Military Air Tactics

After decades of increasingly rapid offensive maneuver, the Russo-Ukraine war is characterized by World War I-style attrition. The enemy can now detect the slightest movements and attack without notice, resulting in a battlefront locked into defensive strongholds with “soldiers buried in trenches, where even personnel rotations and medical evacuations have become perilous.” This is the result of three main developments. The first is small tactical drones, which are used to target military forces and equipment across air, land, and sea—and even fight other drones. The second is electronic warfare, which now encompasses tracing, jamming, and even taking over drone signals. It enabled an enemy to target back and eliminate specialized, difficult-to-replace crews. And the third is remote-controlled sensors of varying complexity. Generously deployed in contested but undefended “white spaces,” they create protective buffers preventing the enemy from sneaking through. https://lnkd.in/exVA6D7Z

"Vladimir Putin has the old Politburo to thank for the huge stockpiles of weapons that were built up during the cold war. Soviet leaders knew that Western military kit was much more advanced than their own, so they opted for mass, churning out thousands of armoured vehicles in peacetime in case of war. When the then defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, boasted in December 2023 that 1,530 tanks had been delivered in the course of the year, he omitted to say that nearly 85% of them were not new tanks but old ones that had been taken out of storage and given a wash and brush-up. Since the invasion, about 175 reasonably modern t-90m tanks have been sent to the front line. As those numbers dwindle, production of newly built t-90ms this year might be no more than 28. Pavel Luzin, an expert on Russian military capacity at the Washington-based Centre for European Policy Analysis, reckons that Russia can build only 30 brand-new tanks a year. Mr Luzin reckons that Russia’s ability to build new tanks or infantry fighting vehicles, or even to refurbish old ones, is hampered by the difficulty of getting components. Stores of components for tank production that before the war were intended for use in 2025 have already been raided, while crucial equipment, such as fuel-heaters for diesel engines, high-voltage electrical systems and infrared thermal imaging to identify targets, were all previously imported from Europe and their sale is now blocked by sanctions. The lack of high-quality ball bearings is also a constraint. Chinese alternatives are sometimes available, but are said not to meet former quality standards. Furthermore, the old Soviet armaments supply chain no longer exists. Ukraine, Georgia and East Germany were all important centres of weapons and components manufacture. Ironically, Kharkiv was the main producer of turrets for t-72 tanks. The number of workers in the military-industrial complex has also fallen dramatically. Another major concern is artillery-barrel production. For now, with the help of North Korea, Russia appears to have enough shells. But the downside of such high rates of fire has been the wear and tear on barrels. Yet, says Mr Luzin, there are only two factories that have the sophisticated Austrian-made rotary forging machines needed to make the barrels. They can each produce only around 100 barrels a year, compared with the thousands needed. Russia has never made its own forging machines; they imported them from America in the 1930s and looted them from Germany after the war. The solution has been to cannibalise the barrels from old towed artillery and fit them to self-propelled howitzers. Richard Vereker, an open-source analyst, thinks that by the start of this year about 4,800 barrels had been swapped out. How long the Russians can carry on doing this depends on the condition of the 7,000 or so that may be left" From https://lnkd.in/dVCR7HbD

#Russia deliberately operates in a legal grey zone where cyberattacks are rarely treated as acts of aggression under international law unless they cause immediate physical destruction or casualties. As long as there are no visible victims, the response remains restrained. #Moscow understands this perfectly. And exploits it. At the Kyiv International Cyber Resilience Forum, Serhii Demediuk, Chairman of the Board at the Institute of Cyber Warfare Research, articulated something that should concern every cybersecurity professional and FIMI expert in the EU and the United States. Instead of a single spectacular strike, Russia applies what can be described as a “thousand cuts” strategy: persistent, accumulative, and often deniable cyber operations that gradually exhaust resilience, erode public trust, and test political red lines. #Europe has already experienced multiple examples of this approach. On the day of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the KA-SAT/Viasat satellite network was disrupted in an attack publicly attributed to Russia and condemned by the #EU; the incident affected several EU member states and demonstrated how quickly civilian infrastructure can be collateral damage. In 2023, #Denmark’s energy sector reported coordinated intrusions affecting more than twenty energy companies, with investigations pointing to activity associated with the GRU-linked Sandworm group. In 2024, #Germany and #Czech Republic publicly attributed malicious cyber activities to APT28 (also linked to the Russian #GRU), warning that the same actor targeted government entities and critical infrastructure operators across Europe. What makes the current phase even more concerning is the evolution toward a “double strike” tactic. Cyber operations increasingly occur alongside synchronized information attacks. The technical disruption is paired with amplified narratives exaggerating scale and impact. This was designed to intimidate, create panic, and undermine confidence in institutions. Even when the technical damage is limited, the psychological and political effects can be far more significant. This fusion of #cyber operations and #information manipulation is not accidental; it is strategic. A more coordinated and assertive approach to attribution, consequences, and integrated cyber-information response is essential. Russia is not merely probing systems. It is probing resolve.

Contrary to popular opinion, the Russian military is a thinking and adaptive institution. One example of adaptation was the transition from the Battalion Tactical Group model to WWI-style assault groups with smaller groups that could attack Ukrainian positions while remaining dispersed to mitigate the effects of drones and artillery. By no means have large company-size attacks seized altogether, but they have diminished significantly. In this document, the commander of the 8th Guards Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District), Lt. Gen Anashlin, discusses the merits of creating Storm "Z" units. Here are five key takeaways: 1.     Formation of "Z" Companies: The proposal outlines creating "Z" assault companies, composed of volunteers and prisoners, to bolster the Russian forces and undertake high-risk combat operations in urban and challenging terrain.  2.     Objectives and Tactics: These companies are tasked with capturing critical infrastructure, conducting sabotage, and eliminating Ukrainian resistance. This indicates a shift towards smaller, more agile units focused on specific objectives, possibly in response to the limitations of larger formations and the Ukrainian use of drones and artillery. 3.     Personnel Challenges: The document highlights the reliance on a "special contingent" of volunteers, including prisoners. This points to the challenges Russia faced in maintaining troop levels and the controversial recruitment of convicts. 4.     Emphasis on Training: Despite the urgency, the proposal emphasizes the need for 10-15 training days for these companies, focusing on restoring basic combat skills and coordination. This underscores the varying levels of experience and training within these units. 5.     Medical and Logistical Concerns: The proposal also addresses these companies' medical evacuation and logistical support, acknowledging the high casualty rates and potential difficulties in providing adequate care and supplies. This proposal, while being from 2023, reflects the Russian military's adaptation to the realities of the war in Ukraine. The creation of "Z" companies, reliance on unconventional recruitment, and focus on urban warfare tactics highlight the challenges and adjustments made by the Russian forces. This document provides a glimpse into the operational and logistical difficulties encountered by the Russian army, further emphasizing the complex and evolving nature of the conflict. For those interested in this topic, Michael Kofman wrote an excellent report on Russian adaptation in 2023, covering these Storm Companies for Carnegie Endowment. The link is below. As always, if you want a copy of the Russian or a translated copy, send me a message. Sources: https://lnkd.in/e_GDZ63u https://lnkd.in/ey-QRh6d

📉 Russia is not out of tanks yet, but its armored force is being steadily hollowed out faster than it can be rebuilt. Since 2022, independent #OSINT trackers and satellite analysts have documented thousands of Russian tank losses, destroyed, captured, or abandoned. A significant portion of those losses involved newer and more capable platforms, which are the hardest and slowest to replace. Russian industry cannot keep pace. Most current output is refurbishment, not new production. Best estimates put annual output at only a few hundred tanks at most, many rebuilt from older hulls with downgraded optics and simplified protection. That rate does not match wartime attrition. 🚽 To fill the gap, Russia has been draining its tank boneyards. Satellite imagery shows long term storage sites steadily emptying. Early in the war, Russia could pull usable vehicles. Now, what remains is increasingly older, incomplete, or mechanically worn, with many hulls stripped for parts over decades. That is why T-64s have returned and even T-55s from the 1950s are appearing. We saw a T-54 blown up just last week. These tanks lack modern fire control, night optics, and protection against today’s anti tank weapons. Many are used for static defense or indirect fire, not modern maneuver warfare. 🔍 The trend is clear. Russia is trading survivability and quality for availability. Older tanks are easier to field but far more vulnerable to #drones, precision munitions, and infantry anti armor systems. At the same time, losses of trained crews, maintainers, and spare parts compound the damage. This is not collapse, but it is long term degradation. Russia can keep fighting by burning through finite reserves, but its ability to regenerate a modern #military force while the war continues is steadily eroding. Supporting #Ukraine matters, because attrition favors the side that adapts faster and preserves its people. - Insights by CDR Brad Crawford

Talk of a “major spring offensive” by Russia should be assessed calmly, without panic. Russia has the resources to continue the war into 2026, but those resources are becoming more expensive and lower in quality. This is reflected in assessments by Jamestown Foundation, Institute for the Study of War, and Royal United Services Institute, as well as in economic and mobilization indicators. The Kremlin relies on mass contract recruitment, high compensation payments, and shifting the budget toward the defense sector. However, this mainly replaces losses rather than forming new high-quality strike forces. The logic is simple: the more intense the fighting, the faster manpower degrades. This is classic attrition warfare. A “large-scale offensive” is therefore more likely to mean a series of localized attacks rather than a deep breakthrough. Small tactical groups, flanking maneuvers, wave assaults, pressure on logistics, and constant psychological strain — this is how Russia compensates for shortages of trained infantry and mid-level commanders. Units are exhausted, the officer corps has been depleted, and logistics remain vulnerable to drones and precision strikes. Modern battlefield transparency makes large force concentrations extremely risky. This does not mean there is no threat. It means the Kremlin is betting on a prolonged war — counting on demography, fear, energy leverage, and information operations. The goal is to convince the West that Russia can fight longer than democracies are willing to support Ukraine. The real battle is for political will and public resilience. Information pressure is already visible: narratives about an “inevitable breakthrough,” “spring catastrophe,” or “Western fatigue.” The aim is panic and division. Russia can apply pressure, but its costs rise every month — in manpower, budget strain, and dependence on Iran, North Korea, and China. Its resources are significant, but not unlimited. Ukraine’s task is clear: hold the line, strike logistics and defense industry targets, expand domestic production, and protect unity. Spring 2026 will be difficult — but not fatal if resolve and allied cohesion remain strong. In this war, endurance matters more than rhetoric.

𝗥𝘂𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗮 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘄 𝗽𝘂𝘀𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮 𝗦𝘁𝘆𝗿𝗼𝗳𝗼𝗮𝗺 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗰𝗲𝗽𝘁𝗼𝗿 𝗱𝗿𝗼𝗻𝗲 At first glance, it sounds almost absurd. A drone interceptor reportedly made largely from cheap Styrofoam, armed with a hand grenade, and intended to destroy much more expensive Ukrainian UAVs. But that is precisely why the reported Russian 𝗦𝗼𝗸𝗼𝗹-𝗜 concept matters in the #UkraineWar. ⚠️ According to Russian reporting and pro-Russian channels, KBP “Polet” has developed a very low-cost interceptor drone designed around brutal wartime logic: • minimal materials   • minimal electronics   • low unit cost   • acceptable performance against higher-value aerial targets Reportedly, the system includes: • camera   • battery   • minimal onboard electronics   • fixed-wing layout   • hand-grenade-based warhead The reported performance figures are also notable: • speed — up to 𝟭𝟱𝟬 𝗸𝗺/𝗵   • altitude — up to 𝟱 𝗸𝗺 Whether every claim is accurate or not, the broader trend is real. Modern #DroneWarfare is increasingly rewarding systems that are not elegant, but expendable, scalable, and cheap enough to trade favorably against the target. That is the key point. If a very low-cost interceptor can reliably destroy reconnaissance drones such as SHARK, Leleka, Chaklun, or similar platforms, then the economics of the aerial fight start to shift. ⚙️ This is not about sophistication. It is about cost-imposition. The side that can field acceptable interceptors in large numbers may gradually force the other side to spend more for every successful sortie. In that sense, even a crude-looking foam interceptor deserves attention. Because in attritional drone warfare, the question is often not which system is most advanced. It is which one is cheap enough to be used without hesitation. 𝘐𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘥𝘳𝘰𝘯𝘦 𝘸𝘢𝘳, 𝘤𝘳𝘶𝘥𝘦 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘤𝘩𝘦𝘢𝘱 𝘤𝘢𝘯 𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘭𝘭 𝘣𝘦 𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘨𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘺 𝘥𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘴.

https://lnkd.in/enbWNz8B The Rise of Low-Cost, Long-Range Attack Drones: A New Era of Firepower In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, one weapon stands out for its cost-effectiveness: the Shahed drone. Launched in mass salvos, these Iranian-made drones have become a cornerstone of Russia’s strategy. At an estimated cost of just $35,000 each, the Shahed carries a 40 kg payload over 2,000 km, targeting Ukraine’s critical infrastructure while overwhelming air defenses. 📊 Despite hitting less than 10% of the time, the Shahed’s true power lies in attrition. The sheer volume of drones forces Ukraine to burn through resources, making it harder to sustain air defense systems. From September to December 2024, Russia launched more Shaheds than in the previous 23 months combined, demonstrating their growing reliance on these drones. 🔍 A recent study by CSIS and the University of Texas highlights the Shahed’s cost-effectiveness, making it the cheapest and most persistent weapon in Russia’s arsenal. This new form of warfare—one that relies not just on precision but on mass and saturation—forces defenders to make tough decisions, such as whether to waste expensive missiles on low-cost drones or save them for higher-priority targets. ⚔️ The lesson is clear: low-cost, long-range attack drones are here to stay, and the U.S. and its allies must adapt. The future of warfare may not be about precision alone, but about overwhelming massed swarms of low-cost threats. #MilitaryInnovation #DroneWarfare #DefenseStrategy #CostEffectiveWeapons

On the frontlines, Ukrainian soldiers use a graphic term to describe the Russian tactics they face daily. They call them "meat assaults": waves of Russian soldiers coming at their defensive positions, sometimes nearly a dozen times in a day. Lt Col Anton Bayev of the Khartia Brigade of Ukraine’s National Guard says wave after wave can arrive in just a few hours at front-line positions north of Kharkiv. “The Russians use these units in most cases purely to see where our firing equipment is located, and to constantly exhaust our units,” he said. “Our guys stand in positions and fight, and when four or five waves of the enemy come at you in a day, which you have to destroy without end, it is very difficult - not only physically, but also psychologically.” This tactic has led to staggering Russian casualties since Moscow launched its latest offensive two months ago. Around 1,200 Russian soldiers were being killed or wounded every day in May and June, the highest rate since the beginning of the war, according to Western officials. Note: The only way Russia has found to gain any ground is by senselessly slaughtering its own soldiers

Understanding the Russian Force Posture in Ukraine (Aug-15 to Sep 5, 2025) Russia used this period to consolidate combat power on the Pokrovsk-Dobropillia axis while sustaining pressure across adjacent sectors. Following gains at the start of August, Russian formations rotated assault elements, thickened artillery groupings, and pushed additional EW assets forward. The posture shift signals preparation for renewed, stepwise penetrations rather than a single breakthrough. Command narratives emphasized an uninterrupted offensive tempo to project initiative and deter Ukrainian counteraction, even as the front remained highly contested. Russian units tested Ukrainian lines with small infiltration groups and company-sized armored thrusts northeast of Rodynske toward key road links feeding Kramatorsk. These pushes created narrow salients and momentary footholds but proved difficult to expand under counterbattery fire and rapid Ukrainian reinforcement. Ukrainians leveraged mobile reserves, dispersed firing points, and loitering munitions to blunt advances before they could harden into encirclement threats. While so, Russia intensified long-range strikes designed to erode air defenses, disrupt logistics, and generate civilian strain. Multi-axis salvos combining drones with cruise and ballistic missiles targeted energy facilities, rail nodes, and urban areas over successive nights. Interceptions reduced but did not eliminate damage; outages and emergency repairs multiplied, and civil authorities faced growing displacement pressures. Ukrainians responded by expanding its own deep-strike campaign against fuel, storage, and command infrastructure to raise costs on Russian redeployments and complicate staging toward the Donetsk front. Russian electronic warfare coverage suppressed Ukrainian reconnaissance drones and challenged precision fires, while minefields and field fortifications slowed counterattacks. Ukraine adapted with layered drone interception, counter EW tactics, and tighter fire control against artillery batteries and logistics clusters. Neither side demonstrated the headroom for rapid maneuver; instead, both optimized for attrition, force protection, and denial of operational freedom. All while Russians extend their operational depth by creating a deeper and expandable EW sphere in order to extend their effective strike range. The idea is to slowly erode Ukrainian drone capabilities and to suppress the elastic defense support mechanisms for the Ukrainian defensive lines. The most likely course is continued grinding assaults aimed at incremental bites, followed by consolidation under heavy artillery and EW cover. Ukrainian responsiveness and precision strikes have constrained Russian exploitation, but the concentration of troops and guns along the Pokrovsk approach preserves the risk of a sudden local breach if reserves are misaligned or interdicted especially if the Russian EW sphere and effective strike range is increased.