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Capture of Acqua Gap

Capture of Acqua Gap
Part of the Battle of Keren of the East African campaign (World War II)

The British Indian troops positioned in Eritrea during the Battle of Acqua Gap, February 1941
Date7 February – 14 February 1941
Location
Acqua Gap, modern day Eritrea
15°46′36″N 38°27′4″E / 15.77667°N 38.45111°E / 15.77667; 38.45111
Result Italian victory[1][2][3][4]
Territorial
changes
Acqua Gap, and Brig's Peak remained under Italian control[5]
Belligerents
Kingdom of Italy
Commanders and leaders
Units involved
5th Infantry Division
4th Infantry Division
Casualties and losses
  • 300 killed[6]
  • 120 wounded
  • 20 missing

Capture of Acqua Gap (February 1941) also known as the Battle of Acqua Gap[a][7] was fought between the Royal Italian Army and Royal British Army in the Col of Acqua Gap during the Battle of Keren. The British and Indian troops advanced upon Acqua Gap but were repelled twice by the Italians. Richhpal Ram the commander of the Rajputana Rifles was killed in the battle and was awarded with the Victoria Cross. The last attempt was made by the 29th Infantry Division on 13 February but they were repelled, the Anglo–Indian troops finally decided to withdraw and retreated from Acqua Gap on 14 February 1941.[8]

Order of Battle

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Italian Royal Army : [9][10]

  • 52nd Colonial Battalio
  • 9th Colonial Battalion
  • 1 Battery, 81 mm mortars

British Royal Army:

Background

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Keren

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The advance of Platt's forces into Eritrea

Keren was not fortified but it is surrounded on most sides by a jumble of steep granite mountains and sharp ridges which gave the defending forces on the high ground a distinct advantage. Control of the mountains provided the Italian artillery with perfect observation of an attack. The narrow Dongolaas Gorge at 15°45′34″N 38°25′16.8″E / 15.75944°N 38.421333°E / 15.75944; 38.421333 (Dongolaas Gorge) through which the road and railway from Agordat to Keren passed was dominated on the south eastern side by the massif of Mount Zeban and Mount Falestoh on which stood the imposing defences of Fort Dologorodoc at 15°45′14.9″N 38°25′30.6″E / 15.754139°N 38.425167°E / 15.754139; 38.425167 (Fort Dologorodoc). The other side of the gorge was commanded by the mass of Mount Sanchil with a saddle of secondary summits, Brig's Peak, Hog's Back and Flat Top stretching north-westwards toward Mount Sammana. In front of the Sanchil feature on its south western side was a secondary ridge, feature 1616, which became known as Cameron Ridge, overlooking the Ascidera Valley and the railway line.[11]

Northern front

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The 5th Indian Infantry Division began to arrive in Sudan in early September 1940 and the Indian Division was placed on the Red Sea coast to protect Port Sudan, the 9th Indian Infantry Brigade south-west of Kassala and the 10th Indian Infantry Brigade (William Slim) were sent to Gedaref with the divisional headquarters, to block an Italian attack on Khartoum from Goz Regeb to Gallabat, on a front of 320 km (200 mi). Gazelle Force (Colonel Frank Messervy) was formed on 16 October, as a mobile unit to raid Italian territory and delay an Italian advance. Late on 30 January, Gazelle Force was ordered to pursue the Italians retreating down the road to Keren. [12]

As the British approached Keren, Brigadier-General Nicolangelo Carnimeo, commander of the 2nd Eritrean Division and the X Territorial Defence Command, drew in the 5th Colonial Brigade and 44th Colonial Brigade from positions to the north. The 42nd Colonial Brigade had reached Keren from Agordat almost intact and the 2nd Colonial Brigade, which had suffered greater casualties there, was reforming. The 11th Regiment of the Savoia Grenadiers and the Alpini Battalion of the 10th Savoia Grenadiers had just arrived after a three-day non-stop truck journey from Addis Ababa while the 11th Colonial Brigade was also in place, having been called from reserve in Addis Ababa. The 6th Brigade, having relinquished its responsibilities at Metemma, was also making its way to Keren.[13]

Battle

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First attempt to capture Acqua Gap

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All attempts to destroy the Italian defences have so far resulted in a failure. The efforts to find an alternate route towards Keren also failed. The main route towards Keren was efficiently blocked by the Italians, hence there was only one option left for the British and the Indians was to capture Acqua Gap a Col between Mount Falestoh and Zelale.[14] Mounts Falestoh and Zelale, both of which are excellent defensive sites for either side. The Italian occupation force in the Acqua Gap included two Colonial battalions with very low morale due to numerous desertions prior to beginning operations. Therefore, the plan was to take Acqua Gap by surprise and then reinforcements would follow through towards Keren. The 5th Indian Division was assigned the mission.[15]

The 4th Indian Division aimed to seize the Acqua Gap during the night between February 7 and February 8. After they captured Acqua, the Indian commander would decide whether to move toward Keren or cut the Keren-Asmara Route.[16] There was a large expectation that a surprise would occur and that the low confidence of the Italians would be an important factor to help achieve that surprise. The 12th Infantry Division was ordered to support the 5th Indian Infantry Brigade's operation. The 12th Indian Division was ordered to execute indirect fire against the Italians on 7 February to 8 February, success that occurred from that attack.

For this operation, the 5th Infantry Division was assigned the following units, 4th Sikh infantry, one anti-aircraft battery and 12 Field Company RIE. The operation consisted of three phases, In phase one, the Brigade Group was scheduled to begin concentrating at Pt. 1260 on 7 February; in phase two, 4 Indians were to seize the Acqua Gap; and in phase three, other units were to advance to the rear of 4 Rajputana Rifles and not interfere with the battle.[17]

On Feb 7, the charging march of D, G, B, H.Q., A Company from Pt. 1260 began at 1800. After the companies of the battalion, there were the 12 Field Companies of Sappers and Miners whose mission was to prepare a track over the Aquas Gap once it was taken. 4 Rajputana Rifles reported ready at 1930 at the bottom of the gorge. D Coy proceeded directly to his objective without encountering resistance. The position was not reassuring.[18] Meanwhile other Regiments experienced stiff resistance from the Italians. Subedar Richpal Ram displayed exceptional bravery while leading the assault. Despite facing very heavy mortar, hand grenade and machine gun fire, two platoons persevered until around midnight when they took their objective; Pt. 1565. During this phase all the Bty; G Bt'y Companies had a tremendous number of casualties. Above able to survive IV counters lame out of their encirclement from Italy were forced off the capture Acqua Gap. B Company was also forced to retreat from the Acqua Gap.[19][20]

On 8 February the Headquarters of 4th Infantry Division informed the 11th Infantry Division about the failure of the 5th Infantry Division to capture and secure Acqua Gap. The commander of the brigade didn't wished to have more casualties and hence the plan for another offensive was cancelled after this setback.[21]

On the 5th Infantry Division front 4 Rajputana Rifles was directed to hold Rajputana Ridge, with the rest of the brigade defending the lower reaches of the valley. In the valley, the 5th Infantry Division was in a precarious place as the entirety of the area and all lines to their rear were controlled by the Italian positions spread around the brigade.[22] While the Italians were unable to capture the vehicles through due to their own roadblocks, they could have caused considerable embarrassment for the Indian units had they demonstrated any initiative or made even a minimal threat to the Indian communication system. As it was, aside from artillery and air action, no threat developed whatsoever. The surprise assault on the on Acqua Gap also proved to be unsuccessful. The Commander of the 5th Infantry Division suggested that that a surprise assault with the current resources would not be not enough to defeat the Italians.[23][24][25]

Attack on Brig's Peak

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The 1/6 Rajputana Rifles B company was given orders to proceed and moved to occupy Hog's Back in the afternoon at 1710 hours. This would allow for to be concentrated at the left feature of Brig's Peak.[26] There were four signal lines laid during the assault but only one of these reached its destination. The remaining lines were destroyed by artillery fire, hence no communication could be established between 1630-1730 hours while communication lines were destroyed.[27][28]

At 11:00 PM on February 11th, the Italians launched a large counter-attack through a gap in the lines between the two Battalion positions. All communications with the rear were lost, including the wireless which had been damaged by Italian artillery fire so it was not possible to get artillery support. A Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Punjab Regiment had to withdraw to the Battalion Headquarters by 2:00 AM on February 12th AT and about 400 Italians were able to infiltrate into the Battalion Headquarters' area.[29] The attack continued and at 2:30 AM on February 12thAT, 3/1 Punjab was driven from Brig's Peak. B Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Rajputana Rifles who were on Hog's Back, were ordered to hold and were told to be prepared to counter-attack. The casualty figures for 3/1 Punjab were 11 killed and 40 wounded. On 12 February the 1/6th Rajputana Rifles were ordered to retreat because of strong Italian positions and Brig's Peak was lost to the Italians.[30]

Strategy for the second assault on Acqua Gap

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The Indian 5th Division was assigned command of the operations to capture Acqua Gap on 12 February. The 29th Infantry Division of the 5th Infantry Division was to advance on Acqua Gap on 12 February, the objective was to attempt capture Acqua Gap once again in order for the 29th Infantry Division to pass through the Acqua Gap and capture Keren.[31]

The Brigade Major made some slight changes to the Gazelle Force plan: while 4/6 Rajputana Rifles are still to conduct the assault from Rajputana Ridge to secure Pt 1565, 4 Sikh is now to be concentrated to attack the Acqua Gap and the Lower Slopes of Mount Zemale, on receipt of an order from Brigade Headquarters between 0645 and 0700 hours. The assault by 4 Sikh will continue regardless of the results of the 4/6 Rajputana Rifles. Both battalions consist of 3 companies each.[32]

The 11th Indian Infantry Brigade faced a counter attack at Brig's Peak from Italians at dawn on 11 February. The brigade retreated back to their original positions after the attack. The Britishers informed the Indians of the current state of affairs and that they still had to follow through with their plan of attack on Acqua Gap; furthermore, they would not have the aid of 2 Mahratta light infantry because that unit was being held for use as a divisional reserve in the Airborne Division.[32]

Failed attack on Acqua Gap

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Brigade Headquarters directed 4/11 Sikh to consider obtaining the support of artillery in support of an attack with all four available guns; the battalion believed this type of operation would succeed. 4/11 Sikh proposed commencing the operation at 1400 hours to provide enough time for it to get all its men together and prepared. However, due to the attack previously not being successful, the Commander of the 4th Indian Division cancelled the operation at 1120 hours. 4/11 Sikh was instructed to remain in position until dark, and once dark fall, to withdraw from position.[33] Rajputana Rifles and Sikhs were also forced to retreat. The loss of personnel sustained by the battalion of 4/11 Sikh were nine killed, eighty-four wounded, and nine missing; the loss of personnel sustained by 4/6 Rajputana Rifles was thirty-seven killed, one hundred seventy-six wounded, and four missing.[34]

The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was located around the Acqua Gap area to take advantage of its position and advance toward Keren. They took casualties from enemy artillery while moving along the main road, and on the evening of February 12 they had returned to the area of km 110, where they spend the night before leaving by truck for Barentu on the morning of February 13.[35] On the evening of 13-14 February, it was recommended that Gazelle Force and the 5th Indian Infantry Brigade withdraw from Acqua Gap. 13 February passed without incident, but at 19.00 hours Italian forces opened up heavy artillery fire as it appeared they were preparing for a counter-attack on Gazelle and C companies. However, there was no counter-attack, and the fire ceased approximately an hour later. The 5th Indian Infantry Brigade and Gazelle Force had completed their withdrawal by 01.00 hours on 14 February with no losses. The two brigades consolidated in the vicinity of 110 kilometres.[36]

Aftermath

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Platt decided to pause, regroup and train before making a further attempt at Keren. To release road transport to bring forward supplies for a new attack, the 5th Indian Infantry Division returned to Kessala where it could be maintained by the railhead for a period of intensive training until preparations were complete and the division could be brought forward again for the offensive. Skinners Horse and most of the Motor Machine Gun companies assembled in front of Arressa and Adi Ugri to pose a threat to the Italian line of reinforcement to Keren.[37] From the north, Briggsforce, comprising two battalions from the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier Harold Briggs) of the 4th Indian Infantry Division and two Free French battalions.[38]

The 4th Indian Infantry Division (Major-General Noel Beresford-Peirse) concentrated on the Sanchil side of the gorge and the 5th Indian Infantry Division (Major-General Lewis Heath) brought forward from Kessala once again, on the Happy Valley side. The Keren defences had been reinforced with the arrival of 6th Colonial Brigade from Metemma and also the 11th Blackshirt Battalion of the Savoia Grenadiers. The defenders now totalled 25,000 facing an attacking force which had grown to more than 13,000.[38] Beresford-Pierce was to attack with the 11th Indian Brigade, expanded to five battalions, against the peaks of the Sanchil mass and 5th Brigade against Mount Sammana on the left of his front. On the 5th Division front, the Italian reinforcements on Dologorodoc meant Happy Valley was dominated by the defenders and the attackers' artillery had had to be withdrawn from their forward positions in the valley to safer locations.[38][39]

See also

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Notes

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  1. Italian : Battaglia di Acqua Gap

References

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  1. Sandhu 1981, p. 106–107.
  2. Battistelli 2024, p. 50–52.
  3. Prasad 1963, p. 58–70.
  4. Jewel & Clancey, p. 58–71.
  5. Prasad 1963, p. 71.
  6. Battistelli 2024, p. 52.
  7. "Invasion of Italian East Africa". WW2DB. Retrieved 2026-05-21.
  8. "This Day in the War in Europe: The Beginning". Aircraft of World War II - WW2Aircraft.net Forums. 2014-08-27. Retrieved 2026-05-21.
  9. Barker 1966.
  10. Nafziger 2012a, 941IBAA.
  11. Mackenzie 1951, p. 53.
  12. Prasad 1963, p. 160.
  13. TAC 1942, pp. 37–38.
  14. Jewel & Clancey, p. 58.
  15. Prasad 1963, p. 58–59.
  16. Jewel & Clancey, p. 59.
  17. Prasad 1963, p. 59–60.
  18. Prasad 1963, p. 60–61.
  19. Jewel & Clancey, p. 60.
  20. Prasad 1963, p. 61.
  21. Prasad 1963, p. 61–62.
  22. Jewel & Clancey, p. 62.
  23. Prasad 1963, p. 62.
  24. Prasad 1963, p. 63.
  25. Jewel & Clancey, p. 63.
  26. "Invasion of Italian East Africa". WW2DB. Retrieved 2026-05-21.
  27. Prasad 1963, p. 65.
  28. Jewel & Clancey, p. 65.
  29. Jewel & Clancey, p. 66.
  30. Prasad 1963, p. 66.
  31. Prasad 1963, p. 67.
  32. 1 2 Prasad 1963, p. 68.
  33. Jewel & Clancey, p. 70.
  34. Prasad 1963, p. 69–70.
  35. Jewel & Clancey, p. 71.
  36. Prasad 1963, p. 70–71.
  37. TAC 1942, p. 42.
  38. 1 2 3 Mackenzie 1951, p. 56.
  39. Brett-James 1951, §4.

Sources

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