers were tabulated with accuracy. The metropole possessed myriad intricate legal and bureaucratic layers to welcome, identify, contain, coerce, and repel if needed, the flow of immigrants.⁵⁸¹ The systems in place to control North African students, however, did not function, and North African students continued to contribute to global anti-imperialist networks. These connections were instrumental in expanding the horizons of the Young Moroccans who compared their lives to the conditions of Muslims elsewhere in the world. Inspired by their expanded outlook, the Young Moroccans in Paris became prolific authors, playwrights, pamphleteers, and overwhelmed French intelligence officers with their intellectual output.

North African students were particularly adept at creating associations that provided laboratory-like conditions to put to practice the thoughts they put down on paper about the government and administration of people. Pozzo di Borgo, was initially conceived of nationalism as the outgrowth of a Soviet campaign to undermine the metropole. He argued that North African students had learned from “an agent of Moscow to develop associations that popped up everywhere, under different names and for diverse motives, that were so many points of assembly for dissidents to crystallize their anger against the French empire.”⁵⁸² His continued monitoring of associations, however, convinced him that the multiplicity of associations owed more to the diffuse nature of student politics of the era who did not form a singular bloc, but in fact, had important political philosophical differences, rather than an international conspiracy orchestrated from Moscow to destroy the empire. Nor were associations merely political

⁵⁸¹ On the creation of a system to control immigration to France see Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in France, 1918-1940* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), and Clifford Rosenberg, *Policing Paris: the Origins of Modern Immigration Control between the Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

⁵⁸² CADN IMA 200 344, Le nationalisme marocain et l'émeute de Meknès, 2 Septembre 1937, 19.

vehicles. Pozzo di Borgo's records suggest that most associations started by North Africans were mutual aid groups that helped students acclimate to life in Paris. Indeed, they were proof that North African students were not hostile to French civilization. The associations that North African students created were modeled on French associations that were a natural part of civic life, such as sports clubs, theater groups, and literary circles, and the clubs' officers internalized the mechanisms of French bureaucracy thanks to their associations.⁵⁸³ A significant part of the work of running an association involved petitioning authorities for grants to help finance, for example, lunch and dinner meal plans for the less wealthy among the students, and to pay for spaces that could accommodate modest libraries, and applying for permits to raise funds independently through concerts, talks, and social events.⁵⁸⁴ More cynical intelligence officers saw in the creation of associations scams to defraud municipalities of their treasury and members of their dues.⁵⁸⁵ Indeed, most associations were never active more than six months, though without discounting the dishonesty of some individuals, perhaps this was due to number of associations that competed with one another for members and for relevance among the small community of North African students in Paris.

The most important student organization was the *Association des étudiants musulmans nord-africains* (AEMNA) and naturally it was the most actively monitored by Pozzo di Borgo.⁵⁸⁶ Founded in 1927, the AEMNA was a formative platform for North African students who sharpened their political skills and learned to organize effectively.⁵⁸⁷ The Moroccans of the

⁵⁸³ SHD 3H 1614, Le Nationalisme Marocain, 12 Octobre 1933, 8.

⁵⁸⁴ Ageron, "L'Association des étudiants musulmans nord-africains," 30-31.

⁵⁸⁵ SHD 3H 1614, Le Nationalisme Marocain, 12 October 1933, 4.

⁵⁸⁶ CADN 1MA/200/70, clippings from 5 and 7 April 1935 editions of *La Dépêche Coloniale et Maritime* on an exposé on the Muslims of Paris entitled "Voyage chez les Musulmans de Paris."

⁵⁸⁷ The archival record of the AMENA's activities is slim. For the most comprehensive look at the AMENA see Charles-Robert Ageron, "L'Association des étudiants musulmans nord-africains en France durant l'entre-deux-guerres;" Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis*, 142-148 ; and Pierre Vermeren, *La formation des élites marocaines: des nationalistes aux islamistes, 1920-2000* (Paris: La Découverte, 2010), 23-26. For a more general

AEMNA who took on leadership roles, for example, were all involved in the creation of Morocco's first nationalist party, the *Comité d'Action Marocaine*, and later, the *Istiqlal*, the independence party. The AEMNA, officially, existed as a "mutual aid society" and a place "to create indestructible bonds of friendship between members."⁵⁸⁸ It sought to avoid appearing as a political organization to avoid scrutiny from the police, and instead portrayed itself to French authorities as an association dedicated to increasing the number North African students in French schools, though this was of course an eminently political objective since it cast light on the deficiencies of the French education system in the empire. Students organized fundraisers to help their poorer classmates back home afford an education in France and shamed the Residency General in Tunis and in Morocco into starting scholarships for students the Protectorates.⁵⁸⁹ Additionally, the AEMNA put forth public proposals to reform education in North Africa, including the development of technical and scientific tracks, redesigning the curriculum of Islamic education offered in Tunisia and in Morocco, ensuring access to education for women, and mandatory primary education. Yet, when on 1 December 1934, the Young Moroccans announced a *Plan de Réformes*, French intelligence in Morocco could no longer ignore the activities of the Young Moroccans in Paris. Thirty-three students had managed to bypass the entire colonial intelligence apparatus and present a document in which they claimed to represent the interests of Moroccans.

contextualization of the AMENA within student movements worldwide, see *Le rôle des mouvements d'étudiants africains dans l'évolution politique et sociale de l'Afrique de 1900 à 1975* (Paris: UNESCO/L'Harmattan, 1993).

⁵⁸⁸ Ageron, "L'Association des étudiants musulmans nord-africains," 31.

⁵⁸⁹ Vermeren, *La formation des élites marocaines*, 24.

Phase 2: Delegitimize traditional authorities

Pozzo di Borgo, had friends in high places, as we noted, but he also had no problems making powerful enemies. Fortunately for the authorities of *Contrôle*, Pozzo di Borgo's enemies were also those of *Contrôle*. Lucien Saint informed *Contrôle* that Pozzo di Borgo was on very bad terms with Pierre Godin and his son, André, the heads of the *Service des Affaires Indigènes Nord Africaines* (SAINA) and the *Brigade Nord Africaine* (BNA).⁵⁹⁰ Headquartered rue Lecomte, in Paris, the SAINA and BNA were a branch of the Paris Police Prefecture, itself dependent on the Ministry of the Interior. The SAINA and the BNA combined coercive measures with social assistance to control North African immigrants in France. They were formidable services as a result of their mandates, but they were notoriously violent and corrupt. Metropolitan officials, however, accepted the dirty tactics of the SAINA and the BNA out of fear of the metropole's growing "North African problem." Closed-door meetings and the willful lack of oversight on a system designed to police colonial subjects in the empire led to what historian Clifford Rosenberg calls the "colonial consensus:" matters of empire and the control of subjects in the metropole were best left to a select few who operated with as little oversight as possible.⁵⁹¹ Godin and his men were embattled everywhere they went, and they were as much of a threat to the security of persons as their targets were a threat to them. The *Commissaire Divisionnaire* of the Lyon branch of the BNA, for example, complained that work conditions for him and his agents had become intolerable. The North African taxi drivers of the city had them under surveillance and BNA officers were often the victims of verbal and even physical abuse.⁵⁹² At political rallies, agents of the BNA who loitered near the exits taking notes on speakers and the

⁵⁹⁰ CADN IMA/200/70, Note relative à une réunion révolutionnaire, see note written in margin, 15 January 1935, 1.

⁵⁹¹ On the colonial consensus see Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, chapter 5.

⁵⁹² CADN IMA/200/70, Sûreté Nationale to Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 9 November 1935, Réunion de la Glorieuse Etoile Nord-Africaine, 2.

audience were violently harangued and openly mocked by rally-goers. The SAINA's methods were also responsible for pushing previously un-politicized North Africans into the arms of nationalists who paraded the victims of the BNA's brutality at venues across Paris. The SAINA and the BNA were hated institutions, symbolic of the state's repressive zeal. "I was put in prison without reason," cried a man sitting in a crowd at a venue to support Messali Hadj, the famed Algerian nationalist who founded the ENA, "but I am very proud of my arrest," he yelled as the crowd cheered him and jeered the uniformed agents at the door.⁵⁹³ Yet, the SAINA also regularly authorized these meetings and allowed the victims of the SAINA's abuses to bear their scars, badges of honor that added to the street credibility of the speakers.

In fact, such venues were important to the work of the Paris police. Pozzo di Borgo suggested to the authorities of *Contrôle* in Morocco, that the BNA compensated for inadequate street policing by doing most of its work at large events where people were sure to be in an extreme state of excitement.⁵⁹⁴ The myth of the fanatic savage in Paris was accordingly cultivated through reports penned immediately after rallies, further inhibiting the collection of meaningful intelligence that was not entirely based on racial biases. The more the police brutalized the North African populations of Paris, the more the rallies attended by North Africans were rowdy affairs, creating a cycle in which police and their targets fed off the violence each other produced.

In this tense atmosphere, the SAINA had very little meaningful interaction with young North African students whom some intelligence officers already knew were "tomorrow's men of action."⁵⁹⁵ It was "a willful shortcoming," according to Pozzo di Borgo. Most of the agents at the

⁵⁹³ CADN IMA/200/70, Note relative à une réunion révolutionnaire, 15 January 1935, 5.

⁵⁹⁴ CADN IMA/200/70, Note relative à l'Etoile Nord-Africaine et au journal "El Ouma" (Réponse à une demande de renseignements en date du 28 Novembre 1933, 1.

⁵⁹⁵ CADN IMA/200/70 Note sur le service des affaires indigènes nord-africaines, 1.

SAINA were hired because they hated educated Arabs, whom they thought were more dangerous than Arab laborers because far too condescending. The SAINA only “inspired suspicion on the part of North African elites.”⁵⁹⁶ Like, the security services in the empire, metropolitan police had no contact with North African elites. The violence of Paris police against North Africans in the metropole only succeeded in creating an environment that they sought to escape, rendering information collection difficult and aggravating the tensions between the French and their subjects.⁵⁹⁷

Most of the intelligence collected on North African students in the metropole was superficial: a word overheard in a café, an offending sentence written in an editorial penned by a student, sometimes a student looking to make ends meet at the end of the month and selling a bit of gossip which usually turned out to be useless. The SAINA and the BNA reigned supreme over intelligence distribution about French subjects in the metropole, and the information they gathered was likely the only official information metropolitan authorities read, and the source of nearly all the information on the activities of the *évolués*, as young North African students were called, that colonial officials read. The SAINA’s intelligence thus permeated all decision-making circles and informed how French officials understood their colonial charges. Conversely, officers and bureaucrats of the SAINA were likely asked for information that confirmed the prejudices and biases of their superiors. The feedback engendered by this bureaucratic discourse led to the creation of fables about French subjects. Two in particular were used to justify intellectual and bureaucratic processes that were used to exclude and abuse North African students. The first was

⁵⁹⁶ CADN 1MA/200/70, Note relative à Bou Ayad, Allal el Fassi et Balafredj (Réponse à une demande de renseignements en date du 25 Novembre 1933), 26 December 1933, 1.

⁵⁹⁷ For a thorough treatment of French policing of North Africans in the metropole during the interwar years, see Clifford Rosenberg, *Policing Paris. The Origins of Modern Immigration Control between the Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006) and Clifford Rosenberg, “The colonial politics of health care provision in interwar Paris,” *French Historical Studies* 27, no. 3 (2011), 637-668.

that untethered from their families and communities, colonial subjects living in France were not ready to participate in the politics of the empire because they were incapable of sophisticated political thought. The second was that their political immaturity made them more likely to embrace “revolutionary” ideologies, which they would invariably carry with them upon their return to their homelands.⁵⁹⁸

In short, the SAINA and the BNA deepened the crisis of authority that the French Empire experienced in the mid-1930s by sending information that contributed to increasing the tensions between colonial authorities and their subjects. There was no one to track the most dangerous subjects of the empire nor was there an intelligence apparatus that seemed to be capable of supplying the basic intelligence needed for the colonial state to function.⁵⁹⁹ The result, as Pozzo di Borgo explained it, was that “the revolutionary North African nationalism that gravely—mortally—menaces our overseas empire is comparable to a gigantic octopus whose tentacles visible or hidden reach out over Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, and whose visible head is in Paris.”⁶⁰⁰

Phase 3: Offer an alternative

Pozzo di Borgo’s reports from Paris and his presence among North African communities anticipated a major shift in the way the French approached empire in North Africa and the Middle East. 1934 was a time of small revolutions in the world of French security services. An anonymous author, well-versed in all things imperial, including Islam, the Levant, North Africa,

⁵⁹⁸ Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*, 135.

⁵⁹⁹ CADN IMA/200/70, #3493 Bénazet to Pozzo di Borgo, 25 November 1933 DAI/3, “One more question: who in Paris might be able to have the Moroccan traffic in Geneva monitored as well as have Chekib Arslan and his aides followed in Geneva?,” 3.

⁶⁰⁰ CADN IMA/200/70, Nationalisme Marocain, 28 Decembre 1934, 4.

and especially Morocco, penned an article entitled “A Muslim Policy in the Levant” in the September 1934 issue of the *Revue politique et parlementaire: questions politiques, sociales et législatives*.⁶⁰¹ It was an argument for renewed engagement of French administration with its Muslim empire:

We’ve only witnessed exceptionally rapports of esteem and friendship between leading Algerians and Moroccans and our military commanders. Such relationships—lets us be clear at a time when we are haunted by budget cuts and reduced troop levels—*are worth entire battalions* [emphasis original]. In fact, they are worth more than that because they prevent the need to call on battalions.⁶⁰ With this chief with whom we’ve shown respect, there will never be an insurrection in that region. This is about instilling fear, of course, but also about elevating their personal prestige, and even more than that, creating trust. To one of our officers, a specialist of Morocco, Moroccans would say to him: ‘you are one of ours, though you do not pray.’ Let us imagine now what happens with the general commanding Damascus who systematically abstains from any relationship with the foremost notables of the city.⁶⁰²

The fear behind the article was on its face the loss of the Damascene Muslim establishment, but the article addressed more generally the failure of the ill-conceived and poorly implemented strategy to co-opt Islam into the French imperial project, truly apparent only after the Berber Dahir. France had rushed into its Levantine mandates officially on behalf of the Christians it had vowed to protect since the Crusades and to recuperate part of the debt the dismembered Ottoman Empire had incurred to French concerns prior to the Great War, but Damascus also represented at least two hundred and forty-eight minarets from which to call a prayer in the name of Allah and his prophet Mohammed, and it was hoped no doubt, that the Republic would one day added to the list of humanity’s providential benefactors. Control of “Damascus, the city of Califs, the city of 248 mosques, the Muslim university, and numerous madrasas; Damascus, a place where Sunni Islam is at its most vibrant...”⁶⁰³ was one of many cynical ploys to co-opt religious

⁶⁰¹ XXX, “Une politique musulmane au Levant,” *Revue politique et parlementaire: question politiques, sociales et législatives* 158, (January-March 1934).

⁶⁰² XXX, “Une politique musulmane au Levant,” 40.

⁶⁰³ XXX, “Une politique musulmane au Levant,” 42.

authorities who could sanction French rule in the Eastern Mediterranean, confirm France as the sole protecting power over pilgrimage routes leading into the Hejaz and the holy cities of Medina and Mecca, and sermon rebellious North Africans into accepting the legitimacy of French rule. Islamic institutions of theory and learning in Syria carried weight in North Africa, and control of Damascus offered the French the next best thing to complete and unimpeded legitimacy in the Muslim world.

However, the consolidation of nationalism, reform, jobs, and religion in North Africa, the inability to blunt the constant attacks on French rule and the Berber blunder, Messily Hadj's calls for Muslim soldiers to mutiny, the pogrom in Algeria, the misunderstood politics of burial rites in Tunisia, all this and the growing concern with Muslim immigrants in France, too, confirmed the author's fears: control of Islam had escaped the French, if indeed, Islam had ever been under French sway. Worse, not only had the French lost control of Islam's political potential, they had allowed its potency as a vector of propaganda and authority to be exploited by vocal anti-imperial agitators, the kind who instigated protests, authored religious and legal opinions, and tested French rule to probe for weaknesses.

If the Imams would not act as mouthpieces for French rule, and indigenous elites were in open rebellion, and the caïds were impotent or corrupt, who then would help run the French Empire? Our anonymous author proposed a change of tactics: it was time to make peace with former enemies and empower those who had been pushed aside by the French but whose charisma could serve the French cause. This new course rested on the assumption that French patronage would continue to be generous and that physical proximity to French sources of power, like a General or Governor, and even a lieutenant or a captain, was enough in turn to confer influence on those whom the French would make collaborators: "to be hosted by an

important French authority flatters because it augments influence. A simple invitation made public announcing that X is being received by French authorities, makes a client out of X, if not a friend.”⁶⁰⁴ “You’d be surprised,” he continued, “how much can be accomplished by sharing a pack of cigarettes and offering a cup of coffee” (*la politique de la tasse de café et de la cigarette aimablement offerte*).⁶⁰⁵ Coffee and cigarettes and the other accoutrements of informal diplomacy were the new tools of imperial statecraft, updated to take into account the political aspirations of the Young Moroccans.

What the anonymous author of “A Muslim Policy in the Levant” called “cigarettes and coffee” was transformed into what Pozzo di Borgo called “la politique du contact,” or the policy of contact. Archival records show that Pozzo di Borgo sought every opportunity to reach out to the Young Moroccans in Paris. Pozzo’s generous donations to associations had indeed made him a household name in the North African neighborhoods of Paris and ensured that he received personal invitations from even the smallest North African clubs to participate in religious festivities, informal dinners, and to share in conversation over the strong but sweet mint tea favored by those who can only discuss current events with passion. The committee for the *Association de Bienfaisance Marocaine*, for example, invited Pozzo di Borgo to their Aid el Mawlid el Nabi celebration of the birth of the Prophet and promised him dancing until the break of dawn on his personal invitation.⁶⁰⁶ The presidents of honor for that night were Galandou Diouf, the *député* for the Senegal Quatre Communes, and Jean Longuet, another French parliamentary representative and co-editor of *Maghreb*, the anticolonial magazine.⁶⁰⁷ On the

⁶⁰⁴ XXX, “Une politique musulmane au Levant,” 41.

⁶⁰⁵ XXX, “Une politique musulmane au Levant,” 41. “Être reçu par un grand chef français le flatte, parce que ça ‘augmente leur influence.’ Une simple invitation, à condition qu’on fasse savoir que c’est X... Bey qui en a été le bénéficiaire, le transforme sinon en ami, du moins en client.”

⁶⁰⁶ CADN IMA/200/70 Invitation from Association de Bienfaisance Marocaine to Pozzo di Borgo, 13 June 1935.

⁶⁰⁷ CADN IMA/200/70, flyer attached to Invitation from Association de Bienfaisance Marocaine to Pozzo di Borgo, 13 June 1935.

night of the party, neither Diouf nor Longuet showed up. But Pozzo di Borgo did. He was not as public a figure in the defense of North Africans as Diouf and Longuet, but he showed up to events, and that was why he was invited to as religious a ceremony as a Mawlid. Before the dancing, at a Mawlid, it is custom when celebrating the Prophet's birth to first discuss public affairs, air grievances, look for closure on outstanding feuds and attempt to weave closer links with neighbors, including rival families and tribes.⁶⁰⁸ Diouf and Longuet have storied reputations as protectors of immigrant communities and colonial peoples, but on that night, the Moroccans of the *Association* were not interested in celebrating the careers of the two politicians, but in reaching out to French authorities to vent their grievances. Pozzo di Borgo watched a play about an old man working diligently in a factory, but arbitrarily imprisoned by the police for no other reason than his North African origins. Pozzo listened to the speeches, the ones that were hostile to the French and the ones that longed for reconciliation with them. He had been attentive to the development of the humble *Association* and recorded for his files the names of the speakers and his impressions of them alongside the names of the officers of the club and his impressions of them, which he had previously completed with passport and visa numbers, employment histories, criminal backgrounds, and witness statements on the lifestyles of his surveillance targets.⁶⁰⁹ The committee members knew that Pozzo di Borgo collected information on them, since, after all, they had sent Pozzo's invitation to his office, rue des Pyramides, but Moroccans expected to network with him and exchange information for favors and better guidance through the French bureaucracy. With time, access became trust with the communities Pozzo di Borgo monitored.

⁶⁰⁸ Tagbaloute Aziz, *Le Fellah Marocain. L'exemple d'une tribu berbère: Les Beni M'Tir du XIXe siècle à nos jours* (Saint-Etienne: Université de Saint-Etienne Centre Interdisciplinaire d'Etudes et de Recherche sur les Structures Regionales, 1994), 54. See also Ali Amahan, *Mutations sociales dans le Haut Atlas: Les Ghoujdama* (Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1998), 268.

⁶⁰⁹ CADN IMA/200/70, A/S Association de Bienfaisance Marocaine, 16 June 1935.

Pozzo di Borgo did not hesitate to use his connections to help those who depended on his outpost. Each request for a favor was an opportunity to prove that the authorities of *Contrôle* were attentive. Each request made to Pozzo di Borgo was also an opportunity for him to undermine Godin's outfit and prove to North African immigrants that his outpost was more relevant than the SAINA and the BNA. The young Abdelmalek Faraj, for example, sent from Morocco to study medicine in Paris in 1934, approached Pozzo di Borgo for help with a bid to intern at the Franco-Muslim Hospital of Bobigny. He explained to Pozzo that he had trouble understanding the application process, which Pozzo took to mean that French officials, specifically the crews at the SAINA and the BNA, were making a point of giving Faraj a hard time with his paperwork. Pozzo fulfilled his role by assisting Faraj in obtaining the proper forms, accompanying him to his meetings at the Prefecture, and introducing him to the director of the hospital in Bobigny. Faraj was grateful and promised to enter the Protectorate's medical service back in Morocco after completing his training in Paris, which he promptly did upon his return. Ever the entrepreneur, Faraj married a French medical student during his stint in France, and together they opened a small medical cabinet that also catered to women. Together, Faraj and his French wife, acquired twice as many patients as doctors who traditionally only took men for patients and contributed to the civilizing mission's provisions on access to healthcare.⁶¹⁰ In the long term, students like Faraj became allies of the Protectorate. In the short term, helping students and workers ameliorate their condition by integrating them into colonial networks of power and patronage was a great way of placing informants in strategic positions for the *Affaires Indigènes*, and more importantly, rebuilding connections between French authorities in Rabat and Moroccan elites.

⁶¹⁰ CADN IMA/200.70, *Réflexions de Jeunes Marocains* (Conversation directe au cours d'un thé), 29 November 1934, 7.

The Paris outpost served to rally the Young Moroccans to the Protectorate, though the manner in which it had to be done was different than in Morocco. It was obviously out of the question to bomb Asnières or send a regiment of Goums into Clichy. Instead, Pozzo di Borgo needed to embody the ideal traits of the *Affaires Indigènes* officer. The best of these officers, according to the *Affaires Indigènes* field manual, ensured that French and Moroccans had “cordial relations built on trust,” and acted as mediators by “teach[ing] these two very different races, which have been suddenly brought together, to have esteem for each other, to love each other, to rely on each other, to combine their efforts and realize their common interests.”⁶¹¹ In spite of the difference in methods, however, the results obtained were similar to the ones in Morocco: soon, it was with Pozzo di Borgo that Moroccan nationalists bargained for a place in the French Makhzen.

The melancholy of empire

The more Pozzo di Borgo and the Young Moroccans interacted, the more he was convinced that French intelligence in general had missed the causes of the French Empire’s crisis of authority. Everywhere Pozzo di Borgo went, the Young Moroccans with whom he spoke seemed to be reasonable in their aspirations. In comfortable settings, the nationalists no longer attempted to vie with one another for the title of most anti-imperialist, or most devout Muslim. On the contrary they were affable and pragmatic. What most struck Pozzo di Borgo, however, was their pain. Young North African students were eager to impress on him the difficulties of their daily lives due to French mistreatment and the moral and mental malaise these difficulties caused. “In Morocco, the young men of my generation suffer the sharpest moral pain (*souffrent*

⁶¹¹ Henri Berriau, *L’Officier de renseignements au Maroc*, (Rabat: Résidence Générale de la République Française au Maroc, 1918), 13.

moralement de la façon la plus aigüe),” one Young Moroccan confessed to Pozzo. “Witness how we carry the heavy sorrows of our souls,” another Moroccan nationalist entreated Pozzo di Borgo.⁶¹² Pozzo di Borgo did witness their pain and reported back to his paymasters in Rabat that Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan students were in the throes of a singular generational crisis caused by the transformation of North Africa that was occasioned by empire.

The mental anguish the *évolués* felt was typical of modern empire.⁶¹³ Angst, depression (*le moral*), and neuroses of all sorts became terms commonly used in intelligence reports in the mid-1930s that described Moroccan nationalism.⁶¹⁴ Many of these reports, however, were written by officers who had read a bit of Freud and figured that made them psychiatrists. Medicalizing the discontent of empire was an easy way to dismiss the demands of colonial subjects, by providing a biological explanations based on seemingly immutable biological traits. Moroccan discontent, one account argued, stemmed invariably from sexual abuse as children or sexual deviance as adults, both endemic in Morocco per the intelligence officer, which in turn led them to become “unhinged.” They subsequently suffered from “hypersensitivity,” which according to this particular account, also endemic among the sons of Fassi bourgeois. This hypersensitivity exacerbated feelings of worthlessness among the *évolués* when confronted with their poor prospects after graduating from universities and their parents’ disappointment. Framing the colonial condition in psychological terms also provided a convenient explanation for their very violent and very public outbursts as corollary attempts to compensate for their insecurities.

⁶¹² CADN IMA/200/70, *Propos de Jeunes Marocains*, 12 June 1934, 5.

⁶¹³ On this see for example, Richard Keller, *Colonial Madness Psychiatry in French North Africa* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007), chapter 4, and on colonialism as a neuroses-inducing system see Diana Fuss “Interior Colonies: Frantz Fanon and the Politics of Identification,” *Diacritics* 24, no. 2/3 (1994):19-42.

⁶¹⁴ SHD 3H 463, *Le nationalisme marocain*, 1947, 2-3.

For the colonized, the psyche was also the site of inquiries into the nature of empire. “There is a fact,” Franz Fanon wrote, “white men consider themselves superior to black men.” “There is another fact,” he continued, “black men want to prove to white men, at all costs, the richness of their thought, the equal value of their intellect.”⁶¹⁵ Fanon’s insight in his 1952 medical thesis was true too for the interwar years. Colonialism was a neurotic system of power that alienated the colonized subject from himself.⁶¹⁶ While the French created visions of success and encouraged their subjects to take advantage of the opportunities presented by empire, they simultaneously acted into power socio-economic policies based in part on grotesque racial stereotypes that prevented the colonized from integrating the economic, social, and cultural polity that the French claimed was universal. This system—colonialism—which Frederic Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler theorize as rife with inclusionary impulses and exclusionary practices,⁶¹⁷ is as Achille Mbembe plainly puts it: “fraudulent in the way it humiliated its victims, rewarded its valets, and punished its dissidents, in the way it created with its lackeys relationships as a lover and as persecutor, as an executioner and a protector...”⁶¹⁸ To be sure, in the Moroccan case, the entire system was based on frauds and lies. Lyautey, himself acknowledged the fact that the Protectorate was a lie. *Contrôle* was based on the subtle, and sometimes not so subtle manipulation of agency, but French authorities insisted that it was Moroccans who

⁶¹⁵ Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, (London: Pluto Press, 1986), 10.

⁶¹⁶ Frantz Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, (New York: Grove Press, 2007), chap 5; see also Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*: “the Negro enslaved by his inferiority, the white man enslaved by his superiority alike behave in accordance with a neurotic orientation,” *Black Skin, White Masks*, 60.

⁶¹⁷ Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda” in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Culture in a Bourgeois World*, eds. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

⁶¹⁸ Achille Mbembe, “Ecrire l’Afrique à partir d’une faille,” *Politique Africaine* 51 (1993): 69-97, 85. “La colonisation est ce qu’elle fut, simplement: une forme historique de domination à part entière, un rapport de violence s’exerçant sur des espaces, des corps, des objets, des imaginaires et des êtres, une relation d’échange et de négoce, frauduleuse dans la façon dont elle humiliait ses victimes, récompensait ses valets, punissait ses dissidents, nouait avec ses laquais des rapports d’amant et de persécuteur, de bourreau et de protecteur...”

misrepresented themselves. The daily encounter of the French subject with the abusive behavior of the French empire was the root cause for the malady Fanon witnessed among Algerians and for which he believed there was no other cure but revolutionary violence leading to independence.

The impulse for cathartic violence was always present in empire. As one angry Algerian student put it in 1934 “as soon as the unbeatable German army puts a noose around France’s neck we should not waste a single minute before shooting from both barrels and end this once and for all.”⁶¹⁹ Another “affirmed his joy at the thought of suffering death for a just cause.”⁶²⁰ Some officials were willing to concede that the *évolués* were in a difficult situation, but still felt that their pain was self-inflicted, or dismissed it as either the product of inadequacies when faced with the civilizational challenges the French presented them, religious fanaticism, or foreign rabbleroising. Pozzo di Borgo reported, for example, that Charles-André Julien, a member of the *Haut Comité Méditerranéen* in the 1930s, suggested that North African students had only themselves to blame for the political condition in North Africa, that their lack of interest in the French empire, their indolence at school, and their animosity toward French authorities were the very reasons why they were harassed by police and ignored by French authorities.⁶²¹ Most French administrators claimed that nothing was stopping North African *évolués* from becoming involved in the administration of the empire. On the face of it, then, the crisis of empire in 1934 was wholly attributable to the *évolués*.

⁶¹⁹ CADN IMA/200/70, Réunion Musulmane, 28 Novembre 1934, 10.

⁶²⁰ CADN IMA/200/70, 17 September 1934 report from Pozzo di Borgo to DAI, 17 September 1934, 1.

⁶²¹ CADN IMA/200/70, “Activité des nationalistes nord-africains,” 18 January 1936, 2 “*Sa conclusion fût que la situation précaire des musulmans de l’Afrique du Nord n’est imputable qu’à leur défaut d’instruction... Les étudiants ont commenté avec mécontentement l’exposé du conférencier reprochant à ce dernier de n’avoir pas abordé le côté politique de la question traitée.*” Julien later became one of the nationalists’ most ardent defenders and one of the historians of the Maghreb who most understood the region. In the 1930s, he was a man of his time, and we should take care to contextualize his remarks.

Yet, a few other channels that existed between the French and *évolués* led some intelligence officers to question this prevailing wisdom. The Algiers analytics branch of the *Deuxième Bureau*, the *Section d'Etudes d'Alger*, for example, commissioned a psychological study in 1934 on Algerian males of age to serve in the army. It was conducted by a group known as H.C. 138, composed of sociologists and psychiatrists from the University of Algiers, in addition to a select group of intelligence officers.

The executive summary of the report H.C. 138 produced, “Note on psychological conditions in case of a general mobilization,” contradicted commonly held beliefs about the *évolués*.⁶²² French governance in the metropole and in the empire was to blame for the crisis at hand. “The show metropolitan France puts on for the natives of its colonial possessions isn’t to reinforce French prestige or authority,” the summary’s author editorialized.⁶²³ Officials in the empire were not respected. The authors echoed notions of a crisis of authority created because officials had spent their energy checking dissent and “overlooked the particular problem of an indigenous population that demand[ed] more rights.”⁶²⁴ Preoccupied by other concerns and disinterested in the lives of their subjects, the report argued, officials had missed the transformation of the North African societies they governed, and that decisions were made by French officials in “complete ignorance of real social and family dynamics.”⁶²⁵

The *évolués* were not only trapped by the abuses of colonialism but also seemingly by an oppressive social environment. First, North African students, even if they were from families of wealth, were expected to help their families pay for the tuition of their younger siblings and thus

⁶²² SHD 7NN SHD 7NN 2222, “Note sur les conditions psychologiques d’une mobilisation générale en Algérie” May 1935. Commander Delor, in charge of the SEA, ordered explicitly that the original report never be filed.

⁶²³ SHD 7NN SHD 7NN 2222, “Note sur les conditions psychologiques d’une mobilisation générale en Algérie” May 1935, 3.

⁶²⁴ SHD 7NN SHD 7NN 2222, “Note sur les conditions psychologiques,” May 1935, 3.

⁶²⁵ SHD 7NN SHD 7NN 2222, “Note sur les conditions psychologiques,” May 1935, 5.

help increase the standing of their families in the community. Without jobs, however, they were unable to fulfill their filial duties. In part, the suffering of the *évolués* stemmed from the disappointment of their parents.

The religious environment of the *évolués* also seemed to be a problem. Although the Salafism of the 1920s and 1930s in North Africa was of a reformist bent, grounded in the study of mathematics, sciences, and foreign languages, it was ultimately tied to an orthodoxy in religious thought and practices, as well as a “narrower sense of belonging.”⁶²⁶ Salafists were not anti-French, but there was no reconciling being French and Muslim at the same time. This was a major point of friction that prevented the *évolués* from taking an active part in the administration of the empire.

Indeed, French officials had tied a majority of administrative positions to French citizenship to incentivize settlement, “mixed positions,” open to both French and Moroccans, but usually awarded them to French nationals for fear of diluting French power in the administration.⁶²⁷ The result, unsurprisingly, was that the *évolués* who already had difficulties finding work were further hampered by citizenship restrictions. “Alas! After having pursued the same scholarly endeavors as his French classmates, the Young Tunisian is told that he will not have the right to secure a career if he does not naturalize,” lamented a Young Tunisian to a crowd.⁶²⁸

⁶²⁶ Henri Lauzière, *The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 132-134, but see chapter 4 in its entirety for the particularity of Morocco’s liberal Salafism which Lauzière calls “modernist Salafism.” See also Jacques Berque, “Ça et là dans les débats du réformisme religieux au Maghreb,” in *Etudes d’Orientalisme dédiées à la mémoire de Levi-Provençal* 2 vols. (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1962), 2: 471-494

⁶²⁷ CDRG 32, Note sur l’organisation des administrations publiques du Protectorat, le réformes à envisager, les économies à réaliser, qui évoque en même temps la nécessité de la prépondérance française au Maroc, et dégage quelques idées générales, 20 January 1937, 1-2.

⁶²⁸ CADN IMA/200/70, Activité des nationalistes Nord-Africains, 13 January 1936, 2.

As H.C. 138 discovered in Algeria and Pozzo di Borgo discovered in Paris, the anger of the North African elites, the violence of their meetings, stemmed from the barriers placed on their path toward association with (and sometimes assimilation in) the empire, not only by the French but also by their parents. The turmoil provoked by the meeting of French and Salafist currents—each mixed with different and contradictory notions of tradition and progress—challenged the *évolués* of the interwar years who risked being labeled backward by one camp and apostates by the other.⁶²⁹ The internal conflicts and the difficulties of the choices of the *évolués* were ignored by most authorities, whether French or North African, who saw only the anger of the students, though evidence to the contrary was also widely available, and even published.

Take for example, the short story, the *Spiritual Adventure of Three Brothers* by Mohamed al Mohktar al Soussi, a discreet but important intellectual pillar of the Moroccan nationalist movement.⁶³⁰ Written in the form of the *rihla*, or travelogue that permitted a recounting of a quest to better understand the self and Islam, the story is about an anonymous narrator who seeks to bring his three brothers who have chosen different paths in life closer together in 1921.⁶³¹ Each character represents a male, Moroccan archetype. The eldest of the brothers is a mystic who relishes more than anything his quiet life of study and prayer and hates the interruptions of the modern world. The youngest owns a small commerce in Fez, *ville*

⁶²⁹ Berque, “Ça et là,” 471.

⁶³⁰ Mokhtar al Soussi, “L’Aventure spirituelles de trois frères” in *Ecrivains Marocains du Protectorat à 1965*, eds. Mohammed Benjelloun Toumi, Abdelkebir Khatibi, and Mohammed Kably, (Paris: Sindbad, 1974), 44-51; The *rihla* was a popular form of writing and a popular genre of study for the Young Moroccans. Mohammed al Fassi, Allal al Fassi’s cousin, studied the *rihla* for his doctoral thesis. His travels from Paris to Berlin and back initially worried French authorities who took him for a German spy, but it was soon clear that his trips had more to do with frequenting the great collection of Middle Eastern works in the libraries of Berlin than fomenting trouble on behalf of the Reich (CADN IMA/200/70, Note au sujet de Si Mohammed el Fassi, réponse à une demande de renseignements datée du 6 Juillet 1934, 17 July 1934).

⁶³¹ Mokhtar al Soussi, “L’Aventure spirituelles de trois frères”, 44.

nouvelle, the European quarters of the city, but short on customers and not particularly enterprising, he closes his shop every day, squandering his daily take in opium dens.

The lifestyles of these two brothers concern the anonymous narrator, but he considers the state of the second eldest brother, Hammad, particularly worrisome; it is for him that the narrator organizes a family reunion. Hammad is too European for his own good and “having earned two doctorates he believes he is amongst the greatest of this world.”⁶³² The narrator explains that against the entreaties of his friends and family, Hammad left the medina and married an Austrian woman, not in a religious ceremony, but in one officiated by a judge of the peace. Hammad was punished for the slight to tradition and his community when, according to the narrator, his wife ruined him by spending a fortune on making herself look pretty (*coquette*) and drank the rest of the money her husband had inherited from his father. He separated from her and married, with the approval of his community this time, a young woman in a proper, religious ceremony. He continued to refuse, however, the counsel of his family, friends, and the community of faithful whom he considered primitive and ignorant, and consequently continued to wander, troubled and withdrawn.⁶³³

The narrator, when he finally meets with Hammad, attempts to understand the source of the Hammad’s malaise. Hammad confesses:

If I had enough money to live in Europe, you would never see me here again. Life here is unbearable. I am only waiting for a scheme that I have only just undertaken to succeed and abandon this country, and live there [Paris], where civilization shines as a bright as a star... Here, I do not feel as if I am in my country, and without the foreigners present here I would have no friends. Those of my kind avoid me as I avoid them.⁶³⁴

⁶³² Mokhtar al Soussi, “L’Aventure spirituelles de trois frères”, 45.

⁶³³ Mokhtar al Soussi, “L’Aventure spirituelles de trois frères”, 45.

⁶³⁴ Mokhtar al Soussi, “L’Aventure spirituelles de trois frères”, 51.

Al Soussi's text echoes the conclusions of H.C. 138's note on the psychological state of young Algerian men. Hammad's desolation highlights the limits of the French project of association, since his unemployment is in all likelihood due to the French, and also the limits of how far his friends and family would allow him to assimilate without eventually rejecting him as one of their own. For those in this situation, there was no middle ground in Morocco on which to wait for a better alternative. "We are truly strangers in the land of our fathers," as one Young Moroccan succinctly put it to Pozzo di Borgo.⁶³⁵

Decisions on where and how to belong to communities of faith, education, and profession were heavy with consequences and the source of angst for the Young Moroccans, Algerians, and Tunisians who found themselves betwixt and between France and North Africa, empire and religion, and allegedly, tradition and progress. For them, exile had been the only option. Paris offered men in their 20s and 30s an opportunity to escape a confusing and frustrating landscape. They had the space to think or suffer through the tensions they experienced at home, and the time they needed to imagine a new future.

Renewing Empire

On 3 December 1934, Pozzo di Borgo was invited by Hassan al Ouezzani, Omar Abdeljelil, and Mohamed el Kholti to talk over mint tea. The three cadres of the Young Moroccans saw in Pozzo di Borgo a sympathetic interlocutor who had been attentive to their suffering and had offered mediation to temper the abuses of empire. They hoped he would help them convince the authorities of *Contrôle* that the Protectorate needed reforming.⁶³⁶

⁶³⁵ CADN IMA/200/70, Note enregistrent, succinctement, réflexions et critiques communes de notables marocains cultivés, de passage à Paris, 5 December 1933, 2.

⁶³⁶ CADN IMA/200/70, Déclarations de: Hassan Ouazzani, Abdeljelil, Kholti (Conversation directe au cours d'un thé le Lundi 3 Décembre 1934.), 5 Decembre 1934, 1.

The conversation took place over a glass of the traditional sweet mint tea, a variant of coffee and cigarettes, that also emphasized conviviality in political discussions. The sugar fueled the conversation while the mint cooled the passions of the interlocutors. It became apparent to Pozzo di Borgo, that the Young Moroccans had evolved beyond the orthodoxies of the societies they straddled. It was not the end of the French empire that they wanted, but an expansion of it. French subjects, though they suffered the abuses of empire, were also some of its most ardent supporters, albeit reformed. As Frederick Cooper has shown in the case of the decolonization of France's African empire, not until the very end did African elites consider independence a primary objective. They worked with the French, and more often than not, in spite of them, to expand the political imagination of the French and make it more inclusive of colonized subjects.⁶³⁷ Algerian nationalists of the 1930s were also amenable to a reformed partnership, as James McDougall has shown.⁶³⁸ The Young Moroccans were likewise enthusiastic supporters of empire in the 1930s. In fact, they were making lifelong commitments based on its continued existence. To anchor themselves into the political life of the empire and establish themselves financially, they adopted a strategy practiced since time immemorial of marrying into power. Not only had the scions of Morocco's Arab elites married into Berber tribes in hopes of becoming the chosen administrators of the French in Berber territories, but it seems, too, that Young Moroccans courted the daughters of French officers in Morocco.⁶³⁹ Unions between them were not uncommon. They happened frequently enough that the Garde des Sceaux of the Ministry of Justice issued formal rules on naturalizing Moroccans married to the daughters of French

⁶³⁷ Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 4.

⁶³⁸ James McDougall, *History and the Culture of Nationalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 74-76.

⁶³⁹ CADN IMA/200/70, *Propos de Jeunes Marocains*, 14 June 1934, 2; see also CADN IMA/200/70 *Réflexions de Jeunes Marocains*, 29 Novembre 1934, 8.

officers.⁶⁴⁰ Mixed marriages, as we saw earlier in the case of Hammad, came with dramatic consequences for Moroccans, and French officials took care to note the price Moroccans paid to associate with the French. Abdelmalek Faraj, the medical student we encountered early, had become a “renegade” in his community after marrying a French woman, but he was also one of four Moroccans to have been integrated into the upper echelons of the French administration in Morocco.⁶⁴¹

The Young Moroccans were not interested in independence, though French intelligence had been certain that they were.⁶⁴² Perhaps intelligence reports about meetings of AEMNA that were entitled, for example, “Notes on a revolutionary meeting,” influenced thinking in intelligence circles. Although, they were unabashed about calling themselves nationalists, the Young Moroccans rejected being labelled extremist and revolutionary.⁶⁴³ As the three Young Moroccans explained to Pozzo di Borgo over tea on 3 December 1934:

We do not want to leave the Protectorate. The Protectorate is the only regime that is suitable for our country and we intend on remaining loyal to the stipulations of the treaty [Treaty of Fez]... Do not accuse us of pursuing the total liberation of our country: look at the innumerable discussions we have had, at the countless publications that have come out of our study groups and leadership committees. Even the zealots (*exultés*) among us have come to recognize the truth that Morocco, which is a minor country, can only subsist and develop under tutelage.⁶⁴⁴

They did not deny wanting “democratic freedoms, freedom of the press, financial aid to farmers through agricultural credits, more schools, social assistance for Moroccans, [and] freedom of association,”⁶⁴⁵ but approached their demands as opening bids: “if only we could find someone with whom to have a friendly and courteous discussion surely we could be persuaded that some

⁶⁴⁰ SHD 3H 118, Rules on the naturalization of Moroccans married to French women, 16 June 1927.

⁶⁴¹ CADN CDRG 32, Note pour Monsieur le Directeur du Cabinet du Résident Général, 20 January 1937, 5.

⁶⁴² CADN IMA/200/70, Pozzo di Borgo to Coutard, A/S Trois réunions nord-africaines à Paris, 21 December 1934.

⁶⁴³ CADN IMA/200/70, Propos de Jeunes Marocains, 12 June 1934, 6.

⁶⁴⁴ CADN IMA/200/70, Déclarations de Hassan Ouazzani, Abdenjelil, Kholti (Conversations directe [emphasis original] au cours d’un thé le Lundi 3 Décembre 1934), 5 December 1934, 2-3.

⁶⁴⁵ CADN IMA/200/70, A.S. Activité des nationalistes nord-africains, 31 January 1936, 4.

of our ideas are wrong, but without discussion it is absurd for you to argue that we are wrong about everything.”⁶⁴⁶ They welcomed the French Protectorate of Morocco, but could no longer accommodate the colonial mentality that came along with it.

The Young Moroccans were practical. The main thrust of their conversations with Pozzo di Borgo in the months surrounding the release of the *Plan* had centered on jobs and education programs for the Young Moroccans. By forcing the French to examine education and hiring policies, the Young Moroccans hoped the French might rationalize the administration of the Protectorate. In the interim, they hoped for some economic relief. Most Young Moroccans seemed to have become nationalists almost out of desperation, one *évolué* remarked. It seems what they wanted most was to settle into a comfortable administrative position that would allow them to raise a family.⁶⁴⁷

Pozzo di Borgo’s early reports to the *Affaires Indigènes* seemed to have sparked the curiosity of many inside the Residency General. There was widespread support among the various technical services to reform the administration if only because it would allow for further compression of the Residency’s budget. A commission was thus formed to sketch the broad lines of a future reform of hiring practices in the French and Moroccan administrations, and to propose short-term stop-gap measures that might accommodate the Young Moroccans and recent graduates of Morocco’s schools.⁶⁴⁸ What immediately struck the Commission was how few positions available were filled.⁶⁴⁹ Local French administrations dependent on the Residency General had a habit of rarely advertising available mid-level positions open to both French and

⁶⁴⁶ CADN 1MA/200.70, *Propos de Jeunes Marocains*, 12 June 1934, 5.

⁶⁴⁷ CADN 1MA/200/70, *Réflexions de Jeunes Marocains* (Conversation directe au cours d’un thé), 29 November 1934, 7.

⁶⁴⁸ CADN (2012) CDRG 32, *Rapport sur les travaux de la Commission chargée d’étudier l’emploi des Marocains dans les Administrations du Protectorat*, 23 June 1934, 2-3.

⁶⁴⁹ CADN (2012) CDRG 32, *Rapport sur les travaux de la Commission chargée d’étudier l’emploi des Marocains*, 23 June 1934, 4.

Moroccans, known as “*emplois mixtes*,” either out of disinterest in filling the positions or to keep them as political rewards for collaborators. The Commission noted that it would make advertisement of these positions obligatory.

Moroccans, by and large, however, preferred seeking employment in the Moroccan administration. A number of positions were available in the central and local Makhzen, too, and the Commission noted that with some reorganization the Makhzen could accommodate many more idle nationalists who might prefer stable employment to protest.⁶⁵⁰ Reforms in the Makhzen put in place in late 1934 divided important positions into a number of less important ones to increase the number of jobs available, and doubled hiring for low-level jobs.⁶⁵¹ At the same time, emoluments across the board increased slightly.⁶⁵² The Commission also decided to abolish the practice of discretionary hiring for these positions and instead, put forth a proposal to institute a civil service entrance exam to access the host of employment opportunities available in the Moroccan administration.⁶⁵³

The Young Moroccans were unsurprisingly also keen on reforming Morocco’s justice system. As one Young Moroccan told Pozzo di Borgo, “no one believed” that the Berber Dahir was an attempt to divide Arabs from Berbers to better rule both, but the Young Moroccans saw in the 16 May 1930 ruling a broken promise to replace the old guard of “amateur judges that included unsupervised Makhzen officials, qadis who were accused of maladministration and fraud, bankrupt merchants, and other individuals who got the job thanks to X or Y.”⁶⁵⁴ The task

⁶⁵⁰ CADN (2012) CDRG 32, Rapport sur les travaux de la Commission chargée d’étudier l’emploi des Marocains dans les Administration du Protectorat, 23 June 1934, 6.

⁶⁵¹ CADN (2012) CDRG 32, Organisation du Service Administratif en Afrique du Nord—Compression des dépenses, undated but likely 1937, 2-3.

⁶⁵² CADN (2012) CDRG 32, Organisation du Service Administratif en Afrique du Nord, 4.

⁶⁵³ CADN (2012) CDRG 32, Rapport sur les travaux de la Commission chargée d’étudier l’emploi des Marocains dans les Administration du Protectorat, 23 June 1934, 9-10.

⁶⁵⁴ CADN IMA/200/70, Déclarations de Hassan Ouazzani, Abdenjelil, Kholti (Conversations directe au cours d’un thé le Lundi 3 Décembre 1934), 2.

of reforming the Moroccan justice system was impossible. Although the French had walked back some of the provisions placing criminal matters in French hands in Berber territories, the *regime special*, “which we call martial law though it is really a state of siege hybrid,” prevented the French military from abdicating its role in court proceedings.⁶⁵⁵ But armed with Pozzo di Borgo’s intelligence, the Protectorate could boast in 1936 that it was making the necessary efforts to meet the Young Moroccans halfway, and that to that end it had put aside credits to renovate old courts and make them bigger, and was committed to constructing new ones which invariably meant new positions for judges, advocates, and the host of paralegal employees that went along with new courts. There was also a hiring plan in place to accommodate a host of young law graduates in junior positions before transitioning them into judges and secretaries to judges. For example, the Residency General enacted provisions within the Moroccan administration to allow religious pilgrims to benefit from a three-month paid leave during the Hajj. They hoped to open enough temporary positions to place young jurists in internships and temporary positions and give them the necessary exposure to the French military judicial system.⁶⁵⁶ Finally, the Residency General also made agricultural development in newly “pacified” areas a priority, and endowed SIPs with large sums to fund Moroccan projects. Part of these funds went toward the hiring of engineers, economists, accountants, and employees to ensure tax collection, the supervision of cooperatives, and training Moroccan farmers.⁶⁵⁷ Slowly, “pacification” and increased efforts to place educated Moroccans in jobs erased the line between

⁶⁵⁵ CADN (2012) CDRG 32, Note sur l’organisation des administrations publiques du Protectorat, le réformes à envisager, les économies à réaliser, qui évoque en même temps la nécessité de la prépondérance française au Maroc, et dégage quelques idées générales, 20 January 1937, 1-4.

⁶⁵⁶ AN-Ma F75, Discours prononcé à Rabat le 1er Janvier 1936 par M. Henri Ponsot, 1 January 1936, 2-3.

⁶⁵⁷ CADN IMA/140/384g, Bulletin de Renseignements, 15 July 1935.

the *bled siba* and *bled al makhzen*, the land of chaos and the land of government, and trained a generation of bureaucrats who would come into their own in 1956, at independence.

Conclusion

At the same time as Pozzo di Borgo worked to reform the Protectorate, his activities at the Croix de Feu came under scrutiny by political authorities and the tabloids in Paris. Pozzo di Borgo had become embroiled in a series of legal disputes when he accused La Rocque, his former collaborator at the *Croix de Feu*, of having been bought off by the French government. La Rocque and Pozzo di Borgo sued and counter-sued one another in a series of high-profile trials, which also exposed politicians to charges of corruption. Pozzo di Borgo also added to his legal troubles when he was scooped up in a police raid against members of the Cagoule, the hard-right paramilitary group that was engaged in destabilizing the socialist *Front Populaire* government elected in 1936.⁶⁵⁸ He had allegedly participated in threats of assassinations, bombings, and other violent acts of subversion in 1937.⁶⁵⁹ Consequently, Pozzo di Borgo was in and out of courtrooms and jail cells and was unable to meet with the Young Moroccans. He was also unable to provide the authorities of *Contrôle* with the intelligence they desperately needed to defuse the tense situation in Morocco. There seemed to be no one capable of replacing him as a backchannel, and without his help the relationship between the Young Moroccans and the authorities of *Contrôle* deteriorated.

⁶⁵⁸ On La Cagoule see for example Pierre Milza, *Histoire de l'extrême droite en France* (Paris: Points, 1993). See also Annie Lacroix-Riz, *De Munich à Vichy. L'assassinat de la Troisième République, 1938-1940* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2008), especially chapters 2 and 3.

⁶⁵⁹ Robert Soucy, *French Fascism: The Second Wave, 1933-1939* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 50.

Conclusion

One of the front-page titles for *Maroc-Matin*'s morning edition on 25 September 1936 was "Another military putsch attempted in Meknès."⁶⁶⁰ It was followed by a short blurb in which reporters explained that they had received new evidence confirming stories previously written by their colleagues at other papers across the metropole and North Africa throughout September 1936 about two mutinies in the Meknes garrison.⁶⁶¹ The stories began appearing on 5 September 1936 with rumors of a mutiny in the Meknes garrison, and ten days later, on 15 September 1936, a number of wires were picked up by Parisian dailies about a possible second mutiny. For the reporters at *Maroc-Matin*, the timing and the gravity of the alleged incidents had something to do with General Charles Noguès's nomination to the Residency General on 16 September 1936.⁶⁶² Noguès was indeed a surprising choice considering that the policy of the Quai d'Orsay since the Rif War had been to appoint career civilian administrators with proven loyalties to the metropole rather than reinforce the authorities of *Contrôle* with a military Resident General.

The gravity of the allegations and the frequency of the articles distressed the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Colonies for whom such an incident was shocking but not inconceivable. The ministers telegraphed General Noguès each time an article appeared in the press, asking him to account for the troops under his command to see if the sentiments expressed by soldiers in Meknes were shared by garrisons elsewhere in Morocco.⁶⁶³ Noguès reassured them repeatedly, vouching for the loyalty of the army in Morocco and launching a special

⁶⁶⁰ "Une nouvelle tentative de putsch militaire aurait eu lieu à Meknès," *Maroc-Matin*, September 5, 1936.

⁶⁶¹ SHD 3H 481, General de Division Corap to Residence Générale (Cabinet Militaire), Objet: Propagation de fausses nouvelles, undated, but written after 16 September 1936.

⁶⁶² "Une nouvelle tentative de putsch militaire aurait eu lieu à Meknès," *Maroc-Matin*, September 5, 1936.

⁶⁶³ SHD 3H 481, 2941 9EMA, Minister of War to Noguès concerning articles about the Meknes garrison, 15 September 1935.

investigation that showed that the Meknes garrison had been quietly supervising road repair and construction a few kilometers outside of the city.⁶⁶⁴ Noguès complained that the French army was the victim of a vicious press campaign, but neither the ministers in Paris nor the population in Morocco were buying Noguès's story. The report of the special investigation noted that an informal polling of "people from diverse backgrounds" suggested that Europeans and Moroccans living in the Protectorate were hardly surprised by rumors of a mutiny in Meknes and that it was also obvious to them that the timing of the alleged events had resulted in Noguès's appointment as Resident General.⁶⁶⁵ It is impossible to know whether the alleged mutinies in Meknes motivated Noguès's appointment. What is certain, however, is that for the socialist *Front Populaire* government in Paris, choosing Noguès was accepting the authorities of *Contrôle* as the rulers of Morocco.

As we have seen, for Moroccans and Europeans living in Morocco, the authorities of *Contrôle* were already the *de facto* government in Morocco. They had come to power at the end of the First World War when differences between the metropole and intelligence officers in the Protectorate over the meaning of empire and the form of imperial governance became irreconcilable, leading to the creation of a parallel state. *Contrôle*, as *Maréchal* Lyautey called the new regime, and its agents, the authorities of *Contrôle*, wrested actual administration away from officials appointed by the government in Paris as well as from Moroccan authorities whose power was protected by the Treaty of Fez. Against the wishes of the Parisian political establishment, the Makhzen, and the international community, intelligence officers who combined political and military power shifted the French Protectorate of Morocco from indirect

⁶⁶⁴ SHD 4H 481, 2941 9EMA, Minister of War to Noguès concerning articles about the Meknes garrison, 15 September 1935.

⁶⁶⁵ SHD 3H 481, 62C/1, General Caillaud to Resident General. General sentiments of the Meknes population after reading news of the alleged putsch, 25 September 1936.

rule to direct rule. Career civil servants at the Quai d'Orsay and their political masters tried to control wayward authorities in Morocco by imposing loyal civilian Residents General after they had ousted Lyautey during the Rif War, but their efforts were unsuccessful. In the years since the Rif War, the authorities of *Contrôle* worked to reunite political and military powers into the hands of a military Resident General, going as far as manipulating Parisian politics and undermining the authority of officials in charge of monitoring North African communities in the metropole. Finally, in 1936, their vision of empire was realized when Noguès became Resident General.

In spite of the fears of the *Front Populaire*'s ministers about the loyalty of the French army in Morocco, appointing Noguès was a choice dictated by necessity. The authorities of *Contrôle* were indispensable to the left-wing government's plans to breath new life into an ailing French Empire by enacting liberal political and economic reforms for French subjects. The much-publicized reset of imperial policy engendered many expectations among colonial subjects, and generated significant enthusiasm especially when, for example, local chapters of the *Front Populaire* in Morocco invited nationalists to participate in the elaboration of social and economic policies.⁶⁶⁶

Reforms, however, if they were to work, were dependent on a stable political situation, and North Africa was increasingly difficult to manage for French authorities. In the years right before the Second World War, general intelligence assessments of North Africa insisted that a course correction was needed if France was to continue to have an empire.⁶⁶⁷ Nationalism was to

⁶⁶⁶ On the effect of the Popular Front in North Africa see Martin Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 262-263. On the Popular Front and Morocco, see Charles-André Julien, *Le Maroc face aux impérialismes, 1415-1956* (Paris: Editions du Jaguar, 2011), 179-187.

⁶⁶⁷ SHD 7NN 2222, Bulletin Mensuel d'Information concernant la politique indigène dans le département d'Oran, November 1937, 11.

be sure a source of concern for French officials, but intelligence reports also indicated a major uptick in delinquency and isolated acts of aggression against Europeans.⁶⁶⁸ Rising petty crime rates and seemingly random acts of aggression against Europeans were indicative of socio-economic discontent and carried serious risks to French legitimacy in the empire.⁶⁶⁹ “Respect for authorities is not absolute as it once was,” wrote an intelligence officer, “the apparent calm is only superficial.”⁶⁷⁰

Events on 2 September 1937, confirmed the perceived need for a regime of *Contrôle* in Morocco when 2,000 Meknassis marched into the city center shouting: “Not a drop of water for the settlers!”⁶⁷¹ The “water crisis,” as it was called, resulted from a drought, a poor crop the previous year, economic anxiety, increasing rates of pauperization, settler greed, and a tone-deaf administration. 1937 was an especially hot and dry year, and the Bou Fekrane, the river that supplied Meknes and the farms surrounding the city, ran low. It was obvious to most fellahs that crop yields would be poor, which added to anxieties over the previous year’s equally poor harvest. Yet, under pressure from four colons with important agricultural holdings surrounding the city, the Meknes Public Works department diverted part of the city’s water supply to irrigate their lands,⁶⁷² further diminishing supply to small Moroccan plots, but also cutting supply to the medina.⁶⁷³ When on the morning of 1 September 1937, the faithful attempted to perform their ablutions before prayers and saw that the faucets ran dry, they marched on city hall where a special water commission was in the middle of deliberations over how to divvy up the water supply of the Bou Fekrane in such a manner as to please the settlers while avoiding trouble with

⁶⁶⁸ SHD 7NN 2222, Compte Rendu de Quinzaine, 31 Novembre 1937, 10.

⁶⁶⁹ SHD 7NN 2222, Compte Rendu de Quinzaine, 28 February, 1938, 7.

⁶⁷⁰ SHD 7NN 2222, Compte Rendu de Quinzaine, 28 February, 1938, 3.

⁶⁷¹ CADN IMA/200/344, Le nationalisme Marocain et l’éméute de Meknès, 10 November 1937.

⁶⁷² Julien, *le Maroc face aux impérialismes*, 187

⁶⁷³ Adam Guerin, “‘Not a drop for the settlers’: reimagining popular protest and anti-colonial nationalism in the Moroccan Protectorate,” *Journal of North Africa Studies* 20, no. 2 (2015): 225-246.

Moroccans.⁶⁷⁴ According to police depositions, the protesters spat on the commissioners and proffered insults against France. Several of the leaders of the march were subsequently arrested and received prison sentences after a swift trial.

On the following morning, Meknassis marched again toward the city center and the courthouse where their comrades had been sentenced to prison. Police dispersed the crowd but Moroccan protesters managed to regroup in small pockets in the neighboring Jewish and European quarters where shops were robbed and destroyed and passersby molested.⁶⁷⁵ After two hours of battles between rioters and security forces, soldiers, unable to control the situation, and having sustained a number of serious casualties, fired into crowds. There were between three and twenty-three dead among the Moroccan protesters according to intelligence reports written in the weeks following the “water crisis.”⁶⁷⁶

In the days that followed the riots in Meknes, French intelligence feared similar scenes in cities where the same palpable anxieties were barely contained. According to intelligence officers, in Fez, groups of Moroccans sporadically showed up in front of the city’s main French police station calling for jihad. In Rabat, two hundred boys gathered on boulevard Joffre to throw rocks at the cars in the street to avenge the Moroccans dead in Meknes. Among Moroccan tribes, also hard hit by the drought, there was apparently talk of rebelling and asking the Germans for help.⁶⁷⁷ Meanwhile, Europeans living in cities feared for their lives: they felt that if Moroccans had had access to more weapons, there might have been a general bloodletting. *La Vigie Marocaine* on 8 September 1937 ran an editorial asking French authorities to “either prevent

⁶⁷⁴ CADN IMA/200/344, Le nationalisme Marocain et l’émeute de Meknès, 10 November 1937.

⁶⁷⁵ CADN IMA/200/344, Le nationalisme Marocain et l’émeute de Meknès, 10 November 1937, 5-7.

⁶⁷⁶ CADN IMA/200/344, Renseignements, 10 September 1937 and CADN IMA/200/344, Renseignements, 20 September 1937.

⁶⁷⁷ CADN IMA/200/344, Le nationalisme Marocain et l’émeute de Meknès, 10 November 1937, 20-31

disorder or accept the need to employ force and re-establish order [in Morocco] by shedding blood.”⁶⁷⁸ Whatever the political differences between the French government and the authorities of *Contrôle*, acts of overt aggression by Moroccans and settler fears comforted the legitimacy of the authorities of *Contrôle* in Morocco. Indeed, after 1937, intelligence officers no longer attempted to conceal their power.

The post-mortem report of the events leading up to the “water crisis” is a case in point. In an astounding report commissioned to identify areas of improvement in the administrative apparatus put in place to exercise *Contrôle*, intelligence officers accepted the blame for not having prevented the riots. The Meknes authorities of *Contrôle* had long been known to be understaffed and overworked, and several intelligence officers were on leave. The report noted that there were many qualified civil servants in Meknes who could have prevented the “water riots,” including the functionaries of the water division at the Public Works department, but

what are they worth without the team that is capable of analyzing and synthesizing intelligence, and ensuring the flow of information throughout [the administration]? Mayors and commissioners come and go, the city remains with its lot of quarrels, divisions, hidden levers and interests which take a long time to discern and understand... [The intelligence officer] is different. He draws his strength from an organization that will always be here. We call it [in Meknes], the *Bureau Régional*; in Rabat, it is known as the *Affaires Indigènes*...⁶⁷⁹

What is telling here is that although the French Protectorate of Morocco was endowed with an effective administration, the constant micro-managing of the authorities of *Contrôle* in civilian institutions whether French or Moroccan sapped the ability of the bureaucracy to function independently for the good of the Protectorate. Without the authorities of *Contrôle*, the report suggests, the administration of the Protectorate was disorganized, leading to breakdowns in the administration with potentially catastrophic consequences on the colonial order. Indeed, “when

⁶⁷⁸ “Emeutes de Meknès,” *La Vigie Marocaine*, 8 September 1937.

⁶⁷⁹ CADN IMA/200/344, Le nationalisme Marocain et l’émeute de Meknès, 10 November 1937, 34-35.

we work in intelligence,” wrote the intelligence officer in charge of the post-mortem, “we do it for ourselves because we love it, but we do it mainly because it is our duty to centralize that little bit of knowledge that only acquires its true value when surrounded by other knowledge and allows us to govern.”⁶⁸⁰

Contrôle did not disappear on 2 March 1956, when Morocco became independent. It seems that the methods Lyautey developed to govern directly while appearing to maintain indirect rule formed the basis of French diplomacy in France’s former Protectorates. The “study on the notion of *Contrôle*,” examined in chapter 1, offered French officials a strategy for managing the post-Protectorate era.⁶⁸¹ *Contrôle* during the Protectorate had been an effective means of directing French and Moroccan administrations, but one official believed it could be adapted to support an informal empire in North Africa and protect future French interests in Morocco. The principle remained the same: to place the right person in the right place at the right time to create the conditions necessary to provoke a particular political outcome.

It was out of the question to manage Morocco’s administration as it had been during the Protectorate. But, there were opportunities to influence it. For one, Moroccans would have to rely on French officials to train them to do the jobs that had once been the purview of the authorities of *Contrôle*, for a little while at least. For another, seamless and successful transitions depended on the French and trained Moroccans working together. “We will replace direct administration with technical assistance,” the French official noted.⁶⁸² There were plenty of

⁶⁸⁰ CADN IMA/200/344, Le nationalisme Marocain et l’émeute de Meknès, 10 November 1937, 35.

⁶⁸¹ CADN IMA/20/54-56, “Etude sur la notion, le contenu et les modalités du *Contrôle* politique dans un régime de protectorat,” 8 December 1955.

⁶⁸² CADN IMA/20/54-56, Au sujet des prérogations et tâches de la puissance protectrice dans la nouvelle conjoncture et de la protection des droits et intérêts français, 26 Novembre 1955, 1.

opportunities for the French to continue to exercise *Contrôle* in Morocco. Continuity of government in matters of, say, legal disputes in territories formerly covered by the Berber Dahir required, ironically, the kind of association that should have taken place between French and Moroccan authorities during the Protectorate as promised by the clauses in the Treaty of Fez to reform the Sultan's government.

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