Monism

David Lewis’ modal realism has two components. First, there is an ontological thesis that there is a plenitude of all possible island universes. Second, there is a reductionist thesis that modal truths reduce to truths about these island universes. My goal is to argue for the first ontological thesis in a way that does not depend on the second reductionist thesis. In particular, I will argue that there are two plausible theses about fundamentality that entail the ontological thesis. Moreover, I (...) will argue that the resulting view is particularly well-suited to satisfy a ‘rationalist’ impulse in metaphysics, according to which it is fully explicable why the world is (and indeed must be) the way it is. (shrink)

Throughout history, numerous thinkers have claimed that monism – in the form of priority monism, existence monism, monotheistic monism, or versions that posit an extra-cosmic ultimate being – theoretically surpasses pluralism, above all by positing a unified universe. This view re-emerges in recent metaphysics through what I call cosmological arguments from parsimony (CAPs) and cosmological arguments from relations (CARs). According to CAPs, monism is more ontologically parsimonious than pluralism because it posits only one fundamental entity. According to CARs, the single (...) fundamental object in monism serves as a required metaphysical explanans for how things in the universe can form certain relations with each other. I argue that this longstanding tradition of arguments spanning Neoplatonism, early and late modern philosophy, analytic philosophy, and even some Eastern traditions fails: monistic frameworks largely fail to reduce the universe’s ontological complexity as alleged, and the remaining ones fail to show any theoretical advantage over pluralism for related reasons. Drawing on the broader materialist tradition, the article also offers a positive case for several theoretical merits of pluralism and ends with a takeaway concerning how best to inquire into the universe’s unity. (shrink)

Priority monism is the view that the cosmos is the basic concrete entity on which each of its parts depend. Kovacs has recently argued that none of the classical notions of dependence could be used to spell out priority monism. I argue that four notions of dependence – namely rigid existential dependence, generic existential dependence, explanatory dependence, and generalised explanatory dependence – can indeed be used to spell out priority monism, and specify the conditions under which this is possible.

‘Substance’ (substantia, zelfstandigheid) is a key term of Spinoza’s philosophy. Like almost all of Spinoza’s philosophical vocabulary, Spinoza did not invent this term, which has a long history that can be traced back at least to Aristotle. Yet, Spinoza radicalized the traditional notion of substance and made a very powerful use of it by demonstrating – or at least attempting to demonstrate -- that there is only one, unique substance -- God (or Nature) -- and that all other things are (...) merely modes or states of God. Some of Spinoza’s readers understood these claims as committing him to the view that only God truly exists, and while this interpretation is not groundless, we will later see that this enticing and bold reading of Spinoza as an ‘acosmist’ comes at the expense of another audacious claim Spinoza advances, i.e., that God/Nature is absolutely and actually infinite. But before we reach this last conclusion, we have a long way to go. So, let me first provide an overview of our plan. In the first section of this paper we will examine Spinoza’s definitions of ‘substance’ and ‘God’ at the opening of his magnum opus, the Ethics. Following a preliminary clarification of these two terms and their relations to the other key terms defined at the beginning of the Ethics, we will briefly address the Aristotelian and Cartesian background of Spinoza’s discussion of substance. In the second section, we will study the properties of the fundamental binary relations pertaining to Spinoza’s substance: inherence, conception, and causation. The third section will be dedicated to a clarification of Spinoza’s claim that God, the unique substance, is absolutely infinite. This essential feature of Spinoza’s substance has been largely neglected in recent Anglo-American scholarship, a neglect which has brought about an unfortunate tendency to domesticate Spinoza’s metaphysics to more contemporary views. The fourth section will study the nature of Spinoza’s monism. It will discuss and criticize the interesting yet controversial views of the eminent Spinoza scholar, Martial Gueroult, about the plurality of substances in the beginning of the Ethics; address Spinoza’s claim in Letter 50 that, strictly speaking, it is improper to describe God as “one”; and, finally, evaluate Spinoza’s kind of monism against the distinction between existence and priority monism recently introduced into the contemporary philosophical literature. The fifth and final section will explain the nature, reality, and manner of existence of modes. We therefore have an ambitious plan; let’s get down to business. (shrink)

In this book I articulate a new view about fundamental reality, an alternative to the familiar opposition between monism and pluralism. On this view, what’s metaphysically fundamental is neither the universal whole nor certain subcosmic entities, but the plurality of all entities, i.e. all entities taken collectively. I call it collective allism. Using higher-order resources, I systematically develop the view and give shape to the robust realism about plurals and the unorthodox ideology of fundamentality upon which it rests. I argue (...) that collective allism is tenable and merits serious consideration in current debates about fundamental reality—it’s a worthy rival to monism and pluralism given considerations about quantum entanglement, mereological infinitism, natural laws, and relations. -/- . (shrink)

I sketch a new picture of fundamental reality, an alternative to monism and pluralism that I call collective allism. On this view, what's fundamental is neither the universal whole nor some of its parts, but all things taken collectively, i.e., the plurality of all entities. I articulate the view, defend its tenability, and argue that it deserves to be taken seriously--it's a worthy rival to monism and pluralism in current discussions about fundamental reality.

I argue in favour of a novel conception of ontological parsimony. According to this novel conception, ontological parsimony qua theoretical virtue should not be measured solely by the number of entities (or kinds of entities, or fundamental kinds of entities) posited, but also by the internal complexity of those entities. I argue for this claim via the familiar methodology of appealing to intuitions about particular cases and to observations about successful scientific methodology. I furthermore point out some implications of my (...) argument for other debates, and suggest a method for rendering parsimony qua degree of internal complexity commensurable with traditional conceptions of parsimony. (shrink)

Can three metaphysical wrongs make a right? Monism, idealism, and panentheism each sit well outside the contemporary mainstream. I argue that, suitably combined, they form a mutually supporting triad. The key move draws on a form of idealism according to which bodies are merely representational objects of mental representation. Applied to panentheism, this yields the view that everything besides God exists wholly in God as the object of a divine idea. That proposal specifies the elusive “in” relation of panentheism while (...) preventing the world’s limitations and evils from bleeding into the divine nature. In turn, panentheism supplies idealism with a single divine mind to anchor its dependence claims, and together these commitments amount to a nonmereological form of priority monism. I close by examining whether the view can distinguish actuality from mere possibility and secure genuine finite subjectivity. (shrink)

Perfect Being Theism is the idea that God is the greatest metaphysically possible being. Most theists argue that God’s greatness entails that God must be ontologically distinct from the cosmos. Otherwise, God would be dependent in some respect, and so imperfect. This constitutes a formidable challenge to pantheism, the view that God is identical with the cosmos. If pantheism is inconsistent with Perfect Being Theism, then pantheists’ concept of God is deficient. I respond by arguing that Perfect Being Theism doesn’t (...) entail God’s distinctness from the cosmos. I then argue that Perfect Being Theism is not a neutral methodological constraint on our theorizing about the divine nature. As a result, pantheists are entitled to develop an alternative conception of God’s perfection that is congenial to their view of the divine. (shrink)

I discuss a novel strategy for blocking Bradleyan regresses that utilizes grounding claims for claims of the form aRb that include themselves within the claimed grounds. Such grounding claims act as regress blockers in the sense that raising the question why aRb, given the claimed grounds that include the grounding claim itself, entails either outright inconsistency – if the grounding claim concerns full grounds for aRb – or pragmatic infelicity – if the grounding claim concerns only partial grounds for aRb.

This paper is about the relation between two venerable and revisionary metaphysical doctrines: Monism and Qualitativism. Monism says, roughly, that reality is in some sense one. Qualitativism says, roughly, that reality contains no facts about particular objects, but is rather purely qualitative. I distinguish various versions of these two doctrines, and in each case argue that proponents of the Monist doctrine should instead embrace a corresponding Qualitativist doctrine. I conclude that Monism culminates in Qualitativism.

The possibility of gunk has famously been used by Schaffer (Philos Rev 119:31-76, 2010) to argue in favour of priority monism. In this paper, we present and explore different principled ways of being a priority pluralist in gunky worlds, thus weakening, if not deflecting, the gunk threat to pluralism.

There are passages of Conway’s Principles that treat all of creation as one integrated substance, but others that treat creation as constituted by indefinitely many substances. Recent work attempts to assuage the tension between these possibilities by arguing that Conway is a priority monist about creation, while other work has pushed back on this position, holding that Conway is better interpreted as a straightforward pluralist. In defense of the priority monist reading, this paper entertains a radical thesis: that Conway’s Christ (...) is the most fundamental created substance of which all other created substances are proper parts. On this reading, Christ is identical to the whole of creation, despite Conway’s commitment to substantial distinction between Christ and creatures on the basis of their mutability. While creatures are mutable for better and worse, Christ is only mutable toward the good. Since the proposed view identifies Christ with the mereological totality of created beings, it holds that the world is perpetually increasing in goodness, though any of its parts may intermittently deteriorate. (shrink)

It has long been recognized that Sartre’s description of “being-in-itself” in the Introduction to Being and Nothingness (B&N) is reminiscent of Eleatic monism, the view traditionally attributed to Parmenides on which there is only one mind-independent entity, which is undifferentiated and atemporal. I reconstruct two arguments from premises Sartre endorses in B&N for Eleatic monism. These arguments are interesting not only because they give new life to an old reading of B&N, but also because there has recently been a revival (...) of interest in monism in analytic metaphysics. (shrink)

Priority monism is the view that the concrete cosmos is the sole substance. Recently, Martin Glazier has posed a problem for this view by arguing that the cosmos isn’t a substance as all substances are necessarily substances and the cosmos is not. In defense of priority monism, I argue that priority monists face the pressure of adopting a branching theory of modality called branching actualism to help resolve the issues raised by Glazier in a unified way. However, this could potentially (...) demonstrate just how substantial the problem that priority monism faces is. (shrink)

Is the cosmos itself conscious, and could our minds be aspects of its vast, overarching consciousness? -/- In this ambitious and original study, Khai Wager defends cosmopsychism, the view that the universe as a whole is conscious and that individual minds like ours derive from this cosmic consciousness. Wager situates cosmopsychism within what he calls the landscape of fundamental consciousness, bringing it into productive dialogue with closely related views such as panpsychism, panqualityism, and perennialism. The result is a fresh perspective (...) on one of philosophy's deepest puzzles: the nature and origin of consciousness. -/- The problem of phenomenal consciousness asks how subjective experience can emerge from non-conscious matter. Fundamental approaches reject the idea that consciousness arises from non-conscious matter, instead proposing that it is present at the most basic level of reality. Panpsychism-the most prominent such view-holds that all fundamental microphysical entities are conscious. This, however, leads to the combination problem: how do billions of micro-level minds combine to form distinct macro-level minds like ours? Cosmopsychism offers a radical alternative: rather than being formed from a combination of micro-level instances of consciousness, individual minds derive from a larger, cosmic-level consciousness. As a result, cosmopsychism sidesteps the combination problem entirely. However, a new and equally pressing challenge arises-the derivation problem: how do individual minds derive from the cosmic consciousness? -/- Through rigorous and insightful analysis, Wager argues that cosmopsychism can navigate these problems and offers a compelling alternative to both physicalism and panpsychism. As such, this first book-length treatment of cosmopsychism makes an illuminating contribution to debates about the nature of reality and our place within it. (shrink)

How should we account for the extraordinary regularity in the world? Humeans and Non-Humeans sharply disagree. According to Non-Humeans, the world behaves in an extraordinarily regular way because of certain necessary connections in nature. However, Humeans have thought that Non-Humean views are metaphysically objectionable. In particular, there are two general metaphysical principles that Humeans have found attractive that are incompatible with all existing versions of Non-Humeanism. My goal in this paper is to develop a novel version of Non-Humeanism that is (...) consistent with (and even entails) both of these general metaphysical principles. By endorsing such a view, one can have the explanatory benefits of Non-Humeanism while at the same time avoiding two of the major metaphysical objections towards Non-Humeanism. (shrink)

Priority monism is the doctrine that there is exactly one substance: the whole concrete cosmos. This paper develops an objection to priority monism. The objection is that although every substance is necessarily a substance, for the priority monist the cosmos is not necessarily a substance. It follows that the cosmos is not a substance and so priority monism is false. The priority monist's pluralist opponent, I argue, can avoid a parallel objection to her view.

This brief conclusion discusses the broad ways in which Cavendish’s and Conway’s views differ in accordance with the aims of their philosophical systems. It also discusses the importance of recovering neglected philosophers, texts, and topics to help refine and expand our understanding of seventeen-century philosophy. Finally, it suggests some new avenues of inquiry in the study of Cavendish and Conway. With respect to Cavendish, it suggests that more attention to the various genres in which she wrote and how they serve (...) different philosophical purposes might lead to a greater understanding of her views. With respect to Conway, it notes that the recent discovery of books from her lost library may provide insight into her philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter explains the ways in which Cavendish and Conway view the world as a whole and the way in which the parts of the world relate to this whole. It argues that both Cavendish and Conway are substance monists, priority monists, and existence pluralists. The claim that Cavendish might be a neutral monist is rejected due to Cavendish’s view that the figurative self-motions of the rational degree of matter just are thoughts. Thus, the fundamental substance for Cavendish is matter, (...) which includes the properties associated with minds. The chapter argues that Cavendish is committed to a type of biological holism where all of nature can be understood as a living organism with varying levels of structural and causal systems within it. Finally, the chapter shows how Conway can avoid the charge of conflating God and creatures through her unique account of emanation. (shrink)

This chapter examines Cavendish’s and Conway’s views on causation and perception. It argues that Cavendish identifies two distinct types of causation: occasional causation and substance transfer. It argues that Cavendish holds that nature is the only prime or principal cause in her system, and that occasional causes are necessary, and as part of the entire cause, sufficient for perception. The chapter argues that Conway also identifies two types of causation, mechanical and vital, and argues that Conway holds that the mind-body (...) problem is resolved by the fact that bodies are moved by resistance, which is possible because spirit comes in degrees of penetrability. Finally, the chapter explicates Conway’s views on cognition and knowledge in light of her account of causation. (shrink)

This book is an examination of the metaphysical systems of Margaret Cavendish and Anne Conway, who share many superficial similarities. By providing a detailed analysis of their views on substance, monism, self-motion, individuation, and identity over time, as well as causation, perception, and freedom, it demonstrates the interesting ways in which their accounts differ. Seeing their systems in tandem highlights the originality of each philosopher. In addition to providing the details of their metaphysical views, the book also shows how they (...) put these views to use: for Cavendish in grounding her natural philosophy and for Conway in developing her theodicy. The account of Cavendish is more naturalistic than current interpretations. It argues that God plays no substantive role in Cavendish’s philosophy. The book provides an account of Cavendish’s matter and her biological holism. It shows how sensitive and rational matter are expressed differently in different natural kinds. It provides the first account of Cavendish’s views on individuation and identity over time and a detailed account of her views on causation, arguing that nature is the only principal cause. The book also provides an account of Conway’s spiritual substance, arguing that it is a unique type of substance. It discusses Conway’s two types of motions and causation. In addition, a detailed account of her view of motion as a mode of body, and how it is transferred, is provided. Finally, the book concludes that Conway’s metaphysics and morality are inseparable and that she holds a type of perfectionism. (shrink)

This chapter explores some of the ways in which Cavendish and Conway use their metaphysical views to ground other areas of philosophical inquiry. The chapter begins with Cavendish’s objections to various aspects of natural philosophy as conceived by Thomas Hobbes, René Descartes, Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle, and Robert Hooke. It shows how Cavendish’s objections are largely based on her own metaphysical commitments, in particular her views on the nature of matter, perception, and motion. It then argues that Cavendish presents an (...) argument against the misogynistic nature of the institutions of natural philosophy. Conway’s theodicean project is then introduced, and her views on God’s justice, sin and restoration, the nature of goodness, and eternal salvation are discussed. The chapter argues that Conway’s account of how creatures turn back to goodness after sin depends not only on the communicative and multiplicative nature of goodness, but also on the attractive nature of goodness. (shrink)

This chapter explains Cavendish’s and Conway’s views about the explanation for the existence of the world and the nature of substances. It argues that Conway’s conception of God as creator is central to her philosophical system, while Cavendish’s God is credited with creating the world but plays no substantive role in her views about nature. The chapter argues that while Cavendish’s matter comes in three “degrees,” these are not degrees of matter, but of motion, from the most agile and quick (...) self-motion to the limit of inanimate matter that is merely moved. Moreover, Cavendish holds that there is only one matter, which is a homogeneous unity. With respect to the nature of Conway’s spirit, it is demonstrated that spirit is neither immaterial nor material, but a unique substance that has attributes traditionally attributed to both minds or souls and to bodies. (shrink)

This chapter explains self-motion in Cavendish and Conway. It examines how Cavendish’s views can be seen as a response to deficits in her contemporaries’ mechanical explanations of motion. It argues that Cavendish’s account of motion cannot be reduced to change of parthood relations, as Cavendish holds that some motions do not involve the addition or subtraction of matter. The limitations of the power of self-motion and its implications for the regularity of nature are explained. With respect to Conway, it is (...) shown that she holds two types of self-motion—vital and local. The chapter argues that Conway holds that the power of vital motion is the result of the essence of creatures, that motion is a mode of body, that these modes are intimately present in bodies, and that vital motion is transferable to other bodies either by the emanation of spirit or through a pressure wave. (shrink)

This chapter considers the views of Margaret Cavendish and Anne Conway on liberty and necessity. It begins with an overview of the controversies about Cavendish’s views. It then argues that there are three aspects of Cavendish’s philosophy that point to a compatibilist account of freedom: her views on causation, her account of voluntary actions, and the motions of nature. It claims that Cavendish’s views are closer to those of her contemporary, Thomas Hobbes. With respect to Conway, it explicates her libertarian (...) account of freedom for creatures and her compatibilist account of God’s freedom. It addresses two possible problems in Conway’s account: explaining why God would create creatures capable of choosing evil and how creatures directed toward the good are able to choose evil. (shrink)

This chapter examines Margaret Cavendish’s and Anne Conway’s view on the nature of individuals. It explains how Cavendish and Conway, who are both monists, explain the fact that there are multiple individuals in the world and how these individuals can be distinguished from other individuals. It argues that both Cavendish and Conway track identity over time by the ordering and arrangements of parts of individuals. For Cavendish, this involves the arrangement and ordering of all the matter of an individual from (...) birth to death. For Conway, this involves tracking the changes of ordering of the central spirit. The chapter explores each philosopher’s views on the generation, growth, and death of individuals, and their views on the unity of the mind. (shrink)

This paper seeks to bring cosmopsychism, a contemporary metaphysical position on the nature of mind and consciousness, into contact with the philosophical tradition of Hinduism. Behind this exercise lies the motivation to examine how ideas developed within this rich tradition could aid in the effort to think constructively and creatively about issues which occupy the contemporary literature on panpsychism, and in particular cosmopsychism. I argue that, within the Hindu philosophical corpus, contemporary cosmopsychism finds its most natural allies in two world-affirming (...) views: Kashmir Śaivism, and the integral Advaita of Sri Aurobindo. After discussing these views, and their affinities to cosmopsychism, I argue that one important potential contributions of such perspectives lies in the fact that they present us with a form of priority monism little developed within contemporary philosophy. I call this neglected perspective generative monism, and I offer a preliminary exposition of the view and of its explanatory potential. (shrink)

The notion of fundamentality, as it is used in metaphysics, aims to capture the idea that there is something basic or primitive in the world. This metaphysical notion is related to the vernacular use of “fundamental”, but philosophers have also put forward various technical definitions of the notion. Among the most influential of these is the definition of absolute fundamentality in terms of ontological independence or ungroundedness. Accordingly, the notion of fundamentality is often associated with these two other technical notions.

The central aim of this paper is to use a particular view about how the laws of nature govern the evolution of our universe in order to develop and evaluate the two main competing options in the metaphysics of persistence, namely endurantism and perdurantism. We begin by motivating the view that our laws of nature dictate not only qualitative facts about the future, but also which objects will instantiate which qualitative properties. We then show that both traditional doctrines in the (...) metaphysics of persistence must take on surprising further commitments in order to vindicate our universe being law-governed in this strong sense. For example, we argue that endurantists should adopt a particular version of monism, and that perdurantists should adopt a qualitativist doctrine that dispenses with all individuals at the fundamental level. (shrink)

In this paper, we evaluate some proposals that have been put forward to clarify the ontological consequences of relational quantum mechanics. We first focus on priority monism and ontic structural realism and argue that these views are not suitable for providing an ontological interpretation of the theory. Then, we discuss an alternative interpretation that we regard as more promising, based on so-called ‘metaphysical coherentism’, which we also connect to the idea of an event-based, or ‘flash’, ontology.

I give shape to a neglected debate in metaphysics, the debate over the ontological priority between individuality and collectivity. I distinguish the debate from more familiar ones in the recent literature and articulate what I call ontological collectivism, the view that collectivity is prior to individuality. I defend the in-principle intelligibility of the view from forceful general objections and argue that not only is it coherent but also of significant interest to the literature: it allows for overlooked alternatives on a (...) variety of central discussions. (shrink)

Metaphysical explanations, unlike many other kinds of explanation, are standardly thought to be insensitive to our epistemic situation and so are not evaluable by cognitive values such as salience. I consider a case study that challenges this view. Some properties are distributed over an extension. For example, the property of being polka-dotted red on white, when instantiated, is distributed over a surface. Similar properties have been put to work in a variety of explanatory tasks in recent metaphysics, including: providing an (...) analysis of change, giving to presentists truthmakers for past claims; giving to priority monists an account of basic heterogeneous entities; and giving to friends of extended simples an explanation of how an extended simple can enjoy qualitative variation. I argue that such explanations exhibit salience failure. How ought we represent the semantics of salience? Differences in linguistic stress induce semantic differences similar to the semantic differences induced in explanations by differences in salience, and I will draw an analogy with linguistic theories of focus sensitivity to sketch how one might model the role of salience in these kinds of explanations. I end with a few tentative conclusions about the role of cognitive values in metaphysical explanations. Some theorists view the citation of a ground as a sufficient explanation. If certain explanations appealing to distributed properties exhibit attenuated salience, then arguably the mere citation of a ground does not always provide an adequate explanation. (shrink)

Monism, characterized by Jonathan Schaffer as the thesis that the cosmos is the one and only basic actual concrete object, has been the subject of a great deal of recent interest. Spinoza is often taken, rightly, to be an important forebear. This article seeks to explain the distinctive content and basis of Spinoza’s monistic metaphysics and to compare it to contemporary Monism. It then argues that although Spinoza’s monistic metaphysics is not strictly a version of Monism as defined, it has (...) a number of theoretical advantages that make central aspects of it worthy of serious consideration. (shrink)

In a series papers, Jonathan Schaffer defended priority monism, the thesis that the cosmos is the only fundamental material object, on which all other objects depend. A primitive notion of dependence plays a crucial role in Schaffer’s argu- ments for priority monism. The goal of this paper is to scrutinize this notion and also to shed new light on what is at stake in the debate. I present three familiar arguments for priority monism and point out that each relies on (...) a connecting principle that ties dependence to other metaphysical relations. I then argue for two desiderata: the relation between dependence and other metaphysical relations needs to be strong enough to establish that other metaphysical relations are relevant to the direction of dependence but not so strong as to leave no room for revisionary versions of priority monism. I propose a particular way of meeting these desiderata, according to which the target notion of dependence is graded rather than all-or-nothing. One upshot is that we should be less preoccupied with priority monism itself and should instead focus on specific aspects of a broader monistic worldview. (shrink)

I argue that Schaffer fails to provide a non-question-begging argument for priority monism. Despite his suggestion to the contrary, Humean pluralists need not, and plausibly do not, endorse his tiling constraint on metaphysically basic objects. Moreover, the distinction between supervenience—of the sort at issue in Humean doctrine—and metaphysical necessitation—of the sort at issue in Schaffer’s tiling constraint—points toward an alternative treatment of the phenomena initially inspiring Schafferian monism. There is an important possibility, one that Humeans can or should embrace, that (...) Schaffer overlooks when drawing his monistic conclusion. (shrink)

In this paper I look at a recent proposal from Yujin Nagasawa and Khai Wager to avoid the de-combination problem for the view called ‘cosmopsychism’. The pair suggest that the de-combination problem can be solved in the same way that the problem of heterogeneity for Schaffer’s priority monism can be solved. I suggest that this is not the case. They are not the same problem and the solutions to the heterogeneity problem do not work for the de-combination problem.

This is a contribution to Paavo Pylkkänen's Festschrift. I discuss his relationship to Bohm's philosophy and a sense of holism that can be extracted from the Bohmian view.

Analytic Philosophy, Volume 63, Issue 1, Page 44-61, March 2022.

Priority monism is roughly the view that the universe is the only fundamental object, that is, a concrete object that does not depend on any other concrete object. Schaffer, the main advocate of PM, claims that PM is compatible with dependence having two different directions: from parts to wholes for subcosmic wholes, and from whole to parts for the cosmic whole. Recently it has been argued that this position is untenable. Given plausible assumptions about dependence, PM entails that dependence has (...) only one direction, it always goes from wholes to parts. One such plausible assumption is a principle of Isolation. I argue that, given all extant accounts of dependence on the market, PM entails No Isolation. The argument depends upon a particular feature of the dependence relation, namely, necessitation and its direction. In the light of this, I contend that the argument is important, insofar as it suggests that we should distinguish dependence from other cognate notions, e.g. grounding. Once this distinction is made, I suggest we should also distinguish between two different notions of fundamentality that might turn out to be not-coextensive. (shrink)

A simple argument proposes a direct link between realism about quantum mechanics and one kind of metaphysical holism: if elementary quantum theory is at least approximately true, then there are entangled systems with intrinsic whole states for which the intrinsic properties and spatiotemporal arrangements of salient subsystem parts do not suffice. Initially, the proposal is compelling: we can find variations on such reasoning throughout influential discussions of entanglement. Upon further consideration, though, this simple argument proves a bit too simple. To (...) get such metaphysically robust consequences out, we need to put more than minimal realism in. This paper offers a diagnosis: our simple argument seems so compelling thanks to an equivocation. The predictions of textbook quantum theory already resonate with familiar holistic slogans; for realists, then, any underlying reality, conforming to such predictions, also counts as holistic in some sense or other, if only by association. Such associated holism, though, does not establish the sort of specific, robust supervenience failure claimed by our simple argument. While it may be natural to slide to this stronger conclusion, facilitating the slide is not minimal realism per se but an additional explanatory assumption about how and why reality behaves in accordance with our theory: roughly, quantum theory accurately captures patterns in the features and behaviors of physical reality because some underlying metaphysical structure constrains reality to exhibit these patterns. Along with the diagnosis comes a recommendation: we can and should understand one traditional disagreement about the metaphysics of entanglement as another manifestation of a familiar and more general conflict between reductive and non-reductive conceptions of metaphysical theorizing. Such reframing makes clearer what resources reductionists have for resisting the simple argument’s challenge from quantum holism. It also has an important moral for their opponents. Traditional focus on whole-part supervenience failure distracts from a root disagreement about metaphysical structure and its role in our theorizing. Non-reductionists fond of our simple argument would be better off tackling this root directly. (shrink)

This paper explores a PSR-connected trail leading from theistic idealism to a form of substance monism. In particular, I argue that the same style of argument available for a Leibnizian form of metaphysical idealism actually leads beyond idealism to something closer to Spinozistic monism. This path begins with a set of theological commitments about the nature and perfection of God that were widely shared among leading early modern philosophers. From these commitments, there arises an interesting case for metaphysical idealism, roughly (...) the thesis that only minds and mind-dependent states actually exist. However, I contend, that same theistic reasoning also leads to an idealist form of substance monism, the view that God is the only actual substance and that almost everything else is merely an intentional object in God’s mind. (shrink)

Existence monism (EM) is a metaphysical view asserting the existence of only one concrete object. EM is well known for its radicalness, and encounters difficulty in terms of its prima facie inconsistency with truisms. This paper aims to propose an alternative (and somewhat easy) way to overcome this difficulty and indicate another means by which the possibility of EM can be defended. I will present a package of theses that are intended to be combined with EM, which I call Linguistic (...) Ontology with the One as Semantic Glue (LOOSG). I will show that this package (in combination with EM) provides a systematic explanation as to why truisms hold while only one concrete object actually exists. In other words, I will argue that if an existence monist embraces LOOSG, the desired explanation for truisms is then available to her. In addition, it will also be noted that LOOSG has a theoretical virtue, in that it only presupposes the framework of standard semantics. Based on these discussions, I offer LOOSG as a viable option for existence monism. (shrink)

For early modern metaphysician Anne Conway, the world comprises creatures. In some sense, Conway is a monist about creatures: all creatures are one. Yet, as Jessica Gordon-Roth has astutely pointed out, that monism can be understood in very different ways. One might read Conway as an ‘existence pluralist’: creatures are all composed of the same type of substance, but many substances exist. Alternatively, one might read Conway as an ‘existence monist’: there is only one created substance. Gordon-Roth has done the (...) scholarship a great favor by illuminating these issues in Conway. However, this article takes issue with Gordon-Roth's further view that Conway ‘oscillates’ between the extremes of existence pluralism and monism. In its place, I argue we should read Conway as a priority monist: the whole of creation is ontologically prior to its parts. (shrink)

This collection of papers centres around a novel approach to the problem of phenomenal consciousness called cosmopsychism. A simple version of cosmopsychism says that the cosmos as a whole is conscious. In this collection, I focus on a comparison between arguably the most promising versions of cosmopsychism and panpsychism, called constitutive cosmopsychism and constitutive panpsychism, respectively. -/- The first paper, ‘A Blueprint for Cosmopsychism’ offers a blueprint for a cosmopsychist approach, comparing it to the panpsychist approach. It highlights how following (...) the blueprint allows one to sidestep the most serious of panpsychism’s problems, the combination problem, while also avoiding the problem of infinite decomposition. However, it notes that the approach must address a serious problem of its own in the derivation problem. -/- The second paper, ‘Beyond Panpsychism and Cosmopsychism? Focuses’ on two related views that reject subjects of experience at the fundamental level, thus avoiding the subject aspects of the combination and derivation problems. Albahari’s perennialism is touted as the natural successor to cosmopsychism; avoiding its subject derivation problem while maintaining a cosmic consciousness. Meanwhile, Coleman’s panqualityism is touted as a natural successor to panpsychism; avoiding its combination problem while maintaining that phenomenality is present at the level of microphysical ultimates. However, I show both views seem to face problems equal in measure to those they seek to avoid. -/- The third paper, ‘The Subject Problem for Panpsychism and Cosmopsychism’ targets the hardest problems for constitutive panpsychism and constitutive cosmopsychism; the subject combination problem and the subject derivation problem, respectively. I show that the two problems are almost identical, both hinging on the entailment of what I call synchronous perspectives scenarios. I formulate broad arguments from metaphysical impossibility and epistemic implausibility against both views, based on such scenarios. However, I provide a possible model of how to understand synchronous perspective scenarios unproblematically. I also provide several alternative responses. -/- The fourth, and final, paper in the collection provides an account of, and motivation for, a version of cosmopsychism I call CRP cosmopsychism. This version of cosmopsychism is created on the priority cosmopsychism blueprint and has three further key commitments: simple panpsychism, priority monism and Russellian monism. The paper motivates each of these commitments both in isolation and in partnership, before responding to each of the derivation problems; the subject derivation problem, the quality derivation problem and the structure derivation problem. Furthermore, I argue that cosmopsychism should be preferred over panpsychism owing to considerations concerning internal relations. (shrink)

Monism is a metaphysical view according to which there is only one fundamental object. This paper will explore monism within the context of truthmaker theory, or Truthmaker Monism, a view rarely discussed in literature. Although few truthmaker theorists defend monism, at least explicitly, some theories seem to share the spirit of monism to some extent. Interestingly, they are proposed as solutions for the same problem, called the problem of negative truth. A close examination will show that while each of these (...) solutions can account for the problem, they are unsatisfactory for different reasons. This paper will suggest a novel solution to the problem of negative truth which preserves the advantages of existing solutions while avoiding the difficulties with which they are faced. (shrink)

Discussion of atomistic and monistic theses about abstract reality.

Monism is roughly the view that there is only one fundamental entity. One of the most powerful argument in its favor comes from quantum mechanics. Extant discussions of quantum monism are framed independently of any interpretation of the quantum theory. In contrast, this paper argues that matters of interpretation play a crucial role when assessing the viability of monism in the quantum realm. I consider four different interpretations: modal interpretations, Bohmian mechanics, many worlds interpretations, and wavefunction realism. In particular, I (...) extensively argue for the following claim: several interpretations of QM do not support monism at a more serious scrutiny, or do so only with further problematic assumptions, or even support different versions of it. (shrink)

I will defend two claims. First, Schaffer's priority monism is in tension with many research programs in quantum gravity. Second, priority monism can be modified into a view more amenable to this physics. The first claim is grounded in the fact that promising approaches to quantum gravity such as loop quantum gravity or string theory deny the fundamental reality of spacetime. Since fundamental spacetime plays an important role in Schaffer's priority monism by being identified with the fundamental structure, namely the (...) cosmos, the disappearance of spacetime in these views might undermine classical priority monism. My second claim is that priority monism can avoid this issue with two moves: first, in dropping one of its core assumptions, namely that the fundamental structure is spatio-temporal, second, by identifying the connection between the non-spatio-temporal structure and the derivative spatio-temporal structure with mereological composition. (shrink)