



# Carnival

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Journal of the International Students of History  
Association



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Assistant Editor   **Kristina Stojšić, ISHA Rijeka**  
Publisher            **International Students of History Association**  
Printing              **Studio HS Internet d.o.o.**  
                            Kolodvorska 139  
                            31 000 Osijek, Croatia  
Distribution         **ISHA Osijek**  
Circulation          **150 copies**

Carnival is a publication of the International Students of History Association (ISHA), an international, academic, non-profit, independent organization of students and graduates interested in history and related sciences. ISHA offers and co-ordinates various means of co-operation among students from different countries and backgrounds that are interested in historical science and related academic disciplines.

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## Carnival XIV

### 2012

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<sup>1</sup> Special thanks go to ISHA Kent, generation 2013/14, for their hard work on final proofreading of this edition. Per their request, they are credited like this.

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**Editorial**

“We are what we repeatedly do, excellence then is not an act but a habit”

(Aristotle)

Dear reader,

Taking this job as editor-in-chief of Carnival was relatively easy but the editing part which I did with my fellow colleague Kristina Stojšić was challenging but in the end I think that both of us can say that it was a remarkable experience that we will never forget. This volume, no. 14, is particularly special because it has something that the previous volumes of Carnival did not have and it represents how the future volumes should look, or to be more precise, how they should be edited. The most important thing a serious journal cannot be edited and published without is the reviewing and proofreading process all done of course by the people who are experts in that area. Our long term goal is to set up a valuable student journal of history that will be recognized and known throughout Europe and other parts of the world for its excellent articles, reviewers and proofreaders. We have formed new standards of writing for Carnival with the unique citation system and any student who wishes to write for Carnival must only write by these rules. The range of topics in the articles is truly big and we have tried a different topic selection process by offering the interested students two topics from the seminars, and a free topic which resulted in quality articles. Students had the chance to write articles from their favourite areas of history that they prefer the most. Among other special characteristics of editing this volume of Carnival, I can say that we have one article which is very different from others, but in a positive way, and it is written in French, so this will be the first time that an article in the French language has been published in this journal, which can only prove that this truly is an international journal. The future for this journal looks bright, the next editor-in-chief of Carnival has brought up some interesting ideas and I am sure that they will be realized in time. According to the quotation above,

excellence is not coincidental, nor some imaginary esoteric thing, its very real and possible for everyone. We can truly say that starting from this volume we will have a better journal of history from year to year. To the future editors we wish good luck and don't give up on your dreams, because a person without dreams is like the night sky without stars.

Yours sincerely,

Dubravko Aladić

Editor-in-chief, 2011-2012

**A word from the president**

Utrecht, The Netherlands

Dear reader

It is a pleasure to be able to write this ‘word from the president’ for the 2012 edition of Carnival. As I am well aware of the hard work that is needed to produce this journal I want to start thanking everyone who was involved in completing the publication!

We had many good times in 2011-2012, but also some disappointments. The disappointments mainly had to do with the bigger picture of economic difficulties not just in the history departments, or art faculties, or universities, or cities or countries, but just throughout Europe in general. There were some projects with our partners that did not get funding this year.

Unfortunately also ISHA-events seem to suffer from the economic recession that hangs over Europe. It was more difficult in some cases to get funds for activities for enthusiastic history students from universities, cities and other institutions. This is, for example, why the summer seminar that was planned in Rome could not take place. It took a while before there was a replacement found for the summer. When we thought we could not find another venue, ISHA-Bucharest came to the rescue and was able to fill this gap with another wonderful seminar in Romania.

There were also positive times, the ISHA year 2011-2012 started for example in beautiful Turku in the autumn, and 2012 was welcomed warmly in Belgrade. April brought us to Jena, Germany where the annual conference took place. This interdisciplinary meeting was also a great success as we talked about ‘Identities in transition’. You will, of course, find some reflections on this in the

published articles in this Carnival. As mentioned above the summer was spent again in Bucharest, so thanks to all the organizing sections!

Next to the ‘normal’ events, our section in Zagreb was able to welcome a group of students from the Balkan region for a regional seminar in October 2011. The main language for once was not English and as the only non-Balkan person, I definitely saw the positive points to start learning some of the languages of the region. At the conference in Jena there was also another language present, there was the possibility to present in French in some workshops. So ISHA was in transition this year as well!

I wish you a pleasant time reading all the articles that were written by all these students of history, and I hope you’ll be inspired to submit your own work in a future edition of Carnival.

On behalf of the International Board 2011-2012 – Jernej Kotar, Sanna Hellstedt and Marjolein Vos

Viva ISHA!

Stephanie Bakker

President of ISHA 2011-2012

# **Roman-Sasanian Conflict in the Third Century**

## **Campaigns of Shapur I and the Battle of Edessa**

**Dubravko Aladić**

*Osijek*

*Since the founding of the Sasanian Empire in 224 A.D., Persians were beginning to attack first the Roman territory and, unlike Parthians, Sasanians claimed their right on what is now Syria and the whole Levant because they wanted their empire to have the borders like the Achaemenian Empire did hundreds of years before. During the whole time of the Sassanian Empire, the shahanshah (king of kings) never stopped trying to fulfill this goal. Because of the Sassanian persistency, the Roman-Sassanian conflict lasted until one of the two empires collapsed. In the third century, after the death of the founder of the Sassanian Empire, Ardashir I, the next ruler was Shapur I and he had only one thought on his mind regarding wars and conquering new lands: how to defeat and crush the Roman Empire. In this article, we will see how one of Shapur's campaigns progressed: the situation in Armenia – the main reason for conflict between Rome and Persia, and how Shapur's campaign led Romans to one of their biggest defeats in history.*

Keywords: Shapur I, Valerian, Armenia, Christianity

### **Introduction: Shapur I and the Sassanian military power**

The battle of Hormuz 226 A.D. marked the end of the unstable Parthian Empire under Artabanus, and the start of the new Sassanian Empire under the rule of Ardashir I. He managed to conquer most of the provinces with the capital Ctesiphont from the former Parthian Empire, except for the

eastern provinces with center in Balkh and Armenia, under the Arsacid king Chosroes (Sykes, 1915: 426). Soon after the consolidation of the newly founded Sassanian Empire, Ardashir I started a war with the Roman Empire which his co-regent and successor Shapur I inherited. He continued to attack Anatolia, Syria and Lebanon because the goal of every Sassanian ruler was to restore the kingdom to its borders from the time of the Achaemenids.

Wanting to ensure a safe succession, Ardashir named his son Shapur I a co-regent during his lifetime. He did this because he had two other sons who had been given governorships, and worried that they might have wanted to assume the throne, just as he did in his youth. This system is very characteristic of the Sassanians, where sons were sent to different provinces to rule and when the ruler died, one of the heirs would assume the throne. In this system there is always a danger of dynastic squabbling. At first, the preceding king elected his successor, later on the nobility and zoroastrian priests. Shapur I accompanied his father in battle, which made him ready for battle and in fact ensured his success in wars against Rome (Daryaee, 2012: 189).

The Roman Emperor Gordian III invaded Mesopotamia in 243 A.D. to reconquer lands that had been taken by Ardashir and his son. The decisive battle occurred next year at Misikhe (close to the Euphrates River) where Gordian's army was crushed and the Emperor was killed, according to some sources, by the hand of Shapur himself. The Persian king of kings later renamed Misikhe to Peroz Shapur (Victorious is Shabuhr). Consequently Phillip the Arab was forced to sign a treaty which ceded Armenia and Mesopotamia to the Sassanians and he agreed to pay reparations amounting to 500 000 denarii (Potter, 2004: 236).

Shapur I commemorated his victory in a rock relief at Naqsh-e Rostam which shows him subjugating the two Roman Emperors. The king of kings made the first long testament of the Sassanians, and demonstrated their outlook in an epic narrative. In his *res gestae* he provides

information on his religious conviction, lineage and the areas he ruled over. What is particularly interesting is that Shapur I writes, in the aforementioned inscriptions, how the Caesar (Gordian III) lied. To put the matter in the Zoroastrian context, the Romans were the incarnation of lies and disorder and the Persians were representatives of truth and order (Daryaee, 2009: 30).

Among other things, in the peace treaty which Phillip the Arab signed, he agreed not to aid Armenians against Shapur because the Arsacid king of Armenia was still an enemy of the Sassanian Empire. The Arsacid king of Armenia, Khosrow, was assassinated by order of the Sassanian king of kings, but the son of the Armenian king, Tiridates, fled to Roman territory which was the cause of the next war between the Persians and Romans (Yahrshater, 2000: 201).

The second campaign of Shapur began in 252 A.D. and the next year the Roman army, which had 60,000 soldiers, was defeated by the Sassanians at Barbalissos. After the victory, Shapur started besieging Antioch, the third largest Roman city, but a nobleman from Antioch named Mariades surrendered the city to the Sassanians. After the capture of Antioch, Sassanians occupied numerous cities along their way, which were, among others: Cyrhus, Seleucia, Alexandretta, Nicopolis, Sinzara, Chamath, Ariste, Batna, Satala, Domana and Artangil. The Sassanian army split in two parts and continued to raid neighbouring cities and, at the end, they again captured Dura Europos, an important Roman city. After that, Shapur consolidated his empire's position and returned back to Ctesiphont, rather than trying to gain a vast territorial expansion at Roman expense (Edwell, 2007: 191).

The Sassanian Empire had a great strategic problem which was created out of waging a war on two fronts (Turks to the East and Romans to the West). So they created a highly mobile and professional cavalry, which became the main reason for Sassanian rising success in fighting with Romans. Heavily armoured cavalymen (Savaran) were the one thing that Romans feared the

most, according to Libianus: "...a Roman would prefer to suffer any fate rather than look a Persian in the face..." In almost every battle the Sassanians had with the Romans, the Savaran cavalry was present and they proved to be Rome's equal (Farrokh, 2005: 5).

The Savarans were an elite cavalry, and therefore, to be a Savaran was considered a great honor. There were three general categories which encompassed the Persian elite cavalry. First of them were members of the seven top families: House of Sassan, Aspahbad, Karin, Suren, Spandiyadh, Mihran and Guiw. The second category was comprised of the *Azadan* (upper nobility), they were descendants of the original Aryan clans that had been settled in the Near East since the times of the Medes or earlier. They formed the core of Savaran. The third category was comprised of the lower nobility, *Dehkans*. The most famous of the Savaran were the *Zhayedan* (Immortals) who numbered 10 000 men and were led by a commander bearing a title *Varthragh Nighan Kvadhay*. They were the direct emulation of the similar unit in Achaemenid Persia. Their task was to secure any breakthrough and they were often held in reserve, entering the battle at crucial stages. The other Savaran prestige unit was the royal guard or Pushtighban (cca. 1000 men), led by a commander Pushtighban-Salar, and the cavalrymen who particularly distinguished themselves for bravery in battle were incorporated into the Gyan-avspar (those who sacrifice their live) also colloquially known as the Peshmerga (Farrokh, 2005: 8).

### **Civil war in the Roman Empire and the crowning of Valerian as Emperor**

The middle of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century A.D. was very turbulent for the Roman Empire, because of the civil war that was raging throughout the state. When the Emperor Gordian III died in battle, his successor Phillip the Arab negotiated peace with the Sassanian king of kings Shapur I. The Romans payed 500 000 denarii as a ransom to assure the safe return of the remnants of the Roman army who were captured by the Sassanians, and allowed Armenia to come in the Sassanian sphere of interest (Farrokh, 2006: 187). Shortly afterwards, Phillip moved to Danube to confront Gothic

princellings who were raiding through Dacia and Oescus during the year of 244, but despite Phillip's victories, the Gothic princellings called *Carpi* were repulsed in the summer of 246 over the Danube (Bowman, Garnsey, Rathbone, 2008: 37).

But the sole fact that the defences of Dacia had been breached, and that the south-eastern defences of the region were weakened, gave the Goths and their allies another chance to raid the provinces. Early in the summer of 248, the Goths started raiding Moesia and Carpi, the province of Dacia. Prior to the start of the barbaric raids, there was a rebellion under the leadership of Claudius Marinus Pacatianus, who was quickly overthrown by his own troops. Emperor Phillip the Arab sent C. Messius Quintus Decius to Moesia and Dacia. He was given special command over all Panonian and Moesian provinces, which enabled him to restore order after the Pacatian's revolt and to expel the barbarian raiders. He was so successful that his troops proclaimed him Emperor. Soon Decius and Phillip the Arab met with their armies at Verona in September of 249, where Philip was defeated and killed (Bowman, Garnsey, Rathbone, 2008: 38).

The Roman civil war encouraged the Carpi to start their raids on southern Dacia again. They received Gothic help again, but the Goths posed a much bigger threat than before with a capable leader named Cniva. While the Carpi were attacking Dacia, eastern Moesia Superior and western Moesia Inferior, the Goths invaded Central Moesia Inferior, but Cniva was repelled from the city of Novae by the provincial governor (future Emperor) Trebonianus Gallus. Cniva then changed his plan and started to press southwards to besiege Nicopolis. In the meantime, Emperor Decius moved first towards the Danube to expell the Carpi, and then further south to pursue the Goths who were moving towards Thracian Philippopolis that was besieged by a second Gothic army (Bowman, Garnsey, Rathbone, 2008: 39).

While Decius was resting north-east of Philippopolis at Beroea, he was suddenly attacked by Cniva. The Romans were badly defeated and Decius withdrew to Oescus. The city of Philippopolis, under the command of Lucius Priscus, had already been surrendered to the Goths. Decius' defeat in Thrace was the cause of trouble in Rome, where Iulius Valens Licinianus started a rebellion, and another rebellion also started on the Rhine. Although the rebellions were crushed by the Emperor's liutenants, there was a loss of confidence in the Emperor's military capability. On top of that, he started to persecute the Christians, which angered a lot of Roman citizens. The Goths, under the command of Cniva, decided to let the winter pass before any future raidings, but Decius was marching along the Danube, and started a battle with the Goths at Abrittus. During the battle he decided that it was the right time to join in, but he was on unfavourable ground and he was soon killed along with his son (Bowman, Garnsey, Rathbone, 2008: 39).

The troops had to proclaim a new Emperor once more, and this time Trebonianus Gallus, a governor of Moesia, was elected in 251. Right after the proclamation he concluded a peace treaty with the Goths who agreed to leave the empire, but under a condition that they retain their captives and plunder, and receive an annual subsidy. After reaching the agreement with the Goths, Trebonianus Gallus left for Rome. Until the end of his reign, he had not left Rome, which gave him a reputation of a sloth. The main reason for staying in Rome is the plague that was ravaging the city. Neglecting the frontiers caused the aggression of Rome's enemies; therefore the Emperor was not so popular among his troops anymore. In 251, Shapur I annexed Armenia, conquered Dura Europos, Nisibis, Circessium and Antioch, but thanks to the self-proclaimed ruler of town Emesa, Sampsigeramus, and the nobleman of Palmyra, Odenathus, Parthians were suppressed (Bowman, Garnsey, Rathbone, 2008: 41).

Although the Goths were expelled from Roman territory, they kept the territory of Dobrudia. Roman forces were frustrated by Gallus' continued absence and so, in the early summer of 253, M.

Aemilius Aemilianus, as governor of Moesia, took command and attacked the Goths. As a consequence, he was hailed as an Emperor by his troops. Aemilian's march on Rome in 253 encouraged Cniva to renew hostilities, where the Goths had penetrated as far as Macedonia. Trebonianus Gallus, realizing that Aemilian is near Rome, called a senior Senator P. Licinius Valerianus to bring troops from the Transalpine frontier, but Aemilianus was quicker and right before the clash, Trebonian was killed by his own troops who went over to Aemilian. In September of 253, at Spolegium, the troops of Aemilianus met with Valerian's troops but, as was the case before, Aemilian was killed by his own troops who joined Valerian and recognized him as the Emperor (Bowman, Garnsey, Rathbone, 2008: 42).

## Rule of Emperor Valerian

### Situation in Armenia in the middle of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century



After Ardashir defeated and killed Artabanus, the last ruler of the Parthian Empire, the fate of Armenia was very uncertain because the Arsacids (Parthian royal family) ruled over Armenia, the arch enemies of the newly founded Sassanian Empire. According to the treaty that Romans and Parthians signed over a century before, the Armenian king should be from the ruling family of the Parthian Empire, but he will be crowned in Rome. Armenia was the buffer between the two superpowers and it was important to both sides because of its strategic position and economic power (de Morgan, 1918: 123).

The hostile situation between the Arsacids in Armenia and Sassanians in Persia drove Armenia closer to Rome, subjugating the kingdom to Sassanian attacks and later conquests. Armenian king Tiridat II stayed firmly behind his beliefs and kept the ancient Armenian religion. Given the fact that the Kingdom of Armenia was formed of kinsmen of the Iranian Parthian royal house, who turned into its avengers, the war between Ardashir and Tiridat II was actually a blood feud (Hovannisian, 1997: 71).

After overthrowing the Parthian Empire, the Armenians gave sanctuary to the children of the deposed king Artabanus. By this act, Ardashir, who was greeted as the restorer of ancient religion and language of the Persians in 229 A.D., attacked Armenia. Tiridat II resisted and, after he was aided by the Medes and some Caucasian tribes, repulsed the invaders. After this defeat, Ardashir raised his territorial claims so that, if fulfilled, they would match the territory of the former Achaemenid empire (Kurkjian, 1958: 110).

In 232, to aid his client kingdom, Roman Emperor Alexander Severus sent in a great army to the eastern frontier which was joined by the Armenians and some of the northern tribes. The main army marched towards Mesopotamia; the second army marched into Chaldea and the third through Armenia towards Atropatene. The main army was stopped in Mesopotamia by the large Sassanian

army commanded by the king of kings. Tiridat's Armenians and the northern tribesmen were forced to retreat from Media to Armenia. Other parts of the army managed to withstand the pressure, thanks to the insubordination of some of Ardashir's troops. The Sassanian ruler managed to hold his discontented troops together and the battle was inconclusive, although Alexander Severus celebrated a triumph in Rome. Ardashir was now greatly weakened and the Roman Emperor managed to save Armenia, so the Armenian king, in exchange for their protection, sent Armenian auxiliaries to the Roman Emperor to return their due for freeing them from the Sassanian invasion, the Armenian auxiliaries served in the war against the German tribes (Kurkjian, 1958. 110).

Armenia was under Roman influence until Ardashir's successor, Shapur I, came. He renewed the attack and caused the Armenian king Tiridates II to flee, and ordered that Zoroastrianism be universally introduced into the country. A Roman ally, the king of Palmyra, also attacked Shapur I, which enabled the Romans to reestablish their influence in Armenia, and to crown Tiridat as the rightful king of Armenia. Tiridat soon fell into a Sassanid trap which the king of kings himself, Shapur I, who eventually killed the young Armenian king, laid for him (Aslan, 1918: 28).

In 238, Shapur I continued the warfare and captured Nisibis, and the Sassanians advanced as far as Antioch. Timesitheus, father-in-law of the Roman Emperor Gordian III repulsed Sassanian forces and started advancing, but Timesitheus soon died and the army had to wait for the arrival of the Roman Emperor Gordian III. In 243, at the battle of Misikhe, the Roman army suffered a heavy loss and the Roman Emperor himself was murdered. His successor was proclaimed Phillip the Arab who signed a peace treaty with the Sassanians which obliged him not to intervene in Armenia, to pay 500 000 denarii and to cede Armenia and Mesopotamia. With this final act of Phillip the Arab, Armenia was handed to the Sassanid Empire (Kurkjian, 1958: 111).

The life of Tiridat's son, who was also named Tiridat, was saved and he escaped to Roman territory. So, although Armenia fell under the domination of the Sassanian king of kings and remained there until the third fall of Ctesiphon 283 A.D., the rightful heir to the Armenian throne was in Roman hands (Aslan, 1918: 29).

### **Reign of Emperor Valerian**

The new Roman Emperor was about sixty years old when he came to power. The person of Valerian was unusual for that time period, because he came from an old Roman senatorial family. After he was proclaimed Emperor by his troops, the senate was very pleased to ratify the position of Valerian and they also accepted his son and colleague, P. Licinius Gallienus, as Augustus (Eutropius, 1853: 7).

At first, Valerian had a reputation for maintaining friendly relations with the Christians. Great Christian centres of Rome, Carthage and Alexandria were quickly recovered. At Carthage, Bishop Cyprian returned in 251 A.D. He had dealt very well with the problems regarding his authority, which were getting bigger, because one group of Christians claimed that the confessor had the right to forgive sins. Nevertheless, after this polished performance by one Christian high priest, a new persecution occurred. Unlike from the times of Emperor Decius, who had made no attempt to confiscate the goods of the church, in this persecution this was the primary aim. The cause of the persecution was in Egypt, where the synagogue of Egyptian magicians was in confrontation with the Christians. Unfortunately for the Christians, the head of the synagogue was Macrianus, a very powerful man in the Roman Empire, so even though the synagogue was accused of infanticide, Emperor Valerian was convinced by Macrianus that Christians should be persecuted (Mitchell, Young, 2006: 515)

The aim of the persecution was to completely destroy the Church, financially and socially, by confiscating its considerable property and by preventing the leadership from functioning. Christian services were forbidden, and Christian places of worship impounded. There was good reason for these new tactics. In the previous thirty years, the social structure of the Church in Rome had been changing. No longer were they ‘the dregs of the population’, but now *matronae* (‘wives of the aristocracy or near-aristocracy’) and the influential *Caesariani* (‘imperial freedmen’) were among its numbers. Furthermore, catacombs, the burial places of retainers of the leading houses in Rome, were passing into Christian hands, and the authorities were faced with a difficult obstacle to overcome (Mitchell, Young, 2006: 516).

In 257 A.D., Emperor Valerian issued an edict proclaiming the Christian religion and its Church illegal, and therefore, the convicted Christians should be exiled or condemned. The sole edict consisted of four instructions: the leaders of the Christian community were to be immediately seized. Secondly, without resorting to rigorous measures, the magistrates were to compel these members of the Christian hierarchy to give homage to the gods of Rome without requiring them to renounce their faith. Thirdly, in case of persistent refusal to perform acts of worship to the pagan deities, send them into exile and fourth, to warn Christians that the holding of any assemblies or even entering the cemetery will be punished by death (Healy, 1905: 136).

Soon after the news of the Sassanian invasion on Antioch got to Rome, Emperor Valerian marched personally to that area, and in the meantime, he issued a second edict saying bishops, priests and deacons should be put to death; that senators and men of high rank of Rome be degraded and deprived of their possessions, and if they persist on being Christians, they should be sentenced to death. Shortly afterwards, every single citizen of the Roman Empire who was a Christian was sentenced to death. One of the most notable martyrs of the Valerian persecution was Bishop Cyprian (Healy, 1905: 169).

These two edicts were more severe in the West than in the East. Fortunately for the Christian population and the stability of the Roman Empire, the edicts were very soon abolished after the ruler in Rome changed. The new Emperor Gallienus declared freedom of worship by his decree, and restored some of the lost properties of the Church (Mitchell, Young, 2006: 516).

### **Battle of Edessa**

The Roman Emperor organized another Roman army to restore Roman frontiers in the East soon after ascending the throne. The rapid success of Shapur's ambition insulted and scared Rome. Valerian flattered himself that the combat expertise of his lieutenants would be

A cameo showing an equestrian combat of Shapur I and Valerian in which the Roman emperor is seized



sufficient in providing safety of the Rhine and of the Danube; but he resolved, notwithstanding his advanced age, to march in person to the defence of the Euphrates. During his progress through Asia Minor, the naval enterprises of the Goths were suspended, and the afflicted province enjoyed a transient and fallacious calm (Gibbon, 1804: 294).

The Romans were keen to destroy Shapur I, his army and empire. Antioch was cleared of Sassanian troops by the end of 256 A.D. This tempted Roman Emperor Valerian to launch a full scale assault because he wanted to strike his own coins upon the victory which was premature, due to the fact that the Roman army had confronted the Sassanians with their second-rate garrison troops. Shapur I had conserved his cavalry and his main army. The Sassanian army was deployed to Carrhae and Edessa. Valerian also deployed his entire army to Edessa which was a fault region ideal for cavalry attacks. Exactly in the same region, Crassus suffered a defeat from Parthian cavalry. Again, Savarans defeated the Romans and captured 70,000 troops around 260 A.D., and,

as an interesting and important captive, among others was the sole Emperor Valerian (Farrokh, 2006: 189).

After his capture, the fate of Emperor Valerian was uncertain. According to *Epitome de Cesaribus*, Valerian was taken to one of the provinces of Mesopotamia where he lived and after many years died in servitude (Victor, 2009: 33). Christian historians of that age, like Lactantius, write that Valerian received the punishment from God for persecuting and killing a large amount of Christians. Lactantius is even crueler with the narrative about how Valerian ended his life, mentioning that he was used as a human stepstool for the king of kings so that he could get on his horse and when Valerian died, his skin was stripped from the flesh and placed in the temple of fire (Fletcher, 1871: 168).

While the Roman Emperor Valerian was in captivity, Odaenathus, the ruler of Palmyrene kingdom gathered an army and attacked the Sassanians in Mesopotamia. He came very close to the Sassanian capital Ctesiphont and managed to capture the treasure and the concubines of Shapur I, who was surprised by the sudden attack, but he managed to assemble an army of *Savaran's* and drive back the Palmyrene ruler and Roman ally. After this withdrawal, the Sassanians stopped waging war with the Romans for a longer period of time (Magie, 1932: 7).

No other person in the world could have claimed the murder of one Roman Emperor, making another a tributary and capturing and imprisoning the third. Shapur was very much aware of his achievement and he mentioned his heroism in his inscription. The borders of Rome and Persia were uncertain between Mesopotamia, Armenia and Syria. They depended on the military success of either side, but travelling was not restricted. On the contrary, people from both sides travelled from one side to another engaged in trade. This ease of movement made espionage a very useful

business and supplying information to the enemy was seen as a great betrayal by both sides (Daryae, 2012: 190).

### **Conclusion**

The third century was a very turbulent period for the Roman Empire. In less than 9 years, five Emperors ruled, until Valerian came to power. Except for the power struggle that was usual in Rome, one religious sect was emerging 200 years after the Romans heard of it for the first time. But, unlike other religions, the Roman pantheon did not absorb the traits of Christian culture and religion. Unlike the Roman polytheistic religion, which accepted almost every god from every conquered nation, Christianity was conservative in that form. It had faith in only one God which was outrageous for the common Romans at the beginning. In the third century, wealthy noble families started converting to Christianity which made the Roman Emperor upset so he started bloody persecutions. Another kingdom that was vital for the stability in Southeast Asia was the Armenian kingdom under the Arsacid dynasty which was overthrown by the Sassanids. Raising tensions and open wars between two kingdoms did not stop the Armenians preserving their independent kingdom. After the Sassanian dynasty came to power in Iran, they almost immediately started waging wars with the Romans. They wanted to restore the ancient borders of the glorious Achaemenid Empire. Although the Sassanians proved to be much stronger adversaries than the Parthians, the border changed very little on a large scale plan, and the Romans and the Persians were fighting an endless war without a winner.

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## Warrior society: The Aztecs

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*Warfare and cults had great impact in shaping cultures and histories in almost every corner of the world. Mesoamerica was not an exception. This part of the world hosted many different cultures with various cults, religions and ideologies, as well as different types of warfare. Some things, however, almost every major group in the Valley of Mexico had in common. The most important is their constant struggle for resources, especially luxurious ones, since they were very limited, while being one of the most important markers of social status. The Aztecs, who rose to major power in the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> century, were also determined by their lack of nutritional resources, as well as luxury ones. Situated on the island in Lake Texcoco, they had little choice but to rely on their strength and political manipulation to overcome their neighbours, establish imperial hegemony and gain access to natural resources. Apocalyptic cults and religion, which were a very important part of their culture, were used by Spanish conquerors to explain the nature of their warfare and to present Aztecs as bloodthirsty barbarians who were driven by their extreme religion to make massive human sacrifices just to please their demonic gods. Even though religion did play an important part in almost every part of Aztec culture, this explanation can only be partial and cannot form a clear picture of warfare for such a developed civilisation. Warfare, rituals and political control were complex and inseparable fundamental parts of their empire, culture and even everyday life.*

Keywords: The Aztecs, Warfare, Political control, Human sacrifice and rituals

**Introduction: Social and political structure of the Aztec Empire**

The Aztecs founded their city of Tenochtitlan in 1325 in the Valley of Mexico, on one of two islands of Lake Texcoco. These island locations had good conditions for raising crops. The very nature of the islands also offered them very good protection against an invasion. However, over time, they built the sinister city of Tlateloco on the second island and both of them grew tremendously, becoming the two most populated cities in Mesoamerica (Somervill, 2010: 26-27). As a consequence, they were not able to produce enough food to support such increasing population from the fields available on the islands and fish from the lake. In later stages of the empire, especially in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, Tenochtitlan relied entirely on tributes and food from its subjects off the basin around the lake<sup>2</sup> (McLynn, 2009:180-181). The greater a society's dependence on the others, the weaker it is. Because the access to essential external resources cannot be guaranteed, polities expand their domination to bring resource-producing areas within the polity, thus making the costs and benefits of various actions predictable. Such was the nature of the Aztec emergence. From subjects of Tepanecs they arose as leaders of the Triple – alliance.<sup>3</sup> Their lack of domestic resources, a vast population, no stable major neighbour power and a religion that supported war, determined them as an imperialistic and warrior society. Imperialism, in which expansion is seen as a natural consequence of power, differences between polities, rather than arising from a particular social structure, became one of the main focuses of Aztecs during the 15<sup>th</sup> and the 16<sup>th</sup> century. According to this view, imperialism springs from the existence of competing national sovereignties that expand in relation to their relative power. However, the resources that polities expand to control are culturally determined: some, such as cotton and obsidian, are material improvements, if not necessities, but others, such as cacao and quetzal feathers, are materially nonessential though often highly valued (Hassig, 1992a:2-6). The Aztecs, for example, were very keen to obtain quetzal feathers from conquered cities. They demanded

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<sup>2</sup> This proved to be Tenochtitlan's greatest weakness, which was later exploited by Hernan Cortes during his conquest.

<sup>3</sup> Tenochtitlan, Texcoco and Tlacopan joined together 1428 in the so called Triple Alliance and became the new centre of power in Mesoamerica. It is also referred to just as The Aztec Empire.

feathers from twenty-two provinces out of thirty of their empire, as part of their regular tribute. Other important tributes were in cotton cloaks, tropical fruit, cacao and honey (Tuerenhout, 2005: 89).

The Aztec rise gave the nobility more economic stability in the form of greater tributary wealth, but it also led to increased political instability, because of the way the Aztecs organized their empire. The Aztecs were faced with two alternative ways to structure their expanding realm. One was to conquer new areas and consolidate their hold by replacing local aristocracy and armies with Aztec governors and garrisons. This would allow the Aztecs to extract large quantities of goods in tribute, but at a high administrative cost in maintaining governors and troops to enforce their mandates. The alternative was to leave the conquered government intact, reducing the empire's political and administrative costs. This approach would limit the amount the Aztecs could extract as tribute, because paying tribute would rely on some degree of voluntary compliance. The first approach, creating a territorial empire, provided greater political control and more tribute, but it limited expansion because exercising direct control quickly absorbed the available manpower in garrison duty. Even though the Aztecs were the largest Mesoamerican group, they were still too feeble to hold a large territorial empire long term. The second approach, creating a hegemonic empire, collected less tribute because it exerted less control, but it freed more men which allowed for further expansion. Faced with this choice, the Aztecs adopted the second alternative (Hassig, 2006: 27-29). Merchants, known as *pochteca*, and tax collectors, known as *calpixtli*, were usually the only Aztec presence among the conquered. Recurrent bloody, punitive expeditions prevented disaffected subjects from challenging Aztec sovereignty or failing to supply the demanded tribute. On the peak of power, the Aztec empire constituted a massive agglomeration of 38 provinces, embracing a range of cultural and linguistic traditions (Russell, 2010: 12).

A great weakness of this approach and system was the need for the constant display of power. The embodiment of power in the empire is a king or an emperor, or in the Aztec case *tlatonai*.<sup>4</sup> The state was an elective monarchy, where *tlatonais*, elected by warriors or priests of high nobility, was connected with the late ruler. He was an image of the gods, the connection between people and their divine sovereigns. The will of the gods was imposed through him, while he was “the first speaker” of mankind in front of them. He did not possess the absolute power and a divine sovereignty given by birth, but was chosen only to “represent” his people. As a consequence, he could have been deposed in the case where the Aztecs felt they had lost their divine favour<sup>5</sup>. It was imperative for the new *tlatonai* to be a strong ruler and an effective warlord. In the case of a weak *tlatonai*, the entire system would be endangered (Cravetto, 2008: 266). The inauguration ceremony of a new *tlatonai*, besides numerous other things that served to awe spectators, required human sacrifices of prisoners taken in battle by *tlatonai* himself. Through this he would prove himself worthy of being an image of the gods, but most importantly to show his military skill and capability of winning battles (Tuerenhout, 2005: 154). Aztec rulers had to distinguish themselves furthermore in warfare, as commanders, in order to fulfil their religious, social, and economic duties. A great *tlatonai* conquered many towns, which increased rich tributary payments to the royal and capital storehouses, as well as displayed necessary power which kept peace and stability in areas already conquered (Carrasco, 2012: 45). New wealth largely accrued to the *tlatonai*, lessened his dependence on the commoners for either goods or political support. On the other hand, these circumstances provided great economic stability for the nobility as well. This led the *tlatonai* into a position where he was greatly supported by the nobility as long as he was able to accumulate new tributes. The *tlatonai*'s military prowess was not simply a matter of ideology or honour: if a weak leader became king, the perception of power could dissipate, and with it, the hegemonic empire. Failure struck directly at the interests of the nobility, undermining their support

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<sup>4</sup> Tlatonai – *eng.* speaker, the first speaker before the gods... It was the ruling title of Aztecs and had almost the same meaning as king or emperor. He was the head of the theocratic state of the Aztec.

<sup>5</sup> This would only happen if *tlatonai* lost several wars and was incompetent.

for the *tlatonai* and even threatening his physical safety. Consequently, both wealth and self-preservation were incentives for the *tlatonai* to avoid defeat (Hassig, 1992b: 86).

The Aztecs had a very definite social structure and classes. They had three social classes – nobility, commoners and slaves. The nobility, *pipiltin*, were the upper class of Aztec society, while the commoners were a part of *macehualli*. People were born into one of those two classes and could only rarely change their status from commoner to nobility or vice versa. Slaves, on the other hand, were not born, rather one became a slave. Anyone could become a slave through war, breaking the law or simply selling themselves into slavery. The social rules for professions were even more rigid. Children of goldsmiths became goldsmiths, farmers' children were farmers, and scribes' sons were scribes, and so on. All young men trained for the military. Success in life mostly came out of a successful military career, but could also be achieved by various special talents. War was the primal media for social mobility and was favoured by commoners as such (Somervill, 2010: 73-75).

### **Military**

From their birth, all male Aztecs were sworn to military service, regardless of their social status. Early education was conducted by their fathers, especially among commoners, while the nobility could send their sons to school earlier, at the age of seven or eight. Noble girls had their own separate schools, while common ones were educated by their mothers. *Telpochalli*<sup>6</sup>, local schools for commoners, were usually led by veteran warriors. The boys learned trade skills, received proper military training and were introduced to laws and how to be “good citizens”. On the other hand, *calmecac* were temple schools led by priests. While being mainly intended for nobility, commoner children could also attend these schools at the age of 15 if they were really talented in a specific area of study. Students at these schools learned how to be leaders, managers and generals.

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<sup>6</sup> Telpochalli - *eng.* youth house

This school also provided training for the priesthood, which was available to every social class (Somervill, 2010: 104-106). In each school, children were prepared for war and hard labour, or great responsibility in both warfare and management, depending on their status. Gladiator rituals during festivals at the end of the war season were the first introduction to actual violence of war for young boys. They were also encouraged to participate in mock combat competing as teams, both *telpochalli* and *calmecac*, against one another for various rewards. Veteran warriors taught the young to use all kinds of basic weapons, such as slings, bows, arrows and spears. Talented and promising students soon advanced to training in the use of the sword and shield (Pohl, Hook, 2001: 14).

Boys that had proven themselves both physically and mentally to their school masters were recommended for recruitment. War was a way of life for Aztecs. Warriors went to war with joy and honour. Courage, strength and fearlessness in the face of the enemy were qualities greatly admired among Aztecs. The Aztec military had no permanent soldiers, but it did have professional officers. Every healthy male at the age of 17 and older was expected to fight whenever he was called upon (Somervill, 2010: 76-77). Through military soldiers had plenty of opportunities to show their individual skills and be rewarded for it. Achievement in the Aztec Imperial army was dependent upon the number of captives that one took in battle. However, not every captive was worth the same. The value of a captive was decided upon the status he held among his own people, as well as the reputation of his people. For example, Huastecs were frowned upon as unworthy captives because their military skills were not highly esteemed. Capturing one of the Huastecs did not bring rich rewards or particularly high honour, unless he was one of the princes or a member of high nobility. On the other hand, one who had captured a Tlaxcalan warrior was highly revered (Pohl, Hook, 2001: 15). Even Hernan Cortes described Tlaxcalans as fierce warriors in his letters. He also mentioned other tribes and peoples who would run away in fear from the battlefield at first sound of gunfire, unlike the Tlaxcalans who fought to the bitter end against superior firepower.

They were also mortal enemies of the Aztecs, the only relevant independent force that would prove to be one of the most important wheels in Cortes' conquests machine. Thus, capturing a worthy opponent like the Tlaxcalan earned a promotion for an Aztec.

Depending upon the number of captives, Aztec warriors earned different garments and uniforms. Unlike usual practice, where uniforms were used to distinguish between units, Aztec uniforms were used to differentiate men within the same unit, depending on experience, achievements and rank. The display of lavish uniforms of veterans must have been a tremendous symbol of pride and courage. It is interesting to acknowledge that members of the same unit were usually from the same town district, and must have been related as well. This type of unit organisation served to boost morale and encourage youth in the presence of familiar veterans, as well as giving veterans an obligation to protect the less experienced ones in direct combat.<sup>7</sup> Regarding garments, a soldier who had captured two of the enemy on the battlefield was entitled to wear *cuextecatli*<sup>8</sup>, the outfit which consisted of a tight-fitting doublet woven of cotton with red, yellow or blue feathers sewn in. In case of a soldier that captured three opponents, the reward was a long cloak with a back ornament shaped as a butterfly. Furthermore, soldiers that managed to capture four of the enemy became members of the jaguar military order, and received the jaguar suit and helmet, while those who captured five of the enemy became members of the eagle military order, receiving a green feather *tlahuiztli* and a back ornament called *xopilli*.<sup>9</sup> There was a similar practice with civil garments, soldiers and officers were also entitled to wear a distinctive cloak that was ornamented in such a way that a soldier could be recognised by his achievements. However, the highest reward for a common soldier was when he managed to capture six or more of the enemy. Then he would be able to decide about his future, having the choice of becoming a military commander or a

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<sup>7</sup> New recruits usually served as servants of veterans; a similar practice to squires and knights in Europe, while veterans had a duty in protecting them until they became experienced enough.

<sup>8</sup> A trophy uniform derived from the military dress of the Huastecs in commemoration of their defeat under Montezuma I.

<sup>9</sup> Meaning "the claw"

member of *cuahchique*<sup>10</sup>, the elite order of the Aztec Imperial army (Pohl, Hook, 2001: 21-22). In addition to new uniforms, ornaments and garments, warriors painted their faces in colours according to their accomplishments and number of captives (Hassig, 1988: 41). All uniforms and garments were recognised as luxury goods, and as such were very rare. Only the royal palace was able to manufacture these goods, because only the royal wives and princesses were trained to produce luxury goods. Consequently, the power and influence of the *tlatonai* was determined by the amount of luxury goods his palace could produce and how much he could obtain as tribute from subjected royal palaces. The *tlatonai* was the only one who could promote his subjects by bestowing luxury goods upon them, thus promoting their social status. Each year, a ceremony was held, where the *tlatonai* would present goods to seasoned warriors for their achievements. This system made elite warriors dependant on the crown, removing them from their commanders and consequently reducing the power of nobility. On the other hand, war became the best media for social mobility, glory and wealth. Princes and commoners alike were battle-hungry, supporting constant war that raged through the entire period of the Aztec Empire. As we can see, everything depended on the success of military campaigns, from the income of luxury goods to social mobility and support for leaders, as well as religious satisfaction. As such, war can be recognised as the fundamental part of the Aztec warrior state and society (Pohl, Hook, 2001: 24, Hassig, 1990: 23 Hassig, 2006: 29).

A new recruit had to capture a captive to be considered a true warrior. This capture had to be conducted by the recruit himself, without help from the others. If a recruit failed to capture anyone in three battles, he would be called a *cuexpalchicacpol*<sup>11</sup>. Furthermore, if he continued to be unsuccessful, his status would be made very obvious for all to see: his head would be pasted with feathers. Those who could not get captives, even with the help of others, had the crown of

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<sup>10</sup> They were "the berserkers", ones sworn to eternal combat with highest honours. They wore their hair bound in a tassel with a red ribbon and had specially ornamented shields.

<sup>11</sup> Cuexpalchicacpol – *eng.* youth with a baby's lock

their head shaven as an ultimate symbol of shame (Hassig, 1988: 36). A warrior was considered a veteran after taking four captives. At this point he was the leader of the smallest tactical unit, which consisted of about five soldiers, usually recruits. These were grouped into squads of about twenty men, and larger units of a few hundred, each with their own commander. As already mentioned, these units were organised on a ward basis and had their own battle standards. Furthermore, these wards were organised by cities with its banner, while an entire army marched under the standard of the *tlatonai*. The largest unit usually consisted of 8,000 men<sup>12</sup> and was self-sufficient, resulting in each unit having its own general and even a different movement path. Aztec allied states and subjects followed the same pattern. To avoid complications in the chain of command, the Aztec *tlatonai* had supreme power over the entire army and had to lead it personally. The chain of command was very important and it relied on a meritocratic system, but with significant influence of heritage. It usually favoured Aztecs over allies, and nobles over commoners, but personal achievements were most important (Hassig, 1992a: 145). Only the four highest commanding offices were restricted for nobles, while commoners could attain low to middle ranking command (Pohl, Hook, 2001: 30).

### **Warfare**

According to Tuerenhout (2005: 170-172), there were different types of warfare in Mesoamerica during the Aztecs reign. Coronation wars were conducted usually shortly after a new *tlatonai* came to power. The basic reason for this type of war was for the *tlatonai* to show his prowess in defeating rebellious subjects or conquering new provinces. This was necessary in order to keep their taxes and tribute income, while setting an example for other potential unrests. Wars with neighbouring cultures were fought in two different ways. The first kind, called the war of attrition, involved bloody battles with the intention of subjugating or even destroying the enemy. These were common imperialistic wars with the goal of extending the empire's borders and tribute

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<sup>12</sup> Larger forces were composed of multiples of this number

regions or to weaken powerful neighbours like Tlaxcalans and Tarascans. The second kind, “flower wars”, were fought mainly for the purpose of obtaining captives for sacrifice. Although they had major religious implications, the political ones were also very important. This kind of war was usually inflicted upon enemies that were too strong to be conquered by direct assault.<sup>13</sup> While the immediate purpose of a “flower war” was to take sacrificial captives, the ultimate goal was as in any war: the obliteration of the opposition and conquest. This was achieved through individual combat of the elites, displaying combat skills and intimidating the opposite side<sup>14</sup>. A “flower war” could last for years, with repeated battles that would slowly drain elite manpower from both sides. Since the Aztecs were numerous, even if the casualties were equal, eventually they would prevail by exhausting the enemy’s manpower potential<sup>15</sup>.

Even though war was one of the most important things for Aztecs, it was dictated by several factors. The very nature of warfare in Mesoamerica is highly determined by geography, and in the Aztec case with a lack of transport technology. Mustering troops, negotiating mass movements, and supplying logistical support were patterned by the rainy season, which determined when troops could be successfully mobilized and where they could march.<sup>16</sup> The commoners, who made up most of the army, were also farmers, and as such were occupied during the summer and early autumn. Food for such an enterprise as war was only available after the harvest. That is a period of dry weather as well, when movement would be a lot easier since the Aztecs did not have stone roads for military purposes. All of this resulted in the fact that the military campaign period was from December to April (Hassig, 2006: 29-30). A lack of roads, as well as big animals and wheeled carts, made projecting a big army of Aztecs into distant territories a very demanding task, as well as one that greatly reduced the movement range of the army, speed and overall

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<sup>13</sup> Or if the cost of conquest would be too high. Aztecs were very careful in taking risks that could endanger their hegemonic empire.

<sup>14</sup> Defeated individuals were taken in captivity and sacrificed.

<sup>15</sup> Without strong elites to lead, commoners would usually surrender without a fight.

<sup>16</sup> Usually from May to September

effectiveness. They moved slowly, with the average of about one and a half miles per hour, or twelve miles per day. Since they lacked proper military roads, they could march only in one straight line of 8,000 men. To speed up their movement, they used many different routes, one for each unit. Only at the destination would they all gather together during one day. Since the entire army did not move together, it made them potentially exposed for ambushes and surprise attacks on separate units. This is the reason why every unit of 8,000 men had to be self-sufficient and be able to fight and hold the line until other units on different routes could come to aid. This strategy also reduced the chance an enemy had to gather up information about the entire Aztec army, their numbers and routes. Furthermore, this also made it impossible for defenders to try to defend their city at particular choke points in the hills or swamps, since they never knew from which side a new army could emerge and surround them (Hassig, 1988: 56, Hassig, 2006: 29-30, Pohl, Hooker, 2001: 26-29). The military campaign was greatly determined by matters of supply as well. Even though an individual soldier took some supplies, most were brought by accompanying porters who carried two *arrobas*.<sup>17</sup> Although the porters were numerous, their ratio to warriors could be one to two at best. During a normal day, the average consumption of an adult male was around 1kg, meaning that an army could carry only eight days of supplies. Because of this, the combat radius of the Aztec army was only thirty-six miles: three days of getting there, one day of fighting, one day of recuperating and three days of returning. Since this was not even nearly enough for Aztecs to expand on a larger portion, they adopted the tributary system. Through this, they demanded supply from subjected towns *en route*; messengers were sent along military routes two days ahead to alert all tributary towns, so they could prepare demanded supplies (Hassig, 1990: 20). Tributary towns gathered food supplies on their own and from their subjected villages around. No looting, pillaging or taking in force was permitted for Aztecs on their campaign, unless some town refused

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<sup>17</sup> Something like a basket that could take around 12 kg of supplies.

to provide the demanded tribute<sup>18</sup>. Also, Aztecs were usually reasonable in their demands, since they did not want to have a serious impact on their economy (Pohl, Hook, 2001: 28). In long terms this has proven to be a very effective system, since it multiplied the combat radius of the Aztecs, while not becoming over demanding towards their allies and subjects, thus not inciting unhappiness and potential rebellions.

There were various weapons and protections that Aztecs used in their warfare. The use of these was determined by social status and experience, the same as earning different uniforms and garments was a process of earning the right to use more advanced equipment. This resulted in the fact that elite warriors were heavily armoured, while novices and recruits had no armour at all (Hassig, 1990: 18). In general, new recruits only had a sling, a 1,5m long loop of cord passed through a thong to hold a projectile in place, usually a stone. Momentum was built by swinging the loop over the head several times and then releasing the projectile toward a target. Employed in actual combat, the sling was able to toss the projectile and break an enemy skull at over 150m. The next standard weapon that everybody was trained to use was the bow. Bowmen and slingers were usually paired together to inflict havoc upon enemy lines from distance. They were rarely used as individual weapons with practice of marksmanship in combat, but rather acted together just to rain projectiles from a distance, whilst being protected by melee warriors. The spear, Mesoamerica's most ancient weapon, together with the spear thrower *atlat* was considered an elite weapon, most frequently seen in the hands of gods than really used in combat. It required a great amount of practice and skill to master *atlat*, and thus only a few really used it despite its great effectiveness.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, clubs and axes were widely spread among the warriors in Mesoamerica, although not so much within the core Aztec army, as much as among their allies and other subjected peoples. Clubs were carved out of wood and were fairly easy and cheap to produce.

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<sup>18</sup> If they refused to give willingly, and if they could not meet the demands because of a poor harvest, plague or something similar, no punishment was incited upon them.

<sup>19</sup> Throwing the spear against a target could cause an impact force as much as 20 times that of arm strength alone.

They were used to knock a man out so that he could be tied-up to be taken as a captive. Axes were produced from stone or copper, thus being harder to make than clubs. In earlier times they were considered to be elite weapons together with *atlat*, but in the Aztec period they were mainly replaced by swords. By far the single most important weapon used by Aztec warriors was the *macuahuitl*: saw-sword carved of wood with an affixed edge of obsidian razor blades. They were usually a bit longer than 1m, but could be even larger so they had to be used as a two-handed weapon. *Tepoztopili*, another common weapon related to *macuahuitl*, was employed as a halberd. As well as swords, these weapons were carved out of wood and affixed with obsidian blades. They varied in length from 1m to over 2m, and were used mostly at the rear to harass the enemy front line, while warriors with swords would engage in hand combat (Pohl, Hook, 2001: 16-21). Hernan Cortes and Diaz de Castillo frequently expressed their superiority of weapons over Aztecs in their letters and work claiming that, together with God's help, it was their main advantage. Even though gunfire and cannons were pretty powerful and tremendously frightening for the domestic population, their number was too low, while the reload time was too high<sup>20</sup> and thus could not be cutting edge in achieving victories in open battles and combat. On the other hand, good Castilian steel was significantly superior to *macuahuitl* and *tepoztopili* wood carved weapons with obsidian blades. Swords, shields, armours, helmets and other equipment that shielded Spaniards were made of very good steel. In direct combat, obsidian blades could not break the steel armour and would become dull after short use in a melee. Cortes describes how Aztecs were constantly replacing their weapons during battle. This means that they usually brought more weapons with them in case of longer fights. Despite their ineffectiveness against Spaniards, when they faced standard Mesoamerican opponents, the weapons they used were effective in their main purpose – to maim the enemy or knock them out so they could be taken as captives.

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<sup>20</sup> It took about one and a half minutes to reload the average musket.

In terms of defence, Aztecs developed various armours and shields that were used as protection against both range and melee weapons. The most important was the *chimali*, the circular shield generally with a 75cm diameter constructed of a fire-hardened cane or wooden rods interwoven with heavy cotton. While being the backbone of protection, it was also decorated with feathers and various ornaments, and was painted with a wide variety of heraldic designs which were connected with the military and social rank of the wearer. Protective hats or caps were worn to reduce the impact of a weapon on the skull, but could not provide serious conservation against full direct contact with a melee weapon or arrows. Elite warriors and commanders wore more efficient helmets in various shapes of animals like the jaguar, eagle, coyote, wolf, parrot, monkey etc. Those elite helmets were designed in such a way that they enveloped the entire head, while the face was usually in the heraldic visor-opening mouth of his animal helmet<sup>21</sup>. Jackets of cotton quilting were standard armour worn by almost all warriors, practical for Mesoamerica's weather conditions, especially the heat. They were designed to absorb the force of a projectile and came in many different forms, designs and materials. Arms and wrist bands, as well as greaves of wood, bark, and leather sometimes sheathed in metal were generally worn with the jacket for additional protection (Pohl, Hook, 2001: 16-21).

Battle was usually conducted in the open, while sieges of towns or fortifications were rare. Although fortifications were built and could be very useful, they were seldom used as primary protection, but rather as shelter for the elite while negotiating peace. There were several reasons for this, but the most important one is that each city or town was connected with a wider social and economic network surrounding them that would still remain vulnerable for enemy raids. A fortified city without its fields, stores and subjected villages was lost anyway (Hassig, 1990: 19). For this reason, only an active defending force that would be able to face and vanquish an enemy on the battlefield was the guarantee for security. As a consequence, wars were usually decided on

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<sup>21</sup> It symbolised that the warrior was one with his religion animal.

a single battlefield. Aztec battlefield assault involved an orderly sequence of weapon use and tactics. They were very careful in ordering their ranks for battle, and serious punishment was employed to those who would break or confuse lines. Tactics were mostly based on various ambushes, as well as exploiting superior numbers in order to overextend the battle line of the enemy, so that they could easily outflank or encircle them<sup>22</sup>. Battle formation was fairly open, leaving enough room for individual presentation of skill and single hand-to-hand combat (Daniel, 1992). The assault started at the signal of the commander's drums or trumpet, usually at dawn. Fighting began with a projectile barrage after the armies closed to about 80m. Archers and slingers, both lightly armoured, tried to inflict as much damage as possible and bring confusion and disorder into enemy lines. Since the frequency of the fire rate was high, while ammunition was limited, they had to wait for the most effective distance to fire<sup>23</sup>. When the barrage began, melee warriors advanced to face the opponent. It was especially deadly for those less protected, so well armoured elite warriors led the charge. As they advanced, at about 20m, they would throw their *atlats* in an attempt to penetrate the armour of the enemy elite, since *atlats* had an enormous strike force and were the only range weapon able to do so<sup>24</sup>. When the front lines clashed, ranged fire would cease, and melee battle began. Military orders were the first ones in combat, followed by veterans that led their units of less experienced men. Last came recruits and novice warriors led by veteran supervision, while archers and slingers remained at the back harassing enemy lines. The battle was heaviest at the front, where melee warriors used their swords for hacking with great efficiency (Hassig, 1990: 18-19). This is the place where captives were taken, fame and fortune earned, as well as lives or freedom lost. Battles were mostly individual combat, with the goal not to kill, but take captives and rout enemy lines. Because hand-to-hand combat was very exhausting,

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<sup>22</sup> They would not usually encircle the enemy completely, but would leave one gap for them to retreat. In such a case, the enemy would panic, rout and try to flee through the gap without putting serious fight, unlike if they were completely surrounded, and face annihilation when the fight would be until the bitter end.

<sup>23</sup> The range of sling or bow was usually over at least 150m, while in battle they were used at 80m.

<sup>24</sup> Only a few *atlats* were carried by an individual, since not more than two or three could be fired before armies clashed into melee combat.

troops were said to have been rotated on 15-minute intervals (Pohl, McBride 1991). If this is true, then the Aztecs possessed unknown means of calculating time with that kind of precision. Victory would be achieved by breaching the enemy's center, by turning an enemy flank, or through double envelopment. These kinds of battlefield maneuvers depended on the ability to communicate troop movements effectively in the heat of battle. Timing and coordination in these movements was dictated through the use of conch shells and drums (Pohl, McBride 1991). The Aztecs were very cunning in drawing their opponents into ambushes and traps. Sometimes they would feign a retreat, thus inciting the enemy into a pursuit for a new location where additional Aztec troops would lay an ambush. During a campaign against Tehuantepec, *tlatonai Axayacatl* drew his enemy into an area where his troops were hidden in foxholes. The Aztecs jumped out and ambushed the Tehuantepec warriors, utterly decimating them. The same *tlatonai* and some of his generals at one time hid in foxholes themselves, during war with the people of Toluca. While they were in hiding, they allowed the Tolucan army to march by. The *tlatonai* and his generals then jumped out and attacked, killing the Tolucan leaders. The ensuing confusion led to the disintegration and retreat of the Tolucan army. The Aztecs were fully aware that the elimination of the opposing leadership could mean the shortening of the war and ultimate victory (Hassig, 1988: 103).

Fighting could end in several ways. One of the sides might break away from engagement and withdraw or simply lay down weapons if they realized that defeat was imminent. In the case of a battle in the city, the destruction of a temple was sufficient to put an end to all armed resistance on the part of the defenders. The burning of a temple had the symbolic meaning of defeating local gods, and, as such, was the ultimate sign of victory<sup>25</sup> (Carrasco, 1999). Looting of the city was common, and was seen as a way to reward or compensate for the victorious army<sup>26</sup>. However,

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<sup>25</sup> Just as in any other pagan case, religion was inseparable from politics in the Aztec Empire. Every polity in Mesoamerica was a theocracy, having its own gods and government that represented them. Burning the local temple; house of the gods, meant the destruction of one's sovereignty.

<sup>26</sup> Looting was limited usually to temple, storehouses, armories and palaces.

cities were not destroyed because the Aztecs' primary goal was to induce the city to submit and pay tribute (Hassig, 1990: 19). In the case that the Aztec army was defeated, it usually meant just another lost battle, or in the worst-case scenario, the loss of a tributary town, subjects or a province, but not a loss of freedom, as was the case for their opposition. News of the Aztec defeat was usually accompanied by the priest of all temples in Tenochtitlan weeping over the lost souls. The surviving warriors would also enter the city weeping. The ceremony would then proceed to the temple of Huitzilopochtli, where they would speak to the emperor himself, and would finally burn their weapons and insignias (Tuerenhout, 2005: 176). This was just one of many ceremonies and religious cult events directly connected with warfare.

### **Cults, captives and sacrifices**

A different reception awaited a victorious Aztec army. The main road would be crowded with people cheering, playing drums and trumpets. People from the entire empire would send gifts and food into the capital for the victors. Those warriors who had a captive enemy would be honoured, while families of those who had died would receive gifts<sup>27</sup> (Tuerenhout, 2005: 176). The captives brought by Aztec warriors were “welcomed” at the entrance of Tenochtitlan by priests:

*“Do not think that you have been brought here by mishap, nor that you have come here to seek a living; you have come to die [for Huitzilopochtli], to offer your chests and throats to the knife. Only in this way has it been your fortune to know and delight in this great city ... We welcome you and say to you that you should be consoled that no womanly nor infamous deed has brought you here, but manly feats [have been responsible]. You will die here but your fame will live forever”* (Pennock, 2008:14).

Human sacrifice was central to Aztec religion, and lines of despondent captives must have been a familiar sight for the men and women who inhabited the capital of the Aztec Empire. As the

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<sup>27</sup> Gifts were determined by social rank of the fallen.

victorious warriors returned home, bringing their human tributes, they were welcomed as husbands and fathers and saluted as soldiers. As men, their duty to the community, to the gods and to their families had been fulfilled; theirs was the glory of victory. For most of their captives, however, crossing the causeway to the Aztec capital symbolized a transition from warrior to victim, indicating an end to their social, familial and personal ties and preparing them to die as sacrificial offerings. But, despite the explicit forfeit of their lives, the captives experienced no disgrace. As warriors, theirs was the honour of battle and masculinity, a badge of courage and commitment, which was universally recognized and which transcended both defeat and death. As a consequence, there was no shame, disgrace, no weakness or lack of pride in captivity. In falling to the superior foe, these warriors had merely assured their “fame”, and their eternal spiritual future.<sup>28</sup> Perceptibly morbid preoccupations mingled with a sense of shared identity and principle, through which the fated victims were implicated in a reciprocal relationship of shared honour and obligation. The sacrificial fate of the captives is made plain, their impending violent death is explicitly and bluntly stated, but the immediacy of their death is tempered by an unambiguous affirmation of their courage and masculinity. It was every warrior’s assumption that he was ready to die, either on the battlefield or as a sacrificial stone (Pennock, 2008: 14-23).

There were many different rituals in which human sacrifices were conducted, presenting captive warriors, slaves, woman and children to the gods. Each festival had its own meaning, process and type of sacrifices. The most spectacular religious ceremony was *Tlacaxipehualiztli*.<sup>29</sup> During this festival, priests and ritual choreographers turned the city of Tenochtitlan into an ideal battlefield – a battlefield where nothing can go wrong for Aztec warriors. The purpose of the festival, in part, was to show the young and other citizens actual violence of the battlefield, but stressing that unlike

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<sup>28</sup> The Aztecs believed that even their foes who would be sacrificed or killed on the battlefield deserved eternal honour and spiritual immortality. This belief was shared among most of Mesoamerica's cultures, thus not being an ethnocentric justification of mass sacrifice conducted by the Aztecs.

<sup>29</sup> Eng. Feast of the Flying Man.

in a real field where victory or defeat could occur, the ritual was a place of splendid, bloody victory for the Aztecs (Carrasco, 2012: 75). In a certain way, through this festival, the Aztecs brought war into their homes. This is a pattern that many cultures used to justify the investment of people that war required, when shown to the public. In modern times, this is achieved through the media, especially TV, where war is presented by the government as necessary, defensive or righteous in order to justify a huge investment that is required. Romans, as well as Aztecs and all other ancient civilisations, had no comparable means to convey the image of a battlefield to their homeland. Triumphs and gladiatorial games were common as ritualised sacrifices of captives. Instead of letting prisoners fight each other to death in the Coliseum, Aztecs conducted ritual sacrifices where the captor would present his captive in front of an audience and offer him to the gods. They did not use the term “human sacrifice”, for them it was *nextlaualli* – sacred debt payment to the gods. According to their religion, the world came into being through the self-sacrifice of an ancient hero, who was then turned into the Sun. But he refused to move across the sky without a gift from humankind to equal his own. War was therefore used to obtain sacred food that the Sun required. (Pohl, 2002: 10-11) It was believed that the fallen or sacrificed warriors were following the Sun from dawn until his zenith, while women that died in childbirth were escorting him from zenith to setting. Each warrior that passed away, as well as a woman, had this sacred duty only for four years.<sup>30</sup> Consequently, new wars had to be waged so more warriors could die or be sacrificed in order for the Sun to keep his cycle (Tuerenhout, 2005: 184-186). The *Tlacaxipehualiztli* ritual ceremony was the greatest offering presented by the Aztecs. The transformation into a battlefield was conducted over a forty-day period, when captured warriors underwent a series of spiritual and social processes of changing – from human enemy into an offer to divine being. They were publicly displayed, had their names changed, danced with their captors, and were eventually sacrificed in a temple or on a circular stone in gladiatorial combat. Their bodies were painted and hair was taken from the crown of their heads. This hair was guarded by

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<sup>30</sup> After four years, warriors would go into some kind of heaven or nirvana, while women would become wraiths.

their captors, bestowing great honour upon him, since his captive was now considered to be “god-like” and would soon come into the presence of the Sun himself. Aztecs would bring their captives into the temple of Huitzilopochtli themselves, dragging them up the stairs or simply escorting them. If a captive would walk all the way, he would present great honour to himself, his captor and his people, and often they would bravely walk to their deaths submitting to their fate<sup>31</sup> (Carrasco, 2012: 75). The very act of sacrifice was similar for every occasion and festival. On top of the temple was a shrine, with a stone disk. The captive was placed on the stone disk lying on his back, held by four priests, while the fifth would perform the very deed of putting an obsidian knife through his chest, pulling out his heart. Presenting the still-beating, bloody heart to the Sun was the climax of almost every human sacrifice conducted by the Aztecs (Pohl, 2002: 10). The fragmented body was carried by elders to the local temple where it was skinned, cut to pieces, and distributed with small pieces of flesh to be eaten by the blood relatives of the captor in a bowl of stew made from dried maize (corn). The captor himself did not take part in this cannibalistic ritual since he shared a special bond with the sacrificed (Carrasco, 2012: 76). This bond between the captor and captive was very strong and important from the Aztec point of view. The relationship was extremely intimate and the prestige of the warrior came from the valour of his captive. Throughout these sacrificial rituals, both the warrior and the captive would present their prowess, prestige and worth. Since the very strong connection between the captor and the captive existed in different ways, there are possible explanations that they were even considered as the same person, as father and son, or as some kind of self-sacrificial substitution of the warrior who would present his captive instead of himself. However, the valiant death of a captive esteemed the captors honour, while his courage was absorbed by the captor too. A symbol of this was represented in taking the captive’s skin, while wearing the same would complete the identification between the warrior and his captive (Pennock, 2008: 17-21).

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<sup>31</sup> Since this kind of ending ensured even greatest fame not only for themselves, and their families, but to their captor as well.

The *Tlacaxipehualiztli* festival, however, was not over once the sacrifices were conducted at the temple. Afterwards, a ritual procession moved through the entire city ending at the imperial palace. Here, the emperor would give a speech and present rewards to warriors of luxury goods, thus promoting their social status. The entire spectacle would culminate in a gladiatorial sacrifice, which took place in front of the public, near the main ceremonial center. The drama of the sacrificial ritual began as the vast crowds entered the auditorium. They saw the captives and their captors march in wearing elaborate garments, accompanied by musical fanfare, to the elevated, circular gladiatorial stone, following the eagle and jaguar warriors who danced, swaggered, and showed off shields and obsidian-bladed clubs raised in dedication to the Sun. With sounds of conch shells, singing, and whistling, the sacrifice began when the captor seized the captive by the hair and led him to the sacrificial stone, where the captor raised a cup of the fermented beverage *pulque* four times and drank it through a long, hollow cane. The captive was made to drink *pulque* and forced onto the round stone where a priest dressed in bear skin tied him by the ankle or waist to the center of the stone with the sustenance rope. Given a war club decked with feathers, the captive was attacked by a dancing jaguar warrior armed with an obsidian-studded war club. If a captive somehow managed to defeat the first Aztec warrior, three others were sent in succession to destroy him. Eventually exhausted and overwhelmed, the captive was finished off and eventually flayed and dismembered (Carrasco, 2012: 76-77) .

Those rituals had a political message – the display of Aztec power to the subjects and enemy rulers. *Tlatoanai* would secretly summon foreign nobles and rulers, both from ally and enemy cities, to witness the ceremony. These princes were guided, incognito, into a strategic location to view the sacrifices. The people of Tenochtitlan could not know of their presence, while they often watched some of their finest being vanquished in pompous ceremonies and ritual fighting. The message was clear – in Tenochtitlan, Aztecs always win (Carrasco, 2012: 77).

Warfare was bound up in Aztec culture, but was also a result of logical political exercise dictated by different factors. Religion was just one smaller part of it; we could even say that religion with its cults and beliefs was forged from the already existing warrior society, and not vice-versa. Aztec imperialistic nature can be explained as a response to the social and ecological circumstances, in which Aztecs found themselves upon settling. Their warfare and combat practice was well suited for their imperialistic goals, as well as religion that justified and encouraged war, even though enhancing it with a certain point of zealousness and extremism. Despite that, Aztec warfare possessed rationality as any other, even our own in modern time.

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**NATIONAL HISTORY REPRESENTED**  
**IN IDEOLOGY. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS**  
**(A Study in 19<sup>th</sup> Century Historical Calendars in the Russian**  
**Empire)**

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*This paper presents the results of research into data on the history of Russia contained in historical calendars of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and their influence on public consciousness of those social groups, whom they addressed. The major objective of the research was to describe the the specific ideological content of calendars of that type. These calendars show how a specific direction within the national policy of the Russian Empire in a field of ideological formation and development of the national concept of Russian history was made.*

Keywords: Russian calendars, national policy, national concept of history

The Russian historical calendar as a source of historical data has been almost unexplored in national historiography, for this reason, at the moment, we are only able to point out major problems and roughly outline the ways to solve them.

A well-known Roman thinker, Marcus Tullius Cicero, said, “*Historia est magistra vitae*” (lat. “History is the teacher of life”), and 2,000 years later this sentence is still relevant. Moreover,

history or a defined interpretation of historical events is still a tool used to manage the public consciousness. Nowadays, we observe the universal and deliberately ‘from-the-top-down’ managed ‘popularisation’ of history. It is done through the mass media and communications, as well as Internet information resources. Similar processes are now occurring in making electronic resources for electronic libraries, which are one of the major elements in the actualisation of the contemporary national historical calendar as an artefact of national historical and cultural heritage.<sup>32</sup>

The key events of Russian public life were presented in historical calendars. Today, when the idea appears, saying that these artefacts belong to world humanitarian heritage, calendars gradually become a part of the global information space. Similar calendars present special histories and cultural monuments with an information constituent, able to influence the public consciousness and change it. After all, the information and ways to present it are known to be (according to the Information Theory) one of the active forms of society management. “For that reason, this idea of an artefact must be considered as a part of its actualisation or usage (usage, coming into operation) of the information, contained in the artefact.” One must also keep “in mind one or another history, social, cultural, economical, political and other objectives” (Abramkin, 2007: 231).

Today it may surely be said that the information set in artefacts (in our case in historical calendars), presents itself from a new perspective and forms a certain angle in the human historical consciousness. “Historical and cultural artefacts as if ‘acted out again’, actualising themselves in the whole «human system»” (Abramkin, 2006: 233), change and establish semantic fields and

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<sup>32</sup> Nowadays in Russia, The Boris Eltsin Presidential Library, the first Russian electronic library, consolidating archival, library and museum documents regarding Russian history, theory and practice of Russian nationhood and law, has the most outstanding and significant role in making an electronic corpus of information resources on Russian historical subjects. Moreover, apart from the information function, its Internet page has an ideological role, providing a well-organized functioning model for the modern national historical calendar within official governmental concepts of Russian history.

matrixes<sup>33</sup> of the human consciousness. In its turn this causes change and adjustments to the whole space of the public (collective) historical consciousness, its altering and finally the formation of a new paradigm of human consciousness. “In such a manner, a complex ‘resonance’ is being formed, which might be considered as a psychological influence of the artefact” (Tsyppkin, 2005: 329). This process of the artefact’s actualisation (in our case — the historical calendar) might be a tool to manage the social consciousness and be used to establish the governmental ideology or concepts of national history.

Thus, in this regard, the national historical calendar needs to be considered as one of the most efficient sources with which to form and develop an understanding of the official ideology in the government management system of the Russian Empire, the USSR and contemporary Russia. To understand the reason for the historical calendar’s rising popularity in Russia, and a mechanism of its influence upon the collective public consciousness, let us discuss the genesis and later developments of that historical and cultural phenomenon.

The Eastern Slavs used to count time by seasons. This is verified by the traditional word ‘Leto’ (summer) to mean a year (e.g. ‘in Leto’ means ‘In the year of’). Spring used to be considered as the beginning of the year and an annual cycle of farm work. Later, the Slavs elaborated their own

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<sup>33</sup> Semantic fields and matrixes in the human individual and public consciousness are those systems of values (from Greek ‘semantics’ meaning ‘sign’), concepts, images and ideas, which have complex interrelations. Using systems like these, the human being is able to perceive the reality and establish his/her own idea of a specific event or phenomenon. In the given case, semantic fields and matrixes might be considered *sui generis* as ‘filters of the consciousness’, through which the human being analyses and perceives the world and his/her place in it. Professionals in consciousness semantics and psychosemantics research functioning of these processes in the human consciousness. This paper is principally based upon the fundamental work by the leading national scholar in psychosemantics, Victor Petrenko’s *The Consciousness Psychosemantics (Psihosemantika soznaniya)*. See further about the consciousness semantics in *Thinking and Speech (Mishlenie i rech’)* by Lev Vygotsky; *Psycholinguistics (Psiholingvistika)* by Aleksey Leontiev; 1) *Neuropsychology: The Basics (Osnovi nejropsihologii)*, 2) *Speech and Thinking (Rech’ i mishlenie)*, 3) *Language and Consciousness (Yazik i soznanie)* – there are by Alexander Luria; *Statistics and Semantics (Statistika i semantika)* by Volf Moskvich; *The Dynamic Stereotypes or Information Prints of the Reality (Dinamicheskie stereotipi ili informacionnie otpechatki dejstvitel’nosti)* by Konstantin Sudakov; *Psychosemantics: The Basics (Osnovi psihosemantiki)* by Victor Petrenko.

system to name the time, months and days of the week, similar to that of other people. The system was based upon the rhythmical system of the lunar phases. The year was divided into twelve months, names of which were closely associated with observed natural phenomena. *The Ostromir Gospel* of 1057 and *The Primary Chronicle* of 1113 are the earliest of the extant sources containing data on division of a year into months in Russia (The Ostromir Gospels (*The Ostromirovo Evangelie*), 1057; The Primary Chronicle in Lavrentievsky Copy (*Povest' vremennih let po Lavrentievskomu spisku*), 1872) also exist.

In the Ancient Rus, they used to apply wooden calendars to count the time. These were bars with six flat sides and knobs in the middle. Each edge of the bar had a cut to mark days in the month, as well as marking important festivals. At the time calendars were an important attribute of the religious life of the people. In the second half of the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> century, during the reign of Ivan III and in the subsequent era, an idea of the imperial state as the successor of the Byzantine Empire, which collapsed under the onslaught of the Ottomans in 1453 (Hosking, 1997: 3-41), started to arise in Russia. The idea of the Russian state as an empire in many ways contributed to the creation of secular calendars, which gradually became a subject of interest for the state power. Since the 16<sup>th</sup> century in Russia they have used foreign calendars. They were translated in the Posolsky Prikaz and intended for the Tsar. Along with some astronomical data, they also had astrology predictions.

In 1699, after the calendar reform in Moscow, the first printed original Russian calendar was published, and it contained a set of astronomical data. Mass issuing of annual civil calendars in Russia began a decade later, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. With the direct participation of Peter I, *The Calendar, ili Mesiatseslov Khristiansky Po Staromu Ischisleniyu na Leto 1709* was published (National History. Encyclopaedia, 1996: 460). This and further calendars were printed as a small-

size book; along with historical data, they also contained useful data on astronomy, seasons, weather forecasts, health care recommendations, etc.

From the opening of The Saint Petersburg Academy of Science in 1724, it got an exclusive right to publish historical calendars. Three years later, it took its privilege of publication of the calendar for 1728. Since then, ‘academic’ historical calendars have been annually issued until 1869. Later, the Academy of Science lost this privilege and individuals across the country started to publish calendars.

‘Academic’ calendars used to be originally printed with titles *The Calendar, or Mesiatseslov na Leto ot Rozhdestva Gospoda Nashego Iisusa Khrista 1728 [1729, 1730 I t.d.]*. Since 1770, those editions have taken another common title *The Mesiatseslov* (The Mesiatseslov na Leto ot Rozhdestva Khristova 1770 Goda, 1769). In their structure, historical calendars were published in separate sections under common titles, such as *The Khronologia Veschei Dostopamiatnyh* (The Mesiatseslov Na Leto ot Rozhdestva Khristova 1772 Goda, 1771: 32), *The Khronologia Dostopamiatnyh Proisshestvii Rossiiskoi Instorii* (The Mesiatseslov na 1841 God, 1841: 165) or *The Khronologicheski Perechen Dostopamiatnyh Istoricheskikh Sobyti v Rossii* (The Mesiatseslov na 1869 God, 1868: 88). By then, the Saint Petersburg Academy of Science started printing so-called ‘ordinary historical and geographical mesiatseslovs with instructions’ (‘nastavlenie’), containing the news of significant achievements in astronomy, history, geography, meteorology and other scientific data. One could also find attached scientific papers on astronomy, meteorology, physics, geography and history, and later — a chronological review of contemporary events.

Since its appearance in the first third of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and for more than a century, the Russian historical calendar as a historical and cultural phenomenon was intended to fulfil “the function of

informing and ‘educating’ society with brief data on history and culture, hence establishing the public (collective) historical consciousness” (Abramkin, 2009: 52). At the age of Enlightenment in Russia, historical calendars were published within so called ‘academic’ *mesiatsseslovs*, which contained information on the life of everyday people like weather forecasts, images of star signs, calendars and lunar phases. Such editions were very popular, which was confirmed through their mass circulations. At that time, the circulations came to about 17-18 thousand copies (Calendar as a Time Keeper, 2000: 60). General availability of the historical calendar was increased with its publication in other similar issues, such as address-calendars, court-guides and Saint-Petersburg calendars.

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the historical calendar was developed further with its increasing popularity along with manuals on national history. The calendar remained a widespread source of knowledge in Russian history and was quite a popular phenomenon among historical and cultural artefacts in Russian society. Thus, in this case, we can certainly say that at that time the historical calendar, being a strategic ‘object’ to manage the collective consciousness, faced a phase of its development as the important and integral constituent of Russian society. This statement in its turn lets us assume that using data from the historical calendar, we can comprehensively picture a direction of governmental policy for the Russian Empire in the aspect of presenting events of Russian national history. Therefore, in this case it is important to know what events from Russian history were usually included in such calendars in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This will enable us to understand what the official history in Russia and the governmental concept (ideology) of Russian history in the 19<sup>th</sup> century looked like.

Firstly, we need to point out that historical data in the calendar of the early 19<sup>th</sup> century essentially differed from those in calendars from the second part of the century. The differences concern the perception of the national history in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, which

(perception) was directly related to events from European and world history. In other words, since Peter the Great, the development of Russian history has been closely associated, with the history of Western Europe. This is in compliance with a structure and contents of the historical calendar. If we look at the calendar, issued in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, we will find different events from European and World history. For example, dates of the Creation, the Flood, prophet Mohammed's settlement from Mecca to Medina (hegira in 622); Constantinople seized by the Turks in 1453; Columbus's discovery of America in 1492, as well as dates devoted to such significant global events as the invention of gun powder in 1342 and early book printing in Europe in 1440. All of these historical dates say that Russian history of that time was oriented in the history of the world and Europe, and there were constant parallels made between them.

The situation started changing in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. In the 1830s, in the Russian historical calendar, data from world history was missing, whereas significant events from national history were mentioned describing Russia as the great and powerful state. These were mainly victories of the Russian Army and Navy (Alexander Nevsky's battle with the Swedes in 1240, toppling the Tatar yoke in 1480, Moscow released from the Polish armed intervention in 1612, Peter the Great's victory over Poltava in 1709 and The Patriotic War of the Russians against Napoleon in 1812). They also mentioned the establishment of leading institutions and events of governmental and scientific importance like the first book printed in Russia *The Acts and Epistles of the Apostils* in 1564, the establishment of the Academy of Science in 1724 and the Academy of Fine Arts in 1757, the National Bank in 1762 and publication of *the Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire* in 1830.

Events from foreign history missing in historical calendars in the 1830s might be explained as follows. In 1825, Emperor Nilkolai I took the Russian throne. His policy was focused on strengthening Russian nationhood and the sovereign dignity of authorities. It was in those years

when in Russia an idea of powerful state appeared and relevant reforms took place, i.e. drawing *The Code of Laws* of the Russian Empire (*The Svod Zakonov*), reforms in finances and public management. The idea of powerful state authority also influenced the content of the historical calendar. The evidence in historical calendars of that and later times let us trace how the ideology in the Russian Empire was established in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

Accordingly, the historical calendar in Russia used to reflect the national ideology, focused on establishing the patriotic historical consciousness. The historical content of calendars from the period when the great-power idea was forming in 1830s and the 1840s and was absolutely oriented at national history, unlike calendars from the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Moreover, since then, memorable events glorifying Russian history and the Russian Empire have been distinguished in calendars and occupy the vast bulk of publication.

The information that is ‘set’ in a popular historical source, like the historical calendar, may change and shape the historical consciousness of society. Nowadays, using methods of the psychological analysis and, more particularly, methods of psychosemantic analysis<sup>34</sup> (as one of the main sections in modern psychology) we may understand how historical information functions at the consciousness level and what their specifics are. At the given level, historical data and findings, put in the calendar, are being retrieved and turned into information, which at the end changes and shapes human consciousness. Thus it plays a role in establishing a factor of the personalized psychological influence in Russia. A similar principle of functioning for the historical calendar and its influence upon public consciousness is directly related to psychosemantic processes. In this

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<sup>34</sup> Psychosemantics (Greek. *semantikos* means ‘designative’) stands for one of the major section in psychology, which deals with studies in the development and functioning of a personal system of meanings. The term ‘psychosemantics’ is used to define a field of research, which appeared at the border of psycholinguistics, perceptual psychology and studies of the individual consciousness.

regard, to our mind, one needs to pay particular attention to the specifics of information disseminated at the level of *consciousness psychosemantics*.

”Reconstructing an individual system of values, through which the subject perceives the world, other people and him/herself” (Petrenko, 2010: 5) is one of the aspects within the major method in experimental psychosemantics, that is to say, a method of reconstructing semantic fields and semantic matrixes in the semantic space of the human consciousness. The method says that the human’s individual consciousness has various forms of meaning for the same phenomenon or event. They are images, symbols, ideas, communicative and ritual actions, as well as verbal concepts. For example, in the collective consciousness, a certain legend (myth) stands behind any historical event. Such a legend refers to a significant person that actually existed or an event that actually happened. This legend might have no sufficient evidence, nevertheless, it has been set as a prescription and represents a certain meaning or ‘sense’, which is in its turn a part of the semantic fields and matrixes in both public and individual consciousness,<sup>35</sup> and even more, a part of the semantic memory.<sup>36</sup> Similar meanings exist in the consciousness within the system of relationships with other meanings, hence, when making semantic analysis, it is possible to reveal the semantic interrelations of an analysed field of those meanings.

As early as the 1920s, the Soviet psychologist and founder of the Culture and Historical School in psychology, L. S. Vygotsky, emphasized that the analysis of meaning required the development of semantic methods. Psychologist A. N. Leontiev extended the idea of his teacher Vygotsky of ‘meaning’ as a generatrix of the ‘consciousness’ and defined a dual nature of meaning. According to Leontiev, the meaning, on the one hand, acts as a unit of public consciousness, and on the other

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<sup>35</sup> From the point of view of psychosemantics - a part of subjective semantic space.

<sup>36</sup> Concerning a link between the semantic memory and consciousness see also the work by Igor Smirnov, Eugene Beznosiuk and Aleksey Zhuravlev *Psychotechnologies: Computer Psychosemantic Analysis and Psychocorrection at the Unconscious Level (Psihotvhnologii: Komp’uternij psihosemanticheskij analiz i psihokorrekcija na neosoznavaemom urovne)*, 1996: 67-72, 226-228.

hand, as the generatrix of an individual. “L. S. Vygotsky and A. N. Leontiev’s ideas have become determinant to establish the psychosemantic approach to research of the consciousness and personality in national psychology” (Petrenko, 2010: 6).

Public consciousness, like an individual one, is heterogeneous, says Leontiev’s follower Professor V. F. Petrenko, and along with scientific knowledge it contains worldly matters, social stereotypes marked with a certain extent of truthfulness, and superstitions and prejudices that are handed down from one generation to another and reflect certain historical national and cultural traditions. The given value system might not only be presented with verbal concepts, but also pre-set with a system of images and ideas, existing in the consciousness of every person along with other special constituents that are unique and based upon personal experience. Dependant on the specifics of the information functioning at the level of conscious psychosemantics, every change to the meaning (‘sense’) of the historical event<sup>37</sup> might be considered as *sui generis*. Such an adjustment to certain semantic fields is also able to seriously influence any other fields of the semantic space within the public and individual human consciousness, where the fact is in place in its original meaning. One always needs to consider similar changes as adjustments to the whole field of the historical consciousness. Therefore, when making relevant studies in this domain, one needs to take into account the psychosemantic meaning of any historical event in the human conscience. Moreover, one needs to take into account that in any given case, speaking of the psychological influence of the historical calendar, we only assume the informational concept (‘information levels’). Informal concepts of the given historical and culture phenomenon, (concept) should undoubtedly not be considered as a comprehensive ones to solve all the questions within such a discipline as psychology of art.

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<sup>37</sup> For example, when expert historians disillusion an existing legend related to a specific historical event.

To conclude, above we have described the problem of presenting the national concept of Russian history through its representations in historical calendars. In this case it is clear that at the level of human consciousness, there is an influence upon the semantic space of a person's conscience, leading to changes in ideas of the past. In its turn, this causes changes to its contents and the whole semantics ('understanding the meaning') of the historical processes. Eventually, the pre-set system of values, reflected in the calendar with verbal and visual methods, leads to adjustments to the whole paradigm of the public and individual historical consciousness.

Actualising the historical calendar, like any other information process, supposes its organization and management. Therefore, a certain set of data from national history finds its place in the historical consciousness of a human being and can form in them 'the pre-set' model of the history viewing, as well as the idea of their role in the historical process.

Thus, analysis of the historical calendar structure, as well as the specifics of how its information influences psychosemantics of the human consciousness, lets us claim that the influence of such a calendar was highly able to change the attitude of people towards the development of fundamental processes in the life of Russian society and established the public historical consciousness among citizens of the Russian Empire in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

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# The outcast minority during the Tokugawa shogunate

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*Zagreb*

*An outcast is a person who has been rejected or ostracized by their society or social group. In most cases they are rejected because they are different in an ethnical, religious or racial sense from the mainstream society. In this work I will try to present to you the development of a special class of inhabitants of Japan, a class that was stigmatized by the rest of society because it did not behave in accordance to the values and behaviour of the majority, but still remained part of that society in an ethnical, religious and racial sense. Even today, this group of people is still rejected in Japan, but in my work the main focus will be placed on their development during the Tokugawa shogunate.*

Keywords: Japan, outcast, Tokugawa, *hinin*, *eta*, burakumin

## Introduction

The Japanese outcasts were a heterogenous group of people, who, because of certain religious reasons and social stratification, found themselves in an inferior position, economically, socially and culturally, based on discrimination caused by the historical development of Japanese society. Our modern-day definition of minority differs from that which would define the Japanese outcasts. Despite often being depicted as an ethnic group alien to Japan (Naitoh, Smythe, 1953: 19-20)<sup>38</sup>, and without any connection to Japanese people, the outcasts were ethnically Japanese, and their origins can be traced to the Kansai province, otherwise considered the heartland of the historic

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<sup>38</sup> The authors have various theories about outcast origin – racial, religious, occupational theory, and marxist theory.

Japanese culture (DeVos, Wagatsuma, 1966: 8, 12). They are not a racial, ethnical or religious minority, but rather a special social category, something which is not unique for Japan. Similar groups can be found in other countries like Korea and India (Passin, 1955). Although the Japanese are genetically similar to the inhabitants of Korea and China, due to its geographical position, Japan lived in relative isolation from foreign influences for centuries. That caused its unique social development and preserved certain patterns of discrimination, which, in case of the outcasts, reappeared through several centuries.

There is no distinct outcast subculture, sharing common features, that encompasses Japan in its entirety today, and today's outcasts reflect the regional and local diversities of their cultural surroundings instead. This is also indicated by various names used to describe outcasts, which vary from region to region. They usually describe the occupation of the outcasts, or show the belief that outcasts had descended from animals, or that they live in poor villages/quarters. Outcasts were characterized by their diverse economic and political "positions", the importance and significance of their vocation, their age, sex, and their interrelation with the political powers. In my paper, I would like to concentrate on the period of the Tokugawa shogunate (also known as *Tokugawa bakufu*, or *Edo bakufu*), that lasted from 1600 until 1868, during which, because of socioeconomic reasons (because they were performing certain occupations), and political reasons (because of legal regulations), the outcasts were separated into a special class in Japanese society, segregated from the rest. This discrimination, which has occurred during the period of that shogunate, traces its origins from the medieval period, from religious beliefs connected to blood and dirt as sources of pollution, because of which certain occupations got status of being impure and unworthy to practice. The shogunate gave these old beliefs a new dimension by introducing legal sanctions, restricting the movement of outcasts, regulating their appearance, behaviour, or binding them to certain occupations. With time, the number of outcasts and "impure" occupations either increased or decreased. The usual reasons were that the outcasts started to perform certain

jobs, and as such they would immediately acquire the “impure” status, thus the Japanese who started to perform "impure" occupations were automatically labeled as outcasts.

### Sources

The appearance and life of outcasts are poorly documented. The majority of the sources we have regarding outcasts come from themselves, from the time when they started taking stronger political actions in an effort to change their discriminated position in Japanese society during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. For the period before that, we are limited to sources written by the social elite, concentrated in cities, who mostly wrote about those cities and very rarely about the countryside. Official documents, such as the population census, list of duties and fines, and geographical maps are also important. During the Tokugawa shogunate, the outcasts were often left out from population census records, and their villages were omitted from official maps. The Meiji refused to acknowledge the existence of outcasts, and named them commoners. For Meiji bureaucrats, all Japanese were equal in the eyes of state and law, even if they were still socially discriminated and segregated.

During the period prior to the Tokugawa shogunate, two major groups of outcasts developed, *hinin* and *eta*, who received official confirmation of their names during the shogunate. In 1871, the population report for the entirety of Japan stated that there were 280,311 *Eta*, 23,480 *Hinin*, and 79,095 other miscellaneous outcasts (DeVos, Wagatsuma, 1966: 24). “*Eta*” means “an abundance of filth” (Passin, 1955: 253), and that term had become established in official laws and proclamations in 1657. It designated the largest and, looking at their social standing, the lowest group of outcasts in Japanese society. One's affiliation to that group could have resulted from a number of factors, but it was mostly the result of blood affiliation and the inheritance of the label that they were “impure”, or through performing occupations which were considered impure. The second group, *hinin* or “non humans” (Groemer, 2001: 265-266), represented a whole range of

Japanese who got this label as a punishment, or through a combination of circumstances. They were ex criminals, the blind, the seriously ill, the executioners, the butchers, people punished for their crimes by being relegated to the social status of *hinin*. Their status was not hereditary. One of their main characteristics was being poor. Up until the 18<sup>th</sup> century, it is rarely stated in sources that they are impure. During the Tokugawa shogunate they were finally placed outside the society, classed as outcasts.

### **Japanese Middle Ages**

While the outcasts of the Tokugawa shogunate period were, in large part, products of social development during the political dominance of the shogunate, certain characteristics of their position were inherited from the previous period. In this segment, I would like to discuss that development. One of the key parts that defined further development of the outcasts was the religion in Japan. Japan's indigenous religion, shintoizm, and the imported variation of Buddhism were the religions of the area. Shintoizm placed emphasis on ritual purity of the body and the soul. To them, blood and death are sources of great pollution. Buddhism brought a strong prohibition of killing animals, which signified the disrupting of the natural cycle of life and death. Despite that, the butchering of animals did exist, but certain villages were assigned with the task of leatherworking, although the dominant political segment of society supported themselves by growing crops, which meant that they tended to look down upon leatherworkers. (DeVos, Wagatsuma, 1966: 18-19) The result of those influences was that certain occupations – related to blood, death, and dirt – were treated as impure. The medieval Japanese society was rigid and class-based, convinced that one's status in society is connected with one's virtues. Some people, like the sick and the poor, were considered to just have “bad” karma, which meant they were less fortunate in life, and as such lower and less significant than the rest of society. That belief system was connected with the religious concept of impurity, which meant that certain occupations, activities, or behaviours, like birth, death, menstruation, sickness, dirt, and injuries, caused physical and

spiritual pollution. For a person to become clean, the person had to undergo the ceremony of purification. Here we arrive at the socio-economic origins to the occupational specializations of outcasts. These were the result of beliefs that certain occupations are low and unworthy of performing. Outcasts started to practice impure vocations, and with time the spectrum of “low” occupations would expand or reduce, to include the disposing of dead bodies, leatherworking, butchery and cleaning dirt. Certain occupations, normally treated as “dirty”, gained certain privileges and political protection at certain points in history, with various twists of fate.

### **Warring States**

Various political, economic, and social preconditions have shaped the development of outcasts in different areas, which meant the discrimination of outcasts pertaining to their occupations, habitation, and formation of association. As a means of defending themselves from the discrimination they faced from the majority, and to survive the hostile environment, people of low class and certain vocations started to group together into special villages and city ghettos. We can discern two types of such an alliance. The first took place because of their mutual benefit. To protect and preserve their monopoly on certain “impure” occupations, the outcasts who performed those vocations started to form groups. The second type is the result of forms of social segregation which gradually drove outcasts on the margins of towns and villages, had them ignored completely by the majority, or assigned them to certain town or village quarters in which they were allowed to live.

One “impure” occupation deserves special attention. It is leatherworking, from which the majority of the Tokugawa period's *eta* group of outcasts descended from. The 16<sup>th</sup> century, the so-called "period of warring states", was marked, apart from those war efforts, by the increase in mobility of the population and their freedom of movement. There was also a constant demand from local warlords and Buddhist temples for large quantities of leather goods, used for the production of

bow strings, saddles, and armor. Since leatherworking included the butchering of animals, and thus forcefully ending the natural cycle of life, various outcast groups have gained, a monopoly over leatherworking. This meant that warlords would try to attract them, and settle them in the vicinity of their fortresses, either by violent or peaceful means. “Even today, about eighty percent of the outcast villages are located in the outskirts of the old castle towns.” (DeVos, Wagatsuma, 1966: 21) Also, for example, they could attract them by giving them certain privileges (e.g. tax cuts or tax exemption) and monopoly over the market (e.g. to skin and dispose of all dead horses and cows in certain areas), thus exploiting them for war efforts. On one side, this meant that the discriminated segment of society received some amount of power and security - more precisely, by accepting that, they often got in return tax reliefs and a high level of personal security, and their leaders would even become the warlords' vassals. On the other side, it also meant a growth of discrimination in a society which had such beliefs regarding pollution and spiritual purity.

### **Tokugawa Shogunate**

Outcasts have emerged during the Japanese medieval period because of a complex set of economic, social, political, and ideological conditions. They were recognized as such by their clothes, looks, and their place of living, having different names that described them in different regions, and even their villages and the city quarters they occupied were getting labeled as “outcast“, and “impure“.

The discrimination from the previous period continued, but it is necessary to determine certain differences and patterns of discrimination. We should discern between the discrimination based on their actual condition, and psychological discrimination, reflected in the minds of people through words and gestures. *Hinin* outcasts were often counted in official census as animals (*hiki*), for example: two head of *hinin*. Also, they were often insulted by wagging four fingers in front of them, meaning that they have four legs as animals, or four fingers, one less than a normal human

being. (Passin, 1955: 254-255) Other terms used referred to their occupation, like leatherworkers (*kawata*) (see: Ooms, 1996). Actual discrimination was characterized by substandard living conditions: a low level of occupation, low level of education and culture. This was a result of official political discrimination through state laws, and treatment of the ruling classes. They were forced to live in ghettos, and their looks and opportunities in life were restricted through official laws and proclamations. The discrimination was driven by social, economic, and political forces, but was applied or ignored in certain situations. For example, in the northeastern part of Japan there were no outcast villages. There, peasants could be hunters, and butchers of animals, without the risk of being labeled as polluted. (Ooms, 1996: 275) Outcasts were discriminated through laws, and official proclamations. Although beliefs of ritual purity and certain vocations being impure have their origins in the medieval period, they should be used with caution in this period. The Tokugawa shogunate played on the psychology of the population, through their laws and proclamations, which was reinforced by their beliefs.

Tokugawa Ieyasu brought a new and unified central government, which came with a new official ideology, the bureaucratization of state, and an effort to establish a singular legal system for the entire country. According to the Buddhist ideology of benevolence, the main goal of a ruler is to achieve common good and fight off evil. In a system like that, physical punishments and the use of outcasts in the legal system had its moral benefits. Outcasts guarded prisons, escorted criminals to the execution grounds, cleaned and disposed of bodies, and even conducted executions themselves. Fuyuhiko asserted that the reappearance of discrimination in the Tokugawa shogunate, the one that followed medieval patterns, was connected with the development of the ideology of benevolence. (Botsman, 2005: 52) The discrimination was officially put into motion, even though they lasted briefly, by Tsunayoshi's Laws of Compassion which defined butchering of horses and cattle for leather production as cruel and unbenevolent behaviour opposing everything that the benevolent shogunate regime represented. Official documents from 1710 put *eta* outcasts who

killed cows for commercial purposes in the same category as children who killed their parents. The punishment for killing a parent was crucifixion. (Botsman, 2005: 52)

During the Tokugawa shogunate, the use of outcasts as the administrators of punishment was systematic and widespread. They were used for this purpose by the authorities even before, but never on such a level as during the Tokugawa shogunate. For them, it meant the continuation of previously established roles such as helping during executions while the official executioner conducted the penalty itself, after which they would do the cleaning and dispose of the corpses – since they were already polluted. They were also in charge of cleansing the pollution created by spilling blood and taking a life. During the shogunate, their role was expanded to parading the prisoners through cities, either to prison or to the execution grounds, displaying severed heads in public places, while also performing a key role in conducting certain punishments, like crucifixion and burning at the stake. The key difference between the two above mentioned types of executions – those conducted by official executioners and those that were conducted by outcasts – is that the first type of execution was conducted secretly, behind closed doors, while the second had a public display of the punishment as its primary goal. Those who performed displays of public punishment, the outcasts, were put under public scrutiny and not the state. The Tokugawa shogunate tried to portray itself as a benevolent regime, and in the eyes of the public they were not the ones performing the punishment, they had only defined it. The outcasts were therefore put into direct focus, since they were treated as some sort of lower beings (as is demonstrated by the translation of word "*hinin*"). While the regime thus redirected public anger, at the same time it sent a clear message – everyone who breaks the law becomes a lower being. It was therefore only normal and natural that, as punishment, they would be handled by other lower beings. To sum everything up - to direct the focus of the public, and *retain* their appearance of a benevolent government, the Tokugawa shogunate had entrusted the most unpleasant and visible aspects of punishment to the outcasts. By doing so, the regime had gradually removed the image of

themselves that they had brought on by past cruelties; samurai warlords killing each other in a brutal civil war, sparing no one, while the outcasts gained a level of security. They became useful for the regime, which tried to reinvent the bloody image of itself and its dominant social strata, the samurai. Although, by accepting this role, they came under negative scrutiny from the majority of society, groups of outcasts had gained a certain level of security. They gained the opportunity to turn to the authorities in case of any trouble or violence pointed at them as well as certain privileges which gifted them a position of power in a society that discriminated and discarded them. In 1743, in the village Kami Hosoya, several outcasts were in charge of managing a three-day public exposure of the head of an executed criminal. In this case, the outcasts had a role of public officials, and sources report that they performed their duties “with pride and authority“. (Ooms, 1996: 250) Their relationship with the authorities meant a rise in power for certain outcasts, which lead to bitter fights between them to obtain those privileges.

It is especially interesting to look at a wider area of Edo (which is the old name for Tokyo) - for which we have most sources, especially regarding the relationship between the government and the outcasts, and also between outcasts themselves. These sources need to be looked at to gain a deeper understanding about this type of governmental behaviour regarding the administration of punishment, and also the attractiveness of helping and participating in it that it had for the outcasts. Edo was, in this period, the unofficial capital of Japan. The emperor was in Kyoto, but the shogun's main residence was in Edo, this was transformed under the Tokugawa into the center of the samurai elite of Japan, and also a hub of literacy which, for us, means useful sources for the life and work of the outcasts.

The main representative of the outcasts, the local governor, in Edo, during the Tokugawa shogunate, was called the *danzaemon*, who gained his position through a good relationship with the Tokugawa. The origins show that the first to carry the title was just one of the lesser rulers

struggling for power during the pre-Tokugawa period. After the Tokugawa victory during the Warring States (Sengoku) period, the *danzaemon* was rewarded for his help (Groemer, 2005: 270-272). The name itself was a hereditary title created during the 17<sup>th</sup> century, given to the leader of the outcasts, and he who carried it got the privilege from the shogun to enforce his rule upon the outcasts in the city of Edo and the surrounding area, called Kanto. Despite being an outcast, he was rich, with a large estate and over 200 households under his rule. He had judicial powers and the right to collect taxes from the outcasts. At the end of the period of the shogunate the *danzaemon* of that time was controlling over 7,000 households (Groemer, 2005: 272). Apart from controlling the outcasts, the *danzaemon* held monopoly over the production and sales of leather, having stakes in numerous other activities as well, such as judicial rights, and control of outcasts on their territories. The *danzaemon* was in fact a privileged vassal of the shogun and in return he carried out public services, while giving a part of the revenues to state. The position of *danzaemon* was unique in the history of Japan. In the case of Kyoto and its surrounding area, called Kansai, the local equivalent of that position, which was introduced by the Tokugawa, was abandoned after only several generations. Instead, each outcast village got its own, specially designated, supervisor. It may be questioned why the Tokugawa shogunate had centralized the control of outcasts in the area of Kanto, but they decided, after several generations, to decentralize it for the area of Kansai and the rest of Japan. For Groemer, this is primarily a “desire to tighten rather than loosen control in both locations” (Groemer, 2005: 273). As it was during the pre-Tokugawa period, the other outcast leaders have shown a tendency to become stronger, and they, over time, started to compete with the *danzaemon* over the control of the outcasts. There were a total of four *hinin* bosses for the area of Edo: *zenshichi*, *matsuemon*, *zenzaburo*, *kyubee*, each controlling his own area of operation. *Zenshichi* was in charge of providing services to the *kotsukappara* execution ground and graveyard, and *matsuemon* was in charge of providing guards and laborers to the *suzugamori* execution ground, while not much is known about *zenzaburo* and *kyubee*, besides that they controlled various groups of *hinin* (Groemer, 2005: 275-276. 288). One of the most

important was the *zenshichi*, who controlled *hinin* outcasts, and gave a part of his income, as a vassal, to his boss, the *danzaemon*. Those carrying that title had tried to break free from *danzaemon*'s rule on several occasions during the Tokugawa period (the conflict is detailed in: Groemer, 2005: 267-288). The two of them controlled their respective areas, determined assignments and the work areas of the outcasts they were leading. They tried to obtain profitable contracts with the state – such as the right to execute criminals, dispose of the bodies, get guard duties in jails and on the scaffolds – and the right to incorporate vagrants or to run them out of town. Their example shows that a certain form of the elite can be found everywhere, even near the bottom of the social order.

Governmental documents of this period used, as official terms for outcasts, words like *eta* (much filth), *hinin* (non-human), and *senmin* (despised groups). With the arrival of the Tokugawa shogunate during the 17th century, and the unification of Japan, the shogun enforced various legal sanctions that were directed towards outcasts, or had negative effects on them. Marriage between people of different social status was prohibited. Outcasts mostly lived in secluded communes, separated from the rest of society. They were not allowed to abandon their vocations, especially those whose occupations included animal slaughter and leatherwork and who were because of that called *eta*. In 1591, an edict that restricted the change of status and residence tried to limit the freedom of movement of the population (Groemer, 2005: 268), but, in practice, it did not work at all since the supervision was left to the villages themselves, and they lacked the necessary resources to control the movement of their inhabitants. Official state censuses often omitted them from their lists, but when they were included, they were set apart from from the rest of the population. During the rule of shogun Shotoku (1711-1715) this practice gained its legal basis when a census officially separating the outcasts from the rest of population, placed them in a special “*eta* register” (Naitoh, Smythe, 1953: 21). In 1723, a special law prescribed that the outcasts must physically distinguish themselves from the rest of the population. They were forced

to shave their heads or wear a special hairstyle (Naitoh, Smythe, 1953: 21). It may be seen as an obsession, trying to identify the outcasts as “the others“. In some areas, they were required to wear pelts or pieces of animal fur to differentiate themselves from the rest of the population (Ooms, 1996: 287). After 1730, because of state-sponsored and state-codified discrimination, the outcasts began to take on certain characteristics of a caste. For example, a person can become an outcast by birth; as a result of the movement within society when it was hampered or completely prevented, or when outcasts were subjected to discrimination based on religious taboos of impurity (Groemer, 2001: 264). Although they were often placed outside of society, with Neo-Confucian philosophers even placing them outside the human race, in the socio-political order of the shogunate in Japan, everyone had their place and purpose, even outcasts. State laws and rulings did not create outcasts. Some of their noticable and distinguishing characteristics were developed in periods prior to Tokugawa. Instead Tokugawa legally sorted them into an undesired segment of the population. This helped facilitate the discrimination of the outcasts, and worsen their status. Sources show that the shogunate made distinctions between the outcasts in their laws. Two groups, the *eta* and the *hinin*, were especially targeted. The *eta* were outcasts by birth, while the *hinin* were outcasts only by vocation and social status. Occupations often treated as *eta*: butchers, tanners, and makers of leather goods, were all groups that were useful for local warlords within periods of the Warring states. *Hinin* occupations were mostly: prostitutes, entertainers, criminals, street performers, and beggars, also those who were physically disabled, suffering from leprosy, and vagrants. That also tells us about their social mobility. Progress was something that was impossible for *Eta* outcasts' because their position in society was decided before their birth. On the other hand, the *hinin* could move up the social ladder on rare occasions, often as a result of a reward for their work. Some of the *hinin* were made by degrading people of other statuses into the status of *hinin* as punishment for certain types of crime, for example, lovers punished for attempted double suicide (Naitoh, Smythe, 1953, 21).

It is often stated in literature that the main characteristic of the Tokugawa shogunate period is its self-imposed isolation, ceasing all contacts with the outside world. However, the thing that characterises Tokugawa Japan, while at the same time giving the answer as to why the outcasts were discriminated against, is the desire of the shogunate to preserve the feudal system while maintaining the economic, political, and social *status quo*. The discrimination of outcasts, both social and political, through laws specially aimed at them, was a part of Tokugawa's efforts to preserve the old system, and to codify it and preserve for future. The main characteristic of Japanese society of that period was that it grouped people based on their vocations and social status. Society was organised rigidly to make control and supervision easier. It followed the feudal characteristics of the shogunate – or better yet, the hierarchical structure of individual clans with their vassals – and as such, society is divided into groups. At the head of each group there is a leader, or social elite who had the task of implementing the laws of shogunate, in return for which they were granted certain privileges (e.g. *danzaemon* in Edo).

Our views of Japanese society were shaped throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century by historians who took the official ideology of Tokugawa's perfect form of government for granted. It revolves around a neat picture of the Neo-Confucian vision of society separated into 4 categories: *Shi-Nō-Kō-Shō* or *shikan-nōgyō-kōgyō-shōgyō* or warriors, peasants, artisans and merchants. The samurai were on top, and the peasants, artisans, and merchants below them (Ruyle, 1979, 59). Of course, this is just an idealized picture, which reflects the hierarchical nature of Japanese society – the warriors above the peasants, and the peasants above the outcasts – but one that does not allow us deeper insight into the social development of Tokugawa Japan. The period of Warring States was marked by a breakdown of the older structures of centralized government. Instead, self-governing communities were formed and incorporated into a new socio-political system after the victory of the Tokugawa clan. We should not think of Tokugawa Japan as a strictly centralized state which was governed from one center, even if the Tokugawa clan did issue laws which were mandatory for the entire

country. Tokugawa Japan was constituted of a network of an overlapping socio-political order of over 300 subdued feudal domains and over 60,000 villages, partly inherited from the period of Warring States, and partly created by direct intervention from the Tokugawa. This meant a creation of a decentralised feudal society, and Hall described this compromise between the authorities and the self-governing communities as a “container society” (Hall, 1974, 45). In a society like that, every individual had their own place within a social unit. “For peasants, the key social container was the village; and for townsfolk, it was the block association. Warriors and nobles were organized into households, the Buddhist clergy into sects, and so on” (Botsman, 2005, 60-61). The Tokugawa shogunate issued laws and ruled over the entire country, but ceded a great deal of autonomy, in the form of internal affairs, over to every single community. This meant a division of the society into self-policing container units, which served as a system of control while at the same time serving as a basis for the tax-paying system, a source of labor and recruitment. One of the most influential writers of the Tokugawa periods, Sorai, argued in favor of permanently fixing people in their “proper” place within society. This way, when people lived inside a single community, it was more difficult to commit crimes since people are constantly watched by their relatives and neighbours (Botsman, 2005, 87). Japan did not have police in the modern sense of the term. Instead, the inhabitants of the village were recruited for special purposes when the need for it occurred. Policing duties in villages were usually carried out by a specially designated person from the *hinin* group of outcasts (Wigmore, 1986: 216). This form of social organisation was recognized by bureaucratic structures of the state by the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Bureaucrats noted official census records of the population in which individuals were listed based on their belonging to a certain community.

## **Conclusion**

The social development, continued or created by the Tokugawa, was organised through a series of self-governing communities, and represents the way Tokugawa controlled the state through a

purification of society. The outcasts' status on the margins of society, did not change because of inherited belief systems about one's vocation from the previous period, . The outcasts did not become “the others”, upon which the society projected all the negative aspects of itself under the shogunate. They were formed as “the others” before the time of the shogunate. The Tokugawa shogunate legally sanctioned their position in an attempt to preserve “the order” for eternity. The role of outcasts in administering punishments became a social necessity which the shogunate used to deflect public attention from itself in effort to reinvent its image.

The idea about the outcasts as a singular class was developed only after 1871, and the emancipation proclamation which nullified the old, officially sanctioned, discrimination by prohibiting the usage of special names for outcasts and treating them differently than the rest of society. The outcasts were officially emancipated, but without a mechanism to prevent the continuation of social and economic discrimination. The idea about the unity of the outcasts developed as a banner in a continuing fight for equality in society. They formed common organizations, started with mass protests and gatherings across the whole country, all with a goal to force the majority of the population to recognize them as equals. In 1979, it was estimated that there were around 2 million descendants of those outcasts living in Japan. The common term for them became *Burakumin* (Nagahara, 1979, 385). Even today they are faced with prejudice and harsh living conditions.

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# The Lion Monument at Bad Kösen as a Revanchist Creation of Meaning through Memorial to the Dead of Wars

Phillip Reinhardt

*Jena*

*History is often made up of stories – resulting in a story of a seemingly unambiguous past. The platitude “in every story is some truth” may be true but does not provide solid scientific evidence and states just a random fact. The question rather should be whether distortions in today’s interpretation found intentional input. Do they pursue a goal and who would have an interest in that goal? One is inclined to understand such a question as the search for political intentions, and nothing else should be subject to this investigation.*

Keywords: lion monument, Rudelsburg, national identity, architecture

## 1. Introduction

Examples that should be considered include four interrelated monuments that are located near the spa town of Bad Kösen. Its popularity for tourism increased in recent years and opens the commemoration to a wider audience. These monuments recall events and characters forming a national identity, such as sorrowful




Drawing of the locations of the monuments

wars, Emperor Wilhelm I, and Chancellor Bismarck. They even construct a popular connection between the foundation of the German Empire in 1871 and the “Wars of liberation” 1813-1815. An aggressive attitude against France can easily be seen and is depicted in the concept of one monument. The fact that the same is sponsored by an academic connection should catch our attention in order to make statements about its significance. That is: what kind of statements are given by this association to these monuments? A brief history of its appeal in terms of the location of the monument setting cannot be left out.

## 2. The Rudelsburg

Most of the visitors who travel from Jena northward along the valley of the river Saale to Naumburg or Halle will first notice the scenic setting above out of which the ruins of Rudelsburg and Saaleck arise.


Sources of the smaller castle Saaleck are older (see Waescher, 1957: 25; Gericke, 1974: 3),



Historic drawing of the Rudelsburg (Image taken from Krieger)

furthermore various important events like the foundation of the “*Thüringisch-sächsischer Verein für Erforschung des vaterländischen Altertums*”<sup>39</sup> (Ibid: 9) took place there, but optically the Rudelsburg stands out with its exposed location on a limestone hill 75m above the Saale river (see Ibid: 10). This impressive effect is nothing new – and that’s why these lapsed walls already drew visitors early in the 19th century who were making trips into nature because they were attracted by

<sup>39</sup> engl: “Thuringian-saxon society of research of local ancient times”.



Gottlieb Wagner, famous host of the Rudelsburg (image taken from Krieger)

the magic of romance and let their fantasy play out. A reason for this free association might also be that “*die historischen Quellen der Rudelsburg [...] dünn und schwach [sind]*”<sup>40</sup> (Stangenberger, 1853: 13) and “*nichts Gewisses [über die Entstehungsgeschichte] zu berichten [sei]*”<sup>41</sup> (Ibid: 13). Especially this mysterious darkness opened doors for fairy tales and sagas; charlatans like the antique chandler Raub made profit out of this uncertainty. He called himself “*Frater Taube von St. Moritz*”<sup>42</sup> and invented a pseudo-chronic of the nearby town Naumburg and surroundings which was quoted a lot in 18th century. He started his narration with a description of “*frühesten Heidenthum, Menschenopferung, [...] Abbildungen von Götzentempeln, sowie Bergschlössern*”<sup>43</sup> (Ibid: 13).

Fascinated by these stories people hiked to the ruin of Rudelsburg. Which was felt and thought can be best read in the visitors’ book which has been provided by the host of the castle since 1826. The very first entry was written by Franz Kugler and consists of the poem “*Sommernacht*”<sup>44</sup> and a comment by the author. “*An der Saale hellem Strande*”<sup>45</sup> as it is called incorrectly in the meantime (see Bahnson, 1985: 114) was afterwards spread throughout the whole of Germany and might have

<sup>40</sup> engl: “the historic sources of the Rudelsburg are rare and unproven”.

<sup>41</sup> engl: “nothing certain [about the origins] can be said”.

<sup>42</sup> engl: “Brother Taube [=pigeon] from Saint Moritz”.

<sup>43</sup> engl: “earliest paganism, human sacrifice, [...] illustrations of idol temples and castles on top of mountains”.

<sup>44</sup> engl: “summer night”.

<sup>45</sup> engl: “at the bright beach of the river Saale”.

led more visitors to the place where it was written. The same shall apply particularly for “*Der Burggeist auf der Rudelsburg*”<sup>46</sup> written by a certain student R from Mecklenburg-Strelitz (see Stangenberger, 1853: 25) in 1827. It is a fantasy story in verses which created the legend of a damned evil knight who has to serve students as host of the castle since he died “*so lange [...] als dauert dieser Ort*”<sup>47</sup> (Ibid: 26). This host has to take the name Samiel (this is a figure of a famous opera “*Der Freischütz*” from Carl Maria von Weber) and contributed to the popularity of the actual host whose real name was Gottlieb Wagner. He was a vineyard worker of the owner Friedrich Christian Franz von Schönberg. Wagner was asked to pour beer and cater for the guests of the ruin (see Krieger, 1930: 153).

Young people – especially men as only they were allowed to study – left notes of their passions in the guestbook; women got access to universities at the end of 19th century, for example Rowena Morse who graduated in Jena in 1904. Then also women commented in the guestbook. A lot of entries are from students of the surrounding universities of Leipzig, Halle and Jena. In 1853 the Rudelsburg already was so often the venue of social joys as never before. One factor was the newly built railway (see Krieger, 1930: 153) which is still cutting through the valley nowadays. Because of the liberality of the then owner von Schönberg (see Stangenberger, 1853: 9) the inner courtyard was “*mit Tischen und Bänken versehen und den zahlreichen Besuchenden gastfreundlich [gestaltet]*”<sup>48</sup> (Ibid: 9).

### **3. Formation and foundation of the K.S.C.V. (Kösener Senioren-Convents Verband)?**

Students were particularly pleased with this offer. One can find an entry in the guestbook made on July 17th 1830 (see Ibid: 30) which was posted by a theology student from Wertheim. It is

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
<sup>46</sup> engl: “the ghost of the Rudelsburg”.

<sup>47</sup> engl: “so long as the place lasts”.

<sup>48</sup> engl: “equipped with tables and benches and [was made accessible to] the many visitors in a hospitable manner”.

evidence of a spree of 43 students from Halle. They partied hard for several days, had several fantasies, interpreted dreams and put no limits to consumption.

Slowly borders of this exchange between young people were expanded in order to “*das Schwere der Zeit leichter tragen*”<sup>49</sup> (Krieger, 1930: 154) and take it easy. In an association which unites corps (similar to fraternities) in various German states there would be “*Kameraden, Freunde [...], [die] das gleiche Los, Freud und Leid teil[en] und zu teilen [haben]*”<sup>50</sup> (Ibid: 154). A political alignment is excluded explicitly several times and thus consolidated as a principle (see Ibid: 159; §1 of the statutes, see Kutz, 2004: 122). This claim should be viewed critically given the erection of monuments which is to be further discussed later.



Logo (source: corpsvandalia.de)

After a thrilling prehistory which at this point cannot be expanded (see Ibid: 122; Brod, Gottwald, 1985: 53; Paschke, 1999: 159) an association was resolved on July 15th 1848 in the auditorium of the University of Jena (see Handbuch des Köseener Corpsstudenten, 1985: 73). It was founded on the purpose to prevail the preservation of common interests. Seven years later on May 5th 1855 in the “*Mutige Ritter*”<sup>51</sup>

Bad Kösen was chosen as the permanent conference venue and included into the name of the association. As reasons, “*die Tradition, die ehrwürdige Stätte der Rudelsburg, die günstige Lage der Stadt im Herzen Deutschlands [und] nicht zuletzt die mit Schönheit reich gesegnete Landschaft*”<sup>52</sup> (Krieger: 157; see Bahnson, 1985: 111) were stated. Since that date Bad Kösen is the venue of the S.C.

<sup>49</sup> engl: “bear the severity of that time”).

<sup>50</sup> engl: “comrades, friends [...], [who] share [and have to share] the same fate, joy and sorrow”.

<sup>51</sup> engl: “brave knight”.

<sup>52</sup> engl: “tradition, the venerable site of the Rudelsburg, the favorable position of the town in the heart of Germany [and] last but not least the landscape blessed with beauty”.

(“*Seniorenconvent*”, meaning “seniors convent”) (exclusive of the years between 1953 and 1994 as the association was forbidden in the DDR; see *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, no. 124, 2009: 2; *Handbuch des Kösener Corpsstudenten*, 1985: 59). Since its establishment the Rudelsburg plays such a central role (see Krieger, 1930: 155) for members of the association that it is represented on the cover of the association’s journal. It was first called “*Akademische Monatshefte*”<sup>53</sup> and was founded in 1894. At the beginning it showed a drawing of the Rudelsburg surrounded by oak leaves (see Kutz, 2004: 105). Oaks had a certain meaning in 19th century Germany which we are going to discuss later.



Heroic woodcut (taken from Fabricius)

#### 4. Memorial and identification with the founders of the German Reich

##### 4.1. Cenotaph (1872)

Immediately after the war between France and Germany in 1870/71 the delegate Rauch from Marburg who was a representative for Teutonia Marburg and Lusatia Leipzig (both corps), suggested “*den im Felde gefallenen Corpsstudenten auf der Rudelsburg ein Denkmal zu setzen*”<sup>54</sup> (Fabricius, 1921: 72). The request which came from deep hearts was accepted joyfully. Primarily in order to “*den Gefallenen würdig zu gedenken*”<sup>55</sup> (Krieger, 1930: 159) at that place “*wo der Verband als solcher der Außenwelt gegenüber schon längst seine Heimat*

<sup>53</sup> engl: “academic monthly issues”.

<sup>54</sup> engl: “to build a memorial in the Rudelsburg for the students [who are members of the association] left behind or dead in the fields of war”.

<sup>55</sup> engl: “commemorate the fallen in a dignified way”.

*gefunden hatte*<sup>56</sup> (Ibid: 159) . A commission formed by students from Jena (represented by Weltz), Halle (Ruckser) and Leipzig (Datzenberg) got unlimited authority regarding planning. In the meantime a local committee decided restoration of the Rudelsburg needed to be performed. Installation of a knight hall can be named as an example. None of the restoration work was historically correct but it was done in the context of Germanomania yearning during that time.

The noble family of Schönberg played a key role within this process. They were owners of the Rudelsburg since 1797 (see Stangenberger, 1853: 21) and provided land in order to build this and all following monuments after the commission asked for it. Just one year after the war had ended the unveiling of the memorial could be celebrated “*am ersten Pfingstfeiertag [1872] gegen Mittag*”<sup>57</sup> (Fabricius, 1921: 74).

The final design of Building Officer Dr. phil. Oskar Mothes from Leipzig is a recourse on ancient Rome (Kutz, 2004: 110) and represents – at least thematically through the symbolic message of the victory column – a connection to the memorized event of the fallen which has nothing in common with ancient times. In order to commemorate the dead students, their names were




Cenotaph today (private)

engraved on four marble plates which had been installed on every side of the big postament. Originally 114 soldiers from 17 universities had their names written on it, later 24 fallen were added during the colonial wars (see Krieger, 1930: 159). After these plates were destroyed when the association was illegal they were replaced in recent times by plates made of granite.

<sup>56</sup> engl: “where the association as such has found its home towards the exterior world [!] a long time ago”.

<sup>57</sup> engl: “on Whit Monday [1872] around noon”.

On these new plates the names of further identified fallen were intentionally not involved. In contrast to this the column has not been restored completely since. The part above the “*damals noch nicht geschmaechten Horaz-Spruch[es], der den Tod für das Vaterland als schoen, erhaben und ehrenvoll preist*”<sup>58</sup> (Ibid: 159) included the crowned German imperial eagle and is still missing (it is sunk in river Saale). This colossal depicting smashed the French declaration of war, a French helmet and armor with his claws (Ibid: 159). Kutz argues that conservation of the damaged condition should include preservation of a “*deutliche Geschichtsspur, die nicht zerstört werden soll*”<sup>59</sup> (Kutz, 2004: 111). A greater influence seems to be the expenses a receding association cannot afford. Despite constantly increasing numbers of students in Germany, members of corps and fraternities recede (see Ernsting, Foelsche, 1985: 6). The only solution would be to draw enormous donations from “*Alte Herren*” (engl: “old gentlemen”) – they are organized in an alumni organization called “*Verband Alter Herren*” which was founded in 1888 and which provides a huge economic factor, career opportunities but also dependence for the younger generation (see Handbuch des Köseener Corpsstudenten, 1985: 66).



Cover of “Akademische Monatshefte”  
(taken from *Handbuch (...)*)

<sup>58</sup> engl: “saying of Horaz which praises death for fatherland as beautiful, sublime and honorable and which has not yet been maligned [!]”.

<sup>59</sup> engl: “noticeable historical track which should not be destroyed”.

#### 4.2. Kaiser Wilhelm monument (1890)

In 1888 when the first German emperor Wilhelm I died and during a time of great sympathy for the Kaiser (Krieger, 1930: 160) the association decided to erect a monument as a counterpart to the fallen memorial (Ibid: 160) in order to honor him. Its inauguration took place “*bei prachtvолlem Wetter*”<sup>60</sup> (Fabricius, 1921: 95) on Whit Monday two years later. As a design a somewhat arbitrary Egyptian obelisk was chosen which stands 12.5m tall. Its simplicity and plainness should be in the “*Sinn dessen [...], dem es gilt*”<sup>61</sup> (Krieger, 1930: 160).

The motive itself also represents an eternity cult which is projected onto the emperor. Towards the road and opposite to the river a bronze medallion with the head of him is mounted, below in the



Historic photo of the monument (Koesener Archiv)

base tribute is shown:

*“Dem Andenken / Sr. Majestaet / des hochseligen Kaisers / Wilhelm I. / in Treue und Verehrung / Die Deutschen Corpsstudenten”*<sup>62</sup>

In 1901 more and more voices within the association turned up to build a new monument “*in trefflicher Weise, [...] [dem] Wesen des deutschesten aller Helden [...] entsprechen[d]*”<sup>63</sup> (Kutz, 2004: 113). However, this plan

had to fail because of the statutes of the K.S.C.V. where it says that monuments are to be maintained (see Handbuch

des Kösener Corpsstudenten, 1985: 67) but not to be built.

<sup>60</sup> engl: “during great weather”.

<sup>61</sup> engl: “sense of the man it honors”.

<sup>62</sup> engl: “In memento / to his majesty / the highly blessed emperor / Wilhelm I / in loyalty and admiration / the German fraternity of students”.

<sup>63</sup> engl: “in an admirable manner [...] according to the character of the most German of all heroes”.

### 4.3. Monument of young Bismarck (1896)

This doesn't apply to completely new monuments; and that's why in 1895 during a celebration in honour of 80-year old Bismarck taking place in Hamburg the intention was announced "*den Corpsstudenten Bismarck in Erz darzustellen*"<sup>64</sup> (Fabricius, 1921: 100). Besides a strong Bismarck cult which took place in Germany the K.S.C.V. identified itself with the constitutional founder of the empire (see Krieger, 1930: 160f.) who as a young man was a member of the corps Hannovera Göttingen himself. The design of artist Norbert Pfrezschner (member of Suevia Freiburg, Thuringia Leipzig and Rhaetia) was shown to the former chancellor as a small model and allegedly commented with the words "*solch ein Denkmal hat noch kein Mensch gehabt und wird so leicht keiner mehr bekommen*"<sup>65</sup> (Kutz, 2004: 115). Roughly one year later on May 23<sup>rd</sup> 1896 the third monument could be revealed while the academic festival overture from Brahms was played (see Krieger, 1930: 160). It was cheered "*vierhundertstimmig [...] [mit] ein Hundsfott, der dich schimpfen soll!*"<sup>66</sup> (Fabricius, 1921: 102). This description obviously is a message towards political opponents of Bismarck, for example socialists.

Surrounded by oak leaves and acorns which are both symbols of male strength and sexuality (see Lurker, 1991: 163) – acorns were already the symbol for life, fertility and immortality for Celts (even in medieval times the idea that oak wood would not rot was still valid; see Heinz-Mohr, 1988: 78) – Bismarck 'thrones' casually leaning back in a simple chair while holding a rapier in his right hand. This portrayal is very uncommon as every other monument and depiction is showing an aged politician. Nevertheless the symbol of the oak serves a specific purpose. Especially in Germany this tree became an icon for heroism during 18<sup>th</sup> century, its leaves represent victory (see Österreicher-Mollwo, 1990: 40; Lurker, 1991: 163; Blau, Kösemer Archiv: Best. A 1 Nr. 663). It might also be possible that referring to the massive tree Bismarck's

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<sup>64</sup> engl: "to display fellow student Bismarck as an ore figure".

<sup>65</sup> engl: "such a monument no human ever had and won't have anytime soon".

<sup>66</sup> engl: "by fourhundred voices [...] it is an idiot who dares to rant you!".

steadiness is expressed. The oak is the tree of life of old Germanic thunder god Thor, too (see Cooper, 1986: 42).

The statue disappeared at the beginning of 1950s; afterwards the socket was also destroyed. Starting from AHSC Munich (a corps) the corps decided in the 1990s first to restore the basis according to historic photographs, later on April 1st 2006 – Bismarck’s 191st birthday – the reconstruction of the whole monument made by Andreas Besler was unveiled (see Corps. Das Magazin, no. 2, 2006: 11f.). This new moulding includes the dog on the right side just like the original one, but except for the huge acorns at the corner of the new fence all oak leaves were excluded just like signs of German Empire. Presumably the metaphor of victory was to be left out without simultaneously sacrificing the fertility symbol.



The lion monument today (private)



Original concept (Koesener Archiv)

#### 4.4. The lion monument (1926)

The last – time wise but also regarding distance to the Rudelsburg – monument, the so-called lion, impresses throughout its monumental size and massive appearance. It is part of a culture of memorials which revisionist reminiscent the *“Kriegsniederlage, von vielen als historischer*

*Irrtum interpretiert, [...] auf Verschwörung und Verrat basiere[nd]*<sup>67</sup> (Speitkamp, 2004: 143).

The profound symbolic of this place makes it a good example to examine more accurate. In the first place a history of the construction is to be outlined with use of the voluminous stock of files.

#### 4.4.1. History of construction

The idea of a memorial for the fallen of the First World War is first mentioned at the 1921 general assembly of the K.S.C.V. taking place in Münster. The brief protocol made by Schultze-Ronhoff (member of Rheno-Guestphalia Münster) has just one sentence in the end of it where the intention to build a memorial is mentioned: *“dem Andenken unserer Gefallenen soll ein einfaches, aber würdiges Gedenkzeichen gewidmet werden; die Ausführung liegt in den Händen des U.H.B.”*<sup>68</sup> (Fabricius, 1921: 130). Today one can have an impression of this ‘simplicity’. Despite the delay of construction because of inflation crisis during first half of the 1920s the memorial for WW1 impresses the most because of its massive appearance, especially if one imagines the square in front of it annually filled with delegations of association students at Pentecost. Public of course is not appreciated – strangers are not regarded worthy of commemorating ‘their’ fallen: *“Zu [ihm] hat nur Eintritt, wer das Band eine[s] dem K.S.C.V. angehörigen Korps trägt”*<sup>69</sup> (Krieger, 1930: 157). After in 1925 teacher Walther from Bad Kösen suggested the Käppelberg near the Rudelsburg as a fitting location for a *“Deutsches Nationaldenkmal für die ‘Gefallenen aller deutschen Stämme’*<sup>70</sup> (Kutz, 2004: 117), Professor Hermann Hosaeus from Berlin began planning.

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<sup>67</sup> engl: “loss of the war which is interpreted by many as a historical mistake [as a consequence] of conspiracy and betrayal”.

<sup>68</sup> engl: “a simple but worthy memorial sign should be dedicated to the commemoration of our fallen; execution is in the hands of U.H.B. [meaning unknown]”.

<sup>69</sup> engl: “only men get entrance which wear a band of a corps which is member of the K.S.C.V.”.

<sup>70</sup> engl: “German national memorial for the ‘fallen of all German tribes’ [!]”.

Kurt Karl Franz von Schönberg who has been owner of the castle and the quarry where the lion is placed today sabotaged construction work with new claims of design again and again. Especially regarding the final draft he had a provable influence: “*Warum sieht der Löwe nicht nach der anderen Seite?*”<sup>71</sup> (Kösener Archiv: Best. A 1, Nr. 662 I) he asked the artist according a letter by the artist to district court director Kehrl on April 18th 1925. In July of the same year the main responsible Meissner sent an appeal for donation to all alumni. It still includes the primary draft of a lion facing east (Kösener Archiv: Best A 1, Nr. 662 I). After all “*Irrtümer und Missverständnisse [wurde] das [Mögliche] in der Befriedigung Ihrer Wünsche bis zum Äussersten*”<sup>72</sup> (Kösener Archiv: Best. A 1, Nr. 662 I) and the planning was corrected. With the realized change of design the impression emerges that “*der ‘sterbende Löwe’ [...] sich [...] trotzig und brüllend aufgerichtet [hat] und seinen Gegnern ungebrochenen Kampfeswillen [zeigt]*”<sup>73</sup> (Kösener Archiv: Best. A 1, Nr. 662 I).

Rüdiger Kutz sees the monument as the logical outrage of the Germans against the treaty of Versailles (Kutz, 2004: 118) and devotes a very perfidious footnote forming a connection between the “*Diktat seiner Sieger*”<sup>74</sup> as a postwar arrangement unpreceded in history and reparations which “*von grossen Teilen des Deutschen Volkes, nicht nur Corpsstudenten, als zutiefst erniedrigend empfunden werden musste*”<sup>75</sup> (for all quotes: Kutz, 2004: 125). Even though no one wants to deny this frustration after 1918; this choice of words must seem quite odd in a research publication of 2004. It becomes obviously that the author is not free from valuation and at least is close to corps. The diplomatic fallacy he expresses in the footnote stating “*leider trug dies als Hass [...] wesentlich zur Entfachung des 2. Weltkrieges bei*”<sup>76</sup> (Kutz, 2004: 125) ‘unfortunately’

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<sup>71</sup> engl: “why doesn’t the lion look to the other direction?”.

<sup>72</sup> engl: “errors and misunderstanding the possible was done to satisfy your [Mr von Schönberg] wishes the best”.

<sup>73</sup> engl: “the dying lion defiantly and roaring rose up and demonstrates unbroken will to fight towards his enemies”.

<sup>74</sup> engl: “dictate of its [Germanys] enemies”.

<sup>75</sup> engl: “must be felt extremely humiliating [!] by big parts of the German people, not only corps students”.

<sup>76</sup> engl: “unfortunately [!] this in a form of hatred considerably provoked the Second World War”.

misses its intention and trivializes – maybe unintentionally – consequences of German revanchism. It seems like the thought of revenge would be legitimate and in which other way might it be realized than through military conflict?!? Between the lines one might more likely read ‘unfortunately we lost revenge of Versailles’.

Then he would ‘accidentally’ join the suspicious club of right-wing blood enmity between France and Germany starting with German liberation wars against Napoleon in 1814. This conception is still supported by a majority in 1926 and is expressed through the direction of the dying lion towards west. On October 16th 1926 after a speech by state attorney Werner Meissner – member of Rhenania Freiburg (see Krieger, 1930: 162; Handbuch des Kösener Corpsstudenten, 1985: 77) – the monument was solemnly inaugurated by representatives of all 123 corps. 123 oak wreaths were laid down, one more was thrown out of an airplane after it circulated three times above the crowd (see Deutsche Tageszeitung, 17.10.1926). The inscription which was originally placed central was erased in 1951, restored and commented on the right pedestal during the 1990s. The new inscription says:

*“GEFALLENENEHRENMAL / des  
Kösener S.C.-Verbandes / 1926  
geschaffen von PROF. HERMANN  
HOSAEUS es trug die Inschrift: / Seinen  
Brüdern die mehr als zweitausend / 1914  
– 1918 / für Deutschland fielen / schuf  
dieses Ehrenmal / der Kösener S.C. / Sie  
hielten aus in Kampf und Sturmeswettern /  
Und standen treu bei Tugend Recht und  
Pflicht / Das Schicksal kann die*



Inauguration with plane (Koesener Archiv)

*Heldenbrust zerschmettern / Doch einen*

*Heldenwillen beugt es nicht / Theodor Körner / 1952 wurde dieser Text getilgt. / DAS  
EHRENMAL WURDE 1991 VOM KSCV AUF STIFTUNG / VON DIPL. ING. KURT  
LANGE X!X! INSTANDGESETZT.”<sup>77</sup>*



Historic photo (Koesener Archiv)

#### 4.4.2. Symbolism

While symbolic forms of the other monuments are, although interpreted very liberal, somehow appropriate, the lion monument crosses politically correct borders quite obviously once the scenery is critically looked at. A lot of newspapers reported about the inauguration and used a common military, heroic style. Only the official

press of the SPD (social democrats) had critical notes included. The focus of attention, however, is the presentation of the roaring lion and the lances which he breaks under his weight.

Since human were able to write the lion represents Majesty, strength, courage, righteousness, justice and military power (Cooper, 1986: 114). Especially the attributes of his symbolic justice and power lead to presence at thrones of ancient and medieval kings (see Heinz-Mohr, 1988: 191; Kretschmer, Hildegard, 2008: 267). As an icon of war and various ancient war gods (see Cooper, 1986: 114) Hosaeus didn't choose the lion coincidentally – Naumburg daily paper describes it “*als*

<sup>77</sup> engl: “MEMORIAL / of the K.S.C.V. / created in 1926 by Professor HERMANN HOSAEUS it had the inscription: / his brothers which are more than two thousand / 1914 – 1918 / fallen for Germany / created this cenotaph / the Koesener S.C. / They resisted in battle and stormy weather / And stood loyal with virtue right and duty / Fate can smash the heroic breast / But it doesn't bend a heroic will / Theodor Koerner / in 1952 this text was erased. / THE CENOPATH WAS [RESTORED] IN 1991 BY THE KSCV ON FOUNDATION / OF CERTIFIED ENGINEER KURT LANGE X!X!.”.

*Sinnbild der Treue und der unbezwingbaren Kraft die trotzig Wacht hält*<sup>78</sup> (Naumburger Tageblatt, no. 244, 1926: supplement).

Conceivable and obvious seems to be the motive of resurrection (see Kretschmer, 2008: 267). Furthermore it is known from tradition that late ancient church fathers like Origenes and Isidor of Seville stated that the roaring lion symbolizes new life and new force. That's why lions are often present on Christian graves (Meinz-Mohr, 1988: 191). Even in late medieval times the perception that lions are born with their eyes closed and open them three days later to keep them open for the rest of their life was widespread. Even the bad image – the lion as a negative and threatening power to overcome – is related to the untamed ferocity and strength (Ibid: 191) and supports the intended impact of the monument.

One should not overlook the spears under the lion; they are a symbol of war (see Cooper, 1986: 107) – because already in Roman religion war god Mars carried one by himself (see Lurker, 1991: 425). The spears hurt the mighty animal, still they could be broken and can be seen as a sign of superiority of German warfare opposite to French warfare; the moral is also superior to the enemy because the lion “*noch einmal mit letzter Kraft seinen Gegnern entgegenreckt*”<sup>79</sup> (Krieger, 1930: 162). Spears as phallic life symbol (see Heinz-Mohr, 1988: 181), so to say as representation of potency in a wider sense, can be seen in the depiction. But that would just add another low blow to the message.

#### **4.4.3. Message**

The devastating effect that might emanate from this monument also is shown in the speech of Meissner where it says that the fallen “*dem Vaterland das Opfer ihres Lebens gebracht hatten,*

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<sup>78</sup> engl: “as a symbol of loyalty and invincible force which is defiantly guarding”.

<sup>79</sup> engl: “is stretching itself once again with final strength against his opponents”.

*vergeblich für unsere Generation, nicht vergeblich, wie wir hoffen, für die, die nach uns kommen werden*”<sup>80</sup> (Krieger, 1930: 162). Earlier than in other cases is suffering and mourning for the dead (Speitkamp, 2004: 144) substituted with additional sense by rejection of any feeling of guilt and as defiant resistance against defeat (Ibid: 144) is demonstrated. The “dull heroism” (see Jeismann, Koselleck, 1994: 24) which comes to light perverts the facts and interprets the defeat as a moral victory.

This even extends to a glorification of the state of war and manifestation of a constitutive antagonism against the western neighbour:

*“Der Sturm war über Deutschland dahingegangen; er hatte das Werk Bismarcks in seinen Grundfesten erschüttert. Der Haß der Feinde von Außen, Unverstand und Gemeinheit im Inneren hatten es beinahe zum Fall gebracht. Die äußere Form des Gebäudes wurde geändert, die Baumeister gedachten es besser zu können, als einst der Alte im Sachsenwalde. Das Gebäude wankte, aber es hielt. Warum? Weil der, der im Bilde als junger Korpsstudent dort drüber saß, es in weiser Ahnung, mit dem unbewußten Blick des Genies doch noch fest genug gebaut hatte. Weil ein Teil seines ungeheuren trotzig Willens zur Selbstbehauptung doch noch in manchem der heutigen weiterlebte, auch eine ‘Tradition’, die Tradition des Bismarck-Wahlspruchs: Inserviendo consumer”*<sup>81</sup>  
(Krieger, 1930: 162).

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<sup>80</sup> engl: “had sacrificed their lives to the father land, in vain for our generation but not so, as we hope, for that to come after us”.

<sup>81</sup> engl: “the storm came over Germany; he had upset the work of Bismarck. Hate of enemies from the outside, foolishness from the inside almost brought it to fall. The exterior form of the building was changed, the builders thought they could do better than once the old man in Saxony forest. The building was shaking but it was still standing. Why? Because he, as a young corps student was working on it, in wise notion with the subconscious gaze of a genius built it up firmly enough. Because a portion of his vast defiant will to self-assertion still lived on in many of today, also a ‘tradition’, the tradition the Bismarck slogan: Inserviendo consumer [consumed in service of others]”.

Already in 1921, a few years after capitulation, Wilhelm Fabricius referred unmistakably to Juvenal: “*Nunc patimur longae pacis mala, saevior armis luxuria incubuit [victumque ulciscitur orbem]*”<sup>82</sup> (Fabricius, 1921: 124). Finally Walter Krieger asked three years before Nazi takeover “*ob einst ein fünftes Denkmal dort oben stehen [würde, und] ob es dem gelten wird, der dem Deutschen Reiche wieder gibt, was es einst besaß, als noch der alte Korpsstudent seine Geschichte lenkte*”<sup>83</sup> (Krieger, 1930: 163). Today we can give an answer. The fifth monument was a tree – of course an oak – which was planted on May 14th 1933 in honor of Horst Wessel (a Nazi hero). Even if this tree was initiated by Kurt Karl Franz von Schönberg the K.S.C.V. also vouched with its name on the now vanished memorial plaque for this “*Verneigung vor dem totalitären System*”<sup>84</sup> (Kutz, 2004: 121). Uncanny clairvoyance we must contrast the lines of a poem presented during the unveiling of the Lion Monument:

*“Und dann – dem Führer nach! Aus Deutschem Stamme  
Wird einst er kommen, voller Kraft und Stolz.  
D a n n: I h r v o r a n mit heißer Herzensflamme,  
Und zeigt, daß ihr aus Korpsstudentenholz!”*<sup>85</sup>  
(Blau, Schlosser, Koesener Archiv: Best. A 1 Nr. 663)

The answer to the crucial question where to locate corps students politically cannot and must not come from their own press. Today they are obviously interested in denying every orientation towards right wing politics, weather it is in their now propagated “principle of tolerance”

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<sup>82</sup> engl: “We are now suffering the evils of a long peace. Luxury, more deadly than war, broods over the city, and avenges a conquered world”.

<sup>83</sup> engl: “whether once a fifth monument [would] be standing up there [and] whether it will apply to the man who gives the German empire back what it once had as the old corps student still directed its history”.

<sup>84</sup> engl: “bow in front of the totalitarian system”.

<sup>85</sup> engl: “and then – follow the leader! From a German tribe

He will come, full of strength and pride

T h e n: Y o u f i r s t with a hot flame in your hearts

And demonstrate that you are made of corps wood!”.

(referring to §1 of the statutes students are accepted with no regards to their political, religious and scientific orientation) which is expressed by their alleged “*Toleranz gegenueber Angehörigen fremder Rassen*”<sup>86</sup> (Corps aktuell. Gaudemus igitur, 1998: 33) or by naming ‘left’ corps students like Karl Marx or Wilhelm Liebknecht (see Ibid: 15).

Based on three contradictions one will see that a critical view on the self-portrayal is appropriate: First comes the myth of the apolitical. Claimed various times an article in the recruitment magazine about involvement of some corps students in early democracy deconstructs their diametrically opposing alleged abstention of political participation. How else do you understand their intended “*Marsch durch die Institutionen*”<sup>87</sup> (Ibid: 15)? Can one realize it without being political?

In this context the question occurs how believable the allegation is being significantly involved in the national assembly in Paul church of Frankfurt (see Ibid: 58, 62) concerning contrary description during Weimar Republic. There it already says in 1921: “*Die Eisenacher Versammlung konnte aber hier nicht ganz übergangen werden, weil man häufig angenommen hat, dass sie den direkten Anstoss zur Jenenser Corpsversammlung und damit zur Gründung des Köseiner S.C.-Verbandes gegeben habe. Dem ist nicht so*”<sup>88</sup> (Fabricius, 1921: 24). It seems like the association would pick the existing examples of politically active corps students in order to have a more positive image. Constitutional and thus more significant statements in their statutes are embezzled this way. There one can read that the “*Kompetenz und praktische Wirksamkeit [der Wartburger Pfingstversammlung] wenigstens in Frage gestellt werden muss*”<sup>89</sup> (Ibid: 30). This is

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<sup>86</sup> engl: “tolerance towards members of foreign races [!]”.

<sup>87</sup> engl: “march through institutions”.

<sup>88</sup> engl: “The assembly in Eisenach could not be ignored totally because it was often assumed that it caused the corps meeting in Jena and thus foundation of the association K.S.C.V. It is not so”.

<sup>89</sup> engl: “competence and practical effectiveness [of the Wartburg assembly, an early vision of democracy in Germany] at least has to be questioned”.

showing a lot more of the constitution and self-perception of the association than outstanding individuals which were definitely there.

The most perfidious twist of history happens at the look on the stereotypical agenda of right wing ideology: anti-Semitism. It is true: After 1935 corps became illegal in so-called ‘Third Reich’ and at least: “*zehn Opfer des Widerstands [sind] Corpsstudenten gewesen*”<sup>90</sup> (Kutz, 2004: 124); reason for a ban was more likely the rivalry to also hieratic and militaristic (see Fabricius, 1921: 28f., 70) institutions of Nazi dictatorship than the corps’ refusal “*ihre durch Treueschwur im Aufnahme-Eid eingeschlossenen ‘jüdisch versippten’ Alten Herren auszuschließen*”<sup>91</sup> (Kutz, 2004: 124). But even this honourable position of some corps is opposed to official resolutions. In 1921 long before a political need they stated the question of the Jews to be solved – because “*es sollen keine Juden mehr in die Corps aufgenommen werden*”<sup>92</sup> (Fabricius, 1921: 130).

In 2006 the then minister of judiciary of Saxony-Anhalt, Curt Becker, was totally right as he stated during the inauguration of the new Bismarck monument that “*nach Auffassung der Landesregierung von Sachsen-Anhalt [...] diese Denkmale auf der Rudelsburg zur Geschichte unseres Landes [gehören] wie die Rudelsburg selbst*”<sup>93</sup> (Corps. Das Magazin, no. 2, 2006: 12). The crucial point must be if one identifies him- or herself positively with this history and be involved in a questionable commemorative culture through revitalization of destroyed or even vanished monuments.

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<sup>90</sup> engl: “ten victims of the resistance [were] corps students”,

<sup>91</sup> engl: “to exclude their ‘Jewish polluted’ alumni which they were loyal to”.

<sup>92</sup> engl: “Jews won’t be received into corps anymore”.

<sup>93</sup> engl: according to the opinion of the state government of Saxonia-Anhalt [...] these monuments near the Rudelsburg [are part] of the history of our land just like the Rudelsburg itself”.

## 5. Conclusion

That an intention to distancing towards such kind of interpretations is not present everyone can easily see via the touristic focus of Bad Kösen. Innocent depictions are identical to prospects of the association. One could paraphrase it this way: corps students are young men with principles who are proud of their homeland and who sometimes kick over the traces in their manners and customs. This especially makes ‘real guys’ out of them who know how to party and bring ‘colour’ into life. Their friendships last a lifetime; they orientate after traditions and honour old members which represent the honourable past. History is used in one of its typical functions: to form an identity. To fulfil this task uncomfortable episodes and facets are edited or at least not turned inside out. But fact is that the connection between national pride and ‘blood enmity’ as togetherness-creating momentum cannot be terminated because it’s embedded in a historic context. In the case of the monument of the K.S.C.V. near Bad Kösen it is special that memorial places of this time are revitalized after reunification of Germany after they were politically unwelcomed for a certain period of time. Apparently – even if not by all, but at least by financially powerful members – much value is put on sustaining a seemingly indispensable heritage. What else is included to this past, what was falsified (intentionally?): that should be subjected to a non-exhausting investigation. This also should be a function of serious historical research: to unveil wrong images.

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# **The Battle of Cable Street: myths, reality and the collective memory**

**Jakub Drábik**

*Prague*

*The Battle of Cable Street, which took place on 4 October 1936 in the East End of London, is one of the most symbolic battles in British working class history. It was a clash between the Metropolitan Police, who were attempting to clear a path for a march by Oswald Mosley's British Union of Fascists (BUF), and a large group of anti-fascists. Today, the Battle of Cable Street has become mythologised as an iconic example of non-sectarian solidarity. The aim of this article is to analyse the important role of the 'Battle' in the collective memory of the inhabitants of the East End and of the British Jewish community and other minorities in Britain.*

Keywords: Mosley, British Union of Fascists, collective memory, blackshirts

## **Introduction**

Cable Street is a small, unassuming street in the East End of London. Walking along it today, it would be difficult to believe that anything extraordinary had ever happened there, but the 'Battle' that took place is still celebrated as a great victory over fascism. This article stresses the importance of preserving the past in order to distinguish between the collective memory of a certain group and the reality. The study also analyses the historical events that took place on 4 October 1936 and presents the 'Battle of Cable Street' as an example of an historical event which

has remained in the collective memory both of the general public and of certain left wing organizations, even though the celebrations of the event are not supported by state institutions.

### **I. Oswald Mosley, the British Union of Fascists and the Olympia rally**

Oswald Mosley was born in Mayfair, London, on 16 November 1896 (see Dorril, 2006: 3). He fought on the Western Front in World War I, and after the war became the youngest ever elected Member of Parliament for the Conservative Party. He soon established himself as an excellent orator and skilled politician, marked with extreme self-confidence and grand ambitions. He made a point, when addressing the House of Commons, of speaking without notes (Mosley, 1968: 166), and was considered by many to be one of the last great platform speakers. However, Mosley gradually fell out with the Conservatives over the 'Irish Question' and left the party in 1922. He won a seat in Parliament as an Independent MP in the general elections of 1922 and 1923, and then in 1926, after spending some time outside the Parliament, he joined the Labour Party. He was close to Ramsay MacDonald, the Labour leader at the time, and hoped for one of the great offices of state. However, when Labour won the 1929 general election, he was appointed only to the post of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Dorril, 2006: 36 - 162). Disenchanted with party politics, he then decided to leave Labour and create his own party, the 'New Party' (Pugh, 2005: 120; Dorril, 2006: 162 - 217). His party failed completely in the 1931 elections so Mosley went on a study tour in continental Europe, where he met with Benito Mussolini and a number of other Nazi leaders and became obsessed with fascism (Dorril, 2006: 210 - 214).

In 1932, he created the British Union of Fascists (BUF), which made an immediate impact in early 1930s Britain (Mowat, 1968: 473). With the backing of Lord Rothermere and his *Daily Mail* newspaper, the BUF reached a peak of 50,000 members in June 1934 (Webber, 1984). In the same month, Mosley decided to hold a mass rally in London's Olympia Hall (Bennewick, 1969: 169 - 193; Pugh, 1998). It was supposed to be a giant triumph for him and his movement, but soon after

the start of the meeting about 500 anti-fascists managed to enter the hall, where they heckled Mosley and started a protest. The demonstrators were immediately attacked by Mosley's defence forces. Mosley had encountered problems with disruption of BUF meetings before, and so had instituted a corps of black-uniformed paramilitary stewards, nicknamed the 'Blackshirts'. The Blackshirts gave the anti-fascist protesters a sound beating. More than 50 protesters were injured, five of them being detained in hospital, and one claiming to have lost an eye. It is clear that although Mosley's left-wing opponents had planned to disrupt the meeting, the Blackshirts overreacted. It all happened in front of the cameras and the lights, and the impression left on most observers was one of frightening Blackshirt violence. The mass brawl that broke out when the protesters were summarily removed by the Blackshirts resulted in much negative publicity for Moseley's movement. The events at the Olympia rally, followed less than a month later by the Night of the Long Knives in Germany, led to the loss of most of the BUF's previous mass support (Pugh, 2005: 166). Lord Rothermere withdrew his and his newspaper's support and over the next few months the membership of the BUF went into decline, hitting an all time low of 5000 members in October 1935 (Webber, 1984: 575). The party was unable to fight the 1935 general election.

## **II. The Battle of Cable Street**

After the events at Olympia, followed by Rothermere's defection and a critical decline in the membership of the BUF, radical voices within the movement suggested using open anti-Semitism in order to stimulate popular support (Thurlow, 2009: 73 - 81; Sykes, 2005: 64 - 66). Mosley was clearly failing to convince people with his ideology, and after the Olympia rally was no longer able to attract large numbers of new members to the movement. He agreed that the only chance to recover his movement and attract more people was to adopt a more openly anti-Semitic approach (Pugh, 2006: 213 - 235; Thurlow, 1989: 77).

In the summer of 1936, Mosley decided to celebrate the BUF's fourth birthday by sending uniformed Blackshirts in marching columns to London's East End (Bennewick, 1969: 217 - 235). The main reason for choosing the East End was the presence of a large Jewish community in the area. According to different historians, somewhere between thirty and sixty percent of the East End's population of half a million was Jewish (Battle of Cable Street, 1995: 19 - 21).

Local Jewish groups tried to prevent the march from taking place. They organised a petition calling for the march to be banned and collected over 77,000 signatures in 48 hours (Thurlow, 2009: 80). The petition was presented to the Home Office on Friday 2 October, two days before the march was due to take place, but despite the petition the Conservative government refused to ban the march (Dorril, 2006: 390).

Next, the Communist Party of Great Britain and other organizations, including the Board of Deputies of British Jews, called for a mass demonstration against the BUF, and leaflets advertising the counter-demonstration were distributed all across the East End.

At 2.30pm on 4 October, Mosley's procession assembled at Gardiner's Corner, a famous department store in Aldgate, the gateway to the East End. It is difficult to say exactly how many fascists gathered there – scholars, historians, fascists, anti-fascists, police and journalists all provide different data. Estimates vary between 3000 and 7000 Blackshirts; there were also somewhere between 200 and 400 black-shirted women in the centre of the fascist column (Dorril, 2006: 390; Kushner, Valman, 2000: 31 – 48; for more on women in the BUF see Gottlieb, 2003). According to the plan, the fascist column was to march from Gardiner's Corner throughout the East End, including along Cable Street, Salmon Lane, Stafford Road, Victoria Park Square and Aske Street. In an attempt to prevent clashes, which had taken place between fascists and anti-

fascists at almost every fascist meeting throughout the 1930s (Cullen, 1993), police sent more than 10,000 officers to the East End, including 4000 on horseback.

What Mosley did not expect was the strength of the opposition. It is estimated that between 100,000 and 300,000 anti-fascist demonstrators, from a number of different backgrounds, turned out in an attempt to prevent the march from taking place. They included Jews from the East End and from many different Jewish organizations from all over the country. There were Communists (the Communist Party of Great Britain was one of the organizers); there were anarchists, and left wing activists from the Labour Party and the Independent Labour Party; there were dockers and labourers from the local community; and there were members of other local minorities such as the Irish and Somali communities.

When the fascists tried to march, their way was blocked by thousands of demonstrators. The police attempted to clear a path for the Blackshirts, but the demonstrators fought back with sticks, rocks, milk bottles, chair legs and other improvised weapons. They even released thousands of small marbles and ball bearings onto the street in order to trip up the police horses and injure their riders (Battle of Cable Street, 1995: 28 - 43; Linehan, 2000: 107 - 109; Thurlow, 2009: 79 - 81). The confrontation between the police and the anti-fascists was concentrated on Cable Street, but demonstrators also flooded all of the surrounding narrow streets, making them impassable. A lone tram driver stopped his tram in the middle of a junction, blocking the Blackshirts' way, then simply got out of his tram and walked off. The demonstrators also hastily built a barricade made of mattresses, furniture, planks of wood from a local builder's yard, and even a lorry. When the police tried to dismantle the barricade, women in the neighbouring houses started throwing rubbish, rotten vegetables, bottles and chamber pots at them. The demonstrators were very well organised. They had a precise system of communications, consisting of small boys on bicycles, who were watching the march from different parts of the street and reporting the news back to the

leaders of the demonstrators. They even had small first aid posts for their injured. When a police charge cleared one barricade, the demonstrators simply retreated to the one behind it and fought again (Battle of Cable Street, 1995: 28 - 43).

The anti-fascists carried banners and chanted 'They Shall Not Pass' - a slogan adopted from Spanish republicans fighting in the Spanish civil war. The slogan ('No pasaran' in Spanish) was used to express determination to defend a position against fascism. Police sustained heavy injuries and after several hours of unsuccessful fighting against the leftist demonstrators, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Philip Game conceded defeat-and ordered Mosley to divert his march westwards (Linehan, 2000: 107; Thurlow, 2009: 81; Pugh, 2006: 227), prompting huge celebrations in Cable Street. 'The Battle of Cable Street', as it became known, is still the largest anti-fascist demonstration ever to have taken place in London (Dorril, 2006: 390).

### **III. The Memory**

Today, the only visible signs that anything momentous ever occurred in Cable Street are a large mural on the side of St. George's Town Hall and a small red plaque. However, the Battle of Cable Street is still very much part of local and national left-wing, anti-fascist celebrations. In 2011, over 1000 people marched through Cable Street celebrating the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 'Battle' (Mirror, 4 Oct 2011). The celebrations are not supported by the State but are organized by various left-wing organizations and local people. The Battle of Cable Street is therefore an event which has been committed to memory and celebrated by the population even without an official system of commemorations, monuments, museums and anniversaries.

For many years the story of Cable Street was pushed to the margins of Anglo-Jewish memory. To a certain extent, as Jewish families became more middle class and less marginalised and were able to relocate from the East End and integrate more fully into British society, the Jewish community

repudiated its immigrant and East End history (Kushner, Valman, 2000: 48 - 56). But fascism in Britain is not, and never has been, only about Jews. It is about minorities in general. Therefore, celebrating the Battle of Cable Street is now part of asserting the need in a democracy to stand up to fascism. It is this that makes Cable Street relevant today, and that connects its story to a broader narrative and represents an important collective memory. The memory of Cable Street helped to inspire successful campaigns against the National Front in the 1970s and against the British National Party in the 1990s. Today, it is mostly East London's Bengali population that is the target of fascist violence and intimidation, and the Bengali community provided most of the participants on the march in 2011.

The events which took place in Cable Street in 1936 are now reinterpreted for use in the present day. The history of the 'Battle' no longer simply has the role of telling us what happened; it also takes an active role and applies itself in the current world. However, there is, of course, the danger of reinterpreting the past selectively, in a subjective way, or even completely inaccurately. In 2010, the BBC revived the TV drama serial *Upstairs, Downstairs*, which included several scenes of the Battle of Cable Street. The drama wrongly suggested that the protesters clashed directly with the BUF, verbally if not physically, but this 'fight' between the fascists and anti-fascists never actually happened. The Battle of Cable Street was, rather, a fight between the police and anti-fascists (Pugh, 2005: 173).

The Battle of Cable Street was a major stimulus for the creation of the Public Order Act 1936, which now required permission for the staging of political marches and forbade the wearing of political uniforms in public. This is considered by many authors to be a significant factor in the BUF's political decline prior to World War II. This is probably true, but the Public Order Act was passed in order to control all extremist political movements, which included not only fascists but also left-wing organizations. Although the act banned the wearing of political uniforms, thus

seriously harming the BUF's propaganda, in the years that followed it was primarily used against left-wing demonstrators and anti-fascists (Turnbull, 1978).

Moreover, the membership of the BUF actually grew after the Battle of Cable Street. The movement quickly gained an extra 2000 members in the weeks after the Battle, most of them from the East End (Skidelsky, 1975: 406, Webber, 1984: 584). The surge in support for the fascists and for increasing anti-Semitism made life even more difficult for the Jewish community.

#### **IV. Remembrance**

In 1976, a community-based arts initiative called the Tower Hamlets Arts Project selected a proposal for a giant mural of the Battle to be painted on the west wall of St. George's Town Hall in Cable Street (Battle of Cable Street, 1995).

Dave Binnington and Desmond Rochfort of the Public Arts Workshop were chosen to carry out the work. Binnington conducted intense historical research. He looked at books, films and photographs of the event and worked much of what he found into his design – the dramatic uniforms of the BUF, the eggs and the milk bottles, the tools and the contents of chamber pots descending from the upper windows, the mounted police with their clubs, the use of marbles and ball bearings against the police horses, the overturned lorry, the chairs and the mattresses of the barricades. Binnington interviewed many local characters and included them in the design, which was made into a slide, projected onto the wall and carefully drawn in (Battle of Cable Street, 1995).

The work was well advanced, when, in 1980, fascists climbed the wall and daubed the mural with the words 'British Nationalism not Communism – Rights for Whites – Stop the Race War' in six-

foot-high letters. The bottom section of the painting was ruined and Dave Binnington immediately resigned from the project (Battle of Cable Street, 1995).

Another artist, Paul Butler, had become involved in the project and with the help of some other artists was able to complete the mural in 1983. The vandalism continued, however. There were more attacks, and the mural had to be repainted in 1985 and again in 1993. A special varnish has now been applied to the mural so that any further attacks can easily be cleaned off.

The 'Battle' has also provided inspiration for artists of all types. It was featured in Arnold Weskers's play *Chicken Soup with Barley*; it was used in a more surreal fashion in the WOOF Theatre Company's musical production *Shattersongs* by Alan Gibley in the late 1980s; it appeared in the theatre play *No Pasaran* by David Holman, in *The Battle of Cable Street* by Simon Blumfeld (Kushner, Valman, 2000: 203 - 280), and in Steven Berkoff's *East*.

There are also many references to the Battle of Cable Street in popular culture. The Scottish anarcho-punk band Oi Polloi wrote and recorded a song called 'Let the Boots Do the Talking' with a refrain that referenced the Battle:

*We remember Mosley  
And how Cable Street folk fought him  
When we see the fash  
We let the boots do the talking*

The British folk-punk group The Man They Couldn't Hang wrote and recorded a song about the event called 'The Ghosts of Cable Street' on their second album 'How Green Is The Valley' in 1985. There are also some poems related to the Battle, the most famous being *The Tramp Poet*.

## Conclusion

The Battle of Cable Street serves today as a mythologized victory and an important symbol for left-wing organizations. The left-wing organizers were indeed able to attract thousands of ordinary people in order to stop the march taking place. It is also true that they were successful and Mosley 'did not pass'. However, the real impact on the BUF and its membership was very limited. It was Mosley himself (and his self-destructive policies that were unable to attract the consciousness of British people), not the British 'Left', who destroyed the British Union of Fascists. The Battle of Cable Street is therefore more of a symbolic victory than a real one. But after all, symbolic victories have proved many times, throughout history, to be much more important than real ones.

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## **Kazakhstan : pays « musulman » ? Identité religieuse ou identités religieuses ?**

**Nariman Shelekpayev**

*Paris*

*Les cloisons qui partagent les religions n'arrivent pas au ciel.*

Vladimir Solovyov

*L'identité religieuse d'un pays multiethnique comme le Kazakhstan<sup>94</sup> est un objet d'analyse semé d'embûches mais très intéressant à déconstruire. Le paysage religieux du Kazakhsan est extrêmement varié La quasi totalité des régions ou grandes villes a un nombre d'édifices religieux appartenant aux différentes confessions. Les kazakhstannais<sup>95</sup> peuvent se définir comme athées, musulmans, chrétiens orthodoxes, catholiques, protestants, témoins de Jéhovah<sup>96</sup>, bouddhistes, juifs, adventistes du septième jour etc. Le plus fréquent est de se décrire comme «croyant en théorie ou de traditions familiales, mais non pratiquant » donc soit ne pas aller souvent dans des lieux de culte, ou y aller très rarement. La constitution kazakhe proclame le pays laïque avec la liberté de culte. Vu que la religion est une étiquette très importante à l'identification et l'auto-identification et que l'identité religieuse est un aspect très important de l'identité du pays en général, il me semble opportun de déconstruire le paysage et le « mindscape » religieux du Kazakhstan.*

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<sup>94</sup> Sanat Kuškumbaev, *L'identité ethnique et la politique d'intégration sociale au Kazakhstan*, Cahiers d'Asie Centrale, 19-20, 2011, p.465.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Celle-ci est parfois définie comme secte et pas une religion.

Les premiers cas de monothéisme (zoroastrisme) en Asie Centrale datent du IX-X siècles avant J.C. Plus tard le christianisme (néstorianisme), le mitraïsme et le manichéisme se sont propagés de manière hétérogène chez les peuples qui habitaient les territoires entre la mère Caspienne à l'ouest, les montagnes Tianshan au sud et la Sibérie au nord. Parallèlement le téngrianisme, ancienne religion païenne des nomades existait en tant qu'une des croyances principales sur les mêmes territoires. A partir du VIII<sup>ème</sup> siècle l'islam commence à se propager, pour devenir au XIV<sup>ème</sup> siècle la religion officielle d'Etat d'Ouzbek-khan. Le XVIII<sup>ème</sup> siècle a vu cohabiter le christianisme et l'islam sur le territoire kazakhe : ce fait est lié à l'histoire politique de la formation de l'Empire russe. A l'époque de l'Union Soviétique les religions ont été interdites.

À l'heure actuelle les confessions majeures au Kazakhstan sont l'orthodoxie et l'islam, mais l'identité religieuse du pays est assez complexe. Selon le recensement du 2009 plus de 70% de la population kazakhe est musulmane ; plus de 26% est chrétienne orthodoxe.<sup>97</sup> C'est précisément ce chiffre ambigu qui permet à certains chercheurs et acteurs de considérer et de définir le Kazakhstan comme un « pays musulman ». S. Huntington, dans son livre renommé, met le Kazakhstan parmi les pays musulmans avec toutes les conséquences d'une telle classification.<sup>98</sup> La question qu'on pose ici est si les données quantitatives peuvent expliquer le contenu de l'identité religieuse et peuvent-elles servir de seul critère d'attribution de telle ou telle étiquette au pays entier ? Car la « qualité de foi » des kazakhstannais et le degré de leur sentiment religieux, selon la plupart des chercheurs et experts, n'est absolument pas le même que celle des musulmans arabes ou africains et même des autres nations de l'Asie Centrale.<sup>99</sup> Dans ce chapitre on envisage donc de

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<sup>97</sup> Recensement national du 2009.

<sup>98</sup> S. Huntington, "The clash of civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.72, n.3, 1993, p.28 ou encore, par exemple, M. E. Ahrari, "The dynamics of the new great game in Muslim Central Asia", *Central Asian Survey* (1994), 13(4), 525-539.

<sup>99</sup> Orozbek A. Moldaliev, « Le rôle de l'islam dans l'évolution du fait étatique en Asie centrale Postsoviétique », *Cahiers d'Asie Centrale*, numéro 15/16 (2007).

montrer pourquoi les données statistiques sur les religions et les confessions du Kazakhstan exigent une approche critique, mais aussi pourquoi un catalogage du pays entier avec pour base de sa tradition religieuse ou de situation géographique doit se faire avec prudence. Les questions qu'on se pose regardent la nature de l'identité religieuse du Kazakhstan : à quel point le paysage religieux du pays peut être considéré comme une empreinte de son identité religieuse ? A quel point le paysage religieux peut-il contribuer à la construction de l'identité religieuse des habitants du pays ? Est-ce que le Kazakhstan est vraiment un pays musulman et quel est l'élément dominant/sont les éléments dominants de l'identité religieuse des gens ? Enfin quel est le lien entre l'identité ethnique et l'identité religieuse et est-ce que les données statistiques sur les groupes ethniques peuvent aussi marquer la différence entre les identités religieuses de ces groupes ? Afin de mieux répondre à ces questions il me semble nécessaire de commencer par un bref aperçu historique de la situation religieuse au Kazakhstan et ensuite passer à une analyse empirique.

### **Bref aperçu de l'histoire de l'islam sur le territoire du Kazakhstan**

La pénétration de l'islam sur le territoire historique du Kazakhstan s'est déroulée pendant plusieurs siècles, et a commencé par les régions du sud. Selon quelques sources<sup>100</sup>, la première mosquée est apparue sur le territoire kazakhe au neuvième siècle. Ensuite l'islam s'est établi chez les populations sédentaires dans la région de Sept Rivières et du Syr Darya au dixième siècle. Pour plusieurs raisons la propagation de l'Islam a procédé plus rapidement et plus facilement sur les territoires peuplés par les sédentaires et/ou les semi-sédentaires. Avec l'expansion du Khanat mongol « l'islamisation » a ralenti, mais ensuite elle a repris un siècle plus tard.<sup>101</sup> L'islam est devenu la religion officielle sous le regne des khans Bérké (1255-1266) et Ouzbègue (1312-1340). Cependant quand on utilise le terme « islamisation » à l'égard d'un territoire donné et de groupes donnés, il s'agit plutôt d'une relation de type substrat-superstratum car l'islam n'arrivait pas dans

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<sup>100</sup> Les travaux de Abu-Shama Al Makdissi dans *Le Recueil des Historiens des Croisades*, mais aussi les fouilles sur le territoire de la ville d'Otrar où les restes du mosqué avec la coupole ont été trouvés.

<sup>101</sup> S.L.Tikhvinskyi, « Les mongolo-tatars en Asie et en Europe », Moscou, 1977.

un lieu vide mais venait se surperpose aux cultes et croyances déjà existants. A chaque fois selon les facteurs géographiques et culturels, la nouvelle religion s'est superposée sur des substrats différents: au Kazakhstan cela a été le Tengrianisme, dans le cas de Perse le Zoroastrisme, quant aux berbères du Maghreb, ils existaient chez eux aussi de nombreux cultes pré-islamiques. Ensuite, la nouvelle religion devenait d'abord et surtout l'apanage des élites qui essayaient de s'adapter aux dogmes islamiques pour en tirer des profits géopolitiques. Les gens ordinaires continuaient à professer le Tengrianisme, lequel ne perdit pas son rôle jusqu'au vingtième siècle.<sup>102</sup>

Il faut aussi noter que les jeux géopolitiques avaient apporté pas uniquement l'Islam aux steppes. À un moment donné les Eurasiens se sont ouverts au manichéisme (Ouïgours au cinquième siècle), au judaïsme (les Khazars au dixième siècle)<sup>103</sup>, au nestorianisme (les Argyns, les Naimans, les Kereys aux XI-XII siècle)<sup>104</sup> et le catholicisme (les Polovets aux XIII-XIV siècle)<sup>105</sup>. Le confucianisme chinois et le bouddhisme n'étaient pas complètement étrangers pour certains des habitants de la Steppe non plus. I.V.Yerofeeva estime qu'au début de la période moderne, les régions de l'Est, Centre et du Sud-Est du Kazakhstan sont devenues les frontières de la propagation du bouddhisme et de la culture bouddhiste. Aujourd'hui le territoire du Kazakhstan dispose encore d'un certain nombre de monuments bouddhistes dans divers états de conservation.<sup>106</sup>

Après l'accession du Juz Mineur à la Russie en 1731 (d'ailleurs l'accession même a duré un siècle

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<sup>102</sup> Artykbayev J.O., « Histoire du Kazakhstan », Astana, 2004., p.159.

<sup>103</sup> Lewicki T. 'Arisu, un nom de tribu énigmatique cité dans la lettre du roi khazar Joseph (Xe siècle), *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, vol. 3 N°1. Janvier-mars 1962, pp. 90-101. apud P. K. Kokovcov, «La Correspondance judéo-khazare au Xe siècle», Lénigrade, 1932.

<sup>104</sup> Voir « La légende de Prêtre Ioanne » chez Édith et François-Bernard Huyghe, « La route de la soie ou les empires du mirage », Petite Bibliothèque Payot, Paris, 2006 ; Marie-Paule Caire-Jabinet, « Le royaume du Prêtre Jean », *L'Histoire*, N°22, avril 1980, p. 36-43.

<sup>105</sup> « Codex Cumanicus », Bibliothèque de Saint Marc, Venise (Cod. Mar. Lat. DXLIX).

<sup>106</sup> I.V.Yeroffeyeva, « Les monuments du Bouddhisme Tibétain du milieu dix-septième - première moitié du dixhuitième siècle au Kazakhstan : nouvelles découvertes et recherches », recueil des articles de la conférence au mémoire de N.Masanov, Almaty, 2008.

et demi), l'islam n'a pas perdu son rôle et son statut, mais au contraire s'est renforcé. Puisque l'islamisation devait contribuer à la sédentarisation des peuples nomades, un plan ambitieux de transition a été élaboré par l'administration russe. Par le décret spécial de Cathérine II, des centaines de mollahs tatars ont été envoyés dans les steppes.<sup>107</sup> Un système de privilèges a été créé, comme ça les Tatars - citoyens de l'Empire Russe, immigrés dans la steppe, ont commencé à jouer un rôle important dans les services de culte, mais aussi dans le commerce et l'éducation. Au début du XIX les historiens et les géographes russes ont noté et décrit la "tatarisation" de l'Horde kazakhe.<sup>108</sup> L'islamisation a été accompagnée par le déplacement de la culture traditionnelle ainsi que l'écriture des nomades. Beaucoup de stèles avec les anciens textes runiques ont été détruites. Les chamans tengriens – porteurs de la spiritualité traditionnelle nomade ont été exposés à des persécutions. Malgré tout cela, même au milieu du XIXe siècle, l'islam n'arrivait pas à se faire accepter chez les nomades. Tchokan Valikhanov, géographe et historien kazakh au service de l'Empire russe écrit en 1857 : «L'islam n'est pas ancré dans notre chair et dans notre sang. Il nous apporte la menace de la division du peuple dans l'avenir. Il y a beaucoup de kazakhs qui ne connaissent même pas le nom de Mohammed et nos chamans dans plusieurs régions n'ont pas encore perdu leur importance. Nous vivons maintenant la période de double croyance... »

Au début du XXe siècle les Kazakhs, ayant préservé la mentalité nomado-tengrienne, ont commencé à devenir une sorte d'ethnie sédentaire, qui a adopté pour des raisons externes et internes le Coran et la charia comme religion. Le pivot de l'identité religieuse fut ainsi créé. Les plus proches des peuples-frères des Kazakhs comme les Ouzbeks et les Kirghizes étaient aussi musulmans. De l'autre côté, il y avait d'autres ethnies eurasiennes nomades et semi-nomades proches aux Kazakhs, comme les Yakoutes, les Khakas, les Gagaouzes ou les Tchouvaches qui n'avaient pas accepté l'islam. Pourtant, la bureaucratie tsariste ne se pressait pas de construire des

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<sup>107</sup> Artykbayev J.O., « Histoire du Kazakhstan », Astana, 2004., p.159.

<sup>108</sup> Islam dans l'Empire Russe (législation, description, statistique), édité par D.Yu. Arapov, Moscou, 2001. Encore Sultangaliyeva A.K., « Islam au Kazakhstan : histoire, ethnie et société », Almaty, 1998.

écoles pour les indigènes. En même temps les mollahs tatars, avec leur enseignement primaire (les madrasas auprès des mosquées) étaient disponibles pour la population. L'alphabétisation des Kazakhs a commencé donc avec la ligature des lettres arabes au XIX<sup>ème</sup> siècle. Peu à peu, l'écriture runique ainsi que la poésie épique traditionnelle ont été effacé ou remplacé par la poésie et les contes de fées arabes et persans. Les hadiths musulmans auparavant inconnus ont pénétrés dans la culture kazakhe. Linguistiquement les changements religieux et culturels se sont manifestés surtout au niveau du vocabulaire : celui(-ci) plus flexible et plus susceptible de changer. La couche turque a été graduellement enseveli par de nombreux emprunts arabo-persans (p.ex. les termes de parenté, les noms des animaux et des affaires militaires).

Dans l'histoire kazakhe le long XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle<sup>109</sup> a été marqué par des soulèvements populaires. Mais, contrairement à des mouvements similaires dans les autres territoires dominés par la Russie comme par exemple le Caucase, ces soulèvements n'étaient pas doté d' une composante religieuse ou en contenaient peu. La Révolution d'Octobre a porté un coup à l'existence et au développement de l'islam et de toute autre religion sur le territoire kazakhe et de l'ex URSS. Les changements du mode de vie ont contribué à l'érosion des traditions religieuses et à la sécularisation voire l'athéisme chez la plupart de la population. Dans un souci d'objectivité il faut ajouter que les événements de 1917 ont contribué à la reprise de l'activité politique des partis nationalistes modérés avec l'auto-identification musulmane : au Kazakhstan cela a été le cas de Alach-Orda, dont les leaders ont été plus tard exterminé par Staline. Déjà à la fin des années 1920 et le début des années 1930 la politique des autorités soviétiques à l'égard de l'islam est devenu assez rigide. Le renforcement des Soviets a amené la confiscation ou la destruction des bâtiments de culte, la fermeture des mosquées, les tribunaux de la charia furent interdits etc. Une partie considérable des mosquées, en particulier dans les zones rurales a été transformé en écoles, clubs ou magasins. Répression du clergé, accusé d'espionnage, de sabotage ou de l'activité contrerévolutionnaire ont

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<sup>109</sup> Terminologie de Eric Hobsbawm.

eu lieu partout au Kazakhstan.<sup>110</sup> Le passage à l'éducation scolaire laïque sous le modèle soviétique avait entraîné la transformation de l'écriture : d'abord de l'arabe à l'alphabet latin et ensuite du latin au cyrillique.<sup>111</sup> Cela a joué un rôle très important dans le processus de la sécularisation de la société kazakhe dans les années 1930. La politique de l'extermination du clergé a contribué à l'émergence des mollahs «non officiels », qui exerçaient des rites religieux. Les activités religieuses ont été souvent concentrées autour des différents lieux saints ainsi que les tombes des saints musulmans. Souvent les croyants faisaient le pèlerinage en ces lieux : cela aurait du substituer le pèlerinage à la Mecque désormais inaccessible. Depuis la fin des années 50 les sanctuaires musulmans sont devenus la cible principale de la propagande anti-musulmane, parfois les autorités détruisaient les sanctuaires ou les faisaient devenir des musées de l'athéisme, clubs ou centres de loisir. Tout de même la littérature soviétique anti-religieuse des années 50' et 60' constate qu'une partie des lieux de culte a quand même fonctionné. La lutte contre les traditions religieuses dans la vie familiale est devenue le noyau de propagande anti-religieuse dans les années 1960-1970. De nombreux livres anti-islamiques ont été publiés en kazakh. Toutefois, la propagande anti-religieuse n'était pas considérée comme opprimante par la plupart de la population et n'a pas produit un effet significatif sur la vie quotidienne de la société kazakhe. Par ailleurs, les autorités officielles ont dû trouver un compromis entre l'idéologie qui appelait à la lutte contre la religion et la constitution qui proclamait la liberté de culte. Durant cette période, les communautés musulmanes ne possédant pas de mosquées devaient accomplir les rites religieux à la maison.

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<sup>110</sup> Des accusations les plus communes et typiques.

<sup>111</sup> Du point de vue socio-culturel l'islam est étroitement lié à la langue arabe. Pour les kazakhs ainsi que pour les autres peuples convertis à l'islam, cette langue : sa culture et son savoir incarnés dans la production écrite symbolisaient au plus haut degré l'islam et ses rites. Avec la transition au nouvel alphabet cyrillique le clergé musulman a perdu beaucoup de son influence sur la vie spirituelle de la population.

Malgré les pressions et les représailles, dans les zones de résidence compacte des musulmans<sup>112</sup>, en particulier dans les zones rurales, les musulmans ont continué à pratiquer les rites et célébrer les fêtes religieuses. Les cérémonies funéraires et les mariages religieux, la circoncision, la fête du Sacrifice (Kurban-Ait), le jeûne (Oraza Ait) furent présents. En même temps, les traditions pré-islamiques faisaient partie de la vie quotidienne des croyants aussi (!): le culte de la pluie "tasattyk", encore "besik ou", "kars ou", "suyek zhatsgyrtu", le vol de jeunes filles pour le mariage, la rançon, le pain cuit dans les jours de commémoration. Tous ces rites - n'étant pas musulmans, ont été considérés par certains kazakhs comme musulmans. Le culte des saints tengrien a continué à occuper une place importante dans la vie spirituelle des kazakhs. Les représentants de la tradition islamique « officielle » ainsi que les fondateurs de clans et de tribus et les représentants de l'aristocratie locale faisaient partie du panthéon des saints tengriens. Pendant la période soviétique, les croyants fanatiques étaient très rares même dans les régions méridionales les plus touchées par l'islam. A la veille de l'effondrement de l'Union soviétique, la plupart des « musulmans » du Kazakhstan ne respectaient pas les règles fondamentales de l'islam : dans les zones rurales, seules les rares personnes âgées allaient à la mosquée, récitaient des prières, faisaient le jeûne. Les prières quotidiennes ont été effectuées par certains individus, surtout de générations plus âgées, ayant plus de temps libre. L'une des prescriptions de l'islam, le pèlerinage (Hadj) aux sanctuaires en Arabie Saoudite, a été, comme déjà indiqué, difficile à réaliser au Kazakhstan Soviétique. Avant la révolution d'octobre c'étaient les personnes riches et les membres du clergé qui l'exécutaient. Après, jusqu'aux années 80 il y avait à peine quelques dizaines de personnes dans tout le pays qui ont pu le faire, certaines croyants pensaient que les visites dans les lieux saints musulmans locaux pouvaient équivaler à Hadj. Dans le sud du Kazakhstan un tel lieu sacré était le mausolée de Khoja Ahmed Yasawi.<sup>113</sup> Ce qui est intéressant à noter, c'est que le clergé officiel ne considérait pas possible une substitution du pèlerinage aux lieux saints de l'Arabie Saoudite par la visite aux

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<sup>112</sup> Il ne faut pas perdre de vue le fait que les kazakhs ont été la minorité ethnique dans leurs pays à l'époque soviétique.

<sup>113</sup> Voir l'illustration 1.

sanctuaires locaux. La plupart des croyants ont suivi les règles les plus générales de l'islam : parmi lesquelles la plus évidente était de ne pas manger du porc. Par contre, le régime alimentaire de nombreux Kazakhs urbains, se composait de saucisses et autres produits à base de porc dont la consommation n'était pas considérée comme répréhensible.

La lutte contre la religion et la propagande anti-religieuse a porté aussi ses fruits dans la destruction de la conscience religieuse. Toutefois, l'islam comme toute autre religion n'a pas été complètement éradiqué de la conscience et de la mémoire collective. Tout au long de la période soviétique les cérémonies civiques ont été accompagnées par les rituels religieux. Le champ des relations familiales et de la famille a été fut le domaine dans lequel l'islam, même adapté, changé ou muté, a conservé sa position jusqu'à nos jours.

Mais une « renaissance » « islamique » qui aurait touché toute la société ou « la revanche de Dieu »<sup>114</sup> comme phénomène social, a-t-elle eu lieu au Kazakhstan ? Premièrement, il est à notre avis possible de parler de la réapparition des cultes autrefois interdits ou oubliés, qui ont pu se manifester à la lumière du jour après la chute de l'Union Soviétique et l'acquisition des droits civils basiques. Deuxièmement, dans la période post-soviétique la quantité de mosquées au Kazakhstan a augmenté, mais il s'agit surtout d'un phénomène quantitatif qui sans une présence d'une « vraie » conscience religieuse ne manifeste pas grand chose. Depuis 1990 la liberté de religion accompagnée par les mouvements démocratiques est devenue un symbole de la délivrance du passé soviétique totalitaire. Mais le problème de l'islam kazakhstannais a toujours été et reste aujourd'hui le manque de conscience religieuse et de sentiment religieux chez les croyants. C'est ce manque qui nous fournit un autre regard sur la continuité et la discontinuité des phénomènes religieux et des identités religieuses pendant deux derniers siècles au Kazakhstan. Plus précisément, nous voyons que les changements de la politique religieuse de l'Etat (par ex. le

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<sup>114</sup> Une expression de G.Kepel, repris par S.Huntington.

renforcement de l'islamisation pendant l'Empire Russe et ensuite les persécutions et l'interdiction de l'Islam pendant l'Union Soviétique) n'a pas considérablement changé les attitudes des gens «ordinaires» envers l'islam. En terme de longue durée les kazakhs ont toujours été des de «mauvais» musulmans.<sup>115</sup>

### **Le Christianisme au Kazakhstan**

La présence du Christianisme au Kazakhstan comme en toute l'Asie centrale remontent au troisième siècle après J.C. Son apparition est devenue possible en raison de l'afflux de la population chrétienne persécutée de Syrie, Palestine et l'Iran. Les flux migratoires de la population chrétienne dans cette région étaient étroitement liés avec les grands axes transcontinentaux des voies commerciales et diplomatiques, parmi lesquels une place particulière est occupée par la Route de la Soie. Cette voie était non seulement un moyen de partager des réalisations économiques, technologiques, scientifiques, mais aussi les de contacts spirituels des cultures et des doctrines. «Ces routes, traversant l'Inde et l'Iran, se déplaçaient progressivement vers le sud de la Bactriane, dans les régions de l'Asie Centrale : la Ferghana, le Sogde, et plus tard grâce à l'oasis de Tachkent vers les zones de steppes nomades dans le sud du Kazakhstan et de Sept Rivières ».<sup>116</sup> Au huitième siècle les églises chrétiennes existaient à Otrar, Ispidzhab, Taraz, Navaket, Suyab. Des fouilles archéologiques ont montré de nombreuses traces laissées par la culture chrétienne. Les flux migratoires de la population croyante chrétienne dans le sud du Kazakhstan et de Sept Rivières sont devenus la base pour la formation du christianisme dans cette région depuis le sixième siècle et fut le facteur majeur de sa propagation jusqu'au quatorzième siècle. Les premiers missionnaires franciscains ont joué un rôle particulier dans la propagation du christianisme dans la région. Tels noms comme Jean de Plan Carpin, Guillaume de Rubrouck ; mais aussi des diplomates

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<sup>115</sup> Habiba Fathi, « Les réseaux mystiques au Kazakhstan : entre *dhikr* et militantisme ? », *Cahiers d'Asie Centrale*, num.15/16, 2007.

<sup>116</sup> Grégor Prikhodko, *Histoire du Christianisme au Kazakhstan et en Asie Centrale au Moyen Age*, Karaganda, 2000, pages 135-181.

missionnaires, comme par exemple Jean de Montecorvino etc. sont connus grâce aux sources documentaires qu'ils ont produit pendant les voyages. Beaucoup de missionnaires ont été les premiers martyrs chrétiens de l'Est. Il est à noter qu'il y avait des missions à la fois temporaires et permanentes. Ainsi, nous voyons que le christianisme fut présent en Asie Centrale et au Kazakhstan dès les premiers siècles de son existence et beaucoup plus tôt par rapport à la Russie Kiévienne. Donc la migration et le travail des missionnaires sont devenus les facteurs fondamentaux pour l'apparition et le développement du christianisme au Kazakhstan. Dans le Moyen Age le rôle et l'importance du christianisme se diminuent en faveur de l'islam.

La réapparition du christianisme a été associée à l'incorporation progressive de trois Jüz Kazakhs à l'Empire russe. Ce processus, qui a duré plus de 130 ans, a commencé dans les années 1730 et a terminé en 1865 avec l'adoption de la citoyenneté russe par le Grand Jüz. Le dix-neuvième siècle fut marqué par l'arrivée de nombreux chrétiens (militaires, ingénieurs de mines, géographes et chercheurs, exilés politiques, etc.) La diffusion du christianisme a été progressive : le développement administratif et économique de la région des steppes et la construction des avant-postes militaires ont progressivement formé l'apparition des espaces peuplés majoritairement par les chrétiens. La plupart des immigrants étaient orthodoxes - principalement de nationalité russe, mais des catholiques et des protestants allemands ont été aussi présents.

La structure confessionnelle de l'Empire russe de la fin du XIXe siècle avait une influence directe sur la structure de la réinstallation des migrants qui arrivaient en Sibérie, au Kazakhstan et en Asie Centrale. Les particularités de l'installation des nouveaux arrivants ont défini l'apparition des villages assez homogènes sur le plan confessionnel, spécialement pour les ukrainiens, les polonais, les lituaniens et dans une moindre mesure, pour les russes. Les immigrants allemands ont été particulièrement « isolés ». Au début du vingtième siècle de nombreux villages catholiques fondées par les immigrants polonais et allemands, avaient leurs propres églises, chapelles et lieux

de culte. Le facteur de migration a été décisif pour les religions : l'origine des migrants n'a pas seulement défini le pourcentage de population dans telle ou telle région, mais aussi leur proportion a défini les principales régions de la propagation du catholicisme, de l'orthodoxie et du protestantisme au Kazakhstan.<sup>117</sup> Il est important de noter que les immigrants et leurs traditions religieuses ont été accueilli chaleureusement par les Kazakhs ou en tout cas les sources russes du dix-neuvième siècle ne contiennent pas de descriptions ou de données sur l'intolérance religieuse, les conflits et le comportement agressif des Kazakhs à l'égard des immigrants. De l'autre côté le fait de la conversion massive au christianisme des Kazakhs n'a pas été non plus observé.

L'afflux important de personnes de la foi chrétienne au Kazakhstan a été observée dans les années 1936 -1941, lors de la réinstallation forcée des Polonais et des Allemands provenant des zones frontalières de l'Ukraine. Environ 500.000 personnes ont été transféré. La grande majorité d'elles étaient catholiques et ont été envoyés au Kazakhstan du Nord et dans l'oblast de Karaganda. L'expulsion forcée des ukrainiens, bielorusses, russes, tatars de Crimée, polonais des régions occidentales de l'Union Soviétique a contribué à l'augmentation du nombre de chrétiens (principalement catholiques) dans la population du Kazakhstan. C'était en même temps le plus puissant des flux migratoires, au cours duquel le territoire de l'habitat des groupes confessionnels chrétiens a considérablement élargi. En outre, les chrétiens tout comme les musulmans kazakhstannais n'avaient pas la liberté de culte jusqu'aux années 80 du vingtième siècle. Ils devaient se contenter de « l'église de catacombes » : les prières secrètes en groupes à la maison au lieu d'une messe dans l'église. Les personnes âgées ont essayé de préserver leur foi et de la transmettre aux enfants. Les baptêmes se faisaient à la maison, en l'absence d'un prêtre, les rites (ont) été accomplis par les grands-mères.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Pourcentage de catholiques a initialement été beaucoup plus faible par rapport aux ortodoxes.

<sup>118</sup> Vl. Bukovinsky, « Souvenirs sur le Kazakhstan », Karaganda, 2000, p.199-283 ; Schnurr J., « Die Kirchen und das religiöse Leben der Russlanddeutschen: Katholischer Teil », Stuttgart, 1980. S. 100-124, p.136-151.

### **Le Catholicisme et l'Orthodoxie au Kazakhstan d'aujourd'hui**

Comme on a déjà noté, la renaissance de l'Eglise catholique a commencé dans les années 90 du XXième siècle. En 1991 le Vatican a établi l'administration apostolique au Kazakhstan. Les années 90 ont été une époque de renouveau de la foi, du réveil de la conscience religieuse des gens et de leur « retour au dieu ». Un rôle énorme dans ce processus a été joué de nouveau par les missionnaires catholiques, qui sont arrivés au Kazakhstan de l'Occident (Allemagne, Italie, Pologne, Slovaquie, etc) En l'absence de « formation spirituelle » in loco l'activité missionnaire est devenue un facteur important dans la relance et le développement de l'Eglise catholique du Kazakhstan indépendant. En 1994, le pays comptait 40 paroisses catholiques avec 26 prêtres. En 1998, le nombre de paroisses catholiques a presque doublé.<sup>119</sup>

Comme avant, les facteurs migratoires ont de nouveau joué un rôle significatif, mais contrairement aux années 30' et 40', c'était un processus d'émigration massive, dont principalement des familles d'origine allemande, polonaise et russe qui revenaient « chez eux ». Ce processus a touché directement les paroisses catholiques car l'émigration des chrétiens orthodoxes a été moins forte. L'émigration de masse de la population allemande a porté un coup sévère à l'Église catholique, en la privant d'une grande partie de paroissiens. En 1999, le taux de la population d'origine allemande a baissé de près de 600 000 par rapport au 1989. Le solde négatif de la croissance chez les non-kazakhs était de 62,7%. Les conséquences de ce processus ont été significatifs soit pour la situation démographique au Kazakhstan que pour le climat religieux dans le pays.<sup>120</sup>

Pour conclure, dans les années 90', le processus d'émigration, comme nous l'avons vu, a eu pour effet une forte réduction du nombre de catholiques dans toutes les régions du Kazakhstan. Le problème de l'émigration est devenu un enjeu central dans la vie de la majorité des paroisses.

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<sup>119</sup> L.A.Burghart, « Les Catholiques kazakhstannais au moment de l'établissement de l'Administration Apostolique au Kazakhstan et en Asie Centrale : quelques caractéristiques démographiques », Ust-Kamenogorsk, 2010.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

Les pertes subies par l'Église catholique en raison de l'émigration, sont irremplaçables à ce jour. Actuellement, la communauté catholique au Kazakhstan est moins homogène qu'auparavant. La plupart des catholiques sont quand même Polonais, Allemands, Ukrainiens, mais il y a aussi une communauté coréenne et quelques russes et kazakhs catholiques. Un archidiocèse, deux diocèses, une administration apostolique, 60 paroisses, 3 évêques, 26 prêtres diocésains, 17 prêtres-moines, 19 moines et 40 soeurs s'occupent de environ 300 000 catholiques kazakhstannais.<sup>121</sup>

En ce qui concerne l'Église orthodoxe, à ce jour il y a six diocèses orthodoxes dans le pays<sup>122</sup>. Les trois nouveaux diocèses sont formées par l'Église orthodoxe russe dans le Nord et le Nord-Est du Kazakhstan : les régions avec la haute concentration des groupes orthodoxes( groupes orthodoxes). A la veille de l'effondrement de l'Union soviétique les orthodoxes(\*) ont été une majorité relative de la population de sept régions du nord et du nord-est de Kazakhstan – c'est-à-dire au Kazakhstan oriental (65,9%), Kazakhstan septentrional (62,1%), à Karaganda (52,2%), Pavlodar (45,4% ) Tselinograd (44,7%), Kustanai (43,7%) et Kokchetav (39,5%), et dans les trois premiers ils étaient aussi une majorité absolue par rapport aux représentants des autres confessions. Au total, les russes ont été un peu moins de la moitié (47,6%) de la population des régions du nord, presque deux fois plus nombreux que les Kazakhs (27,8%) et représentaient, avec les ukrainiens et les biélorusses qui vivaient ici la majorité orthodoxe absolue. Malgré le fait que la population russe du Kazakhstan a diminué d'un quart aux années entre 1990 et 2000 à cause de l'émigration massive, la situation éthno-démographique et religieuse des régions du nord n'a pas radicalement changé, même si une certaine diminution de la proportion des chrétiens a eu lieu. Comme ça (ainsi) , à la fin des années 80' les russes composaient 47,6% de la population des régions du nord, à la fin des années 90' ils étaient 43,6%, tandis que les Kazakhs - 38,5%. Selon les statistiques de l'année 2010 les musulmans ont été toujours une minorité religieuse au régions du nord du Kazakhstan. Même

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Un à Almaty, à Ouralsk et à Shymkent et trois récemment formés à Kostanay, Pavlodar et Karagandy.

les mesures comme le déplacement de la capitale d'Almaty à Astana, la relocalisation des immigrants d'origine kazakhe provenant d'autres pays et l'unification des régions majoritairement peuplées par les russes avec les zones peuplées par les kazakhs<sup>123</sup>, n'ont pas réussi à renverser la situation. Au Kazakhstan il y a aujourd'hui neuf monastères, 230 paroisses et 300 prêtres orthodoxes. La plupart des paroisses sont concentrées dans les régions traditionnellement peuplées par les russes : celles du nord et nord-est, où les trois nouveaux diocèses ont été formés. Au fait, la communauté orthodoxe du Kazakhstan est une des plus grandes dans le monde entier. Le nombre d'orthodoxes au Kazakhstan est d'environ 5 millions de personnes. En comparant ces chiffres avec les données sur le nombre de chrétiens orthodoxes dans les autres pays, nous voyons que le Kazakhstan surpasse la Macédoine (1 million), la Géorgie (2 millions) et la Moldavie (3 millions) et qu'il a approximativement le même nombre que le Bélarus.

### **L'identité religieuse et les données quantitatives**

Pour un chercheur travaillant sur l'identité(s) religieuse(s) au Kazakhstan il existe un problème avec l'estimation du nombre des croyants. Les chiffres plus ou moins fiables sont disponibles à l'égard des catholiques, on peut généralement trouver de l'information sur les orthodoxes. Les statistiques sur les musulmans dans les villes comme dans les régions sont très difficiles à obtenir. Cela est dû non seulement au fait que l'oumma n'a pas de distinction entre le clergé et les laïcs (contrairement, par exemple, aux catholiques qui ont un certain nombre de prêtres par paroisse, chaque paroisse ayant un certain nombre d'âmes), mais l'absence d'une structure dans les organisations musulmanes du Kazakhstan, qui s'occuperaient de l'estimation des fidèles.<sup>124</sup>

Une solution serait de considérer l'appartenance religieuse à la base d'ethnie mais comme certaines personnes peuvent être athées ou appartenir aux autres religions, une telle méthodologie

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<sup>123</sup> Voir la réforme administrative du territoire kazakhe du 1997.

<sup>124</sup> La structure officielle est l'Organisation spirituelle des musulmans du Kazakhstan, mais ils existent quand même les groupes et les organisations par ethnie et par confession (mosquées tatars, azéris, shiites et sunnis etc.)

est douteuse. Strictement parlant, le nombre d'adeptes de toute religion peut être estimée de deux manières principales: à la base de l'appartenance ethnique ou à travers une enquête sociologique. La première méthode est moins précise mais plus accessible, comme le nombre d'un groupe ethnique particulier est connu par les statistiques actuelles démographiques. L'utilisation de la seconde méthode est compliquée parce que le sondage doit embrasser toutes les régions du pays et le nombre de répondants doit être suffisamment élevée. A la base des statistiques sur les groupes ethniques, nous pouvons conclure que, à la veille de l'effondrement de l'Union Soviétique les russes ont été la plus grande ethnique sur le territoire kazakhe, ce qui a distingué le Kazakhstan par rapport aux autres républiques de l'Asie centrale ainsi comme autres pays de l'ex Union Soviétique. Selon le recensement du 1989 la population de la République Soviet Socialiste Kazakhe comptait 7.640.600 de kazakhs et 8.258.400 de russes, ce qui correspond à, respectivement, 47,3 et 51% de la population. Dix ans plus tard, la hiérarchie de deux ethnies a changé. En 1999, il y avait 9.077.800 de kazakhs et 5.593.200 de russes. En conséquence, la proportion de kazakhs a augmenté jusqu'au 60,7%, et celle des russes a baissé à 37,5%.<sup>125</sup> C'est ce chiffre qui permet aux acteurs de niveau différent de calculer le pourcentage approximatif des musulmans et des chrétiens, depuis que « la religion et l'origine ethnique sont liées l'une avec l'autre ». Mais un kazakh n'est pas nécessairement musulman, ainsi qu'une russe n'est pas nécessairement chrétienne.

Cependant, les sondages donnent une image quelque peu différente. En 2002 l'enquête sociologique<sup>126</sup> a interrogé 1120 personnes au Kazakhstan. 50,4% d'entre eux se sont identifiés en tant que croyants, 21,5% ont déclaré qu'ils étaient pas très croyants, mais ils faisaient des pratiques religieuses, 14,2% ont dit qu'ils étaient non croyants qui respectaient les croyants, 7,6% de répondants étaient indifférents, et 1,3% se sont identifiés comme des ennemis de la religion. Pour

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<sup>125</sup> Recensement du 1999.

<sup>126</sup> Sondage fait par Centre de recherches sociologiques (ЦЕССИ).

la question : «Quelle est votre religion? » 33,4% ont choisi l'islam, 35,4% l'orthodoxie, 2,4% - le catholicisme, 0,8% le protestantisme, 0,2% ont choisi les mouvements religieux non-traditionnels. Le reste des répondants était indécis. Les résultats de cette enquête suggèrent que le christianisme dépassait le nombre d'adhérents de l'islam. Le nombre total de croyants chrétiens au Kazakhstan à cette époque était proche de 40% de la population, bien que ce chiffre n'a pas inclus (les) des représentants des sectes chrétiennes non traditionnelles : les pentecôtistes, les charismatiques, les baptistes, etc. qui étaient apparemment très actives à l'époque dans le pays. Ces données peuvent gravement endommager la représentation du Kazakhstan comme un pays musulman ou à majorité musulmane.

Quant'au recensement le plus récent (2010) a (dépeint dans ce sens) peint un tableau tout à fait différent. Selon ses données, environ 70,19% de la population du Kazakhstan (11,2 millions) sont musulmans et 26% (4,2 millions) chrétiens. Ces résultats provoquent un extrême scepticisme et de nombreuses questions. Si la réduction du nombre de chrétiens est encore possible à expliquer d'expliquer par le processus de migration, l'augmentation aussi importante des musulmans dans une période aussi courte n'est pas possible, ainsi que la disparition presque complète des athées. Il est possible que l'écart entre les données du recensement de 2010 et l'enquête de 2002 est due aux différences dans les méthodes de leur mise en œuvre mais il est évident que pour étudier l'identité religieuse il nous faut d'autres données et méthodes d'analyse.

Néanmoins, l'analyse la plus superficielle des chiffres sur la situation confessionnelle démontre une brusque croissance quantitative des confessions, dénominations et organisations religieuses depuis l'indépendance kazakhstanaise. Ce phénomène a créé une situation très particulière, caractérisée par le pluralisme religieux. En 1989 il y avait 671 associations religieuses sur le territoire du Kazakhstan, en 2011 leur quantité a sextuplé devenant 4173. 42 confessions, unions, missions et mouvements religieux y sont présentés. Mais ces données ne couvrent que les

associations religieuses officiellement enregistrées, dont l'activité est connue aux organes étatiques et aux médias. En même temps, environ un nombre d'associations religieuses travaillent sans registration.


## 2.2. Quantité des mosquées par ville/par pays.<sup>127</sup>

<b>Ville ou pays</b>	<b>Population totale</b>	<b>Quantité des mosquées</b>	<b>Habitants par 1 mosquée</b>
<b>Turquie</b>	<b>74,724,269(2011)</b>	<b>76 000</b>	<b>955</b>
<b>Arabie Saoudite</b>	<b>27,136,977(2010)</b>	<b>70 000</b>	<b>386</b>
<b>Kazakhstan</b>	<b>15 522 373(2010)</b>	<b>2 400</b>	<b>6749</b>
<b>Istanbul</b>	<b>14 570 000</b>	<b>3 028</b>	<b>4812</b>
<b>Riyad</b>	<b>4 606 888</b>	<b>2 400</b>	<b>1920</b>
<b>Damas</b>	<b>Env.4 000 000</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2000</b>
<b>Almaty</b>	<b>1 497 500</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>45379</b>
<b>Londre</b>	<b>8 326 842</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>83268</b>
<b>Pékin</b>	<b>17 817 968</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>254542</b>
<b>New-York</b>	<b>8 700 000</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>62143</b>
<b>Moscou</b>	<b>10 514 000</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1752400</b>

**Tableau 1.**

<sup>127</sup> Données ramassées sur des nombreux sites-internet.

### Les établissements religieux à Karaganda<sup>128</sup>



**Le pourcentage des établissements religieux par confession à Karaganda (2011), Tableau 2.**

Avec ces deux derniers tableaux, on voit que la situation est quelque peu différente par rapport aux données statistiques et aux représentations qu'on a vu au début du chapitre. Dans le tableau n ° 2, nous voyons que le nombre de mosquées à Almaty est considérablement inférieur par rapport aux pays avec la population majoritairement musulmane. Par contre, la quantité de croyants par mosquée est un peu moins « intense » que dans les pays avec majorité de population non-musulmane, mais tout de même incomparable aux pays comme l'Arabie saoudite et la Turquie, et des villes comme Damas, Istanbul et à Riyad où il y a beaucoup plus d'églises. Bien sûr, on doit

<sup>128</sup> Les données sur Karaganda nous ont été procurées par l'Administration de la Région de Karaganda en janvier 2012 et elles constatent la situation qui a eu lieu en 2011.

travailler avec ces données avec prudence, car elles ne reflètent pas des facteurs importants tels que la fréquentation, ainsi que divers facteurs régionaux, sociaux et autres.

Une autre façon de clarifier la situation sur l'identité religieuse peut être une tentative de représenter graphiquement le rapport entre les organisations religieuses enregistrées et donc reconnues officiellement par l'état. Le tableau n ° 3 qui représente la situation dans de la ville de Karaganda, est frappant : nous voyons clairement que la majorité des institutions religieuses à Karaganda n'appartient à aucun des quatre religions «officielles»! Illustration n ° 4 est une tentative de cartographier le «paysage religieux».

### **Le manuel « Sciences religieuses »**

Le manuel intitulé «Sciences religieuses » est destiné aux étudiants des lycées kazakhs et recommandé par le Ministère de l'Éducation nationale.<sup>129</sup> Depuis 2009, l'apprentissage des sciences religieuses est devenu obligatoire aux lycées kazakhs. Les professeurs ayant l'expérience d'enseignement des sciences sociales (par ex. l'histoire, la culture ou l'esthétique etc.) sont invités à enseigner les sciences religieuses. La nécessité de l'introduction à la nouvelle discipline a été expliquée par le fait que « même si l'État en vertu de sa Constitution est laïque, la liberté de conscience signifie que toute personne, y compris des enfants ont le droit de professer n'importe quelle religion ou de n'en professer aucune. »

L'auteur principal de l'ouvrage est Garifolla Yessim, professeur, membre de l'Académie Nationale des Sciences et même temps sénateur de la République. Garifolla Yessim a commencé sa carrière dans les années 60' du XXIème siècle comme professeur du matérialisme dialectique, histoire et philosophie pour devenir ensuite spécialiste en philosophie kazakhe et philosophie de la littérature kazakhe. Selon G.Yessim, le but du manuel est d'aider les étudiants à « former la vision du monde

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<sup>129</sup> Publié en 2009 par un collectif de 4 auteurs, G.Yessim étant l'auteur principal.

humaniste, ainsi que les valeurs spirituelles et morales et leur propre système de convictions : religieux ou non-religieux ». Pourtant dans un de ses nombreux interviews<sup>130</sup> G.Yessim déclare « qu'il est impossible de vivre sans foi ».

### **Le manuel a 6 chapitres, 18 paragraphes et 30 illustrations**

Dans le premier chapitre l'objet d'étude, les concepts de base des études religieuses ainsi que la différence entre le polythéisme et le monothéisme sont expliqués. Le deuxième chapitre introduit les origines de "formes historiques" de la religion et des religions « archaïques », y compris les croyances religieuses de la Grèce antique ; mais aussi le zoroastrisme, le shintoïsme, le judaïsme et tengrianism. La première partie du troisième chapitre est consacrée aux religions « mondiales »: le bouddhisme, le christianisme et ses principales courants et le judaïsme. La deuxième partie du troisième chapitre est entièrement consacrée à l'islam: le livre sacré des musulmans, les écoles et les principales tendances, les rituels et les règlements sont présentés. En outre, la notion du djihad, la guerre sainte des musulmans, est expliquée. Le quatrième chapitre décrit le rôle de la religion dans l'histoire et la culture du Kazakhstan, le cinquième est sur les nouveaux mouvements religieux. Le sixième chapitre s'appelle «Kazakhstan – territoire de l'harmonie inter religieuse ». La question qu'on se pose est si ce le titre de ce dernier chapitre est sur une identité réelle ou celle idéale que l'auteur veut voir là où il regarde?

Quant aux nouveaux mouvements religieux, ils sont présentés dans le manuel de manière négative et décrits comme « menaçant » (sans les nommer ou même énumérer), de plus les auteurs insistent sur le fait qu'ils essaient de manipuler les gens et ne favorisent pas « l'enrichissement spirituel ». A propos, le rapport annuel sur la situation religieuse au Kazakhstan<sup>131</sup> du département d'État des

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<sup>130</sup> Garifolla Yessim, Un longue trajet d'Ataméken à Kazak Yeli, interview publié au journal *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 15.12.2011.

<sup>131</sup> Le Rapport sur la liberté de conscience au Kazakhstan en 2006 fait partie du Rapport sur la liberté de conscience dans le monde fait par le Bureau de Démocratie, Droits de l'Homme et Travail du Département d'Etat des Etats-Unis.

États-Unis dit à ce sujet que « les quatre unions confessionnelles, considérées par l'État comme traditionnelles : l'islam, le christianisme orthodoxe, le catholicisme et le judaïsme sont acceptées partout et par tous tandis que *les minorités confessionnelles* et *les « nouveaux » mouvements religieux* n'ont pas toujours un bon accueil et une bonne attitude.»<sup>132</sup> Une telle estimation semble correcte à la lumière des données empiriques sur les « nouveau mouvements religieux », prises du manuel.

Quand on passe aux représentations tout change. Il y a en total 7 représentations des bâtiments religieux musulmans, 7 portraits des savant et philosophes d'origine turque, persane et kazakhe du XIX siècle, 5 portraits du président kazakhe avec les leaders spirituels des confessions les plus importantes, une photo de Bible et de Coran, une représentation tengrienne, une représentation des pétroglyphes de Tamgaly, un plan de la propagation de l'islam, une représentation de Bouddha et 3 représentations « orthodoxes ». En même temps, le manuel ne contient pas de représentations des bâtiments ou lieu de cultes catholiques ou protestantes ni aucune représentation symbolisant l'athéisme ou les athéistes.

#### **Ci-dessous quelques citations tirées du manuel.**

« Selon l'ampleur de la propagation les religions se divisent en *nationales* et *mondiales* ». (p.22)

« Les systèmes polythéistes développés forment leur propre panthéon des dieux, où chacun des dieux a *un domaine d'activité* spécifique. [...] Le domaine d'activité de chaque dieu est séparé du domaine d'activité des autres ». (p.23)

« Telles religions comme Shinto, hindouisme et *taoïsme* sont des religions *modernes* polythéistes». (p.23)

« Abu Nasr Al-Farabi a glorifié sa ville natale (Otrar ou Farab) par ses livres

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid, p.15.

encyclopédiques » (p.207)

« Le travail du médecin qui lutte pour la vie de ses patients, le travail pénible des enseignants ou le travail des économistes qui tentent d'améliorer *la société matérielle* – tout cela peut être qualifié comme *djihad* » (p.196)

« L'Islam rejette l'arbitraire et l'injustice. Voilà pourquoi *durant la guerre* il est interdit de frapper les femmes, enfants, vieux, on ne peut pas tuer les moines »(p.197)

Vu que le manuel est écrit par un membre de l'élite et que son contenu est recommandé par le ministère de l'éducation nationale peut-on considérer le manuel et surtout ses représentations comme un source valable sur l'identité religieuse au Kazakhstan ? A notre avis, à la base du texte et du choix des représentations, on peut au moins présumer que:

- a) il existe plusieurs identités ou plusieurs identifications confessionnelles au Kazakhstan
- b) les élites ont envie de montrer une sorte de continuité entre les personnages du passé et le chef d'état d'aujourd'hui (dans ce sens l'inclusion de Al-Fârâbî semble très intéressante<sup>133</sup>)
- c) il existe un contraste entre l'identité religieuse « idéale » que les autorités voudraient établir et l'identité religieuse existante.

En termes de l'idéologie, la position officielle de l'État consiste en pousser la tolérance religieuse pour les confessions officiellement reconnues<sup>134</sup>, ainsi que la cohabitation et le dialogue entre les religions et les leaders religieux. Les fêtes religieuses, telles que le Noël orthodoxe et le Kurban-Ait musulman sont annoncés les jours fériés. La plupart des « visites » du président de la

<sup>133</sup> Toute d'abord l'appartenance de Alfarabius au Kazakhstan est douteuse. Selon les sources du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle (ibn Khallikan) il est né en 872 à Wâsij près de Farab en Transoxiane (actuel Kazakhstan), tandis que les sources plus vieilles persanes disent qu'il est né à Faryab au Khorassan (actuel Afghanistan). De toute façon la plupart de sa vie il a passé à Bagdad, Damas et Egypte et il est mort en Syrie en 950. Ensuite, Farabi, bien qu'il ait été musulman chiite, du point de vue de son valeur pour l'humanité était surtout philosophe, mathématicien, musicologue, etc., mais pas une figure religieuse ou théologien. Pour le mettre alors dans un manuel des sciences religieuses au Kazakhstan du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle ? A notre avis, l'appropriation d'une telle figure comme Al-Farabi et la tentative de faire des liens entre ce savant essentiel et la culture kazakhe sont un exemple intéressant de la fausse continuité et de l'invention du passé.

<sup>134</sup> Islam, orthodoxie, catholicisme et judaïsme.

République dans un lieu de culte d'une des confessions est accompagné d'une autre visite à un autre lieu de culte appartenant à une confession religieuse différente, afin de rétablir l'équilibre. En 2003, 2006 et 2009, les Congrès des religions mondiales et traditionnelles ont eu lieu à Astana.<sup>135</sup> Comme ça, « territoire de l'harmonie inter religieuse » semble d'être un projet d'état ou une identité « idéale », que les autorités et élites voudraient établir sur le territoire du pays. La tolérance proclamée et le pluralisme sont aussi un atout de la politique internationale<sup>136</sup> les élites ne veulent pas perdre. Ce facteur, ainsi que la séparation constitutionnelle des sphères laïques et spirituelles et le fait que la grande majorité des élites post-soviétiques a une identité religieuse extrêmement faible font penser que le paysage religieux s'est formé dans une certaine mesure. En même temps il est évident que les autorités éprouvent de la méfiance et même ont crainte de l'activité des « nouveaux mouvements religieux » ou organisations religieuses non-traditionnelles<sup>137</sup>.

Il est difficile d'accuser les auteurs de la partialité ou dire qu'ils donnent la préférence à une confession particulière, mais dans le même temps, le problème de l'ouvrage est à notre avis que les auteurs penchent vers le fait que la religion est préférable à son absence, ce qui est inacceptable dans l'éducation laïque. Deuxièmement, plus d'espace est dédié à l'islam qu'aux autres religions, le tengrianisme étant presque ignoré. Plusieurs endroits dans le livre contiennent des affirmations controversées, biaisées ou pas scientifiques, ce qui est inadmissible dans un manuel scolaire.

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<sup>135</sup> Même si les derniers ont été surtout les PR actions du gouvernement destinées à la création d'une image positive du pays l'extérieur du pays.

<sup>136</sup> Investissements par exemple.

<sup>137</sup> La même chose pour les extrémistes. Depuis 2010, des cas fréquents de recrutement et des manifestations de fondamentalistes islamiques ont accéléré l'adoption de la loi "Sur les associations religieuses", qui a provoqué de vifs débats dans la société kazakhe, surtout la partie sur l'interdiction de pratiquer des rites religieux dans les institutions publiques. Aussi, dans le préambule de la loi il s'agit du rôle particulier de l'orthodoxie et l'islam dans la formation de la société kazakhe, l'activité des groupes religieux mineurs est, au contraire, limitée. Cela provoque le mécontentement et les critiques de la part des ONG et des organisations qui s'occupent des droits des hommes. Cependant, il est encore tôt pour fournir une analyse sur la façon dont la loi fonctionne.

## Conclusions

1. Le Kazakhstan est un pays avec la majorité de la population d'éthnicité kazakhe. Mais considérer le Kazakhstan un pays « musulman » est le manque de précision, voire une erreur. Non seulement parce que des millions de non-musulmans habitent le pays mais aussi parce que la constitution définit clairement le pays comme laïque. Donc mettre le signe d'égalité entre une majorité ethnique et une identité religieuse du pays entier est une erreur logique.

2. Grâce à l'influence du tengrianisme et aux autres facteurs historiques et géopolitiques l'islam kazakhstannais est particulièrement tolérant et flexible. L'islam kazakhstannais n'est non plus homogène. Outre à la distinction classique entre les shiites et les sunnites il y a aussi une distinction ethno-confessionnelle parmi les croyants : par exemple des mosquées azéris, tatares, ouïghures etc. existent en parallèlement avec les mosquées « kazakhs ». De plus, il existe même une différence institutionnelle : les mosquées contrôlées par le DUMK<sup>138</sup> et celles qui ne le sont pas.

3. Le fait que de plus en plus de sermons dans les mosquées « radicales » sont prononcés en russe qui est une lingua franca kazakhstannaise, est la preuve du dynamisme et de l'universalisation de l'islam radical. L'islam kazakhstannais s'habitue aux particularités du pays et se gagne les adhérents indépendamment de leur ethnologie.

4. La « revanche du Dieu » au Kazakhstan est plutôt une revanche de l'identité nationale. Le phénomène est lié au vide spirituel et idéologique apparu après la désintégration de l'Union Soviétique. Voilà pourquoi, à notre avis, une « revanche », si elle a lieu, ne signifie pas le retour aux identités religieuses autrefois existantes mais d'en construire de nouvelles identités religieuses.

5. Dans certains cas et sous certaines conditions on peut parler de la désécularisation

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<sup>138</sup> Administration Spirituelle des Musulmans du Kazakhstan.

« mécanique » : manque de foi consciente/identité religieuse pas formée ou pas « achevée » – affiliation automatique à telle ou telle confession à la base du « droit du sang » - désécularisation mécanique. Mais dans ce cas il ne s'agit pas de la revanche de dieu, mais au contraire, d'une crise d'affiliation.

6. Malgré la participation à l'Organisation de Conférence Islamique au niveau institutionnel le panarabisme comme stratégie politique n'est pas très actuel pour le Kazakhstan d'aujourd'hui. Le fait de ne pas parler la langue arabe et, donc, de ne pas appartenir à la civilisation arabe laisse l'intégration au monde arabo-musulman très difficile. Même si un jour l'élite kazakhstanaise tournera vers l'islam et les pays arabes qui en font partie, la vraie intégration sera très difficile. Les alliances politiques, économiques ou militaires avec la Russie ou avec les pays avec une identité musulmane modérée (comme la Turquie) sont plus probables.

7. Le Kazakhstan est un pays avec l'identité religieuse diversifiée. Des siècles de coexistence entre l'islam et l'orthodoxie ont contribué à la construction d'un certain équilibre d'intérêts dans lesquelles chacune des deux religions a formé une niche, en ajustant le dialogue interconfessionnel et des canaux d'interaction sociale. Cet équilibre des intérêts est une des pierres angulaires de la stabilité dans la vie religieuse de toute la société. En dehors des facteurs historiques qu'on a déjà mentionné, l'émergence de ce phénomène de cohabitation paisible doit son origine aux traits communs des dogmes orthodoxes et musulmans, surtout quand il s'agit de leur définition de la place et du rôle de la religion dans la vie publique. Soit l'islam sunnite de l'ordre hanafite, pratiqué au Kazakhstan, soit l'orthodoxie traitent la question la plus controversée sur la relation entre le modèle du gouvernement laïc et religieux de manière pacifique, en illustrant la capacité de compromis avec l'Etat. A la fin, cela contribue à une perception positive de l'actuel modèle laïque existant dans le pays.

# **The Configuration of the Moldovan Identity in the Cold War: History and Linguistics in the Service of Soviet Ambitions.**

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*Although the invention of a Moldovan nation and the foundation of the Autonomous Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic by the Communist International dated back to 1924, it was not until the transformation of Bessarabia into a Soviet Republic in 1945, that the Soviet administration took the matter of constructing a Moldovan national identity seriously. The present article examines the tactics and means employed during the Cold War by Soviet propaganda in order to carve a Moldovan language and identity out of history. Special attention is given to the most successful historical works that circulated in the Soviet Moldovan Republic until 1990 and provided those particular narratives, which were aimed directly at highlighting and emphasizing both the uniqueness and historical continuity of the Moldovan nation. Moreover, particular reference is made to the impact that Soviet propaganda had on Socialist Romania, which, due to various strains in its relations with Moscow, tried to keep the Bessarabian Question alive.*

Keywords: Bessarabian Question, Moldova, Moldovan identity, Nationalities Question, USSR

## **Introduction: Moldova's state of affairs after 1945.**

The legitimacy of Soviet rule in Bessarabia since 1945, aside from resettlements, forced collectivization and a monopoly of power by the powerful Communist Party, which was particularly expressed through the enforcement and consolidation of the familiar inter-war doctrine of "moldovenism". The main goal set by its designers was to alienate the inhabitants of Bessarabia

from the Romanian cultural traditions and persuade them that they constituted a separate Moldovan ethnicity, which was, together with the other peoples of the Soviet Union, struggling to fulfill the socialist ideal and to become free from exploitation, class hatred and ethnic strife (Dima, 1982: 92).

### **Constructing a “Moldovan language”**

Being well aware that language, as a complex system of spoken and written communication, plays an essential part in shaping the sense of common identity, the Soviets exerted themselves to providing, and more often fabricating, a wide range of evidence to prove their controversial theory concerning the existence of a separate and historically traceable Moldovan language.

However, given the fact that Moldovan was undoubtedly a Romance language in content (and also a language which the Romanian-speaking majority of Bessarabians could understand), the Soviet policy makers applied their efforts mainly to make its form look as Slavic as possible (Dyer, 1999: 85-98). At first, the Cyrillic alphabet was reintroduced in administration, schools, press and publishing houses, whereas the Latin script was banned. As the most widely spoken of the Soviet Union's many languages, Russian *de facto* functioned as an official language and served as the *lingua franca* all over the Moldovan cities (the large number of Russian and Ukrainian inhabitants largely contributed to that), while the use of Moldovan was limited to the republic's countryside, where the Moldovan-Romanian element was a majority (Gorenburg, 2006:11-13). Extended borrowings of political, scientific and technical terminology from Russian occurred, and many terms of Latin origin were replaced by Slavic ones. Finally, the name "Moldovan" was used emphatically in every aspect of public life, and the authorities of Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova (SSRM) also put special emphasis on avoiding the use of terms such as "Bessarabia", perceiving it to be a direct hint to Romanian nationalism, and propagated the name "Moldova" and

"Moldovan" instead, even if those words happened to enclose also lands belonging to neighboring socialist Romania (Dima, 1982: 128).

In addition, the Soviets tried to limit every possibility of communication between the citizens of SSRM and Romanians as much as possible. Border crossing slackened, obtaining a visa for Romania became nearly impossible, while barbed wire and minefields were formed along the river Prut. The Soviet leadership strictly prohibited the importation of Romanian newspapers, films and works of literature. The political leadership in Chisinau worked to minimize the Romanian cultural influence in every way and, therefore, every institution in the Moldovan Republic (the press, the arts, the education system, and government agencies) stressed the independence of the Moldovan nation and consistently criticized every move that may have revealed the close affinity between the two peoples on both sides of the Prut (Neukirch, 1996: 72-75).

The credibility gap, which the doctrine of a separate Moldovan language was inadvertently faced with, soon led the Soviets to mobilizing modern linguistics in order to fill it in. The Romance languages specialist, Sergievsky, proved to be the first to take this direction with his work. According to Sergievsky, Moldovan was not a Romanian dialect (as the dialects in Transylvania and Banat were), but a separate Romance language with its own vocabulary and alphabet. Sergievsky's position was further developed by other Soviet specialists in this particular field, such as V. Šišmarev and R. Piotrovskij. Both of them focused mainly on the strong historical ties between the Dacians of Moldova and the Eastern Slavs during the Middle Ages, ties which deeply influenced the form and function of written and spoken Moldovan language throughout history. A significant number of philologists and linguists from Western Europe were against such conclusions, with Klaus Heitmann and Carlo Tagliavini being the most characteristic examples. Both specialists emphasized the political motives behind Moscow's language policy, indicating

that a substantial difference between Moldovan and Romanian did not really exist (Messing, 1985: 287-291).

### **Creating a “Moldovan history”**

Special attention was mostly given to the science of history, however, this was seen by Soviet policy as an effective instrument in the progressive forging of a Moldovan national consciousness among the local population. For this purpose, the history of SSRM should be written in such a way that it can highlight and emphasize both the uniqueness and historical continuity of the Moldovan nation. Russian policy and culture, at the same time, needed to be presented by historians as a decisive factor that brought people together, gave them the socialist ideals and lead them to socialist integration. In short, Soviet policy makers sought an historical narrative that could offer the most convincing mixture of Moldovan nationalism, russophilia and Soviet internationalism. Inevitably faced with a number of large historical and cultural gaps and discontinuities, the communist historiography of SSRM had to resort very early to the configuration of various theories in order to carry out the demanding task of an integrated composition of Moldovan history (Şiş canu, 1998: 117-118, King C., 2000: 106-107).

According to Soviet Moldovan historians, the beginning of Moldovan history was to be found in antiquity, when Moldova constituted the northern part of the ancient kingdom of Dacia. At this point, a clear distinction was made by historians between a Romanian and a Moldovan “circle of influence”. Each circle experienced the colonization and the latinization of the former Dacian kingdom in the first century AD. The same went for the coming of Christianity and the settlement of Slavs in the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> centuries. From the gradual intermingling of the strong Latin element in Oltenia and Muntenia with the Slavs of the South came the so-called Vlachs, ancestors of the Romanians, while the intermingling of the least latinized ethnic group in Bessarabia with the

Eastern Slavs resulted ultimately in the “birth” of Moldovans (История Молдавской ССР, 1965: 36-66, 79-88).

The Soviet historical narrative continued with extensive references to the crucial influence of Russian policy and culture in the evolution of the Moldovan nation. Thus, the Prut campaign in 1710 - 1711, which was the first official Russian military intervention in Romanian affairs, was extensively praised in SSDM by historians, who also did not fail to stress and glorify the patriotism and russophile stand of the Moldovan prince and scholar, Dimitrie Cantemir. The same praise was reserved for the Treaty of Küçük Kainartzi for allegedly allowing Moldova to pay fewer taxes to the Ottomans, and to release prisoners from major Ottoman prisons. The Treaty of Bucharest in 1812, and the following Russian annexation of Bessarabia, despite its negative aspects (e.g. tsarist oppression), was a much better development than the Turkish yoke. In this way, Soviet propaganda maintained, the Moldovan people saw the major economic, cultural, and technological advances achieved by Russia in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Van Meurs, 1994: 149). Taking this theory to another level, most historians of Chisinau expressed the notion that 1812 was not the year of annexation, but the year of the union of Bessarabia with Russia. It was thanks to this act that the Moldovans began to organize their own lifestyle and culture. Into the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Moldovan historians focused the narrative’s attention on all the Russian initiatives that led to the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, and the adoption of the Organic Regulation of 1834. The developments which increased the autonomy of Moldova, put it on track with modernization. How selective the Moldovan historiography could be, was reflected on the conspicuous omission of events most significant to the evolution of the Romanian state, such as the violent suppression of the 1848 uprising by Russian forces, and the arbitrary Russian recapture of southern Bessarabia in 1878. The responsibility for these “unfortunate developments” was not ascribed to Russia itself, but to the corrupt tsarist regime in general. Such “flaws” in the narrative were easily glossed over by Moldovan historiography, the aim of which, at the time, was to establish a connection in

people's minds between tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union and promote the idea that, however different, both political systems were extremely beneficial to the Moldovan national cause (Ciorănescu, 1993: 40-50).

In contrast, Romania was portrayed as the country which, over the years, played the most negative role in the historical development of the Moldovan people. The fact that is most striking is that most Wallachian rulers are portrayed in the darkest colours by the militant Moldovan historians, who made so bold as to reproach the famous vlach voivode of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Michael the Brave, for conducting imperialist wars and exploiting the Moldovan people for his own benefit. As opposed to Michael, the historians in Chisinau praised the patriotism and Russophile stand of the famous ruler of Moldavia, Dimitrie Cantemir, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. They made particular reference, for reasons of propaganda, to the great Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga, who, in his works, regarded the Cantemir as a rather corrupted person who took advantage of the expansionist Russian policy and lightheartedly opened the door to the corrupt Phanariote administration (Van Meurs, 1994: 309). The anti-Romanian sentiment course, sparked by Chisinau historians and Soviet policy, was much more pronounced in the narrative that concerned the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Particularly severe criticism was made to the "nationalist" movement of Pantelimon Halippa in 1907-1918, which allegedly exploited the weakness of the Russian state and spread reactionary Romanian propaganda causing confusion and turmoil. The "treacherous" attitude of Sfatul Țării, ignored the will of the Moldovans and, through insidious machinations, put Moldova under Romanian rule (Van Meurs, 1994: 184-185). With regards to the 1920's and 1930's, the Soviet narrative kept to the old path of the interwar communist propaganda by stressing the oppression and economic drain of Moldovans by Bucharest's bourgeois, an intolerable situation, which inevitably led them to resist. From this point of view, all the subversive actions on the part of Moscow in the 1920's were seen as fair and necessary, because they were aimed at protecting and supporting the Moldovan proletariat (Van Meurs, 1998: 44-47).

In this spirit, it was also trying to indirectly justify the ultimatum of June 26<sup>th</sup> 1940 and the forced extraction of Bessarabia from Romania. On this topic, Soviet propaganda had two basic arguments. The first involved the idea that Russians and Ukrainians in Bessarabia in 1940 were much more than the Romanian authorities claimed to be, and that these groups were experiencing a severe and illegal limitation of their lawful rights and needed protection. The second argument was basically the generally unfounded claim that Bessarabia had already been proclaimed a Soviet Moldovan Republic since December 1917 by the Bolshevik armed forces. This was approximately one month before the Romanian army invaded the area in mid-January 1918 and reinstated the Sfatul Țării. Since the Soviet government was overthrown in 1918 by military force, the Moldovan people were denied the fundamental right to decide on their own future and were unwillingly submitted to the arbitrariness of the bourgeois Romanian classes. Thus, the "reunification" of Bessarabia with the "Soviet family" in 1940 was, from the Soviet point of view, more than justified (История Молдавской ССР, 1968: 345-355, Van Meurs, 1998: 47-50).

The institutions which played a crucial role in promoting "moldovenism" were the "Pedagogical Institute of Chisinau" (set up in accordance since 1940), the "State University of Moldova" (1946), and the "Academy of Sciences of Socialist Soviet Republic of Moldova" (1946). Within the last two institutions, perhaps the most notable figures in the militant historical science of SSDM emerged, the academics Artiom Lazarev and Iachim Grosul. Both of them were fierce supporters of the existence of a separate Moldovan nation. Grosul contributed to the completion of the "History of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova", an ambitious two-volume work published between the years 1951-1953 under the auspices of the Moldovan Academy. Although characterized by populist views, theoretical exaggerations, and a lack of reliable data, it became very popular in the country, because, for the first time, the Moldovans had claimed and earned, through this publication, "their own special place in history" (Van Meurs, 1994: 180-183).

Lazarev, accordingly, stood out because of his rich literary work, which included historical monographs, journal articles and numerous papers in various historical and cultural conferences. Important works, however, were considered to be the first historical documentation that was released by the SSDM in the 1949 "Handbook of History of Moldova" and also in the book entitled "The Reunification of the Moldovan people by the Soviet State" released in 1965. Both projects were characterized by the author's attempt to establish his theory of the existence of a separate Moldovan ethnicity, which had close ties with the Russian nation and the Slavic culture and very little in common with the Romanian people and their history (Sînzianu, 2009: 28-29).

Lazarev, however, became very popular with the general public with a massive study released in 1974, which bore the title "The Moldavian Soviet Statehood and the Bessarabian Question". Even to this day, this work is considered as the "Bible of moldovenism". In that study, Lazarev's basic argument was that the Romanian national consciousness was fully developed after the Principalities Union in 1859. During this time, the people in Bessarabia under Russian rule had already started developing their own national consciousness, so when the "Greater Romania" came into being in 1918, there were already two distinct ethnic groups in the area, the Romanian and the Moldovan. Lazarev attributed the oppression of the Moldovians by the Romanians to the treacherous Sfatul Țării, who represented only the Latin speaking inhabitants of Bessarabia. They did not have any real jurisdiction, as well as the imperialistic Romanian conservative forces which oppressed the rights of other nationalities (Neukirch, 1996: 78-79).

Bucharest's intervention in 1918 triggered, according to Lazarev, the armed struggle of the Moldovan people against "Romanian occupation." In this way, the Moldovan historian projected all the subversive actions of Comintern in Bessarabia from 1919 until 1924 (including the uprising in Tatar Bunar) as expressions of a broader liberation struggle of the "enslaved" and "oppressed" Moldovans against their Romanian oppressors. The struggle was eventually vindicated by the

communist progressive forces, which, according to Lazarev, acknowledged in 1924 the legitimate request of the Moldovan nation to have its own state, by establishing the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova (ASSRM). The second and most decisive step towards Moldovan liberation was the events from the 26<sup>th</sup> to the 28<sup>th</sup> of June 1940, which Lazarev claimed to have restored the legal order and corrected the injustice that had been committed 22 years ago against the defenseless people of Moldova. By buttressing the “liberation argument”, Lazarev was trying to historically legitimize the Soviet rule in Bessarabia and making an historical connection with the Russian annexation of 1812. This presented its policy as a beneficial development that ensured peace and progress for the Moldovan people (Лазарев, 1974: 126-145, 168-186, 262-280, 479-490).

The Moldovan history presented in Lazarev’s works, the Moldovan Academy’s publications and other more simplified studies and brochures, gradually became an undisputable truth, from which almost all literary works, history-writing, folklore and cultural clubs and institutions could not afford to deviate. Until the late 1980’s Moldovan press, radio, television and almost every artistic movement in SSDM were coordinating their actions to ensure the strengthening of Moldovan culture and the consolidation of the Moldovan patriotic morale within the general Soviet-Russian context (Nicolaev, 1995: 3-10). This process, however, was quite often responsible for many comical, often bordering on grotesque, exaggerations. Traditional figures of Romanian history and literature, (with typical examples of the rulers Stefan cel Mare and Dimitrie Cantemir, the chronicler Ion Neculce, the poet Mihai Eminescu and the political Mihail Kogălniceanu), were proudly presented as “heroes” and “pioneers” of the Moldovan nation. To crown it all, traditional folk songs and dances of Romanian origin were named arbitrarily as "Moldovan", while, at the same time, various researchers were roaming across the Moldovan countryside trying to re-discover the "lost" Moldovan traditions, record them and then enlighten the public (Dima, 1982: 118-121, 124-126).

**Bucharest “strikes back”**

Lazarev's book was also written with a view to give some answers to the historians on the west side of Dniester, who, after the crisis in Soviet-Romanian relations in the 1960's, were almost openly challenging Moscow's position about an independent "Moldovan nation" and stressed the Romanian character of Bessarabia. Until that time, the Communist Party of Romania (CCR), following Moscow's directives, considered the annexation of Bessarabia in 1940 by the Soviets to be an act of liberation of the area from the bourgeois oppressors of the Romanian inter-war corrupted regime. The main reason for this attitude was that since 1944 Romania had soviet troops on its soil and the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party was mainly staffed with people of non-Romanian origin who were sympathetic to Moscow's policy. As a result, Bucharest was in no position to bring up any subject associated with Bessarabia and spared any comment on the Kremlin's policy towards the newly-formed Republic of Moldova (Höpken, 2000: 33-35, Dima, 1982:47).

The situation began to change around 1955 when the Romanian communist leader Gheorghiu-Dej managed to elbow out the traditional, non-Romanian and close-to-Moscow clique, and became General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party. In 1958, Dej achieved the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country, which paved the way for CCR to pursue a more independent policy. In 1962, Romania campaigned against the soviet plans to integrate the country in COMECON, for fear of having to dismantle its industries and change it into a supplier of raw materials and agricultural goods to the Soviet Union. Traditional anti-Russian syndromes returned to Romanian society and politics, this time under the guise of anti-Sovietism. In 1964, the central committee of the Romanian Communist Party officially declared and expressed its solidarity with “the right of all nations, whether large or small, whether socialist or not, to determine their own destiny in the light of special circumstances” (Panthöfer, 2002: 9-13, Floyd, 1965: 63-82).

From that point on, Romania's foreign policy acquired a clear anti-Soviet tone and the Bessarabian Question resurfaced. In 1964, the Romanian historian Andrei Oțetea published a book titled "Notes on Romania", which was hitherto a compilation of texts written by Karl Marx, in which the founder of communism openly condemned the imperialist annexation of Bessarabia by Russia in 1812. These texts may have been referring to another, pre-communist era, but, even in a metaphorical sense, they constituted a deliberate hint at the Soviet ultimatum of June 26<sup>th</sup> in 1940 and Moscow's policy regarding Bessarabia in general. Indirect support in this political controversy was also offered to Bucharest by Mao Zedong, who, after the rift in his relations with the USSR, tried to link any possible Romanian claims against the Soviets with his own aspirations in the Far East. As he personally stated to the Romanian delegation in Beijing: "There are many lands occupied by the USSR...the Russians have also appropriated parts of Romania...now the time has come to put an end to this separation..." (Ciorănescu, 1993: 259-260, Ghermani, 1967: 150-153, 163-168, Ionescu, 1965: 252-253).

The death of Gheorghiu-Dej and the rise of Nicolae Ceausescu as General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (1965) and President of Socialist Romania (1968) marked the beginning of a leftist nationalism in Romanian foreign policy. Ceausescu had understood that nationalism, expressed through anti-Russian sentiments within Romanian society, was the key to consolidate his popularity and power and, therefore, he tried to follow a much more independent political course in external affairs. In 1966, he condemned the decisions taken by the Communist leadership of the interwar period (especially those in 1924) as being erroneous, because they supported the occupation of Bessarabia and Bukovina by alien forces. In 1967, Romania was the only communist state not to break off its diplomatic relations with Israel during the Six-Day War, while in 1968, Ceausescu characterized the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia as a grave mistake. Romanian views on the Bessarabian Question started to be made public and gained ground abroad, as an increasing number of researchers from Western Europe were heavily criticizing the Soviet

propaganda in SSRM, considering its views on a separate Moldovan nation being unfounded and unhistorical. This dispute, nevertheless, was kept for several political reasons on an entirely academic level by both sides (Gilberg, 2000: 49-57, Verdery, 1995: 116-136, Dima, 1982: 50-52, King C., 2000: 106).

The only time the situation did seem to get out of control was in 1976, when the Romanian press published a series of articles which referred directly to “the great historical injustice of 1940 towards Romania” and rejected the imperial multinational model that the USSR was promoting by right of violence. The agitation that was caused, in combination with the issue of orders from the Romanian General Staff regarding the mobilization of army reserves, gave rise to rumors of an imminent armed conflict. Ceausescu, though, rushed to calm down the heated spirits in May 1976 by stating publicly that Romania had no military designs against any state. However, he did not miss the opportunity to remind them that Romania would continue its struggle in favor of scientific accuracy and historical truth. In August 1976, Ceausescu visited SSRM, implicitly acknowledging the postwar settlement of the Romanian-Soviet border. Relations between the two socialist states were normalized to a great extent, although neither side had really relinquished its positions, so the atmosphere between them, at least in connection with Bessarabia, remained tense (Ghermani, 1981: 186, 188, King R., 1976: 2-17).

The communications between Romania and SSRM were directly related to the situation between Soviet-Romanian relations. After Stalin's death, Nikita Khrushchev initiated a policy of reforms that allowed the influx of Romanian books and newspapers in SSRM. Classical Romanian literature began to be read beyond the Prut, while traditional music ensembles traveled to SSRM for tour and propaganda. The crisis of bilateral relations in the mid 60's had grave effects on the so far tolerant policy, as strict censorship was once again imposed in any “cultural product” coming to SSRM from Romania. At some point, there was even an absolute ban on any import of a

Romanian book or film. Movement across the Soviet-Romanian border was sparse; obtaining visas for Romanians became more difficult, while barbed wire and minefields were planted along the Prut. In the late 70's, when Romanians and Soviets seemed to have found a *modus vivendi*, Romanian books and movies began to be imported in SSRM again, while Romanian citizens could visit Chisinau for tourism without great difficulty. Moldovans could also watch Romanian TV-channels at home and listen to Romanian radio. However, it would be unrealistic to talk about a flourishing of cultural relations between Romania and SSRM. The political leadership in Chisinau was working to minimize the Romanian cultural influence in every way, and the entire press, the arts, the education system and almost all government agencies were stressing most emphatically about the independence of the Moldovan nation. They were extremely critical of every move, coming from Bucharest or other states, which could reveal the close kinship between the people on both banks of the Prut (Neukirch, 1996: 72-75, Van Meurs, 1994: 254-255, Enciu, Pavelescu, 1998: 288).

Contrary to general expectations, the growing Romanian influence in the Soviet Moldovan Republic could not be stopped. The dominance of the Russian language and culture in public life actually increased bilingualism within the Moldovan-Romanian population, but it did not result in a linguistic assimilation. The main reasons for this curious development were: a) the continuous migrations of Moldovan-Romanians to the urban areas, and the weakening of Slavic character, b) the widespread use of Romanian in the private life of Moldovan-Romanians, and c) the duplicity of the Soviet policy that was promoting Russianization on the one hand, and, on the other hand, was considerably tolerant towards teaching Romanian in schools situated mainly in the Moldovan countryside (Völkl, 1993: 57, Neukirch, 1996: 81-82).

**Conclusion: From “ethnogenesis” to conflict**

In the final analysis, Moldovan-Romanians were strongly influenced by Russian culture, but they did not let themselves be assimilated. During the 1960's and afterwards, they began to educate themselves massively and gain access to public administration, economy and educational institutions within SSRM. Consequently, this gradual ascension and steady progress in most domains of the Moldovan state brought them into political and ideological conflict with the existing political, economic and cultural elite, consisting mainly of Russians and Moldovans from Transnistria. The Moldovans had just arrived in the big cities from the countryside and were gradually demanding that their voice to be heard, whereas the Russianized "foreigners", holding traditionally to the reins of power within the apparatus of SSRM, had all the economic and social influence and were considered by the Kremlin to be politically more reliable than their Romanian-speaking co-nationals. The progressive decline of the Soviet regime in the late 1980's, however, would sharpen this fierce political and social antagonism, to which, after 1991, strong national dimensions would be largely given (King C., 2000: 114-119).

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# **"More than a cordial reception". Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I's visit to Yugoslavia in 1954, with a special reference to the passage to and stay in Croatia**

**David Orlović**

*Pula*

*The Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I's official visit to FPR Yugoslavia in July 1954 was the first visit to the socialist country by a foreign statesman after the Cominform resolution of 1948. The event was turned into a major topic for the public in Yugoslavia through several days of July 1954, especially in Croatia, where the guest Emperor visited several areas of the country. It marked the beginning of Yugoslavia's turn towards building relations with countries that were not part of the two existing Cold War blocs, which eventually ended up in the creation of the Non-aligned movement.*

Keywords: Ethiopia, Haile Selassie I, official visit, Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia, Croatia.

## **Introduction**

The president of a socialist republic and a monarch of a largely feudal state – respectively the president of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) Josip Broz Tito and the emperor (*negus*) of Ethiopia Haile Selassie I (born as Tafari Makonnen) made their respective countries closer to each other in a rather quick manner, and privately became close friends. The fight against fascism was something they both had in common: Tito led the Yugoslav partisan movement in World War II, while Selassie fought against the aggression initiated by Benito Mussolini's Italy in

1935. Also, both of these two countries wanted to lead an independent foreign policy. An accentuated anti-war position was strongly present in the political ideologies of those two countries.

Back in 1947, Tito declared that Yugoslavia “will stay put in it’s foreign policy led so far, faithful to the fight to strenghten peace and make tight cooperation with all countries that are accepting that cooperation” (Golob-Nick, 1976: 49). The break in relationships with Stalin’s USSR in 1948, which came after the Cominform resolution against Yugoslavia, strenghtened such claims, and led Yugoslavia to be closer to the West. However, seeing the danger of “exagerrated” liberalisation as a consequence of these new relationships, and examining the fact that a new convergence with the Eastern bloc wouldn’t bring much fruit, Tito’s Yugoslavia opened itself to the Third World. Here they began producing the kind of foreign policy that would bring them to be one of the leading players in the making of the organisation of cooperation between Third World countries not aligned with one of the two blocs, later known as the Non-aligned Movement. It was erected after the Brioni declaration between Yugoslavia’s Tito, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser and India’s Jawaharlal Nehru in 1956. In 1961, the movement’s first conference was held in Belgrade.

As the oldest independent African country and the victim of aggressive European colonialism, Ethiopia was one of the main flag bearers for the idea of freedom for Africa and all other colonized peoples of the world and of perpetual peace . With such points of view, it attended the conference of the states of Africa and Asia in Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955, being among just six independent African states attending it (of which just two were from the “Black” part of the continent). Although being a staunch ally of the Western allies after World War II, Ethiopia sought after new allies during the 1950s, most certainly because of the tiny amount of material help it was receiving from the West, help that was utterly needed in a poor African country (Adejumobi, 2007: 93-94). We may easily assume that what bothered the Ethiopians was the continuous British

and French colonial occupation of vast parts of Africa. Thus, similar to Yugoslavia, Ethiopia sought new friends around the world, and oriented its foreign policy towards more autonomy.

### **Relations Between Ethiopia and Yugoslavia before 1954**

The pre-war Kingdom of Yugoslavia never established diplomatic relations with Ethiopia, but it is worth mentioning that there was a heightened sensibility that the intellectual elite of that period felt towards the Ethiopians amid the fascist aggression of 1935-36. This was especially felt among the émigrés that left Istra and other Yugoslav territories that were annexed to the Kingdom of Italy after World War I. The mutual recognition between the socialist Yugoslavia and Ethiopia dates back to 1946, which was followed by Yugoslavia's support for Ethiopia from the Paris Peace Treaty onwards. The first official contact between the African monarchy and FPRY occurred in 1951, when a Yugoslav good-faith mission was dispatched to Ethiopia for the purpose of preparing ground for the establishment of full diplomatic relations (Tasić, 2008: 514). They came into force on the 4<sup>th</sup> of March 1952, while in the same year the Yugoslav diplomatic representation was opened in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian diplomat started working in Belgrade in May 1954 (Švob-Đokić, 1976: 30; Jakovina, 1998: 517). An important step in further rapprochement between the two countries was FPRY's support for Ethiopia's annexation of the former Italian colony of Eritrea in 1952 (Jakovina, 1998: 516). The first exchange of respective economic delegations occurred in 1953, and it was soon followed by the signing of a treaty of economic and commercial cooperation (Švob-Đokić, 1976: 30-31).<sup>139</sup> In February 1954, the Chief-of-Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army Peko Dabčević visited Ethiopia and delivered an official invitation to the *Negus* to visit Yugoslavia (Tasić, 2008: 514-515).

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<sup>139</sup> The first direct consequence of the treaty was the establishment of the mixed enterprise „Jugoetiopija A.D.“, that had to increase the level of commercial exchange between the two countries.

### **Haile Selassie's Visit to Yugoslavia in July 1954**

The arrival of the Ethiopian emperor to the FPRY, set to occur in July 1954, was to become the first visit of a head of state in the country since the break of relationships with the USSR in 1948. The preparations for Haile Selassie's visit commenced as early as April 1954, and the expected treaties to be signed during it were the following: a solemn agreement on friendship and consiliation, a protocol on upgrading the existing diplomatic representations to the status of embassies, an agreement on commerce and navigation, and an agreement on further economic cooperation (Tasić, 2008: 515). The Emperor's visit was planned to last seven days, and its program included solemn receptions in Belgrade, the capital of the FPRY, Zagreb, the capital of the People's Republic of Croatia, one of the republics comprising the Federation. Military and naval parades were included in the visit as well as a stay in Tito's residence on the picturesque islands of Brioni and official talks. In Zagreb's daily newspaper *Vjesnik*, beginning with the 4<sup>th</sup> of July, there was a daily publication of texts which had the task to introduce the readers to the history of the African country.<sup>140</sup>

What is very interesting to note is the fact that this visit, which included an „Adriatic tour“ -sort of a cruise, occurred amid increasing tension between Yugoslavia and Italy over the fate of the city of Trieste, which was under interim administration as the „Free Territory of Trieste“ at the time. Italy, as we emphasized already, was at war with Ethiopia a few decades ago. In 1953, Yugoslavia and Italy came close to war, and the crisis was resolved with the London memorandum in October 1954 (*Istarska enciklopedija*, 2005: 448, 822). The connection between the visit and Yugoslavia's state of tension with their old „common enemy“ is fairly obvious (Jakovina, 1998: 517).

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<sup>140</sup> The name of the daily column was „Letters to *Vjesnik* From Ethiopia. Five Thousand Years on the Banks of the Red Sea“.

### **Arrival and Stay in Belgrade**

A few days before the Ethiopian leader's arrival in the city of Belgrade, the nearby military airport at Batajnica, and the whole route from the airport to the city were decorated with flags of Ethiopia and the FPRY, while the whole city looked like it had been „during the days of greatest popular holidays and festivities“ (*Vjesnik*, no. 2915, 1954: 1). Through the whole afternoon of July 20<sup>th</sup>, the day of arrival, citizens congregated along the streets and the route which the luxury car with the Emperor and Tito would have to take. At 17:30 the special plane of the Yugoslav state company *Jugoslavenski aerotransport* (JAT) landed on Batajnica airfield, which was followed by the firing of forty two artillery salvos.<sup>141</sup> Tito, the host, welcomed the guests in the company of several high officials of Yugoslavia. The Emperor left the plane, followed by his son, the prince Sahle Selassie and grandchildren princesses Sable and Sophia Desta. As the protocol dictated, the mutual introducing of state officials and members of the delegation took place, as well as the intonation of the two state anthems, the review of the guard of honour and the Emperor's greeting speech. Afterwards, Tito and his guests left the airport by car, and arrived in downtown Belgrade amid ovations of the citizens present along the route (*Vjesnik*, no. 2917, 1954: 1).

*Vjesnik* of the 21<sup>st</sup> of July was almost completely dedicated to the visit in progress. The main title of the paper was in red (which happened only during national holidays), and the last page was filled with photographs of the events. That kind of last page would reappear throughout the next days of the visit. Amid the Emperor's stay in Belgrade, regime organisations organized a large number of lectures that introduced the attendees to Ethiopia and its history throughout Croatia (*Vjesnik*, no. 2919, 1954: 2).

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<sup>141</sup> The standard honorary salvo consists of twenty one shots, and it is possible that, in this case, it was doubled because of the presence of two state leaders – Tito and Haile Selassie (*Vojna enciklopedija*, 1971: 750-752).

The second and third day of Selassie's stay in Belgrade included ceremonies like the laying of wreaths on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier on the Avala hill near the capital, as well as the solemn meeting of the National Council of the city of Belgrade during which the Emperor was presented with the title of honourable citizen of that city (*Vjesnik*, no. 2919, 1954: 1). The fourth day in Belgrade coincided with his 62nd birthday, and for that occasion, a huge military parade was organized, during which several branches of the Yugoslav People's Army filed in front of the two leaders (*Vjesnik*, no. 2920, 1954: 1).

### **Through Croatia on July 24<sup>th</sup>**

The official talks between the *negus* and Tito were planned to happen only inside Tito's residence on the Brioni islands on July 25<sup>th</sup> (Tasić, 2008: 515). It was decided that Tito with his officials and Haile Selassie with his entourage take Tito's special „Blue train“ (*Plavi vlak* in Croatian, or *Plavi voz* in Serbian) on the journey from Belgrade through the PR Croatia to Opatija, where Tito's yacht „Jadranka“ would wait to take them to the islands.

Zagreb's main train station, the location where the Ethiopian Emperor was to meet Croatia's political leaders on his fifth day of the visit, on July 24<sup>th</sup>, was prepared for the guest's arrival. Along with the usual flags on the station building, platform pillars and nearby overpass, in the middle of the platform a „triumphal arch“ was erected, with Amharic and Serbo-Croatian inscriptions of „Welcome!“. A bit after 08:00 the platform was filled by high Croatian state officials led by the President of the Parliament (*Sabor*), Mr. Vladimir Bakarić (*Vjesnik*, no. 2921, 1954: 1).

As we already said, Tito and his guest were taking the journey from Belgrade to Zagreb and onwards aboard the „Blue train“. Zagreb's *Vjesnik* daily wrote about the high level of excitement of the citizens of PR Croatia living along the railway line because of the opportunity to see the two

leaders. A welcome greeting was inscribed on the station building of Dugo Selo, a town east of Zagreb where the train briefly stopped. There, a group of peasants demonstrated a few popular dances in front of the car with the Emperor inside. The passengers of the „Blue train“ were greeted in locations where it wasn't going to stop, such as in Sesvete and Maksimir (*Vjesnik*, no. 2921, 1954: 1).

The train with Tito and Haile Selassie arrived at Zagreb's main station exactly at 08:24. At that very moment, cannon salvos erupted, and the military band began playing the Emperor's march, „Tafari“ amid loud acclamations by the present citizens. When the train finally stopped, the highest officials of the city of Zagreb and PR Croatia entered the Emperor's car to greet him, like the previously mentioned Bakarić and the mayor of Zagreb Većeslav Holjevac. When the Emperor and Tito disembarked on the platform, the military band played the Yugoslav and Ethiopian anthems, and the two leaders reviewed the Guard of Honour of the Zagreb military garrison. It was followed by further introductions with Croatian officials and the two leaders returned towards the train. Before their embarkment, a company of *pioniri*, the organisation for Yugoslavia's youngsters, approached the Emperor and gave him flowers. According to *Vjesnik*, the *negus* was „evidently touched by the youngster's attention“ and replied with a gift of golden coins (*Vjesnik*, no. 2921, 1954: 1). At 08:35, amid loud acclamations, military band marches and new cannon salvos, the „Blue train“ departed towards the Croatian coastal city of Rijeka (*Vjesnik*, no. 2921, 1954: 1).

Before the arrival in Rijeka, the train with high officials stopped at Karlovac's railway station at 10:00, where there was a huge congregated mass. According to *Vjesnik*, a huge group of people rushed towards the train to greet the two leaders „despite the ban by the police“. Afterwards, Tito and Haile Selassie were greeted by the city officials (*Vjesnik*, no. 2921, 1954: 1).

At 15:35 the train passed through a decorated Rijeka and finally stopped at the railway station of Opatija – Matulji, decorated with flags and arches. Tito and his guests travelled from the station to the Opatija riviera by car, and the route filled with cheering citizens, was the point from which the Emperor „saw the Adriatic for the first time“ (*Vjesnik*, no. 2921, 1954: 1). In Opatija, according to the *Vjesnik*, thousands of Opatija citizens, tourists, and people from surrounding villages congregated, and it „never looked so solemn“ as on that occasion (*Vjesnik*, no. 2921, 1954: 1). In front of the *Jadranka* yacht the ceremony of anthems and there was a second guard of honour as well as the greeting with Rijeka's and Opatija's city officials. The head of the People's Committee of Rijeka, Edo Jardas, greeted the monarch in English, while Selassie replied that he „loves Yugoslavia, as well as this corner of Croatia, and that he regrets the fact that he cannot stay longer“ (*Vjesnik*, no. 2921, 1954: 1). While it was moving away from the coast, the *Jadranka* was joined with several units of the Yugoslav navy as escort towards the Brioni islands off the western coast of the Istrian peninsula.

During the Emperor's short stay in Opatija, *Vjesnik's* foreign policy editor Josip Kirigin obtained a written statement from Haile Selassie himself about his stay in Yugoslavia. The statement, published in the paper on July 27<sup>th</sup> along with a photo with the Emperor holding a copy of the leading Croatian daily, read:

„I'm glad that this visit allowed me to meet Marshal Tito, the heroic leader of the brave people of Yugoslavia, towards whom we feel the highest admiration. The friendship between our two peoples is founded on mutual experience and derives from the struggle which was fought for the sake of preserving independence, which allowed us to ensure the progress of our two countries. I'm very touched by the more than a cordial reception which the people of Yugoslavia and it's government prepared for me. His Highness Emperor Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia“<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> The original version: „Sretan sam što mi je ovaj posjet dozvolio da sretnem maršala tita, herojskog vođu hrabrog jugoslavenskog naroda, prema kojemu mi imamo najveće divljenje. Prijateljstvo između naša dva naroda zasnovano

## Brioni

The voyage towards Brioni lasted for four hours during which the passengers had the opportunity to admire the coasts of Istria and Cres Island. As the yacht sailed off Pula, the main Istrian city on the southern tip of the peninsula, coastal batteries greeted the yacht's occupants with 42 salvos. At 19:00, Haile Selassie and Tito disembarked on the dock of the Brioni Major island, the main island of the little archipelago (*Vjesnik*, no. 2922, 1954: 1). Tito chose Brioni as one of his residential places back in 1947, while the first visits by Yugoslav officials for talks happened in 1952. The islands are known for having many ancient ruins, and their tourist purpose was initiated in the first years of the 20th Century by the Austrian magnate Paul Kupelwieser, at the time when the whole region was part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. After 1952, Tito's presidential villas were built on the islet of Vanga and *Madona* bay, so the archipelago quickly assumes the title of Tito's „summer residence“. Haile Selassie's visit in 1954 was the first of a foreign statesman, and heralded a long era of visits by many foreign statesmen, dignitaries and tsars to the islands (Begović, 2006).

The next day, on July 25th, official talks were conducted between the two statesmen, joined by their entourages. Talks were centered around technical assistance for Ethiopia in the fields of wooden industry, mining and transport, as well as on the building of a university and a factory for infantry weapons in Addis Ababa (Tasić, 2008: 515). Also, it was decided that the diplomatic representations of the two countries should be upgraded to the level of embassies (*Vjesnik*, no. 2923, 1954: 1).

After the official talks were held, the Ethiopian emperor met with the officials of the technological companies „Rade Končar“ from Zagreb and „Litostroj“ from Ljubljana (PR Slovenia), which

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je na zajedničkom iskustvu i proisteklo je iz borbe koja se vodila za očuvanje nezavisnosti, što nam je omogućilo, da osiguramo napredak naših dviju zemalja. Vrlo sam dirnut više nego srdačnim prijemom koji mi je priređen od strane naroda Jugoslavije i njihove vlade. Njegovo Veličanstvo car Haile Selassie, Car Etiopije“ (*Vjesnik*, no. 2923, 1954: 1)

donated the documentation and plans for a hydroelectric dam to the monarch, as well as albums containing photographs of these two companies' assets. According to *Vjesnik*, the Emperor thanked them and expressed „regret that he hasn't been able to make further visits to Croatia and Slovenia and the companies' headquarters“ (*Vjesnik*, no. 2923, 1954: 1). Shortly after that, the *negus* received a visit by the well-known Croatian sculptor Antun Augustinčić, and kindly asked him to create a statue of Ras Makonnen (1852-1906), Haile Selassie's late father.<sup>143</sup> Selassie's stay on the Brioni islands left him with lasting impression. Although the government of PR Croatia offered him a villa near the southern Croatian city of Dubrovnik, the Emperor was heard expressing the following remark during the 1954 visit: „If I were to go somewhere, it would be to the Brioni. Neither me as an emperor neither the marshal [Tito] as a marshal, but privately and in friendship, to spend a holiday on that beautiful island“ (Tasić, 2008: 516-517, note 16)

Haile Selassie, Josip Broz Tito and their entourages boarded Tito's biggest yacht, the *Galeb*, on the same day at 19:00 and sailed towards Split, the southern Croatian harbour city. During the boarding of the ship, forty two salvoes were fired, and the same occurred during the passage off of the nearby city of Pula. *Galeb* was escorted by several units of the Yugoslav Navy (*Vjesnik*, no. 2923, 1954: 1).

## Split

The arrangement of Split's harbour for the arrival of the *Galeb* and its passengers is described in *Vjesnik* with much detail. The harbour was decorated with a huge number of flags and plants. A white arch was erected with the inscription „Welcome!“ with the reliefs of the Yugoslav and Ethiopian coats of arms in front of the Proletarian Brigades' wharf (*Gat proleterskih brigada*). In the length of about 2 km along the whole Marshal Tito coast, a line of columns with the flags of the two countries were erected. Also, the bankside was completed, widening it by 50 meters, all

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<sup>143</sup> Statue was created in 1959.

quickly finished for the purposes of this ceremony. Along the bank, all shops had images of Tito and Haile Selassie on display (*Vjesnik*, no. 2923, 1954: 1).

Before the arrival of the *Galeb* on the morning of Monday July 26th, citizens of Split congregated on the coastline – 40,000 of them according to *Vjesnik* (*Vjesnik*, no. 2923, 1954: 1). Two thirds of the city's population attended the event!<sup>144</sup> On the Proletarian Brigades' wharf, a company of *pioniri* and *pionirke* lined up, accompanied by the Navy's Guard of Honour. The city officials of Split were also present. As the *Galeb* sailed between the lines of destroyers and patrol ships, forty two salvoes were fired, and sailors on ships saluted the passengers of the incoming yacht. Twelve military aircraft flew over the yacht in a wedge formation (*Vjesnik*, no. 2923, 1954: 5).

The Emperor and Tito disembarked the *Galeb* at 09:35, and were greeted by city officials, the anthem and a Guard of honour . Afterwards, the two leaders went by automobile to one of Titos residences, *Vila Dalmacija*, in Meje, a picturesque part of Split. Along the route, the two white-uniformed leaders were greeted by the thousands congregated along it. At 11:00 the *negus* and Tito visited Split's shipyard, where the guest gained access to the facilities, and was able to observe the launching of the ship *Marčara*. The event was timed for the guest's arrival in the city, as was the case with the rapid finishing of the bankside in the city's riviera. In the afternoon, the Emperor and his entourage boarded the *Galeb* again, and sailed towards the Greek island of Corfu, where his visit to Greece was to start. Tito said his farewells and remained in Split (*Vjesnik*, no. 2923, 1954: 5).

### **After 1954**

Good relations between Ethiopia and Yugoslavia remained personified in the close friendship between their two statesmen. Tito soon replied with a visit to Ethiopia, which occurred in

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<sup>144</sup> According to the 1953 census, Split had around 58,000 citizens (Klempić, 2004: 81)

December 1953. A new visit to Ethiopia came in 1959, and in the same year Haile Selassie came to Yugoslavia again, this time just in PR Croatia (Istrian peninsula, Brioni) and PR Slovenia. The *negus* visited Yugoslavia in 1961, too, when the conference of the Non-aligned countries was being held in Belgrade (Jakovina, 2011: 44). It was followed by the meetings of the two leaders in Ethiopia in January/February 1968 and February 1970, and again in Yugoslavia in November 1968 and October 1973 (Radenković, 1975: 115). Besides working on political ties, the presence of Yugoslavia and its economic officials in Ethiopia was continued and upgraded. For example, the Nautical-Edile Company from Split (*Pomgrad*) was hired to build docking facilities in the port of Assab (today's Eritrea), a business deal worth 10 million dollars. In spite of the good relations between the Empire and Yugoslavia, in the immediate aftermath of the military coup that brought down Haile Selassie's rule in 1974, it was possible to observe solid Yugoslav support to Ethiopia's possible turn towards socialism (Švob-Đokić, 1976: 32).<sup>145</sup>

The visit of Haile Selassie to FPR Yugoslavia in 1954 was the initial step in Yugoslavia's relations with states that were not a part of one of the two existing blocs, especially with those African ones. It wasn't long until Yugoslavia took part in the building of the Non-aligned movement, while Ethiopia became one of the first nations that joined it.

## Conclusions

Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I's official visit to FPR Yugoslavia in July 1954 was the first visit by a foreign statesman after the Cominform resolution of 1948. The event was turned into a major topic for the public in Yugoslavia through several days of July 1954, especially in Croatia, where the guest visited several areas of the country. The major Croatian daily newspaper, *Vjesnik*,

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<sup>145</sup> In 1974, Haile Selassie was overthrown in a coup led by military officers. The country became a military dictatorship, and under the rule of Lt. gen. Mengistu Haile Mariam it experimented with socialism and oriented itself to closer ties with the Soviet Union. Emperor Haile Selassie I died in unclear circumstances on the 28th of August 1975 while under house imprisonment.

had several pages in large part devoted to the events of those days. In addition to giving the description of the protocol, one was able to read about the history of Ethiopia from its pages, as well as about the preparations for the Emperor's journey through some areas. Many photographs were published with text too. The authorities, for certain, not only organized a festivity-like atmosphere for its guest, but for its people too. Publicity that was created brought thousands of curious visitors along the route, and judging by the euphoria that resulted, one may conclude that there originated a short phenomenon of cult of personality and devotion to the ruler of a foreign country. Cities changed briefly for the visit, and many events were timed to occur during the visit, such as the completion of the Coast of Marshal Tito and, possibly, the launching of a ship, both in Split. It is important to note that, in fact, this visit became the precedentform for later visits of other heads of states to Yugoslavia. For example, it was during this visit that the Brioni islands were "opened" as a destination for foreign statesmen. However, the atmosphere created during this visit was to show the world the strength of the Yugoslav foreign policy and its new direction.

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


Image 2: Haile Selassie and Josip Broz Tito aboard the yacht Galeb due to dock in Split's harbour. (From: <http://espressostalinist.wordpress.com/marxism-leninism-versus-revisionism/titoism/>)



# Marginal Groups through History: The Hippie Movement

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*The hippie movement was one of the biggest marginal groups ever formed. Usually, when people talk about marginal groups, they are talking about outlaws, slaves, and people with specific sexual orientations, etc. This whole movement was always treated as a marginal group, despite the fact that not all parts of it were marginal. This paper offers some reason why this was the case through the story about life, ideology and the habits of hippies.*

Keywords: Hippie movement, marginal groups, counterculture

## **Introduction**

The story about the history of American society during the twentieth century is one of the most interesting and complicated problems in contemporary history. When we look at the different societies around the world, we can see that American society can take the title of the world's most complex society. Americans see their society as "the greatest", and they have their Jeffersonian ideal to prove why it is so great to be an American. When we look at their society today, we can say that they are correct, because they are equal and they indeed have their rights: to live, to be free and to pursue happiness (Popov, 2010: 37). These ideas were a product of the eighteenth century revolution, but they became reality only with the twentieth century revolution. During the twentieth century, this society went through the turbulent period of social revolution that eventually made it "the greatest society". One of the most important parts of this revolution occurred during the mid-1960s, when the hippie movement was formed. At the time, the hippie movement was just one of the two biggest subcultures that formed American counterculture. When

the hippie movement was formed, it symbolized the social rebellion of the people who had problems with the way that the world around them functioned. During the time when this movement became popular, it also became in many ways marginalized. The aim of this paper is to show how the hippie movement was formed, and what made it so marginalized that it became a part of the counterculture, rather than a part of the mainstream society. It will also show the process of changing the definition of the term marginal through history.

### **Creation of the hippie movement**

We can say that every society has their mainstream culture and their counterculture. The biggest and the most influential counterculture that was ever formed was the one in the mid-1960s in the United States. This counterculture had two main parts: New Left and the Hippie movement. It is hard to find a distinct division between the ideas of counterculture in general and the hippie movement, and the biggest question about this is: did the counterculture create the hippie movement or was it the other way around? We can ask this question because of the fact that people often use these two terms as if they were synonyms. This question is just one of the many consequences that the spreading of the hippie movement had on society.

The creation of every counterculture is a result of the problems within the society itself. The moment when society tries to find a different way of solving these problems is the moment when the counterculture forms. Creation of the American counterculture is a result of all the things that one part of society could not tolerate any longer. It was the first time that people started to act out in order to prevent problems, or they at least discussed divergent ideas with others (Kisseloff, 2006: 145). People were not satisfied with their place in society (black people, homosexuals, women...), with work conditions, social relationships, and with the international politics of the government (war in Vietnam), so they all agreed that these are the consequences of living within an industrial society (Sen-Žan-Polen, 1999: 5). All this made two parts of American

counterculture: New Left (formed by people who fought against the political problems in society, and who wanted to create a new active community that would break the power of the elite) and the Hippie movement (formed by people with a vision of individual „liberation“) (Brinkley, Fitzpatrick, 1997: 510).

This revolution was led by the younger generation, the so-called baby-boom generation. That generation, born during and after World War II, was the largest generation of young people that came to age for college in the world. Most of them were raised under the influence of Dr. Spock's book *The Commonsense Book of Child Care*, which was published in 1946, and advised young mothers not to put any limits for their children, and to encourage their independence and initiative (Sen-Žan-Polen, 1999: 11-12). It was that independence and initiative that formed the rebellion generation. This brings us to the point where we have to explain why are we, when we are talking about the hippie movement, actually talking mostly about students. Not all of the people that were a part of this movement were students, but most of them were, so we have to ask ourselves why that was the case. They were living on campuses, or nearby, at the time when American universities already had a great tradition of social and political protests, so they were under a great influence that made them want to participate and make a change too (Brinkley, Fitzpatrick, 1997: 510-513). There is another factor as to why many of them were students: they had more freedom and less limits than the people of the same age that had work and other responsibilities, not to mention older people with work and family. We can say that their privileges, and the fear of losing them, had led them to reject all those things that they could not have (Sen-Žan-Polen, 1999: 12). By rejecting them, they created a new countercultural ideology. This ideology denied and rejected all the values of mainstream society, so the mainstream society, not without a reason, did the same thing to the counterculture.

**Roots of the hippie movement: beat movement**

The term “hippie” stemmed from the word hipsters, who were chronicled by the beat writers in the 1950s (Kisseloff, 2006: 137). Does this mean that the hippie movement was just one part of the American long tradition of rebellion? The hippie movement was unique, but it was also built on the ideas that lived in American society long before this movement was born.

The Beat Movement was a movement of nonconformists who lived and wrote within the 1950s New York scene. They were a product of the crisis of authority, and they used their writing to show people how unsatisfied they were with their lives. Later, most of them were active members of the hippie movement, and some of their works have made a great impact on the people who joined the hippies later on. Some of the beatniks were Kesey, Barroughs, Snyder, Ginsberg, and Kerouac. Kesey's *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest*, Ginsberg's *Howl*, and Kerouac's *On the Road* became cult books, not only for the hippie generation, but for all the generations to come. In many ways, Allen Ginsberg is considered to be a pioneer of the counterculture with the attitudes in his poems. He wrote about rebellion, about the pleasures of sex and drugs, and about his political attitudes (Sen-Žan-Polen, 1999: 16-17). But he was also one of the people (together with Gary Snyder) who made a direct connection between the beat and hippie movements, when he appeared at the Human Be-In, hippies coming-out party at Golden Gate Park in 1967 (Kisseloff, 2006: 137). Kerouac wrote about the road that people should take as a way of self-cognition, and that became one of the main ideas of the hippie movement. The beatniks were important, not only because they were a guide for hippies, but because of the ideas like the environmental movement, which is one of the most important legacies of the counterculture.

The name of the movement is also the legacy of beatniks, because of their stories about the hipsters. It was soon widely accepted in society, but some of the hippies rejected even that name so they used names like „heads“ or „freaks“ for themselves (Biggs, 2009: 345).

**Marginalization of the hippie movement**

A story about marginalization is actually a story about the forming of this movement and its characteristics. Government politics during the 1950s, with their anticommunist view was one of the main reasons why the first beatniks came about, and then hippies, who were so enthusiastic about everything that had anything to do with communism. They were unsatisfied with the government, because of all the wrong decisions, especially those regarding their relations with communist regimes. People saw no flaws in communism, because they perceived it as the best solution for poverty. For them, a government who fought these ideas was the real enemy, not communism. We can attribute that to ignorance, but they would probably ignore the facts anyway (Sen-Žan-Polen, 1999: 34). This kind of reaction within the society led not to the liberalization of society, but to an even stronger reaction from, at that moment, mostly conservative society in the United States. As a result, the new president was the Republican candidate Richard Nixon (Gair, 2007: 130). Taking this into consideration, we have to say that the active anti-war movement was never formed within the hippie movement, because of the fact that most of the hippies thought that it was much easier to leave the society, than to try to change it (Gair, 2007: 132). The hippies never considered being a political movement, but they did become an important factor in politics anyway. Their positive attitude towards the politics of Third World countries made them a marginalized group (Sen-Žan-Polen, 1999: 34). It was not so important that they were pacifists when they supported something that the American Cold War society did not like. Also, the way they looked and acted did not make them popular either.

During the 1980s, younger generations had a general opinion about the 1960s as the time when all teenagers were hippies, who wore colored clothes and had long hair (New York Times, July 11, 1987). During the 1960s media images of hippies consisted of kids with mindless grins on their faces, covered with peace symbol pins (Kisseloff, 2006: 145), but these are just some of the many

stereotypes about those years. The number of hippies was never bigger than the number of mainstream youth, and this image is a product of what the mainstream society of the time wanted others to see in them (mindless grins as a result of drug abuse). On the other hand, they did wear distinctive clothing, had long hair, used drugs and wore peace symbols. In both of these examples we have true facts, but there were also tendencies in the society to show people what they wanted to see, not the reality. In the 1960s they were pictured as a marginal group, a liability for the society, and in the 1980s they were pictured as something good, something that should be seen everywhere, and so society perceived it that way. Marginalizing them in the media was the easiest way to fight them and to stop them from spreading. It is interesting that things like long hair and distinctive clothing that marginalized them were the ways that they showed gender equality and the bad influence of industrialization.

A life on campus and in the community, away from family, made them start denying family as the nucleus of society (Bigsbi, 2009: 356), and mainstream society was not prepared to tolerate the undermining of the basis of its life. The hippies' solution was a creation of their own kind of communities, without any laws and hierarchy. This was a great idea in theory, but in practice, a community without laws could not last long. As it turned out, it was just another path to the social contract. With this, they wanted to show the world how it can function without any social limits, so the mainstream society could be destroyed (Sen-Žan-Polen, 1999: 37). These were the most obvious examples of marginalization, as the things that were most visible for the eye of the mainstream society. Unlike these, other things were more individual, less visible for society, or like music, were not considered to be a threat.

### **The hippie movement and the new world view**

The ideology of the hippie movement had its roots in earlier movements, but it was still considered to be revolutionary. Why is that? Perhaps one of the answers to this question is the bad timing that

beatniks had with their work, or they just did not make a strong enough impression on society. We can offer all sorts of different answers to this question, but those would just be speculations. Hippie and beat movements were not so similar in the way they spread within society. While beatniks used their words to write about their ideas, hippies used music to spread theirs, and as it turned out, music was the best way of spreading their ideology.

Hippies claimed that they separated themselves from the mainstream society mainly because they saw all the wrong things about industrialization. For them, industrialization was what should be blamed for segregation, alienation, war, etc. So they refused to use industrial products in everyday life as a sign of revolt. Their rural communities really lived by this rule, but there was one thing that those who lived in the city were not ready to lose: sound systems. Can we say that they were consistent in their ideology, if they had exceptions? This is just one of many contradictions about the hippies' new world view.

The way that hippies looked can be explained by their ideology, because it was, in many ways, a reflection of it. They had long hair, as a sign that they were equal with women. This proves that they fought for gender equality. But was that the case? The biggest part of the movement had consisted of men, and when we look at the statistics, we can see that within the movement there was only one woman for every four men (Sen-Žan-Polen, 1999: 113). The position of women was not so different in this movement, than it was in mainstream society. Women had an apparent freedom in both cases, and there were, of course, some examples where women were really free in the hippie movement. We cannot look at that as proof that there was equality in the movement, because we can also find some examples where women were really free in mainstream society too. There was hypocrisy, because although some parts of the movement really fought for equality, most of the women were still seen as a lower race, and treated like that too. The story about segregation was similar to the story of gender equality. Black people were a minority within the

movement, and the rest of the hippies treated them the same way as the rest of society. People wrote about how it was incredible that the main place of the movement (Haight-Ashbury) that advocated equality was full of segregation (Sen-Žan-Polen, 1999: 67). We can conclude that, although they advocated equality, most of them never actually lived that way.

Their appearance and diet can also be interpreted as a sign of solidarity with the inhabitants of third world countries. Their nutrition with the worst meat, rice and vegetables was the nutrition of the poorest population. But the main reason why they managed to live that way is because of their drug use that led to a loss of appetite. This was not real solidarity, and the main consequence of it was not growth of awareness of the situation in the third world, but their thinness was seen to be an aesthetic ideal (Sen-Žan-Polen, 1999: 40). Stealing is defined as one of the characteristics of marginal groups in every society. That leads us to another reason why the hippies were marginalized. Despite the fact that they were stealing food, and not something else, they were still committing crimes.

Silent protest against the war and industry in general could be seen through the convergence of nature. Their opinion was that the world around them was raping nature (Bigsbi, 2009: 346). As an answer, they wanted to make peace with nature and their colorful look was the reason why they were known as “flower children“. They wore natural materials, lots of handmade jewelry inspired by eastern cultures and peace symbols. One of the symbols of their style was tie-dyed fabrics. They were a legacy of Luna Moth, who lived and worked in San Francisco. She took white shirts (they were a part of the working uniforms) that people were leaving in the free store and colored them. After a while, this new art was available for everyone (Kisseloff, 2006: 146). This look made a great impact on fashion, so most of these things became the part of mainstream fashion later on.

Probably the most valuable consequence of the relationship between the hippie movement and nature was ecology. Despite the fact that this term had existed since the nineteenth century, this was the first time that it was actually used prolifically. For the first time in history, people started to talk about the bad influence that industry had on nature. Hippies never used machines in their work, and they did everything to protect and preserve nature. Raising awareness of the environment created a large number of organizations around the world that fought for that cause. During the 1970s in Europe, these kinds of “green” organizations became the new political power (Laker, 1995: 532). While we have a positive view about this, industrial society at that time did everything to marginalize this group by not letting people see any good things about the hippies. Does this mean that we can blame industrial society for the moment when hippies forgot about their cause? We can see that in the movie “Woodstock“, where it is clear that nobody showed any environmental responsibility for all the rubbish and waste left behind (Gair, 2007: 207).

Which religion respected hippies? One of the main reasons why they were rejected from mainstream society was because they were considered to have no respect for religion. This was not true because they respected all religions, but they just did not prefer the mainstream religion of American society (if there was such a thing). They respected Native Americans and Eastern religions and religious rites. The use of drugs like “peyote“ was a part of these religious rites (Native American) and it helped hippies to break a wall of consciousness and go through the door of perception (Bigsbi, 2009: 346). On the other hand, Eastern religions offered them a way to get in touch with their souls and to finish their journey toward self-realization. The only problem with this was the fact that their use of drugs for religious purposes soon became drug abuse.

This new life they found in religious rites had another way to express itself. Rebirth into a new person they wanted to become, led, in many cases, to a change of name. But it was not only religion that made people change their names, it was also the need to create a whole new

personality. It was a symbolic way of showing how they ended all ties with the old life. The new name was inspired by everything around them, by nature, people, books, etc. (Kisseloff, 2006: 228).

### **Haight-Ashbury dream – the capital of American counterculture**

As one of the places where cultural life of the United States was strongest during the 1960s, San Francisco got the title of the capital of American counterculture (Gair, 2007: 171). This was the place with a strong tradition of accepting new ideas and ways of life. Rock music and drugs already had an important place in the city, so the atmosphere was ideal for creating a movement in which those two things were a part.

Why was Haight-Ashbury the place where it all began? After the 1950s spent in New York, most of the beatniks decided to move to San Francisco, a place where (together with Los Angeles) drug use and new ideas were a part of everyday life. Haight-Ashbury was at a crossroads, not only between the University and the Golden Gate Park, but also between the mainstream and countercultural society.

With old houses in Victorian style, it was the perfect place for a new kind of community, and the hippie movement soon took over the whole neighborhood. People were attracted by the freedom they had there, so they used it in many different ways. Some of them became a part of some of the local groups, like the San Francisco Mime Troupe and the Diggers. They used everything and everyone in their performances, showing equality, social rebellion and creativity at the same time. During their first year, they were still active in the anti-war movement, so the 1967 “Summer of love” was also known as “Vietnam Summer” (Sen-Žan-Polen, 1999: 32). With their protests against the war, and with their peace messages like “Make love, not war“, they gathered a large number of young people. But the summer of 1967 was the highlight of the hippie movement in

Haight-Ashbury. The place became crowded with new people (hippies and tourists) and most of the old inhabitants decided to move. People were leaving because they lost the space to create, and because they wanted to travel, or start a life somewhere else.

This hippie migration created a large number of new rural communities. That way, they were finally able to live and be a part of nature. Most of them had never lived in the countryside, so they were lucky if they managed to survive the first winter in a community. Those communities that survived were mostly abandoned during the early 1970s, when the movement lost its power. But there were some exceptions, with people who continued to live in peace with nature.

It was not the popularity of the movement that was (and is) the most important legacy of Haight-Ashbury. While the music that gave power to the movement, became part of capitalistic society later, groups like the Diggers preserved their ideas. They used their big numbers to help people by opening free stores, free restaurants, and free clinics. While this first free clinic did not last long, it still helped thousands of people within a month. In the county where medical insurance was an ongoing problem, this became a model for opening more free clinics all around it (Sen-Žan-Polen, 1999: 55-56).

### **Music and drugs: the path of glory and self-destruction**

Music was the driving force behind the hippie movement. Hippies used music to spread their ideas, but music soon became more than an instrument. Rock music was the great way to express oneself, and musicians used their ideas mixed with rhythm to do that. The San Francisco music scene (Grateful Dead, Jefferson Airplane, Country Joe and the Fish, Quicksilver, etc.) together with bands like the Beatles and Rolling Stones, created an alliance between mainstream society and the hippie movement. Despite the fact that people had a problem with hippies, their music had been widely accepted. Songs like “Fixing to die“, about the war in Vietnam, by Country Joe and the

Fish, became practically an anthem for all people who were against the war (Kisseloff, 2006: 202). Rock music fever during the 1960s is common knowledge, so this paper will show only the most important segments that were considered to be marginal.

Festivals were the place where the popularity of the music could be seen most clearly. Hippies organized small festivals every year to celebrate the summer solstice. They gathered and celebrated nature with rituals, drugs and music. Music festivals were similar in that way. The most important festivals were: Miami Pop Festival (in August 1968), Newport (in 1969), Atlanta Pop Festival (in July 1969) and Woodstock (in August 1969) (Sen-Žan-Polen, 1999: 181). Woodstock gathered around 500,000 people, but it was still considered to be a zenith of the movement. By the end of the 1960s, music lost most of its artistic parts and became a part of the capitalistic world.

Drug use was also an important part of everyday hippie life. Like music, it became another way for some people to make a profit. In the beginning, people used drugs like marijuana and LSD, but later on they started to use stronger drugs, like heroin. The problem with this was not just the use of drugs, but the industry that did everything to increase addiction.

These are the reasons why the movement came to an end. The movie “Woodstock“ shows all the consequences of drug use, with images of people who were not themselves (Gair, 2007: 206). In December 1969 (three months after Woodstock), at Altamont festival, security killed one person, and it was not just that someone got killed, but that people were so drugged that they did not even pay attention to what was going on (Bigsbi, 2009: 349). This murder, together with the murders committed by Charles Manson and his family, who looked and lived like hippies, was the main reason why the movement was marginalized, and it became a reason why people lost their interest in it.

**The influence of the movement to other societies**

The influence that the movement had on American society is well known, but what was the case with other societies? It had infected societies like the French with more than just counterculture, but with mainstream culture as well. The United States became a model for the development of France, in every aspect (Arijes, Dibi, 2004: 467). Like the Americans, the French conservative society had a problem with accepting new ideas that the hippie movement brought. This “echo“ came to France during the 1970s, but its influence was not as strong as in American society (Sen-Žan-Polen, 1999: 197). It still brought ideas about ecology, equality and community to France.

During the Cold War era, the hippie movement managed to break through the iron curtain and inflict communist countries with new ideas and rock music. The USSR created a special version of the rebellion: it created a society with people who had led double lives. During the day, they were all model citizens, but during the night, they were someone else. We can say that USSR society created an underground counterculture (Sharlet, 1984: 135-136), and as in France, this social reaction in the USSR was too late.

Ideas that went together with this movement were international, as were their consequences. The movement was part of the counterculture everywhere where it developed. But we can also say that the counterculture of one era becomes the culture of the next (Sen-Žan-Polen, 1999: 203).

**Conclusion**

The main characteristic of the hippie movement is contradiction. Contradictions could be found everywhere: in their ideology and in the relationships they had (within society and out of it). Some parts of their lives can be interpreted as marginal, but then we have to ask ourselves, what is the definition of the term “marginal”? While their looks were considered to be marginal at that time, can we say that they were really marginal when the contemporary society does not perceive looks

as a reason to marginalize? On the other hand, some things, like segregation, (the separation of contemporary society on the basis of race for example) were not considered a reason for marginalization during the 1960s. So, we can conclude that this was not just a study about one marginal group, but a study of how the term “marginal” changed definitions through history.

The hippie movement has a great legacy within every society, because it inspired people to ask important questions, and to find a solution. While some parts of this movement evolved and entered mainstream society, others preserved the tradition of asking questions that would change society for the better.

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# Propaganda Posters during the Cultural Revolution

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*Prague*

*Propaganda posters have been an integral part of communist propaganda all around the world. Even though visual propaganda was only one of many ways to introduce and deliver a political message to the people, it was one of the most effective. Actually, using art in such an overwhelming and enthusiastic way helped the communist party influence the lives of ordinary people, both publically and privately. In the 1960s and 1970s, approximately half of the Chinese population was illiterate; therefore visual propaganda was the simplest way of approaching its inhabitants. Cultural Revolution represents a turbulent time full of turmoil in Chinese history. The propaganda posters used by the Chinese government record the violent development of this period.*

Key words: Propaganda, Posters, Cultural Revolution, China

## **Introduction**

The People's Republic of China (PRC) was under the rule of Mao Zedong from its establishment in 1949 until his death in 1976. PRC became a socialist state headed by a Democratic Dictatorship with the Communist Party of China (CCP) as the ruling political party. Mao's theoretical contributions to Marxism-Leninism were his military strategies, and his brand of Communist policies, which are now collectively known as Maoism. His social-political programs, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution caused huge turmoil in Chinese culture, society and its economy.

According to Jacques Ellul during the Maoist era, the political system used a very visible and loud propaganda (Ellul, 1965: 6). Propaganda is a complicated piece of machinery that influences or even completely changes public opinion and attitudes towards something. Propaganda, when used properly, is such a strong and influential tool that it can cause a complete mental transformation. In this essay, I attempt to study pictorial posters as a propaganda tool during the Cultural Revolution in China.

During this period China produced a large amount of propaganda posters with designs from the Soviet Union. To quote Napoleon Bonaparte, “a picture is worth a thousand words.” Moreover, posters became a very important and unique part of communist culture; a new culture created in large part by propaganda. Propaganda departments used very sophisticated ways of influencing the public and culture. When propaganda is well-used, it is able to create new combinations of factors in society, which helps to construct what is rejected or perceived to be pleasing by the society and its culture in general. Posters were used as a major vehicle for transferring political messages to the masses. They are an exceptional visual form in that their function and design are geared to be instantly comprehensible by a large portion of the population (Fidelius, 1998: 6). Posters have the power to create an immediate political or emotional impression. Generally, posters are mostly based on people’s cultural and social knowledge, not on knowledge reached by a school education. In this way many people from different social levels, with or without education are affected (Evans, Donald, 1999: 19).

Posters have been an integral part of communist propaganda all around the world. Even though visual propaganda was only one of many ways to introduce and deliver a political message to the people, it was one of the most effective. Actually, using art in such an overwhelming and enthusiastic way helped the communist party to influence the life of ordinary people both

publically and privately. Posters could be produced cheaply and easily and that made them widely available to everyone. Moreover, posters could be seen everywhere. They surrounded all the places where people lived and their bright colours easily caught everyone's attention, even if for only a second. They also remained in the public subconscious and could influence people's future thinking and decision-making as well as modern marketing. Many people in China liked the posters simply because they were colourful, had an interesting composition and visual contents, but did not pay too much attention to the slogans printed underneath. This meant that political messages were delivered in a subconscious way (Edison, V., Edison, J., 2006: 4). It is exactly the same as how advertisements work with consumers nowadays. Although the consumer does not remember the details of the ad, he remembers the product. When it comes time to make a decision about what to buy, our brain chooses something that it has seen before, in life or on TV.

Additionally, posters were able to penetrate even the lowest levels of the social hierarchy. Colourful posters could be seen not only in offices, factories and schools, but also in private homes and dormitories. In part, posters were an easy and cheap way to decorate homes. They were freely accessible when no other art was available. Another factor supporting the use of posters as the main tool for connecting the leadership and the masses was the creation of new cultural values. Even though an amazing 740 million copies of the famous red-covered *Quotations of Mao Tse-tung* were published for every man, woman and child in China during the Cultural Revolution, half of the population was illiterate (Lynch, 1999: 25). Therefore, a visual form of propaganda acted as a crucial factor in delivering a message to more than three hundred million people.

There has been a limited amount of research on visual texts, such as posters. Only recently have they become an interest of study, because posters had been such an essential and ubiquitous part of everyday life, people very often destroyed old posters when they received new ones. Due to this fact, we do not have a complete preserved collection of posters published during the Cultural

Revolution. So far, one of the largest collections of Chinese posters in the West is located in the University of Westminster.<sup>146</sup>

The establishment of the PRC saw profound changes in the lives and working conditions of Chinese artists (Edison, V., Edison, J., 2006: 7). Throughout its long history, the Chinese political system used the arts to propagate correct behaviour and thought. “Literature, poetry, painting, stage plays, songs and other artistic expressions were produced to entertain, but they were also given an important didactic function: they had to educate the people in what was considered right and wrong at any time” (Heijden, Landsberger, Shen, 2009: 4). As long as the State provided examples of correct behaviour, this automatically provided the public with the outlines of what was considered proper and to be believed. After establishing the PRC, propaganda art continued to be one of the major means of providing examples of correct behaviour. Mao’s view of art was very pragmatic. He saw artists as “cultural workers, as just another brigade in the revolutionary army.” They should “serve the people” and “become one with the masses”(Cheek, 2002: 113).

Mao’s speech in May, 1942: *“Revolutionary Chinese writers and artists, the kind from whom we expect great things, must go among the masses; they must go among the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers and into the heat of battle for a long time to come, without reservation, devoting body and soul to the task ahead; they must go to... observe, experience, study, and analyze all different kinds of people... before they are ready for the stage of creating... In the world today, all culture or literature and art belongs to a definite class and party, and has a definite political line. Art for art’s sake, art that stands above class and party, and fellow-travelling or politically independent art do not exist in reality... art obeys both class and party, and must naturally obey the political demands of its class and party...”*(Cheek, 2002: 113-117).

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<sup>146</sup> For more information see: [http://home.wmin.ac.uk/china\\_posters/cataloguelist.htm](http://home.wmin.ac.uk/china_posters/cataloguelist.htm)

### **Posters as communist visual propaganda**

Visual propaganda such as posters can be created through different techniques such as gouaches, oil paintings, water colours, brush and ink drawings or wood block prints. Visual propaganda played a supportive role in campaigns waged through other mass-media, and was only a part of the propaganda mechanism that had been developed by the CCP during its stay in the Yan'an area in the 1940's. "Originally, posters were intended solely for cadres and party-members, but it had shown that visual propaganda fit perfectly to the party's needs in addressing a largely illiterate population" (Chiu, 2008: 5). The population was increasingly exposed to the mechanism of rectification through propaganda, which reached a climax during the 60's and 70's.

As mentioned above, early forms of propaganda already existed in pre-modern China. It was based on the Confucian concept of a "malleability of man," which held the idea that through education a state of social harmony can be achieved. Rules of correct behaviour were set up through constant self-criticism and self-improvement, which were two terms that later became Mao's favourites. The CCP successfully used the tradition of woodcuts and New Years pictures in China. The history of these New Years pictures date back to the 16<sup>th</sup> century, and the "CCP genuinely used various elements of folk art and symbolism with its ideology to penetrate the homes of the public."<sup>147</sup> "These pictures entered into the tastes and beliefs of those in the countryside, expressing wishes for happiness and good luck. Artists creating these pictures were educated in Confucianism, so they were able to utilize symbols that were traditionally seen as auspicious, including those promoting long life, a government career, and wealth" (Landsberger, 1995: 22). Thanks to the relationship with traditional beliefs, the New Years pictures with their subtle messaging circulated throughout the whole country.

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<sup>147</sup> For further details see: [http://www.artgallery.sbc.edu/exhibits/00\\_01/chinesewoodblock/history.html](http://www.artgallery.sbc.edu/exhibits/00_01/chinesewoodblock/history.html)

Propaganda posters in China can be divided between two schemes; the period when they were published which, of course, influenced their theme, or type. Thematic division is closely connected to historical events such as Japanese occupation (1937-1945), Building the People's Republic (1949-1956), the Great Leap Forward (1956-1960), Intervening Years (1960-1965), Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), New Leaders (1976-1978), Modernization (1978-1988), and China opens up (1989 until now). Even though propaganda posters are still published in China, there was a significant decline in the 80's because the development of technology came with new mediums for communicating political messages. There were more types of posters, like the huge billboards located along the streets and avenues of China's urban areas. These billboards involved political and ideological messages about how to behave and think in a specific way or how to work towards a specific goal. They very often involved some quotations from the writings of Mao Zedong or slogans, which were formulated by the CCP and supported the line of current policy, or they visualised ideas of future communist utopia (Landsberger, 1995: 11).

The Cultural Revolution was a mass campaign of enormous dimensions by itself; it included a large amount of sub-campaigns following the current government's policy. First I would like to start with the main themes which appeared on the posters for a longer period of time during the Cultural Revolution and then I would like to provide some examples of shorter sub-campaigns which were only short-term reactions to the changes in the party's policy.

### **Main Poster Themes – Red Guards (1966-1968)**

The first years of the Great Cultural Revolution are considered as the violent phase of the movement. The term "Red Guards" was first used by a group of students who wrote a Revolutionary Big Character Poster that accused the Beijing University of suppressing student political activities in May 1966. It was a large handwritten screed (not a pictorial poster), posted on a public wall. Such handwritten posters were an important medium of propaganda and debate

during the Cultural Revolution. Chairman Mao ordered the text of the poster to be published in the *People's Daily*, China's main newspaper. This was an inspiration for many students across China to start questioning their teachers. Two months later, in July, Mao published his own Big Character Poster with a title “Bombard the Headquarters” and authorized formations of Red Guards organizations, whose members were mostly teenage children from the countryside, politically influenced by the Social Education Movement. He highlighted the role of students in destroying the 'Four Olds' of Chinese society (old customs, old culture, old habits and old ideas). The Red Guards had declared themselves to be 'Chairman Mao's little soldiers and followed Mao's ideas.' One of the signs of a Red Guard and the Cultural Revolution in general, as can be seen in hundreds of poster, was the Little Red Book with quotations from Mao's writings. (App. 1.1) It was small and bound in a red plastic cover so people could always carry it with them (App 1.2). A good Red Guard read hardly anything else. They destroyed old books and art, museums were ransacked, and streets were renamed and given new revolutionary names and adorned with pictures and the sayings of Mao (Langley, 2008: 78-84).

As many posters proposed, a lot of unique cultural heritage was attacked and destroyed; literally smashed to pieces (App. 1.3). Thousands of people, prominent as well as common inhabitants, were accused of being rightists or bourgeois and were beaten to death or committed suicide. Propaganda posters encouraged people to fight against the public enemies of all levels; brother, teacher, neighbour; simply anybody who seemed to be reactionary.

Liu Shaoqi (App. 1.4) or Deng Xiaoping (App. 1.5) could be named as examples of prominent victims. For a long time, until the Cultural Revolution, Liu Shaoqi was seen to be a potential successor to Mao Zedong. He was born in 1898 into a rich peasant family. In 1921, he joined the Communist Party; and in 20's he was an active organizer in the labor movement. In 1927, he was elected to the Central Committee, where he would serve until 1968. He was so successful in the

party that in 1959 he replaced Mao as State President and represented the country abroad. After the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, he and Mao disagreed on the course of development China ought to take. Liu started to be attacked through propaganda posters which evoked negative moods against Liu among Red Guards. In October 1968, Liu was officially denounced as "a renegade, traitor and scab hiding in the Party, a lackey of imperialism, modern revisionism and the Kuomintang reactionaries", formally stripped all his positions and he was permanently expelled from the Party (Schoenhals, 1996: 315). He died in a Kaifeng prison, probably because he was refused medication for diabetes.

Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) was born as Deng Xiansheng into a landlord family. Deng was very soon politically active; at the age of 18 he joined the China Socialist Youth League. In 1927, he then changed his name to Xiaoping, meaning "small peace". After the founding of the PRC, Deng held a number of important military and civilian posts, but he came into conflict with Mao after the collapse of the Great Leap Forward. Similar to Liu, Deng became one of the targets on the propaganda posters, which meant the end of his career in the Party and when he was sent into exile. He was rehabilitated in 1973.

### **Main Poster Themes - Mao, Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, (1966-1972)**

During the Cultural Revolution, three leaders of the party dominate the posters. First, the most important and most often pictured is, of course, Chairman Mao. The image of young Mao became the icon of the revolution. He is often pictured above people, almost as a god (App. 2.1). His picture should give people strength to struggle for a better future; following Mao's leadership which was showing the way. Even though Mao had appeared prominently on propaganda posters in the 1940s, the second half of 60's witnessed an enormous growth in the number of posters with his image (App 2.2, Powell, 1996: 2).

The Minister of Defence, Lin Biao, was behind the creation of the famous 'Mao's personality cult. Mao was depicted as a Great Teacher, a Great Leader, a Great Helmsman, and a Supreme Commander; he dominated the propaganda posters in the first half of the Cultural Revolution. Mao could be shown as a benevolent father, bringing the Confucian mechanisms of popular obedience into play. Or he was portrayed as a wise statesman, a talented military leader or a great teacher. Mao also paid attention to specific details such as his face being portrayed mostly from the left; from the correct side. One group of posters show historical moments from Mao's life such as a Long March or Mao as a young man on his way to the city of Anyuan to lead a miners' strike (App. 2.3). This is actually one of the most commonly reproduced posters of the Cultural Revolution; it was probably reproduced around 900 million times. The poster could be seen almost everywhere, in houses, factories and offices. His image could be used for every occasion, for posters representing the work or happy life or fighting the enemy. Similar images of Mao could be used more often during the Revolution, but for different purposes, and very often only the slogan was different (Evans, Donald, eds, 1999: 123-130).

Mao was displayed on a picture or as a bust in every home. To not have his portrait at home could be understood as unwillingness to go with the Revolution, which was dangerous especially during the Red Guard period. Mao was often displayed in god-like poses; high above the common people, often with sun rays around, or taller than everybody else in the poster. Visualizing Mao as a god was only a part of the religious aspect of Mao's personality cult; there were several rituals which people should follow every day; to ask for instructions in the morning, to thank Mao for his kindness at noon, and to report back at night which was always accompanied with wishing him "Ten thousand years" or singing the song "Beloved Chairman Mao". These extreme religious aspects of Mao's personality cult were not removed until the early 1970s.

Another leader to whom posters were devoted was Lin Biao (1907-1971). Lin was considered to be one of the strategic men of genius of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Even before establishing the PRC Lin was involved in troop training and indoctrination assignments. Later he was the designer of Mao's personality cult (App. 2.4). He made a great school of Mao Zedong Thought for the PLA, and had Mao's Quotations compiled and published in the famous *Little Red Book*, for which he wrote an introduction. He wrote "Everything that Mao Zedong says is the truth; every statement he utters is worth 10,000 sentences" (Schoenhals, 1996: 126). Jiang Qing, Mao's wife, also supported Lin, however, Lin started to prepare for an armed uprising, but when he realized that this plan had been discovered, he tried to run away from China. During his retreat from the country in 1971, with his family and supporters, Lin's plane crashed over the former Mongolian People's Republic (Langley, 2008: 287).

There were only a few famous women who were portrayed in propaganda posters. One of them was Jiang Qing (1913-1991), Mao's last wife (App. 2.5). Although she was a prominent member of the Central Cultural Revolution Group and a major player in Chinese politics in the period 1966-1976, relatively few posters have been published which show her. She was very popular even though she was previously an actress. She became Mao's wife in 1939 and was pressed to become a housewife and avoid playing any role in politics. Later, she served as Mao's personal secretary in the 1940s and was head of the Film Section of the CCP Propaganda Department in the 1950s. In the opening years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Jiang dominated the Chinese arts; she developed the revolutionary model operas (See app. 2.1). When Mao died in 1976, Jiang lost the support and was arrested with the other members of the Gang of Four. Suffering from throat cancer, she was released on bail for medical treatment in early May 1991. Ten days after her release, she committed suicide (Langley, 2008: 254-292).

**Main Poster Themes - Workers, Peasants, Soldiers (1966-1972)**

On the posters workers, peasants and soldiers are portrayed as the pillars of the country, of the new Chinese society. They are shown as the rulers, but of course, in reality the ruler is the Party. Though work dominates the images, people smile because they are building the new and better society (App. 3.1). The Little Red Book is necessary equipment for reaching the goal at work; it does not matter if it is in agriculture or in the factory (App. 3.2). A unique place on propaganda posters belongs to the soldiers. During the Revolution, the position of the PLA had strengthened as Mao felt that the army was the only ideologically correct part of the government. Everybody in the country, even women were encouraged to join the PLA. The army was shown as the defenders of peace; protectors of socialist society; and as a helpful hand for common people (App. 3.3).

**Main Poster Themes - China as Paradise (1972-1976)**

In the last phase of the Revolution, propaganda posters showed the country as being full of happiness, a lot of food (App. 4.1), enough goods, even luxuries, for everyone (App. 4.2) and progress (App 4.3). The countryside was blooming, the factories were busy, the cities and industry were developing. All of these themes on the posters were designed to remind people that the Party's policy line was successful and the country was reaching better times for everyone. Posters from this period were full of bright colours, in contrast with the period of Red Guard where posters were surprisingly simple in their design and coloring, usually produced in red, white and black (see App. 1, Heijiden, Landsberger, Shen, 2009: 58).

Apart from the main poster themes that repeated in various stylings during the Cultural Revolution for a longer period of time, there were also much shorter poster campaigns. The topics of these posters were current policy lines or they reflected certain situations in society. These short-term campaigns were ideologically extremely important for the common people; it was a source of

information for them which told them what was accepted and expected at that moment; what kind of behaviour they were expected to exhibit.

### **Short campaigns - Monsters and Demons (1966-1967)**

This campaign at the beginning of the Red Guard violence period was particularly aggressive against everybody who seemed to be a threat to the revolutionary development and socialism. The name was based in Buddhist demonology (牛鬼蛇神, *niugui sheshen* - cow monsters and snake demons), (Chiu, 2008: 199). Other terms that were used for example, included devil or vampire. Symbolism played a very important role in Chinese society, so to use such a metaphor was a good way to demonize opponents. These people were depicted as demons in opposition to the bright Mao's thoughts. Once people were accused of being rightist they were dragged out by Red Guards and forced to wear caps, collars or placards identifying them as monsters, demons or clowns during humiliating public meetings (App 5.2). There was an easy way to get rid of an enemy; it could be a neighbor or political opponent. For example, a person whose career and life was destroyed during this campaign was vice-premier Ulanfu, an ethnic Mongol. First he was party secretary of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region and he belonged to the first high Party of officials who had fallen. He was dismissed in August 1966 and accused of being the biggest party power-holder taking the capitalist road (App. 5.1, Langley, 2008: 248-251).

### **Short campaigns - Revolutionary Networking (1966-1967)**

This campaign lasted from August 1966 until March 1967. Even though Mao already had authorized the formation of Red Guard organizations, many new established groups of Red Guards felt repressed in their revolutionary fervour by school and university authorities who tried to keep the situation under control. The Red Guards wanted to go to Beijing to see Chairman Mao and look for justice and sympathy, and to share their experiences with other groups. Beijing was seen as the center of the movement. So many young people wanted to take the trains or buses to get to

Beijing, which overloaded the public transport system. But a large amount of students and teenagers wanted to reach Beijing by walk in memory of the Long March, which was considered to be truly devoted to the Revolution (App. 6.1).

### **Short campaigns - Revolutionary Committees (1967)**

Revolutionary Committees were a new structure which in Mao's vision, replaced the original political structures that had existed in China. The Committees were designed to be an alliance of the army and the state and to bring the factional struggle to an end. It was a political reaction to the fights within the Red Guards. All work units, from factories to schools, from workshops to rural communes, formed their own revolutionary committees (App. 7.1).

### **Short campaigns - Seven May Cadre Schools (1968)**

In May 1966, Mao published Mao Zedong's 7th May Directive that asked for the establishment of the 7th May Cadre Schools (Cheek, 2002: 51). The first schools were set up a year later in 1968. In another part of this directive, Mao developed the idea of setting up farms, which were later called cadre schools for cadres and intellectuals, who were sent from the cities to the countryside (App. 8.1). The idea was for participants to experience the manual labor and undergo ideological reeducation. During the revolution it became a favorite way to get rid of unyielding cadres. Over one hundred of these schools were built in the countryside, and over 100,000 officials from the central government were sent there, some with their family members as well. Schools for middle- and lower-ranking cadres had also been sent there, but their number is unknown. Living conditions were quite bad during this reeducation process in the villages. Peasants were not happy about coming cadres. They saw the cadres as a burden, because in their eyes they did not have a high value as working labour. Mao's intention of learning from the poor and lower-middle level peasants was not successful. After Lin Biao's failure in 1971, the cadres were allowed to return to the cities. Slowly one by one, all of the 7th May Cadre Schools were closed.

**Short campaigns - Up to the mountains, down to the villages (1968)**

This was a political program of relocating urban students and young people to the villages to learn from the peasants, similar to the 7<sup>th</sup> May Cadre Schools (App 9.1). It was not a new idea. As well as removing cadres, sending the young to the countryside was first introduced in the 50's during the Great Leap Forward. It reached its climax, however, between the years 1968-1975 when over 12 million young people were relocated, around 10% of the urban population. The intention of the program was a life-long resettlement which of course was not successful and most of the people returned back from the village after the end of the Cultural Revolution (Bernstein, 1977). Posters had shown only idyllic scenes from the countryside, young people enjoying themselves while getting new experiences. The reality was, of course, the opposite. Peasants often saw young people as a threat to their own survival, because students had no labour experience. Many young people did not survive the harsh reality and died during the reeducation process.

**Short campaigns – Criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius (1974)**

It took a few years before the public was informed about the betrayal of the previous ministry of Defense, Lin Baio. Lin was criticized in a campaign which started in 1974 as well as the supporters of Confucianism who were now considered to be revolutionaries. This struggle was made into a large-scale, national movement. Posters also attacked Deng Xiaoping and other rehabilitated veteran cadres (App. 10.1).

**Short campaigns – Criticism of Rightist Deviationism (1976)**

This was one of the last campaigns during the Cultural Revolution. By the end of the Revolution big mass campaigns were mostly over. This one was mostly against former leaders and cadres, who were rehabilitated in the early 70's like Deng Xiaoping. A lot of verdicts against them had been reversed; many who had been rehabilitated were blamed again after several months.

Following the end of the campaign they could come back to their former positions (App. 11.1, Langley, 2008: 390-393).

### **Short campaigns – Iron Ladies**

Communists rejected traditional Chinese norms of female beauty such as foot binding as well as Westernized approaches to women's self-adornment. Communist activists thought that modern women should rebel against beauty norms and forsake self-beautification. According to the Communists, one goal of revolutionary politics was women's liberation from the patriarchal society system and the male-dominated system of private property. They saw a lack of adornment as a sign of women's liberation and dignity. Non-adornment was seen as an attitude and a practice that women should adopt so that they could contribute to the political development and reshaping of society. Resisting fashion and self-adornment was perceived to help the communist struggle for a better socialist future and was appreciated as a new cultural value. Women who were interested in clothing, dressing up, and a comfortable life-style were despicable and did not contribute to the communist revolution.

The Communists strategically manipulated new styles of appearance by imagining ideal revolutionary women on posters. Communists argued that they created a new female appearance, a new kind of beauty. Young, working, physically strong women with short hair, became a symbol of the removal of discrimination against women, creating a new age, new society, and new culture (App. 12.1). A revolutionary appearance was attained by wearing unisex clothing made of rough, cheap cloth and cutting women's hair short. Women were supposed to work, dress and look like men in clothing that was not supposed to reveal any female curves (App. 12.2). Looking serious and wearing simple clothing was an image of a new "politically progressive" woman. Unisex imagery radiated a message of political identification with the revolution and emancipation.

Gender-neutral bodies were important for breaking traditional bounds and it helped women to be respected in rural communities (Ip, 2003).

### **Conclusion**

Propaganda posters during the Cultural Revolution do not show only the current political line and its consequences, but also illustrate what people saw every day, at home, in public places or at work. It was something that strongly formed them in their personal growth and development, what influenced their characters.

Posters display many aspects of Chinese society; the perceptions of the future, things which were valued or that were considered beautiful. There was a huge amount of symbolism included in the posters. Not only the obvious symbolism connected with traditions and beliefs such as Confucianism, but also unintended symbolism. Posters had the power to form people's attitude towards something. Propaganda images worked especially well in China (in comparison to other socialist countries, such as in Eastern Europe), partly because a large part of the population was still illiterate, and with no other media around. The Chinese population traditionally liked posters and the value of symbolism was much higher than in European countries.

Propaganda posters were one of the main transition links through which the Party delivered ideological messages to the masses. Posters became a part of Chinese society. People had them at home, sometimes voluntarily, sometimes compulsory. Posters provide many interesting aspects that can be studied. For example, the masculine appearance of women on the posters promoting work in factories in contrast to the attractive look of young revolutionaries on posters designed to be spread abroad. Posters should be seen as visual texts that delivered political messages through the image, full of symbolism and hidden hints. Even though artists had to deal with many restrictions when creating posters, some of them still have artistic value. Posters became part of

cultural products of that time and further influenced the future development of society, its culture and political communication with the masses.

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<http://chineseposters.net/index.php>



## Appendix<sup>148</sup> 1 – Red Guards

### 1.1 1966, September


Criticize the old world and build a new world with Mao Zedong Thought as a weapon



1.2 1967, The 16<sup>th</sup> May Circular is a great new milestone in the history of the development of

Marxism-Leninism, it is the Manifesto of the Communist Party of the 1960s

<sup>148</sup> Note: All posters are taken from: Heijden van der, Marien, Landsberger, Stefan R., Shen, Kuiyi; *Chinese Posters*, München: Prestel, 2009; <http://chineseposters.net/index.php>, Landsberger, Stephan: *Chinese Propaganda Posters : From Revolution to Modernization*, Singapore, 1995.



1.4 ca. 1966

Hold high the great red flag of Mao Thought, thoroughly smash the reactionary line of Liu and Deng

1.3 ca. 1967

Scatter the old world, build a new world

An example of prominent victims: In 1966, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping became the major targets of struggle during the Cultural Revolution. They and Mao basically disagreed on the course of Chinese development.



Zedong



1.5 1968,  
November

The renegade  
traitor and scab  
Liu Shaoqi must  
forever be  
expelled from the  
Party!

2.1 ca. 1968

Advance victoriously while following Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in literature and the arts






2.2 1966, August

The sunlight of Mao Zedong Thought illuminates the road of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

2.3 1968, July, Chairman Mao going to Anyuan

2.4 1971 Advance victoriously while following Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. Lin is considerably smaller than Mao.



2.5 1969, May



The invincible thought of Mao Zedong illuminates the stage of revolutionary art!



3.1 1970

Go among the workers, peasants and soldiers and into the thick of struggle!

This poster with Western subtitles is also an example of those which were exported to Europe and the United States in large numbers, and distributed by Maoist groups there. They were very popular among left-wing students.

3.2 1971, May



The industry learns from Daqing, agriculture learns from Dazhai and the whole country learns from the People's Liberation Army.

3.3 undated



我们一定要按照毛主席的指示，在当好战斗队的同时，当好工作队、生产队，把军学、军农、军工、军民都兼起来，办好毛泽东思想的大学校，培养能文能武、亦工亦农的共产主义新人。

高举毛泽东思想伟大红旗 把我军真正办成毛泽东思想的大学校

4.1 1973, The commune's fishpond



4.2 1976, A shop scene in the mid-1970s, with abundant goods and happy customers.



4.3 1974, August, The red electromagnetic wave brings good news

The work on the improvement continued also in the night. During the break the workers are ideologically educated by the radio.



红色电波传喜讯

5.1 ca 1966, Thoroughly expose Ulanfu's anti-Party clique



5.2 ca. 1967, Demons



### 6.1 1971, To go on a thousand 'li' march to temper a red heart

A group of young Red Guards are on their way to Beijing to meet Chairman Mao. They are carrying the painting of the young Mao going to Anyuan (App. 2.3)

Carrying a picture like that is reminiscent of religious processions.



### 7.1 1967, Warmly hail the formation of the revolutionary committee of Beijing






8.1 1976, The university takes care of our mountain village

9.1 1969, Educated youth must go to the countryside to receive re-education from the Poor and Lower-Middle peasants!

10.1 1974, Criticize the reactionary thought of Lin Biao and Confucius, firmly walk with the workers and peasants on the road of unity



11.1 1976, Carry on the struggle to the end to strike against the right deviationist wind of reversing verdicts





**12.1** 1976, Women were supposed to work, dress and look like men in clothing that was not supposed to reveal any female curves



**12.2** 1975, Women in masculine roles

## **The Cessation of the „Croatian Silence“**

**Adriano Ivetic**

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*In this article the focus is on the key events in the summer and autumn of 1989, which gradually caused changes towards the democratization of political systems and liberalization in Croatia. At that time, Yugoslavia was in severe economical and political crisis which was further complicated when Slobodan Milosevic took power in Serbia. Incapacity and degradation inside the League of Communists of Croatia (SKH) and improper responses set against enhanced Serbian nationalism encouraged movements and reforms in the same party which ultimately prevailed and led to the establishment of a multiparty system in December of that year. At the same time all other parties, apart from the SKH, supported the small group inside SKH, who also acted in favour of similar reforms and requested changes. This battle between „reformers“ and „conservatives“ will be scrutinized in this article.*

Keywords: 1989, „Croatian silence“, Serbian nationalism, Slobodan Milosevic, SKH, „reformers“, „centrists“, multiparty system.

Almost immediately after the President of Yugoslavia, Tito, died in 1980, there were serious attacks from Serbia on the Constitution created in 1974. The Constitution already contained confederative elements, decentralization, sovereignty of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia) and the federate importance of two provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo). The republic which was the least satisfied with the Constitution was Serbia whose nationalism eventually turned out to be strong enough to break Yugoslavia. Even by

the mid 1980s, especially after extreme chauvinists, including Slobodan Milosevic, had taken power in Serbia, there was no agreement between the republics. Every republic looked after its own interests. Because of their egoism, especially the egoism of the Serbian leadership, Yugoslavia was being pushed towards breakdown which would eventually come. In Croatia, SKH was in severe crisis, but there were signs that almost twenty years of severity and reserved actions towards growing Serbian hegemony were coming to an end. But, changes didn't come overnight. It was a long and complicated process of democratization of the political system which was followed by the liberalization of society. This topic is very delicate and sensitive which makes it very difficult to write about with an open mind. The time difference does not help either, but it leaves a lot of areas for further research opened, because there are plenty of vacancies in archives and newspapers.

### **Serbian nationalism**

Already during the first years of the 1980s, the Serbian leadership applied for the limitation of province autonomy, reinforcement of federal institutions, removal of confederative elements, reinforcement of unique League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) and the limitation of federative Communist parties (Bilandzic, 2001: 32; Bilandzic, 1991, 54-55). These Serbian demands didn't have the wanted impact on other republics, which led to nationalistic movement in Serbia. In 1986 the „Memorandum of Serbian academy of science and art“ was published, through which the majority of Serbian intellectuals were for the establishment of Serbian national and cultural identity, regardless of which republic or province it was situated in (Dunatov, 2009: 383; Garde, 2003: 247-250; Jovic, 2003: 362-370). Meanwhile, during only a year and a half, Slobodan Milosevic had taken full control in Serbia. In May 1986, mostly thanks to Ivan Stambolic, the contemporary President of the Presidency of Serbia, Milosevic was elected President of the League of Communists of Serbia (SKS) (Ramet, 2005: 46). From that point onwards, Serbia openly and provocatively proclaimed its interests. The majority of Serbs, including the media,

supported Milosevic and his nationalistic movement, so he decided to continue conducting policy in which he tried to convert SKS into leading a Serbian nationalist party (Milosavljevic, 2003: 35-37; Banac, 1992, 140). His well-known sentence, said in April 1987 in Kosovo field: „No one will harm you”, caused enhanced hatred towards any nation which could allegedly endanger the Serbs. There were some people in Serbia who were against him, but the majority supported the idea which ensured „protection” of all Serbs who lived in Yugoslavia. Eventually, in October 1987 Milosevic turned his back on Stambolic and ten weeks later overtook his function and became by far the most powerful politician in Serbia (Ramet, 2005: 46).

### **Croatian awakening**

On the other hand, during that time Croatia was still in the period of the so-called Croatian silence, which had begun almost immediately after the breakup of the „Croatian spring“ in December 1971 and lasted until 1989. This period was named the Croatian silence because the Croatian national identity throughout these years was heavily suppressed. Also, one of the primary interests of the SKH had been the maintenance of democratic dogmatism or so called radical anti-liberalism in which the free political and cultural activity didn't exist. The master of this ideology was Stipe Suvar, client of „*the White book*“ – a document which was created in 1984 by the Central committee of the League of Communists of Croatia (CK SKH). The document was originally called: „*On some ideas and cultural tendencies in artistic creation, literary, theatrical and film criticism, and about public offsets of one part of the cultural creations which contain politically unsuitable messages*“. But, the climax of dissatisfaction caused by the policy of SKH did not occur then, it occurred later, in the second half of the 1980's, especially in 1989, due to the lack of interest and neutrality of SKH towards Milosevic's „Anti bureaucratic revolution“ and the breach of Constitution from 1974. Despite this dissatisfaction and the vast number of the so-called „alternatives“ in which all newly formed community organizations with political programs (UJDI, HSLS, HDZ and many more) belonged, until SKH reached a decision in December 1989 to

implement a multiparty system, there was no mass abandoning of the same party. The „alternative“ was to operate illegally, up to the beginning of 1990, because SKH was persistently refusing to legitimize political organizations, although in the first half of 1989 there had yet to be an open discourse about pluralism. They did not talk about introducing pluralism, but rather about the type of pluralism they should intercede for.

### **Serbian provocations**

Just one of the numerous Serbian provocations, whose aim was to destabilize the Croatian political structure and leadership, was the interview with Serbian writer Dobrica Cosic for the Italian newspaper „*Il Tempo*“ on 28th July 1989 in which he stated that „Tito occupied Istria and gave it to the Croats“ (*Vjesnik*, 6th September 1989: 5). Furthermore, Cosic accented that the Croatian people are prone to genocide just because there are war criminals among their ranks, so he claimed that Serbs in Croatia have always been persecuted (*Vjesnik*, 6th September 1989: 5). These and similar comments could be found all over the Serbian media. This provoked reactions and disapproval from the Croatian general public, but the Croatian leadership did not react properly, which was soon reflected in their more accentuated decline in popularity. The policy which included the avoidance of conflict and reasoned dialogue did not prevent further provocations. In fact, the number of provocations increased, as a response to Serbian fear of the repetition of genocide over Serbs who lived in other Yugoslav republics. In Croatia, the fear of genocide was present in Knin, Lika, parts of Banovina and in all the other districts where Serbs represented the majority of the population.

Despite the usually neutral attitude and lack of interest against growing Serbian hegemony, Croatian authorities reacted on 12th July 1989, when they arrested Jovan Opacic, the President of the newly established Serbian Cultural Society „Dawn“, and another 13 Serbs. They were arrested due to their observation of public meetings without registering and improper behaviour in a public

place on 9th July 1989 in a Kosovo field, near the church Lazarica in Knin area relating to the celebration of the 600th anniversary of the Serbian-Turkish battle that took place in Gazimestan, near Pristina, Kosovo (Bilandzic, 2001: 765-766; Baric, 2006: 194-195; Bilandzic, 2001: 765-766; Bilic, 2005: 80; Paukovic, 2011: 3). At the meeting there were about 50 thousand people, mostly Serbs. Features of the Chetnik movement stood out and there were numerous exclamations of war poems. This celebration was added to the celebration in Gazimestan two weeks before when there were several hundred thousand people gathered (Durakovic, 2003: 109). In Serbia, Vojvodina and Montenegro, there were no public condemnations of the Knin event, except for the Montenegrin youth Presidency who were the only ones to directly disassociate themselves from the incident (*Vjesnik*, 18th August 1989: 9). As regards to Serbian leadership, they were consistently avoiding any discussion about nationalism among their ranks, including discussions about incidents in the Knin area. Condemnation of the events in the Knin area by the Croatian political leadership was the reason for the Serbian media, especially magazines „*Duga*“ and „*Intervju*“, daily newspapers „*Politika*“ and „*Politika express*“ and *Television Belgrade* to continue with the criticism of the Constitution from 1974, with inflammatory propaganda and persistent emphasis on the genocidal nature of the Croatian people (Ramet, 2005: 41; Banac, 2001: 141-142). Furthermore, they were emphasizing the hatred of Croats towards Serbs and alleged persecutions of Serbs in Croatia mixed with various unsubstantiated accusations such as „stolen“ Serbian factories and land during the creation of autonomous regions (Durakovic, 2003: 114-115).

### **Conflicts within SKJ**

Milosevic's strategy of „anti bureaucratic revolution“ very soon proved to be effective. Under his supervision and control, Vojvodina and Kosovo had already been united with Serbia in October 1988, and in January 1989 the same happened to the Republic of Montenegro (Jovic, 2003: 419-429). This was a great success for Milosevic because he was controlling 4 out of 8 votes of the Presidency of Yugoslavia (Bilandzic, 2001: 756-758; Garde, 1996: 250-255). In July 1989

Milosevic`s Commission proposed a reform of the Yugoslav political system in which a consensus of the federal units would be needed only on a narrow range of constitutional issues, while in other matters decisions would be made by a qualified majority (Paukovic, 2008: 21-22). Meanwhile, Slovenian leadership proposed an asymmetric federation in which each republic would decide, and arrange with other republics the exact powers they wanted to transfer upon the federal authorities (Cohen, 1993: 58). As for the Croatian leadership, it did not deviate from neutral and regressive policy. Although the Slovenian proposal was somewhat interesting to the majority of the members of SKH, it was not accepted. A consensus relating to a third option has not yet been agreed either, so there were only two concrete, but completely different proposals: the asymmetrical federation and the qualified majority.

Conflicts between Slovenia and Serbia continued on the 25th CK SKJ session during which the main topic was the relation between the nations of Yugoslavia. The Slovenian criticism on account of Serbian national policy gained the support of some members of the League of Communists from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Nevertheless, the Serbian block was still unrelenting in its views, so a consensus or a conclusion about relations between the nations was not reached („*Danas*“, 8th August 1989: 7-9). The session was opened by the chairman of CK SKJ, Ivica Racan, who warned about „threats of nationalism that increasingly endanger the Yugoslav federalism („*Danas*“, 8th August 1989: 10-11). Despite the criticism of Racan and other Croatian representatives directed to the Serbian block during the 25th session, the Croatian public was not yet satisfied because it demanded a more decisive reaction from Croatian political leaders, because they considered that the criticism was not formed clearly and argumentatively enough.

On the other hand, the Croatian political leaders estimated that the time to resolutely oppose Milosevic`s policy did not yet come. They recognized the danger, but because of the fear that relations with Serbia would get more complicated, they did not react in a determined manner. In

relation to the Serbian provocations and accusations, only some individuals responded from SKH such as Marin Buble who emphasized the growing wave of dissatisfaction and called for more of a decisive reaction from the Croatian leaders („*Slobodna Dalmacija*“, 10th September 1989: 5). One of the few Croatian leaders who advocated the ideas of reform was Celestin Sardelic, a member of the Presidency of CK SKH, an intellectual who was well versed in the international movement of ideas and was prepared, unlike most of his colleagues from SKH, to confront the current political situation. He realised that it was high time to stop the media attacks on Croatia that were coming from Serbia and that other republics should deal with their own problems.

### **The 26th session of the Central Committee of SKJ**

On 11th September 1989, at the 26th CK SKJ session in Belgrade, Sardelic publicly criticised the attitudes of the Presidency of the Regional Committee of the Communist party of Vojvodina (PK SKV). He stated that: „you have, with your attitudes, put yourselves in a position to encourage further dramatization of the current political situation. In order that these nationalistic attacks on Croatia appear to be legitimate and normal, you`ve tried to freeze it and put it into a permanent defensive position. Thereby, you have strengthened and allowed the passage of a recognizable policy that occurred from a position of force and pressure, and focused on bringing into question the Yugoslav federation, the threat of foundations of AVNOJ and achievement of equality of all nations and nationalities in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia“ („*Danas*“, 19th September 1989: 8). Sardelic opposed and criticised the members of the Presidency of PK SKV because at the meeting, which took place three days earlier, the Presidency of PK SKV declared SKH to be a nationalistic leadership and sought immediate intervention of CK SKJ because of the already described events which took place in the Knin area. The Presidency of PK SKV claimed that „such a delicate situation cannot be left exclusively to the care of the local authorities („*Danas*“, 19th September 1989: 7). Furthermore, Sardelic accused Vojvodinians of attempting to roughly politically misuse and provoke people. This gave the event a wider legitimate, religious

and national Yugoslav meaning: „By attempting to converse about the situation in the Knin area, you are trying so transparently to give it a Yugoslav dimension“ („*Vjesnik*“, 13th September 1989: 6). Although Sardelic admitted that there were problems in the Knin area, with regard to national liberties, which occurred in other parts of Yugoslavia as well, he concluded that the legal institutions of the state faultlessly meddled with international relations. This included the Serbian population in Croatia, while on the other hand, Vojvodinian Communists had not condemned national and chauvinist outbursts in Vojvodina and Serbia („*Vjesnik*“, 14th September 1989: 6).

After the resolute declaration of Celestin Sardelic, the President of SKH, Stanko Stojcevic, applied for a discussion and then, to the surprise of most of those present, did not provide support for his colleague, he distanced himself from Sardelic`s declaration, claiming that it is beyond the scope of the agenda. He suggested that the topic of international relations in Yugoslavia should be discussed during the next session: „All this should be debated, evaluated and assessed“ (Hudelist, 1999: 231). Stojcevic`s response was incomprehensible to the Croatian public, as well as to some members of SKH, because despite the fact that the Croatian leadership did not discuss the Vojvodinian announcement before the 25th session, it previously condemned „the attempts to destabilize Croatia through encouraging and emphasizing the separation of the Serbs in Croatia“, referring to the provocative speeches and statements of Dobrica Cosic, Antonije Isakovic and other Serbian intellectuals („*Danas*“, 19th September: 8). Following Stojcevic, who was the first to make a statement after Sardelic`s declaration, the President of PK SKV, Nedjeljko Sipovac, spoke and denied all the accusations, then his colleague from PK SKV, Stanko Radmilovic, who supported the Stankovic`s proposal (Hudelist, 1999: 231). Finally, after all the confusion and disagreement deflated, Chairman Stefan Korosec ordered a break which lasted for over an hour, instead of the announced 10 minutes, because the Presidency of CK SKJ was in that period of time discussing Sardelic`s speech in order to finally decide that they would distance themselves from what he had said („*Glas Istre*“, 13th November 1989: 2). With this plenum technique Sardelic`s

opinion was converted into an incident. Sardelic`s speech itself could not be challenged because he had the right to express his opinion, for an unprincipled offence of one of the leading parties could not be neglected („*Vjesnik*“, 14th November 1989: 8). However, according to the viewpoint of the Presidency of CK SKJ, Sardelic should have given his opinion on the viewpoints during the debate in the form of an amendment and in the second part of his speech provided arguments for that amendment. Moreover, Sardelic was criticized because he talked about international relations, and namely, the Presidency reminded Sardelic that after the 25th session this topic should not have been further debated , but they did not react in the same way to the above mentioned announcement of the Presidency of PK SKV which was the vital motive for Sardelic`s presentation. After the Presidency of CK SKJ finished debating, it concluded that Sardelic performed independently and was not promoting the attitude of the Presidency of CK SKH even though he spoke in the first person plural, referring to his Presidency („*Vjesnik*“, 14th September 1989: 8). However, we must ask ourselves whether the conclusion of the Presidency of CK SKJ was based on reliable information, or indeed whether Sardelic performed independently.

### **Sardelic – a hero or a traitor?**

Sardelic`s presentation, which was broadcast live on television, was supported by the immense enthusiasm of a majority of the Croatian public who were shocked and delighted by the unexpected and sensational turn of events at the 26th session. Such a significant outburst of some of the most important members of SKH has not been very rare, especially during the important big occasions such as the 26th session of CK SKJ, because of the already indicated reasons. Sardelic was first among the leading Croatian Communists who opposed Milosevic`s political arguments, and the first who publicly denounced the nationalistic politics of Vojvodina and, thereby, Serbia, because the supporters of Slobodan Milosevic were on the head of PK SKV since October 1988, and were therefore blindly implementing the policy of Serbia. But not everyone in Croatia enthusiastically embraced Sardelic`s offset. An interesting and intriguing fact is that many

members of SKH congratulated Sardelic for his magnificent performance at the 26th session, but most of the members of the Presidency of CK SKH were not pleased with Sardelic`s presentation (Hudelist, 1999: 232). Specifically, on 13 September, during the 168th session of the Presidency of CK SKH Stojcevic accused Sardelic of not previously consulting him regarding his presentation at the 26th session of CK SKJ, which was held two days earlier (Hudelist, 1999: 247-248). The accused defended himself with the thesis that he had made known to all the members of SKH who participated on the 26th session, including Stojcevic, that he would react on Vojvodinians announcement and that he informed the Secretary of SKH Dragutin Dimitrovic and a member of SKH Branko Caratan in detail about his presentation (Hudelist, 1999: 227-228). Dimitrovic then defended Sardelic`s claims that he notified Stojcevic on time about the subject of the presentation and that the presentation was formally given through the conclusions of PK SKV (Hudelist, 1999: 247-248). The session was getting more intense when a candidate for the President of the SKH Ivo Druzic accused Sardelic for conspiring against Stojcevic. However, after Dimitrovic denied Druzic`s claims in an argumentative manner, the session was closed in a relatively peaceful atmosphere, so that the hostility between Stojcevic and Dimitrovic was resolved without major consequences. The day after, several hours of counselling later, the Presidency of SKH issued a press release in which they asserted that they should „decisively reject political discredit, incorrect allusions and speculations with dangerous political organs and individuals within SKH“. Thereby they alluded to the Presidency of PK SKV: „They crossed the line that no one can cross in the relations between republics and provinces“ („*Vjesnik*“, 16th September 1989: 4; „*Danas*“, 19th September 1989: 9). Through this press release the Presidency of SKH stood in defence of Sardelic and very clearly condemned the Presidency of PK SKV. However, despite this press release, which temporarily calmed the passions within SKH, the 168th session had a negative response due to the vigorous debate which, in the opinion of most of the public, should not have even been on the agenda.

**Division of SKH?**

Although the 168th session ended in a more or less conciliatory tone, the relations within the Presidency of SKH were not at all idyllic in the following days. Even though there had previously been two or more different policies their differences became prominent, especially after Sardelic's presentation in Belgrade at the 26th session of CK SKJ when there could easily be distinguished at least three opposite policies: Suvar's (President of the Presidency of CK SKJ), Stojcevic's and Dimitrovic's. Reformists who gathered around Dimitrovic and Sardelic were not numerous but they aimed for reforming the democratic centrism that the majority of the Croatian public approved of. The reforms, in contrast to Suvar's centrist policy, emphasized less conciliatory but a lot more decisive views on political and economic issues. For Stojcevic, who varied from being a reformist to being a centrist, the political crisis was the apparent source of arguments in which the monopolistic and monolithic conception was more efficient than democracy, market development, state of law and political pluralism were („*Vjesnik*“, 23th September 1989: 1). To sum it all up, despite obvious differences of views and increased intolerance, SKH remained united, there had not yet been mass desertion of members, which would occur later, after the 11th Congress of SKH in December 1989.

**Continuation of the Serbian nationalistic attacks on Croatia**

On 14th September, the nationalistic attacks on Croatia repeated, during the reunion of the „Writers Association of Serbia“ in Belgrade, when the Serbian politician Vuk Draskovic called for „the formation of Serbian Krajina“ in Croatia (Mamula, 2002: 292). The following day the „Croatian Writers Society“ condemned „the derogatory speeches about Croatian people and state, about its integrity, sovereignty and about the Serbian people who live in it („*Vjesnik*“, 15th September 1989: 8). A week later, at the 29th session of CK SKH, apart from the above mentioned criticism of Serbian nationalism, Stojcevic criticized Croatian nationalism as well: „All nationalistic movements are manifested in the attempts to revive the policy of MASPOK (Mass

movement in Croatia in early 1970s, it's also known as „Croatian spring”), negate the achievements of the national liberation battle, socialist revolution and community life in Socialist Republic of Croatia“ („*Glas Istre*”, 23th September 1989: 4). Nevertheless, Stojcevic put an emphasis on Serbian nationalism and tried to warn people about the inappropriate policies of political leaders in Vojvodina: „The initiative of the leadership in Vojvodina, about brotherly assistance, is unacceptable and inappropriate when it comes to international relations in SKJ” („*Danas*“, 26th September 1989: 11). Stojcevic's views did not significantly differ from the views published during the already mentioned 168th session of the Presidency of SKH. In the days that followed there were more and more politicians inside SKH who pointed to the harmful policy of Slobodan Milosevic and insisted on putting an end to the verbal attacks on Croatia.

### **Demands for the „alternative“**

After Sardelic's presentation, the Croatian media further emphasized the demands of the so called alternative, that all political movements should be legalized and that the transformation of all political associations into independent political parties should be allowed. Therefore reform forces within the SKH should be able to calm the ideological backwardness and also the wave of nationalistic euphoria, because both of these two fronts would lose in political confrontation („*Glas Istre*“, 25th September 1989: 3). Furthermore, the media have been increasingly emphasizing that it's absurd to believe that the constitution of parties would mark the beginning of national separation. On 8th October, in the organization of the Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSL) a petition was initiated for the return of the monument of Croatian Banus Josip Jelacic to the main square in Zagreb (Bilic, 2005: 81). This initiative further increased the political consciousness of the Croatian people so that they became more aware that some kind of change must occur in order to overcome long-standing political crisis. But despite everything, in the fall of 1989 the majority of the Croatian people still believed that Yugoslavia would not fall apart. Surveys confirm this claim, such as the one from October 1989, published in the weekly magazine

„*Danas*“, in which 34 out of 35 Croatian intellectuals believed in the viability of Yugoslavia („*Danas*“, 17th October 1989, 16-17).

### **Conclusion**

Due primarily to the members of CK SKH, Celestin Sardelic, who was the first from the Croatian political leadership who publicly reacted to months of nationalistic attacks directed from Serbia towards Croatia and who strengthened the position of policy of reform within the SKH, Croatia very soon entered into a new period of democratic initiatives. Wishing to put an end to the verbal abuse, transgression of Croatian national dignity and constant accusations for the alleged genocidal nature of the Croatian people, Sardelic advocated similar views to the so called alternative, and therefore his performance in Belgrade started an avalanche which could not have been stopped. Silence was definitely terminated, the policy of „non tampering with the situation“ could not be implemented anymore, because of the significantly changed political conditions. After Sardelic`s performance the risk of division of SKH in two or even more policies was in certain moments increasingly apparent. However, the relative homogeneity was preserved when it was needed the most. On the other hand, the Croatian public, especially the alternative refused to continue to be patient; it took on a more decisive attitude, primarily when it came to pluralisation of the political system with reference to introducing a multiparty system. This persistence eventually resulted in the decision of the Presidency of SKH issued on the 10th December 1989, the day before the 11th Congress of SKH, on which the multiparty election was announced. After Serbia and Slovenia, the nationalist euphoria took hold in Croatia which had to be reflected on the contemporary political leadership. To sum it all up, the decision to announce the multiparty system marked a definitive end to a period of the so called Croatian silence.

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# The impact on the development of hinterland Dalmatian coast

Željko Juriša

Zadar

*Centers of life have not always been around coastal areas like they are today. History has saved some records that show coasts as vulnerable and dangerous places. The topic of this paper is the city of Zadar and its hinterland, which mainly corresponds to the regions of Ravni kotari, Bukovica and Dalmatian zagora. The region of Dalmatian zagora also includes Šibenik zagora. After that, the region of Middle Dalmatian zagora will be taken into account, which, in terms of relative homogenous regionalization, is divided into: Split zagora, Trogir-Kaštela zagora, Sinj or Cetina krajina (frontier), and Imotski krajina. The Dubrovnik region has no zagora, due to its proximity to Bosnia and Herzegovina.*

Keywords: hinterland of Zadar, Dalmatian zagora, migrations

## Introduction

The main process that relates to the effect of hinterlands on the coast is littoralisation, which manifests as, among other effects, the appearance of working opportunities in coastal areas, which in turn draws the population from hinterlands to the coast. Littoralisation is the process of concentration of economic activities and population increase along coastal areas with numerous results, which affects mainly the restructuring of social and economic systems and reshaping coastal landscapes (Roglić 1967, 42).

A special role in Adriatic's history belongs to Dubrovnik, its powerful walls and social isolation accounting for an imbalance with its surroundings and specific working conditions. The discovery of machines led to a revolution so that the needs of the railway undid the city walls and broad roads had to be constructed for automobiles (Magaš 1998, 54).

The term “zagora” (hinterland) was coined during World War II during Tito's government, after the emigration and decrease in wealth of middle Dalmatian mainland region, or the Dalmatian hinterland, which also began to mean an ethno-cultural notion to describe the whole region of Dalmatia that was not near the sea, and which includes Knin krajina, Drniš krajina, Zagora, Muć krajina, Vrlika krajina, Cetina krajina, Klis krajina, Omiš krajina, Imotski krajina and Vrgorac krajina (Vukosav 2011, 273).

### **The Effect of Hinterlands on the Coastal Area**

The main process that relates to the effect of hinterlands on the coast is littoralisation, which manifests as, among other effects, the appearance of working opportunities at coastal areas, which in turn draws the population from hinterlands to the coast. The later consequence is initially a temporary change that eventually became a permanent relocation of the population to the coast, which in turn resulted in rural depopulation and drops in birth rates (Roglić 1967, 48). Considering the working contingents coming from hinterlands, they were mostly workers who were employed in industry and in relatively bad conditions. The opening of various industrial complexes along the coast has been connected to the mineral resources in hinterlands. In order to address the problems of relocating mineral resources from the hinterlands to the coast, a railway had to be built (Cvitanović 1974, 89). The best example of this is the city of Zadar with its hinterlands, or Ravni kotari. Tourism, economic and general social processes created significant changes. Tourism promotes isolation, distrust, and hostilities by bringing the individual and the nation closer. Tourism is essentially a trade of pleasure, since that is the key element in contemporary

littoralisation. Even today, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, pollution and lack of water represent a significant problem in hinterlands during the summer period (Blažević 2000, 148). In that period, due to a large influx of tourists and temporary increase in population, reduction of resources and lack of water is imminent. One possible solution is the desalinization of sea water which should result in a rational economic cost.

### **Zadar and Its Hinterlands**

The area of Ravni kotari is one of the most significant agricultural spaces in Croatia. The key feature of Ravni kotari is the significant number of agricultural areas which makes it agriculturally the most important area of coastal Croatia. Mediterranean poly-culture is the main way of evaluating the agricultural areas. Transhumance has been an important basis of economy for the last few thousand years (Magaš 1998, 73). By means of drying swampy areas and alluvial valleys and connecting areas via transport routes Ravni kotari was integrated into the Zadar region until the beginning of World War I. Ravni kotari would only be valued again after World War II, after the 60s, by connecting to the railway between Zadar and Knin. That project integrated Ravni kotari as one of the most productive regions of Croatia. Ravni kotari is a region of relatively high population density, with 62 people per km<sup>2</sup> and 53 settlements. Zadar had a well-developed industry throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, providing a migration point for the people of the hinterlands (Magaš 1998, 82). This especially relates to the Marasca cherries factory which employed the most workers. By the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century it had become very famous and had earned a high reputation. Some older sources also state that Marasca cherries was already treated as a reputable source of drinks and food in ancient times, and was often considered medically important (Franić 2003, 1035). The city of Zadar and its region have become famous for one of the products made by Marasca cherries – Maraschino, high-quality liquor, which already had a long standing tradition (Roglić 1967, 54). In fact, it could be said that Marasca cherries have made Zadar famous throughout the world. One of the more important industries was textile production, which was

ruined during the 90s amidst the collapsing process of privatization. During the last 15 years, an important process has been the dislocation of industry into the specialized industrial zone of Gaženica. Turbulent events during the 90s left some negative effects on the hinterlands, primarily the deterioration of an alumina factory in Obrovac, which turned out to be an ecological and economical problem. Ecological consequences have not been researched to the full extent yet, and have not been adequately dealt with either (Magaš 1998, 121).




Figure no. 1 The map of Zadar and its hinterlands

Source: URL no. 1

During its last period, Zadar has developed into a considerable industrial center, which, by its structure and industry ratio, gained a modern and balanced economy. The development of Zadar's industry was determined by several important factors, which have directed, but also limited it. Due to transportation handicaps in recent history, industrial development has been directed toward manufacturing industry and such products that in its technological process do not require significant amounts of mineral resources or energy, as well as those whose final production is not large or characterized by transportation and locational prerequisites (Magaš 1998, 112). Industry in the Zadar region has developed on three mineral bases:

1. Local resources of minerals and agricultural production,
2. Minerals provided by the sea: cultivation and processing of fish and production of salt,

### 3. Input of minerals and materials from other areas in Croatia or abroad

After the war period, Zadar had approximately 13.5 million vine trees, app. 530,000 olive trees, app. 70,000 Marasca cherry trees and app. 40,000 peach trees, as well as an equal amount of cherries. Those are the main fruits. It should be noted that prior to the Independence War the number of trees was significantly larger. The *Baštica agro* company has been raising new plantations measuring 30 ha, at the local area of Baštica, previously parts of PK Zadar. They also employ peach plantations, as well as apples and various nursery gardens featuring fruits and soils (Franić 2003, 1041).

### Šibenik and Its Hinterlands

Šibenik was an important producer of salt, wine and oil during the Middle Ages. In turn, the city would buy grain and livestock products from its hinterlands. After World War I Šibenik's port was used to export bauxite from Drniš mines (Kužić 1997, 25).



Figure no. 2 Šibenik and its  
surrounding region  
Source: URL no. 2.

The development process in this region was important for the railway integration with Split and Šibenik, relating mostly to the Drniš area where coal mines are located (Siverić), and later connecting with Knin via Lika railway (Kužić 1997, 69).

The company owning the *Monte Promina* mine made a request to build a self-funded railway in 1873 between Siverić and Šibenik, which would have enabled the expansion of mining facilities and made the export towards the coast easier. The railway Split – Siverić and Siverić – Perković – Šibenik was officially opened in 1877 (Magaš 1998, 145). The section between Siverić and Knin was opened in 1888, but it was connected to a railway to Zagreb in 1925, via Gračac. Main consumers of coal from Siverić mines in this period were industrial complexes from Split and Šibenik as well as the railroad. Although the need for growing industry and city agglomerations became progressively greater, the production in Siverić stagnated because the mines became almost exhausted in resources due to centuries-long exploitation. The coal mine in Siverić closed in 1971 (Kužić 1997, 95).

In the near vicinity there is a quarry *Kamenolom Parčić* which serves as an exploitation point for mineral resources and production of stone aggregates. Near the quarry there is also a factory of calcite fillings, which manufactures and produces carbonate resources ( $\text{CaCO}_3$ ) for industrial usage.

Šibenik's hinterlands have a specific issue with population distribution. Namely, the whole region of Šibenik County, which has the total area of 3000 km<sup>2</sup>, has a population of only 109,320, according to a recent census (Vukosav 2011, 261).


Areas of Drniš and Knin are, from a functional-geographical perspective, in fact micro-regions. The notion of Knin area in its broader sense relates to territories of Knin and Kistanje districts, and

the notion of Drniš area relates to territory of Drniš district, which includes 26 villages (Magaš 1998, 158).

### **Split and Its Hinterlands**

The genesis and development of the city of Split is almost impossible to explain without first explaining the connection to its hinterlands as well as the Klis pass (343 m). The connections are ancient. The genesis, long existence and development of the city require a meaningful connection with its hinterlands and its intermediary function between hinterlands and islands. Hinterlands, as the region of existential livestock husbandry and agriculture have complemented its economy with the coastal area. Split's mainland vicinity not only features its hinterlands but also large fields of west Bosnia with its wide mountainous pastures (Magaš 1998, 158). That way, Split provided the initial land way for its close islands and a sea way for its hinterlands. The trade of goods was significant for that period including livestock, leather, wool, dairy products and wood from hinterlands, and salt, wax, textile, wine and oil from coastal areas and islands.

In the second period of existential husbandry the sub-Mediterranean region of hinterlands provided a stable although modest life. The livestock of the hinterlands provided the basic goods and enabled a millennia-long trading function of Split. Caravan trade routes and livestock economy were organically linked. The connection of Split with its hinterland, via the Klis pass, ensured a long-standing, but limited lifeline; it could not enable a significant development of the city. Split developed into a large city based on the bonuses provided by its broader gravitational region. The speedy development ensued during the 1930s, which corresponds to the period of littoralisation (Roglić 1967, 105). The city center enabled working opportunities and income for the relatively poor hinterlands. In the beginning, workers had difficult conditions, while the narrow railway towards Sinj provided the only transport method.



Having narrow railway tracks of relatively low quality resulted in frequent accidents which occurred all along the line. Workers who used to travel daily or weekly to their working place decided to move permanently into the city. This new relation between Split and its hinterlands resulted in so-called “wild construction”, which rapidly changed the outline of the Split region (Magaš 1998, 167).

The increasing number of immigrants who came through Klis pass resulted in the so-called process of biological merging of populations. Littoralisation and the revitalization of the coastal area, especially Split, affected the hinterlands in such a way that it started to pull its population toward the city (Stražić 1989, 58). This process spread to the region of western Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. The effect of other coastal centers was not as intensive and spatially limited.

The coastal area attracts immigration by littoral valorization. Littoralisation was mostly evident in people leaving the hinterlands, which, for the future, can have tragic effects as it endangers the already small biological reproduction possibilities of the population (Vukosav 2011, 263). The process of urbanization during the 1960s brought progress in terms of development of population

of hinterlands. The process of building contemporary roads, mostly highways, enabled the hinterlands to come closer to coastal areas, which could have positive effects on the development of its economy in the near future (Alapagić 2007, 73).



Figure no. 4 Sinj krajina

Source: URL no. 4

The beginnings of industry in Dalmatia did not emerge from the already established manufactures (except for food industry, liquor, oil and the conserved fish industry). The first larger factories were made by foreign investors based on local resources (limestone, coal, bauxite, marl) and energy (Krka, Cetina) from areas such as the hinterlands and a cheap labor force from the intersection of the sea and mainland. The main agricultural areas are located at narrow flysch and dolomite coastal areas and alluvial plains, fields and limestones of smaller areas of Split's hinterlands (Alapagić 2007, 75).

It is also important to mention the region of Imotski and Sinj krajina which function as micro-regional centers. The region around Imotski features a broad karst *polje* which plays an important role for the wider region. Successful plantations of tobacco, wine, fruits and vegetables enabled a crucial monetary gain. This enforced the intermediary role of Imotski as an important trade center for the broader region. Connections between livestock-oriented Imotski and coastal areas were necessary and were always kept stable. This region is widely known for so-called “torbari” and

“galantari”, which are household shops and a large number of people from Imotski, live in Split today (Kužić 1997, 136).

The city of Sinj is the most evident urban center of Split’s hinterlands. It had gained its reputation even before the urban development of Split. It is well connected to Split, and its contemporary development has been modified by a relative close proximity to Split, some 20 minutes of traveling by car (Magaš 1998, 177).

The area of Omiš and its hinterlands has an important role as well. It was a tradition to name the area from east of Split to confluence of Cetina as the Poljica coast. Considering the historical and geographical importance of Poljica, this was reasonable (Poljica was divided into Upper, Middle, Lower and Coastal Poljica). The coastal area of Omiš with its hinterlands makes a broader spatial notion since it also includes a coastal region east of Omiš all the way to Dubci (Vrulje) (Magaš 1998, 154). Omiš plays a role of center in this region. By its dynamic, it has positioned itself as micro-regional gravitational and administrative center of the area between Split and Makarska with its corresponding Hinterlands.

### **Trogir – Kaštela Region**

The Trogir Hinterlands are karst areas separated by a mountainous rim from the coastal areas in the near vicinity of Split and Trogir. In its past, the valorization relied mainly on livestock and the agricultural potential of the land. Between 1857 and 1900 the population increased in this region, while the karst terrain limited the development of agricultural areas (Derado 1976, 68). In order to increase the amount of agricultural land, people started to decrease the areas covered in forests in order to create pastures. The increase in livestock numbers resulted in excessive exploitation of the land, which resulted in a population decrease and migrations in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, most often targeted toward coastal areas of Trogir, Split and Kaštela.




Figure no. 5. Trogir Zagora and its districts

Source: Klement Derado 1976, 66.

Increasing poverty caused by agricultural overpopulation led to migrations from Trogir Zagora (Blizna, Ljubitovica, Prapatnica...) to Trogir in search for work, and especially to Split where people searched for employment in factories which paid low wages in relatively harsh conditions; this is most evident in cases of iron industry and asbestos factories, which later showed a negative effect on people's health as well. In the early migrations from the hinterlands to the coast, women did not seem to participate, or, if they did, then only slightly (Derado 1976, 71). This was a consequence of traditional cultural attitudes to women, who were supposed to live in their homes, as housewives, taking care of children while their husbands went off to work. Today, the region of Trogir Zagora is a poorly populated area featuring mostly an elderly population that is involved in agriculture solely for their personal needs (Kužić 1997, 54).

In the past, centers of life were not situated near the coast as they are today. The increase in population and the urban development of cities brought about by littoralisation led to migrations from the hinterlands to the coastal areas.

Littoralisation is the process of concentration of population and economy at the sea coast. The trade of various goods in these areas was significant enough for the economy in the past (livestock, leather, wool, dairy products and wood from hinterlands, and salt, wax, textile, wine and oil from the coast and islands). The effect of hinterland movements to the coast was most evident in the transport of agricultural products and mineral resources (such as bauxite) to the sea.

In the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the population mostly migrated to the coast in search of better living conditions, which in turn resulted in a decrease of population in the hinterlands. Littoralisation of coastal areas, especially Split and Zadar regions, as the largest cities in Dalmatia, gravitationally affected their hinterlands and attracted their population.

Today, Zagora is a scarcely populated region, mostly populated by elderly people that are involved in agriculture for their personal needs. Zagora has little to offer to young people, which makes its future rather bleak. This leads to the process of so-called biological merging of populations. The most evident feature of the Rijeka region is an extremely high degree of deagrarization. There does not seem to be any significant difference in qualificational structure between the city and its surrounding region. The possibility of development in hinterland regions can be expected in the future through the development of their economy, since the contemporary transportation system brought the coastal areas closer to their hinterlands.

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# **Slavery in our times: Measures undertaken by the International Community to fight slavery in all its forms**

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*Rome*

*When we think about slavery, the first images that come to mind are all connected to the past: we picture prisoners sold in slave markets in Ancient Rome; we imagine black people deported from their lands to be employed in the New World's mines and fields, or we may think about Ancient Egypt. Rarely, though, would we think and consider slavery as a contemporary issue. It is true that it is nowadays considered a crime worldwide, and that no one today would measure his wealth on the number of slaves he owns. However, despite all the efforts carried out to eradicate this problem, still millions of people around the world today find themselves in situations where they are deprived of their freedom, which can easily be recognized as slavery related practices. In this article, with no claim to be exhaustive, I will try to briefly review the most important steps taken by the International Community in order to defeat practise of slavery, and to give some examples to illustrate the situation today.*

Keywords: slavery, trafficking, human rights, International Community

## **Introduction: What is Slavery?**

Slavery is the condition of someone who is obliged to work under psychological and/or physical threats, who is possessed and controlled by someone else; deprived of human dignity; treated as an object that can be sold or bought, and physically limited in their movements.

The practice of slavery and the submission of people are parts of human history since the first societies were settled. It was a practice in all the greatest ancient societies: Egyptian, Roman and Greek, although in different measures. Slavery was the privileged form of employing war prisoners, but there were also people enslaved because of debts, or as a penalty. Slaves were largely employed in field work, mines, and for all the lowest kind of work. The cultured ones could be employed in aristocratic houses, and experienced slightly better treatment, but just like the others they were considered by all means a property of the owner, who held power of life and death over them. They were captured and sold in markets, or exchanged by their owners. Children of slaves were considered slaves from their birth.

In the Middle Ages there was a transition from slavery to servitude, with the assignment of specific tasks, a minimum right of ownership and the obligation to reside on the land they were tied to. The servants could still be sold together with the land, but they were no longer considered “things” or “property” belonging to the landowner. It seemed that the practice of slavery was going to cease in Europe, with the first legislation against enslavement and the slave trade (Venice, 960 A.C.), but this did not happen. Instead, slavery returned in all its strength in the Modern Age, after the American continent was discovered.

The massive exploitation of American indigenous populations, the subsequent exposure to European diseases and displacement lead to their near total extermination. That is the reason why Europeans began to capture - or buy from smugglers - and traffic African people, who were considered more suitable for the hard working conditions in fields and mines in Latin America.

This process, known as the Atlantic Slave Trade, started in the 16<sup>th</sup> century and lasted until the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Every colonial power trafficked in slaves, and people from Africa were deported all over

the American continent. Slavery was not only accepted, but was also morally justified because of a supposed inferiority of enslaved people.

Next to the slave trade, the abolitionist movement developed. At first, it regarded only the condition of Native Americans, considered men *in fieri*, but not the African slaves (Bartolomè De Las Casas). It was thanks to the diffusion of the Illuminist ideas in the 18<sup>th</sup> century that the idea of slavery itself began to be contested and despised.

Colbert, in his Code Noir promulgated in 1685 by Louis XIV (and then modified and re-enacted by Louis XV in 1724), even without condemning slavery tout court, promoted a better treatment for slaves in French colonies through religious education. Other great thinkers, like Montesquieu, expressed themselves against the harsh treatment of slaves.

In England and France abolitionists associations and movements were founded, such as the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade in England (1787) with the aims of stopping the enslavement of African people and promoting the abolition of the slave trade. In France La Société des Amis des Noirs (1788) proposed a gradual emancipation in order to abolish slavery. In 1839 Anti Slavery International was founded in England, and is still active today.

Since then, slavery and slavery related practices have been disowned by almost every country. Since the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the slave trade had begun to be prohibited in France, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Holland to name but a few places. Technically, France had abolished the slave trade during the Revolutionary Age, but then Napoleon re-established it in 1802. The States then began to prohibit slavery in the colonies and in their territories, the last one being Brazil in 1888.

**International declarations and measures against slavery**

The story of the efforts to outlaw the practices of slavery and the slave trade, permanently and worldwide, crosses the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, and continues today. In the last two centuries countries and governments have tried to find a definition for slavery that could also cover its new forms and have agreed, officially, to consider slavery and the slave trade as something to fight against and to eradicate.

In 1815, the attachment N°15 of the Final Act of the Wien Conference, known as the “Declaration Relative to the Universal Abolition of Slave Trade”, was the first international agreement to condemn slavery, although abolitionist movements and authoritative opinions against slavery existed long before this date. In 1890, the signatories of the General Act of the Brussels Conference declared their intention to put an end to the traffic in African slaves, commitment reassured by the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye of 1919.

In 1924, the Temporary Commission of the League of Nations identified several forms of slavery, including debt bondage and serfdom, and recommended taking action against these practices. Based on the work of the Temporary Commission, the League of Nations gave the definition of slavery which appeared in the Slavery Convention of September 25<sup>th</sup> 1926 (then amended and endorsed by the United Nations in 1953), it can still be applied today. It defines slavery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised” (art.1, 1).

The Convention also defined the slave trade, referring to it as “all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every act of

trade or transport in slaves” (art. 1, 2). The aim of this Convention, as stated by article 2, was to “prevent and suppress the slave trade” and “to bring about, progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms”.

In article 5, the Convention also considered the practice of forced labour, still in use at the time by some nations as a form of public duty or penalty for convicted people, stipulating that “forced labour may only be exacted for public purposes” and requiring States parties “to prevent compulsory or forced labour from developing into conditions analogous to slavery” (art 5). Reflecting the spirit of the time, it did not outlaw the practise of forced labour, but at least it specified that only a public authority can exact it, giving to it an extraordinary character, and providing that equal remunerations shall be paid in return for the work.

One of the most important institutions, whose work is to fight against forced labour and to promote social justice in order to avoid future conflicts, is the International Labour Organization (ILO), founded in 1919. In 1930 the ILO approved a Convention, known as “The Forced Labour Convention”, with the purpose of definitely eradicating the practise of forced labour, after a transitional period of 5 years.

What this Convention stated fiercely was that, in any case, no concessions granted to private individuals, companies or associations shall involve forced labour (article 5).

Regarding forced labour exacted for public purposes, it remarked the same restrictions as the Slavery Convention of 1926, limiting the use of forced labourers to extreme and exceptional situations and under the responsibility of the “competent” authority. Certainly, the most well-known provision against slavery is article 4 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human

Rights (1948): “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms”.

This Declaration, together with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the following two Optional Protocols to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, forms the so-called “International Bill of Human Rights”, which is the basis of Human Rights protection today. The importance of an article that prohibits slavery in the Charter of the United Nations is obvious, considering that today almost all the Nations of the World are part of it.

In 1956, the United Nations adopted a further Convention, known as the “Supplementary Convention”, because they recognized that, despite many efforts and good steps taken, the problem of slavery, slave trade and practises similar to slavery had not been completely eliminated all over the world (Supplementary Convention, preamble). The most interesting thing about this Convention is that it identifies more forms of deprivation of liberty, which can be considered forms of slavery that need to be repressed and eradicated, specifying and widening the definition of slavery given by the 1926 Convention.

The most hideous form of exploitation is certainly the one involving children. Unfortunately, they are some of the most numerous victims of this practice. All over the world, children are taken from their families, abused, exploited, and without effective protection and education, they are very unlikely to change their status. In 1989, the United Nations adopted the “Convention on the Rights of the Child” which recognizes the right of the child not to be exploited economically, and to be protected from exposure to hazardous works (article 32), and their right to receive an education (article 28).

Despite this, it was necessary, ten years later, to undertake another convention, the so-called Convention for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999), requiring immediate and comprehensive action in order to eradicate any form of exploitation of children, from forced labour to their recruitment in armed conflicts.

### **Some definitions of slavery**

It is very important, when we talk about modern slavery, that we keep in mind what exactly the term “slavery related practices” means. It could be easy, picturing images of ancient society slaves, to think that these conducts are something different, maybe just hard work conditions. It is vital to understand that when an individual has no control over his/her movements, earnings, free time and otherwise; when he/she is submitted to somebody else’s will or control, we are talking about a slave. It could be useful, at this point, to report some of the international definitions of these practices, as recognized by international Conventions and Protocols:

**Serfdom:** Also known as “peonaje” especially in Latin America, is the “condition or status of a tenant who is by law, custom or agreement bound to live and labour on land belonging to another person and to render some determinate service to such other person, whether for reward or not, and is not free to change his status” (Supplementary Convention 1956 art.1, b) The status of a serf can be hereditary, and when it is generated by a debt, if the debt is not repaid, it can be passed from parents to children.

**Forced Labour:** The Forced Labour Convention of 1930 defines forced labour as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily” (article 2,1). Often associated with debt bondage, despite the many Conventions and Protocols, it still affects millions of people all over the world.

**Debt Bondage:** It is the “status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services or those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined” (Supplementary Convention 1956 art 1, a) As with forced labour, debt bondage still affects millions of people today, both adults and children. Bonded labourers are not free to leave until they have repaid their debts, and this might never happen.

**Migrant Workers:** Migrant workers can be divided in two groups: the ones who legally enter a country and those who are “helped” to enter by a trafficker or a smuggler. Often, they come from lands that are theatres of war, or with an extremely depressed economy. They reach a new country in order to find a job and better life conditions, for them and their families, often with the intention to get back to their own countries once they have earned enough money to build a life there.

They leave with the hope or the promise of a job, but when they arrive, after an almost always dangerous trip, migrants have to face another scenario: the jobs they were promised do not exist, or the work conditions are much harsher than they thought. Whether they are legal or “illegal”, migrant workers are often victims of abuse from their employers.

The employers may take their passport and other documents, and there begins the exploitation: women are almost always forced into prostitution, men into agricultural or manufacturing work, with no security conditions and without defined working hours. In addition to this, debt bondage often affects migrant workers, because they contract debts to pay for their trip and because they often have to live in barracks provided by the employers and they must pay rent. Plus, they need to buy food and beverages from the employers, and in some cases they even have to pay for the bus ticket (provided by the employer) that takes them to work.

**Trafficking:** According to the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking of Persons (2000) trafficking means “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation” (article 3,a). This gives a wide meaning to the term exploitation. The Protocol requires that the States parties undertake the appropriate measures to establish as criminal offences the conduct set forth in article 3 (article 5, 1).

Today, due to the dramatic increase in global migration and the disguises that traffickers use to escape from legal controls, it is even more difficult to fight against this phenomenon. People are trafficked for different reasons: forced domestic labour, false marriages, clandestine employment and false adoption or prostitution. Trafficked people can be migrant workers, or, especially when it comes to children and women, they can be abducted or sold by their parents.

Slavery is nowadays commonly considered a crime against humanity, and protection from it constitutes an international obligation. But the reality is that, still today, millions of people, including children, are forced into some kind of slavery-related practices, for economic reasons, sexual exploitation or as a result of “cultural” customs. All over the world people are exploited and trafficked, in their own countries or abroad.

In South Asia, in countries like Nepal, India and Pakistan, people from low castes are victims of bonded labour (Kaye, 2008 pag.5). They are forced into the harshest work, like manual scavenging, or work in brick kilns, without plausible possibilities to change their status; farmers contract debts with landowners or multinational companies, thus becoming bonded labourers, who

often commit suicide when they cannot repay their debts. In Latin America, indigenous people are victims of both debt bondage and bonded labour (Kaye, 2008 pag.7) in the estates, and many of them are trafficked to North America, especially from Mexico.

In Africa, in some of the west countries like Niger, Mauritania and Mali, people can still be born a slave (Kaye, 2008 pag.8). It is from Africa that the majority of people trafficked come to Italy, especially people trying to escape from war, or famine and poverty. All over the world, women and children, weakest among the weak, are forced into prostitution.

### **Conclusions**

All the people who are affected by a form of slavery or exploitation have their condition of minority and vulnerability in common, which leads to discrimination and abuse. They are women and children, or they come from disadvantaged situations, poor countries or theatres of war. Often they come from “low castes” or indigenous communities, with no protection or access to a fair legal system. It is important to notice how these features have not changed since the ancient times: reasons and targets of exploitation have not changed in centuries.

The International Community has tried to establish rules and laws to prevent slavery and exploitation, but several other measures are necessary. First of all, the States have to promote and guarantee human rights for all, especially minorities, which today are not properly protected, and have to go seek their freedom, when they can, through a legal system that has no tools to help them, or is made of people coming from the same class responsible for their condition.

It is vital to stop the trafficking of human beings, the smuggling from developing countries and the exploitation operated by rich classes and industries, both local and multinational, at the expense of the weakest. To do so, a common effort of all Countries is necessary, in order to develop serious

and strict laws against all forms of exploitation, the subscription and the direct and effective application of international covenants and protocols. But something else is even more important: education about the respect of others and human rights are fundamental to fight the discrimination that is the base of exploitation in many countries. In order to definitively end slavery and slavery-like practices, it is necessary that legal institutions, education and economy work together to create better conditions, and to eradicate the causes of exploitation all over the world.

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