Social Contract

This article argues that the 2026 constitutional referendum conferred a powerful but limited democratic mandate rather than unlimited constituent authority. By distinguishing derivative authority from constitution-founding power, it contends that referendum legitimacy is constrained by the scope of the question presented to voters. Democratic reform, therefore, requires faithful implementation within the authorised framework rather than expansive reinterpretation that exceeds the mandate granted by the electorate.

Explaining altruistic behavior may require expanding the bargaining framework. In particular, accommodating altruism may require greater emphasis on bargaining under normative rather than actual conditions. Fleshing out the account of resource-rational bargaining under normative conditions raises important questions for future research.

This paper develops the Ownership Boundary Theory (OBT), an account of the limits of legitimate regulation grounded in the structure rights share rather than their content. A two-tier social contract secures a minimum of ownership for coexistence and allocates all further rights by unanimous agreement. Ownership itself reduces to one relation: the attribution of a right to an agent over another agent, an asset, a space, or an activity. OBT separates allocation, which fixes ownership boundaries, from regulation, confined to maintaining (...) them; legitimate intervention requires only a boundary crossing, irrespective of its moral content. Implications for market entry, market exit, environmental harm, and education follow. (shrink)

Why "cultivating contingency" is essential to being free, including an argument for public bodies selected via sortition (random selection).

The social contract tradition, I conjecture, is constituted by an understanding of peoples as persons. I explore this conjecture in investigating one substantial contribution to the tradition: Rousseau's. It is in the systematic consideration of the nature of persons, defined with respect to autonomy that the heart of his social contract theory may be understood. I argue that 'arguments from principle' in Rousseau originate from (1) considering the autonomy of individual citizens, and (2) considering the autonomy of the whole of (...) the people as a person. The first produces a constraint on the content of laws (that they are oriented to the common good), and the second produces a constraint on the form of laws, or the way they may be permissibly given (that legislative right remains always the people's alone, and that its transfer, in despotism or representation, is collective enslavement). The latter allows us to understand Rousseau's principled argument for democracy. A crucial insight for political philosophy: further than personhood delimiting how citizens may be treated or relate to each other, personhood may delimit also the shape of social-institutional organization (namely, in conformance with one's conception of what it takes for the social totality to be a person). (shrink)

Democratic Peace Theory has been an important discussion topic in the International Relations field since the mid-twentieth century, a time when the number of demo-liberal societies rose sharply on the international stage, as a direct consequence of worldwide decolonization processes, eventually becoming the predominant form of government towards the end of the 20th century. In this essay, I will trace back the Kantian origins of this theory to the famous essay Toward Perpetual Peace (1795), which is widely regarded as the (...) philosophical core of the aforementioned theory, since it presented the three tenets that are key aspects of current research projects: republicanism, federations of republics and universal hospitality. I will also address common misunderstandings of Kant’s writings and explore the institutional and normative flaws of the claims proposed by Democratic Peace Theory proponents. (shrink)

<This is Incomplete Version. Provisional Complete Version is "The Causality Game: Redefining Academics as a Game with Causality as its Rule Based on Blind Faith" (HORTCG-2)> This paper proposes "The Causality Game," a comprehensive framework that redefines academic inquiry as a rule-governed system founded on the strict adherence to causality. Neglecting these foundations has led to the logical fragility observed in modern physics and philosophy. In Part I, we establish the logical and physical requirements of a causal universe, defining it (...) as a non-local, deterministic, and isolated system. We examine minimal units in non-uniform distribution and their spatial relationships, analyzing how structure and intelligence emerge from these fundamental elements. In Part II, we bridge ontology and epistemology, arguing that while the world is deterministic, human perception remains imperfectly epistemological. Based on the structure, we derive the concepts of profit and loss, further analyzing the validity of regimes and rights. This includes a critical examination of natural rights theory and the social mechanics of discrimination through the lens of acceptance and community strategy. Finally, in Part III, we explore the necessity of "blind faith" in causality for efficient action and examine the historical shift where science deviated into myth by abandoning causal rigor. We conclude that forming a common foundation based on causality is an urgent prerequisite for preventing conflict and ensuring the expansion of human freedom. (shrink)

This treatise advances the novel concept of Philosophical Neglect—the systematic institutional failure to develop the philosophical self and its attendant functions (meaning-making, value determination, existential inquiry, identity formation) in the citizens entrusted to institutional care. The argument identifies two co-responsible institutions as defendants: the United States education system and the discipline of psychology, which together have denied the development of the philosophical dimension of selfhood. The American populace constitutes the plaintiff class in what this paper frames as a theoretical class (...) action. Drawing upon the author’s theoretical corpus—including the Double Helix of Understanding (Boether, 2025), the Mathematics of the “I” (Boether, 2025), the Sound Mind reconstruction (Boether, 2026), the Pyramid of Personality (Boether, 2025), and the theory of Borderline Nihilistic Disorder (Boether, 2026)—this paper constructs three interlocking arguments. The legal argument establishes that educational and psychological institutions owe a duty of care encompassing philosophical development and that their breach constitutes actionable negligence. The moral argument contends that excluding philosophical education violates ethical obligations grounded in Kantian autonomy, Aristotelian flourishing, and the social contract. The consequentialist argument demonstrates that the measurable outcomes of Philosophical Neglect—a mental health crisis affecting over 60 million Americans annually, epidemic meaninglessness, and the lethal phenomenon of adolescent suicide—constitute empirical evidence of institutional failure. The paper concludes that both institutions bear a duty to correct this error and proposes remedial actions grounded in philosophical-psychological consilience. (shrink)

The later work of John Rawls remains the most common foil in the literature on public reason, but an ostensible conflict between core ideas has caused significant misinterpretations. Specifically, a “well-ordered society" requires that citizens act on the basis of a shared conception of political justice whereas "the ideal of public reason" involves people acting according to differing conceptions of justice. Instead of representing two different periods in his thought, I argue that Rawls intended to offer two different accounts of (...) public reason; one for within the well-ordered society and one for outside it. This interpretation matches the text and withstands recent criticisms better than alternatives. (shrink)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ideas about society, culture, and government are pivotal in the history of political thought. His works are as controversial as they are relevant today. This volume brings together three of Rousseau’s most important political writings—_The Social Contract and The First Discourse (Discourse on the Sciences and Arts) _and_ The Second Discourse (Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality)_—and_ _presents essays by major scholars that shed light on the dimensions and implications of these texts. Susan Dunn’s introductory essay (...) underlines the unity of Rousseau’s political thought and explains why his ideas influenced Jacobin revolutionaries in France but repelled American revolutionaries across the ocean. Gita May’s essay discusses Rousseau as cultural critic. Robert N. Bellah explores Rousseau’s attempt to resolve the tension between the individual’s desire for freedom and the obligations that society imposes. David Bromwich analyzes Rousseau as a psychologist of the human self. And Conor Cruise O’Brien takes on the “noxious,” “deranged” Rousseau, excoriated by Edmund Burke but admired by Robespierre and Thomas Jefferson. Written from different, even opposing perspectives, these lucid essays convey a sense of the vital and contentious debate surrounding Rousseau and his legacy. For this edition Susan Dunn has provided a new translation of the _Discourse on the Sciences and Arts _and_ _has revised a previously published translation of _The Social Contract._. (shrink)

Este capítulo explora la sociedad contemporánea como un sistema patológico influido por el capitalismo digital y las redes sociales, utilizando marcos teóricos de Deleuze, Guattari, Berardi y otros pensadores. Se divide en secciones que analizan el inconsciente social, la vigilancia paranoica y la manipulación psicótica de emociones, destacando cómo el control se ejerce a través de mecanismos invisibles como algoritmos y datos.

Este capítulo aplica el psicoanálisis (Freud y Lacan) para analizar la socialdemocracia como un "espejismo" del Estado de bienestar, un "cuento chino" sustentado en autoengaños colectivos, neurosis y psicosis sociales. Explora la transición de sociedades disciplinarias (biopolítica) a sociedades de control (psicopolítica), donde el poder modula el alma colectiva en lugar de disciplinar el cuerpo social. Critica interpretaciones neomarxistas (Deleuze, Foucault, Han) para resaltar cómo la socialdemocracia perpetúa ilusiones mediante contratos de engaño y dependencia de la deuda.

Introduction. The article analyzes the state-society relationship in the theory of social contract by T. Hobbes. The etatist interpretation of his socio-political doctrine, widespread in Russian philosophical thought, fundamentally opposing society to the state, does not seem to reflect the understanding of their relationship. From our point of view this is inherent in the contractual theory of the English thinker. Theoretical analysis. The author shows that the original conceptual and theoretical principles of T. Hobbes are the unity of sociogenesis and (...) politogenesis, the actual identification of sociality and statehood, and the assertion of the need for security as the most important factor in the transition of people from the «state of nature» to the state-public organization of their life together. Analyzing the nature of state power, T. Hobbes believes that the political activity of the sovereign, as the source and bearer of the first, is subject, first of all, to the interests of the society he controls. Conclusion. The etatist interpretation of the state-society relationship does not find sufficient confirmation in the theory of the social contract of T. Hobbes. The analysis made it possible to reveal that his point of view on this problem can be described with the idea of the syncretism of society and the state, which implies the unity of the processes of sociogenesis and politogenesis and, accordingly, the simultaneous emergence of these forms of common life. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes claims that the sovereign of a commonwealth provides a “common measure,” determining what counts as right reason for its subjects. As a form of public reason, this is often taken to be a purely political notion. I maintain that Hobbes holds that the public reason of the sovereign also provides a number of epistemic benefits both to the commonwealth and to individuals. Some are a matter of providing conditions that allow for the social growth of knowledge (particularly what (...) Hobbes calls “science”). But I argue that by considering the mechanics of processes of reckoning, we can see that the public reason of the sovereign serves important epistemic functions in the practical reason even of private individuals. (shrink)

Xunzi made a notable departure from Mengzi and Kongzi, by insisting that people are inherently bad and need to be shaped by social institutions. This may represent the beginnings of institutional politics in ancient China, which focused on establishing social order from chaos. There are obvious and interesting similarities with Thomas Hobbes’s social contract theory in their shared cynicism of human nature, which have received only partial attention. Structurally, the institutionalism found in Xunzi is comparable to the social contract theory, (...) making politics an objective, external and measurable set of institutional rules rather than virtues. There have been no notable attempts at this comparison. The Anglophone scholarship has not paid much attention to the structural and institutional dimensions of Xunzi’s political philosophy. The Sinophone scholarship has not paid as much attention to the comparative elements between the social contract theory and Xunzi’s social-moral institutions. This thesis attempts to supply a comparative interpretation of several key concepts in the Xunzi: 1. order zhi 治; chaos luan 亂, which are Xunzi’s foundational moral concerns; 2. duties yi 義; public gong 公, which alludes to a way public duties are generated from internal impulses; 3. rituals li 禮, which is a means of distributing esteem as a scarce social resource; 4. reason/coherence LI* 理, which is an externally accessible set of quasi-empirical principles that justifies political prescriptions; 5. the way and hierarchy dao 道/ fen 分, which show that hierarchies as the device that makes social order possible. Through these explications, I argue that Xunzi’s systematic political philosophy amounts to an alternative way to achieve civility through social institutions distinct from but comparable to the social contract theory familiar to Western philosophy. (shrink)

This paper proposes a comprehensive framework aimed at deepening the understanding of hierarchical coordination mechanisms in complex systems by integrating Attention Agent Theory (AAT) with Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) from social sciences. The core argument is that in a collective composed of lower-level AAT agents pursuing their own "Existence and Order" (E&O), a hierarchical structure spontaneously emerges to achieve a superior collective E&O. In this structure, lower-level agents functionally delegate their "attention resources" or "selection weights" (analogous to delegated matters in PAT) (...) upwards to a specialized higher-level AAT agent (analogous to the agent in PAT). This higher-level agent guides the formation of "collective attention" through activities such as integrating information, processing information, and broadcasting coordination signals, thereby maximizing the system's overall E&O. However, this emergent hierarchical attention delegation structure also faces potential costs and risks analogous to PAT agency problems, such as information bottlenecks, coordination inefficiency, tension between optimizing local and global E&O, and structural rigidity. This paper analyzes these potential dysfunctional patterns by using PAT concepts as a functional analogy tool. Through applications to cross-domain examples (biological swarms, human organizations, computational/AI systems), the framework demonstrates its explanatory power, revealing the common logic of hierarchical coordination in different complex systems. The contribution of this study lies in theoretically bridging the ontological perspective of AAT with the functional analysis perspective of PAT, clarifying the intrinsic drive (E&O) and core mechanism (attention delegation) of hierarchical emergence, and providing new analytical leverage for understanding issues related to complex system organization, governance, and AI alignment. (shrink)

We are all parties to a social contract and obligated under it. But how is such an agreement possible in a society riven by deep moral disagreement? This book explains the social-contract tradition from its beginnings in the English Revolution, through Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau to its culmination in Rawls.

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, Volume 34, Issue 1, Page 32-42, January 2025.

I provide a defence of the classical liberal tradition (from Locke and Smith to Hayek and Tomasi) as a blueprint for a 'bleeding-heart libertarian' framework of society. Such a society defends three principles: 1) Freedom from private coercion (Private Property), 2) Freedom from public coercion (Limited Government); and 3) Within these limits, the provision of a limited range of public goods and public welfare (Limited Welfare State). I show that principles can be abstracted from a reading of the classical liberal (...) tradition. Then, through an extensive analysis of Locke, I show the importance, and consequentialist justifications, of the Three Principles for any liberal welfare state. Through a critique of Nozick, I show the inadequacy of the hardcore libertarian interpretation. Then, I show that John Tomasi, Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek have all defended versions of limited welfare states. On this basis, I propose that the Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) is a good example, supported by Hayek, Buchanan and Friedman, of a welfare principle that is compatible with bleeding-heart libertarianism. I believe we can justify, on the basis of a consequentialist theory, that the limited welfare state, which combines welfare with liberty, and the free market with a social safety net, has highly beneficial effects on the society. It thus suggests itself as a viable competitor to rights-based libertarianism and more expansive social liberalism. (shrink)

I will show that there are mainly two different, mutually contradictory approaches taken by philosophers in trying to answer the question: “Who or what is to blame for the Holocaust?” The first answer, offered by radical critics of Enlightenment (Adorno/Horkheimer, Saul, Heidegger), blames one of the following: Reason, Modernity, the State, Industrial Society, Bureaucratic Management and/or Technocratic Efficiency. On the other side, we have the answer given by liberal-democratic defenders of Enlightenment (Arendt, Habermas, Rawls): It claims the Holocaust was caused (...) the upsurge of anti-rational, irrational or pre-rational forces and a deep rejection of the humanistic principles and ethical values that underpin modernity. In this study, I want to analyze these two perspectives, comparing and contrasting their respective merits. (shrink)

At the time of the French Revolution, Olympe de Gouges (1748-1793) campaigned for the rights of women, enslaved people and other politically marginalised and underprivileged groups. Conceptually, her reflection is located within the tradition of the social contract. However, she made a theoretical and practical break with this by abolishing the separation between the political and private spheres and universally expanding political participation and belonging.

Basing itself on the universality of the Buddhist ethic, this book manifests much learning on the part of the author as acquired from many a complementary branch of study including history, philosophy, and, above all, jurisprudence. Celebrating both Eastern and Western thought, parallels are convincingly drawn between contributions made by such seemingly incomparable personalities as the Buddha and Greek philosophers and King Aśoka and John Rawls. The viability of a body of common jurisprudence having both municipal and international application, as (...) founded upon the universal truths of the ‘Dhamma,’ is herein seen firmly established, ultimately dispelling all doubts hitherto cast upon the legal worth of Buddhism. (shrink)

In this paper, I explain why people seeking to flourish together fairly in the im- perfect world we share today ought to support a universal carbon tax with no exception for international aviation. The argument proceeds in four steps. First, I provide a free-standing analysis of emissions behavior at the individual moral level. Second, I offer a picture of ideal and non-ideal coordination based mostly on Kantian social contract theory. Third, I argue that in a non-ideal context, moral signals about (...) right relation offer a coordinating fulcrum around which meaningful if only partly coordinated action is possible. Fourth, I apply these conclusions to the case of aviation exceptionalism, focusing especially on instances of incomplete, overlapping, partly coordinated climate actions. I conclude that these arguments together amount to a case for reversing the Chicago Convention and applying a universal carbon tax that does not exclude international flights, ending aviation exceptionalism. (shrink)

In this new edition of Evolution of the Social Contract, Brian Skyrms uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the genesis of social contracts and investigates social phenomena including justice, communication, altruism, and bargaining. Featuring new material on evolution and information transfer, and including recent developments in game theory and evolution literature, his book introduces and applies appropriate concepts of equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics, showing how key issues can be modelled as games and considering the ways in which evolution sometimes supports, (...) and sometimes does not support, rational choice. He discusses topics including how bargaining with neighbours promotes sharing of resources, the diversity of behavior in ultimatum bargaining in small societies, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and an investigation into signalling games and the spontaneous emergence of meaningful communication. His book will be of great interest to readers in philosophy of science, social science, evolutionary biology, game and decision theory, and political theory. (shrink)

This paper argues that Rousseau’s lawgiver is best thought of as a fictional teacher of peoples. It is fictional as it reflects an idea that is entertained despite its contradictory nature, and it is contradictory in the sense that it describes ‘an undertaking beyond human strength and, to execute it, an authority that amounts to nothing’ (II.7; 192). Rousseau conceives of the social contract as a necessary device for enabling the transferal of individual power to the body politic, for subsuming (...) individual wills under the general will, and for aligning the good of the individual with the common good. For the social contract to be valid, however, it needs to be preceded by a desire to belong to a moral community that can induce people to join willingly, and that will grant legitimacy to the laws established. If the social contract is the machinery that makes the body politic function, the lawgiver is ‘the mechanic who invents the machine’ (II.7; 191). In this paper we will look closer at the pedagogical functions of Rousseau’s mythical lawgiver by first examining the relationship between the social contract, the general will and the lawgiver. Then, we aim to flesh out a pedagogical understanding of the figure of the lawgiver by way of the two educational dimensions of accommodation and transformation. Finally, we will argue for the importance of understanding Rousseau’s lawgiver as a fictional device allowing for the fundamental and enduring educational task of balancing between the preservation and renewal of society. (shrink)

This article critically analyzes Rawls’s attitude toward envy. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls is predominantly concerned with the threat that class envy poses to political stability. Yet he also briefly discusses the kind of envy that individuals experience toward their social peers, which he calls particular envy, and which I refer to as peer envy. He quickly concludes, however, that particular envy would not present a serious risk to the stability of his just society. In this article, I contest (...) this claim by arguing that the principles that structure Rawls’s ideal society are likely to exacerbate particular envy to a politically risky extent. Section 1 reconstructs his account of envy, giving special attention to his belief that competition kindles envy between peers. Section 2 then examines the way in which Rawls often endorses rivalry within the body politic. I argue that the society governed by justice as fairness is, on account of this rivalry, likely to generate a politically problematic degree of particular envy. In Section 3, I invoke ancient Greece as an example of a society that was, as a result of its intense competitiveness, often imperiled by dangerously elevated levels of peer envy. I then survey the key institutional mechanisms by which the ancient Greeks sought to manage this hazardous emotion. It turns out, however, that most of these mechanisms would be unavailable to Rawls insofar as they starkly contravene his principles of justice. I conclude that if Rawlsians wish to establish a society that fosters rivalry, they would do well to reflect on the means by which peer envy can be effectively harnessed. (shrink)

(Early) Modern social contract theories reject the idea that legal and political institutions are grounded in an alleged natural ordering or hierarchy of human beings, and instead argue that only government by a public (and not private) authority can fulfil the idea of justice as freedom and equality for all. To be authoritative and not just powerful, governing institutions must be shared as ours in this irreducible sense. I first outline how Kant’s ideal account of rightful freedom brilliantly transforms this (...) tradition as found in the works of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, before proposing a way to see Kant’s two-layered non-ideal theory—his accounts of human nature (“moral anthropology”) and historical societies (“the principle of politics”)—as complementing his ideal theory of rightful freedom. This enables us to envision a conception not only of rightful external freedom but of rightful human freedom in particular societies—with their histories—on planet Earth. With these arguments at hand, we can also better appreciate the importance of realizing that the four possible political conditions for Kant—anarchy, barbarism, despotism, and republic—are ideas of reason, which means that they are never perfectly realized. Hence, historical societies we are not either in the state of nature or in civil society. In addition, in historical societies founded on principles of freedom, there are pockets of injustice or pockets that are devoid of justice that can only be captured by means of one of the three political ideas that are not constitutive of the republican legal-political framework. Kant’s four ideas therefore give us more tools with which to capture the nature of different political forces and challenges facing us in our historical societies. (shrink)

In his collection of articles, "Where Are We Now - The Epidemic as Politics", Giorgio Agamben appears to make some very startling (if not downright outrageous) claims concerning the political situation in Italy and elsewhere in Europe during the Covid-19 pandemic. In this piece [in German] I analyse how these claims are rooted in the philosophy of Agamben's "Homo sacer" project. Focussing on three central notions (Schmitt's "state of exception", Foucault's "biopolitics", and Agamben's very own "bare life"), I show how (...) Agamben's illegitimate identification of the bare life with the subject of biopolitics leads to the derailment of his theory as well as to some of the grave political misjudgments he makes regarding the pandemic. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue in favor of a structural turn in social contract theory. More precisely, I argue that dealing with the complex and dynamic nature of the social world requires an emphasis on social structures greater than what contractarians often consider. I take structures to be the dynamic and non-random networks of interdependence among all active components that shape society. I also constrain my focus to a growing body of literature on diversity that explores plausible contractarian alternatives given (...) the complexity of modern societies. I argue that shifting weight from diversity to structures in theorizing alternative contractarian frameworks would be an improvement. (shrink)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's main work in political philosophy, the _Social Contract_, contains two beginnings; on the one hand, it commences, quite conventionally, with a social contract between individuals, on the other hand it also states that a lawmaker needs to precede the agreement of such a contract. This curious co-existence of two beginnings in the text has usually been ignored or played down by interpreters. This article, on the other hand, presents a reading of their interplay inspired by Zizek's theory of (...) ideology. It demonstrates how one of the beginnings, if seen from this point of view, may be understood as the truth about the other, and how the figure of the lawmaker specifically reveals the text as torn apart by contradictory internal tendencies. (shrink)

Most scholars who write on social contract and classical natural law perceive an irreconcilable tension between them. Social contract theory is widely considered the political-theoretic concomitant of modern philosophy. Against the regnant view, The Social Contract in the Ruins, argues that all attempts to ground political authority and obligation in agreement alone are logically self-defeating. Political authority and obligation require an antecedent moral ground. But this moral ground cannot be constructed by human agreement or created by sheer will-human or divine. (...) All accounts of morality as constructed or made collapse into self-referential incoherence. Only an uncreated, real good can coherently ground political authority and obligation or the proposition that rightful government depends on the consent of the governed. Government by consent requires classical natural law for its very coherence. (shrink)

In January 2023, Moderna announced its intent to increase the price of the COVID-19 vaccine it co-developed with the National Institutes of Health (NIH) by 400%. The federal government should pressure Moderna to change course and resume buying doses for all Americans, leveraging its purchasing power to obtain a fair price.

Social contract theory enjoys a long history in moral and political philosophy. Since the European Enlightenment, social contract theory has become one of the most important traditions in moral and political philosophy. This chapter provides a brief introduction to central concepts in social contract theory and their development over time. Most importantly, the chapter clarifies some of the distinct features of new approaches to social contract theory (or “new social contract theory” for short) that have evolved in the twenty-first century (...) and are most suitable for capturing the circumstances of contemporary societies, even if new social contract theory does not constitute a unified theoretical position but is best considered as a family of approaches, methods, and topics. The chapter also provides an overview of the contributions to this book and their connections both methodologically and thematically. (shrink)

Ideal theory in social and political philosophy generally works to hide philosophical theories’ complicity in sustaining the structural violence and maintenance of white supremacy that are foundational to settler colonial societies. While non-ideal theory can provide a corrective to some of ideal theory’s intended omissions, it can also work to conceal the same systems of violence that ideal theory does, especially when framed primarily as a response to ideal theory. This article takes a decolonial approach to exploring the limitations of (...) non-ideal theory in its ability to respond to and redress the continuing harms done to Indigenous peoples by settler colonialism, including by outlining non-ideal theory’s relationship to a colonial politics of recognition. (shrink)

The article`s goal is to enlighten modern philosophy projects polivariance on example of social contract concept and its critique in England in the first half of XVIIIth. c. Due to marxist philosophical methodology in Ukrainian literature this theme was not properly enlightened. The author considers, firstly, George Barkley as an author of rational-theological argument. This argument provides support from nature`s laws and God`s will. Secondly, David Hume that offered arguments: 1) ontological, 2) anthropological, and 3) politic-juridical. Hence, the author enlightens (...) positions that were not previously properly analyzed nor classified due to nature of historico-philosophical methodology. (shrink)

RESUMEN El siguiente ensayo tiene como objetivo delimitar los argumentos bases que dan origen a la teoría política conocida como atomismo. Para ello será necesario hacer un análisis de sus orígenes en las proposiciones del contrato social, así como de las razones por las cuales se considera al individuo como autosuficiente, para luego ver cómo esto mismo les da un fundamento a los derechos de esta índole. Ello nos demostrará la importancia de replantear estos argumentos, si es que hacen posible (...) la convivencia entre otros, y cómo es que un sistema que requiera de mayor cooperación es contrario al atomismo político. Finalmente, se verán las implicaciones contradictorias y los elementos que juegan en contra de formar parte de este pensamiento, sobre todo en su forma radical. -/- ABSTRACT The following essay aims to delimit the basic arguments that give rise to the political theory known as atomism. To do so, it will be necessary to analyze its origins in the propositions of the social contract, the reasons why the individual is considered as self-su-fficient, and then see how this gives a foundation to the rights of this kind. This will demonstrate the importance of rethinking these arguments if they make coexistence among others possible and how a system that requires greater cooperation is contrary to political atomism. Finally, we will see the contradictory implications and the elements that play against being part of this thought, especially in its radical form. (shrink)

Cooperative relations steeped in honesty and good faith are a necessity for any viable society. This is especially relevant to the police institution because the police are entrusted to promote justice and security. Despite the necessity of societal honesty and good faith, the police institution has embraced deception, dishonesty, and bad faith as tools of the trade for providing security. In fact, it seems that providing security is impossible without using deception and dishonesty during interrogations, undercover operations, pretextual detentions, and (...) other common scenarios. This presents a paradox related to the erosion of public faith in the police institution and the weakening of the police's legitimacy. -/- The book seeks to solve this puzzle by showing that many of our assumptions about policing and security are unjustified. Specifically, they are unjustified in the way many of our assumptions about security were unjustified after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, when state institutions embraced a variety of brutal rules and tactics in pursuit of perceived security enhancements. The police are likewise unjustified in their pursuit of many supposed security enhancements that rely on proactive deception, dishonesty, and bad faith. -/- There are compelling reasons to think that the police's widespread use of proactive deception and dishonesty is inconsistent with fundamental norms of political morality regarding fraud and the rule of law. Although there are times and places for such tactics in policing, those times and places should be much more limited than current practices suggest. (shrink)

The authors of the article aim to show the ideological and historical origins of the idea of a social contract, as well as the fundamental difference between the modern version of the social contract and its historical predecessors. By distinguishing between the synodal and contractual principles of integration, the authors conclude that the social contract is not a purely modern political idea. The contractual principle as the basis of the organization and legitimization of power was systematically developed already in the (...) XIII-XIV centuries, taking the form of a socio-political program in the theory of the cathedral governance of the church. In contrast to medieval concepts, the modern social contract is not a consequence of God's established order, but the will of human individuals. Due to this determination of will, individuals limit their natural freedom for the sake of the possibility and good of common existence. (shrink)

As far as we know, humans are unique in our remarkable ability to cooperate and learn from one another. This requires explanation, not just because it is very striking, but also because it is centr...

The idea that society is a cooperative venture has been used by contractualists, contractarians, and deliberative democrats to justify the burdens of society to each member. In such a cooperative venture, those who benefit from society owe a contribution and those who contribute are owed benefits. Even though this idea is quite intuitive, there are deep disagreements about what makes society cooperative. Some focus on acts of production, others on fair interaction, and still others on the intention to contribute to (...) shared projects. In this article, I show where this kind of disagreement causes problems in current debates, and I defend one conception of social cooperation as uniquely best. Specifically, I argue that the relevant acts that make society a cooperative venture are acts of institutional rule-following. Society is a cooperative venture because people cooperate with one another by following the rules of our basic institutions. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview of recent work in experimental political philosophy. It begins with a brief discussion of methodology: unlike many areas of experimental philosophy, experimentalists in political philosophy often draw on laboratory protocols from economics and forgo questionnaires and vignettes. The chapter then turns to recent experimental work on the social contract and suggest further avenues for exploration.

This paper demonstrates how ideology plays a major, but previously neglected role in Rousseau's treatment of politics in the Social Contract. Specifically, it shows how a number of key elements in his line of argument come close to ideology criticism as it is conceived in Louis Althusser's theory of ideological state apparatuses. This is the case not just in relation to the distinction between general will and particular will, but also in relation to such concepts as property and social contract. (...) However, the paper also demonstrates how this pre-Marxist understanding of ideology co-exists in the text with a different and more primitive understanding of ideology which is incompatible with Marxism and which points back to Rousseau's previous discourse on the origins of inequality. The paper concludes that while there are definitely elements in Rousseau's text which point toward a future development of the theme of ideology in Marxist theory, the Social Contract on the whole is characterized by heterogeneity on this topic. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the non-reciprocity problem does not apply to intergenerational justice. Future generations impact, here and now, on the well-being of people now living. I firstly illustrate the economic-synchronic model of direct intergenerational reciprocity (DIR): future generations allow people now living to maintain the economic system future-oriented and capital-preserving. The rational choice for people now living is to guarantee transgenerational sufficiency to future generations. I then analyse the axiological-synchronic model of DIR: future generations give meaning and (...) value to many of the activities that people now living carry out, and this is a compelling reason for the latter to worry about the former. I argue that only the economic-synchronic model of DIR can consistently explain why we need future generations. I conclude by discussing the limits of indirect intergenerational reciprocity. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Some scholars tend to argue that Black marginality is due largely to the exclusion of Blacks from meaningful economic participation as well as generalized social exclusions. This, owing to the division of the world’s populations along a racial hierarchy on the one hand, and in geopolitical terms along the dichotomy of Metropoles and dependencies. While there have been some cosmetic changes, particularly in relation to the complexion of the ruling personnel in the aftermath of Independence, the view adopted here (...) is that the colonial structure remains largely intact. This is because the material base of colonial countries or regions remains fundamentally predisposed toward satisfying the economic interest of industrialized Western powers, the former colonizers. The argument advanced here therefore, is that such marginality is due not from exclusions per se but rather from inclusion albeit only as junior, and therefore inferior, partners. So at the root of the problem is the problem of “white supremacy,” which establishes and maintains asymmetrical relations between the races. This system underlies as it underpins the standard contract and thus functions as a clandestine and unofficial political system. The article thus delves into the social contract theory, particularly the works of Charles Mills and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, with the view of ascertaining how their ideas help us understand the modern world in terms of race relations. Furthermore, Walter Rodney’s concept of “white power” is appropriated as it provides a useful framework within which to understand the white power complex. (shrink)

This article examines social contract theory in the Anthropocene. Past and current social contract theories have a narrowly conceived conception of human that pits humans against nonhumans. This article suggests new parameters for a social contract for the Anthropocene, which has as its focus humans, animals, and nature. Based on the thinking of Brian Elliott, this article suggests that a politics of environmental catastrophe will not encourage the adoption of a post- or more-than human social contract. Instead, political engagement must (...) focus on the relationship between capitalism and climate change in order to create new economic, political and social systems. (shrink)